WORLD TRADE WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 11 May 2009 ORGANIZATION (09-2324) Committee on Trade and Development Dedicated Session WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES Compilation paper prepared by the Secretariat Revision I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 5 II. MANDATE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK........................................................................... 6 A. PARAGRAPH 35 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20 NOVEMBER 2001) ................................................................................................................. 6 B. PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES FRAMEWORK AND PROCEDURES – WT/L/447 (1 MARCH 2002) ................................................................................. 6 C. PARAGRAPH 1.D OF THE 1 AUGUST: D. PARAGRAPH 41 OF THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION - WT/MIN(05)/DEC (18 DECEMBER 2005) .................................................................................................................. 7 D.1 REFERENCES TO SMALL ECONOMIES IN PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE SECTION ON NAMA IN THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ............................................................................ 7 D.2 REFERENCES TO SMALL ECONOMIES IN THE SERVICES – ANNEX C OF THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION........................................................................................................ 8 E. OTHER TEXTS OFTEN CITED BY SMALL ECONOMIES IN THE 1 AUGUST 2004 GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION – ANNEX B NAMA FRAMEWORK – WT/L/579 (2 AUGUST 2004) ................... 8 III. DECISIONS .............................................................................................................................. 9 A. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DEDICATED SESSION ON SMALL ECONOMIES ................................................................................................................................. 9 1. Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS - WT/COMTD/SE/5 (3 October 2006)........................................................................ 9 B. COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ................................................ 11 1. Decision of the General Council of 27 July 2007 - WT/L/691 (31 July 2007) Based on the Draft Decision of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of 13 July 2007 (G/SCM/120). ............................................................................... 11 IV. COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE - SPECIAL SESSION ............................................ 18 A. CURRENT MODALITIES DRAFT ................................................................................................... 18 1. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (6 December 2008) ......... 18 B. HISTORIC EVOLUTION ................................................................................................................ 23 2004 GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION - WT/L/579 ................. 7 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 2 1. Overview of Small Economies' Positions on the Agriculture Negotiations – JOB(05)/161 (27 July 2005) .................................................................................................... 23 2. Proposal by the Small, Vulnerable Economies on Market Access in Agriculture – TN/AG/GEN/11 (11 November 2005).................................................................................... 24 3. Report by the Chairman to the TNC – TN/AG/21 (28 November 2005), also Annex A of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration ........................................................... 24 4. Chairman's Reference Paper on SVEs – Room Document (4 May 2006) ......................... 24 5. Contribution by the SVEs on the Chairman's Reference Paper on SVEs – JOB(06)/164 (31 May 2006).................................................................................................... 26 6. Chairman's Revised Consolidated Reference Paper on Possible Modalities on Market Access – (9 June 2006) .............................................................................................. 26 7. Revised Consolidated Reference Paper on Modalities on Market Access – Contribution on the Treatment of SVEs – JOB(06)/196 (19 June 2006) ........................... 27 8. Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture – TN/AG/W/3 (12 July 2006)............................ 27 9. Submission on the Treatment of Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) – JOB(07)/47 (11 April 2007) .................................................................................................... 27 10. Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session - Second Instalment (25 May 2007) .......................................................................... 29 11. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4 (1 August 2007) ......................... 29 12. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1 (8 February 2008) .......... 34 13. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2 (19 May 2008) ................. 39 14. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (10 July 2008) ................. 43 15. G-33 Proposal on the Treatment of SSM provided to the SVEs - TN/AG/GEN/29 (10 February 2009).................................................................................................................. 48 V. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS................................................................................. 50 A. CURRENT MODALITIES DRAFT ................................................................................................... 50 1. Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (6 December 2008) ............................................................................. 50 B. HISTORIC EVOLUTION ................................................................................................................ 51 1. Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products - Treatment of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the NAMA Negotiations - TN/MA/W/66 (11 November 2005).................... 51 2. Progress Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee – TN/MA/16 (24 November 2005), also Annex B of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration .............................................................................................................................. 52 3. NAMA – Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products - Criteria and Treatment of SVEs, submission by the SVEs – (1 May 2006)............................................. 52 4. Small and Vulnerable Economies - Text Proposal for the Chairman of NAMA by the Delegations of Costa Rica and Uruguay – Room Document (30 May 2006) .......... 53 5. NAMA 11 - Non-Paper – Small Vulnerable Economies – (30 May 2006).......................... 54 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 3 6. Proposal on Small, Vulnerable Economies by Norway – Room Document (6 June 2006)............................................................................................................................ 54 7. Treatment of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the NAMA Negotiations, Proposal by the SVEs – (15 June 2006) ................................................................................................. 55 8. Towards NAMA Modalities – TN/MA/W/80 (19 July 2006)............................................... 56 9. Draft NAMA Modalities – JOB(07)/126 (17 July 2007) ...................................................... 57 10. Submission by Small, Vulnerable Economies on Modalities to Apply in Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/100 (17 January 2008) ............................ 59 11. Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access - TN/MA/W/103 (8 February 2008).................................................................................................................... 60 12. Submission by Small, Vulnerable Economies on Modalities Applicable to NonAgricultural Market Access - JOB(08)/26 (11 April 2008) .................................................. 62 13. Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access Second Revision TN/MA/W/103/Rev.1 (20 May 2008) ..................................................................................... 63 14. Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/103/Rev.2 (10 July 2008) .......................................................................................................................... 64 VI. COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES SPECIAL SESSION ......................................... 66 1. Services – Information Note (November 2005) .................................................................... 66 2. Outline of an SVE position on Possible Elements of a Services Text (23 January 2008) ......................................................................................................................................... 66 VII. WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION ..................................................... 69 1. Services - Trade-Related Concerns of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the Working Party on Domestic Regulation - JOB(06)/66/Rev.2 (10 July 2006)..................... 69 VIII. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON RULES ................................................................................. 72 1. Fisheries Subsidies - TN/RL/W/136 (14 July 2003).............................................................. 72 2. WTO Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines – Architecture on Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines - TN/RL/GEN/57/Rev.2 (13 September 2005) ................................................... 72 3. Special and Differential Treatment in the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations: Views of the Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) - TN/RL/W/210/Rev.2 (22 June 2007).......................................................................................................................... 73 4. Drafting Proposal on Issues Relating to Article III.4 ("Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members") of the Fisheries Subsidies Annex to the SCM Agreement as Proposed by the Chair in TN/RL/W/213 TN/RL/GEN/158 (22 May 2008) ............................................................................................ 76 5. Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) - Statement on Key Aspects Of Article III of the Fisheries Subsidies Annex- TN/RL/W/226/Rev.5 (22 September 2008) .................. 77 IX. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON TRADE FACILITATION ................................................. 79 1. Regional Approaches to Trade Facilitation: Enquiry Points TN/TF/W/129/Rev.2 (10 March 2008)................................................................................... 79 X. COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ..................... 80 A. HISTORIC EVOLUTION ............................................................................................................... 80 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 4 1. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - G/SCM/W/535 and Add.1 (12 April 2006 and 20 July 2006) ......................................................................................................................................... 80 2. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/535 and 537) – JOB(07)/49 (18 April 2007) .......... 80 3. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/535 and 537) – JOB(07)/50 (19 April 2007) .......... 85 4. Chairman's Proposal for the Text of a Draft Decision – JOB(07)/78 (6 June 2007) ......................................................................................................................................... 87 5. Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Decision of the Committee of 13 July 2007– G/SCM/120 (17 July 2007) ........................... 91 XI. AID FOR TRADE TASK FORCE ........................................................................................ 98 1. Aid for Trade - WT/AFT/W/18 (15 June 2006) .................................................................... 98 XII. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DEDICATED SESSION ON SMALL ECONOMIES ................................................................................................. 102 1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/15 (18 October 2005) .......................................................................... 102 2. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16 (18 October 2005) ................ 102 3. Accession to the WTO - WT/COMTD/SE/W/17 (18 October 2005) ................................ 102 4. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18 (18 October 2005) ............................................. 103 5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) .................................................................... 103 6. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) .......... 104 7. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) ....................................... 104 8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.2 (18 July 2006)...................................................................... 104 9. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.2 (18 July 2006) ............ 105 10. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.2 (18 July 2006)......................................... 106 11. Draft Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS (27 September 2006) ................................................................................................. 107 12. Draft Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS (28 September 2006) ................................................................................................. 108 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 5 I. INTRODUCTION Paragraph 41 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration1 instructs the CTD in Dedicated Session to monitor progress of the small economies' proposals in the negotiating and other bodies. At its Fifteenth Dedicated Session on 20 July 2006, Members requested that the Secretariat prepare a note that would help the CTD in Dedicated Session to monitor work currently underway in WTO and in the negotiating groups. The Secretariat's paper is based on the compilation paper that had been prepared by a group of small economies2 and incorporates the reports and draft texts by the various Chairs of the negotiating groups. The present document attempts to reflect the current state of play of the small economies' issues discussed so far in the negotiating and other bodies, prior to the Ministerial-level meeting at the end of July 2008. This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and does not prejudice the right of any Member to raise other concerns or views related to the Work Programme on Small Economies. 1 2 WT/MIN(05)/DEC. WT/COMTD/SE/W/21/Rev.1. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 6 II. MANDATE AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. PARAGRAPH 35 OF (20 NOVEMBER 2001) THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 We agree to a work programme, under the auspices of the General Council, to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies. The objective of this work is to frame responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, and not to create a sub-category of WTO Members. The General Council shall review the work programme and make recommendations for action to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference. PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE WORK PROGRAMME ON SMALL ECONOMIES FRAMEWORK AND PROCEDURES WT/L/447 (1 MARCH 2002) In pursuance of this mandate, the Work Programme shall be undertaken in accordance with the following framework and procedures: (a) The Work Programme shall remain under the overall responsibility of the General Council. (b) The General Council shall have the Work Programme on Small Economies (WPSE) as a standing item on its agenda. (c) The objective of this work is to frame responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system. (d) The General Council shall instruct the CTD to have a programme of work on small economies which will be conducted in dedicated sessions of the CTD. (e) The CTD shall report regularly to the General Council on the progress of work in the dedicated sessions. (f) The Chairperson of the regular CTD shall also be the Chair for the dedicated sessions of the CTD. (g) The dedicated sessions of the CTD shall have an agreed calendar of meetings to complete the work under its mandate. (h) The CTD will hold informal meetings as necessary with a view to assisting the formal process in the dedicated sessions of the CTD. (i) In accordance with the outcome of the programme of work in the CTD, the General Council shall, as appropriate, direct relevant subsidiary bodies to frame responses to the trade-related issues identified by the CTD with a view to making recommendations for action to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference as mandated. This does not prejudice the right of Members to submit for consideration proposals relating to the concerns of small economies to the relevant WTO bodies. – WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 7 (j) As and when necessary, the dedicated sessions of the CTD will work in collaboration with relevant subsidiary bodies. (k) Members are urged to make their own contributions to the work of the CTD under its programme of work. The General Council shall instruct the WTO Secretariat to provide relevant information and factual analysis, inter alia, (i) on the impact of WTO rules on Small Economies; (ii) on the constraints faced by Small Economies as well as their shortfalls in institutional and administrative capacities, including in the area of human resources; (iii) on the effects of Trade Liberalization on Small Economies. The CTD will also request information and analysis from other agencies and bodies that carry out work on small economies. PARAGRAPH 1.D OF THE 1 AUGUST: 2004 GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION - WT/L/579 The trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, should also be addressed, without creating a sub-category of Members, as part of a work programme, as mandated in paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. PARAGRAPH 41 OF THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION - WT/MIN(05)/DEC (18 DECEMBER 2005) We reaffirm our commitment to the Work Programme on Small Economies and urge Members to adopt specific measures that would facilitate the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, without creating a sub-category of WTO Members. We take note of the report of the Committee on Trade and Development in Dedicated Session on the Work Programme on Small Economies to the General Council and agree to the recommendations on future work. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Development, under the overall responsibility of the General Council, to continue the work in the Dedicated Session and to monitor progress of the small economies' proposals in the negotiating and other bodies, with the aim of providing responses to the trade-related issues of small economies as soon as possible but no later than 31 December 2006. We instruct the General Council to report on progress and action taken, together with any further recommendations as appropriate, to our next Session. D.1 REFERENCES TO SMALL ECONOMIES IN PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE SECTION ON NAMA IN THE HONG KONG MINISTERIAL DECLARATION PARAGRAPH 21 We note the concerns raised by small, vulnerable economies, and instruct the Negotiating Group to establish ways to provide flexibilities for these Members without creating a sub-category of WTO Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 8 D.2 REFERENCES TO SMALL ECONOMIES IN THE SERVICES MINISTERIAL DECLARATION – ANNEX C OF THE HONG KONG PARAGRAPH 8 Due consideration shall be given to proposals on trade-related concerns of small economies. OTHER TEXTS OFTEN CITED BY SMALL ECONOMIES IN THE 1 AUGUST 2004 GENERAL COUNCIL DECISION – ANNEX B NAMA FRAMEWORK – WT/L/579 (2 AUGUST 2004) PARAGRAPH 6 We furthermore agree that, as an exception, participants with a binding coverage of non-agricultural tariff lines of less than [35] per cent would be exempt from making tariff reductions through the formula. Instead, we expect them to bind [100] per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after full implementation of current concessions. PARAGRAPH 8 We agree that developing-country participants shall have longer implementation periods for tariff reductions. In addition, they shall be given the following flexibility: (b) applying less than formula cuts to up to [10] per cent of the tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that these tariff lines do not exceed [10] per cent of the total value of a Member's imports; or (c) keeping, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, or not applying formula cuts for up to [5] per cent of tariff lines provided they do not exceed [5] per cent of the total value of a Member's imports. PARAGRAPH 9 We agree that least-developed country participants shall not be required to apply the formula nor participate in the sectorial approach, however, as part of their contribution to this round of negotiations, they are expected to substantially increase their level of binding commitments. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 9 III. DECISIONS A. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DEDICATED SESSION ON SMALL ECONOMIES 1. Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS3 WT/COMTD/SE/5 (3 October 2006) 147. In paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,4 Ministers established a work programme under the auspices of the General Council to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies with the objective of framing responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, without creating a sub-category of WTO Members. 148. On 1 March 2002, the General Council took note of a framework and procedures for the conduct of the Work Programme on Small Economies5 and instructed the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to conduct this programme of work in Dedicated Sessions and to report regularly on the progress of its work to the General Council. This mandate was reaffirmed by the 1 August 2004 Decision of the General Council.6 At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to this Work Programme and urged Members to adopt specific measures that would facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system.7 149. In discussions in the CTD in Dedicated Session, the proponents of small economies identified, as one of the trade-related issues affecting the fuller integration of their economies into the multilateral trading system, their limited administrative capacities to implement complex rules and procedures and, in particular, to fulfil their obligations under the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 150. In documents WT/COMTD/SE/W/15, WT/COMTD/SE/W/16 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18, the proponents suggested that they be allowed to designate regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations in the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements and sought explicit approval from Members to do so. The proposals underwent two revisions8 to take into account the concerns raised by other Members in the Dedicated Session and at informal and/or formal meetings of the SPS and TBT Committees and the TRIPS Council. 151. Reports from the Chairpersons of these bodies were sent to the Chairperson of the CTD in Dedicated Session. The proponents of small economies also clarified that it was not their intention to modify, amend or alter the balance of rights and obligations contained in the SPS, TBT or TRIPS Agreements and that they, as Members, remain ultimately responsible for adhering to the obligations they contain. 3 The General Council, at its meeting of 10 October 2006, agreed to the recommendations and understandings contained in paragraph 6 of the report. 4 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 5 WT/L/447. 6 WT/L/579. 7 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, paragraph 41. 8 The latest versions have been circulated as WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.2; WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.2 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.2. