C/76-18
LONG-RUN TRENDS IN STRIKE ACTIVITY
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.
Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and
Center for European Studies
Harvard University
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
August 1976
Contents
Twentieth Century Trends
Strike Activity
In Aggregate
Explanations of Patterns in Industrial
6
19
Conflict
The Political System and the Locus of
Oist-ibutional Conflict
Conflict
Oistributional
in
the
Welfare State
References
Appendix:
26
36
47
Strike
and Labor Force Oata
i
52
3
LONG-RUN TRENDS IN STRIKE ACTIVITY
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*
Outbursts of strike activity in many industrial societies
the late 1960s and early 1970s focused
great
militancy.
autumn"
The events of
May-June
capitalist
of
1968
on
attention
state of labor-capital relations in advanced
and led to many Inquiries into the sources
during
In
the
systems
"new"
France,
the
labor
the
"hot
of 1969 In Italy, and the nation-wide strikes of the coal
miners in 1972 and 1974 in the United Kingdom
(the
first
since
the great general strike of 1926) are the most dramatic examples,
but sharp upturns
Finland (1971),
in
in
strike
activity
in
the United States (J970)
Canada
(1969,1972),
and smaller strike waves
other nations also contributed to the
surge
of
interest
in
labo- discontent.
Recent
attempts
to
reevaluate
the
industrial soclelties to generate
perhaps
a
useful
of
perspective
"Integration"
of
modern
AmQAigai
corrective
postwar
social
to
potential
severe
the
science
of
social
conflicts
dominant
which
advanced
theoretical
stressed
of the working class into the socioeconomic
capitalist
nations.
Sociologists
are
wrote
the
fabric
of
the
of blue-collar workers; oolitical scientists and
political sociologists argued about, but in the
main,
I
think,
rhis is one of a series of papers from
my prol-ect on
industrial conflict in advanced Industrial societies supported by
the National Science Foundation.
I am grateful
to Nicholas
Vasilatos and Marilyn Shapleigh for able research assistance on
all phases of the pro)ect.
*
4
subsc-lbed to the
"the
idea of
end
of
ideology";
of
industrial relations specialists, the thesis
away
of
Ross
important, comparative study of
acceoted.
this monograph is to show that when industrial
is analyzed over the long-run
historical
perspective --
emphasis on a agg
the thesis of a 2ea-L
labor militancy is
the turn of
the century.
traditional
explanations
they
are
of
The
three-dimensional
a
long-run
The
third part
trends
in strike
industrial conflict
developments
factors.
(2)
the volume of
(1)
of
since
reviews
some
activity
and
accounting
for
lution
industrial
of
of
It is argued that trends
in
shaped
cultural,
pr imarily
socio logical,
The core of the argument is t hat major
Industrial
the
the study Dres ents my own theory
been
rather than
in
long-run evo
in
twelve nations
strike
value
activity.
have
trends
section
following
of variations in
cross-national patterns i n the
conflict.
conflict in
limited
and that the
to a great extent misplaced.
characterization of strike activity and analyzes
overall magnitude of Industrial
in
away
withering
evidence,
introduces
The first part of the monograph
viewed
Is
i.e.
--
of the strike is at odos with the empircal
concludes
widely
(1)
One of the aims of
conflict
the
with
was
Hartman)
and
among
"withering
the
associated
prominently
(most
strike"
the
and,
conflict during
the
political
by
or
economic
changes
twentieth
in
century
Ross and Hartman, 1960.
(2) Economic variables do, of course, have an important influence
on short-run fluctuations in strike activity.
See Hibbs,
1976
and the studies cited therein.
5
are
largely explained by the effectiveness of
and
labor parties in shifting the locus of
national
income
marketplace)
away
from
the
to the public sector
private
(the
social
the
democratic
distribution
sector
political
recent
(the
economic
marketplace).
economic
The final
section of the monograph reviews
political
developments in the highly developed welfare states
Scandinavia,
and speculates about the implications of
the public sector share of
national
Income
industrial conflict over distributional
for
issues.
of
trends
political
and
of
in
and
6
in.lir1
Stihs &Qtily.l
in Aagregat
investigation of strike activity is Ross and
fi1ar-DE
InduIcia
.f
this
f
conclusions
pronounced
l
Nethe-lands,
believed
the
that
acknowledged
the
decline
in
and
countries
Hartman
--
Denmark,
--
they
the
1950s
a nited Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Sweden
they
was apparent
had
identifed a general
in
virtually
all
trend which
capitalist,
most
was
activity
strike
European
Northern
Industrialized
Ross
Although
world during t he twentieth century.
that
was
study
the
in
away"
orincipal
the
of
empirical
influential
Qb agD21D_
Hartman's
One
"aJJaLti.
had "withered
industrial co n flict
quantitative
comparative,
important
most
the
Perhaps
I:t'Aid
cQkialut.
by
democracies.
The
analyses Dres ented below wi II show that this conclusion is simply
erroneous.
It
is
true,
of
course,
that
the
clashes between labor and capital which characterized
are
unloi recognition strikes
strikes have become
long-run, however,
strike
now
ra-e
civilized".
more
and,
When
In
no
RqjDrai
secular
less
constant
averag e
level
(stationary
sense,
this
over
magnitude
mean)
countries, and declined by varying degrees in others.
the
of
strike
decline:
a
activity has increased in some nations, oscillated about
or
early
the
viewed
it is als o clear that the gross
activity exhibits
violent
bloody,
more
a
few
Ross
and
in
Hartman's work has been inf luential enoigh to speculate about the
source of their "w ithering
away of
the stri ke" thesis.
7
In
the
course
of
constructed a half
their
Investigation,
dozen
or
developing the "withering
more
away
st'ike
of
the
relIed heavilIy on the analysis of only
lost in
strike
activity
per
Ross
Hartman
indicators;
strike"
two
union
and
but
argument
measures:
man-days
Ratio") and man-days lost in strike activity per worker
"Ouration").
(average
As
I
have
asgued
elsewhef-e
(1)
poor index on which to
base
inferences
strike
is
because union
countries,
secular
membership
data
trends.
are
very
but also because the meaning of
greatly across nations. (2)
membershio rations are
duratior is
a
International
therefore
perfectly
This
sensible
dimension of strike 3ctivity, which indeed
decline in many industrial societies.
of
(1)
magnitude
labor
of
an
4owever, this
trends
overall
of
some
differs
Average
exhibits
sweeping
the
for
comparison
much too narrow in scope to support
in
general
unionization
indicator
the
partially
unreliable
problematic.
Loss
involved
Membership Loss Ratio is a
about
they
("Membership
member
in
union
strike
important
a
long-run
measure
conclusions
militancy.
is
about
(3)
Hibbs, 1976.
in
(2)
Contrast, for example, the conception of union membership
Canada and the United States
-where
*members*
include all
workers covered by contract who merely oay dues, typically via an
automatic check-off (payroll
deduction) method
-with union
membership in the largest unions in France
*members* are usually militant
activists.
and
Italy
(Although
-in
where
recent
years the French CGT and the Italian CGIL have
tried
to become
mass organizations.)
The strength of F-ench and
Italian unions
are probably judged oetter by the number of workers that they can
mobilize for
an activity rather
than
3y
the
number
of
their
official members.
(3) For example, in many nations decliing
accompanied by rising strike frequency.
strike
duration
is
I think that this tells
8
Therefore,
perhaps
the
withering
away
thesis
represents
an
optical IlIusion that stems from placing too heavy an emphasis on
faulty and/or
limited indicators.
This cannot be the whole story, however, for in the
to
hiao1ia Pallana
21
=gaiigt,
Dnairia.
claimed that even gross man-days
lost
in
introduction
Hartman
and
Ross
had
activity
strike
everywhere declined:
strike
activity
in
a pronounced decline
"There
has been
the
late 1950's
throughout the world. Man-days of idleness in
are fewer than in the late 1940*s or the late 1930's, despite the
Increases in populatior and union membe-shio." ()
momentary,
cyclical
many countries
Italy,
iownturn in strike
--
in the 1950's
for
activity
postwar
labor
relations
France,
Canada,
example,
in
to be an
capitalist
enduring
industrial
When viewed in relation to the strike explosions
systems.
the end 3r just after
occured in
most nations toward
World War,
the short-lived labor quiescence
of
the
the
which
second
and
middle
away
late 1950s undoubtedly gave the impression that a withering
of
the strike was at hand.
In
reviewing the Ross and Hartman thesis I
number
of
points
to
observable
trends
by
experienced
United Kingdom end the United States --
featire of
the
took
others,
many
Apparently Ross and Hartman, along with
have
and
referred
at
fluctuations
a
in
us more about rational labor adaptation to a changing environment
labor
or
labor aggressiveness
in
trends
than it does about
issue
this
treat
monograph will
A subsequent
militancy.
extensively.
(J) Ross and Hartman, J960, pp. 4-5.
'3
twentieth
century
strike
activity.
emprical
data in
explicit
scheme for strike measurement.
however,
detali,
Before
looking
it is necessary to
ministriest
the
number
are
supplied
by
of
strikes,
the
activity.
components
on
these
economy-wide totals and for nine
activity.
Since
this
man-days
separate
monograph
is
of
are
data
workers
strike
reoorted
sectors
of
for
economic
with
are
of
labor
in
lost
concerned
economy-wide trends, only the aggregate
an
Labor
national
number
of
data
present
components
the
involved (strikers)and the number
Annual
the
The International
Office compiles and oublishes data on three basic
industrial conflict that
at
national,
used
in
the
Knowles,
and
Tilly,
(1)
analyses reported here.
