INFRASTRUCTURE AS A VEHICLE FOR COMMUNITY BUILDING:
AN URBAN DESIGN STRATEGY FOR IZTAPALAPA, MEXICO CITY
by
George H. Beane
MASSACHUSETTS INSTIT(ITF
Bachelor of Arts in Architecture
Yale University
JUN 29 2015
ARC
OF TECHNOLOLGY
New Haven, Connecticut (2008)
Submitted to the Department of Architecture and the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degrees of
LIBRARIES
&
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ARCHITECTURE STUDIES
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2015
George H. Beane. All Rights Reserved
The author here by grants to MIT the permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of the thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now known or hereafter
created.
--
Author
Signature redacted
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Department of Architecture
May 21, 2015
Certified by
Signature redacted
7
Assistant Professor, Deart
Certified by
rs
Gabriella Carolini
and Planning
(1T1sis Supervisor
Signature redacted
\
Rafi Segal
Associate Professor, Department of Architecture
Thesis Supervisor
Signature redacted
Accepted by
Dennis Frenchman
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Accepted by
Takehiko Nagakura
Assgiate Professor of Design and Computation
Department of Architecture Committee on Graduate Students
TITLE
Infrastructure as a Vehicle For Community Building: An Urban
Design Strategy for Iztapalapa, Mexico City
AUTHOR
George H. Beane
ABSTRACT
Mexico City suffers from flooding, water scarcity, pollution,
subsidence and enormous financial costs related to water
infrastructure. Poor governance contributes to the city's water
troubles by creating overlapping political organizations whose
interests and administrative purview often conflict. This thesis
proposes decentralized water infrastructures implemented at
the neighborhood scale, that engage directly with dominant
institutional arrangements - namely, the complicated relationship between local government and social organizations
representing the needs of informal settlements. The proposal
articulates x) a site-specific exploration of design solutions for
improving water service in one neighborhood of lztapalapa,
2) a template for coupled social and hydrological development that can be replicated elsewhere in the borough, and 3)
a broad argument for multi-performative infrastructure that
incorporates, and strengthens, existing reserves of social and
political capital. Through these strategies, the thesis addresses
the question of how urban designers can use physical infrastructure to not only improve basic service provision but also
create new opportunities for community building within and
between marginalized urban settlements.
Submitted to the Department of Architecture and the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 212015 in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degrees of Master
in City Planning & Master of Science in Architecture Studies.
ADVISOR
Gabriellia Carolini
Assistant Professor
Department of Urban Studies & Planning
ADVISOR
Rafi Segal
Associate Professor
Department of Architecture
iii
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION
5
Since the 16th Century, public authorities in Mexico City have
managed water resources through centralized water infrastructures. This approach has not resolved recurring problems of
scarcity, flooding, and sewage treatment, which disproportionally affected the urban poor concentrated in the eastern regions
of the Federal District. The thesis addresses a fundamental
problem of water resources management, with a focus on its
strategies for informal settlements, and a methodology that
combines ethnographic research, mapping, and design.
2 GOVERNANCE
15
Chapter Two describes the existing regulatory structures that
oversee water management at the municipal level, and outlines
Mexico's experiments with decentralizing water governance.
Using examples from other low-income and informal settlements, I argue that social and political capital must be valued in
the design of physical infrastructure, and that neglecting to do
so risks the long-term sustainabiltiy of that infrastructure.
3 CONTEXT
25
In lztapalapa, one of Mexico City's sixteen boroughs, marginalized communities at the borough's southeastern border suffer
greatest from poor water service. In these areas, the predominant institutional forces are 'social organizations' that co-govern
along formal government agencies, through a system of
political clientelism. Such organizations are so entrenched and
so powerful in neighborhoods where they operate, that new
models for local-level water infrastructure must engage them in
the creation and management of new infrastructures.
iv
4
PROPOSAL
5
Chapter Five proposes a nieghborhood-level network of decentralized "nodes" for water collection and retention, and emphasizes the visibility and visual prominence of such infrastructure,
and the potential for new urban spaces defined by various
forms of water infrastructure. This design is considered in the
context of the local institutional bodies necessary for governing,
financing and maintaining water infrastructure. It suggests a
repIciable strategy for siting infrastructures along a central axis,
which supplies needed civic and water-managmeent services to
local residents.
5 CONCLUSION
15
The thesis returns to the principle that the design of physical
infrastructure can and should be informed by issues of
power, politics and relevant local institutions. Conversely, the
manipulation of physical form can offer a meaningful tool for
institutional reform in local communities. New approaches to
water management in Mexico City should deliberatlively align
themselves with the realities of local institutional context,
engaging with the actual, rather than idealized, landscapes of
local governance. Neighborhood models of decentralized infrastructure will employ infrastructure as a multi-performative tool,
exhibiting a 'pragmatic idealism' in its ambitions for pragmatic
resource management and broad institutional change.
V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
With sincere thanks to Gabriella Carolini and Rafi Segal, my co-advisors
on this project; to my colleagues in the SmarchS Urbanism program (Wenji, Agu, Gabriel, David, Chaewon, Manos, Kairav, Naichun, Difei, and Ariel)
for their support over the past two years; to Lorena Bello Gomez, for her
advice and support; for Yolanda Cervantes, Raul Trejo, David Adler, and
Raul Gutierrez Calder6n who shared insight and resources that form the
basis for this study; and for Susan Szenasy for her encouragement.
vi
vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The proposal here addresses the need for water and sanitation infrastructure in the neighborhood of Iztapalapa, Mexico City. Implicit
in this scheme is an argument for a model of infrastructure in which
urban design is grounded in the institutional qualities of a place. The
thesis argues that designers should understand infrastructure not just
in the context of geographic or landscape considerations, but in light
of institutional relationships that can improve the effectiveness, and
extend the lives of physical objects. As such, the project attempts to
articulate a design process in which infrastructure can both respond to
and strengthen complex urban social and political systems.
-
The choice to situate this argument in the context of Mexico City's faulty water infrastructure is deliberate.
The inadequacy of urban water infrastructure is a problem at the global scale, and has particular relevance
to informal settlements, where almost a third of the world's population currently lives (UN Habitat 2012, 2).
Mexico City offers an ideal case in a number of ways; as a megacity, in which most land production over the
past half century has occurred irregularly, the Mexican capital is emblematic of the type of urban growth
and the sorts of urban problems - that confront the current generation of urbanists. In practical terms, it is
reasonably accessible as a study site, and maintains fairly good data on topics relevant to this thesis.
At the same time, the urgency of the water crisis makes water and sanitation (WatSan) infrastructure an
ideal vehicle for influencing institutions. Water carries with it a profound intrinsic and emotional value in a
way that other infrastructural goods do not. Academic debates over water as an economic good or a human
right - which implicitly recognize it as both - sum up its complexity. Water is, simultaneously, a necessary
ingredient for human life, an economic commodity, an ecological element, and a religiously charged
substance. And, in a way that other physical infrastructure does not, addressing issues of water supply
and sanitation has direct bearings on the broader health of urban societies, as demonstrated by discrete
epidemics, and perennially high mortality rates associated with diarrhea, the second leading cause of death
in children worldwide (WHO 2013).
Not surprisingly, then, access to clean water is often a rallying cry for political and social mobilization. In
this light, physical infrastructure becomes the manifestation of community demands, as well as a primary
tool for improving public health. That infrastructure assumes such varied and complicated meanings, also
makes it an ideal topic of investigation within multiple disciplines. Simultaneously, it can be understood
as a set of tangible objects whose physicality shapes people's interactions in real space, and the product of
rban systems that are influenced by institutions and responsive to particular historical conditions. Ultimately, this thesis investigates both physical and social properties of infrastructure in an attempt to better
understand the potential for urban design as a mechanism of community 'upgrading.'
8
INTRODUCTION
;
-
A
===,sow
~:
.~
~
!11
J7
a
I
~
*<
~
i-.
1.1 THE PROBLEM
Historically, with the growth of Mexico City, local populations segregated along ethnic and economic lines, and
according to physical boundaries demarcated by access to water resources and risk (Legoretta 2008). Accordingly, the western edges of the city, which are less prone to seasonal flooding and closer to water sources, are
typically wealthier (and whiter) than the rest of the city. To the east, illegal settlers, attracted by cheap land
prices and lax property regulations, have historically settled in flood-prone areas. Citywide, almost one fifth
of illegal settlers live in riverbeds, mostly on the eastern edge of the city (WWF 2011, 22). Since the 1960s, a
general pattern of illegal land invasion has become the dominant form of land production in the capital: large
properties are illegally subdivided and sold to residents seeking to escape the crowded inner city, or drawn to
the capital for its abundant economic resources and employment opportunities. The new residents lay out
their settlement according to a regular grid pattern, with electric lines laid out, and roads paved. Finally, water
lines are extended. Though residents do not possess official deeds to their property, a reasonable expectation of
formalization is born out after a few decades. At that point, the settlements are neighborhoods, largely indistinguishable from the rest of the city.
The trend of physical municipal expansion - driven in large part by the growth of these informal communities
along the capital's eastern fringe - places heavy demands on the city's water infrastructure. In Mexico City,
rapid urbanization in the second half of the 20th century led to fast, massive expansion of water infrastructure
to keep pace with nascent population demand. Existing water infrastructure, built in the 16th century and
continuously updated to manage the enormous growth of city, now services a population of over 22 million
people. When water from the valley's 48 rivers proved insufficient, city leadership looked beyond the Valley of
Mexico for additional supply. First in the 1940s, and then in the 1970s, government-approved projects to pipe
water from the Lerma Valley (62 km away) and the Cutzamala River (130 km) (Legoretta 2008, 74-80). Within the
capital, water is distributed through a primary network of 1074 km of pipes, and a secondary network of 12,278
km (Tortajada 2006,360). Pipes also manage the removal of waste outside of the naturally closed water basin,
carrying 40 cubic meters / second of sewage north of the city, where it is deposited into the Tula River and
eventually carried into the Gulf of Mexico. Only one fourth of the city's sewage is currently treated (Burns 2009,
39). The Atononilco plant, the metropolitan area's largest treatment facility, lies 90 km outside of the city and
treats 3.6 million tons of wastewater per day (Acevedo, Bogdan, et al. 2013, 11). The plant is owned and operated
by Slim, a private company that retains exclusive rights to wastewater treatment in the metropolitan region
(Acevedo, Bogdan, et al. 2013, 12; Acevedo, Bogdan, et al. 2013, 17). Twenty six other plants operate within the
Federal District, with a combined actual treatment of 3430 liters per second (or approximately 300,000 gallons
per day) (Estadisticas del Agua de la Region Hidrologica 2009,103).
Despite the massive investment in cost and energy required to plan, realize and maintain these infrastructural
systems, Mexico City today suffers from many of the same problems it confronted in the 17th century. Summer
flooding, occurring in increasing frequency over the past half century, is compounded by poor drainage and
inadequate sewer infrastructure that leads to sewage backups. Conversely, citywide demand, estimated at 74
cubic meters / second, exceeds system capacity of 64 cubic meters / second (Soto Montes de Oca and Bateman
2006, 4). Seasonal droughts necessitate private delivery of water to municipalities and colonias within the
metropolitan region, at great cost to the private citizens and government, which often subsidizes water delivery
11
through delivery of trucked water, called pipas. The quality
of the water that arrives in households is low; studies show
bacteria contamination rates of approximately 40% for
water supply, with higher contamination rates of groundwater sources (Mazari-Hiriart, Lopez-Vidal and Calva 2001,
93) (Mazari-Hiriart et al. 2005, 5131). Notwithstanding the
enormous investment in infrastructure needed to pipe water
into the city from outside the basin, external water sources
accounts for only 31% of the capital's water supply (Tortajada
2006, 360). The rest, drawn from approximately 2,000 wells,
between 2oo and 400 meters deep, draw from the city's
I Spatial divisions can intensify pronounced
differences in quality of service provision. For
instance, writing about India, Chaplin finds that
segregation of rich and poor reinforced political
divides between suburban middle classes and
the urban poor, which reduces pressure on
government to improve universal conditions
(Chaplin 1999, 150).
2 Even these numbers, which rely on data from
CONAGUA and SACMEX, may exaggerate
water access. Figures for water quantity also
ignore the low quality of water resources available in economically marginalized communities
(Acevedo et al. 2013, 22).
3 A more recent estimate by the Centro Mario
Molina, which includes drainage infrastructure
in its final tally, puts the number at $3.1 billion.
At the time of writing (anuary 2015) and from
this point onwards, I will use the exchange rate
of $1 US = $14.7 MX.
FILLING WATER BARRELS during dry winter
months (photo credit: Rodolpho Angulo).
12
INTRODUCTION
14 underground aquifers. This has led to overexploitation
of the city's 14 aquifers, and an annual subsidence rates of
between 5 and 40 cm per year (Centro Mario Molino 2012,
391; WWF 2011, 6). Of course, as the city sinks, building
foundations shift and pipes crack, increasing the risks of
contamination to the system. Additionally, the old gravityfed exit routes for sewage water have sunk too, increasing
the energy cost of pumping wastewater out of the basin and
into the Tula River. Estimates put energy costs associated
with water pumping for water supply and waste removal for
Mexico City at o.6% of the country's total electrical energy
generated (WWF 2011, 6).
The residents of the city's informal neighborhoods are the
most heavily impacted by the water problems; flooding is
most pronounced in low-lying eastern neighborhoods, and
water provision is highly inconsistent. In their comparative study of the delegaciones within the Federal District,
Montes de Oca and Batement find lower service rates in
poorer neighborhoods of Iztapalapa and Iztacalco, where
high percentage of residents reported low water pressure
(59%), poor water quality (36%), frequent water shortages
(52%), and bottled water consumption (91%). That service
deficiencies occur along defined socio-economic boundaries indicates that the populations most affected by water
shortages are also those least well-equipped to pay added
cost of water delivery (or recover from flood damage in cases
of perennial flooding). Similarly, differences in neighborhood consumption rates reflect the deep socio-economic
divisions that exist within the city. High rates of household
water access (98%) and a citywide aggregated consumption
of 297 liters per capita per day mask the deep inequalities of
municipal-level water provision (WWF 2011, 6). Minimum
daily water intake is typically considered 15- 25 liters per
person per day, a consumption rate similar to that experienced in Mexico City's poorer neighborhoods. In contrast,
consumption in the city's wealthier, western regions can
reach upwards of 6oo liters per person per day (Tortajada
2006,362).
1.2 THE LARGE-SCALE
INFRASTRUCTURAL APPROACH
Estimates for Mexico City's Cutzamala Water System,
the metropolitan area's primary external supply system,
indicate aggregated costs of $1.3 billion, or "higher than the
national investment in the entire public sector in Mexico,
in 1996, in the areas of education ($700 million), health and
social security ($300 million), agriculture livestock and rural
development ($105 million), tourism ($50 million), and the
marine sector ($6o million)" (Tortajada 2006,363). Beyond
standard operational expenses, large investments in energy
13
are required to support pumping for water supply, wells,
drainage and water treatment. Energy use of 2,113,180,775
annual (kWh) results in $224.1 million spent to provide
Mexico City with externally sourced water (Centro Mario
Molino 2012, 84).
