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ANTI-KOREAN SENTIMENT IN JAPAN
AND ITS EFFECTS ON
KOREA-JAPAN TRADE
Kurt W. Tong
MITJP 96-05
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
_1_
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OMIT Japan Program
ANTI-KOREAN SENTIMENT IN JAPAN
AND ITS EFFECTS ON
KOREA-JAPAN TRADE
Kurt W. Tong
MITJP 96-05
About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyobased office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
Anti-Korean Sentiment in Japan
and Its Effects on Korea-Japan Trade
Kurt W. Tong*
Summary
This paper uses standard econometric analysis to assess the impact of
popular sentiment in Japan on trade relations between Japan and the
Republic of Korea. Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula was
unusually intense, engendering strong anti-Japanese feelings among
Koreans, but also generating bitterness among Japanese who are reluctant to
view their colonial efforts as a failure and are thus resentful of Korea's
marked rejection of Japan. Fifty years after the end of the colonial period,
Japanese for the most part still have strong, negative prejudices toward
Korea and Koreans -- feelings which become more or less intense in reaction
to historical events. The variation in anti-Korean sentiment, as reflected in
the monthly Jiji News Service poll of "liked" and "disliked" countries, can be
used as an explanatory variable for variation in the pattern of bilateral trade.
The regression analysis in this paper finds that anti-Korean sentiment
among Japanese has had a strong, statistically significant, and negative
impact on the growth of Japanese imports from Korea. Findings concerning
Japanese exports to Korea are similar, but less conclusive. When reliable
time series data sets on political variables are available, both economists and
political historians should consider using statistical techniques incorporating
political variables more frequently, as a method to make the study of
"political economy" more exacting.
* Kurt W. Tong, a career U.S. diplomat assignedto the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, is currently Visitor at
Tokyo University's Faculty of Economics. The contents of thispaper are the sole responsibilityof the
author, and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or any other organization
with which the author is or has been affiliated The author would like to thank James Marshall of the U.S.
Information Agency for sharing hisfiles of survey data. Comments are welcome; e-mail may be addressed
to kurttong@aol.com.
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Introduction
The power of nationalistsentiment can override all other
considerations;it can dominate the minds of a people, and dictate the
policies of government, even when in every possible way and to every
conceivable degree it is in sharp conflict with what seem to be and are
in fact the basic economic interests of the people in question. To
accept as obviously true the notion that the bonds of allegiance must
necessarily be largely economic in characterto be strong, or to accept
unhesitatingly the notion that where economic entanglements are
artificiallyor naturally strong the political affectations will also
necessarily become strong, is to reject whatever lessons past
experience has for us in this field. -- Jacob Vinerl
In the loose languages of journalism and political science, it is
frequently said that "relations between Country A and Country B have
soured, both politically and economically," or conversely, "expanding
economic relations between Country A and Country B are fostering an
improved bilateral atmosphere." Such statements do not raise eyebrows
because it is common sense to believe that, in international relations,
economic and political factors influence each other significantly during the
course of interaction between any two partners. But can the interaction
between political and economic variables be documented and measured in a
precise, quantitative way?
Although international relations theorists tend to discuss relations
among states as a cold calculus of economic and strategic national interests,
in fact history can be strongly influenced by the emotions and biases that
groups of people naturally develop toward other nations and peoples.
Aggregated from the individual level to the national level, this phenomenon
is "popular sentiment." Popular sentiment can have powerful effects on
nation-to-nation ties. Also, popular sentiment (perhaps unique among the
socio-political "intangibles" that impact history) can be measured and
assessed reasonably accurately, using modern polling techniques. It is
impossible to quantify the effects of any one individual on the measurable
economic variables of international relations. But this essay demonstrates
that it is in fact possible to quantify and assess the impact of broader popular
sentiment on seemingly unrelated quantitative economic variables.
I Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1950, p. 105.
2
A case study of Japan-Korea economic relations is especially suitable
for this endeavor, for three reasons. First, economic relations between the
two nations are well-developed, and of great significance to both countries.
Japan is Korea's second largest trading partner and foreign source of capital,
and probably its most important foreign source of manufacturing-related
technology. Korea, meanwhile, ranks among Japan's key economic partners
in terms of trade, as a host for outward foreign investment, and as a
competitor in international manufactured goods markets.
Second, as will be detailed below, emotions -- overwhelmingly negative
-- run very deep between the two peoples, implying a powerful role for
popular sentiment in determining the course of political and economic
relations. Political friction fueled by popular resentment is of course not
unusual. Also, the expansion of international trade and investment is a
normal, almost inevitable part of modern international relations. But what
is unusual about Korea-Japan relations is that the contradictory trends of
economic cooperation and mutual antipathy have both been so strong,
exerting themselves simultaneously over the course of the last three decades
(using the establishment of formal ties between Japan and the Republic of
Korea in 1965 as a starting point). The net result is a kind of "reluctant
partnership," where Koreans and Japanese interact vigorously in the
economic realm, but resent having to deal with each other each step of the
way. 2
The third reason for choosing Japan and Korea for this case study -essential to the exercise of quantification proposed for this essay -- is the
availability of a consistent time series data set measuring popular sentiment
in Japan-Korea relations. The Tokyo-based Jiji Tsushin news service has
faithfully conducted a "liked and disliked countries" survey every month since
1971, enabling one to plot month-by-month changes in the attitudes of
Japanese citizens toward Korea. For use in assessing "intangibles,"
consistent and reliable time series data sets of this type are quite rare.
This essay is divided into five parts. Section One contains a brief
discussion of the historical roots of strong bilateral antipathy between Korea
2 For detailed analyses of modern political and economic relations between Korea and Japan,
see Brian Bridges, Japan & Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment,
Ashgate Publishing, 1993,
Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, Hoover Institution Press,
1985, or Kurt W. Tong, Distant Neighbors and Reluctant Partners: Popular
Consciousness and the Political Economy of Japan-Korea Relations, Princeton
University Woodrow Wilson School Graduation Thesis, 1987.
3
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and Japan, while Section Two provides an overview of several data sets
related to popular sentiment in Korea and Japan, to serve as additional
background. Section Three introduces and describes the data set of economic
variables and popular sentiment data at the center of this study. The data is
analyzed using standard econometric techniques in Section Four. Section
Five contains concluding remarks on the implications of this study for further
research.
I. Historical Sources of Mutual Antipathy
Japanese commentators sometimes use the expression "distant
neighbors" 3 to describe the psychological aspects of Japan's relationship with
Korea. This phrase accurately captures the way Korea and Japan view each
other. Geographically Korea and Japan are very close, and culturally,
linguistically, and historically Japanese and Koreans have much in common.