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 10 152. On the basis of the discussions that have been held on this matter, the CTD in Dedicated Session considers that the use by small, vulnerable economies of regional bodies to provide technical support and assistance as necessary could help them implement their obligations in the areas of SPS, TBT and TRIPS, and thereby facilitate their fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. Accordingly, and in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 41 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the CTD in Dedicated Session recommends that the General Council agrees that small economies are allowed to use such regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations under the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements. It also recommends that Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under the agreements concerned, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body where such exists. It is understood that individual Members benefiting from these recommendations will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual notifications and other obligations under these Agreements. This recommendation is without prejudice both to the identification of other specific measures in due course to facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system and to the use of regional bodies as described in this report by other developing country Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 11 COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 2. Decision of the General Council of 27 July 2007 - WT/L/691 (31 July 2007) Based on the Draft Decision of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of 13 July 2007 (G/SCM/120) ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES Decision of 27 July 2007 The General Council, Having regard to Articles IV:1 and 2 and IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") and Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"); Recalling that the Members of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Committee" or "Committee"), as directed by the Ministerial Conference9 have granted, pursuant to the procedures set forth in document G/SCM/39, extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement of the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for the elimination of export subsidies, in respect of certain programmes of certain developing country Members; Noting the proposals submitted by those developing country Members to extend the procedures contained in G/SCM/39;10 Noting the terms of paragraph 5 of this Decision; Recognizing the economic, financial and development needs, as well as the capacity and administrative constraints, of those Members in implementing their commitments pursuant to the SCM Agreement in respect of the elimination of export subsidies; On the basis of the commitment of those Members to eliminate the export subsidies in question not later than 31 December 2015, with no requests for extension beyond those foreseen pursuant to this Decision; Decides to adopt the following procedures. PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUATION OF EXTENSIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 27.2(b) OF THE SCM AGREEMENT FOR CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS The SCM Committee shall follow the procedures set forth below in respect of the continuation of extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement ("SCM Article 27.4") of 9 Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, (WT/MIN(01)/17), paragraph 10.6. 10 See documents G/SCM/W/535 and G/SCM/W/537 and addenda. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 12 the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for certain programmes, identified in the Annex.11 1. Mechanism for continuation of extension (a) A Member that wishes to seek a continuation, for calendar year 2008, of the extension under SCM Article 27.4 for a programme listed in the Annex, shall submit a request to that effect to the SCM Committee not later than 3 September 2007. The request also shall include a reference to the WTO document containing the corresponding updating notification covering calendar year 2006, which the Member shall have submitted to the SCM Committee pursuant to 1(d) of G/SCM/39.12 (b) Not later than 26 October 2007, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions, for calendar year 2008, for programmes listed in the Annex in respect of which requests have been submitted pursuant to 1(a) and for which the Committee has verified, in its annual review conducted pursuant to G/SCM/3913, that the transparency and standstill requirements under G/SCM/39 were fulfilled during 2006. (c) As provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the continuation of extensions by the SCM Committee pursuant to these procedures shall be subject to annual reviews in the form of consultations between the Committee and the Members receiving continuations of extensions. These annual reviews shall be conducted on the basis of annual updating notifications from the Members in question, as referred to in 2(a). The purpose of the annual reviews shall be to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled. (d) During the period 2008-2012, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions pursuant to these procedures, subject to verification through annual reviews as provided for in 1(c) that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled.14 The "last authorized period" referred to in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall not extend beyond 31 December 2013, and the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall end not later than 31 December 2015. (e) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall take, from 1 January 2008, the necessary internal steps with a view to eliminating export subsidies under the programme before the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. These steps shall include consultations with relevant government bodies and organisations and any necessary technical and/or legal assessments. In addition, from 1 January 2008 and in no case later than 31 December 2009, the Member shall notify each beneficiary under the programme indicating that no export subsidies within the meaning of 11 The programmes eligible for continuations of extensions under these procedures are programmes providing export subsidies in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal taxes for which the SCM Committee continued extensions of the transition period under SCM Article 27.4 for calendar year 2007 pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. 12 At the regular meeting of the Committee in April 2007, these Members were reminded to submit their updating notifications by 30 June 2007. 13 The procedures in G/SCM/39 shall cease to be effective upon completion of this 2007 annual review. 14 This extension mechanism shall cease to be effective upon completion in 2012 of the annual review by the Committee to continue the extensions for calendar year 2013, such that there will be no basis for requests for extension beyond those foreseen in this Decision. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 13 SCM Article 3.1(a) will be granted or maintained beyond the end of calendar year 2015. 2. 3. (f) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall provide, for transparency purposes, an action plan for eliminating export subsidies under the programme, as an integral part of the annual updating notification submitted for the annual review to be conducted in 2010.15 As part of this review, the SCM Committee shall undertake a mid-period assessment of each programme for which it has continued an extension under these procedures. During this mid-period assessment, the SCM Committee shall take stock of the steps undertaken as of that point by the notifying Member pursuant to 1(e), and shall discuss the action plan provided by the Member. (g) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures may request the WTO Secretariat to provide technical assistance for eliminating export subsidies under the programme. Transparency (a) The annual updating notifications shall follow the agreed format for subsidy notifications under SCM Article 25 (found in G/SCM/6/Rev.1). Beginning with the updating notifications covering calendar year 2008, notifying Members also shall provide information regarding the actions they have taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). (b) During the annual reviews by the SCM Committee referred to in 1(c), notifying Members can be requested by other Members to provide additional detail and clarification with a view to maintaining transparency in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes in question16 and the form of the subsidies provided thereunder; and in respect of the actions taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). Any information provided in response to such requests shall be considered part of the notified information. (c) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall ensure transparency in respect of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 by submitting updating notifications under paragraph 2(a), which shall be subject to annual review by the Committee. Standstill (a) 15 Through the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the programmes for which extensions are continued under these procedures shall not be modified so as to make them more favourable than they were as at 1 September 2001, as specified in the notified information previously submitted pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. The continuation of an expiring programme without modification shall not be deemed to violate standstill. The action plan shall indicate how the Member intends to eliminate export subsidies under the programme not later than the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4, including information as to legislative changes, administrative amendments and/or other procedures as may be necessary, and whether any of these actions have been undertaken or are in the process of being undertaken, including how the individual beneficiaries have been notified pursuant to 1(e). 16 The scope, coverage and intensity of benefits of the programmes in question will be determined on the basis of the legal instruments underlying the programmes. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 14 (b) 4. The verification of standstill in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes shall be based on the notified information referred to in 1(c), 2(a), 2(b) and 3(a). Product graduation on the basis of export competitiveness Notwithstanding these procedures, Articles 27.5 and 27.6 shall apply in respect of export subsidies for which extensions are continued pursuant to these procedures. 5. Members listed in Annex VII(b) which reserved rights pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39 (a) This Decision does not prejudge rights of Annex VII Members. (b) If, during the period 2008-2015, the per capita GNP of a Member that reserved rights under paragraph 6(b) of G/SCM/3917 reaches the level provided for in Annex VII(b) of the SCM Agreement such that the Member is no longer included in Annex VII(b), that Member shall be able to make use of these procedures as from the date at which its per capita GNP reaches that level and for the remainder of that period. The effective date for the standstill requirement referred to in 3(a) shall be the year in which that Member's GNP per capita reaches the level provided for in Annex VII(b) such that it is no longer included in Annex VII(b). 17 The Members that reserved rights, and the programmes in respect of which these rights were reserved, are identified in documents G/SCM/N/74/BOL & Suppl.1, G/SCM/N/74/HND, G/SCM/N/74/KEN, and G/SCM/N/74/LKA. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 15 ANNEX LIST OF PROGRAMMES ELIGIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF EXTENSIONS UNDER THE PROCEDURES18, AND DOCUMENT REFERENCES FOR THE EXTENSION DECISIONS BY THE SCM COMMITTEE COVERING CALENDAR YEAR 2007 Antigua & Barbuda Fiscal Incentive Act Cap 172 (December 1975) (G/SCM/50/Add.4) Free Trade and Processing Zone Act No. 12 of 1994 (G/SCM/51/Add.4) Barbados Fiscal Incentive Programme (G/SCM/52/Add.4) Export Allowance (G/SCM/53/Add.4) Research & Development Allowance (G/SCM/54/Add.4) International Business Incentives (G/SCM/55/Add.4) Societies With Restricted Liability (G/SCM/56/Add.4) Belize Fiscal Incentives Act (G/SCM/57/Add.4) Export Processing Zone Act (G/SCM/58/Add. 4) Commercial Free Zone Act (G/SCM/59/Add.4) Conditional Duty Exemptions Facility under Treaty of Chaguaramas (G/SCM/60/Add.4) Costa Rica Free Zone Regime (G/SCM/61/Add.4) Inward Processing Regime (G/SCM/62/Add.4) Dominica Fiscal Incentives Programme (G/SCM/63/Add.4) 18 Programmes for which the SCM Committee continued extensions of the transition period under SCM Article 27.4 for calendar year 2007 pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. It is recalled that the eligibility criteria in G/SCM/39 on the basis of which the original extension decisions pursuant to those procedures (for calendar year 2003) were taken for the listed programmes were as follows (footnotes omitted): "Programmes eligible for extension pursuant to these procedures, and for which Members shall therefore grant extensions for calendar year 2003 [...], are export subsidy programmes (i) in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal taxes, (ii) which were in existence not later than 1 September 2001, and (iii) which are provided by developing country Members (iv) whose share of world merchandise export trade was not greater than 0.10 per cent, (v) whose total Gross National Income ("GNI") for the year 2000 as published by the World Bank was at or below US$20 billion, (vi) and who are otherwise eligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 27.4, and (vii) in respect of which these procedures are followed." It is further recalled that, in respect of the above eligibility criteria, G/SCM/39 also provided that: "The criteria set forth in these procedures are solely and strictly for the purpose of determining whether Members are eligible to invoke these procedures. Members of the Committee agree that these criteria have no precedential value or relevance, direct or indirect, for any other purpose." WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 16 Dominican Republic Law No. 8-90 to "Promote the Establishment of New Free Zones and Expand Existing Ones" (G/SCM/64/Add.4) El Salvador Export Processing Zones and Marketing Act, as amended (G/SCM/65/Add.4) Fiji Short-Term Export Profit Deduction (G/SCM/66/Add.4) Export Processing Factories/Export Processing Zones Scheme (G/SCM/67/Add.4) The Income Tax Act (Film Making and Audio Visual Incentive Amendment Decree 2000) (G/SCM/68/Add.4) Grenada Fiscal Incentives Act No. 41 of 1974 (G/SCM/69/Add.4) Statutory Rules and Orders No. 37 of 1999 (G/SCM/70/Add.4) Qualified Enterprises Act No. 18 of 1978 (G/SCM/71/Add.4) Guatemala Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for Companies under Special Customs Regimes (G/SCM/72/Add.4) Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for the Production Process Relating to Activities of Managers and Users of Free Zones (G/SCM/73/Add.4) Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for the Production Process of Commercial and Industrial Enterprises Operating in the Industrial and Free Trade Zone (G/SCM/74/Add.4) Jamaica Export Industry Encouragement Act (G/SCM/75/Add.4) Jamaica Export Free Zone Act (G/SCM/76/Add.4) Foreign Sales Corporation Act (G/SCM/77/Add.4) Industrial Incentives (Factory Construction) Act (G/SCM/78/Add.4) Jordan Partial or Total Exemption from Income Tax of Profits Generated from Exports under Law No. 57 of 1985, as amended (G/SCM/79/Add.4) Mauritius Export Enterprise Scheme (G/SCM/80/Add.4) Pioneer Status Enterprise Scheme (G/SCM/81/Add.4) Export Promotion (G/SCM/82/Add.4) Freeport Scheme (G/SCM/83/Add.4) Panama Official Industry Register (G/SCM/84/Add.4 Export Processing Zones (G/SCM/85/Add.4) Papua New Guinea Section 45 of the Income Tax (G/SCM/86/Add.4) WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 17 St. Kitts and Nevis Fiscal Incentives Act No. 17 of 1974 (G/SCM/90/Add.4) St. Lucia Fiscal Incentives Act No. 15 of 1974 (G/SCM/87/Add.4) Free Zone Act, No. 10 of 1999 (G/SCM/88/Add.4) Micro and Small Scale Business Enterprises Act, No. 19 of 1998 (G/SCM/89/Add.4) St. Vincent & Grenadines Fiscal Incentives Act No. 5 of 1982, as amended (G/SCM/91/Add.4) Uruguay Automotive Industry Export Promotion Regime (G/SCM/92/Add.4) WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 18 IV. COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE - SPECIAL SESSION A. CURRENT MODALITIES DRAFT 1. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (6 December 2008) II. MARKET ACCESS A. TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS 61. Developed country Members shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over five years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 20 per cent, the reduction shall be 50 per cent; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 20 per cent and less than or equal to 50 per cent, the reduction shall be 57 per cent; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 50 per cent and less than or equal to 75 per cent, the reduction shall be 64 per cent; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 75 per cent, the reduction shall be 70 per cent. 63. Developing country Members other than those specified in paragraph 61 below shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over eight years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 30 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(a) above; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 30 per cent and less than or equal to 80 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(b) above; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 80 per cent and less than or equal to 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(c) above; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(c) above. 65. Those small, vulnerable economies19, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, which choose to exercise the option set 19 The Members concerned are those that meet the criteria set out in paragraph 151 and are listed in Annex I. As is made clear in the Agreed Framework, Small vulnerable economies (SVEs) are not meant to create any sub-category of Members. Bearing that principle in mind, the following Members could also be deemed to be eligible for this treatment, should they choose to avail themselves of it, despite not being members of the SVE Group per se given that this treatment could be deemed to be broadly comparably appropriate: Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (plus other Members that can provide data that show that they WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 19 forth in paragraph 130 below shall be entitled to moderate the cuts specified in paragraph 63 above by a further 10 ad valorem percentage points in each band. D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT Special Products 129. Developing country Members shall be entitled to self-designate Special Products guided by indicators20 based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. There shall be 12 per cent of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products. Up to 5 per cent of lines may have no cut. The overall average cut shall, in any case, be 11 percent.* * A number of developing country Members have expressed reservations concerning the numbers specified in this paragraph, noting also that this may be affected by what is decided in other areas of the text. 130. In the case of small vulnerable economies, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, they may, if they choose to do so, apply the moderated tariff tiered formula for SVEs provided for in paragraph 65 above plus the Special Product entitlement outlined above. Alternatively, they may chose not to apply the tiered formula but simply meet an overall average cut of 24 per cent through having in effect opted to designate as many tariff lines as they choose as Special Products. The tariff lines so chosen need not be subject to any minimum tariff cut and need not be guided by the indicators. Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) 144. [In the case of SVE’s referred to in footnote 11 to these modalities, they may apply the maximum remedy provided for above even if this would otherwise entail breach of a pre-Doha bound tariff, provided that the maximum increase over a pre-Doha bound tariff does not exceed 20 ad valorem percentage points or 20 per cent of the current bound tariff, whichever is higher, for up to a maximum of (10-15) per cent of tariff lines in any given period. This would be provided that all other relevant conditions for application of the measure have been met. 145. For developing country Members other than those referred to in the preceding paragraph, they may apply the maximum remedy provided for above even if this would otherwise entail breach of a pre-Doha bound tariff provided that (a) the maximum increase over the pre-Doha bound tariffs would be no more than 15 ad valorem percentage points or 15 per cent of the current bound tariff, whichever is the higher; (b) the maximum number of products for which this provision would be invoked would be no more than 2-621 in any given period; and (c) this would not be permissible for two consecutive periods. All other provisions would be applicable.] meet the criteria in paragraph 147). Additionally, Bolivia shall have access, exceptionally, to treatment equivalent to that provided for in paragraph 142. As an exception, Suriname shall rebind its agricultural tariffs on a line by line basis at the level of the average bound tariff of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago resulting from these modalities. 20 See Annex F. 21 For the purposes of this provision a "product" is identifiable at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature, but with the understanding that this can entail a maximum of [4 - 8] tariff lines per product below that 6-digit level. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 20 G. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 157. For the purposes of this Agreement, this term applies to Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent. 158. Developed country Members and developing country Members in a position to do so shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies. 159. More specific provisions are to be found in relevant sections of this document. ANNEX I SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 1. The data are based on the methodology that was used to prepare a previous Secretariat paper on shares of WTO Members in world non-agricultural trade, 1999-2004 (TN/MA/S/18). Individual Members' data were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database on 6 June 2007. World export and import totals, excluding significant re-exports were taken from the Secretariat's International Trade Statistics Report 2006. This time period has been updated to 2000-2005 and a cif-fob adjustment has been applied to world exports by commodity group to derive respective world imports, but this does not change the overall results22. The country averages are calculated on the basis of the years for which data are available. 2. A small, vulnerable economy is defined as one whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent. 3. The attached table does not include those Members that are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and those Members for which no data are available. 22 Cif-fob factors were estimated based on the ratio of imports to exports for a matched group of reporters in Comtrade. World imports by commodity group were derived by applying these cif-fob factors to the WTO's world exports by commodity group and aligning the resulting figures to the WTO's world total imports Intra-trade of the 25 EC member States was then subtracted from the totals. WTO Member Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.050 0.008 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.018 0.060 0.037 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.102 0.143 0.065 0.075 0.030 0.116 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.112 0.140 0.087 0.240 0.223 0.256 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.154 0.115 0.189 0.326 0.515 0.154 0.173 0.136 0.206 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.069 0.083 0.026 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.221 0.302 0.144 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.319 0.416 0.231 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.190 0.223 0.160 0.114 0.091 0.136 0.198 0.120 0.269 0.215 0.314 0.126 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.017 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.053 0.086 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.022 0.080 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.011 0.111 0.098 0.087 0.107 0.044 0.018 0.068 0.012 0.007 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.072 0.030 0.110 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.049 0.040 0.020 0.059 0.071 0.049 0.092 0.041 0.019 0.062 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 21 Worlda Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Barbados Belize Bolivia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Fiji FYR Macedonia Gabon Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Jordan Kenya Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.078 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.034 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.018 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.051 0.026 0.075 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.086 0.053 0.116 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.041 0.026 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.063 0.079 0.052 0.104 0.052 0.037 0.065 Kyrgyzstan Macao, China Mauritius Moldova Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Zimbabwe Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.055 0.013 0.093 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.132 0.051 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.102 0.129 0.079 0.105 0.091 0.114 0.070 0.086 0.056 0.173 0.280 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.249 0.284 0.217 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.098 0.209 0.333 0.096 0.151 0.280 0.067 a Excludes intra-EC trade (25 member States) and significant re-exports. Source: All data are from the United Nations Comtrade database except for world totals, which are WTO estimates. Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.053 0.046 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.081 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.107 0.071 0.037 0.025 0.048 0.030 0.021 0.037 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 22 WTO Member Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.038 0.016 0.059 0.032 0.042 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.086 0.102 0.071 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.039 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 23 HISTORIC EVOLUTION 1. Overview of Small Economies' Positions on the Agriculture Negotiations – JOB(05)/161 (27 July 2005) 4. Taking into account documents WT/COMTD/SE/W/12 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/13/Rev.1, the small, vulnerable economies would like to highlight the following fundamental considerations: (a) The agricultural sector in small, vulnerable economies plays a key role in the attainment of their socio-economic development goals, in particular with respect to food security, rural development, exports and employment. The volatility of international prices for products exported by small, vulnerable economies constitutes an important factor of high vulnerability for some small, vulnerable economies. In this context, it is important for small economies that these issues be addressed satisfactorily in the agriculture negotiations; (b) Small, vulnerable economies have an insignificant level of participation in the multilateral trading system and a minimal share of total world trade. Furthermore, these economies are constrained by low levels of competitiveness. Issues related to market access for small economies' products should be addressed satisfactorily so that these economies can participate meaningfully in the multilateral trading system in accordance with their level of development; (c) Small, vulnerable economies have critical concerns in the market access pillar of the agriculture negotiations, including special and differential treatment and flexibilities and economic development broadly. For most small economies, tariffs are the only tool at their disposal to protect their agricultural sectors. It is therefore crucial that the tariff reduction formula be flexible enough to accommodate the concerns of small vulnerable economies; (d) Bearing in mind the key contribution that agriculture makes to the food security and rural development of small, vulnerable economies, these countries consider that the provisions of Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) are important for the development of their agricultural sectors. Accordingly, Special Products shall be exempted from tariff reductions and from any commitments on TRQs. Special Products shall also have access to the SSM; (e) The issue of maintenance of current de minimis support levels for developing countries is of major importance to small, vulnerable economies, especially since they do not have access to the aggregate measure of support (AMS). We wish to emphasize that there is no justification for the reduction of de minimis support by developing countries; (f) The concerns of small, vulnerable economies shall be taken into account in all the provisions of special and differential treatment which are provided in the Doha mandate. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 24 2. Proposal by the Small, Vulnerable Economies on Market Access in Agriculture – TN/AG/GEN/11 (11 November 2005) Proponents: Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago. 8. Small, vulnerable economies (SVEs), with the exception of LDCs, whose average share of world merchandise exports over the period 1995-2004 do not exceed 0.10 per cent, will make a contribution to the reform process in agriculture according to the following provisions: 3. Small, vulnerable economies will undertake linear cuts not exceeding 15 per cent, with a minimum of 10 per cent per tariff line, from the bound rate. No further commitments will be expected from the small, vulnerable economies on the basis of modalities that may be agreed with respect to other elements under the market access pillar. No tariff capping shall apply to the small, vulnerable economies. Modalities shall provide for substantial improvement in market access for products of export interest to small, vulnerable economies. Small, vulnerable economies will designate Special Products based on their food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. Special Products of small, vulnerable economies will be exempted from tariff reductions and tariff rate quota commitments. All agricultural tariff lines will be eligible for the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). SPs of small, vulnerable economies will have automatic access to the SSM. The small, vulnerable economies insist that the SSM shall contemplate price and volume-based triggers. Remedy measures should be effective and flexible to respond to the needs of the small, vulnerable economies. Report by the Chairman to the TNC – TN/AG/21 (28 November 2005), also Annex A of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 26. In the case of small and vulnerable economies, a concrete proposal has been made recently. It has not yet been subject to consultation. 4. Chairman's Reference Paper on SVEs – Room Document (4 May 2006) 3. The criteria for defining small, vulnerable economies and possible modalities available to them, or from which they might benefit, do not apply only to the agriculture negotiations. This note, however, can only address the agriculture specific elements and is without prejudice to proposals and discussions in other negotiating bodies. However, some elements of these other proposals and discussions may offer some clarification on specific issues relating to SVEs, such as the criteria that might be relevant for defining a Member as a having a "small, vulnerable economy". WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 25 Proposed modalities for market access 4. The negotiations have benefited from a specific proposal23 in the market access area that outlines possible provisions the SVEs propose should apply to them. These provisions could be summarised as: Tariff reduction formula: linear cuts not exceeding 15 per cent, with a minimum of 10 per cent per tariff line and no tariff cap; Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM): automatic access for all agricultural tariff lines; Special Products: self-designation based on food security, livelihood security and rural development needs; exemption from tariff reductions and tariff rate quota commitments; and Offensive interests: Substantial improvement in market access for products of export interest. Issues to be addressed 7. In view of the level of uncertainty surrounding the distinct elements of the general provisions for market access and related special and differential treatment, a focused response to the specific proposals made by the SVEs remains elusive. However, if there are to be any provisions for SVEs, they will have to be part of the modalities. Although some SVEs Members have supported the ACP comprehensive proposal – notably as regards the proposed tariff cuts for developing countries, which they see as a good basis for accommodating their concerns – there has been little convergence among Members regarding the core tariff reduction formula, Sensitive Products and the special and differential treatment provisions (of which, Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism are key elements). 8. It is encouraging to note, however, that practically all of the individual elements covered by the SVE proposal have already been the subject of intensive discussions in various formats under the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture. Furthermore, each of these topics is being addressed in the various Chairman's Reference Papers which are being prepared or revised. The direct involvement of SVEs at this stage is crucial in order to ensure that their specific views on the various market access parameters, as well as on meaningful special and differential treatment, are adequately incorporated. They, and other Members, will also need to assess what additional provisions, if any, may be needed in addition to those available under special and differential treatment. 9. Furthermore, market access is not entirely de-linked from the other two pillars of negotiations. As noted by SVEs themselves, market access conditions to international markets will be effectively improved only if trade-distorting measures affecting agricultural trade are also corrected and addressed. To a large extent, through the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration and in the recent negotiations, it would appear that the political will and support exists already for some improvements: the final date for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies has been agreed; and there has been some convergence on reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. These topics are definitely on the agenda for reform and I have addressed some of them through earlier Reference Papers. 23 See Attachment 1 to this reference paper; see also JOB(05)/161 (27 July 2005). WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 26 10. All these elements must be brought together in the right way, i.e. in a horizontal (no sub-category of WTO Members), inclusive, transparent and participatory process. 5. Contribution by the SVEs on the Chairman's Reference Paper on SVEs – JOB(06)/164 (31 May 2006) Criteria for defining SVEs 4. In paragraph 3 of the reference paper, the Chairman notes that the criteria to define SVEs are being discussed in other negotiating bodies. It is worth noting that the SVEs have recently presented a submission in the Negotiating Group on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA24) proposing that countries whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent should be identified as SVEs. 5. The SVEs would wish to highlight that the vulnerability that characterizes them affects their trade performance in the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors. In this sense, the same criteria should prevail in both negotiating areas and we fully endorse the use of the criteria submitted in the NAMA Negotiating Group for the agriculture negotiations. What specific provisions should be envisaged ? 8. The level of ambition, which the SVEs are seeking is spelt out in paragraph 8 of TN/AG/GEN/11. In this sense, given the current stage of the agriculture negotiations, provisions applicable to SVEs should be based on the following principles: 6. SVEs will contribute less than other developing countries in terms of tariff reduction. SPs designated by SVEs should be exempted from tariff reduction, capping, tariff-quota commitments. They will also have the right to have recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism based on import quantity and price triggers. Modalities shall provide for substantial improvement in market access for products of export interest to SVEs. Chairman's Revised Consolidated Reference Paper on Possible Modalities on Market Access – (9 June 2006) [SMALL AND VULNERABLE ECONOMIES] 38. Members with economies defined as small, vulnerable in [ ] may reduce bound duties by [ ] less than those that would otherwise have been required under paragraph 4 above. Any product designated as a Special Product under paragraphs 16 to 19 above by a Member with a small, vulnerable economy shall not be required to [undertake reductions in bound duties,] [or] [increase bound tariff quotas] [or] [be subject to a tariff cap.] 39. [Members shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies.] 24 Circulated as a room document on 10 May 2006. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 27 7. Revised Consolidated Reference Paper on Modalities on Market Access – Contribution on the Treatment of SVEs – JOB(06)/196 (19 June 2006) I. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 38. Countries whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent shall reduce bound duties by [X25] percentage points less than would otherwise have been required under paragraph 4 above. 39. In accordance with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration and the July 2004 Decision, SVEs will have the right to self-designate at least [ ] per cent of tariff lines as SPs based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. SVEs shall not be required to undertake reductions in bound duties, increase bound tariff quotas nor be subject to a tariff cap with regards to these tariff lines. 40. Members shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to SVEs. 8. Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture – TN/AG/W/3 (12 July 2006) [I. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 47. Members with economies that, in the period [1999] to [2004], had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than [0.16] per cent, (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than [0.10] per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than [0.40] per cent shall have the right to reduce bound duties by [ ] less than those that would otherwise have been required under paragraph 4 above. 48. Any Member meeting the criteria in paragraph 47 shall have the right to self-designate at least [ ] per cent of tariff lines as Special Products based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs. Such Members shall not be required to undertake reductions in bound duties, increase bound tariff quotas or be subject to a tariff cap] on these products.] 49. [Developed country] Members shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies.] 9. Submission on the Treatment of Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) – JOB(07)/47 (11 April 2007) 6. In view of their specific situation, SVEs need enhanced Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). This paper builds upon two elements of the previous SVEs submissions on: (a) tariff reduction through the tiered formula; and (b) Special Products (SPs). 25 This figure will be determined in the light of emerging convergence in respect of the level of ambition of the overall market access package. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 28 7. New commitments undertaken by SVEs shall reflect consideration of their specific situation and their development needs. For the reasons enumerated above, SVEs shall contribute less than other developing countries in terms of tariff reduction. 8. An examination of the tariff schedules and tariff profile of SVE Members will reveal that tariff reduction commitments based on a tiered formula will require disproportionate efforts from SVEs because: Some have homogeneous low bindings. Reduction commitments are likely to affect those products that are highly important for their development needs. Applying the formula cuts is likely to reduce the applied rates of such products. Some have ceiling bindings and/or a high percentage of their tariff lines may fall in the highest tiers of the tiered formula. This would require them to undertake greater efforts in terms of average tariff reduction and tariff reduction per tariff line when compared with the average reduction for developing countries used during the Uruguay Round (24 per cent) and assessed through the lens of the proportionality principle. 9. SPs self-designated by SVEs shall be exempted from tariff reduction, tariff capping and tariff-quota commitments. Provisions on SPs are important for the development of the agricultural sectors in SVEs, bearing in mind the key contribution that agriculture makes to their food security, livelihood security and rural development. 10. SVEs fully support the view that SPs should be selected and designated based on the food and livelihood security and rural development needs of developing countries, guided by the illustrative list of indicators submitted by the G-33. The right to self-designate any product as SP shall not be questioned at any stage of the negotiating processes, including the verification of the schedules of members. 11. SVEs are of the view that the concessions made in the framework of free trade agreements (FTAs) are part of a very specific and particular balance between the rights and obligations of the Members involved in the FTA. There shall be no requirement that multilateral WTO rights and obligations, resulting from the Doha negotiations, including the self-designation of SPs, be contingent on such FTA concessions. 12. SVEs also believe that SPs shall cover at least 20 per cent of the total number of tariff lines of a particular Member and that this limited percentage of tariff lines should be treated according to the following three layers of commitments: At least 50 per cent of these tariff lines will be exempted from tariff reductions. For those SVEs characterized by special circumstances26, an additional 15 per cent of the tariff lines designated as Special Products will not be subject to any tariff reduction commitment; 25 per cent of tariff lines will be subject to a reduction of 5 per cent; and The remaining tariff lines, other than those categorized in the two sub-paragraphs above, will be subject to a reduction of not more than 10 per cent. 26 Special circumstances include situations where a developing country Member: (a) had bound at least 25 per cent of its total tariff lines at a maximum import duty of 80 per cent at the start of the implementation period; (b) had undertaken ceiling binding commitments under the Uruguay Round; (c) has predominantly low income or resource poor producers; or (d) has any other structural difficulties in its agriculture sector. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 29 13. An outcome that reflects the aspirations of SVEs would contribute to enhancing their participation in the multilateral trading system, in accordance with their development, economic, financial and trade needs. These enhanced flexibilities will not have any significant impact on world markets, taking into account the small size of their markets, the fact that many of these countries are already highly open and are net food-importing countries. 10. Communication from the Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session Second Instalment (25 May 2007) 17. From the mandate it is clear that the modalities should address the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system but without creating a sub-category of Members. In the proposals made by the group of small, vulnerable economies, three distinct elements have been raised: the definition of what is a small, vulnerable economy; how their concerns relating to improving market access may be addressed; and how their export interests may be addressed. 18. In order to define what is a small, vulnerable economy, there is a proposal from the group which states that they are Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of world merchandise trade of 0.16 per cent or less and world trade in non agricultural products of 0.1 per cent or less and world trade in agricultural products of 0.4 per cent or less. In the absence of any contrary view I will take that this definition is acceptable. I would also assume that in submitting their draft Schedules any Member that claims that its economy meets these criteria would provide verifiable supporting data. 19. The group of small, vulnerable economies proposed that their export interests should be addressed by a modality that would require all Members to provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to SVEs. I do not recall any delegation disagreeing with this proposal. 20. While the proposal made by the SVE group is independent of proposals on Special Products generally, I would note that it does follow very closely that of the G-33. However, at this stage there is no consensus among Members on the designation and treatment of Special Products. Therefore, I feel that, at this stage, there is little I can usefully add beyond noting that, as regards my own comments on special products, I would have envisaged that some form of additional flexibility – whether in terms of number and/or treatment – under Special Products – reflecting the potentiality of disproportionate impact – would appear to have been the most appropriate means for addressing the specific import concerns of small, vulnerable economies. 11. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4 (1 August 2007) II. MARKET ACCESS A. TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS 50. Developing country Members other than those specified in paragraph 52 below shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over eight years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 30 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 49(a) above; WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 30 (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 30 per cent and less than or equal to 80 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 49(b) above; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 80 per cent and less than or equal to 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 49(c) above; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 49(d) above. 52. Small and vulnerable economies27 will, in respect of each tier specified above for developing countries, be entitled to moderate the two-thirds cut by a further [10] ad valorem points in each band. Should strict application of this formula result in an overall average cut higher than [24] per cent, the Member concerned would be entitled to apply lesser reductions at its discretion, to keep within such an average level. 53. Where a small and vulnerable Member (or a Member in the supplementary list specified in footnote below) has ceiling bindings or homogeneous low bindings and application of the approach specified above would still place an unsustainable adjustment burden upon it, the Member concerned shall not be required to make a tiered reduction but would be subject only to the overall average reduction. D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT Special Products 94. Fourth, we discard any view that we will end up with a rigidly applicable, onesize-fits-all approach as regards selection, given the inherent country-specific nature of a Special Product provision under the Framework and the Hong Kong Agreement. One option is, of course, that we have no a priori number whatsoever and accept whatever derives from the indicators when agreed. Another option is to adopt a more tailored approach, along something like the following broad lines: (c) H. for those developing country Members including SVEs and others referred to in footnote, their threshold could be set at a proportionately higher level. There would be no ceiling for those Members above that threshold. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 134. For the purposes of this Agreement, this term applies to Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent. 27 The Members concerned are those that meet the criteria set out in paragraph IV.A.1.147 and are listed in Annex C. As is made clear in the Framework, SVEs are not meant to create any new category of Members. Bearing that principle in mind, the following Members could also be deemed to be eligible for this treatment, should they choose to avail themselves of it, despite not being Members of the SVE group of countries per se given that this treatment could be deemed to be broadly comparably appropriate: Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (plus other Members that can provide data that show that they meet the criteria in paragraph 137). These latter Members would also have freedom to opt for varying bands for the tiers. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 31 135. Developed country Members and developing country Members in a position to do so shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies. 136. More specific provisions are to be found in relevant sections of this document. ANNEX C SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 1. The data are based on the methodology that was used to prepare a previous Secretariat paper on shares of WTO Members in world non-agricultural trade, 1999-2004 (TN/MA/S/18). Individual Members' data were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database on 6 June 2007. World export and import totals, excluding significant re-exports were taken from the Secretariat's International Trade Statistics Report 2006. This time period has been updated to 2000-2005 and a cif-fob adjustment has been applied to world exports by commodity group to derive respective world imports, but this does not change the overall results28. The country averages are calculated on the basis of the years for which data are available. 4. A small, vulnerable economy is defined as one whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent. 5. The attached table does not include those Members that are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and those Members for which no data are available. 