Following the earlier, seminal
work of Forchelmer,
Goetz-Girey and the more recent work of Shorter
the basic industrial conflict variables are used
with data on nonagricultural
(2)
to
1948;
and Tilly,
in
conjunction
civilian wage and salary
form three theoretically
(1) Forcheimer,
Shorter
and
Knowles,
distinct
employment
of
dimensions
Goetz-Girey,
1952;
strike
1963;
and
1971.
(2) Since strikes rarely occur In the
those that do are not
recorded with
agricultural
sector
great
accuracy),
I
(and
have
excluded agricultural workers from the labor force
data
of
all
nations
except
Italy,
a country
in
which
there
has
been
substantial
strike activity by farm laborers during most
twentieth century.
The military as
well
as
small
of
the
proprietors,
entrepreneurs, cEgn1t.Jr_,
and
other
self-employed persons
have
also been
excluded
from
the
labor
force data because
they
cont-ibute little
to aggregate strike
activity
but comprise
a
significant
fraction of
the work
force in many nations
'and
time
periods.
International
and
intertemporal
comparisons
of
industrial conflict are therefore facilitated by using the number
of nonagricultural civilian wage and salary workers to adjust the
strike statistics
for differences in labor force size.
10
the average
activityi
of
.11"
workers involved per strike;
i.e. man-days lost
per
the
worker
strikes,
average
the
i.e.
of
dyC.Ation
involved;
and
number
of
strikes,
size-adjusted
a
measure of strike IC auenCX, i.e. the njmber of strikes per
1000
nonagricultural civilian wage and salary workers.
5igL
workers involved (strikers)/strikes
Qyctia±.IQQ
man-days lost/strikers (1)
ECit.2aaY.
strikes/civilian
wage and salary workers
in
Each of these dimensions (defined per unit of time)
for time-series and cross-national analysis.
however, to array them into a
particular nation during a
particular
of
time
is
suitable
It is advantageous,
three-dimensional
depicting the typical profile or "shape"
1000s.
solid
strike activity
period.
or
cube
in
Figure
a
1
Notice that strike duration is calculated from the available
total
the
man-days
lost by
aggregate data by dividing total
duration
average
number of strikers, which yields a "weighted"
computed from
average
a simple arithmetical
to
(as opposed
to the
Individual disputes) -- the weights being proportionate
number of workers involved in the strike.
For example, If -wy, W2P
...
wnare the number of workers
involved
in
strikes 1, 2, e-on,
of' these
are the corresponding durations
...
d
and if d1 , d2
strikes in d3yvs),
he number of man-days lost my m?
...
mn =d1 w
d2w 2, ...
d w .
The Total number of man-days' 1ot
is M =
mI
+M2+ ...
+M , and the total number of workers involved is W= w1+W2
is
+ ...
+wn* nihe weighted average duration defined in the text
(1)
therefore
.. mn = diw +d2w2+...+d wn
.uMamti2
Duration- M = wy
2 +'''n w 1+W+...4v
1w 2 2''
W w1 w 2+..+w
in each
workers
involved
where the weights are the number of
dispute. The practical significance of this is that the duration
measure is heavily Influenced by large-scale strikes.
11
displays two distinctive, hypothetical strike shapes.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
historical
can
deal
Although a great
analysis of
learned
be
profiles
strike
from
comparative,
the
strike
individual
and
is
dimensions, (1) what is needed for the purposes of this study
a
single
conflict.
of
indicator
overall
one
magnitude
industrial
The most suitable index of of overall strike
simply
activity
which
of
the product of the three dimensions depicted
in
volume,
is a quantity akin to the physical concept of
course is
of
Figure 1.
Strike Volume =
man-days lost
per 1000
nonagricultural
civilian
employees
Man-days
strikes
nonagricultural
civilian
employees
in 1008s
lost from
strikes
per
employees has both theoretical
X
1000
Size
X
Duration
X
Frequency
_Man.-days
workers
involved
X
nonagricultural
workers,
Involyed
strikes
civilian
Justification (being the volume of
a three-dimensional profile that characterizes strike activity at
time
any
or
place)
and
intuitive
obvious
appeal
a
as
Indeed,
most
specialists have proposed man-days lost adjusted for labor
force
size as the best single indicator of gross strike activity
on
comprehensive
2rlagrJ
()
grounds.
See,
index
of
Since it
industrial
is built
up
conflict.
from
a
for example, Shorter and Tilly, 1971.
nation's
overall
a
Figure 1:
Hypothetical Strike Profiles
-
.e I
Size
Frequency
Duration
(b)
(a)
Frequency:
# of strikes per 1000 wage and salary workers
Duration:
Mandays lost per striker in strikes
Size:
# of strikers per strike
= Frequency X Duration X Size
Strike Volume = Mandays lost per
salary
and
1000 wage
workers
12
strike profile,
it
strike activity
that are not confounded by changes
allows inferences
conflict dimension.
trends
In
a
In
single
(1)
of
"sides"
Individual
long-run
aoout
the
profIlIe
secondary Indices of aggregate
or
strike
cube
give
activity.
important,
It
might
be
plausibly argued, for example, that strike duration tells us more
about the relative power of the contestants
low duration
relatively
signifying
that
either
labor
or
management
weak ano therefore concedes quickly when
test of a strike --
than
labor's
to
propensity
it
does
quantity
yields
the
(strikers) per 1000
workers, which
number
might
be
the
same
worker
Therefore,
of
the
particular
of
workers
nonagricultural
strike R&ril.irAtiaD rate.
by
about
strike.
FreqJency and Size alone may be
strike
in labor struggles --
designated
as
or
product
of
interest.
in
wage
the
This
strikes
and
salary
(nonagricultural)
Barring involvement in more than
worker
in
a
given
the
militancy
involved
civilian
to
put
is
year,
participation variable gives the fraction of the
the
labor
one
strike
force
on
strike at some time during the year.
Figure 2 reports time-series plots of
lost in
strike
activity
oer
JO0,
strike
volumes
nonagriculturical
(man-days
civilian
(1) Notice, for example, the reduction in strike duration but not
in strike volume between Figures 1(a) and
1(b).
By using
the
composite measure
strike
volume,
one
avoids
making
spurious
conclusions about trends in the gross magnitude
of
Industrial
conflict that can arise by focusing
exclusively on one strike
dimension and mistaking changes in
it
for
changes in overall
strike activity.
13
employees) and strike participation rates
strikes per 1000 nonagricultural civilian employees)
twentieth century in 12
Finland,
France,
United Kingdom and
Belgium,
countriest
the United States.
inclides al I major Industrial
(1)
Sweden,
The sample of
nations
societies except Germany.
of the data;
in
some
the second quarter of the century;
until
country
nations
countries
the Germans during the second World War have gaos
1930s and early 1940s; and for Japan and
corresponding
gaps
organized
FIGURE
It
to
the
of
period
Fascist
The
according
on
all
by
occupied
for
the
late
there
are
long
repression
of
labor.
2 ABOUT HERE
is clear
from the plots that
in most countries strike activity
exhioits great year-to-year fluctuation.
fell
Italy
data
(2)
systematically
collected
components of strike activity were not
Denmark,
Norway,
exact time range of the strike series vary by
to the availability
the
during
Canada,
Netherlands,
Japan,
Italy,
in
involved
(workers
sharply during major business
during Periods of
economic
Strike action
contractions,
recovery.
(Major
and
normally
increased
depressions
are
(1) Small differences In definitions and methods of collection of
the strike data affect somewhat the accuracy of Intertemporal and
important
not
are
However, they
comparisons.
international
enough to impair analyses of major changes through time and major
See
activity.
differences across countries in aggregate strike
and Ross and
1968;
the discussions in Fisher, 1973; Eldridge,
Hartman, 196C,
appendix.
societies
(2) Germany was excluded from the sample of industrial
the
from the outset of this project because the partitioning of
Problematic.
analyses
country makes long-run time-series
Figure 2:
Strike Volume and Strike Participation during the
Twentieth Century in Twelve Nationsa
Belgium
Stri1:~ Volume
1500
|||
I
I
I I I
750
I
I
I
I
I
I
j
I
I
I
I
I; I
.
I
(D
1-4
11
II
I
500
Cd
250
I
0
30
1910
1920
1930
Li
1940
0
0
U,
(42
(I,
'4
lb
I-
0~
~0
1950
U ILi
19
197
__J
I
--Za
b
42,
a-
k3
b
Strike Participation
I It
300
III1
I II
150
(a
$-4
Q)
100
50
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
Li
U L-
1950
1960
1970
L
J
('a
c
lb
.0
~
t.
(42
~
~
(:1~
b
(a
U,
ources:
see appendix
0
I
0
L
war
depression
I-
dapross/on
war
depres sian
1-..
L0.D
depres six
depression
war
depression
* rr
r?
C
(r,,
%-1
0)
depressim
depression
war
C
rQ3
Strikers per 1000 Workers
CT"
0
ki)
L
w4
F-
L
0
I(~J
:
C)
CD
'-I,
0D
C0
C0
\0
0
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
t'3
0)
5
0
I
En
social
de mocraf
governments
(/t ernatingg
with bourgols)
0 CcUp a tiOn
war/
depression
depression
depress/on
dopression,
U
L
1
E
C)
',D
.00
N,
U,
0
----------- a
1
1,
Strikers per 1000 Workers
0
r?
with bourgvIs)
governments
(altcrnating
social
do nocrat C
war/
o ccupa tion
dapression
depression
depress0ion
depression
.
G
1711
C
C0
L~.
...
a1
co
00'
'-p4
-----
en
~
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
C3
0)
-IZ
t1
rt
rt
depression
participation
government
sporadic social
democratic
Cr
-
(n)
'-1
sporadic social
democratiC
government
participation
goa
o0D
0
war (USSR)
00
war (USSR)
depression
U,'
I-
I~i)
N)
Strikers per 1000 Workers
r
a
------
Q
I.~)
,..