Still, their very closeness only seems to deepen their mutual dislike. This
dilemma is in turn capsulized in another phrase, pronounced "kin-shin zo-o"
in Japanese, which translates roughly as "closeness breeds dislike." 4
According to this concept, the animosity between Japanese and Koreans is
actually exacerbated by their cultural and ethnic similarity and geographical
proximity -- a notion which is useful in explaining the perpetuation of mutual
antipathy between Korea and Japan in the postwar era. Still, the kin-shin
zo-o concept fails to explain how the "family feud" began. In order to
understand the roots of the mutual animosity between Korea and Japan, it is
necessary to examine the record of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, which
has set the tone for Japan-Korea relations throughout the second half of the
20th century.
Japan's Colonial "Intensity:" Japan's colonial occupation of Korea was
unusual in several aspects, most notably the fact that the metropole nation
was geographically close (as well as culturally similar) to the colony,
resulting in an extremely intense form of colonization. As Bruce Cumings
explains, "Japan became the only world power to colonize its contiguous
neighbors ... (facilitating) the settling of metropolitan citizens ... [and]
(raising) the possibility of an integral coordination and tying of the colonies to
the metropole such that exchange time in market relations was
extraordinarily rapid, with railroads rather than sea lanes as the prime
medium." 5 In other words, proximity to Japan made it practical (as well as
3 In Japanese, "chikakute toi kuni."
4 This concept is outlined, and criticized, in Lee Keun, Nikkan Sogo Rikai he no Kozu [A
Framework for Mutual Understanding between Japan and Korea], PHP Kenkyujo,
1982.
5 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 78.
4
desirable from Japan's perspective) for the colonizers to practice an uniquely
intense form of colonial rule in Korea.
What do I mean by "colonial intensity?" Mainly this: To a much
greater extent than their European or American competitors, Japan's
leadership aimed to rapidly integrate Korea into the economic and social
fabric of the Japanese Empire, treating it more as an annexed extension of
Japan than as an overseas colony. Japanese commentators sometimes point
out that this was not without its benefits in terms of the modernization of
Korea's feudal and mostly agricultural domestic economy. But Japan's
colonial policies, while often efficient in economic productivity terms, were
onerous for the Korean people. Politically, socially, and culturally, Koreans
were treated not as overseas colonial subjects but as an inferior class of
citizens in their own land, with all the obligations but none of the privileges
of citizenship in the Japanese Empire. Soldiers and police in colonial Korea
were Japanese, as were tax collectors and local bureaucrats. At school,
children studied Japanese and were taught to worship the Emperor. Citizens
could be punished for using their Korean names, speaking the Korean
language, or observing Korean traditions. The justification for this draconian
style of rule was the need for Korean subjects to support the "common cause"
of Japanese imperial success, a cause which found few followers among the
alienated Koreans.
In the world view of the Japanese leadership of the time, the "cultural
obliteration of Korea as an entity distinct from Japan, the extinction of
Korean as a separate language, and the end of Koreans as a separate
people" 6 all made perfect sense, even if this required policies of severe
political and social repression. Thus, political activity was sharply curtailed
by the colonial government after the March 1 Movement uprising in 1919.
Forced conscription became common during the last years of Japanese
colonial rule, including conscription of women to serve involuntarily as
prostitutes for the Japanese Army. 7 But more than mere economic or
political oppression, the indignity and insult of the misguided Japanese
campaign to destroy Korea's national identity was probably the most
important cause of the distrust that still dominates Korea's postwar view of
Japan.
6 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Harvard University Press, 1968,
pp. 73-74.
7 Roughly 100,000 Koreans were drafted into the Imperial armed forces, where many died or
were imprisoned. Estimates of the number of Korean "comfort women" who were forced into
prostitution range well into the tens of thousands (See George Hicks, The Comfort Women,
W.W. Norton & Company, 1994.) Another often-overlooked tragedy is the case of the tens of
thousands of Koreans killed or injured by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
(See Kurt W. Tong, "Korea's Forgotten Atomic Bomb Victims," Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, January-March 1991.)
5
QIP----
Divergent Views of History: Koreans emerged from colonial rule with
a long list of (justifiable) grievances against their larger and more powerful
neighbor to the east. Among these is the role that Japanese colonialism
played in the division of the Korean peninsula and the resulting 1950-53
civil/global war, which inflicted great hardship on the Korean people. 8
Koreans are angered when Japan's leaders claim -- as Prime Minister
Tomiichi Murayama did most recently on January 31, 1995 -- that "Japan
has no responsibility for the division of Korea into North and South Korea." 9
Koreans also object strongly to the common Japanese view that
Japanese colonial rule has in the long run served Korea well in its efforts to
development economically. To be sure, under Japanese rule Korea's economy
was rapidly and forcibly modernized. In order to consolidate Japanese
military and political power in its colonies, the Japanese authorities
established a sophisticated authoritarian administrative apparatus. And in
order to develop the colonial economies to the point where they could
contribute to Japanese wealth, the Japanese government invested heavily in
infrastructure and industrial capacity (particularly in northern Korea). As a
result, according to most purely economic analyses, "the net effect of the
colonial relationship was an acceleration of Korean growth."' °
On the other hand, little of the resulting economic growth in Korea
translated into prosperity for Korean nationals. By 1945, for example, only
about one-tenth of the industrial establishments on the Korean peninsula
were owned by Koreans, and investment by Korean nationals accounted for a
mere 3% of total paid-up capital in the country." Management and technical
positions were also usually occupied by Japanese. These barriers, combined
with postwar capital shortages and the destruction of Japan's infrastructural
legacy in Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War, meant that Korea's colonial
era economic development actually provided only a limited impetus for
postwar Korean economic growth.
8Like many decolonized nations, the Korea that emerged in 1945 was unstable socially, and
had only weak leadership -- conditions that made it susceptible to civil war. The division of
the peninsula into zones occupied by Soviet and American forces was also a direct result of
Japanese rule (and the desire of the Soviet military to capture all elements of Japan's
retreating Kwantung Army in 1945).
9Kyodo News Service, February 1, 1995. On Korean opinion see, for example, Lee Won Sul,
"Japan is at the Root of a Divided Korea," Japan Times, November 4, 1995, op-ed page.
10 Randall Sidney Jones, The Economic Development of Colonial Korea, Michigan
University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1984, p. 2.
11 Daniel Sung-il Juhn, "The Development of Korean Entrepreneurship," in Nahm,ed., Korea
Under Japanese Colonial Rule, Western Michigan University Center for Korean Studies,
1973, p. 127.
6
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Therefore, when Japanese commentators insist on discussing Japan's
colonial investments in Korea as a sort of"endowment" that Japan provided
to the colonies,' 2 Koreans bristle. In fact, the colonial economy during the
later years of Japanese colonial rule was based on labor utilization policies
equivalent to slave labor. Historians on both sides of the debate use the term
"labor mobilization," but while some Japanese use it to describe the
developmental process of drawing labor off the farms into the industrial
economy, in the minds of Koreans the term conjures up images of divided
families, hard work under severe conditions, and a meager existence in urban
slums or labor camps. Many Korean laborers, particularly those who became
part of the industrial work force after 1937, were conscripted against their
will and paid pitifully low wages. Thousands more Korean farmers lost their
land to absentee landlords. In general, the Korean standard of living
showed very little improvement throughout the colonial period, despite rapid
gains in overall colonial economic productivity and improving standards of
living in the Japanese home islands.