28 Cif-fob factors were estimated based on the ratio of imports to exports for a matched group of reporters in Comtrade. World imports by commodity group were derived by applying these cif-fob factors to the WTO's world exports by commodity group and aligning the resulting figures to the WTO's world total imports Intra-trade of the 25 member States of the European Communities was then subtracted from the totals. Worlda Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Barbados Belize Bolivia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Fiji FYR Macedonia Gabon Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Jordan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Macao, China Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.050 0.008 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.018 0.060 0.037 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.102 0.143 0.065 0.075 0.030 0.116 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.112 0.140 0.087 0.240 0.223 0.256 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.154 0.115 0.189 0.326 0.515 0.154 0.173 0.136 0.206 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.069 0.083 0.026 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.221 0.302 0.144 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.319 0.416 0.231 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.190 0.223 0.160 0.114 0.091 0.136 0.198 0.120 0.269 0.215 0.314 0.126 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.055 0.013 0.093 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.017 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.053 0.086 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.022 0.080 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.011 0.111 0.098 0.087 0.107 0.044 0.018 0.068 0.012 0.007 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.072 0.030 0.110 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.049 0.040 0.020 0.059 0.071 0.049 0.092 0.041 0.019 0.062 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.053 0.046 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 32 WTO Member Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.078 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.034 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.018 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.051 0.026 0.075 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.086 0.053 0.116 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.041 0.026 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.063 0.079 0.052 0.104 0.052 0.037 0.065 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.049 0.048 WTO Member Mauritius Moldova Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Zimbabwe Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.038 0.016 0.059 0.032 0.042 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.086 0.102 0.071 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.039 Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.132 0.051 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.102 0.129 0.079 0.105 0.091 0.114 0.070 0.086 0.056 0.173 0.280 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.249 0.284 0.217 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.098 0.209 0.333 0.096 0.151 0.280 0.067 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.081 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.107 0.071 0.037 0.025 0.048 0.030 0.021 0.037 a WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 33 Excludes intra-trade of the European Communities and significant re-exports. Source: All data are from the United Nations Comtrade database except for World totals, which are WTO estimates. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 34 12. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1 (8 February 2008) II. MARKET ACCESS TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS 64. Developing country Members other than those specified in paragraph 66 below shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over eight years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 30 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 62(a) above; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 30 per cent and less than or equal to 80 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 62(b) above; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 80 per cent and less than or equal to 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 62(c) above; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 62(d) above. 65. Small, vulnerable economies29 shall be entitled to moderate the cuts specified in paragraph 64 above by a further [10] ad valorem percentage points in each band D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT Special Products 123. Developing country Members shall be entitled to self-designate Special Products guided by indicators30 based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development.[31] There shall be a minimum entitlement of 8 per cent32, and a maximum 29 The Members concerned are those that meet the criteria set out in paragraph 151 and are listed in Annex I. As is made clear in the Agreed Framework, Small vulnerable economies (SVEs) are not meant to create any sub-category of Members. Bearing that principle in mind, the following Members could also be deemed to be eligible for this treatment, should they choose to avail themselves of it, despite not being members of the SVE Group per se given that this treatment could be deemed to be broadly comparably appropriate: Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (plus other Members that can provide data that show that they meet the criteria in paragraph 151). 30 See Annex F. 31 Below the minimum entitlement of 8 per cent referred to in the next sentence, the developing country Member concerned need not resort to guidance by those indicators. 32 Where a Member finds that it would not, after guidance by indicators, be entitled to any additional Special Products beyond the minimum provided for in this paragraph, that Member may, in effect, "transfer" any unused Sensitive Products entitlement to obtain thereby additional Special Products, subject to the following: (a) that the maximum entitlement for transfer cannot be more than would be consistent with respecting the overall ceiling of [12] [20] per cent of tariff lines for Special Products; and (b) that the tariff reduction treatment for the tariff lines concerned shall be in conformity with the tariff cut entitlements for Special Products under this paragraph, except that sensitive product "transfers" cannot be used for [additional] "no cut" Special Products. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 35 entitlement of [12] [20] per cent, of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products. Under this provision, there is an entitlement to [6] per cent of tariff lines which shall take a tariff cut of [8] [15] per cent. A further [6] per cent is available with a cut of [12] [25] per cent. [[A further] [8 per cent of] [no] tariff lines shall be eligible for no cut.] 124. In the case of small vulnerable economies, they may, if they choose to do so, apply the moderated tariff tiered formula for SVEs provided for in paragraph 61 above plus the Special Product entitlement outlined above. Alternatively, they may simply deviate from the tiered formula cut for as many tariff lines as they choose to designate as a Special Product provided that they meet the overall average cut of 24 per cent. The tariff lines that they designate as Special Products need not be subject to any minimum tariff cut and this designation need not be guided by the indicators. Developing country Members shall be entitled to self-designate Special Products guided by indicators33 based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. There shall be 10-18 per cent of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products34. Up to 6 per cent of/no lines may have no cut. The overall average cut shall, in any case, be 10-14 percent. G. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 134. For the purposes of this Agreement, this term applies to Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent. 135. Developed country Members and developing country Members in a position to do so shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies. 136. More specific provisions are to be found in relevant sections of this document. ANNEX I SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 1. The data are based on the methodology that was used to prepare a previous Secretariat paper on shares of WTO Members in world non-agricultural trade, 1999-2004 (TN/MA/S/18). Individual Members' data were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database on 6 June 2007. World export and import totals, excluding significant re-exports were taken from the Secretariat's International Trade Statistics Report 2006. This time period has been updated to 2000-2005 and a cif-fob adjustment has been applied to world exports by commodity group to derive respective world imports, but this does not change the overall results35. The country averages are calculated on the basis of the years for which data are available. 33 See Annex F. Below this level, the developing country Member concerned need not resort to guidance by those indicators. In the case of RAMs, the threshold level above which indicators are not required to be used shall be 1 percentage point higher. 35 Cif-fob factors were estimated based on the ratio of imports to exports for a matched group of reporters in Comtrade. World imports by commodity group were derived by applying these cif-fob factors to the WTO's world exports by commodity group and aligning the resulting figures to the WTO's world total imports Intra-trade of the 25 member States of the European Communities was then subtracted from the totals. 34 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 36 6. A small, vulnerable economy is defined as one whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent. 7. The attached table does not include those Members that are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and those Members for which no data are available. WTO Member Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.050 0.008 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.018 0.060 0.037 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.102 0.143 0.065 0.075 0.030 0.116 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.112 0.140 0.087 0.240 0.223 0.256 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.154 0.115 0.189 0.326 0.515 0.154 0.173 0.136 0.206 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.069 0.083 0.026 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.221 0.302 0.144 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.319 0.416 0.231 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.190 0.223 0.160 0.114 0.091 0.136 0.198 0.120 0.269 0.215 0.314 0.126 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.055 0.013 0.093 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.017 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.053 0.086 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.022 0.080 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.011 0.111 0.098 0.087 0.107 0.044 0.018 0.068 0.012 0.007 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.072 0.030 0.110 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.049 0.040 0.020 0.059 0.071 0.049 0.092 0.041 0.019 0.062 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.053 0.046 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 37 Worlda Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Barbados Belize Bolivia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Fiji FYR Macedonia Gabon Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Jordan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Macao, China Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.078 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.034 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.018 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.051 0.026 0.075 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.086 0.053 0.116 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.041 0.026 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.063 0.079 0.052 0.104 0.052 0.037 0.065 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.049 0.048 Mauritius Moldova Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Zimbabwe a Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.132 0.051 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.102 0.129 0.079 0.105 0.091 0.114 0.070 0.086 0.056 0.173 0.280 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.249 0.284 0.217 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.098 0.209 0.333 0.096 0.151 0.280 0.067 Excludes intra-trade of the European Communities and significant re-exports. Source: All data are from the United Nations Comtrade database except for World totals, which are WTO estimates. Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.081 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.107 0.071 0.037 0.025 0.048 0.030 0.021 0.037 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 38 WTO Member Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.038 0.016 0.059 0.032 0.042 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.086 0.102 0.071 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.039 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 39 13. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.2 (19 May 2008) II. MARKET ACCESS A. TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS 63. Developing country Members other than those specified in paragraph 65 below shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over eight years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 30 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(a) above; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 30 per cent and less than or equal to 80 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(b) above; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 80 per cent and less than or equal to 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(c) above; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(d) above. 65. Those small, vulnerable economies36, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, which choose to exercise the option set forth in paragraph 120 below shall be entitled to moderate the cuts specified in paragraph 63 above by a further 10 ad valorem percentage points in each band. D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT Special Products 118. Developing country Members shall be entitled to self-designate Special Products guided by indicators37 based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. There shall be 10-18 per cent of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products38. Up to 6 per cent of/no lines may have no cut. The overall average cut shall, in any case, be 10-14 percent. 36 The Members concerned are those that meet the criteria set out in paragraph 151 and are listed in Annex I. As is made clear in the Agreed Framework, Small vulnerable economies (SVEs) are not meant to create any sub-category of Members. Bearing that principle in mind, the following Members could also be deemed to be eligible for this treatment, should they choose to avail themselves of it, despite not being members of the SVE Group per se given that this treatment could be deemed to be broadly comparably appropriate: Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (plus other Members that can provide data that show that they meet the criteria in paragraph 147). Additionally, Bolivia shall have access, exceptionally, to treatment equivalent to that provided for in paragraph 142. 37 See Annex F. 38 Below this level, the developing country Member concerned need not resort to guidance by those indicators. In the case of RAMs, the threshold level above which indicators are not required to be used shall be 1 percentage point higher. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 40 119. In the case of small vulnerable economies, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, they may, if they choose to do so, apply the moderated tariff tiered formula for SVEs provided for in paragraph 61 above plus the Special Product entitlement outlined above. Alternatively, they may chose not to apply the tiered formula but simply meet an overall average cut of 24 per cent through having in effect opted to designate as many tariff lines as they choose as Special Products. The tariff lines so chosen need not be subject to any minimum tariff cut and need not be guided by the indicators. G. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 141. For the purposes of this Agreement, this term applies to Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent. 142. Developed country Members and developing country Members in a position to do so shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies. 143. More specific provisions are to be found in relevant sections of this document. ANNEX I SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 1. The data are based on the methodology that was used to prepare a previous Secretariat paper on shares of WTO Members in world non-agricultural trade, 1999-2004 (TN/MA/S/18). Individual Members' data were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database on 6 June 2007. World export and import totals, excluding significant re-exports were taken from the Secretariat's International Trade Statistics Report 2006. This time period has been updated to 2000-2005 and a cif-fob adjustment has been applied to world exports by commodity group to derive respective world imports, but this does not change the overall results39. The country averages are calculated on the basis of the years for which data are available. 8. A small, vulnerable economy is defined as one whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent. 9. The attached table does not include those Members that are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and those Members for which no data are available. 39 Cif-fob factors were estimated based on the ratio of imports to exports for a matched group of reporters in Comtrade. World imports by commodity group were derived by applying these cif-fob factors to the WTO's world exports by commodity group and aligning the resulting figures to the WTO's world total imports Intra-trade of the 25 member States of the European Communities was then subtracted from the totals. WTO Member Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.050 0.008 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.018 0.060 0.037 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.102 0.143 0.065 0.075 0.030 0.116 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.112 0.140 0.087 0.240 0.223 0.256 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.154 0.115 0.189 0.326 0.515 0.154 0.173 0.136 0.206 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.069 0.083 0.026 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.221 0.302 0.144 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.319 0.416 0.231 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.190 0.223 0.160 0.114 0.091 0.136 0.198 0.120 0.269 0.215 0.314 0.126 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.055 0.013 0.093 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.017 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.053 0.086 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.022 0.080 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.011 0.111 0.098 0.087 0.107 0.044 0.018 0.068 0.012 0.007 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.072 0.030 0.110 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.049 0.040 0.020 0.059 0.071 0.049 0.092 0.041 0.019 0.062 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.053 0.046 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 41 Worlda Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Barbados Belize Bolivia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Fiji FYR Macedonia Gabon Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Jordan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Macao, China Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.078 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.034 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.018 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.051 0.026 0.075 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.086 0.053 0.116 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.041 0.026 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.063 0.079 0.052 0.104 0.052 0.037 0.065 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.049 0.048 Mauritius Moldova Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Zimbabwe a Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.132 0.051 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.102 0.129 0.079 0.105 0.091 0.114 0.070 0.086 0.056 0.173 0.280 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.249 0.284 0.217 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.098 0.209 0.333 0.096 0.151 0.280 0.067 Excludes intra-trade of the European Communities and significant re-exports. Source: All data are from the United Nations Comtrade database except for World totals, which are WTO estimates. Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.081 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.107 0.071 0.037 0.025 0.048 0.030 0.021 0.037 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 42 WTO Member Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.038 0.016 0.059 0.032 0.042 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.086 0.102 0.071 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.039 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 43 14. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture - TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (10 July 2008) II. MARKET ACCESS A. TIERED FORMULA FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS 137. Developed country Members shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over five years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 20 per cent, the reduction shall be 50 per cent; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 20 per cent and less than or equal to 50 per cent, the reduction shall be 57 per cent; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 50 per cent and less than or equal to 75 per cent, the reduction shall be 64 per cent; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 75 per cent, the reduction shall be [(66) (73)] per cent. 138. Developing country Members other than those specified in paragraph 61 below shall reduce their final bound tariffs in equal annual instalments over eight years in accordance with the following tiered formula: (a) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 30 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(a) above; (b) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 30 per cent and less than or equal to 80 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(b) above; (c) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 80 per cent and less than or equal to 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(c) above; and (d) where the final bound tariff or ad valorem equivalent is greater than 130 per cent, the reduction shall be 2/3 of the cut for developed country Members in paragraph 61(c) above. 139. Those small, vulnerable economies40, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, which choose to exercise the option set forth in paragraph 120 below shall be entitled to moderate the cuts specified in paragraph 63 above by a further 10 ad valorem percentage points in each band. 40 The Members concerned are those that meet the criteria set out in paragraph 151 and are listed in Annex I. As is made clear in the Agreed Framework, Small vulnerable economies (SVEs) are not meant to create any sub-category of Members. Bearing that principle in mind, the following Members could also be deemed to be eligible for this treatment, should they choose to avail themselves of it, despite not being members of the SVE Group per se given that this treatment could be deemed to be broadly comparably appropriate: Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (plus other Members that can provide data that show that they meet the criteria in paragraph 147). Additionally, Bolivia shall have access, exceptionally, to treatment equivalent to that provided for in paragraph 142. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 44 D. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT Special Products 120. Developing country Members shall be entitled to self-designate Special Products guided by indicators41 based on the criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development. There shall be 10-18 per cent of tariff lines available for self-designation as Special Products42. Up to 6 per cent of/no lines may have no cut. The overall average cut shall, in any case, be 10-14 per cent. 121. In the case of small vulnerable economies, including those among them which are ceiling binding and homogenously low binding countries, they may, if they choose to do so, apply the moderated tariff tiered formula for SVEs provided for in paragraph 65 above plus the Special Product entitlement outlined above. Alternatively, they may chose not to apply the tiered formula but simply meet an overall average cut of 24 per cent through having in effect opted to designate as many tariff lines as they choose as Special Products. The tariff lines so chosen need not be subject to any minimum tariff cut and need not be guided by the indicators. G. SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 122. For the purposes of this Agreement, this term applies to Members with economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent. 123. Developed country Members and developing country Members in a position to do so shall provide enhanced improvements in market access for products of export interest to Members with small, vulnerable economies. 124. More specific provisions are to be found in relevant sections of this document. ANNEX I SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 1. The data are based on the methodology that was used to prepare a previous Secretariat paper on shares of WTO Members in world non-agricultural trade, 1999-2004 (TN/MA/S/18). Individual Members' data were extracted from the United Nations Comtrade database on 6 June 2007. World export and import totals, excluding significant re-exports were taken from the Secretariat's International Trade Statistics Report 2006. This time period has been updated to 2000-2005 and a cif-fob adjustment has been applied to world exports by commodity group to derive respective world imports, but this does not change the overall results43. The country averages are calculated on the basis of the years for which data are available. 41 See Annex F. Below this level, the developing country Member concerned need not resort to guidance by those indicators. In the case of RAMs, the threshold level above which indicators are not required to be used shall be 1 percentage point higher. 