0
o0
a01
*1
oL
co
oD
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
N3
CD
CD
m-
(n
-r.
war
depress/on
110
0
Q
I.
'0
co
%.n
Strikers per 1000 Workers
en
0
1-1
r?
-
war
depression
war
depression
Cr
Ln
I-
..
10
C
C
0I
1
CD
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
0
0
0
(D
0
rt
C/)
(D1
war
fasc/sn/
depression/
war
0
Q
1
kD
ID
CID
ol
&I
K
03
%A
Strikers per 1000 Workers
C)-
%n
0)
'1
Ft
depression/
war
tasisp,/
war
'D
K-
-CD
C)
1
U
%.n
l44ndays Lost per 1000 Workers
0
0
0
ljd
(D
0
rt
Japan
Strike Volume
1200
a 40
0
200
0
IS-7
I
o
1900
1910
119 20
19 3 0
Jo
1940
1950
196
197
-4
Strike Participation
200
ED
S
100
75
50
25
t1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
governments
(altornating
with bourgvis)
co alition
socialists in
war/.
occupation
depression
depression
I-'
0
Q
(-j
I..-
ro
C).
.C
C>
U'
0A
Strikers per 1000 Workers
\,r
0
(n
zU
sociai/sts in
coo/i/ion
governments
(alternati g
with bourgpis)
war/
occupation
depression
depression
'~0
iJJ
0
U
L
C.
C)
Co
CD
C
D
0
CD
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
%,
C0
C0
0
CO
rt
labor governments
(alternating with
bourgeois)
war/
0 c cup ation
dopress/On
depress/on
depression
depression
'D
*I
N*.
I--
V
- - ---
C
%UI
LK
C)
---------------
0C)
Strikers per 1000 Workers
C
CD
'-1
0
FT
f(I)
labor governrents
(alternating with
bourggois)
wor/
o c cup ation
depresslon
depress/on
depression
depression
b.-
E.
Cc3
I I
C?
go
~: F
~~~0
U~-----
C)
%A
0:
0
--
%.
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
-
C)
0I
CD
M OT
0
CD
so cial
democrotic
governments
war (neutral)
dopression
depression
depression
.I
Q)
Q
c
~r
.C
---
-
*
C)
-
-
-
1
tO
-
Strikers per 1000 Workers
- -
--
---
-
--
-
g
----
--
- - - -
__ _
C,
r
rt
(D
Ci)
social
dem oc ratic
govern/nonts
war (neutral)
de pression
depression
dopression
I
I
*'ft U
'b
aT,
~c'
a- I
'~I1
'r' I
t~J
I
1%
IJ~
C
C:)
C)
3~-
U------
C)
C)
CO
CD
CD
C3
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
C)
C)
CD
:~j
(D
(altornating with
conservativas)
lob our
govrnents
war
depress/on
depress/on
war
t
'4)
'Li
4)
cr1
I'..
4)
4
I-'
in
kJ)
--
---
oN)
%-nU~
~4A
-
C0
N.1'
%
-
-4
*
o
oD
Il
---------
-
----
- - - - - - -- ----
-
Strikers per 1000 Workers
,.-.
-
0
cU
labour
governments
(alternating with
consarvatives)
war
depression
depress/on
war
C0
Un
Qr
I
K
H-
0-C
C)
o0
'C,
-----
-----
1I
o
C)
CD
CD
C>
Vn
-
Mandays Lost per 1000 Workers
-
C)
0
0
C)
0
C'-.
H'
U)
'-1
0
(D
Ft-
H'
United States
Strike Volume
3000
14
1 5 00
C
U
L-
0
0.
CO
500
t1
at
ow 1000
I
0~.
:3tU
C1Q
LAJ
190 0
1910
1920
U Li
1940
1930
1960
1970
t
250
I
1
100
0
91
Iia
"
0
o
1950
1
-3
9
II14
0
o
o
90
LiH
$4
I
Z
I
'
q)I
g
u
3I
9
11
1
91
widesoread unemployment typically
some exceptIons to the pattern,
in
response
depressions were usually desperate actions by unions in
management
to wage cuts and as often as not were orovoked by
weaken
Wars.
Figure
(cf.
this
part
In
2.)
but more important was the
prohloitions against war-time strikes,
voluntary commitment of
some neutral)
effort.
against
sporadic,
were
defend
shop-floor
strikes
in
on
just after the end of
its
war-time
grievances
*discipline*,
and
accumulated
real
over
countries
were
leaders,
wages
in
very
and
explosions
toward
labor
sought
resolve
gains,
the
government
labor
the world wars as
organizational
preserve
by
war
established
most
Most nations experienced strike
the
to
support
accompanied
capital
by
(and
combatant
all
usually unauthorized by trade-union
short-lived.
the end or
attacks
War-time
organizations.)
maximum
give
to
countries
in virtually
(Such pledges usually
protection
to
unions
legal
to
due
was
World
second
markedly in combatant rations during the first and
to
declined
also
conflict
Industrial
labor organizations.
during
called
were
that
strikes
The
membership.
union
declines
led to great
leaders, and
demoralized workers and their
are
there
Although
(1)
identified on the plots in Figure 2.)
long
the
the
Period
of
face
of
war-generated uoward movements in prices.
which unemoloyment
In
as periods
(I) Depressionsare iefined
production
industrial
increased and Gross National Product and
decreased for two years in succession. The primary source used
to iJentify depression periods was Mitchell, 1975.
15
A detailed analysis of these short-run
movements
conflict will be presented in another paper;
long-run trends.
focused on gross,
estimates of
volume and strike participation in each of
were explored (including the
trend model
simple
the
in
strike
countries.
the twelve
strike
trends
least-sauares
linear
long-run
conventional
is
regression
year
and the 3ox-Jenkins ARMA trend model),
satisfactory proved to be
attention
reports
per
the average percentage change
A variety of schemes for estimating the
here
I
Table
industrial
in
log
but
trend
most
the
(exponential)
moae I.
Y0 (1+g)t
Yt
log Yt
=
log Y 0 + t log (1+g)
where Y denotes the strike variable and where g denotes the average
annual percentage rate of change (reported in Table 1).
The trend estimates in
from visual
Table i
merely summarize what Is
apparent
inspection of the time-series plots of strike volumes
and strike participation rates in Figure 2.
TABLE I ABOUT HERE
There simply is
away of
strike
activity
twentieth century.
Finland, France,
general
no evidence of a
Japan,
increased
withering
or
industrial
societies
during
twelve
countries
--
In six of the
Italy,
activity has either
In
decline
and the United
or
States
fluctuated
about a constant mean or equilibrium level.
(often
Industrial
Canada,
--
strike
markedly)
conflict
has declined significantly in Belgium and the Unitea Kingdom,
has decreased to truly negligible levels
Netherlands,
Norway and Sweden.
Hence,
only
in
the
Denmark,
the withering away of
but
The
the
Table 1:
Twentieth Century Trends in Strike Volume and
Strike Participation in Twelve Countries
(all nonagricultural sectors of economic activity)
Average Percentage Change Per Year
Strike Volume
(man-days lost per
1000 nonagricultural
civilian employees)
Belgium
(1927-40
1945-72)
Canada
(1901-72)
Denmark
(1900-72)
-3.50
negligible
-4.88
Strike Participation
(strikers per 1000
nonagricultural
civilian employees)
-2.74
+1.35
negligible
Finland
(1907-41,
1945-72)
negligible
negligible
France
(Vol.:1900-35,
1946-72; Part.:
negligible
+4.46
1900-38, 1946-72)
Italya
(Vol: 1916-23,
1949-72
Part: 1900-35,
1945-72
Japan
(Vol.: 1927-37,
+6.87
negligible
(curvilinear)
+5.31
+7.81
1947-72
Part: 1914-38,
1947-72)
Netherlands
-10.15
-4.56
-6.88
-5.00
Sweden
(1903-72)
-9.65
-6.99
United Kingdom
-2.66
(1913-40
1946-72)
Norway
(1903-39,
1945-72)
negligible
(1911-72)
United States
(Vol: 1927-72
Part: 1919-72)
negligible
negligible
aincludes agricultural workers
16
that strike data are relevant
state
of
class
considerable
relations,
doubt
on
in
the
making
about
judgements
macrosociological
the
the
cast
results
trend
long-run
integration of the working class into
extent
Moreover, to the
smaller democracies of Northern Europe.
the
to
largely
confined
limited phenomenon
strike is a rather
about
arguments
the
structure
social
of
advanced capitalist nations.
At the same time,
however,
historical trends in
lead one to question the usefulness of the "new"
of contemporary industrial relations.
the
late
i960s
and
early
1970s
treatments
outbursts
Most strike
simply
militancy
labor
science
orientation currently popular in many social
activity
strike
not
do
of
represent
significant departures from long- standing patterns in industrial
conflict.
of
course
1968
strike
The events of May-June 1968 in France must
The
stand as an exception to this generaiLzation.
labor
wave was unquestionably the most severe in recorded French
history (1) (the strike volume of that year is nearly three times
larger than that of the great general
strike
surely merits the hundreds of studies
devoted
should be recognized,
however,
periodic strike explosions --
of
to
and
1920)
it.
(2)
It
that France has a long history
for example, 1906,
19±9-20,
it
of
1936,
recorded
(1) Actually, the strike wave of 1968 in France was not
the
in
in the usual way at all; the man-days lost figure shown
unofficial
the careful
from
was derived
French volume plot
calculations of C. Ourand.
(2) An excellent source for references on the events of
1968 Is Wylie, et al., 1973.
May-June
and 1947-48 --
of which 1968 Is the most dramatic example. (J)
Recent upturns
in strike activity in other nations are
exceptional
record of
labor relations.
