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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518
Seoul, ROK
1 June 19XX
CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX
PEACETIME CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERESTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA
REFERENCES:
a. “Status of Forces Agreement, UNITED STATES of AMERICA and the REPUBLIC of SOUTH
KOREA,” 1 June 19WW.
b. Area Study, “THE REPUBLIC of SOUTH KOREA.”
c. “South East Asia Treaty Organization”, ” (SEATO) 1948.
d. CFC, Order of Battle (CINC OB).
e. Map, NIMA series,
WGS-84, series L654, KOREA, sheets
3118,3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3218, 3219, 3220, 3221, 3222,3318,
3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3515,
3516, 3517,3518, 3519, 3520, 3521, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3715,
3716, 3717, 3815, 3816,and 3817, 3915, 3916, 3917, 4016, 4017,
edition 001-KAMC, scale 1:100,000.
f. Map, NIMA, series L654, sheet reference e, scale 1:1,000,000.
g. Datum used throughout this OPLAN is WGS84.
TASK ORGANIZATION. Refer to Annex A, this OPLAN.
1. Situation
a. General
(1) North Korea’s military strategy is primarily concerned with an offensive against South
Korea and defense against a counterattack. Pyongyang has created the most militarized peacetime
society in the world today, diverting tremendous investment resources away from productive sectors of the
economy. The North Korean Army remains largely an infantry army adapted to peninsular conditions and
employs infantry tactics developed during the Korean war. North Korean Army tactical doctrine has always
emphasized surprise, firepower, mobility, and strong armor and artillery components to meet these needs.
(2) South Korea has a moderately large standing Army with strength of 633,000, divided
into 22 divisions, which are again divided into 65 brigades. The army is currently over extended protecting
key installations and facilities from DPRK SOF attacks. The Republic of Korea government remains
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supportive of the international community and US interests in eliminating the threat of attack by DPRK military
forces, but South Korea is unable to adequately protect itself from attack by DPRK military forces.
b. Area of Concern
(1) Area of Responsibility. The Area of Responsibility can be defined as the sea, land,
and air space specified by the following: The Yellow sea area, Sea of Japan, and Pacific Ocean area,
and the land, sea, and airspace of the REPUBLICS of South Korea and Japan.
(2) Area of Interest. The Northern and Southern regions of South Korea and other Asian
countries where population and elected officials support the North Korean military by providing military
supplies, transportation, or other related support operations.
(3) Theater of Operations. The Theater of Operations is comprised of multiple areas of
operations within the REPUBLIC OF South Korea. The first is defined as Tactical Operations Areas 1, 2,
and 3. The center of each TOA is the MDL with a two hundred-mile diameter radius. The second is the
cities and airports identified in this OPLAN as non-combatant evacuation sites
c. Deterrent Options
(1) CFC conducts military operations to deter the DPRK military forces acts of war and
aggression. Upon arrival in the Joint Operations Area in Phase II (Establish Intermediate Staging Bases),
JTF Korea begins planning and conducting military operations in support of CFC’s flexible deterrent
options. JTF Korea will establish liaison with South Korean Government, Military Forces, and National
Police in order to ensure a cohesive deterrence and defense effort. Throughout the (Decisive Combat
and Lodgment) and (Follow-Through) Phases, JTF Korea will maintain a careful balance between combat
military operations and demonstrating US and South Korea resolve. Force protection measures will
center on countering of the North Korean military force superior numbers. Collection efforts will focuses
on those indicators that provide early warning and reduce ambiguity regarding the North Korea’s
intentions. This will provide JTF Korea the opportunity to respond proactively as well as reactively. JTF
Korea’s Information Operations will emphasize themes of US/South Korea resolve to protect both
countries citizens and property; the legitimacy of the mission. Additionally, JTF Korea will gain and
maintain dominance of the Electro-magnetic spectrum, emphasizing the supporting nature of US
involvement and the futility of North Korea’s aggression. JTF Korea will also undertake Civil Affairs efforts
aimed at ensuring continued Host-Nation support of the operation at the governmental and population
levels.