Japanese Complaints: This record amply explains why Koreans
continue to distrust and dislike Japanese, even decades after the end of
World War II. But why should Japanese have similar negative feelings about
Korea and Koreans? After all, the Koreans were the "victims" of colonialism,
not the Japanese.
Put simply, many Japanese (perhaps the majority) view Koreans not
as victims of history, but rather as ungrateful and disloyal beneficiaries of
Japanese leadership. It important to point out that the Japanese of the time
felt entirely justified in using a firm hand in adminstrating Korea during the
colonial period. Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries felt
surrounded by European expansionism, and at the same time Japan's leaders
were consumed with a strong sense of national identity and destiny, emotions
which were eventually translated into broad support for the militaristic
nationalism of the 1930's. Therefore, Japanese felt comfortable emulating
the expansionist policies of Europe and the United States.
In dealing with their Asian neighbors, the Japanese of the colonial era
were also possessed with a strong sense of national and cultural superiority.
In their vertically-organized view of the world, the Japanese saw all other
Asians as occupying a position lower than themselves. While practicing what
the Japanese viewed as a mix of paternalism and authoritarianism in ruling
12 According to commentator Komuro Naoki, for example, "The relationship between
Japanese and Koreans was not ... a relationship of subject and ruler. Japan was a friend,
and it went to Korea in order to teach Koreans various things." Komuro Naoki, Kankoku
no Higeki: Dare mo Kakanakatta Shinjitsu [The Tragedy of Korea: The Untold
Story], Kobunsha, 1985, pp. 150-151.
7
ao*lara---·rar-·I-----·-----·-
Korea, the Japanese expected both loyalty and obedience from the new
imperial subjects in the colonies. When Koreans objected to this
arrangement, before or after the war, the Japanese saw them as ungrateful
malcontents.
The psychology of Japanese colonialism, and the Korean reaction to it,
are eloquently summed up in this passage written by a Japanese-American
soldier arriving in Seoul in September 1945:
I shall try to describe [this Japanese attitude] by paraphrasing their
own words. Although they had ruled Korea kindly, albeit firmly, for
over a generation, though they had established fine public schools to
educate the ignorant Korean subjects to be fit subjects of the
emperor, though they had proclaimed the racial identity of the
Koreans and Japanese, and though they had done all these good
things unselfishly and in the best interests of the Koreans, who were
simply incapable of helping themselves, yet the obstinate peninsula
people persisted in retaining their characteristic traits, in keeping
their family names, in speaking and writing their own language and
subversively acting like Koreans.' 3
While most Japanese have accepted the inevitability of their military
defeat at the hands of a unified West led by the United States, many have
balked at recognizing the failure of their overseas colonial efforts, even five
decades later. When, under severe pressure from the South Korean
government, Japanese Cabinet Minister Takumi Eto was forced to resign in
November 1995 for telling reporters that Japan "did some good things"
during its colonial rule in Korea, Eto was not voicing a minority view.' 4
Nationalism and cultural chauvinism persist in Japan in the postwar era,
and Japanese have been reluctant to give up their feelings of national
superiority toward Asia. These attittudes translate easily into popular
dislike of Korea and things Korean among the Japanese public. Add to this
Japanese resentment of Koreans and the "attitude of superiority" Koreans
assumed after the Japanese defeat in the Pacific War,' 5 as well as the
13 From a letter by Warren Tsuneishi, dated September 12, 1945, written in Seoul. Reprinted
in Otis Cary, ed., From a Ruined Empire: Letters From Japan, China, and Korea,
1945-46, (Kodansha, 1975), pp. 32-34.
14
Eto was the sixth Japanese politician -- starting with Education Minister Masayuki Fujio
in 1982 -- forced to resign for expressing "incorrect" views of Japan's colonial and war-time
history. But Eto's case elicited the most forceful response yet from Seoul, which threatened
to recall its Ambassador to Japan and cancel a planned bilateral summit meeting if Eto was
not removed.
15 A 1978 survey by Ikeda Kenichi showed that Japanese felt stronger resentment toward
Korea for their wartime defeat than they do towards China or the United States. Data in
Tsujimura Akira, ed., Nihon to Kankoky no Bunka Masatsu [Cultural Friction
between Japan and Korea], Shukko Shoten, 1984, p. 16.
8
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___
psychological need for Japanese to identify a group of people "lower on the
ladder of status" than themselves, and one begins to have a fuller
understanding of the roots of Japanese prejudices toward Korea and Koreans.
II. The Depth of Bilateral Antipathy
The Korean View of Japan and the Japanese: Koreans emerged from
thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule with valid grounds for a low
national opinion of Japan and the Japanese people. Rather than abating in
subsequent years, this antipathy has been fostered as a basic element of
Korean national identity, and persists until today. Consider, for example,
the following results of a Gallup poll of adult Koreans conducted in March
1987:16
Most Liked Countries
USA
Switzerland
Australia
Japan
1987
1983
33.7
45.5
17.1
17.1
6.3
3.4
5.8
1.8
By Age (1987)
20-29
30-39
27.3
29.7
19.2
22.4
5.8
6.4
5.3
6.6
40-49
Over 49
44.0
55.7
11.9
2.3
8.3
4.8
5.1
7.4
Overall
Most Disliked Countries
North Korea
Japan
USSR
USA
1987
1983
54.9
54.0
22.3
14.7
6.0
22.5
1.9
0.6
By Age (1987)
20-29
30-39
40-49
Over 49
38.3
58.8
66.2
65.4
31.8
22.2
16.4
12.3
5.9
4.9
4.7
9.5
4.9
0.7
0.0
0.6
Overall
(% of respondents choosing each; only one choice allowed)
This data shows quite a lot. Forty years after the end of the colonial
period, Korea's image of Japan was still overwhelmingly negative, as can be
seen from the 22.3% of Koreans who selected Japan as the country they liked
16 Gallup poll of March 20, 1987, as reprinted in Kawase Eimei and Sakuwa Tetsu,
Kankokujin wa Naze Nihonjin ga Dai-kirai ka [Why Koreans Hate Japanese],
Nisshin Hodo, 1987, pp. 125-128. Note: France, which is not included in this table, scored
higher than Japan as a "most-liked" country in 1987. Japan was actually ranked fifth.