In
the "hot
Italy,
long-run
the
of
perspective
the
when viewed from
activity
conflict,
upwar'd trend since the early 1950s.
I
as
but
another paper this departure from the
modest
of
level
by
explained
most
variation in strike activity since the 1930s.
(2)
The
idea
of
a
time-series
movements
new
labor
plots
for
militancy.
the
It
remaining
in strike volume and
strike
is
fixed
of
the
1966-72
appeal to the
obvi.ous
countries
in
postwar
a
for
upward trend, therefore, does not require a special
the
show
will
accounts
coefficients econometric model that
(but
over
steadily
1966-72 period in the United Kingdom,
conflict is adequately
distinct
strikes
The volume of
not the strike participation rate) increased
British industrial
a
about
fluctuated
has
1969
of
autumn"
represents the peak of that nations postwar industrial
but Italian strike
not
just
from
that
participation
are
the
recent
quite
consistent with past patterns in strike activity, and thus do not
(1)
See Shorter
and Tlly, 1974,
Chapter 5.
In
1976)
(see Hibbs,
(2) My model for short-run fluctuations
were
factors
two
that
activity suggests
strike
British
of
growth of
(1) the rate
responsible for the 1966-72 trend:
of
growth of
rate
real wages systematically lagged behind the
the
and
(11)
sector;
industrial
in the
productivity
labor
the
to
union establishment
the
British trade
reaction
of
197±
Act
of
Relations
Industrial
government's
conservative
(repealed by the subseauent labour government),
Union
Congress
Trades
the normally moderate
stimulated
which
peak
union
(the
militant
organization) to join the shop stewards in pressing the
The latter factor of course only influenced the post
position.
rate.
1970 strike
require a search
for
special explanations.
unusual
factors
or
the
development
of
19
f..w~n1cl
EXalanallana 9.1 Patierns In laaiclal
the
The log trend analyses discussed in
a
yield
not
trends
long-run
of
characterization
do
I,
Table
in
reporfted
little
of
First,
time-series plots.
estimated
equilibrium (mean) levels.
in
the
in Table 1, but they ranged
gradually
coefficients imply.
so
this
many
percent
per
has
conflict
discontinuously
or just after the second World
by
about
cases,
industrial
decreased substantially, the decline occured
than
greatly
fluctuates
trendless
the
from
Second, and for the purposes of
study more Important, in nations where
the late 1930s --
strike
and
volume
activity
strike
very
"exolain"
The reasons are aooarent
or,
trends
conventional
by
equations
strike
(R 2s are not reported
in the neighborhood of .20.)
about
trend
in
variation
the
participation.
log
the
conflict.
industrial
Although the trend coefficients are significant
satistical criteria,
satisfactory
very
in
and
section,
previous
--
War
For example, in Sweden, strike
rather
the
as
year
in
trend
does
volume
not drop-off more or less continuously by nine or ten percent per
annum from the early 190js as
the
trend
estimate
suggests, on the contrary, the withering away of
Sweden is apparent only by the late 1930s,
marked during the postwar era. (1)
levels of
industrial
conflict
are
and
the
is
Table
in
strike
J
in
particularly
Long-run changes In aggregate
therefore
probably
better
(1.) Figure 2 shows that the dramatic decline In strike activity
in Sweden, as in other countries, took place when the social
democrats assumed political power. I return to this important
point in the next section.
20
summarized by contrasting pre-
and
post-
Figure 3 shows a histogram
of
(1944-72)
volumes
average
nonagricultural,
The strike
strike
civilian
Interwar
employees)
World
War
for-
lost
the
For example, Norwdy's
100.
Japan's interwar mean Volume was about
mean was nearly 30C.
FIGURE
It's
countries
the same manner.
3 ABOUT HERE
identified in the previous discussion of
patterns
time-series
the
In the period between the world wars, Norway, Sweden, the
Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands had the highest
Industrial
conflict in
world
dramatically in
levels.
other
about
postwar
The histogram merely provides a graphic illustration of
second
on
strike
only
The mean strike Volumes of other
tistogram in
the
are -ead-off
bars
mean
was
50;
1000
countries.
the
interwar
Volume was over 2,000, whereas its postwar mean
postwar
per
twelve
level means are given by the heights of
the vertical scale.
means.
and
(1918-38)
(man-days
II
war,
the western world.
however,
these nations --
strike
In
By
the
activity
most
This contrasts sharply with the record
countries.
oscillated
about
Elsewhere
industrial
the
average
same
level
three-quarters of a certury, or has actually
end
to
for
of
of
the
declined
negligible
for most
conflict
United
levels
had
cases
data.
has
of
the
either
approximately
increased
somewhat
during the postwar era.
What explains these patterns in the evolution of aggregate strike
activity during the
twentieth
century?
The
sociological
and
Figure 3:
Average Strike Volumes, Interwar and Postwar Periodsa
LII
Mean Strike Volume
Inter-war period.
(1918-1938)
2079
Post-war period.
(1944-1972)
1713
1300
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
II
600
500
400
I
I
300
200
I
100
0
Ca
U)
_N4
W1
0
U)
0
z
CU
CO
'-4
U)
U)
CU
44)
4-"
Cj.~
1PQ
j:z~
a)
Q)
z
CU
CU
4-J
Ca
CL.
CU
0
U)
4~J
a
interwar data are
incomplete for some nations,
1945 excluded for Sweden
21
should observe
dgclining
ItAkIL or JaQCfaljj
unexplained.
labor conflict
process of
magnitudes of strike
One school
lie
of thinking proposes that the
one expression of
the
conflict
Industrial
antagonisms
class
formation of large,
discrete social
phase of industrial
development.
is
of
by
the
viewed
the
during
early
Once society passes through the
Period of basic industrialization into the "postindustrial"
of
complex
and
differentiated
status
hierarchies, class conflict is replaced
and social Integration.
as
the
with
associated
groupings
roots
on
_n the disruptive changes brought
Industrialization.
largely
are
activity
we
but
conflict,
industrial
of
levels
why
reasons
many
suggests
industrial relations literature
by
Phase
and
occuoetional
class
collaboration
Wilbert Moore, for example, has written:
The broad chaiges in the occupational structure in the process of
its
in
conflict,
industrial
that
suggest
industrialization
In
*stage*
fits a particular
primarily
sence,
traditional
the
represented by
That stage may be
inoustrial development.
the
to
prior
secondary production,
from primary to
shift
the
line between
to make
elaborate specialization that tends
to the
and shifting and prior
management and labor blurred
extensive development of
tertlary production.
(1)
Although Moore has called attention to important
stages
"postindustrial"
development" hypothesis
long-run
patterns
in
society
does
strike
not
a
literature,
account
of
"stages
of
activity
well
very
identified
Virtually every nation treated in this study passed
stage of basic industrialization long ago (Italy
(1) Moore, 1954, p. 230.
is
the
much
evolution of industrial societies and his work presaged
the later
in
for
the
earlier.
through
perhaps
the
an
exception)
and
rapidly
is
developing
all
associated with a postindustrial social
showed
analyses
previous
yet
structure;
declined
--
two countries with the most advanced tertiary sectors
Sweden
stand at opposite poles with respect
and the United States --
conflict.
Sweden's
industrialization,
the
Indeed, the
significantly in only a limited number of countries.
patterns of industrial
as
has
activity
strike
attributes
the
the
Since
strike
oeriod
has
volume
basic
of
decreased
several orders of magnitude and is currently among the lowest
the world.
By comparison, in the United States,
production
and
occupational
advanced than in any other society, the
probably
postwar
by
in
tertiary
where
is
specIaiIzation
to
average
more
strike
volume exceeds the prewar average and is among the l'ighest in the
capitalist world.
Other
have
arguments
employment,
pointed
to
the
of
persistence
the enormous improvement in standards of
full
living
and
the &gIXourgaiggagal of the working class as important factors in
reducing class antagonisms and
Goldthorpe and his colleagues,
ALYIdCQaiwan
without
strikes.
(1)
among others,
The
suggests
thesis is greatly exaggerated,
substance.
time-series strike
(2)
data
More
important,
presented
earlier
research
it
that
of
the
if not altogether
is
no
simple, mechanical connection between the long-run
evolution
of
industrial conflict ano changes in
affluence
or
class
there
from
is
working
that
clear
(J) These arguments are summarized in Ross and Hartman, 1960.
(2) Goldthorpe et al.
1968.
23
life styles.
virtually everywhere --
changed
have
standards
Living
security of
employment
for
is
better
the
real
greater,
Incomes have increased, hours of work have decreased, and working
in
only
improved --
have
conditions
comparatively
levels
high
low-to-modest wage countries (e.g.
States).
(e.g. the United
Italy) and high wage countries
Conversely,
Sweden)
(e.g.
living
and
moderate-to-low wages
Kingdom).
(1)
Nor
any higher among
is
as
as
well
living
standards
lower paid workers than among
Ross ana Hartman have identified changes in
trends
workers in
in
relations as one of
industrial
"Withering Away of
the most
conflict.
In
their
the Strike", they contend
role
influences
chapter
that
sectors
(2)
the state's
critical
is
conditions;
work
just the reverse has typically been the case.
industrial
United
the
(e.g.
there any evidence that strike activity
of economic activity with relatively favorable
indeed,
with
nations
among
standards
strike
low
relatively
rates are found among nations with very high wages and
of
both
in
conflict
industrial
of
observe
we
Cross-nationally,
countries.
few
a
but strike activity has withered away
an
on
in
on
the
important
decline in labo--management
conflict
is
the heightened activity on the part of the state as
operator
of
reason "for
the general
Is no relationship between
there
(1) This Is not to say that
fluctuations, only
movements In real wages and short-run strike
labor
in
differences
that long-run changes and International
and related
militancy bear no systematic association to income
variables.
on
(2) The data on this point will be presented in another paper
and
by
Kerr
study
seminal
the
See
intersectoral comparisons.