(2) The capstone event to deter further warfare aggression is decisive strikes against the
North Korea’s UGFs, industrial capacity, leadership, and WMD locations, which will make clear the
overwhelming capabilities of US/South Korea’s Military Forces’ ability to be victorious. During Phase IV
(Lodgment and Follow-Through), all forces will continue combat operations to unseat current North
Korean leadership to reinforce the message that US/South Korea Military forces are prepared to continue
decisive combat operations until victory is achieved. Throughout Phases IV and V, JTF Korea's actions
will attempt to resolve potential additional crises short of confrontation, but will be ready to execute military
options to protect US citizens, property, and interests in the Joint Operations Area.
d. Enemy Forces
(1) Refer to Annex B, this OPLAN.
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(3) The DPRK military forces have been increasingly aggressive in their reconnaissance
activities and the intensity of their military training as conventional, small to medium size, operational units
is evident. There has been a build-up of North Koreas military forces along the MDL and deployment of
the Taep Dong at three new operational sites.
(3) Although there is no known support from outside Governments, the DPRK operatives
have been able to acquire state of the art technology, lazer weapons, and other military related supplies
across international borders and through ports. Some South Korea military armories have been
successfully raided.
(4) DPRK military forces do not possess a level of sophistication to match that of CFC or
JTF South Korea, but is larger than the ROK Army does. They have twice as many active uniformed
personnel and main battle tanks, five times as many self-propelled artillery pieces, air defenses suites that
dwarf South Korean analogues, plus many more submarines, torpedo boats, and anti-ship missile craft
(5) Centers of Gravity
(a) The enemy’s strategic center of gravity is the leadership.
(b) The enemy’s operational center of gravity is the military force’s ability to
conduct operational combat for a limited duration.
e. Friendly Forces
(1) Centers of Gravity
(a) The friendly theater strategic center of gravity is the South Korea, capital city
of Seoul, and support from the United Nations, SEATO, and support for US intervention and combat
operations.
(b) The friendly operational center of gravity is force protection.
(2) Relationships with Internal and Foreign Nations and Organizations.
(a) “Status of Forces Agreement, UNITED STATES of AMERICA and the
REPUBLIC of SOUTH KOREA,” 1 June 19WW.
(b) “Mutual Defense Treaty, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and the REPUBLIC
of JAPAN,” 1 June 19WW.
(c) “South East Asia Treaty Organization,” (SEATO) 1948.
(3) South Korea Armed Forces
(a) Army. South Korea has a moderately large standing Army with strength of
633,000, divided into 22 divisions, which are again divided into 65 brigades. The army is currently over
extended protecting key installations and facilities from DPRK SOF attacks. The Republic of Korea
government remains supportive of the international community and US interests in eliminating the threat of
attack by DPRK military forces, but South Korea is unable to adequately protect itself from attack by DPRK
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military forces. The South Korean Military High Command uses its Twelve and Seventeen Corps, and
other home defense units, to protect key governmental installations, local infrastructure, and personnel
throughout the country. Its Field Armies are conducting a long-running operations along the MDL. The
Special Operation Command, by direction of the South Korean Government, is equipped to provide limited
assistance to US military operations.
(b) Air Force. The Air Force is fully committed to be integrated into the ACC air
campaign and maintain a joint headquarters with the ACC Commander.
(c) Navy. The Navy has three fleets. One on the Yellow sea side, southern
Pacific coast area, and one on the sea of Japan side. All are heavily involved in coastal patrols. Their
primary mission is to interdict the DPRK’s SOF insertion operations in support of its military forces. Seas
and air insertion are the principal means the DPRK attempt to supply its forces. Its Naval Infantry brigade,
in conjunction with the South Korean Army, is being used to safeguard ports on both coasts and along the
inland waterways.
(d) Special Operations Forces. The Republic of South Korea has eight brigades
of special operations forces, which typically work closely with the National Police and other special forces
elements of the CFC in combat operations. It is well equipped and trained in small unit jungle operations
and long range surveillance.
(4) The following commands and agencies will support operations as indicated.
(a) Department of State (DOS)
1. Obtain use of foreign bases, over flight rights, and transit rights, as
required, and establish Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) in the Joint Operations Area.
2. Seek political advocacy of other nations in the region to effect
assistance in combating military forces.