9
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least, while only 5.8% of Koreans polled named Japan as their favorite
foreign country.1 7 Perhaps as important as the pro- and anti-Japan
sentiment figures is the trend for younger Koreans to have a less favorable
view of Japan than the older generations. Although it may be that attitudes
simply change with age, this data could also be interpreted as predicting that
Korean attitudes toward Japan may become even more negative in the
future, rather than (as one might expect) improving over time as the
experiences of World War II slip farther into the past.18
A number of words can be used to describe the way Koreans feel about
Japan and the Japanese, ranging from fear, resentment, envy, distrust, and
hatred to nostalgia and reluctant admiration. No matter which feeling is
predominant at any one time, Korean perceptions of Japan are always heavy
tinged by emotion. An American diplomat who has served in both Seoul and
Tokyo explains:
Koreans harbor a number of convictions that have a strong effect on
their country's relations with Japan. These convictions include
feelings that: Japan takes pleasure in humiliating Korea; Japan's
economic takeoff grew from the carnage of the Korean war; Japan
bullies the physically weak (such as Korea) or the spiritually weak
(such as the U.S.) while kowtowing before the strong (such as the
USSR); Japan denies any cultural or moral debt to Korea; Japan
17 The 5.8% score for "most-liked" in 1987 was a large improvement over the 1.8% showing in
1983, perhaps reflecting the effects of the series of breakthrough diplomatic initiatives in
Korea-Japan relations in the mid-1980s. Still, one must be careful in assigning cause and
effect in any poll -- especially one such as this where the respondent is limited to one choice,
so that the figures shown for each choice will naturally vary widely from one polling to the
next as the focus of national media attention shifts in response to events. For instance, the
number of respondents naming Japan as their "most-disliked" country also increased from
1983 to 1987, inconsistent with the trend on the "most-liked" side, but this may only be a
reflection of the Soviet Union's exceptionally high "most-disliked" score in 1983 coming as a
result of the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 that year.
Other portions of this poll break down anti-Japanese sentiment by segment of
Korean society. Urban residents with more education -- in particular students -- register as
the most anti-Japanese, while negative feelings about Japan are less pronounced among
rural agricultural and blue collar workers.
18 A 1976 study of the attitudes of Korean college students found that 86.1% had "unfriendly"
feelings towards Japanese, as opposed to only 28.6% for Westerners. (Hong Sung-chick,
"Japanese in the Mind of Korean People - A Survey of Student Attitudes," in Hahn and
Yamamoto, ed., Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue Across the Channel, Korea
University Asiatic Research Center, 1978, pp. 209-210.) In fact, even Korean students who
study Japanese, when asked why they did, often profess motives like "in order to prevent
another invasion" or "to catch up with Japan," in addition to the usual "in order to get a good
job." (Nishioka Masaru, "Kankoku Nihongo Senko Daigaku Gakusei no Nihonkan"
[TheViews of Japan of Korean Students Majoring in Japanese], Gendai Koria, November
1986, pp. 51-59.)
10
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-__.____1_- -1
continues to mistreat Korean residents of Japan; and Japan exploits
Korea economically and morally. 19
In a 1984 survey, Kim and Oh found that the adjectives most
commonly agreed upon by Koreans as describing Japanese people were hardworking, organized, clean, fast, and selfish.2 0 Some of these adjectives
clearly have positive connotations. However, the terms most agreed upon by
Koreans to describe Japan as a nation were: fast, active, pragmatic,
untrustworthy, selfish, and "harsh toward the weak while meek toward the
strong." Thus, the Koreans surveyed had a considerably more disparaging
attitude toward Japan as a country than toward Japanese as a people. A poll
conducted by Gallup in 1982 asked 1,218 Koreans what first came to mind
when they thought of Japan. 2 ' The most common responses were:
Japanese Imperial Rule
29.1%
Shrewd or Sly
15.1%
Economic Power
4.1%
Cruel
3.9%
Economic Animals
3.7%
Hateful/Abominable
3.2%
Prime Minister Suzuki
2.0%
Selfish
1.5%
Hiroshima Atomic Bombing 1.5%
Clearly, Korean impressions of Japan have been shaped most strongly
by the Pacific War and the colonial period preceding it. As political theorist
Robert Jervis explains, "The only thing as important for a nation as its
revolution is its last major war. Because of the dramatic and pervasive
nature of a war and its consequences, the experiences associated with it will
deeply influence the perceptual dispositions of most citizens ... What was
believed to have caused the last war will be considered likely to cause the
next one." 2 2 In this framework, Korean concern with the "Japanese threat" -whether it be economic, military, political, or cultural -- makes sense.
Certainly, Koreans do not share the same faith in Japan's postwar pacifism
that Japanese, or Americans, possess. 2 3
19 Spence Richardson, unpublished paper on Japan-Korea relations presented at the Japan
Defense College, 1986, p. 20.
20 Tsujimura Akira, ed., Nihon to Kankoku no Bunka Masatsu [Cultural Friction
between Japan and Korea], Shukko Shoten, 1984, pp. 80 - 81 .
21 Gallup Poll results printed in the Yomiuri Shimbun, August 13, 1982.
22 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton
University Press, 1976, pp. 266-267.
23 An anecdote: At the 2nd annual Japan-Korea Student Forum held in August 1986 the
Korean delegates were clearly concerned with the possible renaissance of Japanese
militarism. The Korean students had all read translations of the January 1986 Sankei
11
The Japanese Image of Korea and Koreans: Japanese antipathy
towards Korea, the causes of which are described above, is still significant,
and has been exacerbated in the postwar era by diplomatic conflicts, Korean
demands for Japanese apologies about the colonial period, and the persistent
problems of the Korean minority in Japan.
Japanese perceptions of Korea and Koreans were at their most
negative in the 1950s and 1960s, when the political wrangling between the
two countries was at its worst. In an often-quoted 1962 survey by Izumi
Seichi, for example, Koreans ranked next to last on a list of peoples Japanese
"liked" (Blacks ranked last), while 75% of the respondents felt that the words
"deceitful" and "scheming" best described the character of the Korean
people.2 4 For much of the postwar period, the Japanese image of Korea was
of a "dark, closed, oppressed, or warlike" country under the domination of a
dangerous military dictatorship. In a 1978 survey, for example, when asked
what first came to mind when they heard the word "Korea," participating
Japanese responded as follows: 25
Kim Dae-jung Incident
Conflict between North and South
Recent rapid economic growth
Korean War
12.1%
President Park
Park's dictatorial rule
Prewar colonial rule
Martial law
7.0%
16.1%
13.8%
13.6%
11.6%
10.0%
9.7%
In general, it is likely that the Japanese image of Korea as a nation
has been shaped primarily by political factors rather than by economic or
cultural determinants. But although that image is still largely negative,
many Japanese have begun to recognize the strategic and economic
importance of Korea to Japan. In a survey by the Prime Minister's Office
conducted annually, the percentage of Japanese who thought that Japan
needed to have good relations with Korea rose sharply from 32.0% in 1978 to
50.3% in 1984.26
Shimbun series calling for a stronger military as part of Japan's "internationalization." None
of their Japanese compatriots had noticed the series in Japan.
24
Izumi Seiichi, "Nihonjin no Jinshuteki Henken [The Racial Prejudices of Japanese
People]," Sekai, March 1963, pp. 83-84.
25 Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 13. The Kim Dae-jung Incident occurred in August 1973, when the
Korean Central Intelligence Agency abducted the well-known democracy advocate from a
Tokyo hotel.