Siegel, J954.
24
supervisor of industrial
developments in
the
protector
planner,
economic
public enterprise,
disputes".
(1)
and
I will argue below
do
system
political
labor
of
that
the
provide
indeed
principal explanation for long-run trends in Industrial conflict,
however,
me
the specific factors noted by Ross and Hartman
to be
somewhat
wide
of
the
mark.
ownership of the means of production,
that labor is any
public
less
management
or
militant
("state
there simply is
more
It
public ownership is
negligible and
of course true that
in
strike rates stand at comparatively high
levels,
have not exhibited a
Contrary
downward
trend.
conceptions, however, government
consequence
in
Sweden
insignificant during the
ownership of
where
postwar
ownership
strike
period.
no evidence
is
private
North
America
and
American
and historically
to
also
activity
By
yet strike activity
(indeed, in Italy
other
widespread
of
little
has
been
contrast,
state
productive enterprises is more extensive
and Italy than in virtually all
toward
toward
Canadian
both
to
government
conciliatory
than
capitalists")
sector management.
is
Concerning
seem
non-Communist
in
France
countries;
nation
shows no signs of declining in either
it has increased steadily during
most
of
the
postwar period).
Government
general
or to
Intervention in particular strikes,
as
well
as
more
attempts by the state to suppress collective labor action
legitimate the status of trade unions,
has
obviously
had
great influence on unions* ability to mobilize workers and pursue
(Q) Ross and Hartman, 1960, p. 50.
25
aggressively disputes with management.
evidence that
conf I ict.
general
a
is
little
protector,
and
relations
has
I ndustrial
and
supervisor" of economic activity
contributed significantly to
planner,
as
involvement
state
However, there
decline
in
industrial
State intervention in the economy has politicized
strike, in the sense
serious challenge
and to more modest
inflation. (1)
that
militant
union
to government coordinated
government
to
efforts
can
action
the
In systems where the state participates
of
in setting wages (or wage floors) and conditions
France, Italy, and in
recent
strike is often used as a
years
form
of
the
United
political
oose
rate
work
(e.g.
Kingdom),
the
on
the
unilaterally
to coerce a favorable settlement from recalcitrant employers.
In
general,
cont-ibuted
then,
to the
to its decline as
state involvement in industrial
relations
olaitiZaijLjan of strike activity -an
Instrument
of
collective
of
directly
pressure
government either to grant concessions to labor
a
policies',
"Incomes
check
the
but
working
or
(2)
has
not
class
action.
(i) This point is pursued more fully In my forthcoming paper
"Labor Militancy and Wage Inflation: A Comparative Analysis."
many
of
(2) Notwithstanding the larger political visiors
left-wing union leaders, most workers are probably mobilized for
strike activity not by slogans about worker seizure of political
power but by the narrower economic Incentives usually associated
As Lorwin put it in his study
with American "business unionism."
of French labor relations "When they received wage ad)ustments,
little
showed
members,
union
most
including
workers,
of
content
institutional
the
for
dete-mination to press
agreements about which their leaders talked."* (1966, P. 215) Even
the massive strikes of May-June 1968 in France (which were viewed
popular
many
events in
largely as spontaneous "political"
accounts) centered in the overwhelming majority of cases around
traditional demanas for wage increases and came to an end in the
the government and
wake of sizeable wage concessions from
employers. See Ourand, 1973 and Ross, 1973.
Ith
=trlCluilnal Conf 10t
E2iL1&ai 5.xilm and lba Locus al1
The principal
earlier,
theoretical weakness
and the main reason
it
of
does
explanation of secular trends and
industrial
and
conflict, is that
purposes
societies.
of
strike
Strikes are
rather than
conceived institutional
Korpi
and oolitical
class
MadLLIIAtilaQ
!aiaaaEas
in
aid
industrial
(1)
view
consequently,
the
separation
of
of
the
narrowly
Moreover, as
the
traditional
inherent
a
tendency
and
political
result,
what
industrial
As
between
occupational
life-styles,
such
of
ohenomena
linkages between conflict in the
I
industrial
arenas tend to be obscured.
strikes should
working
and,
in
function
connections
changes
out,
The argument developed here
level
the
reactive
mechanical
conflict in advanced capitalist nations.
believe are critical
differences
capitalist,
as
reviewed
satisfactory
arrangements, aid the like.
liter!ature adopts Dahrendorfos
institutional
a
identify
actions
affluence
has recently pointed
towa-d
in
collective
class
yield
largely
conflict and exogenous
structure, working
literature
international
activity
analysis focuses on determining
industrial
not
It falls to
viewed
purposive,
the
" g
(1) Korpi,
be
action
i
that
viewed
and
as
dUir
the
Uaiag
that
ib utIon
at
macro-theoretical
Instruments
Igt
41D angoing struggleA
th14a
1975.
is
21
of
collective
a.tig.ity
pgj ewen
C-uauQCCAs,
is one
5.Qscia.
Drincloally
27
1ihaggaqgigQ1_axig.glyL
the study is that 1i2naCr.I
ACr
ganlili
iaCsriY.
=AaStg
The main ttesis of
gLume
la L£a
iaa
D
MD Lai"12
lcaagl.
d1itibutionail
(J)
niatLion al 1n02a=-
1
tb
i.z
parties
dramatically in nations where Social Democratic or Labor
assumed power in the 1930s --
state".
In these countries an
enormous fraction of the national income now Passes
public
and
sector
is
allocated
by
Political conflict between left-and
electoral
arena (i.e.,
industrial
sector (i.e.,
national
of
countries governed more or
in
replaced
private
the
as the u Itimate mechanism
income.
By
comparison,
in
less continuously by bourgeols parties
thie center and right, the private sector cont inues to dominate
the 2112.jj120 as well
the
as
RC2dME112a
economic marketplace remains the primary
conflict
of
has
the
in
parties
capital
and
the
through
pg.illJsal
marketplac e)
the economic marketplace)
for the distribution
of
labor
the
right-wing
the political
conflict between
War
or just after the second World
the modern "welfare
and created
lba
21
declined
has
activity
Strike
ilndstlal
21
activity
has
been
resources.
locus o f
in these nations, and, consequently,
strike
of
the
relatively
The
distributional
level
average
constant
for
three-quarters of a century or more.
The evidence in
in
the
overall
favor of
volume
this interpretation of
of
industrial
long-run
conflict
is,
changes
I
think
() cf. Shorter and Tilly J974, especially Chapters I and 13,
I
Although
Snyder and Tilly, 1972, and especially Korpli, 1975.
drafted,
was
read Korpi*s unpublished paper after this section
analysis
the theory sketched here is in broad agreement with his
of the evolution of Swedish industrial relations.
28
It is clear from the data Presented in Figures 2 and
compelling.
3 that nations experiencing a sustained decline or withering away
of strike activity during the postwar era are largely those where
(having
power
assumed
parties
support in the
political
welfare state.
economy of
This
historical
"organized working class."
evolution
the
societies
Samuel
Some Idea of
of
strike
power between the social
oolitical
In
development
which shows a scatterplot of
political
represented
the
has
Beer
percentage
Socialist,
Labor,
of
the
close
association
shift
of
classes is given by Figure
4,
change
in
and
activity
the
interwar-to-postwar
cabinet
(executive)
and Communist parties.
posts
years
(The
Socialist/Labor parties were continuously in power or
regularly in
a
the
called
in
the
held
by
average strike volume and the Interwar-to-postwar change
average
the
engineered
power away fiom business interests and
their middle class allies to what
the
mass
mobilized
and
arena)
some capitalist, Industrial
massive shift of political
between
successfully
electoral
Labor
Democratic and
working class-based, union supported Social
In
which
alternated
power with bourgeois parties are identified
on
the
strike volume and participation plots Ii Figure 2.)
FIGURE
4 ABOUT
The variables
HERE
in
Figure
4
clearly
association (the correlation is -.97);
figure
lie the countries where center
exhibit
at
and
a
strong
extreme
one
rightist
have ruled almost continuously throughout the
of
the
governments
twentieth
(Japan, Canada, U.S., etc.); at the other extreme
linear
century
Ile the nations
29
Figure 4: Change in
Average Strike Volume and Average Socialist-Labor and
Communist Percentage Cabinet Representation,
Interwar to Postwar
Perioda
Japan
United States
Canada
400
Finland
200
*@France
0
-200
*
Italy
*
Belgium
-400
Netherlands
-600
*
Denmark
*
United Kingdom
-800
-1000
-12Q0
-1400
-1600
.
Sweden
-1800
r = -. 97
SNorway
0
10
30
20
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Change in Socialist-Labor and Communist Percentage
Cabinet Representation, Interwar Mean minus
Postwar Mean
aSources: Strike data Cabinet data
-
see appendix
Statesman's Yearbook, various issues
30
where Social
governments
Democratic and Labor parties have dominated
postwar
Countries in which
leftist
(Norway and Sweden).
(1)
parties have shared or alternated in power with bourgeois parties
respect to the decline in
What
is
crucial
activity, however,
Social
for
strike volume.
is not the assumption of
agt
locus of
the distribution of
welfa-e
state
policies
the
socializing
long-run
explaining
Democratic parties
"i
of
change
Social
Product,
the
Income produced by
the
Democratic
and
distribution
Democratic
and
engineered a massive circumvention of the
The principal
regimes.