Water provision is frequently defined by dual concerns for
equity and financial sustainability, yet those principles are
frequently at odds with one another (Moe and Rheingans
2oo6, 51). Full cost recovery, which ensures the financial
viability of systems and adequate resources for operational
and capital expenditures, often results in increased tariffs
for lower income users. Efforts to achieve both long-term
financial viability and universal coverage have historically
led municipalities to subsidize water and sanitation services,
a practice which is fiscally unsustainable and can discourage
new projects that seek to expand access or service quality
(Olmstead 2003, 33). Montes de Oca and Batement report
that in Mexico City, the average tariff of 2 pesos per i cubic
meter of water (approximately $0.15 US) falls far below the
cost estimate of 9 pesos per cubic meter ($o.67 US). That
estimate differs from Tortajada's tariff and cost figures of
$0.2 US and $o.214, respectively, but confirms the conclusion that gaps between current supply and treatment costs
make the system fiscally unsustainable (Tortajada 2006,
360). The realization of new capital projects will only exaggerate the cost deficit. Including projects at every stage of
implementation (review, construction, etc.) at least seven
large capital works are projected for the Valley of Mexico
between 2014-2018, with an estimated price tag that
exceeds $3 billion. Additionally, the omisi6n Nacional del
Agua (CONAGUA) proposes extracting water from three
new sources, all in neighboring states, at undefined cost
(CONAGUA 2014-2018).
More generally, the scale of the necessary infrastructure
carries with it its own associated problems. Buried distribution systems, aging and invisible, are vulnerable to
contamination problems, cracks and high leakage rates.
Internationally, water loss in industrialized countries, calculated as a percentage of water supplied, ranges from 8 to
24%, with substantially higher average leakage rates reported
in developing countries (Moe and Rheingans 2006,43).
14
INTRODUCTION
Mexico City's nonrevenue water rate, exacerbated by dated
infrastructure, subsidence and seismic activity, is estimated
at 30-40% (Tortajada 2003,
124).
1.3 MEXICO CITY'S COLONIAS POPULARES
In informal settlements where property owners lack legal
title to their land, high population density, haphazard
growth patterns, and limited space reduce options for new
infrastructures installed retroactively. Iztapalapa shares
some of the qualities that characterize WatSan delivery in
informal settlements, including substandard facilities, a lack
of government investment in infrastructure and, perhaps
most importantly, high rates of poverty at the household
level.
But in Mexico City and elsewhere, the formal / informal
distinction may be more useful in describing historical
ambiguities in legal status than as a set of physical qualities
that characterize current conditions with any degree of
specificity. Some development economists argue that
'informal' assumes multiple meanings in the academic
literature, is understood largely in opposition to 'formal'
but lacks specificity in its own right (Hernandez, Kellet
and Allen 2010; Guha-Khasnobis, Kanbur and Ostrom
2007; Sindzingere 2006). Meanwhile, scholars of land use
and property rights are inclined to describe ownership
as a "bundle of rights" than as a single right; to discuss
ownership as a spectrum between full and zero legality
(Payne 200); to admit the co-existence of informal
ownership arrangements within formalized property
systems (Ensminger 1997); to recognize the legitimacy of
informal property rights (Lanjouw and Levy 2002); and
to acknowledge the fluidity of land status, which easily
passes from formal to informal (e.g. with failure to pay
taxes, or disregard of new building codes). Despite its wide
currency in depicting a global phenomenon of extra-legal
land production, the term informal may flatten nuances of
property ownership regimes at a local level, where communities consist of both informal and formal ownership
arrangements, and legal status changes easily and often.
4 Typically, lack of legal status discourages
government investment in delivery, storage
and waste treatment infrastructure, and
insecure land tenure can discourage homeowners from investing in necessary water
infrastructure (Katukiza et al. 2012, 965). In
developed but informal settlements where
renting is common, landlords are often
reluctant to invest in new infrastructure
for the same reasons, and because tenant
recourse is limited given their tenuous legal
status (lsunju et al. 2011, 370). Even where
tenure security is not a barrier to investment, residents may feel that improved
sanitation is a human right and should
therefore be provided at low or no cost by
government (Bolaane and lkgopoleng 2011,
491). Inadequate household investment in
delivery, storage and waste treatment infrastructure often leads to water contamination, which can occur both in transmission
and during household storage (Mintz et al.
2001, 1567). Because it is often necessary to
teach best practices for water treatment,
storage, and hygiene practices, slums may
suffer when educational resources are
scarce. Slum dwellers may also lack the
social networks and kinship ties necessary
for developing the institutional capacity for
shared sanitation facilities, or the political
cohesion necessary to make demands of
government agencies (lsunju et al. 2011,
370).
ATOTONILCO WASTEWATER
TREATMENT PLANT
In Hidalgo State, Mexico.
15
i6
INTRODUCTION
CIUDAD NEZAHUALC6YOTL
Ciudad Neza is a municipality with a population over i million, lying within the greater
Mexico City Metropolitan Area but outside
the Federal District. Planned and developed
by real estate interests and citizen organizations, Ciudad Neza was founded on illegally
subdivided land. Unsanctioned by local
government, public services and land title
were only granted retroactively, through
decades of protest and political pressure
from local activists. The municipality is fully
urban and generally indistinguishable from
much of adjacent city; here, "informalism"
describes a historical condition rather than
an ongoing urbanization process. Still, the
lack of planned public spaces manifest this
history.
Historically, in Mexico City, government policy indirectly
encouraged the formation of informal settlements, and then
muddied the already ambiguous legal status of those settlements.
Although various types of informal settlements had existed in
the capital since the colonial era, enormous population growth
in the 1950s and 196os, combined with rent freezes, bans on
low-income housing subdivisions, and protection of communityowned ejido lands, reduced housing options for Mexico City's
urban poor (Zanetta 2004, 84). As a result, families turned away
from rental housing options in the city center, and towards
illegally developed plots on the city's outskirts (Ward 1998, 47).
These, and land invasions of private or publicly owned land,
produced colonias populares, informal communities settled by
organized coalitions of families, or enterprising real estate developers who illegally subdivided ejido land (community property
protected from privatization by the 1917 Mexican Constitution)
(Ward 1998, 195). Although official government policy banned
the acquisition of these lands, at both the federal and municipal
level, politicians and bureaucrats often turned a blind eye to
informal developments. Since the 1970s, large-scale national
efforts have focused on regularizing properties, resulting in the
granting of 700,000 titles in Mexico City between 1969 and 1981
(Zanetta 2004,78). Thus, many of the illegal settlements that
absorbed Mexico City's growth in the 1960s have since been
formalized and regularized. Though the neighborhoods still bear
the imprint of their origins, including a lack of basic infrastructure, informal in this context is best used to describe a historical
condition.
Currently, almost fifty percent of new housing in the capital
is produced informally (Yarza 2014). Given the size of this
number, and considering government's tacit support of informal
housing production and national policies that regularize illegally
occupied land almost as soon as it is occupied, informality
is both an ambiguous and a short-lived characterization. In
this light, while the literature on service provision in informal
settlements is a useful reference in some respects, the scholarship often bears little resemblance to the reality of settlements
in Mexico City. Moreover, historical precedents influence the
relationship between various levels of government, fragmented
community interests, local organizations, and individual actors,
and the particular blend of interests and influences present in
any given settlement.
i8
INTRODUCTION
1.4 METHODOLOGY
In this research, I rely on three principal sources. First, I
reference existing literature on the topic of Mexico City's
recurrent water challenges, the experiences of water service
provision in informal settlements elsewhere, and theories
of social capital in community development, especially
those articulated by the scholar Elinor Ostrom. Second, I
employ GIS data gathered from three government agencies
in Mexico City: Sistema de Aguas de Ciudad de Mexico
(SACMEX), Calidad de Vida (PROCDMX), and the Centro
de Evaluaci6n de Riesgo Geol6gico (CERG) in Iztapalapa. I used these data to create a series of analytic maps,
informing the choice of site and type of intervention.
5 For instance, scholars writing about Africa
often highlight lack of accessibility as a limiting factor in WatSan delivery to informal
settlements; where informal settlements
are founded according to a more "organic"
form, narrow and winding streets make it
difficult for tankers to access and empty pit
latrines (lsunju et al. 2011, 369). Yet in the
case of Mexico City, irregular settlements
are often laid out according to a grid, with
ample space for car access. Additionally,
indoor plumbing is common in the capital,
and latrines are rare.
Third, my analysis relies heavily on qualitative data
gathered over the course of two trips to Mexico City, one
an extended two-month stay in July 2014, and the second
in January 2015. During both trips, I conducted semi-structured interviews of local government officials, residents, and
community leaders in Iztapalapa, Mexico City. I identified
participants through local contacts in city government and
academia, and with the help of a Fulbright Scholar, David
Adler, whose own work focused on the political life of social
organizations in lztapalapa. I conducted one site visit and
one interview in Miravalle, a community along the Sierra de
Santa Catarina, and three sets of interviews and site visits
to Yuguelito, a small informal settlement near lztapalapa's
border with the borough of Tlalpan. The interviews were
by no exhaustive, but they introduced and explored some
of the larger themes this work addresses - namely, political
fragmentation and service provision within the delegacion,
and the role of clientelistic politics in determining which
communities are provided water service, according to what
schedule.
This project is both research and design proposal, and as
such, the choice of site combines considerations of access
-- where I could gather substantive information on local
communities - and geo-spatial characteristics - such as the
availability of vacant land, topography and water. The result
is that the proposal includes areas that fall within Tlahuac,
19
a delegacion that neighbors lztapalapa to its south, and the
includes communities whose leadership 1 did not contact. While
acknowledging these information gaps, I nonetheless assume
the broader system of politics and patterns of land production
described in the academic literature and my own interviews in
small communities, apply to the more expansive site chosen for
this design exercise.
20
INTRODUCTION
1.5 SCOPE OF THESIS
The thesis is roughly split into two sections. In Part i, I
describe the theoretical, historical and geographic context
which my design proposal engages. Chapter One defines
the essential problem, briefly describes informal settlements
in Mexico City, and argues for water and sanitation infrastructure as an appropriate vehicle for institutional change.
Chapter Two outlines the costs associated with Mexico
City's centralized WatSan infrastructure, examines the role
of governance in exacerbating water provision, and argues
for the inclusion of social and political capital as critical
components of infrastructural design. Chapter Three
discusses theories of institutional change in the context of
water struggles in Mexico City.
Part 2 outlines the thesis' main design proposal in the
context Iztapalapa, a historically founded informal settlement in the east of Mexico City. Chapter Four describes the
neighborhood - its physical and institutional landscape,
including demographics, local stakeholders, and political
and civic organizations. Chapter Five proposes a pilot design
that considers the potential for decentralized networks, for
public "nodes" oriented towards water service provision
(collection, provision, etc.), the visibility and visual prominence of such infrastructure, and the potential for new
urban spaces defined by various forms of water infrastructure. This design is considered in the context of the local
institutional bodies necessary for governing, financing and
maintaining water infrastructure. The design proposal thus
traces the potential ripple effect of implementing the new
WASH 'skeleton' on the physical and institutional landscape
of the community.
Finally, in Chapter Six, the thesis returns to its initial
argument - namely, that the design of physical infrastructure can and should be informed by issues of power, politics
and local institutions and, conversely, that the manipulation
of physical form can offer a meaningful tool for institutional
reform in local communities.
21
CHAPTER 2: GOVERNANCE
The challenges outlined above are directly the result of deficiencies in the
physical networks of WatSan delivery, but the provision of water and sanitation services is also inherently tied to issues of governance. Academic
scholars and development agencies identify the importance of good governance in ensuring provision of water and sanitation. For instance, USAID,
UNDP, the World Bank, the EC, the UN Water and Sanitation Program,
and the Global Water Partnership (GWP) all recognize water governance
as a key element in improving the lives of urban poor (Harris et al. 2011,
2). In their work on Jakarta, Bakker et al. report that governance failure
due to poor pricing strategies, counterproductive land use policies, antipoor service provision business models, etc. was a more important cause
of deficient service provision than was natural scarcity. Successful water
services thus rely heavily on "clear standards for good governance (such as
accountability, transparency, participation, inclusiveness, and the rule of
law)" (Bakker 2008, 1899-1900).
2.1 INSTITUTIONS AND WATER GOVERNANCE IN MEXICO
Within Mexico, government water agencies operate with overlapping responsibilities on different administrative scales, complicating WatSan service provision at the local level. The existing institutional arrangements of
water governance, characterized by unclear boundaries between federal, state and municipal water authorities,
are directly tied to Mexico's experiments with political decentralization in the late 1980s and 1990s.7 Following
broader trends towards increased local community participation, in 1992 Mexico formally passed the Law of
National Waters, which adopts Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) as a guiding principle of
federal water policy. The Comisi6n Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA), created in 1989 is divided into 13 administrative basin regions, which handle water management at the regional level. The agency is responsible for
measuring hydrologic data, water conservation policies for sustainable development, technical and social water
control (Mestre, 2009). Beyond this, water management responsibilities are divided into 13 administrative
regions, and 102 sub-regions based on political jurisdictions Each of the thirteen regional basins are divided
into two groups - a Basin Agency which is responsible for designing and implementing local water policy, and
a Basin Council, made up of representatives from local stakeholders, which advises the Agency on decisions
(Acevedo, et al. 2013, 6).
22
GOVERNANCE
6 Throughout the paper, I use United Nation's definition of governance as "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs
at all levels...comprises the mechanisms
processes and institutions through which
citizens and group articulate their interests,
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences" (UNDP
2006).
I use on Elinor Ostrom's definition of
institutions: "Broadly defined, institutions
are the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured
interactions including those within families,
neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports
leagues, churches, private associations, and
governments at all scales" (Ostrom 2009, 3).
23
7 Political power in Mexico has historically been centralized in the presidency.
However, beginning in the 1980s, largely
because of neoliberal economic policies,
the country moved decisively towards
political decentralization, with political
decisions at the federal level devolved financial responsibilities to thirty one state
governments, and the Federal District.
Under President Salinas de Gortari (19881994) federal government increased funding of local municipalities through discretionary programs, whose administration
became increasingly transparent under
the Zedillo presidency (Smoke, Gomez,
Peterson 2006, 268). That the largest
recipients of funding were traditional supporters of the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional), Mexico's oldest and most
dominant political party, hints at political
motives for these efforts; increases in
funding and transparency may reflect a
political hedging, an effort to institutionalize political support of key PRI states in
the face of political challenges from rival
PAN (Partido Acci6n Nacional) and PRD
(Partido de la Revoluci6n DemocrAtica).
Greater political competition at the
subnational level has led to new political
leaders operating outside of the traditional PRI dominated party system, who
push for further decentralization (Beer
2004, 191). The effect has been increased
decentralization at the state level, though
there exist "enormous variation in levels
of political competition among the states
and between some subnational political
environments and the national government" (Beer 2004, 182).
Despite federal reforms intended to devolve decisionmaking to the local level, the practical effect of these policies
has been mixed. As of 2005, 25 of the 26 planned basin
councils were not functional for practical purposes, indicating low stakeholder participation due to lack of technical
and managerial experience, reluctance of the authorities
to disseminate reliable data, undervaluing of stakeholders
participation, and poor economic pricing regimes (Tortajada
2005,125; Scott and Banister 20o8). Basin Council decisions
are not legally binding and, in the case of Mexico City, the
local Basin Council does not meet regularly or carry out any
duties (Acevedo et al. 2013, 13).
A lack of enforcement and administrative overlap also
stymies effective water governance. For instance, although
CONAGUA retains the legal power to sanction those who
violate extraction agreements, the agency claims not to have
enough inspectors to enforce concessions (despite its staff of
13,406 national employees in 2008) and concession-holders
self-report water use. (Acevedo et al. 2013, 15). At the same
time, while water management has officially been devolved
to local authorities, in practice CONAGUA is responsible for
approving concession applications and grants approval to
individual users seeking use of local water resources. These
concessionary powers make CONAGUA the preeminent
water authority in the country. In Mexico City, CONAGUA
controls concessions to those users who extract from underground aquifers, an estimated 70% of water users. Additionally, since most local water agencies lack the financial and/
or human resources to build or modernize infrastructure,
CONAGUA often defines the agendas of local water institutions (Barkin 2011, 382). Local groups often do not have a
formal information system that allows them to share data
with counterparts higher up in administrative circles, and
oversight over local water agencies is minimal or nonexistent. (Barkin 2011,383). Even within CONAGUA, programs
to improve efficiency in water provision lack feedback
mechanisms and suffer from "incongruence and ill-defined
system boundaries" (CCA 2013, 17).