26 When asked why they thought that way, 53.3% responded "because Korea is so close
(physically)." Sorifu [Prime Minister's Office], Gekkan Yoron Chosa [Monthly Public Opinion
12
----- - II
_
__.
....
_~
In looking at the Jiji News Service data set at the center of this study,
however, what is most remarkable is the tenacity of Japanese persons' antiKorea sentiment. Athough increasing numbers of Japanese may recognize
that Korea is important to Japan, there has been relatively little growth in
the number of people who say they "like" Korea, and a continuing high
proportion of Japanese who say that they "dislike" Korea:
Sentiment Toward Korea -- "Dislike" and "Like"
RR
I.
O 30.0
',; 25.0
a)
, 20.0
s 15.0
c0
o 10.0
0
r
g
5.0
6^YI
0.0
oo
.o..~*.4MYWI
m
IT
r_cM
rm
)
cO
)
Cl)
co
a
M
C:
c0s
CI)
oC
cr
C
s:
How does this compare with Japanese attitudes toward other
countries? Following are annual averages from the Jiji News Service survey
for certain representative countries: 27
Liked Countries
1994
1991
1987
1983
South Korea
3.7
2.9
2.6
1.6
North Korea
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
China
12.1
10.7
20.8
16.4
USA
43.3
44.3
38.4
37.3
USSRICIS
0.8
2.1
0.9
1.0
Switzerland
42.5
40.6
38.5
38.2
Surveys], December 1984, p. 6. This sharp increase in "Korea awareness" was undoubtedly
sparked by the Chun-Nakasone diplomatic initiative, as well as general awareness of the
rapid growth and increasing regional importance of the Korean economy. Over the same
period, the score for China rose from 63.9% to 77.2%.
27 The figures for 1961 and 1965 are reprinted in Shin Hee-suk, "Analyses of Public Opinion
in the Process of Japan's Foreign Policy-Making with Special Reference to the Normalization
of Korea-Japan Relations," Korea Observer, Summer 1980.
13
---
--- ----
---
1979
1975
1971
1965
1961
1.1
0.8
1.5
1.3
1.4
0.4
0.8
1.0
12.5
10.8
4.8
South Korea
North Korea
China
18.0
19.2
19.2
19.4
22.6
25.0
12.6
23.0
41.6
56.1
44.4
36.2
30.5
28.0
25.3
24.1
12.2
14.3
4.6
5.7
8.0
8.3
21.6
1.6
2.4
3.7
37.2
33.6
34.9
USA
USSR/CIS
Switzerland
6.7
7.0
7.0
6.3
3.9
7.7
10.5
44.3
35.6
51.2
54.9
43.9
27.0
29.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
35.2
23.4
26.3
Disliked Countries
1994
1991
1987
1983
1979
1975
1971
1965
1961
(% of respondents choosing each; up to three choices allowed)
The limited progress in Japanese attitudes toward Korea seems
singularly unspectacular when compared to changes in Japanese attitudes
toward China, another Asian colonial era antagonist that is highly sensitive
about historical issues (China scored 35.4% on the "dislike" scale in 1962, but
only 4.0% in 1986). Japanese like neutral, unobtrusive Switzerland with its
reputation for natural beauty and quality products, but are concerned with
staying one competitive step ahead of Korea, the Asian newly industrialized
country mostly closely following Japan's rapid industrial growth pattern.
The competitive dynamic is a powerful phenomenon on both sides of
the Korea Straits, extending even to sporting competition. In a 1981 survey
regarding athletic competition, for example, Korea ranked second behind the
Soviet Union in the order of nations which Japanese most resented losing to
in athletic contests. China ranked fourth. When the same question was put
to Koreans, 65.8% named Japan as the country which they most disliked
losing to, while 27.0% selected North Korea. 2 8 In fact, anyone who has
attended an athletic event pitting the national representatives of Korea and
Japan against one another can testify to the powerful loyalties exhibited by
the supporters of each side. Writing about the 1986 Asian Games in the Los
Angeles Times, Randy Harvey described the situation as follows: "South
Korean sports fans still beg their teams to beat the Japanese. For that
matter, they beg every team to beat the Japanese...The South Koreans'
favorite team is South Korea. Their second-favorite team is whoever is
playing Japan." 29
28 Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 76.
29 Randy Harvey, "South Koreans' Success is Sweet," Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1986, p. 4.
14
--`
-`----------------a-------
I-.--
rarrrri;rr-
An official Japanese government survey, also conducted annually,
confirms the lack of improvement in Japanese sentiment toward Korea. 3 0
Asked whether they feel "close" or "not close" to Korea, consistently half or
more Japanese respond "not close" -- despite Korea's cultural and physical
proximity to Japan. In fact, in this survey the most significant change in
Japanese responses from 1978 to 1994 would appear to be the decline in the
proportion of respondents saying they "don't know" how they feel:
Feelings Toward Korea 31
Close
Somewhat
Close
Don't Know
Somewhat Not
Close
Not Close
7.9
9.6
9.2
7.7
12.1
34.0
33.1
30.5
32.5
28.0
5.1
6.5
8.5
11.0
14.7
35.0
33.4
33.3
31.6
25.5
18.0
17.4
18.5
17.3
19.7
By Age (1992)
20-29
3.9
30-39
7.3
40-49
8.1
9.9
50-59
60-69
10.2
Over 69
10.8
32.3
34.6
35.5
36.3
36.5
26.1
3.5
3.7
4.7
3.8
6.4
8.9
38.6
34.6
33.5
30.0
28.1
31.5
21.7
19.7
18.2
20.0
18.9
22.7
Overall
1994
1990
1986
1982
1978
(% of respondents choosing each; one choice allowed)
Differences between age groups in Japanese sentiment toward Korea
is much less marked than in Korean sentiment toward Japan, but the data
shows the same pattern of stronger anti-Korean sentiment among younger
Japanese.
Clearly, anti-Korean sentiment in Japan is strong, and deep-seated.
Attitudes have changed somewhat as Korea has earned respect for its
economic (and more recently, political) accomplishments. But it could still
take decades to wear down anti-Korean prejudices in Japan. 3 2
Sorifu [Prime Minister's Office], Gekkan Yoron Chosa IMonthly Public Opinion Surveys], April
1995 and previous.
31 The categories in Japanese are: "Shitashimi wo kanjiru;" "Dochiraka to iu to shitashimi wo kanjiru;"
"Wakaranai;" "Dochiraka to iu to shitashimi wo kanjinai;"and "Shitashimiwo kanjinai."
32 Direct contact with the other country seems to be the most sure way to improve psychological relations.
The study by Oh and Kim shows that Koreans who have been to Japan have substantially more positive
attitudes about Japan and Japanese people. (Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 94.) A similar study by Inamasa
reached the same conclusion about Japanese who had traveled to Korea. (Tsujimura, op. cit., pp. 32-43.)
Thus, while generational change cannot be counted on to shift popular consciousness, attitudes could still
change significantly over time.