By
(though
not
interests
enjoy
distributional
private
an
the
to
(where
advantage
Inherent
outcomes)
political resources of
sector
the
public
organized
Gross
the
Labor
Governments
economic
marketplace.
locus of distribution of the national
shifted from the
by
in
Social
consumption
strike
power
political
but rather the
the national
In
trends
necessarily the production) of an enormous fraction of
National
with
position
in an intermediate
during the postwar period fall
property
with
sector
working
product
and
was
capital
respect
to
(where
the
are
more
class
telling.)
underlying
international
of the reasons
(i) A discussion
executive political
success and
electoral
differences in the
is beyond
the
power of Socialist, Labor, and Communist parties
the
that
noted,
however,
should be
It
scope of this paper.
"politicization" of the strike is most pronounced in France and
the state is heavily
Italy,
where, as I pointed out earlier,
involved in establishirg wages and conditions of
work in
the
private sector, and, also, where Leftist parties have commanded a
sizeable share of the vote for thirty years or more but have been
largely frozen out of positions of executive power.
31
Although the public sector share of
the
virtually all countries during
postwar
the
GNP
has
increased
period,
and
in
early
welfare state measures were in some cases introduced by the right
to retard development of
Insurance
most
labor movement parties (e.g. the
social
legislation initiated by Bismark and Lloyd George),
dramatic
increases
in
public
sector
primarily the result of Social Democratic
Consider the
policies. (.)
cases that
Ile near
and
Labor
experience
historical
the opposite ends of
public sector allocation of the national income -United States.
Between
938 and 1972,
the
of
the
and
were
Government
of
the range
power of the working class
in the political
expenditure
the
two
variation
extent
of
Sweden and the
the fraction
of
the
GNP
passing through the public sector (exclusive of expenditures
for
defense and nationalized industries)
in Sweden,
governed almost continuously by the Social
early 1930s,
trioled.
grew
which
Democrats
from less than 1/5 to almost 1/2;
In contrast,
from
1938
to
1972
in
the
United
i.e.
nondefense
States,
(1)
the
nearly
general
the
which
course has never experienced socialist or labor party rule.
of
been
since
government expenditure increased from just under 1/5 of
to only about 1/4 of the GNP
has
GNP
of
The
sector share
In the United Kingdom, for example, the public
the GNP (exclusive of defence) expanded in three waves:
of
the
a result
iD 1944-48, from less than 20% to 35% as
the welfare
first
postwar Labour government's creation of
state and nationalization;
second postwar
du-ing
the
to 45%,
2) 1964-68, from 35%
Labour government; and (although it is beyond the time frame
of this study)
3) 1973-75, from 45% to 55%, as the third Labour government
tried to deliver on its side of the social contract.
See the analysis in the Economi.t, February 21, 1976.
32
of other nations falls
experience
bounds
by these polar
set
of
st-Ike
correlations between
political
power
in the locus of
the oublic
the
long-run
the
growth of
ner
100C
interwar to postwar
for
the
in the volume
simple
displays
repoesentatIon),
and
Labor
the
income
and change In
nonagricultural
the
Democratic
the distribution of national
share of the GNP) ,
within
support
gtgAVg
which
Social
(percentage cabinet
sector
(man-days lost
for
given in Figure 5,
is
activity
Some empirical
cases.
sketched here
model
historical
points
at vaIous
change
(growth
strike
volume
civilian employees)
oeriod in ten countries.
Change in Public
Sector Allocatlian
Political Power
(Interwar-to-
(change in nondefense
general government
from
(1)
-. 812
+.023
Change in
Socialist/Labor
of
Change in
-Strike Volume
(Interwar-to-oostwar
change in average
postwar change
expenditure as a %
man-days
lost
in average %
of GNP, 1938-1972)
per 1OG
employees)
of cabinet
posts held)
-.
to
find
(1) I was unable
in
government
expendituire
965
data
on
Belgium
correlations in Figure 5 are based
countries.
circa 1938:
Sources of
Statistical
pre-World
aid
Italy
on
ten
II
general
War
so
the
and
rather
than
Oshima, 1957;
£972: O.E.C.D., 1974.
Sources of the data for the other variaoles are given in
notes.
twelve
the government expenditure data weret
Office of the United
Nations,
1950
and
earlier
33
Postwar jgy~gjg of strike activity
highl
are also welI explained by this
power,
class political
the importance of the
the allocation of national
activity.
relevant
Income,
Figure 6 reports the
and
simple
the
sector
public
of
volume
tax
rate
for
strike
among
correlations
Indicators, but here the 1972 average
working
between
abstracted model of the causal relations
for
the
a
typical manufacturing production worker with two children is used
to measure the importance of the public sector for distributional
outcomes.
(i)
Postwar
+.775
Socialist/Labor
Political Power
(average X of
cabinet posts,
1944-72)
Clearly,
postwar
-.746
Average Tax
Rate
(average for
married manuf.
production workers
with two children,
1972)
levels as well
Average Postwar
t- Strike Volume
(man-days lost
per 1oao
nonagricultural
employees, 1944-72,
log scale)
as interwar-to-nostwar
changes in
aggregate strike activity vary inversely with the extent to which
national income is
process.
In
raised
and
distributed
nations such as Denmark,
Norway,
via
the
the
political
Netherlands,
is
(1.) ihe average tax rate for manufacturing production workers
the
for
sector
public
the
a good index of the relevance of
alternative
with
undertaken
Analyses
class.
blue-collar
of the
precentage
the
and
rate
tax
measures, e.g. the marginal
produced
sector,
public
the
through
passing
national income
source
The
results very similar to those reported in Figure 6.
6.
Table
Appendix,
1975,
O.E.C.D.,
of the tax rate data was
34
and Sweden,
where the public sector share of
for
50%, the average tax rate
political
volumes
the
60%,
the
comparatively
low
By
at
stands
conflict
Industrial
contrast, In countries
the United States),
and
the GNP passing through the public sector
25 to
30%,
23-28% range.
private
the
less,
marg1n3l
and the
The bulk of the national
sector
these
in
for
rate
tax
average
strike
high
relatively
with
(for example, Canada, Italy,
workers is 15% or
the
in
is
and,
fraction of
order of
nearly
arena is the key focus of distributional outcomes
therefore,
levels.
is
approaches
rate
tax
GNP
workers
blue-collar
marginal
30-35% range, and the
the
is
income
is
in
allocated
therefore,
and,
societies
on
the
manufacturing
rate
tax
is
the
the
in
the
economic marketolace remains the most important arena of conflict
over distributional
The basic argument
outcomes.
of this section Is summarized from a
dist-ibutional
loci
the
how
different perspective in Table 2, which shows
slightly
of
conflict and the character of strike activity vary
state
by tne degree of
economic
Intervention
orientation of
state politico-economic goals.
comparatively
low
(passive)
supporting (bourgeois) state goals, the
private
with
nations
In
and
litervention
state
market
the
and
sector
market
is
the
primary arena of conflict over distributional outcomes, "business
unionism" is the dominant oriertation
of
organized
strike activity is relatively high and has shown no
decline over the
examoles
of
long-run.
this
pattern.
Canada
and
Strike
the
United
activity
also
labor,
tendency
States
stands
and
to
are
at
State Intervention
Table 2
Passive (Low)
Active (High)
Market
Supporting
(Bourgeois)
State
Political/
Economic
Goals
primary locus of distributional conflict:
private sector with state intervention
primary locus of distributional conflict:
private sector
implications for strike activity:
"politicization" of the strike, little or
no decline in strike volume
Implications for strike activity:
"business unionism", little or no decline
in strike volume
exemplars:
exemplars:
France, Italy
Canada, U.S.
long-run strike trend: negligible or upward
long-run strike trend: negligible or upward
postwar average strike volume: 670
postwar average strike volume: 557
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972:
33
.0 %a
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972:
average tax rate, 1972:
average tax rate, 1972: 11%b
(Ideology)
primary locus of distributional conflict:
public sector/political process
Market
Modifying
(Social
Democratic)
implications for strike activity:
'withering away' of the strike;
displacement of distributive conflict
to political marketplace
Null Cell
exemplars: Denmark, Norway, Sweden
long-run strike trend: downward from
late 1930s
postwar
average strike volume: 103
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972:
44
.8 %a
average tax rate, 1972: 31.3%b
aexcluding defense and state productive enterprises
b
mean for manufacturing production workers with two children
1 5 %b
28
.7 %a
35
decining
levels and exhibits no signs of
comparatively high
market on behalf of market supporting goals;
hours
and
consumption
and
participated in private sector bargaining over wages,
conditions
of
work
socializing
without
distribution of a very large
The distinctive feature
of
important
lltiLzatian
system and,
actor
in
therefore, the strike is
the
has actively (and
has
there
been
massive
strike.
the
of
industrial
relations
frequently used as a
form of
France and
Only in societies where the state
successfully) pursued market
a
societies
in
political action to exert pressure on the government.
Italy are the exemplary cases.
income.
national
the
relations
industrial
falling in this category is the
The state is an
of
fraction
the
actively
has
i.e.
labor
the
in
countries where the state has intervened actively
In
displacement
modifying policies
of
distributional
issues to the electoral arena and,
the "withering
away"
of the strike in
the
This historical configuration Is of course
the Scandinavian Social Oemocracies.
as
economic
best
over
conflict
a
result,
marketplace.
illustrated
by
(1)
factors
configuration of
(1) -Heaoey has argued that a similar
See
Incomes policies.
of
acceptance
union
trade
underlies
Headey, 1970.
