Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
FM 34-10-6/ST
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CHAPTER 1
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THE JOINT CONTINGENCY FORCE (JCF) INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM
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The JCF intelligence operations are based on a complex system of personnel, organizations,
and equipment. When focused and synchronized properly, it provides the JCF and ARFOR
commanders and their subordinates with an enhanced understanding of the threat and the
environment that enables the ARFOR to execute decisive operations in a wide variety of
operational settings. The system leverages advances in technology, improvements in
organizations, and the professionalism of soldiers to ensure the maneuver forces have the
intelligence needed to achieve this level of situational understanding.
SECTION I – MISSION
1-1. The mission of the JCF intelligence system is to provide timely, relevant, accurate, and
synchronized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support to the JCF
commander, staff, and subordinates during the planning, preparation, and execution of multiple,
simultaneous decisive actions on a distributed battlefield. Paramount to providing this support is
development of a common understanding or operating picture of the threat and the environment
through the coordinated actions of all the Contingency Force’s ISR assets. The military
intelligence analysts in the JCF’s maneuver brigade(s) couple the collection by organic assets
with the raw data and finished intelligence products provided by higher echelon Army and joint
intelligence organizations operating within and outside of the theater of operations, to form a
common operating picture. This picture forms the maneuver force’s basis for planning,
decisions, and tasks to subordinate units.
SECTION II – ORGANIZATION
1-2. The JCF intelligence operations rely on a flexible force of ISR personnel, organizations,
and systems. Individually and collectively, these assets provide commanders at all echelons
with the capability to plan and direct ISR operations, collect and process information, produce
relevant intelligence, and disseminate combat information and intelligence to those who need it,
when they need it. Each echelon possesses organic ISR assets that enable the above actions.
Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civilian (METT-TC),
considerations, the maneuver brigade will task organize its organic ISR assets for the operation.
The brigade will receive additional ISR assets from division, corps, joint, and National
organizations as needed for the mission.
Writer’s Draft v1.0 – 4 February 2000
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FM 34-10-6/ST
INTELLIGENCE
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SURVEILLANCE
REMBASS
CI
MI
Company
GSM
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RECONNAISSANCE
Infantry
Battalion
HUMINT
MI
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MI
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Company
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Figure 1-2. The Brigade’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Assets
INTELLIGENCE STAFF
1-3. An intelligence staff is organic to the brigade and each battalion. The division and
maneuver brigade staffs are normally augmented with an analysis and control element (ACE) or
analysis and control team (ACT), respectively, from the divisional Military Intelligence (MI)
battalion. The intelligence staff of non-maneuver brigades and battalions vary in number of
assigned MI personnel and normally do not receive additional intelligence augmentation.
Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units may not have any MI personnel
and are often combined with the battalion’s operations staff. Figure 1-2 depicts the intelligence
assets supporting the brigade headquarters and major subordinate commands.
SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE
1-4. Surveillance and reconnaissance assets vary between echelons and unit type. Combat
units such as the maneuver brigade have battalion scouts and a direct support MI company to
perform surveillance and reconnaissance. In contrast, CSS units do not possess dedicated
surveillance and reconnaissance assets but rely upon ad hoc organizations and standard
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operating procedures to perform such missions as route reconnaissance and the occupation of
observation posts.
TASK ORGANIZATION
1-5. Task organization allows the division to optimize the allocation and capabilities of its finite
ISR assets based on METT-TC. For example, in a Joint Task Force in which a single brigade is
the maneuver element, the division may direct the divisional MI battalion to reinforce its direct
support MI company with additional human intelligence (HUMINT) teams to provide the
maneuver brigade with an interrogation and document exploitation (DOCEX) capability. The
division, as the ARFOR, may also receive corps or higher echelon ISR assets such as an air
cavalry troop from corps, counterintelligence (CI) teams from corps or the Reserve Component
(RC), or a National Intelligence Support Team when the scope of the mission exceeds the
division organic capability.
SECTION III – CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
1-6. The capabilities and limitations are inherent in any system. The brigades intelligence
system’s capabilities continue to improve as more technologically advanced sensors,
processors, and communications systems enter the force structure. Its limitations reflect the
impact of force structure limitations, advances in the adversary’s technology, and diverse
operational environment in which the division must operate.
Some specific capabilities of the brigade intelligence system are –
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The divisional ACE and the ACT at the maneuver brigade improve the intelligence staff’s
synchronization of ISR actions and access to intelligence organizations, products, and
databases.
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Improved sensor on Commanche, Raptor, …
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All-source Analysis System (ASAS) workstations at division, brigade, and battalion facilitate
the collaborative preparation and presentation of a common threat picture.
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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at division and brigade extend the commander’s view
beyond the next hill, thus enabling aviation and fire support assets to shape the battlefield
in-depth, day or night.
Some specific limitations are –
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Distribution of ISR reports and products (imagery, overlays, webpages, etc) requires a
robust, high-capacity communications area network.
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Limited organic HUMINT collection capability requires augmentation from high echelons and
RC organizations.
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Qualified MI linguists are not available for all operational settings.
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