Low cost recovery contributes to failures of local water
governance. SACMEX, the Federal District's municipal
water provider, prices water according to an increasing
24
GOVERNANCE
Block Water Tariffs (IBT) model, which may have unintended adverse effects on poor households that share
water connections among many members, and therefore pay higher costs per person (Whittington 1992,
75). Moreover, the tariff does not account for sewerage costs, sanitation costs or depreciation, and is undersupported by federal sources. (Acevedo et al. 2013, 16). Since 1994, in two ten-year contracts, four private
companies have been quietly hired to establish a user registry, install meters, repair secondary pipe networks,
and collect fees on behalf of SACMEX (Maranon 2004, 178). Because those companies are paid on the number,
rather the volume of water connections they collect, they are incentivized to bill individual households. The
largest consumers of water - industrial and commercial users - frequently do not pay their full share (Acevedo
et al. 2013, 16). Unsustainable revenues mean that federal and municipal authorities often lack the resources to
implement proper maintenance.
Mexico thus suffers from a crisis of governance, in which "in the absence of an operational and developmental
role for the state in Mexico, there exists an 'institutional vacuum' with few civil institutions capable of replacing
the roles and functions of the state" (Wilder and Lankao 2006, 1992 citing Dejanvry et al. 1997). Consequently,
efforts to strengthen service provision at the grassroots level must address both the physical and institutional
challenges described above. The following sections propose decentralized infrastructure as one alternative to
the existing system, and suggest broad principles for how decentralized infrastructure might be implemented to
strengthen local water governance.
2.2 REALIZING THE PROMISES OF DECENTRALIZED WATER GOVERNANCE
Political decentralization is broadly understood as the devolution of authority by central government to
independent regional and local governments (Faguet, 2014,4). Proponents of decentralization argue for its
positive effect on governance and public sector outputs, by localizing politics and thus increasing public
officials' responsiveness to citizens. In theory, decentralized government can reduce abuses of power, grant
greater governing authority to minority populations, and increase political competition (Faguet 2014, 2).
Empirically, the political-economic literature suggests generally positive results where governments have
distributed political and fiscal resources, though, as Bardhan writes, "most of the studies are largely descriptive,
not analytical, and often suggest correlations rather than causal processes" (Bardhan 2002, 200). Nonetheless,
there is evidence indicating the benefits of decentralization, including strong negative correlations between
fiscal decentralization and corruption (Smoke, Gomez, Peterson 2006, 20 citing Fisman and Gatti 2001); "closer"
government, which is more likely to respond to local concerns (de Mello 2000, 7); and improved social capital,
including greater confidence in government and increased social activity (de Mello 2000, 9).
Decentralization has been a formalized and consistently reaffirmed tenet of international water management
since 1992, when the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development assumed Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) as best practice, and adopted participatory governance as a key feature in national water
policies (Rahaman and Varis 2005, 17).' According to a 2012 UN Status Report, 78% of 133 countries polled
claimed to have aligned national water policies with an 1WRM model (UN-Water, 2012, 12). Repeatedly, international conferences on development have linked IWRM principles on local water governance to poverty alleviation.9 Simultaneously - though not always linked to national level policies - low-income communities have
experimented with decentralized, on-site water and sanitation infrastructure as a way of increasing affordability
and service coverage, while ensuring greater community participation and flexibility in service provision.
25
8 The Global Water Partnership (GWP)
an international advocate for IWRM
promotes participatory action, makes the
links between decentralization and community participation explicit: participation
is best achieved through "decentralizing
decision making to the lowest level"
9 According to Rahaman and Varis (2005)
In addition to the Rio Declaration, the
Second World Water Forum in 2000, the
World Summit on Sustainable development in 2002, the Third World Water
Forum in 2003, and the UN Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) reaffirmed
support for IWRM principles (Rahaman
and Varis 2005, 17)
Yet, as seen in Mexico, decentralization at the local level
frequently falls short of the aspirations articulated in federal
policy. The discrepancy is often due to lack of adequate
enforcement at the local level. For instance, while Pakistani
law mandates some degree of water cost-recovery, only
7% of rural households countrywide pay for water, largely
because local authorities lack of realistic mechanisms for
providing water to those unable to pay (Nawab and Nyborg
2009, 588). Insufficient coordination among sectors (i.e.
academic and government), levels (i.e. national and local),
and bureaucratic agencies may also frustrate attempts to
provide water and sanitation services (Nawab and Nyborg
2009, 583; Tsagarakis et al. 2001). For instance, in Haiti,
despite national laws supporting decentralized water
governance, lack of coordination between government
agencies, overlapping laws and unclear parceling of responsibility among federal and state level water agencies has
resulted in an inefficient water management regime (Stoa
2014, 36). Where federal law explicitly acknowledges the
role of community in creating water policy, as is the case in
Pakistan, local governments often still have trouble finding
appropriate venues for community participation, attracting
truly representative members of local communities, and
engaging with women (Nawab and Nyborg 2009,583).
More generally, the way decentralization is implemented
may have broad, unintended effects on the transparency
of local government. If strong, democratic institutions are
not already in place at the local level, decentralizing funds
and authority may, in fact, increase authoritarianism and
decrease government accountability (Oxhorn, Tulchion,
Selee 2004); make local government (and federal funds)
more vulnerable to capture by local elites (Bardhan 2002,
192); increase local dependency on federal funding sources,
with potentially harmful results for national economies
(Montero and Samuels, 2004); and lead to problematic
spending behavior at the local level, as local governments
look for national government for bailouts in exchange for
votes (Fauget 2013, 8).
Ultimately, as Bardhan writes, "decentralization, to be really
effective, has to accompany serious attempts to change the
existing structures of power within communities and to
improve the opportunities for participation and voice and
26
GOVERNANCE
engaging the hitherto disadvantaged or disenfranchised in the political process" (Bardhan 2002, 202). In other
words, while decentralized government structures may contribute to good governance, the theorized benefits of
decentralization are realized through the work of local institutions, not federal mandate. The successful experience of community WatSan systems, illustrated below in cases from Pakistan and Latin America, suggest lessons
for how local institutions might realize physical infrastructure and good governance as mutually reinforcing
forces.
2.3 CASE STUDIES
In her seminal work on common-pool management institutions, Elinor Ostrom emphasizes the importance
of human capital (knowledge and skills) and social capital (interaction among individuals) in complementing
physical capital (material resources). She argues that because facilities are not operated or maintained automatically, institutions should encourage the growth of social capital as a necessary quality for development
(Ostrom 1994, 20-23). Ostrom writes, "it is a mistake to design irrigation and other development projects
on the presumption that physical capital is the most important input factor" (Ostrom 1994, 20). Scholars
have since supplemented Ostrom's list of community capital by acknowledging the importance of political
capital (influence over resource distribution), natural capital (environmental resources) and cultural capital
(community values) (Flora 2004,8).
Some of the most successful WatSan programs implemented in poor urban communities have relied on local
reserves of social, human and political capital to realize ambitious infrastructures in areas with few apparent
resources. The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan is one example of a large, informal, low-income
community mobilizing for improved WatSan coverage, in the face of provision deficits from local government.' 0
In a second example, from Brazil, partnerships between local government and users developed "condominial"
networks of small pipes, buried shallow in the ground. Extensive networks address the needs of growing water
and sanitation needs of populations in the peri-urban surroundings of large Brazilian cities (Melo 2005, 7).
Both projects serve as useful models for the Mexico case, to outline some characteristics of successful
community implementation and management of WatSan systems. Though the projects exist in very different
geographic, political and cultural contexts, there are some basic similarities that recommend them as suitable
precedents for community action in the peri-urban neighborhoods of Mexico City. In each case, target populations are urban, informally settled, low-income, and large. The sanitation component of the OPP currently
serves around 1oo,ooo households in informal settlements of Karachi, with an additional 5o,ooo households
involved in replication projects implemented throughout the country. Similarly, condiminial sewerage
programs have been used widely for both sanitation and water provision, including in Brasilia, where 500,000
people benefit from improved sewerage systems (Melo 2005, 7). Orangi has also been studied extensively
since the OPP sanitation project was founded in 1988, and condiminial sewerage projects in Brazil date from
the 1980s. In both instances, citizen and government groups work together to create practical solutions that
addressed both the need for new infrastructure, and the necessity of long-term maintenance of WatSan systems.
27
2.4 SPATIAL ORGANIZATION AS A TOOL FOR COMMUNITY BUILDING
The critical innovation of OPP's sanitation project is that of internal-external sanitation provision, which
assigns responsibilities for infrastructure along strict spatial borders. Organizational units, which correspond
to geographic scales - from household to neighborhood - order construction, maintenance, and financial
interactions. According to this model, residents are responsible for household latrines, underground sewers in
lanes, and neighborhood collector sewers ("internal" infrastructure) while local government builds and manages
trunk sewers and treatment plants ("external" infrastructure) (Hasan 2006, 458). Separating community and
government responsibilities allows integration of existing sewage networks into new plans." Responsibility
for internal infrastructure is partitioned further according to scalar divisions within the neighborhood. Individual households are responsible for providing sanitary latrines; lanes (20-30 households) create underground
sewerage lines and connections; at the neighborhood level, secondary or collector drains (Boyatzis and Khawaja
2014, 295). Households can pay off the cost of lane sewage lines in installments to lane managers, who are
elected by households in each lane (Boyatzis and Khawaja 2014, 296; Hasan zoo8, 115). In this way, natural
geographic boundaries organize actors into community units that maintain the neighborhood sanitation
system. Many of the innovations of the OPP were developed separately in the Brazilian model. There, a division
between public and "condiminial" or resident-developed branches, also reduced costs, established clear responsibilities of participants and brought traditional service providers and residents together (Melo 2005, 6).
2.5 EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
Ostrom argues that once established, institutions may be used "to accomplish entirely different joint activities at much lower start-up costs" (Ostrom 1994, 20). Supporting that hypothesis, the OPP has diversified
into a variety of functions beyond its original purpose of sanitation provision. Currently, the OPP manages
community housing and education programs, water supply systems, women's savings programs, research and
training, mapping, micro enterprise credit, and health programs (OPPinstitutions.org). The programs are instrumental in their own right, but some, including community credit programs are also tools for building trust in
the community and between local community organizations and OPP (Welle zoo6, 22).
Where local organizations are most successful, they often invest heavily in human capital. The OPP-RTl
(Research and Training Institute) runs training programs that operate along a similar model, teaching residents
mapping, surveying, and planning, designing and cost estimating low cost sanitation (OPPinstitutions.
org). Similarly, in Honduras, AguaClara, a US-based nonprofit that has co-built eight rural community water
systems since 2005, sponsors training programs for local operators in a variety of hard and soft skills including
accounting, leadership, teamwork, health, water quality measuring, legal frameworks for water quality, water
treatment, technology (M. Gonzalez Rivas et al 2014, 568). Developing such skills within communities are
especially important in light of the fact that as much as 30-40% of built water systems is dysfunctional at any
moment (Lockwood and Smits 2011 cited in Rivas et al. 2014, 567). Considering that maintenance is a key cause
of infrastructural failure, local partners are critical players in ensuring the sustainability of such systems.
2.6 HORIZONTAL LINKS & VERTICAL TIES
28
GOVERNANCE
12 According to Muhammad Yunus, microcredit was pioneered in Khan's earlier work
in Comilla, Pakistan, a project that OPP
borrowed heavily from, but which predates
Opp by approximately two decades.
11 Where the
Karachi Water and Sewerage
Board (KWSB) has built and funded both
internal and external sewage and ignored
the in-place informal sewerage systems,
new sewer trunk lines remained dry and
treatment plants underused, and increased
costs have led to loans the KWSB cannot
service (Hasan 2006, 473)
-
Both "bonding" capital, or horizontal links between
members of the community, and "bridging" capital, or
vertical connections to outsiders, are necessary in successfully leveraging existing social capital; where one is present
and the other is not, communities may reject ideas from
outsiders, or adopt those ideas indiscriminately (Flora 2004,
9). The founder of OPP, Akhtar Ameed Khan Khan, argued
that the OPP model succeeded because a network of relationships allowed leadership to develop at multiple levels of
the organization (country, community, village, lane, family),
and created tight social groups that strengthened commitment towards realizing projects (Boyatz and Khawaja 2014,
299). Accordingly, the development of community-based
organizational units and internal leadership was critical
to OPP's success in Karachi. Well-defined community
responsibilities - such as managing and collecting money
reinforce the autonomy of local, resident-based institutions.
Widely used, micro-credit initiatives, which leverage strong
social capital for mutual financial gain - used extensively in
Orangi today - are actively used to reinforce bonding capital
within the settlement (Boyatz 2014, 30o).12 At a national
level, a community development network of replication
projects employing the OPP model links settlements
throughout the country, as partner organizations meet
CONDOMINIAL SEWERAGE systems in
Brazil and Karachi, Pakistan.
regularly to discuss findings (Hasan 2006,460).
Condiminial programs in Brasilia "received support from
the highest levels of the utility company and local authorities" (Melo 2005,
2). Simultaneously, project leaders worked
to garner support from community residents by holding
approximately 5,000 meetings within the community,
which were attended by 57,000 participants (Melo 2005,17).
Similarly, the Orangi Project relied heavily on the coordinated efforts of a variety of community, governmental,
nonprofit and academic partners.
In both cases, while
community participation is critical, project success relies
heavily on the strength of links between participants within
and outside of the settlement. The experiences in Brazil
and Pakistan are borne out elsewhere in the literature.
Globally, lack of coordination among actors at different
scales (national, local) and sectors (public, private, NGO)
negatively affects their ability to provide adequate service
provision. In Pakistan, for instance, Nawab and Nyborg's
29
analysis of water provision in rural areas finds that higher
level decision-makers often consider local people to be illiterate, disorganized or non-cooperative, while local residents
see policy-makers as naive and out of touch (Nawab and
Nyborg 2009, 591). In the OPP, well-rehearsed interactions
among actors, including between local government and
residents, reduced the likelihood of conflict. These vertical
links, a form of "bridging" social capital, also connected
residents to outside constituencies such as government and
nonprofit groups. While community involvement is fundamental to planning and financing the community sanitation
system, the OPP has also consistently provided technical
assistance and managerial guidance. In fact, the financial
viability of the Orangi project is premised on technological
innovations, developed in coordination with the OPP and
its partners that simplified the materials and sizing of pipes
(Boyatzis and Khawaja 2014, 295). Government, which
finances and constructs large trunk sewer lines and wastewater treatment plants, are equal partners in the internalexternal sanitation model. Students from local universities
helped survey the Orangi settlement early in the history
of the project (Hasan 2006,460). In Brasilia, government
funding and technical support helped plan and implement
new condiminial lines.