36
iiAtscib.lM.nal LaD Iil ci in illattilaC2
The core of the argument developed in
that
the "wi thering
away"
of
the
.a1a
prev 10 us
the
in
st-Ike
outcomes
Although
there is
from the private to
in the locus of
the
process leads
to
domination
conflict as some theorists of the "postindustrial"
national
when
society
have
income allocated by the political system grows to
percent or more the arena
"become more decisive."
of
politics
Thus,
(1)
at least potentially, even in
a great
routine
in
has,
deal
electora I
between bourgeois and socialist bloc parties in
societies of,
for
example,
contest s
electoral
Denmark,
between
Norway and
left-and
mo
the
of
share
the
fifty
words,
Bell's
re is at stake,
confrontations
the welfare state
Sweaen,
right-leaning
than
marketpl ace
dist-lbution
sharoest
the
Scandinavian
bourgeois"
(1.)
resources.
of
challenge
traditional,
remains
"old
the
In
recent
years,
of
however,
the
the
the
to the system of public sector distribution in
walfare
states
bourgeois"
has
parties
flash political movements.
Bel1, 1973,
arena
orincipal
in
politi cal
parties in nations such as Canada and the United States where
economic
of
group
or
c lass
increased
argued, there can be little doubt that
sector.
public
little evidence that government
the distributional
is
social
E uropean
democracies is primarily a consequence of a shift
distributional
section
p. 364.
come
but
not
rather
from
from
the
" new
37
The 1973
election
example.
Until
dominated
bourgelos" bloc comprised of
and Radica I Liberal
partles,
the Social Democrats, the
and the socialist b loc
Socialists and the Communists.
competitive
very
Left
share
data
until
The
1950-53,
governing in
1968-71,
Social
the
and
1973-75,
and
blocs
parties
b ourgeols
the
blocs
recently,
monopolize d more than 90 percent of the popular vote.
have oscil lated in political power, with
of
the
political
and,
electorally
composed
vote
aggregate
established
Figure 7 show that the
reoorted In
have been
The
"old
Liberal,
party,
People's
was
the
Agrarian
the Conservative,
Socialist
dramatic
politics
blo cst
political
established
most
the
Dani sh
postwar
the 1973 election,
two
by
is
Denmark
in
outcome
Democrats heading governments during the remaini ng postwar years.
The advant age
in
government
enjoyed
control
Democrats was large ly due to support received in the
and
early
from
1960s
nonsocialist "swing"
FIGURE
the
party of
Radical
Liberals
--
late
a
classic,
the center.
two-bloc Danish party system experienced a severe
shock in the 1973 election when two new "orotest"
upon the Political
Erhard Jacobsen,
scene. (1)
The election
a well-known Social
Oemocrat,
was
parties
burst
triggered
when
defected from
party over the issue of increasing taxes on single-family
and organized the new Center Democrat party.
(1) DO
1950s
7 ABOUT HERE
The traditional
J975.
Social
the
by
the 1973 Danish election, see
Barre,
The
1974
his
houses
most
striking
and
Einhorn,
Figure 7: Postwar Electoral Trends in Denmarka
60%
L
%Vote
50%
40%
*
='Old' Bourgois Bloc (Conservatives, Agrarian
Liberals, Radical Liberals)
*
=Socialist/Communist Bloc (Social Democrats,
Socialist Peoples Party, Left Social Communists)
30%
*
=
20%
'new' Bourgois/Welfare Protest Bloc (Progressive
Party, Center Democrats, Independents)
10%
0 %
1950
1955
1960
Sources: Borre, 1975 and Damgaard, 1974
1965
1970
1975
38
Progress
party,
paid
having
of
taxes in 1972, despite a sizeable income and net worth.
attack
the
tax,
Income
the
established
Progress party.
party
Jakobsen's
wide-ranging
the
with
the
drastic
a
in taxes,
anti-welfare
commanded
election;
percent.
15.9
a
drastic
particularly Income taxes.
bourgeois and socialist olocs
b9.3
Progress
bureaucracy,
services to achieve
and social
the
the growth of
state
in
more
or
Glistrup*s
1950s,
roll-back
(although
state),
welfare
was
exploited
and
in oppositior to
early
parties
state "protest"
December, 1973
low of
which
policy
tax
symbolized
bloc) received a combined total
the
presented
particular
wnich had stood
government expenditure,
The
a
to
discontent
Party,
his
for
support
consumption
undoubtedly
advocated
reduction
of
the Janish system of collective
the welfare state since
party
incompetence
fundamental
opposition
In
Indeoendent
to
Unlike Jakobsen's Center Democrats,
and distribution.
launchea
case
a
The GlIstrup movement
on
and the
mobilizing
thereby
parties,
assault
oolitical
the bureaucracy,
no
Glistruo
tax
his
surrounding
exploited the enormous publicity
of
during
fighters
resistance
publically boasted
who
occupation,
fond
lawyer
a tax
Glistrup,
the Oanish
tax dodgers to
comparing
the Nazi
formed by Mogens
new
the
of
appearance
development, however, was the
political
(cf.
percent
of
of
(the
Figure
the
from 96.1
7)
vote
of
the
vote
in
established
percent to a postwar
28
alone
party
Glistrups
and
bourgeols"
the
23.7 percent of
the vote share
felt
"new
of
the
parliamentary seats, making the Progress party the second
175
largest
39
(behind
the Social
that of
traditional
Democrats)
in the Dalish tjhJ8jjjD.
political
blocs
recovered
significartly
the subsequent election of January 1975 --
increasing
to 77.1 percent --
the
and the vote share
off
orotest parties dropoeo
oercent
--
Glistrup's
--
of
declining
Progressives showed
from
"new
from
is difficult to
Danish
welfare
say why
state
this
came
In
massive
outburst
Inaeoendents had provided a political outlet
of
such discontent
receiving
-xpenditure
Denmark
was
m ay have
survey
of
base
nsrd the burden of
particularly
hard hit
also played a role.
analysis of
the
for
threshold had been reached
Rusk
two new
by
What
and Borre,
and Jakobsen's Center Democrats --
against
the
in
however,
is
--
fact
The
that
was
of
that
recession
the
Glistrup's
it
level
the world economic
from
the
expression
the
taxation.
the
all
Perhaps
is clear
parties
protest
seats.
after
for more than twenty years.
because a critical
opublic
--
15.8
to
--
roots
(1)
1973
69.3
staying-power
13.6 percent of the oopular vote and 24 parliamentary
It
in
bourgeois,"
23.7
amazing
for a perty without long-standing electoral
Although
extensive
the
issue
Progressives
was dissatisfaction
with
the
(1) Aoparently, the latent tensions underlying the 1973
election
outcome went undetected by Scandinavian
social
scientists.
As
late as 1969, for example, the Danish election specialist
Mogens
Pede-sen
wrote
that Denmark was
"...one
of
the
most dull
countries to deal with for an
empirically oriented student
of
votlig behavior.
Apparently
the Danish
Political
system
lacks
most of the characteristics that form the point of departure
for
many modern researcth
workers,
i.e.
conflicts,
cleavages, and
instabilities. Homogerelty characterizes the Danish
electorate.
No religious, ethnic, ragional
or other
types of
significant
subcultures exist,
political
the
system or
voters."
which
might
threaten
the
maintenance
of
the
at least produce conflicts and tensions among
Pedersen,
1969,
p. 253.
performance and increasing financial burdens of the welfare state
combined with a lack of confidence that the
were
It
(1)
likely to provide relief.
was
parties
established
of
entirely
course
look
to
for voters disenchanted with the welfare state
rational
outside the established party system to the new bourgeoi.s parties
for effective opposition to the continued growth
of
the
public
creature
of
the
Social
sector.
The
Democrats,
shown
welfare
was
state
and governments of the
little
to
inclination
the
"old
bourgeois"
the
alter
parties
had
appreciably.
system
Indeed, taxes rose sharply during the 1968-71 period of bourgeois
rule.
Whether
the "new
bourgeois,"
anti-welfare state
bloc, built around Gistrup*s Progress
party,
long-run undoubtedly depends on whether the
persists
political
in
the
Danish
traditional
bourgeois parties
are able (or willing) to establish credibility
with those opposed
to continued public sector domination
of
the
distribution of resources. (2)
(i) Rusk and Borre, 1974.
Minister Poul
(2) Prime
government made overtures
when a 7 billion jC2DgC
expenditure was passed in
Libe-als, Conservatives,
Party, Single Taxers, and
am
tempted
minority
Hartling's Agrarian-Liberal
September J974
in
in this direction
government
and
taxes
income
in
cut
parliament with the support of Radical
Christian People's
Center Democrats,
I
some members of the Progress Party.
to infer, without
support
from survey
evidence,
that
in the 1975
support
electoral
the decline in "new bourgeois"
In
election was associatec with this significant policy change.
strong against
continues to run
sentiment
public
any case,
lat
hIt.
The
state:
further extensions of the Danish welfare
LLiMn. (September 28, 1975) reports polls taken in 1975 Indicating
that 63 percent
of
the Public
felt that
the
burden
of
taxation
The
far.
was excessive and that the welfare state had gone too
minority Social Democratic government, which assumed office after
the 1975 election, responded to the drift in public sentiment by
submitting a budget that further reduced welfare spending.
41
The most
developments
recent
Important
in
politics stem from the Intense controversy ov er
European Economic Community.
EEC was solily defeated in
entry
into
the
Although the pr oposal to
loln
the
Referendum,
the
across
the
fragmenting
for
the September
issue sharply divided the rank-and-flie
political spectrum.
the Liberals and
19 72
of
parties
The issue was particular ly
(moderate
the
electoral
Norwegian
socialist)
pro-European Liberals split-off to form the
Labor
New
party.
People's
and the anti-EEC Laborites joined the Communi sts and the
Socialist
People's
Al li3nce.