3. Initiate political and diplomatic activity to gain international supportincluding the United Nations and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) for economic
sanctions and possible military support.
4. Assist in the arrangement of host nation support.
5. Identify military assistance requirements for Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations (NEO).
6. Provide guidance and direct the evacuation of US citizens and other
qualified nationals in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
(b) USPACCOM
1. Provide forces and logistics support as requested by CFC.
2. Provide search and rescue operations outside the JTF Korea Joint
Operations Area.
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3.
Conduct amphibious operations outside the JTF Korea Joint
Operations Area, to include security of Sea Lines of Communications, countermine operations (if
required), and maritime intercept operations (if required).
4. Conduct Antisubmarine Warfare Operations outside the JTF Korea
Joint Operations Area, as required.
(c) USTRANSCOM
1. Provide strategic airlift and sealift forces and closure estimates for
deploying forces.
2. Assist in deployment and redeployment planning and schedule
strategic airlift and sealift for deploying forces.
3. Provide Noncombatant Evacuation airlift and sealift.
(d) USSOCOM
1. Provide forces and logistics support as required by JTF Korea.
2. Prepare to implement SOF operations in support of JTF Korea.
3. Provide liaison and/or training teams and strategic reconnaissance
elements as required.
(e) USSPACECOM.
ensure US access to space-based resources.
Provide support as requested by COMJTF Korea and
(f) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Provide strategic, operational, and tactical
area intelligence.
(g) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Provide strategic and operational
intelligence on the REPUBLIC of South Korea and border nations concerning guerrilla activities and force
structure.
(h) National Security Agency (NSA). Provide SIGINT support.
(i)
Joint Deployment Community (JDC). Provide logistics planning, eployment
planning, and execution.
(j) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Coordinate
activities with deployed US forces and support as directed by US Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission,
REPUBLIC of South Korea.
(k) United States Information Agency (USIA). Influence world and regional public
attitudes about US foreign policy objectives in the REPUBLIC OF South Korea.
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(l) Department of Justice (DOJ).
Coordinate disposition of international
legal issues and provide advisory assistance surrounding JTF Korea’s mission requirements in the
REPUBLIC of South Korea.
(m) United States Drug Enforcement Administration (USDEA). Provide liaison
and intelligence based on contacts in the REPUBLIC of South Korea and throughout the southeast asia
region.
(n) Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC). Provide planning,
forces, and assessment.
f. Assumptions
(1) Governments of United Nations members will assist South Korea Military forces in
restoration of MDL and South Korea areas controlled by the DPRK ‘s military forces.
(2) South Korea Military forces will not be able to secure key installations, facilities,
APODs/SPODs, and protect American citizens.
(3) DPRK elements inside South Korea will continue their support of terrorism and
assination of key public officials.
(4) Nations outside the region will not intervene either for or against South Korea with
their own armed forces.
(5)
Operations Area.
US air forces will be able to establish and maintain air supremacy in the Joint
(6) The South Korea Government can provide only limited host nation support.
(7) The degree of mobilization assumed to support this OPLAN: Presidential Selective
Reserve Call-Up (PSRC).
g. Legal Considerations
(1) Operations will comply with the Law of Armed Conflict and references an and c, of
this OPLAN.
(2) The threat of invasion or invasion by DPRK military forces, request by the
Government of South Korea and for US military assistance and the threat to US citizens and key
installations and property, are the reasons for implementation of CFC OPLAN 9518X-XX.
(3) Captured high ranking officers of the North Korean military forces will be transferred
to the custody of the South Korean Government. Captured personnel will remain in the custody of US
Forces if it is believed they will be mistreated. Commanders shall coordinate with their supporting Staff
Judge Advocate before transfer of custody. North Korea military force members will be afforded Enemy
Prisoner of War (EPW) status by US Military Forces until transfer of custody to South Korean
Government, National Police, or military officials.
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(4) Jurisdiction over civilian common criminal personnel remains with the local courts of
South Korea. As expeditiously as practical, custody of non-US civilian personnel will be transferred to
local authorities.
(5) Captured weapons, munitions, documents, and equipment will not be transferred to
the custody of the South Korean Government, Military Forces, or National Police until transfer authority
has been provided by the US Department of Justice or their designated representatives.