The case of AguaClara, shows how vertical linkages between
actors can help village communities access financial and
technical support unavailable locally. Although decentralized water management is a basic principle of Honduras'
national water policy, local political capital is necessary for
villages to claim resources made available by regional and
national government (Gonzalez Rivas et al. 2014, 573). As
with OPP, community participation is critical to success,
but outside guidance provided by APP "helps build bridging
ties to access external technical expertise and financial
resources" (Gonzalez Rivas et al. 2014, 572). In Honduras,
Brazil and Pakistan local mobilizations for improved water
services were most effective when they combined top-down
support with bottom-up activism, belying the conceptual
dichotomy that maintains a clear distinction between the
two. In other words, even where movements explicitly root
themselves in community support, as in the case of OPP,
complex social projects entail hybrid system of institutions
30
GOVERNANCE
that combine public, private and nonprofit actors operating
at multiple scales. In the next section, 1propose this hybrid
system - simultaneously bottom-up and top-down, centralized and decentralized - in the social and institutional
context of Mexico City.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this light, any new WatSan infrastructures should
consider not only physical capital, but also the various forms
of social, political and human capital described above. The
referenced cases suggest that participatory approaches can
create sustainable physical infrastructures, by leveraging
latent sources of finance and labor. At the same time,
infrastructure can reinforce local institutions in nonphysical ways by developing inter and intra-community
ties, encouraging opportunities for learning and knowledge
creation, and creating new organizational vehicles for
wealth generation and political mobilization.
This basic principle of complementarity - that an understanding of local institutions should inform the design
of physical infrastructure, and that infrastructure should
in turn reinforce local institutions - describes the philosophical logic behind the proposal offered in Part 2 of this
thesis. That section begins by examining lztapalapa in
greater detail as a way of better understanding what types of
infrastructure might be most appropriate for the neighborhood, and what forms of local governance can contribute to
implementation and long term sustainability of new water
infrastructures there.
31
CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT
If the preceding examples illustrate some of the general social characteristics for
successful urban water and sanitation projects, this chapter explores the specific
physical and social landscape of Iztapalapa. Rather than speculate on the possibility for community led mobilization in the delegacion, the intention here is
to better understand ways to integrate new water infrastructure within the local
institutional context. As the cases described earlier suggest, successful projects
inevitably exploit multiple forms of latent capital (social, cultural, technological,
financial, etc.), realized through a network of actors that include local residents
and community leaders, government, and civil society. Identifying the resources and partners present in the site heavily influences choices regarding the form
and placement of design interventions that promote effective water management at the local level.
3.1 GROWTH
lztapalapa is the most populous of Mexico City's delegaciones, the most densely settled, and the third largest by land
area (INEGI). The borough lies along the eastern edge of the Federal district, bounded to the east and north by the
municipalities of Ciudad Nezahualcoyotl and La Paz, both within Mexico State.
Among residents of the Federal District, the delegacion carries a reputation for crime, perhaps because it consistently
ranks at the top of city rates in absolute numbers, although the per capita rates are in fact almost identical to citywide
averages (372.8 "high impact" crimes per 100,000 people, versus an average of 373.3 in 2014 for the entire Distrito Federal)
(calculations based on Informe Estadistico Delectivo en el Distrito Federal, 2014).
Commerce and Industry represent the two largest economic sectors within Iztapalapa, accounting for 38.0% and 27.5%
of gross product, respectively (Delegacion Iztapalapa, Secretaria de Desarollo Economico). Most male residents work
as artesans or manual laborers, while women are most commonly merchants or clerks (Delegacion Iztapalapa: Perfil
Sociodemografico, 34).13 Despite employment rates roughly equal with the Federal District, half of lztapalapa's population earns less than two times the minimum monthly wage, and almost three quarters earn less than three times the
minimum monthly wage (Delegacion lztapalapa, Secretaria de Desarollo Economico, 22; Delegacion lztapalapa: Perfil
Sociodemografico, 34).14 These numbers compare unfavorably with the greater Federal District, where only 42% of the
population makes less than two times the minimum monthly wage (Programa Delegacional de Desarrollo Urbano en
lztapalapa, 18). Most residents live in freestanding houses, though almost a quarter inhabit apartments, and 13% live
in vecindades, a type of apartment building with shared central patios, often designed for low-income residents (El
Universal, 2009).
Historically, the area has grown at a faster rate than the rest of the Federal District, though this rate has declined
significantly since 1990 as the delegacion fully urbanized (Delegacion Iztapalapa: Perfil Sociodemografico, 6). As early as
the 16th century, lztapalapa consisted of io,ooo residents (wikipedia - delegacion original source), though the number
32
CONTEXT
0
_____
Ylp
.4
~MjXCLVAT
-1-
-J~
~
'J
L~
'I
13
-I
Data regarding business size for the
delegacion is not publically available
but if lztapalapa accords with trends
at the city level, the vast majority of
residents (approximately 94%) work in
microempresas of less than io people
(Mondragon and Mondragon 2008, 51).
14 This metric is commonly in
Mexico
used to describe earning potential,
and to evaluate household eligibility
for subsidies, among other things. In
2014, the minimum monthly salary was
67.29 pesos per day, which translates
to roughly 2020 pesos per month or
$136 USD (CONSAMI 2014).
33
URBAN FABRICS
Recent settlement in lztapalapa tends to
concentrate along the district's eastern edge,
in the area bordering the Sierra Catalina
mountain ranges and Mexico State, farthest
removed from the city center. The distinction
between the more recently founded urban
areas, and those established in the 1940s and
earlier, can be read in the physical fabric of
these communities, which become increasing dense along a west-to-east gradient.
The neighborhood social organizations that
agitate and protest on behalf of the urban
poor, typically command more local support
in these eastern regions.
34
CONTEXT
0
UUPS
V
Al.
a-Wil
41
PIZ1
9 plinia tflA
i'"'
UU~intAX
N
K
{
{Li~ ~
;.ThE7LpC w
/
tj~1
N-.
;jJ-i-4.4
~'
(p
/
/
'~-N.
N-''
-p
A
/
1-.
N-
ff1!
-J
N
I-
Nt
35
dropped considerably during early colonial times, and only fully recovered in the early 2oth century. By 1903 the
municipal population had grown to 10,0440 residents (lztapalapa, 6/132), with most inhabitants concentrated
predominantly in neighborhoods north of the Cerro de la Estrella, and around what is the modern day Central
de Abastos - the commercial heart of the region, and the single most important foodstuff entrepot for the
greater metropolitan area (Enciclopedia de los Municipios y Delegaciones de Mexico: lztapalapa). In 1928, when
lztapalapa was made a delegacion within the Federal District the area population still hovered around io,ooo. In
1940, the population was 24,272. By 1960, however, the population had grown to 254,355 with 37% of the demographic growth due to rural migration spurred by economic opportunities in Mexico City (Bravo M., 55). By the
end of the 1970s, the delegacion was almost fully urbanized, its economy shifted from agricultural to industrial
and commercial production, and fueled by heady population growth. Throughout the Federal District, public
authorities propogated a new housing type, the modernist apartment block called unidades habitacioneles,
built to meet the housing needs of migrants with limited economic means. As industry made agricultural land
uses obsolete, the lacustrine landscape disappeared, and by 1950 almost all navigable canals were buried under
asphalt or paved for new roads (lztapalapa Delegacion website; Enciclopedia de los Municipios y Delegaciones
de Mexico: lztapalapa).
The pace of growth continued through the 198os, then slowed dramatically; population growth exceeded zoo%
each decade between 1940 and 1960, dropped to between ioo% and 140% in the decades from 1960 to 1980,
and then plunged to below 20% after 1990, with negative growth in the five year period between 2005 and
2010 (calculations from INEGL; Delegacion lztapalapa Diagnostico; Bravo M. 54,55). Despite the slow-down,
migration still accounts for a sizeable and stable portion of lztapalapa's gradual densification. Both the 20oo and
2010, the census documents that approximately 20% of the area's population was born outside of the delegacion.
3.2 GEOGRAPHY AND MARGINALIZATION
While lztapalapa's historical settlement initially concentrated around its center and the flat plains of the drained
Texcoco Lake, recent growth concentrates in the less hospitable geographies around the delegation's eastern
edges, where the Sierra de Santa Catalina separates Lztapalapa from the delegacion of Tlahuac. The mountains
are the site of prominent land invasions since the 1960s, and new informal settlements that advanced along the
mountain slopes. Nor surprisingly, the colonias along Santa Catalina are home to the youngest, most illiterate
and most densely settled populations, the largest numbers of recently immigrated groups, and feature the
longest commute times from downtown Mexico City (Delegacion lztapalapa: Perfil Sociodemografico). Natural
physical barriers to adequate service provision compound social vulnerabilities inherent to the urban poor, who
often lack the time, financial resources and political clout to redress these problems. The supply of water, which
flows through secondary piping networks along the flat expanses at the center of the delegacion, often does not
reach the upper levels of the mountain slope. Water service is therefore rationed, with service in some communities limited to several hours, and extended as infrequently as once per week (interviews). Throughout much of
the delegacion, but especially in water poor sierran communities, service is supplemented by delivery of pipas,
water tankers subsidized by government but for which residents still pay am unofficial delivery fee (interviews).
Because neither piped nor trucked water is potable without treatment, families buy 20 liter water jugs from
local suppliers who tour the community regularly, selling each for approximately $8 MX, though prices vary
between colonias (interview with Jorge Carbajal).
36
CONTEXT
The Sierra Catalina terminates in several large inactive volcanoes, the most prominent of which - Cerro de la
Estrella - was Pre-Colombian ceremonial site and is now a protected ecological region. To the east, the volcano
Yuhualixqui is owned by mining interests that produce gravel from the mountain's volcanic rock. Even further
east lies Xaltepec, another volcano and protected ecological site. With the exception of Yuhualixqui, these
landforms are administered jointly by the city and national level environmental agencies, though the delegacion
struggles with the challenge of encroaching urbanization on the slopes of the sierra (interview with Juan Pablo
Espejel).
A lack of adequate water service is one unifying concern for the settlements along the Sierra Catalina, but there
also exist deficiencies in the quality of urban spaces within the region. Settlements here were often founded
with the singular purpose of supplying additional housing and, consequently, many of the colonias in the sierra
lack purposely built public spaces, including plazas, parks and playing fields. These characteristics exacerbate
problems associated with flooding - the dearth of green surfaces contribute to poor drainage and increased
surface runoff - but they also imply an impact on quality of life. Communal public spaces are opportunistic and
often improvised, established where space and demand exist to justify their presence. In satellite photos, one
identifies the presence of urban shared spaces not through large expanses of green - as in the city's center and
western neighborhoods - but through the colorful mosaic of market stalls that indicate tianguis, outdoor street
markets. These markets represent the most ubiquitous forms of public space throughout much of lztapalapa,
and they display an immediate logic corresponding to local demand but even here the lack of planning externalizes higher levels of traffic, congestion and pollution.
In this way, the geography of the sierra abstracts common demographic characteristics of social risk and
marginalization. Roughly speaking, the severity of these conditions diminishes as the mountain range breaks
from a continuous range to an archipelago of volcanic features, along the southeastern border of the delegacion. The colonias touching these mountainous areas share common household characteristics related to
access to amenities and services, are farther removed from the center of the Federal District, and benefit less
from municipal infrastructure. The conditions related to their historical founding - inward looking planning
regimes concerned almost exclusively with housing production - promotes urban density without the relief or
luxury of shard civic spaces and parkland.
38
CONTEXT
--
- 2MMA
--
--
-
-
.
- -
3.3 CLIENTELISM AND PARTY POLITICS
In previous sections, I describe how recent experiments in
political decentralization have contributed to a failure of federal
and regional-level water governance, blurring the relationship
between agencies charged with the same mission but operating
in overlapping administrative levels and physical geographies. At
the local level - that is, how local communities actually receive
water services from the delegacion - the institutional processes
involved are no less problematic, but in fact have a longer history
and are thus in many ways more entrenched.
Within Iztapalapa, provision of basic services such as water,
drainage, electricity, and housing is largely accounted for within
systems of clientelistic politics, with social organizations representing the interests of urban poor. Clientelism describes an
institutionalized politics in which "the distribution of resources
(or promise of) by political office holders or political candidates
in exchange for political support, primarily - although not
exclusively - in the form of the vote" (Gay 1990 quoted in Auyero
199,297). It has a long history in Mexico, where a single political
party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) dominated
Mexican politics from the late 1920S until the 1988 presidential
election.
VULNERABILITY & MARGINALIZATION
According to various household indicators of
of social marginalization, the eastern edges
of the borough are the most marginalized.
Not surprisingly, these areas are the farthest
removed from downtown Mexico City, the
most recently settled, and the most vulnerable to water shortages. The first map derives
from studies made by the borough's Centro
de Evaluacion de Riesgo (CERG), which employs federal standards, accounting for level
of education, health, houshold characteristic,
etc. All other maps are derived from Mexican
census data Source: INEGI).
40
CONTEXT
Beginning in the late 1960s, social organizations fought for
increasing autonomy in their relations with the state, while never
breaking fully with the patronage model. Local organizations
cultivated strong links with the PRI, but were largely confined
to operating as social welfare groups rather than political groups
(Fox 1994,160). Beginning in the 198os, however, several events
accelerated the creation of an increasingly pluralistic political
landscape, and a move away from traditional clientelism. First,
the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the wake of the
1980s debt crisis limited the resources available for clientelistic
rewards (Fox 1994, 165). Second, after the 1985 earthquake,
effective responses from citizen groups contrasted sharply with
government incompetency, affirming the value of these organizations in popular imagination (and especially in Mexico City)
(Fox and Hernandez 1002, 166). Third, as a result of ideological
disagreements within the PRI, several charismatic political
leaders emerged as alternative candidates to the ruling party.
In 1988, running under the Frente Democratico Nacional party,
RATE OF SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION
COMPUTER
IN HOUSEHOLD
100%
HIGH
I
0%
LOW
POPULATION UNDER
14 YEARS
BORN IN IZTAPALAPA
66%
0%
200%
I
I
YEARS OF SCHOOLING
0%
POPULATION DENSITY
So,ooo / sq. km
17
01
I
0
41
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas lost the Mexican presidency by a slim
electoral margin, which was widely believed to be the result of
electoral fraud. The following year, Cardenas and other leftleaning former prifstas formed the Partido de la Revolucion
Democritico (PRD). Throughout the Federal District, leaders of
city government had been appointed by the federal government
until 1997, when the city won the right to elect its own leaders
(Hilgers 2005, io). Beginning in the late 199os, however, residents
of the Federal District were free to elect their own officials,
making the left-leaning PRD an increasingly potent political
force within the city, and especially in the poorer delegaciones
along its eastern edge.
15 In an interview with Rebelion, Enrique
Reinosos, a leader of the movement, says the
origin date is 1988.
Emergent social organizations allied with newly established
political parties for mutual advantage. By the early 198os an
explosion of urban social organizations responded to budget cuts
that limited funding for basic services in neighborhoods. In turn,
movements like the Coordinadora Nacional de Movimientos
Urbanos Populares (CONAMUP) coordinated disparate neighborhood-based local movements that made explicit demands
on the PRI leadership (Davis 1994, 252). In the face of the PRI's
waning ability to address local concerns, social organizations
sought and found greater political autonomy, "working with new
technocrats in in government that recognized social movements
as legitimate representatives of the poor" (Fox 16o). Since 2000,
when elections were first initiated in individual delegaciones,
PRD leaders have won every local political election in Iztapalapa,
thereby creating a new political space and traction for local social
organizations aligned with their leftist political views.
36 Hilgers describes a 2004 meeting of the
PRD National Council this way: "the objective
appears to be seeing and being seen, as well
as meeting and making deals with associates,
rather than engaging in the formal business
of the meeting at hand, since it is well know
that matters of importance have already been
resolved (or postponed) by those present in
the private room." (Hilgers 2005, 20)
17 For example, in Yuguelito, the six subcommittees are security, which includes
access to the community and safety within
its borders; and press, responsible for creating
and disseminating literature and publications
advancing the FPVI mission.