As a result, both
Party
to
form
the
Socialist
the
and
Liberal
declined significantly in the 1973 alinrga
The
Party
leftist
Electoral
the
Labor
election.
vote
(1)
Although the EEC controversy produced the most severe disturbance
to
the established Norwegian
flash political
party,
party
system,
a
akin to the GlIstrup movement
also appeared in Norway in
1973.
The
new
bourgeois"
"new
in
Denmark,
anti-welfare
state
party was organized by Anders Lange
--
a former activist
in
movements of the 1930s
--
around a platform
calling
old rightist
for
radical
reductiors
"Anaes Lange's Party"
by the traditional
in
(ALP)
public
was at
expenditure
first greeted
parties of the left
and
right,
protest movement was taken a great oeal more
received 5 percent of the vote and 4 seats
September 1973 election.
less than 2 percent
(1)
in
and
with
derision
the
when
in the i1Q..lla
in
However, the ALP vote share dropped
the subsequent election in 1975.
See Valen and Rokkan,
taxation.
but
seriously
1974.
the
Why
new
it
the
to
the
42
Anders Lange's
Party
less
showed
initial
strength
staying-power than the Glistrup Progressives in
altogether clear.
Lange's death in J974
the ALP's decline in 1975,
organizational
base
founder.
fundamental
More
since
the
Oenmark
surely
party
in addition to class --
no
also
geography and culture
and consequently
not as dominant in electoral
of
dimen sion
reactionary
(which
behavior.
anchors
political
pol it ical
the
tha n
line
the
Therefore, d espite the fact that the
in
the
196 5-71
center-right
has
about Norway's oil
anxiety about
the burden of
have
has
deflied by
a single
political blocst
(
the
the
more
growing
to
still
outlet
optimism
diminish
financing the public sector.
party
The Swedish
viable
helped
Norway,
stability.
a
undoubtedly
is
experience
Swedish
of
established
In contrast to the recent political
the
pole
this
Finally,
resources may also
Norwegian
participated
system
the welfare sta te.
are
Conservatives.
viewed by a large fraction of the electorate as a
for oppositi on to
than
Conservatives
government,
right-wing p arty i n the Norwegian
work.
issues
pursued
Danish
its
important
the
right-wing
cleavage)
at
are
Also,
of
Norway
left/right
(i)
not
virtually
and was built around the personality
elsewhere in Scandin3via --
class
is
to
had
factors were probably
less
contributed
The political cleavage structure is more complex in
Conservative party
and
system
system,
left-right
(small)
like
exhibited
the
dimension
Communist
of
Danish,
Dermark
and
considerable
is
largely
with
two
established
party
and
the
-) _S ee- aTe n a nd Rok a n,jin Ro se,9 _ed.~j974;.0
Social
43
Democ-rats form the socialist bloc; the Center party, the People's
bloc.
bourgeois
party, ano the Conservatives comprise the
The
Social Democrats have governed continously since the early 1930s,
although there is no reason to expect the bourgeois oarties to be
permanently in opposition; the popular vote has been Quite evenly
split between the two blocs since
The
1950s.
early
the
most
significant postwar covelopment in the Swedish party
system
has
which
during
the
of
the
been the dramatic growth of the Center oarty,
last dozen years has steadily absorbed former supporters
of
Libe-ats and now stands as the largest party
bourgeois,
the
opposition bloc. (1)
The interesting question for our purposes Is why Sweden
a
experienced
"new
bourgeols",
similar to the Glistrup phenomenon
in
Party
Anders Lange
Norway.
anti-welfare
explanation is that Sweden is the only highly
opposition for the entire postwar era.
growth of the
therefore,
bureaucracy,
state,
collective
have
(2)
and
popular
consumption
(1) See Petersson,
and
as
a
viable
been
with
distribution
has
for
Consequently,
to
the
system
of
alternatve
discontent
In
taxation,
and
exoenditure,
public
welfare
Responsibility
rests wholly with the Social Democrats.
the old bourgeois bloc stands
welfare
developed
parties
state in which the traditional bourgeois
smaller
plausible
most
the
think
I
the
or
not
movement
state
Denmark
in
has
the
been
channeled
1974; S~rlvik, 1975; and Sgrlvik in Rose,
ed.
J974.
(2) See, for example,
Petersson, 1974.
the analyses of Valen and Rokkan,
J974
and
44
through the established right-of-center parties.
Survey evidence reported by Sarlvik suggests that such discontent
is widespread, and has increased significantly in
recent
years.
The survey results reproduced in Table 3 show that the proportion
of the Swedish mass
public
advocating
a
reduction
in
social
welfare benefits grew from 41 percent to 60 percent between
and 1973.
The
growth
of
opposition
to
welfare
apparent among the supporters of all political
particularly pronounced among Social
1968
policies
parties,
and
is
is
Democratic voters.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
This *shift to the right* on the social
with a gradual
(albeit small) erosion of
welfare
may well
coincides
socialist bloc electoral
strength which began in 1970, continued into
and, if recent political
issue
the
J973
election
preference surveys are any guide, (j)
lead to the first
bourgeois
government
after the upcoming September 1976 election.
In
44
years
(2)
(-j)According
to poll results published in 12ftQ1 Nyheter, June
5, 1976, less than 40 percent of the public considered the Social
Democrats to be the "best" party in April
and
May,
1976 -a
decline of more than j percent from the May J969 results.
(2) As readers undoubtedly are aware, the Social
Democrats
were
defeated in the election and a Center Party
led bourgeois
coalition is about to assume power.
It was inevitable
that
the
Social Democrats would eventually lose an
election;
It
is not
possible to say without survey data to what extent
their defeat
at this time was due to the "welfare state' Issue.
The expansion
of
nuclear
power,
a trade-union-Social
Democratic
plan
to
gradually 'expropriate'
large firms, and the fact that the Social
Democrats simply have been in power for so long, were also issues
in the campaign.
Table 3:
Views on Welfare State Policies in Sweden 1968-1973
(interview question: "Social reforms have gone so far in this
country that in the future the State should reduce rather than
increase social benefits and support for the citizens.")a
Party Vote
1968
Communist
Social
Democrat
Center
People's
Party
Moderate
Party
All Voters
and Nonvoters
% Agree
13%
28%
56%
54%
71%
41%
% Disagree
77
65
38
39
23
52
% Agree
22%
47%
76%
68%
78%
60%
% Disagree
70
46
18
25
15
32
1973
akmbiguous or 'don't know' responses omitted.
Sarlvik, 1975, Table 12.
Source:
45
The appearance of "new
bourcieols"
flash
political
and the erosion of social
Denmark and Norway,
movements
democratic
in
support
in Sweden, suggests that once the public sector share of the
app roaches fifty percent or so, opposition to
further
of the welfare state may
It
likely
that
discontent
and
inflation
part in the
remarkable
Denmark, and
surely
the
government
and
expenditures
economic
welfa re state Rar
w ith the
Labour
are a major
in
divert
(and I believe
high levels
of
that
taxatior
sector
likely
is
it
expression
I
Britain
some
to
reduce
sector.
has
behavior
political
exce ed
public
private
once costs
does),
in
the
benefits
a sizeable
form
from
of
state
fraction
of
seriou s resistance to the growth of the oublic
to
--
a rise
popular
even
then,
oppos ition
taxation occ ured in Derm ark,
where
manufacturin g workers is the h l ghest
world, and
to
the
to
model of
s not coinci d ental,
of
least
of
within
political co nstituency of social democra tic
Perhaps
than
factor in the current attempt
transfers an d collective consumption for
the working class,
r ather
at
Glistrup
course
in
resources
begin
of
m ovement
Great
it
played
the
extension
is
stagnationv
ig,
of
success
Nonetheless, if the "rati onal"
merit
sharply.
increase
GNP
disposable
percentage of gross earnings,
the
in
is
the
the
public
the
lowest.
labor
parties.
most
dramatic
tax
western
of
traditional
expenditure
average
( ncIusi ve
income
and
that
to
the
and
rate
for
industrial
transfers)
as
a
(1)
(1) I base this statement on data
for
manufacturing
workers with average ircomes reported in OECD,
1975,
Tables 29 3, and 6.
production
Appendix,
46
it
I think
is
political arenas of advanced welfare
a levelling-off of
the
the Scandinavian
state societies will
in
dist-lbutional
likely
to
be
the
(indeed, this trend is already
visible
soci al
national
as
aemocracies
priva te
sector.
In
well
as
in
Great
increase in the
share
words,
other
impact of further growth of the public
viewed
(and
correctly,
the
given
sector
trends
tax/benefit ratios) as di sadvantageous oy a significant
of
the
orivate
politically
sector
appreciably
dom inant
allocati on
in the welfar e
lead to
passing
the
Britain) and perhaps even to a significant
allocated
the
in
developments
income
of
share
through the Public sector
in
that
therefore,
likely,
of
"organized
national
state societies ,
income
does
then we are
is
in
fraction
class."
working
the
If
increase
likely
to
obse-ve a renaissance of industrial confict (which now stands at
negligible
levels) as the economic marketplace
regains
its former importance as the focus of distributional
some
outcomes.
of
47
Bell,
Daniel
1973 Ibar 9migng 21
QZtzIndsAiial
igggi Fact
New Yorkt
n11g.
E2CLAti
A Vnture
in
Basic Books.
Borre, Ole
1974
"Denmarks
SaQditaLLAcLa
Protest
of
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2Q1IJIial it.ggLt.
1973."
December
9, Po. 197-204.
Borre, Ole
J975
A
"The General Election in Denmark January 19751
Structure
New
EgUirzial Stuala.
of
the
Party
10,
pp.
211-216.
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ScandInavlan
Damgaard, Erik
1974
"Stability and Change in the Danish Party System
Half a Century."
Paltirai
2inaUl
i12va2.
9,
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103-126.
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Claude
1973
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1968
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la
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1948
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