(6) Captured chemicals, WMD and significant tactical equipment, and highly classified
documents will not be transferred to the custody of the South Korean Government until authority has been
provided by the US Department of Justice, DOD, or their designated representatives.
2. Mission. When directed, CINCKorea in coordination with the Government of South Korea conducts
military operations to protect US interests and assist the Government of South Korea.
3. Execution
a. Concept of Operations. NCA through CJCS, directs CINCKorea to execute OPLAN 9518XXX. CINCKorea assigns US ARMY Korea (USARKOREA) the mission to form Joint Task Force Korea
and discharge specified planning and mission requirements. The operation is envisioned in 5 phases: (1)
Prehostilities: Alert and Staging, (2) Establish Intermediate Staging Bases, (3) Decisive Combat, (4)
Lodgment and Follow-Through, (5) Posthostilities and Redeployment. Phases may overlap and are
condition based.
(1) Commander’s Intent. My purpose in conducting operations in the Joint Operations
Area (The REPUBLIC of South Korea) is to create an environment wherein the Government can achieve
the mandate it was given in the 1953 Armistice. The mandate provides for a Republic that is free to
commit to the democracy building process and free elections without outside influence and threats of
military invasion. The method I have chosen is to stage Joint Task Force Korea from the US or through
ISB Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and off shore to conduct military operations in coordination with the South
Korean Military and other United Nation military Forces to evacuate designated noncombatants, secure
key US/South Korea installations, and defeat DPRK military forces. Success is the Government of South
Korea with its military and law enforcement organizations operating freely within its own borders and
pursuing two national objectives: (1) a stable Government free of outside military threats and, (2) a
Republic that has gained the upper hand in subversive threats, radical means to overthrow a freely elected
government. Our end state comes after all US citizens and qualified foreign nationals have been safely
evacuated, DPRK military threats to conduct brigade size operations, and key leadership has been
eliminated, and the Government of South Korea is judged, by the NCA, to be capable of maintaining an
environment that allows for the achievement of its national goals. Joint Task Force Korea is dissolved
when all forces have redeployed, reached home station or their further deployed location. Force
protection will be paramount in all phases.
(2) General. JTF Korea conducts military operations within the Republic of Korea to
defeat DPRK military forces, which are conducting combat operation against South Korea/US military
forces.
(3) Deployment. Designated forces will deploy from CONUS and maritime positions to
intermediate staging bases in the Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and positions adjacent to the coasts of the
Republic of Korea. Dependent on the requirement for surprise and mission urgency, some forces may
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deploy directly into South Korea from CONUS bases. To assist with the operation, the Government of
Japan has agreed to provide Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB).
(4) Employment. JTF Korea forces will deploy, conduct noncombatant evacuation
operations at designated sites, and execute security operations in Tactical Operations Area(s) (TOAs).
Initial US entry into the Republic of South Korea will focus on locating, assembling, and evacuating
nonessential US citizens and qualified foreign nationals. Noncombatant assembly and evacuation sites
are OSAN, TAEGU, and PUSAN. Evacuees will be transported to ISB Japan where processing and
onward movement requirements will occur. Concurrently, and in coordination with the South Korean
Military, preemptive strikes will be directed against AN2-Colts and UGFs known. All preemptive strikes
are expected to be accomplished within the initial portion of the decisive combat phase. The execution of
this OPLAN does not provide for JTF Korea’s occupation of large areas of the Republic of South Korea.
Combat operations are expected to continue until the South Korean Government is able to assume this
mission. OPLAN 9518X-XX execution is complete upon the last JTF unit returning to its home station or
follow-on mission location. During each phase of the operation, every precaution should be taken to limit
the disruption of South Korea’s economic, political, and governmental status. The duration of this
operation is uncertain.
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging. (D-28 through D-24). Phase I begins when
the NCA issues the order to execute OPLAN 9518X-XX. Allocated forces are then alerted at home station
or at sea. Emphasis is placed on planning for the rapid deployment of forces from CONUS/OCONUS to
the intermediate staging base (ISB Japan) with a continuation of movement from ISB Japan into South
Korea. Planning will include the deployment of designated forces directly from the US to South Korea.