42
CONTEXT
Thus, by the 1990s community-based community organizations
exercised a real influence on local level politics, dramatically
altering the urban political landscape of Mexico City. In lztapalapa, since the 1980s the single most important organization has
been the Frente Popular Francisco Villa (FPFV), which espouses a
Marxist-Leninist political philosophy, and retains close ties to the
Partido de la Revoluci6n Democritico (PRD). FPFV was founded
in 1983 in Mexico City. From the start it pursued a strategy of
claiming abandoned land at the outskirts of the city, and a focus
on providing housing to its constituents (Guerra Blanco 2013,
8o). 5 The FPFV actively pursued alliances with like-minded
social groups, participating in alliances through pan-organizational bodies such as CONAMUP, as well as directing its own
43
internal assemblies for local chapters. The FPFV's political ideology has always been intrinsic to the organization, yet the group only became explicitly political - engaged in the day-to-day of local politics - in 1997, in
exchange for a seat on the city assembly. That decision, which reified an implicit ideological alliance with the
PRD, exacerbated divisions within the organization and quickly led to fracture (Guerra Blanco 2013, 85; Hilgers
2005, 17).
One faction, of particular relevance here because of its local political influence in parts of the Sierra de Santa
Catarina, is the Frente Popular Francisco Villa Independientes (FPFVI), an offshoot that engages with local
politics to secure services for its members, but keeps no longstanding affiliation with any local party. Still, FPFV
carries its own set of political allegiances, including a partnership with UNOPIL (Unidad Nacional de Organizaciones Populares de Izuierda Independiente), an umbrella group that includes the FPFV and the Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ) (unopii.org). The complicated mix of alliances and conflict hints
at the complex structure and competing motivations shared by local organizations.
Within the established party, the dispersed nature of the group means that individual factions must compete for
influence in the national Congress.' Consequently, it is not easy to chart the specifics of the institutional relationship between and among political groups in lztapalapa, where social organizations within the borough are
as frequently engaged with internal political feuds as they are winning concessions from higher levels of government. Much decision-making is devolved to the local affiliates, who establish local committees that govern the
quotidian matters of security, maintenance, and community finances. The specific governance operations of
these bodies, including term lengths for committee members, vary between communities (Lao y Flavia Rebelion
2009,4). '7 The basic function, however, remains consistent across groups; in exchange for participation in
protest and marches, party members receive benefits, foremost access to property and housing. Where organizations are explicitly political, as is the FPFV (with the exception of the "independent" faction) members are
also required to vote for the affiliated political party, which in lztapalapa, means the PRD. In both cases, where
local government is not receptive to community demands, organizations join with groups to protest for basic
services through the use of strikes, protest, denuncias and roadblocks. Represented through its local community
leaders, the social organization initiates land invasions, secures government services and housing subsidies, and
retroactively negotiates title deeds with the delegacion. Residents pay fees and labor directly to the organization
for maintenance and new capital projects, such as installing electric transformers for electricity (interviews with
Raul Trujo; Hilger 17). They bear the cost of housing construction individually, though materials are often offset
by subsidies from the Instituto de Vivienda del Distrito Federal (INVI), which are negotiated by the FPFV.
3.4 YUGUELITO
The case of Yuguelito, in southeastern lztapalapa, illustrates the clientelistic model of service provision, and
the role of water in the mobilizations of certain marginalized communities. Yuguelito is the youngest of several
organized communities in the area founded by social organizations. It is home to around 5,000 people, housed
on 20,000 square meters. Prior to its settlement, the site had been used as a trash dump, which allowed its
unconstrained (but illegal) expansion until the community grew to the boundaries of active gravel site to the
north, and older settlements to the east. The settlement is divided into 50 square meter family-owned lots,
distributed over 21 blocks. A local architect worked with community leaders to draft the initial masterplan for
the community, and subsequent development has followed that original layout somewhat faithfully. Because
44
CONTEXT
FPFVI DEMONSTRATIONS
FPFVI rally in downtown Mexico City, in
2014. (photo credit: Raul Trejo)
45
,4
MI4
_
_
_
_
j
\
TT
-
e
47
financial means vary between households, and some
families have been present in Yuguelito longer than others,
houses in the community differ somewhat in their degree
of furnishing, building materials and number of stories.
Still, a typical home costs somewhere around $300,000
MX, including the cost of materials - subsidized by loans
from the Instituto de Vivienda del Distrito Federal (lNVl),
negotiated by the community leaders - and of labor, which
is often drawn from workers living within the community.
In Yuguelito's infancy, however, early settlers often lived
in makeshift houses built with whatever materials were
available, including cardboard and salvaged plastic. New
arrivals sometimes build temporary structures until they
secure enough capital for more permanent homes, and
almost all houses are planned in anticipation of future
expansion (interview with Raul Trejo).
The community is currently run by the Ruben Jaramillo
faction of the FPFVI. However, the original settlement
consisted of a larger parcel, established by a unified FPFVI
group before a political split between Yuguelito and its
neighbor, another FPFVI faction that now occupies a
slightly larger footprint on an adjacent plot. The two
groups sometimes clash, though their leadership remains
on amicable terms. In part, the friendly relationship is built
of necessity and political convenience. The need for shared
water infrastructure has proven significant enough that the
two factions have forged a working relationship over the
construction and management of shared water pipelines.
The two groups perform maintenance jointly, with the
understanding that shared infrastructure is critical to
the health of both communities. Although group leaders
communicate with one another when necessary, no shared
community group exists to administer water. Although the
new infrastructure will alleviate demand, it is not enough to
meet all of the needs of the community. Yuguelito receives
6-7 pipas per day for its population of approximately 5,000
people. The supply from secondary networks is insufficient,
so families buy jugs from private vendors for consumption.
Unlike in overtly politicized settlements, Yuguelito
residents are not required to vote for any particular political
48
CONTEXT
candidate. They are, however, expected to partake in organized protests such as marches or strikes, to pay
for necessary infrastructure, and to participate in community governance. Three citizen committees, each
comprised of twenty local residents elected every six months, are responsible for local security, community
health, and press (in charge of community newspapers and flyers). Additionally, block coordinators gather
regular payments from citizens, including fees for guards (who patrol the settlement and watch major
entrances) and water. Specifically, each family pays $6.50 MX per week for the cost of water, which affords
them three barrels per week, although families often pay an added "tip" of 70 or 8o pesos directly to the piperos
(6:oo). Families pay an initial downpayment of $500 MX (approximately $35 US) and are expected to contribute
to large infrastructural projects such as drainage, walls, electricity, and legal fees, as those projects come up. In
exchange for their participation, residents receive titles to their lots once the parcel is regularized, as a result
of legal negotiations between community lawyers and government officials (person interview with Yolanda
Cervantes).
Residents also pay a fee to support the salary of community leaders and administrative overhead. In Yuguelito,
the two community leaders - Yolanda and Raul - are cofounders and residents of the settlement, and organizers for several nearby settlements affiliated with the Ruben Jaramillo FPFVI faction. Unlike other administrative positions within the community, community leaders are not elected. They resolve disputes, organize
protests and negotiate with political officials and bureaucrats to win services for the community. Yolanda and
Raul have also developed relationships with some civil society groups, including Rotary International and Isla
Urbana, a small nonprofit that advocates for rainwater catchment in Mexico City. The Ruben Jaramillo faction
collaborates with like-minded organizations periodically. However, Raul describes a similar process of service
provision even in non-organized settlements, with politicians promising services street by street in exchange for
service provision.
50
CONTEXT
4
7
V
.
;:5-f
--
TT-
-177
MIRAVALLE, IZTAPALAPA
Like Yuguelito, the settlement of Miravalle
sits along lztapalapa's eastern edge. Founded
through land invasions in the early 198os,
Miravalle still struggles with deficient water
service.
51
52
CONTEXT
We arrived here June 28, seven years ago. We came because
one of the [social groups] sold us io,ooo square meters.
However, our organization grew in two direction, until it had in
its possession around 50,000 square meters. That were divided
into two territories, one part of land for the group Patria y
Libertad, and the group Ruben Jaramillo...With the compatriots
from Patria y Libertad, we had to have meetings because of
water. Precisely for water. Here, on the street you walk on [to
get here] we put in an 8 inch water. So, for that we had to talk
with each other and come to an agreement. And we put in a
joint water connection."
Raul Trejo
Yuguelito, lztapalapa
53
3.5 MIRAVALLE
In contrast, Miravalle - a colonia near Iztapalapa's border
with Mexico State, northeast from Yuguelito along the sierra
- has increasingly relied on apolitical strategies to secure
new services. Unlike Yuguelito, Miravalle has a long history
as a regularized informal settlement, dating to the early
1980s when the community was founded by migrants from
the Mexican interior. Since then, the colonia has grown
to approximately 13,000 inhabitants, housed in 69 blocks
that climb upwards from the foothills of the Mexico Valley
(Asamblea Comunitaria Miravalle website; interview with
Jorge Carbajal). Initial settlements were founded through
land invasions of ejido land, and local community groups
fought for additional services from local government, who
eventually provided paving, electricity and water, although
more recent informal enclaves still lack basic services.
Miravalle has been connected to the municipal water
network since approximately 20IO. Yet water service remains
sporadic, and residents receive water only one or two days
a week, for two to three hours per day, and typically reserve
those times for the bulk of their weekly clothes and dishwashing. The newer settlements, also the product of land
invasions, are entirely unconnected to the existing network
(interview with Jorge Carbajal). Because of inadequate piped
supply, the community is serviced by publicly subsidized
pipas. As in Yuguelito pipa delivery is purportedly free, but
drivers often demand additional payments from residents,
fill up large barrels for washing and cleaning purposes. Three
businesses in the area sell zo liter jugs of potable from the
back of trucks which circulate through the community.
Unlike in Yuguelito, the activist residents of Miravalle
have adopted a strategy to second-generation service
provision that relies on multiple sources and toggles
between government and civil society organizations for
support. Although the community has benefited from basic
service provision from both the PRI and, to a lesser extent
the PRD, the community has a long history of politically
unaffiliated community organizing. Through the Coordinadora Comunitaria de Miravalle (COCOMl), local school
teachers, students and family heads, developed community
54
CONTEXT
committees in health, education, ecology and provisions. But the fact that COCOMI remained largely apolitical
eventually threatened PRI leaders who resented the increased power of the community group, and continues to
threaten political groups.
In other words, the asamblea derives its authority from its apolitical nature; the fact that it is unaffiliated makes
it less effective in some respects and encounters significant political opposition from local political parties,
but it also means that its demands cannot be dismissed, redirected or subverted. In this way, the community
has staked out politically independent territory. COCOMI has since been largely subsumed within another
community organization, the asamblea comunitaria of approximately 8o people from the community, unelected
by widely representative of the community and not beholden to any single political party. The strategy of the
asamblea, is to rely on multiple sources of support, seeking funding from nonprofits and charitable organizations, and relying primarily on Federal District for support, but triangulating efforts between the municipal, city,
and federal levels of government. The assembly relies on Federal District funds from the Programa Comunitario
de Mejoramiento Barrial, which gives money to committees. The community won a $MX 1,200,ooo grant from
Deutsche Bank to fund a complex surrounding the school building, that includes a skate park, music pavilion
and running track. As Carabajal says, "more taxes, less services.. .the first [cause] is corruption. Here in Mexico,
to be a politician implies indirect benefits and direct benefits, negotiations with providers." Consequently, the
community has had to find creative alternatives to working with local government through traditional measure.
(43:40). In addition to Deutsche Bank - which provided a $1,200,ooo MX grant to fund a complex surrounding
the school building, that includes a skate park, music pavilion and running track - the asamblea comunitaria
has received assistance from local universities. Similarly, from moneys from the Federal District's Programa
Comunitario de Mejoramiento Barrial the assembly received $5,000,000 MX the community to build a library,
childcare center, community cafeteria, theater, bandstand, and community center (27:00).
Despite their differences, both Yuguelito and Miravalle are typical of the ways communities leverage existing
resources for basic services, and the somewhat oppositional relationship between local communities and local
government. However, both Yuguelito and Miravalle are also decidedly atypical in their overt rejection of
political means for securing services. As suggested earlier, social groups in lztapalapa are often explicitly affiliated with the PRD, and trade votes for land, water, electricity and other services. In this system, leaders of social
groups reap the political rewards of acting as go-betweens, translating the political will of local communities
to higher-ups in delegation government. Despite differences in tactics and political ideologies, neither of the
two cases discussed above follow this mold of explicit politicization. Leadership has chosen, instead to remain
strategically unaligned, picking their partners as needed, and availing themselves of multiple streams of revenue
and political support.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In lztapalapa, a long tradition of clientelistic politics creates a set of powerful interests described only partially
by the borough's formal democratic political system. Interactions between government and citizen groups, and
between codified and informal practices, is clouded if not entirely opaque. In this arrangement, representatives of social organizations marshal votes to secure services from government leaders, so that the urban poor
primarily derive their rights not as citizens but as members of groups. At their worst, social organization lack
transparency, embody coercive and authoritarian political tactics, and dampen free democratic expression. 8
55
km
;
a'
Here the political issue is clientelism, including with the left.
Here in the colonia there are three parties of the PRD and one
of the PRI, which is the minority. But they do these political
games playing with services ... The government's fear is to have
politically conscious citizens. Because the moment we wake up,
we won't let them [the government] to continue to do these
ridiculous things. We'll start demanding, pressuring. They can't
tell us no when we start to mobilize, because it's a right. We
have a right to this. If they delay or they tell us they don't have
money, we can tell them it's not true and it's not legal. They
can't deny us."
Jorge Carbajal
Miravalle, lztapalapa
57
Yet, in the face of government indifference to the needs of the urban poor, social organizations have consistently demonstrated their ability to win basic rights to water, sanitation, housing, transportation, etc. Moreover,
as clientelistic relationships depend upon the patron's ability to win real victories for the political client, leaders
are ultimately beholden to their constituents for support (Auyero , 326).
The philosophical merits of social organizations notwithstanding, there are several problems associated with
the unplanned and inherently political method of community building described above. First, this form of land
production - through illegal and unplanned appropriation - often neglects consideration of "second-order"
amenities such as public space or parks. Second, because social organizations are primarily concerned with
housing production, both leadership and members appear to lose interest in collective civic improvements once
those primary goals have been achieved. For example, as indicated in relatively low numbers of community
schools within the Sierra de Santa Catarina, neighborhood schools rank comparatively low on the priority list of
social organization leadership, who tend to focus on more pressing needs such as shelter, roads, and electricity.
Nor does government prioritize this agenda of "second order" amenities. Instances of low-income community
mobilizations promoting community centers, health clinics, parks, recreation programs, etc. are rare, and- as
in the case of Miravalle - often the result of efforts by unusually active but non-political community groups.
To some extent at least, the nature of social organizations - which mix elements of collective idealism, narrow
political ideology, and realpolitiks - frustrate institutional transparency and true democracy. The existence of
such groups is thus a double-edged sword, instrumental in realizing short-term needs but harmful to long-term
prospects of citizen empowerment. In the same way that Mexico City's traditional approach to water supply
offers a reasonable (if expensive) short-term solution to scarcity while sacrificing the system's long-term health,
so too do local clientelistic politics pose as many new long-term problems as they resolve.
The link between water and politics is not simply rhetorical. In fact, improved water infrastructure can serve as
a vehicle for addressing some of the critical urban problems described above. Within Iztapalapa, residents and
government leadership view the issue with some urgency, while over-withdrawal from aquifers in the Valley
of Mexico threatens the entire Federal District and adjacent municipalities within the State of Mexico. The
challenge thus unifies disparate political interests, and presents opportunities for cooperation and resource
sharing between governments at several levels. If linked to a fuller agenda of urban reform that includes
demands for adequate urban space, schools, medical facilities, daycare, parks etc. - the amenities afforded to
residents of the formally planned city - improved water infrastructure subsumes the needs of the urban poor
within a broader agenda able to garner support from non-local interests.