30
15
III. Data Sets
With the above background in mind, one can proceed to the data
analysis exercise of measuring the impact of negative sentiment on bilateral
economic relations. More specifically, this analysis looks at whether popular
sentiment in Japan (together with three economic variables, namely, the
exchange rate, economic growth, and direct investment flows) can help
explain fluctuations in Japan's imports from (and exports to) South Korea.3 3
Key Variables: The following data series are utilized:
IMPORTS = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change in the
value of Japan's imports from South Korea, adjusted for inflation using the
Japanese wholesale price index (WPI). The raw data on trade comes from the
Summary Report on Trade of Japan, published monthly by the Japan Tariff
Association, and data on Japan's WPI from the International Financial
Statistics, published monthly by the International Monetary Fund.
SENTIMENT = Quarterly data combining and averaging the month-bymonth scores for South Korea in the "like" and "dislike" categories of the
ongoing survey of Japanese public attitudes toward foreign countries released
monthly by the Jiji Tsushin news service. The "sentiment" index is produced
by subtracting two times the "like" score from the "dislike" score.
EXCHANGE RATE = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change
in the exchange rate, measured as Korean won per Japanese yen. The raw
data is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
JAPANESE GROWTH = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage
growth of Japan's real gross national product (GNP), taken from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics.
DIRECT INVESTMENT = Year-on-year percentage change in the total of
Japanese direct foreign investment in South Korea, correcting for inflation
using Korea's producer price index (PPI). Since quarterly raw data is
unavailable, annual change data is inserted for quarterly year-on-year
change values. Data for 1994, not yet available, is forecast based on the
linear trend from 1984 to 1993. Data for 1978 to 1993 comes from Korean
33 The link between the exchange rate and imports is obvious, as is the link between Japanese economic
growth and growth in imports (expected to be positive). Japanese direct investment in Korea is included as
a variable due to the growing consensus in economic studies that overseas investment -- particularly
manufacturing investment -- will lead to both increased exports and increased "reverse" imports. Korean
investment in Japan is not considered because it is relatively very small in magnitude.
16
- ------
Ministry of Finance data reprinted in the Korea Statistical Yearbook,
published by the Bureau of Statistics of the Economic Planning Board. As
direct investment data divided by source country is unavailable prior to 1978,
Japan's direct investment is calculated as a proportion (extrapolated from
Japan's average share of the total from 1978 to 1987) of the total foreign
direct investment reported in the Balance of Payments Yearbook published
by the IMF. Data on Korea's PPI is taken from the IMF's International
Financial Statistics.
EXPORTS = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change in the
value of Japan's exports to South Korea, adjusted for inflation using the
Japanese wholesale price index (WPI). The raw data comes from the same
sources as the "IMPORTS" series described above.
KOREAN GROWTH = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage growth
of Korea's real gross national product (GNP), taken from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Data for the fourth quarter of 1994 is
forecast based on the prior four quarters. Data for 1971 and 1972 are based
on annual, not quarterly, real Korean GNP growth.
Notes on the Variables: As can be seen from these definitions, the
economic time series variables included in this study are all growth
variables, measuring changes in the various economic indices rather than
their absolute value. This method is adopted to fit the paper's central
hypothesis that public sentiment may be able to impact the rate at which
bilateral trade expands. 3 4 (Assessment of the effect of public sentiment on
the absolute size of trade flows would require a cross-sectional analysis,
beyond the scope of this study.) Only the SENTIMENT index is treated
differently. This stems from my belief that the raw index on popular
sentiment is the best measure of the "intangible" force that can impact how
economic variables change; changes in popular sentiment may also be
appropriate, but seem less likely to give accurate results.
As constructed for this study, the SENTIMENT index also gives the
"like Korea" responses twice as much weight as as the "dislike Korea"
responses. (The index figures, subtracting the "like" score from the "dislike"
score, are still always positive because the "like" proportion is consistently
much smaller.) This weighting stems from my belief that the positive
feelings toward Korea of those Japanese who "like" Korea are more likely to
impact their decision to buy or not buy Korean-made goods than are the
negative feelings of those Japanese who "dislike" Korea. This is because the
"like" and "dislike" responses are tied to different thought processes. Those
34 Usefully, growth rate series also exhibit more statistical stationarity than absolute data series, reducing
the probability of spurious correlations between variables.
17
---
saying they "dislike" Korea are probably considering Korea as a
political/economic/historical entity, whereas those who say they "like" Korea
may be thinking of Korea as a cultural entity. The "like" thought process
therefore seems closer to the buy/not buy decision than the "dislike" calculus.
For example, a person may decide to respond that they "like" Korea because
of they enjoy Korean food, which they may want to buy, but will probably not
say they "dislike" Korea because they do not enjoy kimchi.
When inserted into the econometric estimate, the explanatory
variables are all lagged according to the number of quarters one would expect
that it would usually take -- given time for trade orders to be planned and
carried out -- for the explanatory variables to have their maximum impact on
trade decisions. Thus, the EXCHANGE RATE and GROWTH variables are
lagged three quarters since that is an appropriate length of time for
macroeconomic factors to have an impact. SENTIMENT is only lagged two
quarters, since negative feelings could conceivably cause trade orders to be
cancelled mid-transaction. DIRECT INVESTMENT is lagged six quarters
when explaining Japanese imports, due to the time required for plants to be
set up and products made, but only lagged three quarters when explaining
Japanese exports, since investment-related equipment will likely be shipped
relatively soon after an investment commitment is made.
Some concluding notes on the data used may also be useful. Although
the Jiji Tsushin data is available monthly, quarterly data is used to enhance
the reliability of results, since aggregation should mellow the impact of onetime measurement errors. At the same time, for the economic variables yearto-year changes are measured instead of quarter-to-quarter changes, in order
to adjust the data for seasonal cycles (which can be particularly evident in
Korean data, with slow fourth quarters and booming first quarters).
Parameters of the Data: Before proceeding, finally, the reader may
find it useful to look at the size and shape of the economic data sets involved,
starting with Japanese trade with Korea (recall that the data used for
calculating the sentiment index has already been considered in detail in Section Two
above). As can be seen in the following chart, Japan runs a consistent trade
surplus with South Korea. Although bilateral trade has, in the main, grown
fairly rapidly throughout the period studied, this growth has not always been
consistent. In particular, bilateral trade slumped in the mid-1980s, and
again in the early 1990s:
18
___
1
_1______11_·
C
_
Japanese Trade with Korea
- 800
0,
9.600
-- 400
c
-
}
200
O0
I
r
V'rT -
M
r
m
VT
C=
ra_
-
co
o
-
M
C
CO
-
LO
N
C
co
W
C"
f--
M
C"
I·
The dynamics of the won/yen exchange rate can be seen in the chart below.