Completion of all planning, alerting, and staging preparations for the movement to ISB Japan or to the
Republic of Korea signals the end of Phase I.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases. (D+40 through D+60). This
phase begins with the deployment of forces from their alert and staging bases to ISBs in the Japan or off
the shore of the Republic of Korea. Special attention must be paid to Reception, Staging, Onward
movement, and Integration (RSOI) capabilities in the ISBs and sustainment requirements once lodgments
are established in the Joint Operations Area. Movement forward of the ISBs and establishment of
Forward Support Bases (FSBs) or Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs) inside the Republic of Korea is the
responsibility of COMJTF. Phase II ends when all TPFDL forces are in position to establish lodgments in
the Republic of Korea and execute decisive combat operations.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat. (D+60 through D+100). This phase begins with
the establishment of air and naval exclusion zones within the Joint Operations Area. In a coordinated
effort with the Republic of Korea’s Military and National Police Forces, JTF Korea initiates near
simultaneous preemptive strikes against designated North Korea headquarters and military force
defensive locations and UGFs, noncombatant evacuation operations, and operations to secure all river
crossing sites. The safe and complete evacuation of US citizens and qualified foreign nationals to ISB
Japan and securing of key installations designated by CINCKorea or COMJTF signals the end of Phase
III.
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through. (D+100 through D+180). This
Phase begins with the first deployments after the key tactical operational objectives are secured. Activities
during this Phase run the gamut from attacks on emerging military targets and to expanded security
missions, to assistance in implementing CINCKorea’s economic and political initiatives. The transfer of all
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security missions to a follow-on force (SEATO, United Nations) or back to the South Korean Military or
National Police force signals the end of this Phase.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment. (D+180 through D+260). This
phase begins upon notification by the NCA that the South Korean Government is capable of providing
security to US citizens, installations, and facilities. Redeployment operations may occur throughout all
phases as personnel and equipment are deemed excess to mission requirements by COMJTF Korea.
This phase and the execution of this OPLAN end when the last JTF unit arrives at its home station or
further deployed location.
b. Tasks
(1) USARKOREA
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 Through D-24).
1. Identify, alert, and stage for movement deployable forces and logistics
support.
2. Provide Commander, Joint Task Force Korea (COMJTF Korea);
establish JTF Korea headquarters, receive augmentation forces, and prepare for the conduct of
operations in Joint Operations Area.
3. Continue as Army Service Component Command and Korea defense
mission.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
1. Receive staged units in ISB Japan.
2. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
3. Establish Forward Support Bases (FSBs) and Tactical Assembly Areas
(TAAs), as required.
4. Assist in acclimatization and mission training.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+60 through D+100).
Service Component forces as required.
Provide logistics to
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180. Provide
logistics to Service Component forces as required.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Receive returning forces and equipment.
2. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
(2) PACFLT-NGCC
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(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 through D-24).
1. Identify, alert, stage, and support deployable forces for movement.
2. Provide liaison teams and augmentation to Headquarters, JTF Korea
and CFC.
3. Identify and begin planning for secure Sea Lines of Communication.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
1. Move alerted units into the Joint Operations Area (ISB Japan or at
sea).
2. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
3. Secure Sea Lines of Communication.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+ 60 through D+100).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Secure sea Lines of Communication.
(d). Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Secure Sea Lines of Communication.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Secure SPODs and Sea Lines of Communication for returning forces.
3. Receive returning forces and equipment.
(3) MARFORKorea
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 through D-24).
1. Identify, alert, stage, and support deployable forces for movement.
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2. Provide liaison teams and augmentation to Headquarters, JTF Korea
and CFC.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
1. Move alerted forces to the Joint Operations Area (ISB Okinawa).
2. Be prepared to conduct sustained military operations ashore.
3. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+60 through D+100).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Be Prepared to conduct sustained military operations ashore.
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Be prepared to conduct sustained military operations ashore.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Receive returning forces and equipment.
(4) 7th ACCAF
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 through D-24).
1. Identify, alert, support, and stage deployable forces for movement.
2. Provide liaison teams and augmentation to Headquarters, JTF Korea
and CFC.