In theory, at least, Mexico City's water crisis represents an opportunity for collaborative action that can improve
urban conditions for the urban poor. In practice, political leadership has been tepid, reluctant to invest the
human and financial capital necessary for system-wide reform. The key question becomes, in the absence
of committed political leadership, how can local actors leverage existing resources to realize the agenda of
combined urban / water improvement described above.
58
CONTEXT
59
CHAPTER 4: PROPOSAL
As successive levels of public leadership shirk responsibility for Mexico
City's water crisis, the impact of the crisis continues to fall on city residents. Local resident groups are both most likely to mobilize in response
to this crisis, and best equipped to fill the administrative management
vacuum. In the management of local water resources, which transcend
local geographies, neighborhood groups may find a focal point for broadbased activism that transcends hyper-local political divisions.
Urban infrastructures are physical objects. That these objects must be designed and built, suggests a role for
architecture in creating new types of urban space, inserting new complementary functions and, finally, developing to new models of local governance. In those capacities, new water infrastructure may help address the
problems associated with the model of urbanization described earlier, which result in incomplete neighborhoods that lack essential civic programs and public space. This proposal attempts to justify the high costs of
urban infrastructure by coupling water infrastructure with new social programs and public space. It suggests
a model for one network - based on models of network decentralization, and implemented in the area around
RAIN CATCHMENT SYSTEMS
are used in a limited capacity throughout
the city, installed by groups like Isla Urbana,
a nonprofit organization based in Coyoacan, Mexico City. Isla Urbana teaches local
residents to install and maintain household
catchment systems. These household
systems are limited by the cost and space
requirements associated with storage, which
could take place off-site.
6o
PROPOSAL
41AIM
-
7,
.
*04
r
Yuguelito, lztapalapa - that can be replicated broadly throughout the borough. Using local networks of water
transmission and storage as a skeleton, the plan inserts new public spaces and civic functions into the dense
urban fabrics, thereby completing the unfinished processes of informal urbanization described in Chapter 4.
Broadly, the proposal addresses the entire volcanic archipelago, the socially marginalized region of lztapalapa
that suffers from the greatest problems with water supply. Specifically, the project focuses on a series of neighborhoods at the southern edge of the archipelago, in an area adjacent to Yuhualixqui. The area includes the
settlement of Yuguelito the study of my fieldwork. My knowledge of local conditions influenced the decision
to locate the design intervention here, where 1could best apply the methodology described in the following
section.
DECENTRALIZED WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
In the context of Mexico City's recurrent water problems, and its historical reliance on highly centralized infrastructure systems, I propose a decentralized water network as one alternative to the current method of service
delivery.
Many of the same qualities that recommend decentralization in a political economic context - namely, more
efficient resource allocation and improved governance (see Chapter i) - are also key tenets of decentralized
water management. Decentralized infrastructure occurs locally, at the household or neighborhood level. Such
strategies - which often include 'soft' or 'green' infrastructures that treat water on-site - purport to address
'wicked' problems more effectively than centralized regimes, while localizing the ecological, ecological and
urbanistic benefits of these strategies. Proponents argue that local level community actors are more aware of
ecological processes and more likely to adopt regulations in accordance with local realities, and that their regulations have additional legitimacy if imposed at the local level (Stoa 2014, 34). Reusing water at the neighborhood scale reduces financial and ecological costs associated with piping water (in) and wastewater (out) (Nelson,
12). Generally, such systems are lower in cost, require less energy, and are more finely attuned to community
needs. Simultaneously, soft infrastructure offers opportunities to improve the spatial and urbanistic quality
of neighborhoods by introducing ecological diversity and creating new public spaces. Such systems may yield
significant cost savings too, and in cases of absent or insufficient technical and financial assistance they may be
the only option available to communities (M.A. Massoud et al. 2009, 654).'9
In a second sense, decentralization refers to a non-hierarchical network, in which there is no single central
server, and each node is connected to multiple other nodes. As the number of nodes grows, the risk of failure
to the entire system is reduced, and reliance on a single central node decreases (Baran 1962, 3). Decentralized
networks are not the opposite of centralized networks (Paul Baran refers to such networks as "distributed"
networks); rather decentralized networks are similar to centralized networks in the "zoomed-in" scale, where
they focus around a small number of centralizing nodes. In a decentralized network, each grouping of nodes
and links forms a sort of module, however, connected to the next decentralized network. While the individual
parts of the broad network may be centralized, the network in the aggregate is non-hierarchical, making the
system resilient in the face of any single failure.
62
PROPOSAL
-Link
Stollar
CENTRALIZED
I
A A
DECENTRALIZED
fal
DISTRIBUTED
fri
Centralized, Decentralized, Distributed
Networks. (Baran 1964, i)
19 Comparisons of centralized and decentralized infrastructure costs typically look at
peri-urban and rural, as opposed to urban
settings, however. An EPA study concludes
that total costs for alternative and centralized water systems are between 1/4th and
1/7th of the cost of a centralized system,
including capital, operation and maintenance fees.
63
SITE STRATEGY
This proposal illustrates one module within a decentralized
network, offering a series of vignettes describing module and
outlining the rules for connecting such modules into a unified
network. The parts of the system here are the nodes, individual infrastructural "assets," and connectors, the pipes that
link each node in the system.
The intention is to address three concerns articulated in
earlier descriptions of the area. First, the design manages the
need for improved water service by capturing, transmitting
and storing rainwater for domestic use. Second, the project
introduces new civic programs and open spaces to the neighborhood in an effort to correct for a historical shortage of
these basic civic amenities. Third, the proposal attempts to
reduce the severity of neighborhood divisions that factionalize
relationships in the area, and create physical barriers that
divide the neighborhood.
The project creates a single axis, located along existing seams
of political division (and considering land availability and
local needs; this process is described in a subsequent section
on methodology). Along this axis, the proposal introduces a
combination of civic infrastructure - small parks, larger recreation spaces, schools and medical facilities -- and hydraulic
infrastructure - a mix of pipes, water storage tanks water.
The axis, which runs along existing rights of way, recreates
the street as a new center of civic life for the area, unifying
segregated and inward-looking settlements into a cohesive
new neighborhood.
64
PROPOSAL
Fl-
+
4
DESIGN STRATEGY
The project identifies boundaries or areas
of division (1), locates an axis along those
seams (2), and introduces a mix of social
and hydraulic infrastructures (3), to create
common spaces and integrate isolated
settlements (4).
65
BOUNDARIES The process of informal
urbanization often results in inward-facing
communities of self-interested groups
looking to maximize their own access to
finite resources. These divisions are clearly
read where territory is delineated through
walls, and political affiliations are advertised
prominently. The result is neighborhoods that
are divided physically, with long stretches of
dead streetscape, deadening urban life and
frustrates pedestrian mobility (photo credit:
Paulina Reyes.)
66
PROPOSAL
67
&
BOUNDARIES
DIVISIONS
KERNEL DENSITY
BOUNDARIES
SITE SELECTION & DESIGN METHODOLOGY:
The proposal introduces a site-selection methodology that
uses GIS-based mapping to identify areas most suitable for
new design interventions. Suitability analysis considers
proximity to certain 'desirable' characteristics, then calculates
the rate of occurrence of these characteristics and assigns each
square meter a score indicating low or high suitability. In this
case, I map four discrete characteristics including, first, the
existence of political boundaries and divisions; second, the
frequency of recent flooding events; third, the regularity of
water service; and fourth the presence of unused or underused
parcels. Proximity to each condition suggests either a need for
new infrastructure - as in the first three cases - or an opportunity for minimizing disruptive impact on the neighborhood
- as in the fourth case.
The selection criteria can be expanded and customized when
applied elsewhere. For instance, a more detailed suitability
analysis might include distance to relevant civic infrastructure
(schools, hospitals, etc.), access to existing transportation
networks, or demographic characteristics like income or
household size, as a measure of which neighborhoods demonstrate most need for new interventions. Consequently, the
method is can increase or reduce the number of characteristics
considered when defining site 'suitability' Similarly, the meth-
68
PROPOSAL
VACANT PARCELS
KERNEL DENSITY
VACANT
FLOODING
WATER RATIONED
COLONIAS
KERNEL DENSITY
KERNEL DENSITY
FLOODING
WATER RATIONED
SUITABILITY
(COMPOSITE)
SITE
IDENTIFICATION
69
odology can be implemented at a variety of scales. In this
case, 1used the approach to "zoom-in" on a pre-chosen site
area - the neighborhood that surrounds Yuguelito where
much of my previous research focuses. However, the same
method could have been applied to a much larger site, with
similar results.
There are significant caveats to this process, both in its
specific application to Yuguelito, and its broad use as a
replicable process used throughout the borough. First, the
availability, specificity, and currentness of information
may influence the results in unintended ways by favoring
data-rich areas. For example, because of its newness and
informal status, Yuguelito, appears on some official maps
but not others. Without correcting for this data gap, suitability analyses will under-represent the demand for infrastructures within the community. Second, despite their
apparent objectivity, decisions made through GIS-based
software are inherently subjective, reflecting map makers'
determinations about which information to include, how
to visualize that data, and - in this case - how to weight
each individual criteria in the final composite analysis.20
Although there is no "correct" weighting method, all
assumptions should be made apparent and justified. Third,
because these methods rely on information gathered from
field interviews and site visits, the data itself is subject to
biases, faulty memory and deliberate misrepresentation.
Nevertheless, the use of GIS-based tools provides a valuable
baseline for decision-making processes, helping guide
choices about where to locate specific interventions within
a larger site. Despite its inherent limitations, the method
offers a useful way to locate longitudinal axes and nodes
within large areas.
70
PROPOSAL
20 In this case, each of the four criteria
(land use, borders, regular supply, and
flooding) are weighted equally. The data is
sourced from a variety of places: Calidad
de Vida, a city government agency provided building footprints, blocks and street
shapefiles. Sistemas de Agua de Ciudad
de Mexico (SACMEX) provided flooding
data. I based political boundaries on site
interviews, site visits, and online maps
made available by the Instituto Electoral
del Distrito Federal (IEDF). I determined
vacant parcels based on satellite imagery. I
also note that footprints on GIS shape files
do not always align with the most current
satellite photos which, in turn do not necessarily correlate with on-site observations.
71
URBAN ARMATURE
The site, which includes the rectangular area along both sides
of a 500 meter axis, running just southwest of Yuguelito.
The axis coincides with an existing street - Calle Salto de
Agua - that begins at a vacant parcel on one end, and terminates at secondary school at the other. Within this site, the
proposal connects storage systems at four different levels - the
household, street, block and neighborhood level. At each level,
tanks store water for a predefined geographic area. Storage is
mixed between aboveground and underground tanks. Smaller
pipes, buried at shallow depths beneath streets, connect
household systems to larger neighborhood tanks. Where one
street fails, it does not affect the rest of the system, but where
the central line fails, it can cripple service to nodes farther
down the system. The impact of such a break is limited to the
quantities of water lost during the period of the pipe break,
however, with overall storage within each tank largely unaffected.
A mix of open spaces and new civic buildings punctuate the
axis at the site of formerly vacant parcels. The axis provides
a proof-of-concept to describe the rules governing how and
where such a strategy can be implemented within densely
settled areas. It represents a single component within a
larger network deployed throughout the borough. That larger
network can be described as decentralized when taken in the
aggregate, and yet the module itself relies on a single central
transmission axis, making it prone to systemic failure in the
case of leakage along the central water main. Still, because
each axis functions independently from the next, taken as a
whole, the entire network becomes immune to single shocks.
72
PROPOSAL
UNDERGROUND
WATER STORAGE
ABOVEGROUND
WATER TORAGE
I.
K
HYDRAULIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
1
1
AXIS
1>1.
41
SITE CONTEXT
73
CIVIC PROGRAMS
Civic programs housed in mid-sized buildings, accommodate small community libraries, daycare centers, schools,
health clinics. While the type of program varies according to
community needs, the buildings themselves are built using
locally available materials, according to construction techniques already employed by local laborers. Rather than making
water infrastructure invisible by burying it, fencing it off, or
removing it from the city entirely, the proposal highlights
those assets.
74
PROPOSAL
UNDERGROUND
WATER STORAGE
ABOVEGROUND
WATER TORAGE
ii
I
HYDRAUUC
INFRASTRUCTURE
AXIS
A
SITE CONTEXT
75
RAINWATER HARVESTING & STORAGE
The technology involved with water harvesting from roofs
is proven, simple and cheap. Within Mexico City, organizations such as the nonprofit Isla Urbana have installed
various rainwater harvesting systems at a household level,
often for central community buildings in socially marginalized areas of the capital. Isla Urbana officially counts 1700
systems installed over the past six years, and estimates
complete capital costs of approximately $350 for most
household systems (Isla Urbana website; interview with
Enrique Lomnitz).
Applied at the urban scale, the principal limitation to the
harvesting systems is the system's capacity for storage,
which varies according to the household cistern size but
typically stores up to 5,ooo liters. However, space is limited
in dense urban areas, and there are significant economies
of scale associated with centralizing storage capacity in
a limited number of large tanks, which is what this plan
proposes.
The proposal estimates the amount of rainwater that can be
harvested in a given catchment area over the course of any
given year, based on the type and size of roof, and estimates
for annual precipitation.2 The catchment area here encompasses a zone of one square kilometer, along both sides of
the central axis. The proposal assumes various scenarios
for this area, according to the number of households
channeling water into the new system's storage tanks. As
more roofs are introduced to the catchment area, and new
parcels are identified for development, the necessary storage
capacity grows to accommodate ioo% of volume stored by
these roofs. Storing, treating and reusing this water would
yield a total of 47,000,000 liters of water annually, accommodating the needs of 866 people per day, or - if saved for
exclusive use during three, summer dry months, accommodating 3474 people per day.
76
PROPOSAL
21 These calculations use the equation S = R x
A x Cr, where S = total rain volume, R = annual
precipitation, A = surface catchment area and
Cr = a runoff coefficient describing material
properties of the roof surface (in this case, I
use a runoff coefficient of 0.85 for sheet-metal
roofs).
The numbers reflect back-of-the-envelope
calculations that do not account for water
stored and consumed at the individual household level. Accounting for this consumption will
22
reduce the total amount of rainwater available
to the entire system, which in turn reduces the
total number of residents that the system can
serve. At the same time, this will mean that
each storage tank does not need to cover ioo%
of the volume captured annually - with the assumption that some small percentage of runoff
is stored by individual households.
RAIN VOLUME & CATCHMENT
The size of the catchment area determines the
total volume of rain captured, and the number
of local residents supported by the system. At
100%, so% and s% of roofs used to capture run-
off, the total volume varies up to 40,000,000
liters.
AREA: 91, 731 SQ METERS
VOLUME: 47,422,474 LITERS
~~a~
:t
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMAMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
11MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM
AREA: 45,865 SQ METERS
VOLUME: 23,711,000 LITERS
noonooOono
MOMMEMEMEMEMS=
M OME:=======
H
-
0
OMU....
AREA: 4,586 SQ METERS
VOLUME: 2,371,000 LITERS
0
U....MMMMM=MMMM=MH
MMEMMMMMMMMMM=M=MM
MESON
77
CALLE SALTO DEL AGUA / STREET SECTION
If the full system functions as an integrated mechanism for
storing rainwater, the central axis moves water between
individual nodes within that network. From household
roofs, where it is captured and undergoes a 'first flush' to
remove sediment, rainwater is piped along streets into a
large main running beneath Salto del Agua, the major street
axis for the network.13 Pipes carry water to underground
and aboveground tanks along the axis, terminating in the
largest tanks of the network. Along the street, native vegetation captures and filters storm water, which percolates into
the subsurface and reduces street flooding. The strip runs
along the eastern side of the existing street and, where it
widens into small plazas, introduces new spaces for seating
and street furniture. At its terminus, treated water is trucked
back to individual households by private water vendors and
public pipas, where it is delivered at no cost or sold back to
residents at heavily subsidized prices.