43 Cif-fob factors were estimated based on the ratio of imports to exports for a matched group of reporters in Comtrade. World imports by commodity group were derived by applying these cif-fob factors to 42 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 45 10. A small, vulnerable economy is defined as one whose average share for the period 1999-2004 (a) of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent and (b) of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent and (c) of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent. 11. The attached table does not include those Members that are defined as least-developed countries by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and those Members for which no data are available. the WTO's world exports by commodity group and aligning the resulting figures to the WTO's world total imports Intra-trade of the 25 member States of the European Communities was then subtracted from the totals. Worlda Albania Antigua and Barbuda Armenia Barbados Belize Bolivia Botswana Brunei Darussalam Cameroon Cuba Dominica Dominican Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Fiji FYR Macedonia Gabon Georgia Ghana Grenada Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.050 0.008 0.087 0.011 0.000 0.020 0.040 0.018 0.060 0.037 0.022 0.050 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.102 0.143 0.065 0.075 0.030 0.116 0.029 0.000 0.056 0.112 0.140 0.087 0.240 0.223 0.256 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.154 0.115 0.189 0.326 0.515 0.154 0.173 0.136 0.206 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.076 0.069 0.083 0.026 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.221 0.302 0.144 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.319 0.416 0.231 0.037 0.052 0.024 0.190 0.223 0.160 0.114 0.091 0.136 Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.017 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.056 0.065 0.048 0.053 0.086 0.023 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.022 0.080 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.063 0.011 0.111 0.098 0.087 0.107 0.044 0.018 0.068 0.012 0.007 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.032 0.051 0.015 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.072 0.030 0.110 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.049 0.040 0.020 0.059 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 46 WTO Member Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 100 100 100 0.019 0.008 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.019 0.013 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.057 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.078 0.025 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.063 0.034 0.089 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.068 0.018 0.113 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.051 0.026 0.075 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.039 0.031 0.046 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.020 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.086 0.053 0.116 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.041 0.026 0.056 0.044 0.024 0.063 WTO Member a Share of world agriculture (AOA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.198 0.120 0.269 0.215 0.314 0.126 0.029 0.032 0.026 0.055 0.013 0.093 0.096 0.102 0.090 0.089 0.132 0.051 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.102 0.129 0.079 0.105 0.091 0.114 0.070 0.086 0.056 0.173 0.280 0.077 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.022 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.249 0.284 0.217 0.017 0.007 0.027 0.068 0.082 0.056 0.086 0.072 0.098 0.209 0.333 0.096 0.151 0.280 0.067 Excludes intra-trade of the European Communities and significant re-exports. Source: All data are from the United Nations Comtrade database except for World totals, which are WTO estimates. Share of non-agriculture (NAMA) trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.071 0.049 0.092 0.041 0.019 0.062 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.050 0.053 0.046 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.013 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.018 0.004 0.031 0.035 0.011 0.056 0.030 0.040 0.022 0.023 0.005 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.095 0.081 0.107 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.088 0.107 0.071 0.037 0.025 0.048 0.030 0.021 0.037 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 47 Jordan Kenya Kyrgyzstan Macao, China Mauritius Moldova Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sri Lanka Suriname Swaziland Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Zimbabwe Share of total merchandise trade (%) Total (exports + Exports Imports imports 0.079 0.052 0.104 0.052 0.037 0.065 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.037 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.038 0.016 0.059 0.032 0.042 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.042 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.086 0.102 0.071 0.047 0.044 0.050 0.037 0.037 0.039 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 48 15. G-33 Proposal on the Treatment of SSM provided to the SVEs - TN/AG/GEN/29 (10 February 2009) 4. The basis and the structure for the SSM to be agreed should be the one in the document TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4. 5. In that regard, it should include a paragraph 133 bis for the SVEs, as follows: 133 bis As regards the volume-based SSM, it shall be applied on the basis of a rolling average of imports in the preceding three-year period for which data are available (hereafter "base imports"). On this basis, the applicable triggers and remedies shall be set as follows: (a) where the volume of imports during any year exceeds 110 per cent but does not exceed 115 per cent of base imports, the maximum additional duty that may be imposed shall not exceed 25 per cent of the current bound tariff or 25 percentage points, whichever is higher; (b) where the volume of imports during any year exceeds 115 per cent but does not exceed 120 per cent of base imports, the maximum additional duty that may be imposed shall not exceed 40 per cent of the current bound tariff or 40 percentage points, whichever is higher; (c) where the volume of imports during any year exceeds 120 per cent of base imports, the maximum additional duty that may be imposed shall not exceed 50 per cent of the current bound tariff or 50 percentage points, whichever is higher. 6. In paragraph 144, the maximum increase over the pre-Doha bound tariff should be 75 ad valorem percentage points or 75 per cent of the current bound tariff whichever is higher. Also, a maximum of 30 per cent of tariff lines in any given period should be allowed to go beyond the pre-Doha bound levels.44 7. Further, as a matter of abundant caution for the SVEs, the SVEs reiterates some of its existing positions which hold good for SVEs as well as for other developing countries. The provisions in the proposed paragraph 133 bis (a) to (c) are without prejudice to Members' rights to raise their applied tariffs up to the level of their current bound tariffs. The triggers and remedies in paragraph 133 will apply for both within and over the preDoha bound rates. No mandatory cross check mechanism of any kind is acceptable. 8. For all developing countries’ markets including SVEs and LDCs, depressed prices attributable to high subsidies and market imperfections/failures can have a deleterious effect on domestic production and markets. As such, the price-based mechanism is of crucial importance and a focused discussion on the modalities for the price-based mechanism, including the flexibilities for SVEs, is called for as soon as possible. 44 Bolivia is not in a position to support these numbers at this stage and remains with the pre-July position of the Group. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 49 9. Finally, the G-33 emphasizes that both the volume-based SSM and price-based SSM have to be designed in order to address their needs in a simple and effective manner, and that this will only be achievable by extending additional and substantive special and differential treatment to the group. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 50 V. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON MARKET ACCESS FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS A. CURRENT MODALITIES DRAFT 1. Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (6 December 2008) Small, Vulnerable Economies 13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 percent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:45 (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all of their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of 30 per cent; (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of 27 per cent; (iii) at or above 20 per cent but below 30 shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average 18 per cent; and (iv) below 20 per cent, shall apply a minimum line-by-line reduction of 5 per cent on 95 per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines or bind at the overall average that would result from that line-by-line reduction. As an exception, Bolivia shall not be required but is encouraged to apply the modalities in paragraph 13. As an exception, Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (a)(i). As an exception, Gabon shall engage in GATT Article XXVIII negotiations to reach the overall target average of 20 per cent. (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. As an exception, Fiji shall have the flexibility to maintain 10 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines unbound. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. 45 See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 51 (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in 11 equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, except for lines covered under 13(e) where the first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following completion of the grace period. (e) For those Recently Acceded Members applying this modality, a grace period of 3 years shall be applied on those lines on which accession commitments are not fully implemented before entry into force of the DDA results. This grace period shall begin as of the date of full implementation of the accession commitment on that tariff line. (f) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20. HISTORIC EVOLUTION 1. Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products - Treatment of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the NAMA Negotiations - TN/MA/W/66 (11 November 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bolivia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. 9. As their contribution to the NAMA negotiating process, small, vulnerable economies propose that developing countries, not covered in paragraph 6 and paragraph 9 of Annex B, and whose average share in total world merchandise exports does not exceed 0.10 per cent over the period 1995-2004, will be expected to: (a) Make tariff reductions not exceeding 15 per cent, but with minimum cuts of 10 per cent on individual lines and with no more than half the cuts at the lowest level of this range. This contribution will ensure a significant reduction of small, vulnerable economies' tariff averages as well as a reduction in individual tariff lines. (b) On the treatment of unbound tariffs, small, vulnerable economies whose binding coverage is more then 90 per cent commit themselves to the objective of full tariff binding as an outcome of the NAMA negotiations. However, newly bound tariff lines will not be subject to reductions through the formula during these negotiations. Small, vulnerable economies are open to discuss a possible target rate at which these tariffs should be bound or a maximum rate at which to bind these lines. 10. Small, vulnerable economies firmly believe that only tariff reductions compatible with their capacity to sustain trade reforms, as spelt out in this paper, are likely to efficiently discharge the Doha mandate. In this context, small, vulnerable economies will continue to have access to flexibilities such as those outlined in paragraph 8 of Annex B. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 52 2. Progress Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiations Committee – TN/MA/16 (24 November 2005), also Annex B of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 19. A paper was submitted recently by a group of Members which proposes inter alia lesser and linear cuts to Members identified by a criterion using trade share. While some developing and developed Members were sympathetic to the situation of such Members, concerns were expressed with respect to the threshold used to establish eligibility, and also the treatment envisaged. Other developing Members expressed serious reservations about this proposal which in their view appeared to be creating a new category of developing Members, and to be further diluting the ambition of the NAMA negotiations. The sponsors of this proposal stressed that the small, vulnerable economies had characteristics which warranted special treatment. 20. This is an issue on which there is a serious divergence of opinion among developing Members. This subject will need to be debated further. Discussions may be facilitated through additional statistical analysis. 3. NAMA – Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products - Criteria and Treatment of SVEs, submission by the SVEs – (1 May 2006) 1. Following the submission of two proposals to the Negotiating Group on Market Access46, and in pursuance of paragraph 21 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in which Ministers agreed to "establish ways to provide flexibilities" for the small, vulnerable economies, the proponents have held a series of consultations with a number of delegations over the past weeks regarding the criteria and treatment of the small, vulnerable economies in the NAMA and agriculture modalities. 2. Members of the NAMA Negotiating Group have shown an understanding of the concerns raised by the small, vulnerable economies and have demonstrated a willingness to engage constructively to find solutions that are capable of integrating these economies into the multilateral trading system, consistent with the wishes of the Ministers. 3. A number of issues were raised by delegations participating in the consultations regarding the criteria and treatment of small, vulnerable economies as well as the contribution these economies are capable of making to trade liberalisation. 7. The criteria for the identification of potential developing country beneficiaries of this proposal in the NAMA negotiations, excluding LDC's, countries in transition and paragraph 6 countries, would apply to the remaining countries: whose share of world merchandise trade does not exceed 0.16 per cent; and whose share of world NAMA trade does not exceed 0.10 per cent; and whose share of world agricultural trade does not exceed 0.40 per cent47 8. The treatment proposed for all developing countries who meet the above criteria would be that these countries would not be subject to formula cuts, but would bind 100 per cent of their non-agricultural tariff lines at average levels reflected in the following tiers and bands: 46 47 JOB(05)/165 of 29 July 2005; and TN/MA/W/66 of 11 November 2005. Data Source: WTO, 1999 – 2004. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 53 Current Average % Bound Average Cut % Final Bound Average % 0 – 30 10 0 – 27 31 – 40 15 26 – 34 41 – 50 20 33 – 40 51 - 60 25 38 – 45 61 - 30 43 - 9. Beneficiaries with less than 50 per cent binding coverage shall be allowed to keep [5 per cent] of their lines unbound while binding the remaining [95 per cent] at an average of [ ]. 10. The implementation of the tariff reduction commitments should be staged over a longer period than other developing countries in order to ensure a smooth liberalisation process and not jeopardise the industrial and social development prospects of the small, vulnerable economies. 4. Small and Vulnerable Economies - Text Proposal for the Chairman of NAMA by the Delegations of Costa Rica and Uruguay – Room Document (30 May 2006) Criteria Regarding trade participation of a small and vulnerable economy in global trade, the identifying criteria should be as follows: Developing countries whose share of world NAMA trade (exp-imp) does not exceed a unique percentage to be agreed as a threshold. WTO Secretariat statistics should be used in order to determine the specific situation of these countries in this area of negotiation. The period of reference to be used should be from year 1999 to year 2004 given that year 1999 is already included as the reference period in Annex B. Treatment Once the objective criteria and period of reference have been determined, the negotiating group should then proceed to negotiate the treatment. Such treatment should take into account the following principles: SVEs contribution should be significantly higher than the contribution to be agreed for paragraph 6 countries and LDCs. Treatment should be compatible with the NAMA Framework and the Hong Kong Declaration. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 54 Proposal The treatment proposed for small and vulnerable economies is as follows: 5. Developing countries that have been identified by the above mentioned criteria to be small and vulnerable economies will benefit from a unique [X] additional percentage points to the figure currently in brackets in paragraph 8(a) or paragraph 8(b)48. NAMA 11 - Non-Paper – Small Vulnerable Economies – (30 May 2006) 4. For the above reasons, it is the view of the NAMA 1149 that a solution based on the paragraph 8, with appropriate modulation, will provide the much needed additional protection for the sensitivities and specific needs of the SVEs. In document TN/MA/W/66, the SVEs have pointed out that the flexibilities "as currently crafted in paragraph 8 are of very limited scope ... in addition, the thresholds and conditionalities limit the usefulness...". The NAMA 11 agrees that these limitations have to be overcome and thereby the following could be considered as an appropriate solution: 6. i. Once the number in brackets of paragraph 8(a) and (b) has been agreed for developing countries, additional flexibility beyond that shall be identified for SVEs; further relaxation of the trade limitation, in particular, is an avenue worth exploring, considering the economic situation of SVEs, with a longer implementation period; or ii. The SVEs could be permitted access to paragraph 8(a) and (b) cumulatively, with a longer implementation period. Proposal on Small, Vulnerable Economies by Norway – Room Document (6 June 2006) For the purposes of the NAMA negotiations, we propose that developing Members whose share of total NAMA trade (imports plus exports) does not exceed [0.1] per cent for the time period of 1999-2004 as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 shall be considered a small, vulnerable economy pursuant to paragraph 21 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. In the event that NAMA trade data is not available for a Member for any of the years in this time period, that Member's share of total NAMA trade shall be calculated by the Secretariat using the best available data. We propose that the developing Members who meet the above criteria will bind [100] per cent of their non agricultural tariffs. The average bound tariff level of a Member being considered a small, vulnerable economy will not exceed [X] per cent after the implementation period. In meeting this requirement, beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [Y] per cent on individual tariff lines.50 48 The additional [X] percentage points will depend on the share of NAMA trade to be agreed in the selection criteria. These [X] percentage points would be higher if the threshold of NAMA trade is lower, and vice versa. 49 Grouping includes Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Venezuela. 50 The values of X and Y should be set at appropriate levels with the objective to ensure that the SVEs make a contribution that goes beyond the contribution to be made by the Members covered by paragraph 6. The values of X and Y are related. The more stringent the average requirement, the less stringent will be the line by line reduction requirement, and vice versa. Mathematically, this implies that the lower X is the lower Y will be. The exact levels of these variables will be determined by Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 55 7. Treatment of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the NAMA Negotiations, Proposal by the SVEs – (15 June 2006) 4. The following principles have guided the revision of the SVEs treatment proposal: SVEs should not be penalised for the progressive liberalization decisions they made during the Uruguay Round, nor should they be asked to accept cuts in this Round greater than Members who achieve greater benefits from the Round. The dispersion in proponent's current bound averages (32.6 to 73.0) demands variable cuts to variable final bound averages. The treatment being sought by the small, vulnerable economies should be compatible with the terms and mechanisms established in the NAMA Framework (Annex B of the July 2004 decision by the General Council) and further mandated in paragraph 21 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. This proposal builds on the treatment proposed in the Norwegian submission, which did receive some favourable responses. Full binding at any one bound average is not easily compared with less than full binding at the same bound average. There is no justification for all SVEs binding at a lower average than other members whose economies are at similar levels of development. 5. Based on data from the World Trade Report 2005, SVE proponents (excluding paragraph 6 and LDC countries) have average applied rates of 7.6 per cent while paragraph 6 countries have an average of 13.8 per cent and LDCs 13.4 per cent. SVEs effort to welcome imports is therefore clear. Proposal: 6. The treatment proposed for small, vulnerable economies would be that these countries would not be subject to formula cuts, but would bind 100 per cent of their non-agricultural tariff lines at average levels reflected in the following bands: Current Bound Average % Average Cut % Expected Final Bound Average % ≤ 37 [….] [….] 38 – 47 [….] [….] 48 – 57 [….] [….] ≥ 58 [….] [….] 7. Tariff reduction for SVEs shall be on the basis of lower tariff cuts for those in the lower bands and higher cuts for those in the higher bands WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 56 8. In meeting this requirement, beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [ ] per cent on a maximum of [ ] per cent of individual tariff lines 9. In the specific case of Fiji with less than 50 per cent binding coverage, Fiji shall be allowed to keep [5 per cent] of their lines unbound while binding the remaining [95 per cent] at an average of [ ]. 10. The implementation of the tariff reduction commitments should be staged over a longer period than other developing countries in order to ensure a smooth liberalisation process and not jeopardise the industrial and social development prospects of the small, vulnerable economies. 8. Towards NAMA Modalities – TN/MA/W/80 (19 July 2006) Modalities51 The criteria With the exception of developed countries, Members having a share of NAMA trade (exports and imports) of less than [0.1 per cent] of world trade for a reference period of 1999 to 2001, or best available data, as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may use the following modality for tariff reduction: It is understood that this does not create a sub-category of WTO Members. Chairman's remarks The criteria There is consensus on the use of this criterion to determine eligibility for additional flexibilities as a small, vulnerable economy. While recognizing that this benchmark establishes only that an economy is small, in terms of its NAMA trade, Members have acknowledged the difficulties of articulating additional criteria to establish that economies are also vulnerable and can accept the single criterion. The proponents have proposed additional criteria related to agricultural trade and total goods (both NAMA and agriculture) trade. Many Members oppose the use of such criteria, arguing that this would create a new sub-category of Members. I would note, in this regard, that it is important for many Members that the treatment of small, vulnerable economies in these negotiations does not create a precedent for future negotiations. Finally, it was noted that this criterion should be understood as only a "trigger" for eligibility – that is, the criterion alone should not define the group of countries that will have access to these flexibilities. Members will recall that the proponents do not include all countries with trade below this threshold. The treatment There is no consensus on the treatment of small, vulnerable economies. 51 In the reference Paper, there is no text in the modalities concerning the treatment of small economies. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 57 There are two basic options on the table: a paragraph 6-type solution or a paragraph 8-type solution. The first option has two variations, one put forward by the SVEs proponents and the second by Norway. The SVE proponents have suggested a banded approach while Norway's proposal is more similar in structure to paragraph 6, with a single target tariff average. The second option is to use a paragraph 8-type solution, which would envisage increasing the flexibilities in paragraph 8. There are different permutations of this option including adding percentage points to the existing numbers in paragraph 8; removing the trade limitation, combining sub-paragraph (a) and (b), and by extending the implementation period. Unfortunately, I am unable to provide much guidance on this issue. I would note that one factor which has made this discussion difficult is the diverse tariff profiles of the SVE proponents. Beyond this, I can only repeat my view that a satisfactory contribution from these Members can be achieved using either the paragraph 8 or paragraph 6 approach. The central question, therefore, is how great a contribution is required of these Members. 