3. Identify and begin planning to secure Air Lines of Communication and
air exclusion zones within the Joint Operations Area.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
1. Move designated forces to ISB Korea and Japan.
2. Provide logistics to Service Components as required.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+60 through D+100).
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1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Secure Air Lines of Communication.
3. Establish and maintain air exclusion zones within the Joint Operations
Area.
4. Receive, process, house, and provide onward movement support for
noncombatant evacuees.
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces and other support to
JTF SOUTH, as required or requested.
2. Secure APODs and Air Lines of Communication.
3. Maintain air exclusion zones within the Joint Operations Area.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Provide logistics to Service Component forces as required.
2. Secure APODs and Air Lines of Communication.
3. Maintain air exclusion zones within the Joint Operations Area.
4. Receive returning forces and equipment.
(5) SOCKorea
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 through D-24).
1. Identify, alert, and stage deployable forces for movement.
2. Provide liaison teams and augmentation to Headquarters, JTF Korea,
and CFC.
3. Be prepared to serve as COMJTF Korea.
4. Be prepared to serve as the coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
1. Move designated forces to ISB Korea or locations off the shore.
2. Be prepared to conduct sustained military operations.
3. Be prepared to serve as COMJTF Korea.
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4. Be prepared to serve as the coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+60 through D+100.
1. Be prepared to conduct sustained military operations.
2. Be prepared to serve as COMJTF Korea.
3. Be prepared to serve as the coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180).
1. Be prepared to conduct sustained military operations.
2.
Be prepared to serve as COMJTF Korea.
3. Be prepared to serve as the coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(e) Phase V, Posthostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Receive returning forces and equipment.
2. Be prepared to serve as COMJTF Korea.
3. Be prepared to serve as the coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(6) Joint Task Force Korea (JTF KOREA)
(a) Phase I, Prehostilities: Alert and Staging (D-28 through D-24).
1. Upon activation, begin deployment and employment planning.
2. Monitor and coordinate the alert and staging of forces identified to
take part in the operation.
3. Designate APOD, SPOD, Staging areas, LOCs, and TPFDD priorities.
4.
Assist US Embassy (South Korea) in planning for Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO).
5. Identify, coordinate for, and be prepared to receive liaison teams and
augmentation personnel from CFC/USPACOM and its Service Component Commands.
(b) Phase II, Establish Intermediate Staging Bases (D+40 through D+60).
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1. Receive forces as they arrive at ISBs Japan, Okinawa, Korea or offshore from home stations and ports.
2.
Assist US Embassy (South Korea) in planning for Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO).
3. Serve as the CFC’s coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(c) Phase III, Decisive Combat (D+60 through D+100).
1. Monitor and coordinate the deployment of forces into the theater of
operations, including aggressive force protection measures and expeditious movement of forces onward
from APODs/SPODs.
2. Conduct military operations in coordination with the Government of
South Korea’s Military Forces to destroy North Korean Army headquarters, military UGFs.
3. Evacuate US citizens and other qualified foreign nationals.
4. Protect key US installations and facilities.
5. Conduct defensive and offensive operations.
6. Serve as the CFC’s coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(d) Phase IV, Lodgment and Follow-Through (D+100 through D+180).
1. Protect key US installations and facilities.
2. Assist South Korean Military Forces in security efforts.
3. Coordinate with US Embassy (South Korea).
4. Prepare for redeployment.
5. Conduct offensive operations.
6. Serve as the CFC coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
(e) Phase V, Post hostilities and Redeployment (D+180 through D+240).
1. Provide liaison with the Government of South Korea and its Military
forces to facilitate redeployment of US forces.
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2.
Provide ground Lines of communication security, as required for
3.
Redeploy all US forces and equipment to home station or further
redeploying forces.
deployed location.
4.
Serve as the CFC coordinating authority for Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the Joint Operations Area.
c. Coordinating Instructions
(1) C-Day will be designated by the NCA. D-Day is the day the first JTF Korea forces
depart Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB) Japan or from offshore staging areas for operations in the
Republic of Korea.
(2) This OPLAN is effective for planning upon receipt and for execution when directed.
(3) Direct liaison is authorized among all Service Components. Keep CFC advised of all
significant operational or logistical coordination.