23 The system borrows heavily from the simplified sewerage systems
discussed in the context of brazil and Pakistan. In both cases, pipes are laid
by citizen groups operating at the block or street level. Pipes themselves are
placed at shallow depths beneath the street, to minimize costs.
STREET SECTION
A Household Connection
B Connection to Street
C Transmission Line to Storage
D Existing Water Main
78
PROPOSAL
A
B
D
A
MOT&
B
C
D
79
....
.........
..............
..
= : -
--
- .
.
.
*
f"Www4wimpow
LIBRARY
The community library serves as a flexible learning space,
managed by local users and employed as a flexible space
for community programs. The ground floor is open to a
large plaza, below which a cistern gathers rainwater piped
from surrounding communities. The open lobby connects
the interior communities to the major development axis,
linking fragmented neighborhoods through a series of related
programs. The central square becomes a meeting place for
various groups, an outdoor weekend market, and a space for
protest and demonstration.
80
PROPOSAL
41
I
--
-- 1111-
-
I - -
I.
.
. .
-.
II
I
81
MARKET
A public market mediates between the street and interior
recreation space, which also functions as a retention
basin during heavy rains and flooding. On the street-side,
commercial activities link the avenue to the interior parts
of the neighborhood. Recreation rooms, meeting spaces,
and community halls on the inside of the building serve
surrounding communities. Water is stored in underground
cisterns, the surface of which forms a stepped plaza overlooking soccer fields. These fields flood during periods of
high storm runoff.
82
PROPOSAL
-.-
IL
1
-
-
El.
.,
7
83
84
PROPOSAL
85
86
PROPOSAL
87
WATER STORAGE
Large aboveground storage tanks collect and store rainwater
from neighboring blocks. When these tanks reach full
capacity, shutoff valves located inside the tanks bypass water
flows along the water main towards the next cluster of
tanks along the line. Water stored in each cistern is treated
with chlorine on site, then transferred into mid-sized
water tankers, and trucked to households. Unlike most
existing water infrastructure, which is typically removed
from sight, these structures remain visible and prominent,
a reminder of water's centrality to the healthy functioning
of the neighborhood, and of government's standing obligation to provide these basic services. The tanks become local
neighborhood landmarks, contributing to a shared civic
identity. By opening the street wall, they introduce new civic
spaces, adding variety to the existing grid, and providing
new areas for meeting and gathering, socializing and
small-scale commerce. As a recurring modular unit, these
infrastructures can be built according to standardized plans,
exploiting the knowledge and labor of local residents, with
financial support from governmental and nongovernmental
bodies at the borough, city, and national level.
88
PROPOSAL
89
STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
Activist organizations like FPFVI have become increasingly
creative in their search for outside financial support for
community projects. These groups often pair their significant organizing skills and members' capacity for semi-skilled
manual labor with financial backing from sympathetic
organizations; in Miravalle, for instance, Jorge Carabajal
has fundraised from Deutsche Bank, among other private
24
foundations, nonprofits and government agencies.
The same approach could be used to develop the series of
small civic and water storage projects that make up the
axis water system, with its connected storage tanks, civic
buildings, and open spaces. Where local user groups provide
much of the sweat equity involved in construction and
maintenance needs, outside funders - including government agencies from the municipal to federal levels - could
contribute to the capital and operating expenses associated
with building and maintaining those assets.
90
PROPOSAL
COMMUNITY 'USE SHARES'
+
+
CONSTRUCTION
MAINTENANCE
USE
USER COMMITTEES
I
COMMUNITY
REPRESENTATIVES
OUTSIDE CIVIL
--
GOVERNMENT
SOCIETY
91
Although each asset is available for broad public use, local
user committees make decisions regarding how to maintain
and program each asset. Membership in these boards reflects
each group's level of participation in construction and maintenance, measured by communities' financial donations
and sweat equity. For each asset, user committees consist
of representatives from each sponsoring organization, with
the size of each committee varying with the type and cost of
the infrastructural asset. A large civic building, for example,
might necessitate a larger board, whose membership includes
representatives from government and civil society, as well
representatives from neighborhood groups.
This type of community governance is not new to the area. For
many local groups, there already exists a culture of neighborhood committees charged with performing basic administrative functions within their self-contained settlements. Within
the FPFV1 in Yuguelito, for instance, user committees organize
efforts behind laying pipes, paving and electric lines for the
settlement. Other committees maintain communal spaces,
perform security, collect funds, and organize social events.
92
PROPOSAL
F
A
B
CD
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
A
B
C D
E
F
G
E
USE / MANAGEMENT
CONSTRUCTION
MAINTENANCE
A
B
C
D
E
F
La Polvorilla Neighborhood
G
H
Francisco Villa indepeiente
Santa Cruz Residential Block
J
K
L
M
N
0
Pancho Villa Patria y Libertad
Francisco Villa Indepediente
Santa Cruz Residential Block
Las Arboledas Neighborhood
Santa Ana Residential Block
Las Arboledas Neighborhood
Santa Ana Residential Block
Minas Polvorilla Neighborhood
Isla Urbana
SACMEX (CDMX)
Secretaria de Desarollo Econornico
(CDMX)
93
a4jpjl%!W!
, , t4wrim
-
Rain Event
__
-
__
Household
Collection
--- .-
.,
Off-Site
Storage
Household Use
-
JCL"
off-Site
Treatment
Trucked De-
livery
4.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROJECT SPONSORSHIP
Beyond individual grants, there exist recurrent opportunities for government sponsorship, according to extant
government programs. One potential source of small project
funding exists in the form of Programa Comunitario de
Mejoramiento Barrial (PCMB), a program initiated in 2007
through the Secretaria de Desarollo Social of the Federal
District (Ziccardi 2013, 13). PCMB targets neighborhoods
defined as having very high, high and medium levels of
marginalization. Its goal is to create and improve public
spaces in marginalized communities, and it funds new
parks, community centers, playgrounds etc. in response to
projects presented to them by community groups. Broadly,
the initiative represents an effort to devolve the design and
implementation of these projects to the local level, and the
program relies local Asamblea Vecinales to officially endorse
projects before they receive municipal funding. Projects are
supported directly by funds from the Federal District, and
budgets are reviewed Technical Committee comprised of
members of the Secretaria de Desarollo Social, the Federal
District government, and civil society. Project budgets are
decided on an annual budget, with a maximum timeframe
of five years, with up to $5oo,ooo MX for new projects and
up to $i,ooo,ooo MX for continuing projects (Gaceta Oficial
94 PROPOSAL
POTENTIAL SPONSORS
Organizations like FPFVI have become
increasingly creative in their search for
funds, and found a variety of public and
private sponsors for projects. These groups
operate in lztapalapa and nearby, and could
be tapped as potential sponsors for new
infrastructural assets.
24 Government sponsors could include
Delegaci6n de lztapalapa, Sistemas de
Aguas de Ciudad de Mexico (SACMEX),
Secretara de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda,
Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Secretaria de
Obras y Servicios, Secretaria de Desarrollo
Social, Secretarfa de Salud, Secretaria de
Educaci6n, and the Comisi6n Nacional de Agua
(CONAGUA).
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
POTENTIAL SPONSORS
MeGAC"
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IZTAPALAPA
CIVIL SOCIETY
K!)
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
95
del Distrito Federal 2014, 144). Despite friction between local assemblies and local politicians, the nature of the
funding process allows project funding to remain somewhat beyond the reach of local politicians, and therefore
insulated from the traditional clientelistic relationship. This, in effect, allows a certain amount of autonomy for
local projects. Although the projects have one-year budgets, amounts can be significant: projects between 2007
and 2009 typically varied between $i,ooo,ooo - $5,ooo,ooo MX (Ziccardi 2013, 13). The program's budget in 2014
was $108,750,000 MX, down from $117,000,000 MX in 2012 (El Universal 2014; Torres Marquez 2014, 12).
In fact, current budgetary procedures may actually bias local politicians towards the types of small-scale
urban projects offered here. lztapalapa, like the other boroughs within the Federal District, does not collect its
own taxes, relying instead on the city to recover and redistribute money to boroughs based on need and size.
Accordingly, lztapalapa - the city's largest delegaci6n - receives the greatest share of collected taxes. In 2014,
only 16% of the budget was apportioned directly to boroughs, with the rest of funds directed towards various
citywide funds (El Universal 2013). Of the $3.4B MX allocated to Lztapalapa, approximately one third of that
amount is distributed equally among the 290 colonias within the borough ($353,000 MX per entity or approximately $24,000 US), administered by citizen committees and councils. Additionally, $63M MX is allotted to
"special programs" decided on by the council members (El Universal, December 22, 2013).26
To justify its expenses, each delegaci6n must submit annual budgets that describe operational and capital
costs. The one-year cycle discourages long term project planning because, even when longer-term projects are
described in annual phases, the added difficulty imposed by this bureaucratic process makes it harder and more
expensive to realize multi-year initiatives (interview with Mar Tomas Cascall6, Equipo de Proyectos Especiales,
Delegaci6n lztapalapa,). One interviewer also suggested that the short timeline of each project dissuaded real
community participation, since there was simply not enough time to engage with communities in any meaningful way (interview with Mar Tomas Cascall6, Equipo de Proyectos Especiales, Delegaci6n lztapalapa).
At the same time, delegados, the elected heads of each borough, are limited to a single three-year term.
Moreover, the tendency for sitting politicians to plan their next move in advance of their term's conclusion
often shortens their tenure even further. For instance, in January of 2015 fourteen of the sixteen elected
delegados resigned their positions. All fourteen were members of the PRD, and thirteen resigned in anticipation
of running for other office.28 The three-year election cycle for active delegados, combined with the one-year
municipal budgetary cycle, means that small-scale infrastructure projects may be both fiscally and politically
attractive to sitting politicians working at the borough level.
96
PROPOSAL
25 The relative size of budgets within
the DF are only partially accounted for by
size. In 2014, the top three budgets were
awarded to lztapalapa , which received 3,417
million pesos; Gustavo A. Madero, which
received 2,914 million pesos; and Cuauhtemoc, which received 2,277 million pesos.
However, the differences in per capita
funding 1882 pesos / person versus 2457
pesos / person versus 4281 pesos / person,
respectively, suggests funding considers
other priorities (budget calculations from
CNN 2013).
26 The total DF budget came to $156.8B
MX of which $25.4 MX was allocated to
boroughs. The rest of the budget included
$67B MX for various city-wide secretariats,
such as the Secretary of Tourism, Secretary
of Economic Development, etc. Of these,
the Secretary of Public Security ($13B MX),
SACMEX ($ilB MX), the Secretary of Social
Development ($8B MX), and Secretary
of Works and Services ($7B MX) received
the largest shares of the $67B MX budget
allocated to all groups. Forty other city
entities, such as the city Metro system, the
city Housing Authority (INVI) and various
educational agencies received the combined
next largest budgetary share. ("Administraci6n P6blica del Distrito Federal: Decreto
de Presupuesto de Egresos del Distrito
Federal para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2014," Gaceta
Oficial del Distrito Federal, December 2013.
27 Beginning in 2018, delegados will be
eligible for a second term (Diaz 2014).
28 The single delegado not running for
office was Jesus Valencia of lztapalapa, who
resigned to resolve accusations of corruption, stemming from a car accident the
month before, in which Valencia crashed a
truck owned by Protexer, a private company
that had received almost $3M MX in fees
for services to cultural programs within the
delegaci6n (Milenio, December 22 2014).
97
98
CONCLUSION
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In her investigation of institutions ("what they are, how and why they
are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate"), Elinor
Ostrom coins the term "action situation" to describe "the social space1s]
where participants with diverse preferences interact, exchange goods and
services, solve problems, dominate one another or fight" (Ostrom 2009, 14)
- in other words, spaces of ideological conflict and resolution. The proposal here literalizes those social spaces by tying them to physical networks of
pipes, plazas, and buildings. The final chapter in this thesis reiterates the
link between social and institutional space in order to reframe water infrastructure as a potential agent for institutional change.
MULTI-PERFORMATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE
Where an active local civil society exists, and local residents meet and discuss issues of concern with their
elected officials, interactions between citizens, government and civil society will occur naturally. Where these
relationships are absent - because, for instance, the legal status of residents remains in doubt, or civic amenities
do not exist - other venues for meaningful interaction must stand in. The network of infrastructural objects
performs this function.
In this way the governance strategies described earlier seek to introduce multiple opportunities and incentives
for collective organizing around shared interests. These strategies borrow directly from existing models of
informal governance, but service of a broad social agenda that transcends the hyper-local interests of individual
communities. Co-constructed and locally managed, each infrastructural asset facilitates new horizontal ties
between isolated community organizations, and creates vertical links between residents, government and civil
society. At the same time, the creation of user committees introduces new local governing bodies, may challenge
the entrenched system of political clientelism by making it harder for local politicians to 'divide and conquer'
with promises of resources awarded to individual communities in exchange for votes.
The proposal offers a new paradigm for urban infrastructure that justifies its costs by combining essential functional benefits (e.g. water service) with social, cultural, ecological and institutional concerns. The design thus
catalyzes community development by exploiting and then building upon latent community strengths. In this
sense, it embraces a multi-performative infrastructure that makes explicit claims on altering social and political,
as well as physical landscapes.
99
PRAGMATIC IDEALISM
Even replicated widely, the proposed network supplies only
a portion of the catchment area's total water needs. At best,
the proposal represents a partial fix to the large-scale water
management issues described in Chapter i. A full solution
to Mexico City's water challenges would require widespread
societal commitment to reducing water use; enormous
public expenditures to maintain existing infrastructure;
investment in new technologies capable of treating and
recycling grey and black water; enforcement of existing
regulations, including bans on pumping from aquifers and
vigilant policing of corporate pollution; and broad limits on
urban expansion, especially where development encroaches
on protected ecological zones. Given the political risk
associated with each of those options, and considering the
countervailing historical inertia, none of these reforms is
likely.
The intention here is neither to fully resolve those chronic
and large-scale challenges, nor to absolve government of
its core responsibilities to citizens. Instead, the proposal
aspires to a realizable, medium-term solution that alleviates the most crippling impacts of the water crisis on local
communities, while laying the groundwork for long-term
institutional change. In both its geographic and temporal
aspirations, the proposal advocates a meso-scale solution,
operating at the level of the neighborhood and scalable to
larger geographic areas. By engaging the "action situation"
at the level of the neighborhood, the project mitigates the
impact of flooding and water shortages. Although it offers
a limited solution to entrenched socio-hydrological challenges, the proposal can be piloted and scaled up over the
course of 5-20 years, with immediate benefits. In this light,
the approach reflects a philosophy of pragmatic idealism
that recognizes the need to operate within existing political
and physical landscapes, despite the inherent power imbalances that define those landscapes. It exploits the ability
of social organizations to negotiate with governmental
authorities while ultimately reducing the need for such
practices.
To borrow again from Ostrom, new coalitions for
neighborhood-level water management will manifest the
100 CONCLUSION
- 2r
phenomenon of "level shifting," wherein an actor is made
aware of "the opportunities and constraints that might be
available at a different level for solving some of the problems
occurring at a current level" (Ostrom 2009, 62).) By creating
avenues for regular, substantive, and unmediated interaction between different sponsors, the project translates local
needs into new urban policy. It situates both the diagnosis
and response to Mexico City's water management problems
at the neighborhood scale.
CONCLUSION
-
Throughout this thesis, I have tried to forefront the role
of designer as advocate for marginalized communities.