Although the won/yen exchange rate is generally driven by adjustments in the values of
the won and yen, respectively, to the U.S. dollar, it is also plain that the won has
generally appreciated against the yen over the period studied, as would be predicted by
Korea's generally higher rate of inflation and more rapid economic growth:
Korea-Japan Exchange Rate
10.00
8.00
c
0
6.00
4.00
I
2.00
I :
0.00
-
ra
a,
x
r
I-
C,
Ln
m
,Ilc
c
r
c
co
a "
CX
--
L
co
m
r.-
co
C"
D
:
c0:
(
i
m
c"
cn
C"
I
I
Japanese GNP has generally grown rapidly over the period studied, with major
recessions coming in 1974-75 and 1991-94:
19
Japanese Gross National Product
-CO
;M Mn
K
E
W
-
400,000
C 300,000
X 200,000
c 100,000
o
I---*-
C
LD '-
Cc
I--
(c
I---
-
Cc
~
-
cC
n
~-
~-
1----
L
--
C'
cc
n
M
Cn
~
-
M
cM
1-
cM
--
Finally, figures for (new) Japanese direct investment in Korea have fluctuated
rather wildly around a general declining trend, with investment booms coming in the
early 1970s, and again in the mid/late 1980s, probably as a result of domestic Japanese
asset price inflation increasing liquidity:
Japanese Direct Investment in Korea
R__
.-
E
_ 40
X 30
, 20
c 10
=
m
o
r-
C
-
M
r-
cM
MC
n
rcm
NrC0
O
rC
m
CO
C
0C
c
on
co
C)
rC
cn
cr
CO
C
O)
m
M
m
C)
IV. Study Results
The main equation to be calculated, then, has growth in Japanese imports as a
dependent variable, and the sentiment index, exchange rate changes, the rate of growth of
the Japanese economy, and the rate of growth of Japanese direct investment in Korea
(lagged appropriately as discussed above) as explanatory variables. Results are as
follows, with t-statistics inserted below the coefficients:
20
~~~~~~---·--------·-·-
------·
·---------
·..... .
------------ ---------------------
·---------------- ·-----
- ---- --- ---------------- -----
A
IMPORTS= 10.94 + -2.19*SENTIMENT + 0.89*EXCHANGE RATE
(0.76)
(-3.32)
(5.00)
+ 7.60*JAPANESE GROWTH + -0.05*DIRECT INVESTMENT
(5.58)
(-1.81)
R-squared = 0.54
In short, negative feelings about Korea among Japanese are shown to have a
statistically significant dampening impact on Japanese imports from Korea, and the
magnitude of the effect is quite large! For each point increase in the sentiment index, this
equation predicts that, given historical trends, the growth of Japanese imports from Korea
will be slowed by 2.2 percentage points. In other words, we can document that the legacy
of Japanese colonial rule -- in the form of negative Japanese sentiment toward Korea -- is
slowing the expansion of economic interaction between the two countries.
These results imply a major impact on bilateral economic relations. Making
"what if' projections based on regresssion analysis of this type has numerous potential
pitfalls. But in theory one can conclude that if, for example, Japanese sentiment toward
Korea in the 1990's were to improve to the same levels as Japanese sentiment toward
China (all other factors remaining unchanged), then imports from Korea would grow at a
much faster annual rate -- higher by as much as forty percentage points per year.
As for the economic explanatory variables, the results are predictable. A stronger
won is associated significantly with greater expenditures on Japanese imports from
Korea, showing the J-curve effect despite the time lag of three reporting quarters. The
health of the Japanese economy in general, as reflected in its annual growth rate, is the
explanatory variable with the greatest influence on Japanese trade. A one-percentagepoint increase in Japan's annual economic growth rate will accelerate Japanese imports
from Korea by 7.6%. The impact of Japanese direct investment Korea on Japanese
imports is not statistically significant, except at the 10% level. (This may be due to the
indirect calculations required to produce the data series, as noted above. But at any rate,
the coefficent's negative sign also runs counter to expectations; it is not clear by what
economic mechanism Japanese direct investment in Korea could lead to reduced Japanese
imports from Korea.)
The net result is a rather successful modeling of Japanese imports (with a high Rsquared term of 0.54), clearly underlining the important influence of popular sentiment on
economic interactions.
What if we try the same exercise with modeling Japanese exports? The results are
not so illuminating:
21
"IliL1I------
t
A
EXPORTS = 20.27 + -1.07*SENTIMENT + 0.22*EXCHANGE RATE
(2.42)
(-2.29)
(1.51)
+ 0.48*KOREAN GROWTH + -0.03*DIRECT INVESTMENT
(1.47)
(1.70)
R-squared = 0.14
Among the explanatory variables, only the coefficents for SENTIMENT and
KOREAN GROWTH are statistically significant (the latter only at the 10% level). Of the
two, surprisingly, popular sentiment seems to have a larger impact on Japanese exports to
Korea than does Korean economic growth conditions. Still, the R-squared term for this
equation is quite low, meaning that most of the variation in Japanese exports to Korea
remains unexplained. It is possible that economic structure or regulatory factors play an
important role, given the very large and statistically significant constant term in this
equation.
V. Conclusion and Implications
Variation in anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public, as
reflected in the monthly Jiji News Service poll of "liked" and "disliked"
countries, is a useful explanatory variable to explain variations in the
pattern of bilateral trade. The econometric analysis in this paper finds that
anti-Korean sentiment among Japanese has had a strong, statistically
significant, and negative impact on the growth of Japanese imports from
Korea.
Japanese imports from Korea grew rapidly during the period studied,
averaging 15.6% real annual growth, while the Japanese economy only grew
at an average of 3.9% in real terms. But if Japanese sentiment toward Korea
-- which according to the measure here averaged 15.4 points over the period
studied -- had been more favorable, Japanese imports from Korea may have
grown more rapidly. If, for instance, the pattern of Japanese "dislike" toward
Korea had shown the same improving trend as the score for Japanese
"dislike" of China, the sentiment index could have averaged 3.0 points over
the period studied, meaning -- in theory -- that Japanese imports from Korea
might have grown at a much faster rate of 42.6% per annum!
Of course much caution should be exercised in interpreting these
findings to avoid cavalier assertions of cause and effect. Making "what if'
projections based on regresssion analysis of this type has numerous potential pitfalls.
Also, more exacting analysis than contained in this paper is needed to explain
the practical mechanism whereby popular sentiment impacts economic
activity. Still, the results of this study recommend that -- when reliable time
22
________
_11
1llir__
---1.-.._-11---. -.·--1-1-------^*IX...-
-II-
series data sets on political variables are available -- both economists and
political historians should consider using statistical techniques incorporating
political variables, in order to add depth and precision to analysis of the
various phenomena of "political economy."
23
-·I--II.--..
-
·
..