(4) Coordination with the Government of South Korea and US Department of State will be
conducted through CFC until Phase III when DIRLAUTH and executive liaison is anticipated
(5) Due to the sensitivity to foreign troops on South Korea soil, US forces should avoid
any actions which may violate the customs or religion of the Japnanese and South Korean people.
(6) Reporting requirements will be IAW this OPLAN, its Annexes, and CJCS
requirements.
(7) Force protection and physical security is essential throughout this operation and will
be written into all aspects of planning and execution.
(8) No air, land, sea, or special operations will be conducted across international borders,
or in the territorial waters of other nations, without NCA authorization.
(9) 7th ACCAF is authorized direct coordination with Department of State representatives
concerning the reception, processing, and onward movement of noncombatant evacuees.
(10) Diplomatic Coordination. USCINCKorea will inform US Ambassador or Deputy Chief
of Mission of operations through direct coordination.
4. Administration and Logistics
a. Concept of Support. When directed by CJCS to execute OPLAN 9518X-XX, CINCKorea has
directive authority for all logistics in Joint Operations Area.
(1) Service Component Commands will provide appropriate logistics support to deployed
forces. Single Service Logistics Support is required for Service-peculiar items; inter-service, common,
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and cross-servicing agreements may be used to minimize common support requirements. Copies of the
agreements will be provided to the CFC, CJG4.
(2) Develop tailored deployment packages to provide anticipated supply service and
maintenance support for troops, equipment, and aircraft.
(3) Provide logistics support for operations at the lowest level. Request requirements
beyond Service Component capabilities through CFC, CJG4.
(4) During deployment, initial priority is to the development of the APODs/SPODs. The
secondary mission is sustainment base operations to receive, process, medicate, feed, and transport
civilian evacuees.
(5) Primary means of intratheater resupply for all US forces is Containerized Delivery
System (CDS) and combat off-load.
b. Logistics. Refer to Annex D.
c. Personnel. Refer to Annex E.
d. Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.
e. Civil Affairs. Refer to Annex G.
f. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. Refer to Annex H.
g. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. Refer to Annex M.
h. Medical Services. Refer to Annex Q.
5. Command and Control
a. Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J.
(1) CINCKorea is the supported CINC.
(2)
Supporting CINCs are CINCJFC, CINCSOC, CINCPAC, CINCTRANS, and
(3)
Supporting agencies are DOS, DOJ, DIA, CIA, JCCWC, JDC, NSA, USIA, AND
CINCSPACE.
USAID.
(4) Service Component Commands COCOM to CINCKorea.
(a) US ARMY, KOREA, (USARKO)
(b) USPACIFIC FLEET, (PACFLT)-NAVAL GROUP COMPONENT COMMAND
(c) US MARINE CORPS FORCES, KOREA, (MARFORKorea)
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(d) 7TH US AIR FORCE, AIR COMPONENT COMMAND (7th ACCAF)
(e) SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND KOREA, (SOCKorea). Commander,
Special Operations Command (COMSOCKOREA) will be designated Commander Joint Special
Operations Task Force (COMJKOTF), if activated.
(f) Upon implementation of this plan, CINCKOREA will designate Commander,
USARKO as the Commander, Joint Task Force Korea.
b. Command Post
(1) CP TANGO.
(2) CC SEOUL.
c. Succession to Command. COMMARFORKOREA, then CINCPAFLT-NGCC.
d. Command, Control and communications Systems. Refer to Annex K.
JIM R. RILEY
General, USA
Commander in Chief
Annexes:
A - TASK ORGANIZATION
B - INTELLIGENCE
B - OPERATIONS
D - LOGISTICS
E - PERSONNEL
F - PUBLIC AFFAIRS
G - CIVIL AFFAIRS
H – METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
J - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
K – COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
L – ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
M - MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
N - SPACE OPERATIONS
P - HOST-NATION SUPPORT
Q – MEDICAL SERVICES
S – SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS: (PROVIDED UNDER SEPARATE
COVER)
X - EXECUTION CHECKLIST
OFFICIAL:
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/s/
George J. Jolly
Major General, USAF
Director, J5
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