Generally speaking, urban planners are explicit about their
professional responsibilities to the public, and to disadvantaged classes, in particular. This stance stems from an
acute awareness of the discipline's mixed historical legacy
specifically its complicity in large-scale displacement of the
urban poor in the middle of the 20th century - and the topic
remains an important and recurrent theme in planning
literature and its curriculum. By contrast, the question of
ethics plays a much more subdued role in the urban design
discourse. Although designers are often concerned with
physical space as a means for improving quality of life, and
increasingly focus on the discipline's environmental responsibilities, the same issues of equity and social activism rarely
express themselves in discussion about the role and responsibilities of the urban designer.29
An explicit social mission underlies this work. The proposal
recommends designers as advocates for the urban poor. It
argues that they can affect widespread change in the physical
expression of neighborhoods and how their inhabitants live,
shop, move and play in those spaces. Moreover, it asserts
that designers impact the ways residents exercise control
over those spaces and, by extension, how they negotiate
their role within hierarchies of power. These questions
imply ethical stances on the part of the designer that should
be prominent in discussions about the role infrastructure
and its impact on the city.
102 CONCLUSION
29 Many of the canonical urban planning
texts from the last century (Jacobs 1961,
Davidoff 1965, Arnstein 1969, Richard
Klosterman 1985, Scott 1998) acknowledge the discipline's record as a tool of
the powerful, imposed upon the powerless. While some authors in the field of
urban design address this same question,
the topic is much less resonant within
the academic literature of that field. As
an illustration of this fact, the official
code of ethics for the American Institute
of Certified Planners (AICP) includes the
following mandates: "We shall always
be conscious of the rights of others; we
shall give people the opportunity to have
a meaningful impact on the development
of plans and programs that may affect
them; we shall seek social justice by
working to expand choice and opportunity for all persons; we shall educate the
public about planning issues and their
relevance to our everyday lives" (AICP
website). Although the Code of Ethics
for the American Institute of Architects
(AIA) exhorts members to "uphold
human rights in all their professional
endeavors," the document overwhelmingly emphasizes professional obligations
to clients and colleagues, to "care and
competence," to "standards of aesthetic
excellence," and to embracing the "spirit
and letter of the law governing their
professional affairs" (AIA website).
103
BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHAPTER 1
Bolaane, B., and H. Ikgopoleng. "Towards Improved Sanitation: Constraints and Opportuni
ties in Accessing Waterborne Sewerage in Major Villages of Botswana." Habitat Interna
tional 35.3. 2011.
Big Cities. Big Water. Big Challenges: Water in an Urbanizing World. WWF Germany. 20H.
Burns, Elena. "Repensar la cuenca: la gesti6n de ciclos del agua en el Valle de Mexico." UAMCENTL, Mexico. 2009.
Centro Mario Molino "Evaluaci6n Energdtica de los Actuales Sistemas de Aguas Urbanas y
Propuestas de Manejo de los Recursos Hidricos en la Ciudad de Mexico." 2012.
CONAGUA, "Strategic Projects: Drinking Water, Sewerage, Sanitation. Programa Nacional de
Infraestructura 2014-2018.
Chaplin, Susan E. "Cities, Sewers and Poverty: India's Politics of Sanitation." Environment
and Urbanization ii.1.
199.
Daigger, Glen T., and George V. Crawford. "Enhancing Water System Security and Sustain
ability by Incorporating Centralized and Decentralized Water Reclamation and Reuse
into Urban Water Management Systems." Journal of Environmental Engineering and
Management 17, no. 1. 2007.
Ensminger, Jean. "Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to
Land in Africa." The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. 1997.
Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom. "Linking the Formal and
Informal economy: Concepts and Policies." Oxford University Press. 2007.
Hern~indez, Felipe, Peter Kellett, and Lea Knudsen Allen. "Rethinking the informal city."
Critical Perspectives from Latin America. 2009.
Isunju, J. B., et al. "Socio-economic Aspects of Improved Sanitation in Slums: A review."
Public Health 125.6. 2011.
Katukiza, A. Y., et al. "Sustainable Sanitation Technology Options for Urban Slums."
Biotechnology Advances 30.5. 2012.
Lanjouw, Jean 0., and Philip 1. Levy. "Untitled: A Study of Formal and Informal Property
Rights in Urban Ecuador*." The Economic Journal 112, no. 482. 2002.
Legorreta, Jorge. "El Agua y la Ciudad de Mexico." Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana
Azcapotzalco. 2008.
Massoud, May A., Akram Tarhini, and Joumana A. Nasr. "Decentralized Approaches to
Wastewater Treatment and Management: Applicability in Developing Countries."
Journal of Environmental Management go, no. i. January 2009.
Mazari-Hiriart, Marisa, et al. "Longitudinal Study of Microbial Diversity and Seasonality
in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area Water Supply System." Applied and Environ
mental Microbiology 71.9. 2005.
Mazari-Hiriart, M., Y. Lopez-Vidal, and J. Calva. "Helicobacter pylori in water systems for
human use in Mexico City." Water Science & Technology 43.12. 2001.
Mintz, Eric, et al. "Not just a drop in the bucket: expanding access to point-of-use water
treatment systems." American Journal of Public Health 91.10. 2001.
104 CONCLUSION
Moe, Christine L., and Richard D. Rheingans. "Global challenges in water, sanitation and
health." Journal of Water and Health 4. 2006.
Olmstead, Sheila M. "Water Supply and Poor Communities: What's Price Got to Do with
It?." Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 45, no. 10. 2003.
Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton university press, 2009.
Payne, Geoffrey. "Urban land tenure policy options: Titles or rights?." Habitat Interna
tional 25, no. 3. 2001.
Sindzingre, Alice. "The Relevance of the Concepts of Formality and Informality: A
Theoretical Appraisal." Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and
Policies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2006.
Tortajada, Cecilia. "Water Management in Mexico City Metropolitan Area." Water
Resources Development 22.2. 2006.
Tortajada, Cecilia, and Enrique Castelin. "Water management for a Megacity: Mexico
City Metropolitan Area." AMBIO: A journal of the Human Environment 32. 2003.
UN Habitat "Making Slums History - A Global Challenge for 2020." Morrocco.
November 2012..
Ward, Peter M. Mexico City. J. Wiley, England. 1998.
Ward, Peter. "'A Patrimony for the Children': Low-Income Homeownership and
Housing (lm)mobility in Latin American Cities." Annals of the Association of
American Geographers 102 (6). 2012.
Whittington, Dale. "Possible Adverse Effects of Increasing Block Water Tariffs in
Developing Countries." Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1992.
World Health Organization. "Diarrhoeal Disease: Fact Sheet No 330." April 2013. http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs33o/en/
Yarza, Jorge. "Housing in Mexico: Structural Opportunities, Short Term Challenges."
Housing Finance International. 2014.
Zanetta, Cecilia. The Influence of the World Bank on National Housing and Urban
Policies. Ashgate, Wiltshire, UK. 2004.
105
BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHAPTER 2
Acevedo, Brielle, et al. "The Institutional Structure of Water Policy in the Mexico City Metro
politan Area." 2013.
Aldama, Alvaro A. "Water Management in Mexico." Cech TV. Principles of Water Resources.
&
History, Development, Management, and Policy. 2nd edition. New York: John Wiley
Sons. 2005.
Bardhan, Pranab. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." Journal of Economic
Perspectives. 2002.
Barkin, David. "The Governance Crisis in Urban Water Management in Mexico." In Water
Resources in Mexico, pp. 379-393. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 20H.
Bakker, Karen, Michelle Kooy, Nur Endah Shofiani, and Ernst-Jan Martijn. "Governance
Failure: Rethinking the
Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Hous
holds." World Development 36, no. 10. 2008.
Big Cities. Big Water. Big Challenges: Water in an Urbanizing World. WWF Germany. 2011.
Boyatzis, Richard E., and Masud Khawaja. "How Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan Led a Change
Process That Started a Movement." The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science. 2014.
Beer, Caroline. "Electoral competition and fiscal decentralization in Mexico." 2004.
Burns, Elena. "Repensar la Cuenca: la Gesti6n de Ciclos del Agua en el Valle de Mexico."
UAM-CENTLl, Mexico.
2009.
Cameron, John, Joseph S. Tulchin, Philip Oxhorn, and Andrew D. Selee. "Decentralization,
Democratic Governance, and Civil Society in Comparative Perspective: Africa, Asia and
Latin America." Canadian Journal of Development Studies. 2005.
CONAGUA, "Strategic Projects: Drinking water, sewerage, sanitation. Programa Nacional de
Infraestructura 2014-2018.
Daigger, Glen T., and George V. Crawford. "Enhancing Water System Security and
Sustainability by Incorporating Centralized and Decentralized Water Reclamation and
Reuse into Urban Water Management Systems." Journal of Environmental Engineering
and Management 17, no. 1. 2007.
Faguet, Jean-Paul. "Decentralization and Governance." World Development 53. January 2014.
Flora, Cornelia Butler. "Social aspects of small water systems." Journal of Contemporary
Water Research & Education 128, no. 1. 2004.
GonzAlez Rivas, Marcela, Karim Beers, Mildred E. Warner, and Monroe Weber-Shirk.
"Analyzing the Potential of Community Water Systems: The Case of AguaClara." Water
16, no. 3. June 2014.
Harris, Daniel, L. Jones, and M. Kooy. Analysing the governance and political economy of
water and sanitation service delivery. ODI Working Paper 334. London: Overseas
Policy
Development Institute. 2011.
Hasan, Arif. "Orangi Pilot Project: The expansion of Work beyond Orangi and the Mapping
of Informal Settlements and Infrastructure." Environment and Urbanization 18, no. 2.
2006.
Legorreta, Jorge. "El agua y la Ciudad de Mexico." (2008) Universidad Autonoma
Metropotana-Azcapotzalco.
io6
CONCLUSION
Massoud, May A., Akram Tarhini, and Joumana A. Nasr. "Decentralized Approaches
to Wastewater Treatment and Management: Applicability in Developing
Countries." Journal of Environmental Management 90, no. i. January 2009.
Mazari-Hiriart, Marisa, et al. "Longitudinal Study of Microbial Diversity and Seasonality
in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area Water Supply System." Applied and Environ
mental Microbiology 71.9. 2005.
Mazari-Hiriart, M., Y. Lopez-Vidal, and J. Calva. "Helicobacter Pylori in Water Systems
for Human Use in Mexico City." Water Science &Technology 43.12. 2001.
Melo, Jose Carlos. "The experience of condominial water and sewerage systems in
Brazil." Case studies from Brasdia, Salvador and Parauapebas. Lima: Water and
Sanitation Program Latin America. 2005.
Moe, Christine L., and Richard D. Rheingans. "Global Challenges in Water, Sanitation
and Health." Journal of Water and Health 4. 20o6.
Montero, Alfred, et al. Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America. Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press. 2004.
Nawab, Bahadar, and 1. Nyborg. "Institutional Challenges in Water Supply and Sanitation
in Pakistan: Revealing the Gap between National Policy and Local Experience."
Water Policy 11.5. 2009.
Nelson, Valerie 1. "New Approaches in Decentralized Water Infrastructure." Gloucester.
MA. USA: Coalition for Alternative Wastewater Treatment, 2008.
Olmstead, Sheila M. "Water Supply and Poor Communities: What's Price Got to Do with
it?." Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 45, no. 10. 2003.
Ostrom, Elinor. Neither market nor state: Governance of common-pool resources in
the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research
Institute. 1994.
Rahaman, Muhammad Mizanur, and Olli Varis. "Integrated water resources
management: evolution, prospects and future challenges." Sustainability: Science,
Practice & Policy 1.1. 2005.
Smoke, Paul J., Eduardo J. G6mez, and George E. Peterson, eds. Decentralization in Asia
and Latin America: Towards a Comparative Interdisciplinary Perspective. Edward
Elgar Publishing, 20o6.
Tortajada, "River Basin Management. Approaches in Mexico." 2005.
UN-Water, "Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water
Resources Management." 2012.
UNDP "Beyond Scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis." Human Develop
ment Report (2006).
Welle, Katharina. "WaterAid Learning for Advocacy and Good Practice." Water and
Sanitation Mapping in Ghana and Nigeria. Based on field visits to Ghana and
Nigeria. 2006.
Wilder, Margaret, and Patricia Romero Lankao. "Paradoxes of Decentralization: Water
Reform and Social Implications in Mexico." World Development 34, no. ii.
November 2006.
107
BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHAPTER 3
El Universal: lztapalapa: Sus Habitants, Viviendas, Problemas. 2009. http://
www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/645276.html
Aduna Mondrag6n, Alma Patricia. "La influencia de la Cultura y del Estilo de
Gesti6n Sobre el Clima Organizacional. Estudio de Caso de la Mediana
Empresa en la Delegaci6n lztapalapa." Estudios gerenciales 24, no. 1o6
(2008): 47-64.
Auyero, Javier. ""From The Client's Point (S) Of View": How Poor People
Perceive And Evaluate Political Clientelism." Theory And Society 28, No.
2
(1999): 297-334.
Blanco, Edgar Everardo Guerra. "Observing Protest Organizations As Social
Systems: The Popular Front Francisco Villa's Media Diffusion and its Press
and Propaganda Strategy." Contention: The Multidisciplinary Journal Of
Social Protest Volume i Issue i. October 2013.
Bravo, Carlos. "Poblacidn Indigena Urbana. El Caso de lztapalapa." Iztapalapa
Ritual Cultural y Cambio Social. Revista de Ciencias Sociales y
Humandades 25. 2005.
Castillo, Elia and Valdez, lich. Valencia Utiliza Otra Caminoeta'Prestada'
Milenio, December 22 2014.
CNN Expansion. DF Tendra Presupuesto De 156,837 Mdp. December 2013.
Davis, Diane. Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century. Temple
University Press. 2010.
Diaz, Omar. "Delegados Y Diputados Locales Podrain Reelegirse a Partir de
2018." Mas Df. June 2014.
Enciclopedia de los Municipios Y Delegaciones De Mexico: lztapalapa, INAFED
(Instituto Nacional Para El Federalismo Y El Disarrollo Municipal).
http:www.inafed.gob.mx/work/enciclopedia/EMMogDF
delegaciones/o9007a.htmI
Gay, Robert. "Community Organization and Clientelist Politics in
Contemporary Brazil: a case study from suburban Rio de Janeiro."
International journal of Urban and Regional Research 14, no. 4.1990.
Hilgers, Tina. "The Nature of Clientelism in Mexico City." Canadian Political
Science. 2005.
i08 CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHAPTER 4
"Publican Presupuesto de Egresos y Ley de Ingresos 2014 para el DF" El Milenio.
December 2013
"Los 14 delegados del PRD en el DF piden licencia; 13 van por una candidature." Animal
Politico.com. January 2015.
Robles, Johana "GDF publica presupuesto 2014 en la gaceta official del DF" El Universal.
December 2013.
"Lztapalapa tendra de Nuevo presupuesto historico" El Universal. December 2013.
Ziccardi, Alicia. "Espacio pdblico y nuevas formas de participaci6n ciudadana. El caso del
Programa Comunitario de Mejoramiento de Barrios de la Ciudad de Mexico."
Organo del Gobierno del Distrito Federal. "Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal." AVISO.
2014.
"Modifican presupuesto para programas sociales del DF" El Universal. November 2014.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: CHAPTER 5
Arnstein, Sherry R. "A ladder of Citizen Participation." Journal of the American Institute
of planners 35, no. 4. 1969.
Davidoff, Paul. "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning." Journal of the American Institute
of Planners 31, no. 4. 1965.
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Vintage. 1961.
Klosterman, Richard E. "Arguments for and Against Planning." Town Planning Review
56, no. 1. 1985Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition have Failed. Yale University Press. 1998.
2009.
109