Data Set
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
IMPORTS
SENTIMENT
EXCHANGE
RATE
JAPANESE
GROWTH
DIRECT
INVESTMENT
EXPORTS
KOREAN
GROWTH
25.82
8.36
2.86
21.96
23.25
31.88
50.03
38.85
83.28
128.59
157.53
182.96
130.45
71.07
5.41
-37.28
-47.99
-29.09
-2.57
18.72
51.06
51.74
36.52
31.94
17.56
2.01
-7.02
-13.00
-7.95
-10.47
-7.66
15.15
24.15
40.62
40.06
15.57
-13.92
-21.23
-29.78
-26.21
-9.07
-6.93
10.0
9.1
10.0
9.4
9.2
9.2
7.4
5.8
5.8
5.5
11.0
14.8
12.6
13.7
23.2
24.5
25.4
23.9
20.8
23.0
21.3
19.7
20.4
20.9
20.8
20.7
19.9
20.7
18.7
18.2
17.5
18.0
20.1
16.6
21.5
23.4
19.2
21.2
26.2
27.7
21.1
20.9
4.84
10.31
23.65
30.09
39.24
37.41
22.93
15.52
15.09
15.18
13.34
9.05
-3.32
-5.91
-11.35
-1.46
19.26
16.97
22.00
12.07
-3.22
-2.28
2.38
3.41
5.91
8.71
9.34
18.89
20.18
24.71
38.12
29.64
17.95
1.37
-11.94
-20.14
-0.48
15.71
26.05
52.53
36.24
20.64
4.08
4.86
3.68
4.87
7.32
7.81
8.16
9.79
10.21
8.94
6.84
4.99
-0.85
-0.95
0.09
-1.31
1.16
2.92
2.86
4.71
5.73
3.92
4.11
3.21
4.79
4.77
4.13
5.37
4.59
4.59
5.43
5.20
5.26
6.15
5.68
5.17
4.91
2.87
2.87
3.33
3.30
3.70
-29.03
-29.03
-29.03
-29.03
-32.81
-32.81
-32.81
-32.81
111.72
111.72
111.72
111.72
-28.36
-28.36
-28.36
-28.36
-62.40
-62.40
-62.40
-62.40
32.85
32.85
32.85
32.85
4.71
4.71
4.71
4.71
-27.19
-27.19
-27.19
-27.19
15.64
15.64
15.64
15.64
-70.70
-70.70
-70.70
-70.70
-26.34
-26.34
16.73
-0.89
-5.44
-3.62
-13.11
-9.70
-3.54
25.68
55.09
62.51
60.49
71.02
96.84
76.32
58.38
31.62
-14.57
-11.07
-23.41
-7.57
20.89
24.96
38.34
18.98
32.91
31.69
27.65
27.67
34.45
19.17
12.16
1.03
-3.40
3.96
17.81
15.69
6.16
-4.29
-21.78
-19.80
-17.33
0.72
9.75
9.75
9.75
9.75
7.31
7.31
7.31
7.31
22.14
10.75
4.54
-7.13
2.77
-2.27
-0.41
7.75
4.59
11.34
17.85
17.32
32.81
38.23
37.28
22.04
16.61
10.41
17.62
19.00
20.26
24.02
20.25
9.89
19.73
12.56
12.46
11.02
1.50
-1.95
-0.12
-9.82
2.08
4.65
24
-·I-__III
-·-C---X-_··II··I-__
1._1__-._ -_II_
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
15.92
33.15
18.62
17.96
11.68
-14.97
-9.07
-7.92
-3.43
31.02
26.31
24.29
31.34
15.37
5.03
17.11
-5.97
-13.63
-4.30
-16.25
0.42
24.64
36.46
35.56
38.56
32.11
29.80
40.54
38.66
17.10
19.98
16.28
13.38
13.33
0.69
-3.69
-11.41
-12.94
-7.94
0.01
-1.85
2.39
-4.36
-9.89
-13.00
-13.29
-8.67
-12.98
-3.65
19.5
18.9
16.2
17.9
19.9
17.7
16.4
18.0
16.0
14.4
13.4
12.8
11.6
10.0
11.1
12.4
10.3
12.8
14.5
14.3
15.2
14.8
13.0
12.7
15.7
14.5
9.9
11.7
8.1
11.3
13.8
14.2
14.6
14.4
14.0
14.7
16.0
13.1
12.3
14.8
13.7
12.7
13.4
16.5
15.4
15.4
13.1
11.5
14.2
6.08
-0.69
-6.60
-3.85
-3.12
-6.48
5.03
8.59
13.00
18.03
7.80
7.30
2.83
-1.82
-5.53
-0.54
11.15
29.30
45.36
50.85
53.06
26.00
18.08
11.25
-2.92
8.65
7.88
0.93
-1.66
-5.79
-12.48
-17.44
-13.09
-15.30
-11.47
-5.38
4.93
16.23
15.49
14.62
8.44
6.37
10.72
14.70
17.90
10.08
9.96
20.81
21.48
3.73
2.93
2.61
3.80
3.35
3.94
3.17
2.29
3.26
2.52
3.91
4.89
3.91
4.52
4.55
5.08
5.14
5.69
2.97
2.61
2.59
2.56
4.14
3.04
4.54
5.37
6.46
6.53
6.65
5.64
5.29
4.41
4.62
4.86
4.10
6.21
4.77
4.30
5.21
4.19
4.04
3.69
2.76
1.77
0.86
0.11
0.31
-0.05
0.15
-26.34
-26.34
2.02
2.02
2.02
2.02
316.50
316.50
316.50
316.50
-2.58
-2.58
-2.58
-2.58
119.03
119.03
119.03
119.03
-61.35
-61.35
-61.35
-61.35
254.29
254.29
254.29
254.29
37.24
37.24
37.24
37.24
-34.05
-34.05
-34.05
-34.05
-51.42
-51.42
-51.42
-51.42
-8.97
-8.97
-8.97
-8.97
-32.88
-32.88
-32.88
-32.88
81.59
81.59
81.59
25
.........
"·
·..
~
_
24.55
5.29
-0.88
-9.52
-10.54
12.96
8.54
17.80
24.11
18.32
33.62
23.66
13.46
13.03
10.34
-1.20
-8.61
-3.12
-6.34
5.09
11.01
6.22
12.09
8.54
12.36
4.20
0.59
-3.87
6.42
8.57
12.52
15.23
15.64
17.39
8.86
16.01
5.73
11.23
19.24
8.35
2.91
1.36
-12.03
-15.65
-17.09
-21.62
-10.60
-8.40
-5.37
5.92
13.19
1.63
5.18
7.15
1.53
9.50
10.39
11.37
7.44
16.51
10.44
11.55
7.68
4.99
4.39
5.37
5.66
10.79
12.38
13.60
11.69
13.33
13.94
9.40
8.24
17.99
10.07
13.97
8.01
6.33
6.34
5.08
6.98
10.06
9.74
9.76
7.01
8.86
9.63
7.20
6.31
7.31
7.22
6.29
4.21
3.96
4.71
6.69
1994
-5.78
2.80
8.81
4.69
16.55
16.84
14.41
7.50
5.87
7.62
15.4
10.6
9.5
10.3
12.0
-0.15
0.66
-0.10
0.36
-1.63
26
-F
--;
81.59
4.27
4.27
4.27
4.27
1.47
9.69
16.20
23.46
19.65
6.43
9.15
6.94
7.71
7.96