9. Draft NAMA Modalities – JOB(07)/126 (17 July 2007) Chairman’s Introduction to the Draft NAMA Modalities Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) 32. In my July 2006 report to the Trade Negotiations Committee (TN/MA/W/80), I proposed that consensus had been reached on the trigger for access to the flexibilities for SVEs. Specifically, I noted that Members had agreed to abandon the search for benchmarks of vulnerability and had accepted a single eligibility criterion based on the value of NAMA trade, that is less than 0.1 per cent of world trade in non-agricultural products. 33. On the question of the treatment of SVEs, while Members remained divided - then and now - on the architecture of the flexibility (a formula tariff reduction with expanded flexibilities or a target average tariff reduction as proposed by the proponents), they widely agreed that the central question was the level of contribution to be made by these Members to the Round. 34. As regards the architecture of the modality, I have proposed the tariff average approach, in three tiers based on average bound tariffs, and including a minimum line-by-line tariff reduction. I believe that this architecture is appropriate because it facilitates differentiated treatment of a very diverse group of Members. A tiered approach would provide for some degree of harmonization of tariffs among them, with the Members with the highest tariffs making the greatest reduction. Moreover, based on my consultations, I believe that this architecture is the more likely to find consensus, provided the level of contribution to the Round is satisfactory. 35. With respect to that contribution, I have proposed target tariff averages of 14, 18 and 22 per cent, together with a minimum line-by-line tariff reduction of 10 per cent on 95 per cent of tariff lines. This would ensure a minimum contribution to the market access outcome in the Round, while providing a very significant flexibility in how that contribution is made. SVEs would reduce their average tariffs in reasonable proportion to other developing countries but would be permitted greater flexibility in how to structure their tariff schedules. This approach is consistent with the development needs of small, vulnerable economies. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 58 36. Special consideration of Fiji is proposed, in view of it’s low level of binding coverage and the fact that 100 per cent of tariffs lines are to be bound by SVEs. Draft NAMA Modalities Small, Vulnerable Economies 13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 per cent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:52 (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of 22 per cent; (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of 18 per cent; and (iii) below 30 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average 14 per cent. Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (i). In addition, 95 per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines shall be subject to a minimum cut of 10 per cent. (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in 9 equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years. (e) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20. 52 See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 59 10. Submission by Small, Vulnerable Economies on Modalities to Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/100 (17 January 2008)53 54 Apply in PRINCIPLES 1. SVEs have signalled their willingness to contribute to the current Doha Development Round, consistent with their ability so to do, and taking into account their trade, economic and social realities. SVEs should neither be penalized for their liberalization decisions taken thus far, nor be required to undertake reductions that are disproportionate to the marginal level of benefits likely to accrue from this Round. 2. SVEs have verbally, and in written submissions, articulated the principles which have guided their proposals. These principles emanate from work in the WTO Committee on Trade and Development over the years as well as from paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the July 2004 Framework Agreement and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. MODALITIES APPLICABLE TO SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES 3. The current modalities proposed for SVEs do not conform to the principle of less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments as these modalities require higher levels of contributions from SVEs, in comparison to other developing countries, and even some developed countries. These results are inconsistent with the various mandates in this Doha Development Round on the flexibilities to be accorded to developing countries in general, and the enhanced flexibilities to be provided to SVEs, in particular, and are therefore unacceptable. 4. The SVEs have, in the past, submitted proposals based on 5 bands, taking into account the tariff dispersion of the proponents. It should be noted that the Chair's proposal effectively restricts the SVEs proponents to two (2) bands, with the 3 rd band accommodating SVEs RAMs. However, consistent with the constructive engagement that has characterized the approach of SVEs thus far; the Group is willing to work within the 3 band approach outlined by the Chair, so long as such bands adhere to the principles outlined in the various mandates, including the principle of less than full reciprocity. Acceptance of a 3 band approach is contingent on adequate flexibilities afforded to SVEs, including the requirement for maximum average reductions that are less than those of developed countries and which are consistent with the economic, social, trade and development needs of SVEs. 5. The flexibility to exempt, at their discretion, 10 per cent of tariff lines from reduction commitments is also an integral aspect of the flexibilities required by SVEs. This flexibility is independent of the maximum tariff reduction required of SVEs. 6. The specific tariff reduction modalities to apply to SVEs are outlined in Annex 1 of this paper. 53 Bolivia did not accompany this proposal. This proposal is without prejudice to the rights of those Recently Acceded Members (RAMs) that are Small, Vulnerable Economies, and the proposals submitted by that Group to specifically address their concerns. 54 WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 60 Annex 1 Revised Textual Proposal on the Provisions Applicable to Small, Vulnerable Economies (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines: (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level of [32] per cent. Where this average results in reductions that are greater than [40] per cent, the Member concerned would be entitled to apply lesser reductions, at its discretion, in keeping with this maximum average reduction of [40] per cent. (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 at per cent shall bind their nonagricultural tariff lines at an average level of [28] per cent. Where this average results in reductions that are greater than [30] per cent, the Member concerned would be entitled to apply lesser reductions, at its discretion, in keeping with this maximum average reduction of [30] per cent. Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (i). In addition, 90 per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines shall be subject to a minimum cut of 5 per cent. 11. (b) SVEs with a binding coverage of 50 per cent or less shall have the flexibility to maintain [10 per cent] of tariff lines unbound. (c) The implementation period for Small, Vulnerable Economies shall be [2] years longer than that for other developing countries. Draft Modalities (8 February 2008) for Non-Agricultural Market Access - TN/MA/W/103 Draft Modalities Small, Vulnerable Economies 13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 per cent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:55 (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all of their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [22 -32] per cent; (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [18-28] per cent; and 55 See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 61 (iii) below 30 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average [14-20] per cent and shall apply a minimum line-by-line reduction of [5-10] per cent on [90-95] per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines. Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (a) (i). (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. Fiji shall have the flexibility to maintain 10 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines unbound. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in [9] equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, except for lines covered under 13(e) where the first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following completion of the grace period. (e) For those Recently Acceded Members applying this modality, a grace period of 3 years shall be applied on those lines on which accession commitments are still being implemented. This grace period shall begin as of the date of full implementation of the accession commitment on that tariff line. (f) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20. Chairman's Comments There is agreement on the basic architecture and flexibility has been expressed by Members on the target tariff averages proposed in the July text. Issues to resolve include: Capping: in an effort to find consensus, SVE proponents have proposed higher target averages in exchange for withdrawing their proposal for caps in the average percentage reduction from bound rates – specifically, a 40 per cent cap (a)(i) and 30 per cent cap in (a)(ii). There is not wide support for the idea of caps, but some Members have expressed a willingness to consider additional "bands" in (a) to address the concerns of SVE Members most disproportionately affected by the current architecture. Minimum line-by-line cut: SVE proponents proposed a minimum line-by-line tariff cut, but I have detected little real interest in this additional modality, except in respect of (a)(iii) since this may be the only contribution of some Members in that band. Bolivia: an informal proposal was submitted by Bolivia arguing that, in view of their exceptional economic circumstances, they should be granted the flexibility to substantially preserve (not specified) their current bound tariff rates. Members have had little opportunity to consider this proposal and I am unable to assess their support. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 62 12. Submission by Small, Vulnerable Economies on Modalities Applicable to Non-Agricultural Market Access56 - JOB(08)/26 (11 April 2008) "13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 per cent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:57 (i) (ii) (iii) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all of their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [22 -32] per cent; at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [18 28] per cent; and below 30 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average [14-20] per cent and shall apply a minimum line-by-line reduction of [5-10] per cent on [90-95] per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines. Countries which fall under 13 (a)(i), shall not undertake reduction commitments above 40 per cent, and those which fall under 13 (a)(ii) shall not undertake reduction commitments above 30 per cent. Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (a)(i). (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. Fiji shall have the flexibility to maintain 10 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines unbound. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in [9] equal rate reductions 10 years. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, except for lines covered under 13(e) where the first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following completion of the grace period. (e) For those Recently Acceded Members applying this modality, a grace period of 3 years shall be applied on those lines on which accession commitments are still being implemented. This grace period shall begin as of the date of full implementation of the accession commitment on that tariff line. 56 Bolivia could not join the proponents of TN/MA/W/100 and therefore is not able to accompany the present proposal. 57 See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 63 (f) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20." This proposal is based on the Revised Modalities text presented by the Chair of the NAMA Negotiating Group, on 8 February 2008, and refers only to the provisions established for Small Vulnerable Economies, without prejudice to Member’s positions on related issues. 13. Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural TN/MA/W/103/Rev.1 (20 May 2008) Market Access Second Revision - Small, Vulnerable Economies 13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 per cent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:58 (a) (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all of their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [22 - 32] per cent [or shall reduce their average bound tariff by 40 per cent, whichever is the lesser reduction]; (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [18-28] per cent [or shall reduce their average bound tariff by 30 per cent, whichever is the lesser reduction]; and (iii) below 30 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average [14-20] per cent and shall apply a minimum line-by-line reduction of [5-10] per cent on [90-95] per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines. Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (a)(i). [As an exception, Bolivia shall apply [ bound tariff rates]. 58 ] which shall substantially preserve its (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. Fiji shall have the flexibility to maintain 10 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines unbound. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 64 (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in [9-11] equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, except for lines covered under 13(e) where the first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following completion of the grace period. (e) For those Recently Acceded Members applying this modality, a grace period of 3 years shall be applied on those lines on which accession commitments are not fully implemented before entry into force of the DDA results. This grace period shall begin as of the date of full implementation of the accession commitment on that tariff line. (f) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20. Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access – TN/MA/W/103/Rev.2 (10 July 2008) 14. Small, Vulnerable Economies 13. With the exception of developed Members, those Members having a share of less than 0.1 percent of world NAMA trade for the reference period of 1999 to 2001 or best available data as contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may apply the following modality of tariff reduction instead of the formula modality which is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above. (a) Members with a bound tariff average of non-agricultural tariff lines:59 (i) at or above 50 per cent shall bind all of their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [28-32] per cent; (ii) at or above 30 per cent but below 50 per cent shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average of [24-28] per cent; (iii) at or above 20 per cent but below 30 shall bind all their non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed an overall average 18 per cent; and (iv) below 20 per cent, shall apply a minimum line-by-line reduction of 5 per cent on 95 per cent of all non-agricultural tariff lines or bind at the overall average that would result from that line-by-line reduction. As an exception, Fiji shall be deemed to fall under (a)(i). 59 See document TN/MA/S/4 and Corr.1 for the bound tariff averages of Members. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 65 As an exception, Gabon shall be deemed to fall under (a)(iii) and shall engage in GATT Article XXVIII negotiations to reach the overall target average of 18 per cent. As an exception, Bolivia shall not be required but is encouraged to apply the modalities in paragraph 13 and shall annually notify the Council for Trade in Goods steps taken to progressively implement these modalities. (b) All tariff lines shall be bound on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results at initial bound rates. As an exception, Fiji shall have the flexibility to maintain 10 per cent of non-agricultural tariff lines unbound. (c) The initial bound rates shall be established as follows: for bound tariff lines the existing bindings shall be used, and for unbound tariff lines the Member subject to this modality will determine the level of the initial binding of those tariff lines. (d) The overall binding target average shall be made effective at the end of the implementation period as follows: the tariff reductions shall be implemented in 11 equal rate reductions. The first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following the entry into force of the DDA results and each successive reduction shall be made effective on 1 January of each of the following years, except for lines covered under 13(e) where the first reduction shall be implemented on 1 January of the year following completion of the grace period. (e) For those Recently Acceded Members applying this modality, a grace period of 3 years shall be applied on those lines on which accession commitments are not fully implemented before entry into force of the DDA results. This grace period shall begin as of the date of full implementation of the accession commitment on that tariff line. (f) All duties shall be bound on an ad valorem basis. Existing bindings on a non ad valorem basis shall be converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis of the methodology outlined in document TN/MA/20. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 66 VI. COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES SPECIAL SESSION 1. Services – Information Note (November 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. The two-track process involving the CTD and negotiating groups has therefore emerged as the process whereby the objective of framing responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system is being pursued. Small Economies have already and will continue to demonstrate their engagement to the services negotiations including through the tabling of initial and revised offers. Taking the above into consideration, issues of concern to small, vulnerable economies should be addressed satisfactorily in the services negotiations in order for these economies to participate meaningfully in the multilateral trading system in accordance with their level of development, market share, vulnerabilities and economic size and structure, without creating a subcategory of WTO Members. 2. Outline of an SVE position on Possible Elements of a Services Text (23 January 2008) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago I. General Considerations 1. As Small Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) have previously indicated, the co-sponsoring delegations are prepared to engage constructively in the exercise of developing a Services outcome for the negotiations, although not proponents of a Services text. SVEs believe that the preparation of a services outcome could be addressed where texts are being developed in other areas of the Doha agenda, and where concrete progress in Agriculture and NAMA has been registered. In terms of timing, a possible services text should only be tabled after the release of final modalities in Agriculture and NAMA have been tabled. 2. The process of developing a text should be multilateral, fully inclusive and transparent, with regular open-ended sessions. The development of a text must moreover respect the current architecture of the GATS and its positive list approach. We will therefore not support any attempts that propose to bind current levels of market access and national treatment, nor to introduce any further notion of benchmarks within these negotiations. We are also not supportive of the desire that some delegations have to establish a level of comparability among the Services, Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Market Access Negotiations (NAMA). 3. The Hong Kong Declaration and Annex C contain the substantive guidelines and outcomes for the conclusion of the Services negotiations through specified Objectives, Approaches and Timelines. As such, we believe that the level of ambition for the services negotiations has already been established, and is based on a very delicate balance. With the WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 67 suspension of the Doha negotiations in July 2006, prior to the tabling of a second round of revised offers on 31 July 2006, many of the intended objectives and timelines outlined remain unfulfilled. 4. SVEs consider that there is a need to be cautious in the preparation of a text in services in order not to reopen the delicate balance achieved in the Hong Kong outcome through the negotiating process. SVEs further consider that the objectives of a services outcome at this stage should be related to the unfinished business remaining from the July 2006 suspension and shall take into account developments which have taken place since the Hong Kong Ministerial. 5. Based on the general considerations highlighted above, the elements that SVEs consider feasible and desirable to include in a possible text in Services to be presented when conditions are met, are the following:II. Possible Elements 1. Reaffirmation of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration and Annex C. 2. Dates for the tabling of revised offers and final schedules, which should reflect timeframes developed for the overall round (i.e. no less than 90 days following the establishment of modalities and presentation of draft schedules in Agriculture and NAMA respectively), and should be in accordance with the Hong Kong timelines, including through sequencing. 3. Developing country participation in services trade shall be facilitated through the liberalisation of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them, particularly as reflected in their specific requests. 4. The process of liberalisation shall take into account the level of development of individual Members both in overall and individual sectors, and accord developing countries the flexibilities provided in Article XIX of the GATS for opening fewer sectors, liberalising fewer transactions and extending market access in line with their development situation. 5. Within the context of paragraph 5 of Annex C and the mandate to develop disciplines on domestic regulation, a factual account of the progress attained, should be registered. 6. For GATS Rules, a factual account of the state of play should be registered as well as the need for continued focused discussions in this area. 7. Further to the mandate of paragraph 7 of Annex C, recognition of the number of collective requests established, the number of participants, and the number of meetings undertaken, may be provided. 8. Reflection of paragraph 8 of Annex C: Members shall continue to give due consideration to proposals on trade related concerns of small economies. 9. Revised timelines should also be developed for the operationalisation of LDC Modalities prior to the tabling of final offers as provided in paragraph 11 e) of Annex C. 10. S&D proposals should be addressed with appropriate recommendations to the General Council. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 68 11. The importance of technical assistance and capacity building should be underscored through Members' request to the Secretariat to provide a report of targeted technical assistance, and providing further guidance, if required. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 69 VII. WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION 1. Services - Trade-Related Concerns of Small, Vulnerable Economies in the Working Party on Domestic Regulation - JOB(06)/66/Rev.2 (10 July 2006) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. Small, vulnerable economies recommend that the following elements be included in any future disciplines on domestic regulation in services. III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS VULNERABLE ECONOMIES A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES B. THE CONCERNS OF SMALL, (i) These disciplines shall not affect nor limit a Member's right to regulate, and shall not prevent or prescribe the development and adoption of future legislation to meet Members' national policy objectives. (ii) Developing country Members shall implement the disciplines that require adjustment of existing domestic regulation and/or the adoption of new implementation mechanisms to the extent consistent with their financial, administrative and institutional capabilities and according to their size and level of development. (iii) Developing country Members shall be accorded adequate time frames to upgrade their legislative, regulatory, administrative and institutional capacity to implement these disciplines. Members shall provide technical assistance and capacity-building assistance in order to help developing country Members to develop such capacity. (iv) These disciplines shall apply to a Member's measures only to the extent that these affect sectors, sub-sectors and modes of supply covered by the respective Member's schedule of commitments. (v) These disciplines shall not prevent a Member from establishing measures or mechanisms to support the development of regional economic integration. QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (i) The establishment of qualification requirements by the competent authorities shall not be limited to the recognition and verification of specific diplomas, test scores or the like, but shall include where possible, the opportunity to fulfil such requirements by the recognition and verification of relevant experience and other education methods for establishing a provider's competence to supply the respective services. (ii) To ensure that qualification requirements do not in themselves constitute barriers to trade, Members shall provide technical assistance and capacity WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 70 building assistance in order to help developing country Members and their suppliers meet such requirements. C. D. E. F. QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES (i) Fees charged by the competent authorities should not be an impediment in themselves to practising the relevant activity. Developing country Members are not precluded from recovering fees where fees are utilised to meet national policy objectives. (ii) Procedures for the verification of qualifications shall be limited to those required to establish the minimum qualifications required for supplying the service. (iii) Members shall ensure that its competent authorities provide for clear and practical mechanisms for recognizing as being comparable, education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licences or certifications granted in the territory of another Member. (iv) To ensure that qualification procedures do not in themselves constitute barriers to trade, Members shall provide technical assistance and capacity building assistance in order to help developing country Members and their suppliers meet such procedures. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS (i) Fees charged by the competent authorities should not be an impediment in themselves to practising the relevant activity. Developing country Members are not precluded from recovering fees where fees are utilised to meet national policy objectives. (ii) To ensure that licensing requirements do not in themselves constitute barriers to trade, Members shall provide technical assistance and capacity building assistance in order to help developing country Members and their suppliers meet such requirements. LICENSING PROCEDURES (i) Members shall ensure that licensing procedures applied by its competent authorities are of minimal complexity and entail minimal costs for meeting requirements and fulfilling procedures for entry into export markets. Members may grant reduced licensing and other related fees to service providers from developing country Members. (ii) To ensure that licensing procedures do not in themselves constitute barriers to trade, Members shall provide technical assistance and capacity building assistance in order to help developing country Members and their suppliers meet such procedures. TECHNICAL STANDARDS (i) Members shall in reasonable time publish a notice in a publication, print or electronic, and notify other Members through the Secretariat, of the WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 71 establishment and application of measures relating to national or international technical standards relating to services and service providers. G. (ii) Members shall, where requested, grant other Members, especially developing country Members, technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and conditions regarding the establishment of technical standards and participation in the international standardizing bodies in the area of services. (iii) As a matter of good practice, Members involved in the development and application of measures relating to plurilateral standards, and standards developed and applied by non-governmental standardisation bodies should ensure maximum transparency of relevant processes for the benefit of other Members. TRANSPARENCY (i) Members shall ensure access for service suppliers of other Members to relevant information on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, licensing requirements and procedures, and technical standards. (ii) Members shall ensure the establishment of appropriate, transparent and accessible administrative and judicial channels for reviewing decisions. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 72 VIII. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON RULES 1. Fisheries Subsidies - TN/RL/W/136 (14 July 2003) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Fiji Islands, Guyana, the Maldives, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis. Small vulnerable coastal states therefore seek appropriate special and differential treatment in the current negotiations on fisheries subsidies disciplines. Article 1 of the ASCM shall be clarified to explicitly exclude the following from definition of subsidy: 2. (1) Access Fees and Development Assistance - any development assistance granted to small vulnerable coastal states by developed or more advanced developing countries to facilitate sustainable management. (2) Fiscal Incentives to Domestication and Fisheries Development - incentives applied by small vulnerable coastal states for the development and domestication of their fisheries. (3) Artisanal Fisheries - those measures undertaken by governments of small vulnerable coastal states to assist their artisanal fisheries sector. WTO Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines – Architecture on Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines TN/RL/GEN/57/Rev.2 (13 September 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago. 16. Small, vulnerable coastal states seek appropriate special and differential treatment in any disciplines on fisheries subsidies. In this regard the following should not be subject to subsidies disciplines: (i) Any development assistance to developing coastal states; (ii) Assistance to artisanal or small-scale fisheries. This requires a consensus on the definition of artisanal or small-scale. Some existing definitions of artisanal are based on vessel size in metres, capacity in gross registered tonnage (GRT), or area of operation in terms of proximity to the shoreline. We invite discussions on prevailing definitions used by Member States and possible approaches for arriving at a definition for use in the WTO; to facilitate the discussions, the sponsors of this paper will share information with Members on definitions currently being used in their respective jurisdictions; (iii) Access fees in fisheries access agreements; (iv) Fiscal Incentives - to facilitate the development of capabilities of small vulnerable coastal states. 17. We propose that the special and differential treatment provisions of the ASCM for Least Developed Countries be maintained in future disciplines. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 73 3. Special and Differential Treatment in the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations60: Views of the Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) - TN/RL/W/210/Rev.2 (22 June 2007) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands. A. INTERPRETING THE MINISTERIAL MANDATES ON FISHERIES SUBSIDIES The Doha Ministerial Declaration states that "In the context of these negotiations, participants shall also aim to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this sector to developing countries". The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration noted that there is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines on subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and call on Participants promptly to undertake further detailed work to, inter alia, establish the nature and extent of those disciplines, including transparency and enforceability. Appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed Members should be an integral part of the fisheries subsidies negotiations, taking into account the importance of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns: i. The Co-sponsors of this document are of the view that the Ministerial mandates give clear instruction and guidance to negotiators on the issue of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for developing and least developed countries. The Hong Kong Ministerial mandate specifically reflects the need for S&DT to be an integral component of the disciplines and recognises that the fisheries sector is of importance to developing countries for a number of socio-economic reasons. ii. With this in mind, S&DT must be more than an instrument to assist developing countries to implement the emerging rules, but must also allow developing countries the opportunity to take advantage of the natural resources in their maritime space and enhance their level of productivity in the area of fisheries. iii. In this respect S&DT in the fisheries disciplines must be more than longer implementation periods and must instead support the development of the fisheries sector in small, vulnerable economies and their potential trade in fisheries products and must not impede their capacity enhancement, management initiatives, or the processing and value added components of the industry in these economies. iv. The co-sponsors of this proposal recognise the environmental and sustainability effects of over fishing and overcapacity and are willing to examine possible disciplines which seek to minimise environmental and ecological damage so long as they are mutually supportive of the developmental priorities of small, vulnerable economies and other similarly situated developing countries. 60 This document is an attempt to respond to the call of the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules for brainstorming on S&DT issues and does not preclude the co-sponsors of this document from submitting any additional proposals on these matters. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 74 B. SHOULD THE PROVISION OF S&DT BE CONDITIONAL? i. The co-sponsors of this document view S&DT as a fundamental principle of all WTO Agreements for developing countries and should be accorded without conditions attached. However, the co-sponsors recognise that given the environmental and sustainability element of the fisheries negotiations, there have been proposals which recommend the provision of S&DT on the basis of the individual country either acquiring certain management capacity or on ideas such as status of the fisheries and total allowable catch. Such conditionality would depart from WTO principles for according S&DT. ii. The co-sponsors recognise that there are wide divergences between the productive and trading capacity of developing countries in the fisheries sector and in the interests of sustainability of the marine resources are willing to consider carefully crafted parameters for S&DT which could meet this objective. It is clear however that small, vulnerable economies, LDCs and some other developing countries have had such a minimum impact on over fishing and overcapacity that the proposed restrictions on these countries would be unduly punitive and would have the detrimental effect of impeding the legitimate growth of their fisheries industry, thereby leading to industry regression and stagnation. iii. An effective management regime for fisheries is an important component of a country's fisheries policy. However, it must be recognised that not all developing countries, especially the SVEs and the LDCs, have the capacity to enact a management regime which can produce statistics, analyse data or secure its waters from IUU fishing to the extent that major fishing nations do. In light of this relatively limited capacity, any S&DT conditionality in the area of management regimes should not unduly punish these countries for their capacity constraints and should be examined in light of their relatively small productive and trading share of world fisheries. iv. The FAO Code of Conduct has been suggested as an appropriate guideline for countries to follow with regards to their management regimes and the co-sponsors of this document concur that it has many important elements. However as it is a voluntary instrument, the Code of Conduct should not be simply imported into a WTO agreement as a binding discipline. Rather it may be appropriate for developing countries to illustrate the existence of a management plan, either a national management plan or a regional management plan. If the architecture of these plans is found to be significantly lacking, the developed countries and international organisations with necessary levels of capacity and competence in these areas for improvement should provide technical and financial assistance to these developing countries to enhance their management plans. v. Environmental criteria such as the level of exploitation of the fisheries species or the level of exploitation in certain waters have been suggested as conditions for developing countries to use certain subsidies. The co-sponsors are concerned about the accuracy of data and unwarranted penalisation of small economies as a result of the exploitation of fisheries species outside of their waters by larger fleets of countries with greater capacity. The idea of utilising total allowable catch as a mechanism is one which must also take into account the need to accord flexibility for developing countries as well as to safeguard the future growth prospects of their fishing industry. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 75 C. ARTISANAL AND SMALL SCALE FISHERIES i. The co-sponsors of this document recognise that there has been a great degree of discussion on this issue within the negotiating group. Despite this, there does not appear to be any agreement on a definition for these types of fisheries nor how they should be treated in the disciplines. ii. SVEs have consistently stated that their domestic definitions and practical industry realities do not recognise a clear distinction between artisanal and small scale fisheries. In the majority of cases there is a small profit trade involved in the fisheries and in some cases it is part of a small productive chain especially in those countries dependent on tourism. These small fisheries may also be organised into cooperatives and hence there could be an economic component to the fisheries transactions notwithstanding the traditional nature of the fishery and its livelihood and food security aspect. iii. With this in mind the co-sponsors believe that any definition of artisanal must take into account this economic aspect if it is really to result in any benefits for the developing countries. It has been recognised however that a cumulative view of small artisanal and small scale fishing fleets may result in certain environmental and sustainability impacts and we are willing to further discuss how this impact can be minimised including discussions on the assistance which can be provided by relevant international organisations and developed country members in this area. iv. Some proposals have sought to use physical characteristics for determining artisanal and small scale fishing and the co-sponsors are of the view that any definition based on physical attributes should recognise the following if it is to take the reality of SVEs artisanal and small scale fisheries into account: Any definition using the length of vessel should take into account the domestic definitions used by SVEs, Allowances should be made for a certain level of modernisation such as engine horsepower of up to 300hp, the use of navigation and safety equipment and mechanised fishing gear as improved technology becomes available. v. Socio-economic considerations must also be taken into account if seeking to define artisanal and small scale fisheries such as the importance of the sector to employment, food security, poverty reduction and nutrition. vi. The co-sponsors recognise that the issue of "small programmes" has also been raised in the negotiations. Any treatment for "small programmes" should be a component of the S&DT for developing countries and its architecture could be based on a level of financial amount, the size of the fleet and/or the share of the country in world fisheries trade. D. i. OTHER AREAS OF S&DT The co-sponsors believe that there are other areas in the disciplines where S&DT should apply. These include: 1. 2. 3. appropriate flexibilities for industrial and semi-industrial fishing for SVEs notification requirements length of time to implement the agreement WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 76 4. 5. greater opportunity for consultation before any DSB cases technical assistance and capacity building for enhancing management regimes The co-sponsors of this document are willing to continue to work with other members to find solutions in these areas which take into account the trade, development and environmental elements of the fisheries negotiations. 4. Drafting Proposal on Issues Relating to Article III.4 ("Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Country Members") of the Fisheries Subsidies Annex to the SCM Agreement as Proposed by the Chair in TN/RL/W/213 - TN/RL/GEN/158 (22 May 2008) Proponents: ACP and SVEs Groups 6. In line with the above considerations, it is suggested to modify Article III.4 as follows: III.4.1 "Members recognize that developing country Members, especially least-developed countries and small, vulnerable economies, will face serious challenges in complying with the requirements of this Annex, in particular as regards the conditions and criteria set forth in this Article and in Articles V ("Fisheries Management") and VI ("Notifications and Surveillance"). III.4.2 Members recognize that the ability of developing country Members, especially least-developed countries and small, vulnerable economies, to adopt, implement and sustain measures necessary for complying with the requirements of this Annex may depend on the effective and timely provision of technical assistance by Members to developing country Members in accordance with their demands and needs. Members recognize that developing country Members will have different implementation needs and capacities and to this end, developing countries which indicate a need for technical assistance shall be provided with such assistance through bilateral processes, through new and/or existing WTO technical assistance and support mechanisms and through other mechanisms of relevant international and regional organisations. III.4.3 The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures shall establish a Sub-Committee dealing exclusively with issues related to technical assistance and support programs under this Annex, specifically as regards fisheries management systems and measures related thereto. The Sub-Committee shall coordinate the requests from developing country Members for technical assistance and support programs and shall review the effectiveness of the technical assistance provided to developing country Members.61 The Sub-Committee shall periodically report its findings to the 61 The Sub-Committee, in consultation with the developing Member concerned, shall identify any additional needs of that Member for technical assistance and every effort shall be made to ensure that appropriate technical assistance is provided to that Member. The role of the Sub-Committee shall not be to determine the validity of a developing country's request for technical assistance. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 77 Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and the Committee on Trade and Development.62 5. Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) - Statement on Key Aspects Of Article III of the Fisheries Subsidies Annex- TN/RL/W/226/Rev.5 (22 September 2008) Proponents: Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Jamaica, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Tonga. 3. Article III on Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) is a critical element in the balance of rights and obligations in the Annex and although we welcome some elements of Article III we remain concerned that some of the conditionality provisions contained therein effectively prevent SVEs from benefiting from exemptions that are consistent with the realities of their fisheries, the types of subsidies which these economies offer and the developmental path which these countries wish to follow to allow for diversification of their economies. 4. This concern is most pronounced in relation to the need for SVEs to benefit from an exemption from the prohibition of subsidies in Article I.1.c of the Chair's text. These forms of subsidies which include, inter alia, operational costs for fuel, ice, bait, license fees, insurance and subsidies for landing, handling or in-or near port processing activities are exactly the forms of government assistance which SVEs could provide to their fishers. These are the specific forms of assistance which the SVEs have consistently stated should be allowed for those economies which have negligible or no impact on over fishing or over capacity. In the experience of the SVEs, these forms of operational subsidies are more affordable and manageable for our economies given our small administrations. Moreover, in terms of sustainability aspects, we are able to better monitor and regulate these forms of government support unlike capital subsidies (e.g. vessel construction) which are far more costly to remove after the fact (e.g. decommissioning schemes). Subsidies for processing activities are also crucial elements of our development trajectories and are consistent with our plans to progress into more diverse, value added components of the fisheries production cycle. 5. In formal and verbal submissions to the negotiating group, the SVEs and other developing countries have expressed the need for additional flexibility regarding the programmes under Article 1.1.c. The SVEs have made reference to the need to increase the length of the vessel in Article III.2.b.2 to 25 metres to take into account the size of the small scale fishing vessels used in our maritime space. Requests have also been made by developing countries to benefit from an exemption from Article I.1.c subsidies. 6. Some form of additional flexibility regarding Article I.1.c subsidies is necessary if these fisheries subsidies disciplines are to have real and practical meaning for the developing small island and coastal states of the WTO. These countries rely on fisheries for diversification, food security and livelihoods, and their miniscule share of global trade and marine capture fisheries demonstrates that they do not, either individually or cumulatively, impact on over fishing and over capacity. It is clear to the SVEs that 'one size does not fit all' and that consequently in the context of Article I.1.c subsidies a degree of additional flexibility in S&DT is necessary considering the profound importance of fisheries to their national socio-economic development; noting that the SVEs have not requested a substantial roll-back of the fisheries management principles established in Article V. 62 Future discussion would be required on the procedures to be followed if a developing country member does not receive the requested technical assistance. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 78 7. The SVEs are currently undertaking additional technical work with the aim of proposing, if necessary and at the appropriate time, additional options to take our concerns into account in a revised text. This current document has been tabled in the Negotiating Group to reiterate our needs and to call on the Negotiating Group to look for appropriate solutions to confront these concerns. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 79 IX. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON TRADE FACILITATION 1. Regional Approaches to Trade Facilitation: (10 March 2008) Enquiry Points - TN/TF/W/129/Rev.2 Proponents: Barbados, Cuba, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. I. TO BE PLACED IN THE PREAMBLE/INTRODUCTORY SECTION OF A POSSIBLE TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT Small Economies/developing countries which are members of a Customs Union or a regional economic arrangement may adopt regional approaches to assist in the implementation of their obligations under the Trade Facilitation Agreement including through the establishment and use of regional bodies. II. TO BE PLACED IN THE SECTION ON "ESTABLISHMENT OF ENQUIRY POINTS" Small Economies/developing countries which are members of a Customs Union or a regional economic arrangement shall have the option of establishing one or more enquiry points at the regional level.63 The existence of a notified regional enquiry point would satisfy the requirements for the existence of an enquiry point under this current provision. III. TO BE PLACED IN THE SECTION ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND CAPACITY BUILDING Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide technical and financial assistance, on mutually agreed terms, to small economies/developing countries to support the establishment, modification and maintenance of these national and regional enquiry points. Members and the WTO shall consider the advantages of providing assistance to the regional body, where one exists within a Customs Union or regional economic arrangement, which will assist those members in the implementation of their obligations under the Trade Facilitation agreement. 63 It is understood that individual Members benefiting from these recommendations will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual notifications and other obligations under these Agreements. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 80 X. COMMITTEE ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES HISTORIC EVOLUTION 1. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - G/SCM/W/535 and Add.1 (12 April 2006 and 20 July 2006)64 Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 6. The sponsors of this proposal believe that the objective of "fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system" (WT/L/579, paragraph 1(d) – 2 August 2004) could be achieved in part by reaffirming the Article 27.4 procedures and extensions within the context of the provisions of 14 November 2001, Doha Ministerial Decision on procedures for Extension under Article 27.4 of the ASCM by granting further extensions until the year 2018. 7. The sponsors of this proposal submit the following modification to the procedures set forth in document G/SCM/39 and call for the preparation of an addendum detailing 'Procedures for Extensions Under Article 27.4 for Certain Developing Country Members' which would amend paragraph 1(e) of G/SCM/39 to state as follows: A. ‘Through the calendar year 2018, subject to annual reviews during that period to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in (3) and (4) are being fulfilled, Members of the Committee shall agree to continue the extensions granted pursuant to 1(c)’. 8. The extension procedures under Article 27.4 would hence be applicable to all of the members and the existing programmes referred to in Annex A in line with paragraph 2 of G/SCM/39. This extension process would be applicable from the end of 2007 through to the end of 2018 with identical procedures as indicated in G/SCM/39 paragraph 1(f) and 1(g). 2. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/535 and 537) – JOB(07)/49 (18 April 2007) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Statement by Barbados on behalf of the Proponents of W/535 Add. 1 at the Informal Meeting of the SCM Committee, 8 March 2007 7. This intervention is delivered on behalf of the proponents of W/535 Add 1. 64 While the proponents of G/SCM/W/535 and Add.1 are small, vulnerable economies, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) does not treat this issue as specific to small, vulnerable economies. A similar proposal was submitted to the Committee on SCM from the delegations of Costa Rica, Jordan, Panama and Uruguay (G/SCM/W/537, G/SCM/W/537/Add.1, Add.2 and Add.3). WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 81 8. I understand that you wish to structure the discussions today around three areas which you have deemed to be key issues within these discussions and I would hence wish to give a brief overview of some of our bilateral encounters and then make brief comments on each subject consistent with the organisation of this session. 9. At the last informal meeting of the Committee on 15 February we delivered a statement that sought to recognise the positive interaction which we have been having with some Members of the Committee and to indicate the areas where we saw there being some form of convergence and also aspects where work was required to bring positions closer together. We are pleased to say that this positive interaction and willingness to engage has been maintained although the discussions are becoming more precise and substantive in nature. 10. We have also enhanced our interaction with the W/537 proponents and have consequently begun to hold joint bilateral and plurilateral meetings. The Members we have dialogued with continue to express a willingness to work towards an April conclusion of this matter but we do recognise that there needs to be a narrowing of the gap on some key issues. 11. Before I speak to the issue of the timeframe, which is the first item on the agenda, I wish to reiterate on behalf of all of the proponents that in reacting to our proposals and concessions it is important to remain cognisant of the reality of our economies, not only in terms of size and vulnerability but also the ability and capacity to enact onerously strict regulations within a relatively short timeframe. At the last meeting we stated that the aim should be to reach a mutually agreeable end point without expecting the proponents to undertake actions which would unnecessarily increase the burden on our economies and governments. If a straight path can take us to the same destination as an obstacle course we urge members to give consideration to the unencumbered route. 12. We shall continue to meet bilaterally and informally and will indeed seek to enhance our level of engagement. During the last series of bilateral meetings we held, we floated some elements of what we consider could form integral components of an eventual decision. The reaction to these elements ranged from clear support for some initiatives, questions and clarifications for others and calls for strengthened language and provisions in other areas. The proponents have made what we consider to be serious and difficult concessions but are still faced with not knowing exactly what other members would like to see in an eventual decision. Once again we urge members to forward any text or ideas which they feel could address their legitimate concerns. The Duration of a Possible Extension of the Procedures in G/SCM/39 13. The Committee would recall that we had requested an extension until 2018 in our original proposal of W/535. Today we are prepared to make a concession on this aspect of the proposal and move to 2015 which is a request for eight years rather than 11 years. This request is consistent with the extension given in the Uruguay Round. On this issue we should indicate that the timeframe is one pillar in this discussion and should be seen as related to the other areas of the negotiations such as the conditions of extension and any commitments which the proponents would be requested to undertake beyond that in the original Uruguay decision or in the Doha decision. 14. We presented this concession during the bilateral meetings and although some members indicated that it was longer than envisioned there did appear to be a willingness to positively consider the timeframe in line with other conditions of the extension. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 82 Requirements Applicable during the Extended Transition Period 15. On this matter of conditions of the extension we remain willing to discuss what the priority areas are for members and to receive clear and specific ideas on what they would wish to see integrated into a final decision. We have expressed a willingness to integrate technical assistance into the decision and have proposed draft text reflecting this. We have also expressed a willingness to bring our programmes into conformity with the SCM agreement and have also suggested some draft language on this matter. For us these reflect substantial movement from our position in W/535. Unfortunately other Members were not able to meet us halfway on these issues and the proponents are currently re-examining their proposals in light of the discussions. Whether or not it should be possible for the Members concerned to request another extension of the transition period 16. This is a matter that has been raised by some delegations in our informal deliberations. It is clear that this is a very politically sensitive issue for the proponents and other parties. From our perspective it is difficult to demarcate this issue from the fact that we are small developing countries seeking flexibilities and favourable consideration of our trade, economic and developmental concerns within a development round. Any decision on this matter has to take these political considerations into account. In any event the proponents have taken note of the concerns raised by other members although much of our attention will be focused on attempting to develop conditions in the transition period which would be acceptable to all members of the Committee. 17. The proponents extend appreciation to all delegations for their engagement and useful suggestions during the bilateral process. Statement by Barbados on behalf of the Proponents of W/535 Add 1 at the Informal Meeting of the SCM Committee, 15 February 2007 18. This intervention is delivered on behalf of the proponents of W/535/Add.1 and on their behalf I wish to express thanks to you and the Secretariat for the work that you have been doing to help us to move this process forward. 19. In that line I would like to focus on our perceptions and interpretations of where we stand at present in this process based on the bilateral, plurilateral and informal interactions we have held with a number of delegations who have expressed particular interest in the proposal. We must express sincere thanks to all of those Members of the Committee who met with us informally and who always came to the table with a willingness to engage on possible solutions to the request for an extension. The proponents have taken note of all suggestions and concerns and our hope is that we can duly integrate many of these into a final agreed package. We remain open to discussions with any other members with whom we have not yet met. 20. One of the most important conclusions that we have been able to draw from these encounters is that there is a general consensus to continue and increase the pace of the work on the proposal. The language that we heard in our meetings is no longer couched in 'ifs' and 'whys' but rather 'when' and 'how'. This is an achievement for the proponents and the Committee as a whole as it illustrates a willingness to find an appropriate solution and reaffirms the fact that we have all been negotiating this matter in good faith. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 83 21. The second equally important assessment is that there is an understanding that a conclusion by April is possible and desirable and members expressed willingness to work towards that target date. The reasons for this are many, the schedule of the formal meeting of the SCM in April, the need for investor confidence and predictability in our economies, the need to avoid any form of legal or logistical complications regarding the phase out period of the Doha decision and more importantly and logically the fact that we have all worked steadily in the introductory phase, and in the Q and A procedures and we believe that there is enough information and technical work on the table, and enough scope for a mutually beneficial outcome, for April 2007 to be the outer limits of the timeframe for a conclusion. We understand that it is not a difficult task to convene the SCM in formal session before April if the need arises, hence if a resolution can be reached even before the scheduled formal meeting, this would be preferable. 22. Other conclusions that we have drawn from these meetings are that the majority of delegations understand our particular circumstances and many found the answers provided during the question and answer phase as fostering a greater understanding of the specifics of our programmes, the relative 'smallness' of the subsidies offered, and the continued importance of these programmes in our domestic reality both from an economic and social perspective. In addition it should be recognised that these programmes are in many cases, policy responses to advice from international organisations that economic diversification in SVES is not only necessary, but urgent if we are going to able to integrate into the global economy in a sustainable manner. 23. It is important that we also recognise that some delegations have indicated that they have a systemic interest in seeing tightened disciplines on export subsidies even as they recognise the relatively low, if not completely absent, trade distorting effects of our programmes. A few other delegations expressed concern based on the possible economic impact of our programmes on their economies and we continue to be open and willing to explore this matter bilaterally, based on any statistics or studies that may illustrate that there is indeed a problem. 24. The majority of Members have expressed satisfaction with the transparency element of the current process and as proposed by the proponents in W/535, wish to see these transparency, standstill, favourability and notification elements maintained. We completely agree that these elements have been working as envisaged in the 2001 decision and would hence seek to retain these in a new decision on a further extension. We are of course willing to engage on any specific areas where Members may feel the transparency and notification elements can be improved but we seek Members' understanding of our capacity constraints in this regard. 25. The issue of the timeframe was one that was widely discussed during our informal encounters and it has become clear to the proponents that an extension of 11 years to 2018 (IE 11+2) has not gained enough traction on which to move forward. The date was proposed to coincide with what was originally requested by the proponents in 2001 and to take into account the importance of these programmes to our developmental trajectory. In the spirit of negotiation and the importance of concluding this process by April, the proponents have recognised that there will have to be a compromise on the issue of the timeframe and we are willing to do this with the understanding that we gained during our bilateral meetings, that Members would seek to impose stricter conditions on longer timeframes and less oppressive conditions on shorter timeframes. At this point therefore we should seek to arrive at some consensus on this matter, recognising the interrelated nature of timeframe and any additional conditions imposed on the extension. We should reaffirm that we see the two year phase out WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 84 period envisaged in Article 27.4 and in G/SCM/39 as an important component of the decision hence we don't believe there is any need to negotiate on those final two years. 26. On the question of possible conditions of an extension, there was also a great degree of discussion at the informal level on this. You would recall that the proponents had called for the conditions of a future extension to be identical to those in G/SCM/39 as we felt there was a general consensus that they were working well. However, in the spirit of cooperation and given the feedback from these bilateral talks we have realised that there will need to be some additional discussion on this issue to accommodate the perspectives of all delegations. Yet again we seek your understanding of our developmental realities when suggesting any possible conditions. We have had a suggestion that the proponents could look at incorporating a financial cap on the subsidy amount but there appeared to be some understanding, even on the part of the members who suggested this, that in reality this would be difficult to craft and implement and would be unduly onerous. We have heard other suggestions such as a cap on the number of beneficiaries and on the inclusion of language which illustrates our intention to make these programmes compatible with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. These are all concerns that we have taken on board and we will continue to analyse them technically to determine the practical impact these suggestions may have. The matter of integrating the provision of technical assistance from the WTO Secretariat into an eventual decision to assist us in this process is a suggestion that the proponents would be willing to take on board. 27. There are some additional comments emanating from the bilaterals which we would like to suggest as guiding principles for this next phase of negotiations. Unduly harsh, strict and unnecessary conditions of extension could prove burdensome on our economies and in an environment where development is the key, our call would be for any conditions to be more focused on the expected result. Hence, if lesser conditions could be adopted to achieve the same results as harsher conditions, we would strongly recommend that the application of manageable conditions be the route taken. We believe that conditions can be applied that could lead to a resolution for all, without us, as small developing countries, having to renounce any legal rights under the SCM or without a process that places unnecessary strain on our capitals. 28. We also ask that the proponents be recognised for their movement on these matters. Almost a year ago we proposed what we saw as a simple and workable solution: a continuation of the procedures in G/SCM/39 until 2018. Today we stand ready to move on that date of 2018 and we stand ready to incorporate, within limits, certain conditions that could seek to give comfort to our partners. Although as demandeurs we recognise that ultimately the responsibility of moving this process along will always lie with us, we do admit that it has been difficult to convince our capitals to move from our proposal in the absence of any other clear proposals on the table from others. However, the signals that we received from most of you are clear and we hope that this meeting will lead to an acceleration of the crafting of a new decision for extension of our programmes. 29. The proponents extend appreciation to all delegations for their engagement and useful suggestions. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 85 3. Procedures for Extensions under Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (G/SCM/W/535 and 537) – JOB(07)/50 (19 April 2007) SVE Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines65. 1. This submission is based on documents G/SCM/W/5351 of 12 April 2006 and G/SCM/W/5372 of 23 June 2006 and is an attempt to reflect the outcome of the various bilateral and plurilateral consultations conducted by the proponents of this submission as well as the discussions in the informal and formal Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which were held over the period of April 2006 to the present. The proponents are of the view that the submission reflects a basis for a recommendation from the Committee for the approval of the General Council. 2. The submission amends document G/SCM/39 of 20 November 2001 by incorporating new legal language which seeks to take into account the concerns of those delegations who have expressed views during the informal and formal process and illustrates substantial movement from the proposals contained in G/SCM/W/535/Add.1 and G/SCM/W/537. This new language can be found in new paragraphs 1(e), 1(f), 1(g), 1(h) and 1(i) and in footnotes 1, 2, 3 and 4. The original language of G/SCM/39 is retained in the text for ease of reference. 3. The proponents of this submission have not changed any of the existing language in G/SCM/39 but there is the recognition that additional technical work may need to be undertaken to appropriately integrate and reconcile the new elements of G/SCM/39/Rev.1 with the rest of the text. (e) Through the end of calendar year 2007, subject to annual reviews during that period to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 3 and 4 are being fulfilled, Members of the Committee shall agree to continue the extensions granted pursuant to 1(c). (f) During the last year of the period referred to in 1(e), a Member that has received an extension under these procedures shall have the possibility to seek a continuation of the extension pursuant to SCM Article 27.4, for the programmes in question. The Committee shall consider any such requests at that year's annual review, on the basis of the provisions of SCM Article 27.4, i.e., outside the framework of these procedures. (g) If a continuation of the extension pursuant to 1(f) is either not requested or not granted, the Member in question shall have the final two years referred to in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. (e) Through the end of calendar year 2013 subject to annual reviews during that period to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 3 and 4 are being fulfilled, Members of the Committee shall agree to continue the extensions granted pursuant to 1(c). The Member receiving a continuation of the extension of these procedures shall benefit from the final two years referred to in the last sentence of 65 Other non-SVE proponents of this document are Jordan, Panama and Uruguay. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 86 SCM Article 27.4 with the calendar years 2014 and 2015 constituting this two year phase out period.66 (f) The Committee notes that the Member receiving an extension under these procedures shall take all necessary internal steps with a view to bringing the programmes into conformity with Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement before the expiration of the extension period. (g) During the period January 1 2008 through to December 31 2011 the Member receiving the extension under these procedures shall undertake actions at the national level in accordance with the commitment in 1(f). These actions may include consultations with relevant government actors and organisations and any technical and/or legal assessments which may need to be undertaken to assist the Member to conform with 1(f) as well as a communication to existing or future beneficiaries indicating the commitments undertaken in 1(e) and 1(f) of these procedures. (h) During the annual transparency and notification process in 2012, the Member receiving an extension under these procedures shall participate in a mid-period assessment held under the auspices of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.67 During this mid-period assessment the Member shall provide information to the Committee on what steps it has taken to date and shall take to conform to 1(f). During the mid-period assessment the Member receiving an extension in 1(e) shall also provide an action plan for bringing its export subsidies into conformity with Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.68 This mid-period assessment shall take into account the development, financial and trade needs of the member as well as its capacity and administrative constraints.69 (i) The Member receiving the extension under these procedures may request the WTO Secretariat to provide technical assistance to assist that Member to bring its export subsidies into conformity with Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement. 66 There shall be no further requests for a continuation of the extension beyond 2015 for the programmes contained in Annex 1 of this current decision. 67 The mid-period review is a transparency exercise intended to enhance the annual transparency process. 68 This action plan will be submitted for transparency purposes and may contain information as to whether legislative changes, administrative amendments or any other procedures are required to bring the programmes into conformity with Article 3.1 of the ASCM and whether any of these actions have been undertaken. 69 This will be without prejudice to the commitments undertaken in 1(f) of these procedures. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 87 4. Chairman's Proposal for the Text of a Draft Decision – JOB(07)/78 (6 June 2007) ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES Decision of xx 2007* DRAFT The General Council, Having regard to Articles IV:1 and 2 and IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") and Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"); Recalling that the Members of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Committee" or "Committee"), as directed by the Ministerial Conference70 have granted, pursuant to the procedures set forth in document G/SCM/39, extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement of the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for the elimination of export subsidies, in respect of certain programmes of certain developing country Members; Noting the proposals submitted by those developing country Members to extend the procedures contained in G/SCM/39;71 Recognizing the economic, financial and development needs, as well as the capacity and administrative constraints, of those Members in implementing their commitments pursuant to the SCM Agreement in respect of the elimination of export subsidies; On the basis of the commitment of those Members to eliminate the export subsidies in question not later than 31 December 2015, with no further requests for extension pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement beyond those foreseen pursuant to this Decision; Emphasizing that as from the date of adoption of this Decision, the procedures referred to herein shall represent the sole and unique basis for any extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement; Decides to adopt the following procedures. *It is proposed that the text of the draft decision, once agreed by the SCM Committee, be subject to a Committee decision forwarding it to the General Council with the recommendation that it be adopted. PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUATION OF EXTENSIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 27.2(b) OF THE SCM AGREEMENT FOR CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS The SCM Committee shall follow the procedures set forth below in respect of the continuation of extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement ("SCM 70 71 WT/MIN(01)/17, paragraph 10.6. See documents G/SCM/W/535 and G/SCM/W/537 and addenda. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 88 Article 27.4") of the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for certain programmes, identified in the Annex.72 1. Mechanism for continuation of extension (a) A Member that wishes to seek a continuation, for calendar year 2008, of the extension under SCM Article 27.4 for a programme listed in the Annex, shall submit a request to that effect to the SCM Committee not later than 3 September 2007. The request also shall include a reference to the WTO document containing the corresponding updating notification covering calendar year 2006, which the Member shall have submitted to the SCM Committee pursuant to 1(d) of G/SCM/39.73 (b) Not later than 26 October 2007, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions, for calendar year 2008, for programmes listed in the Annex in respect of which requests have been submitted pursuant to 1(a) and for which the Committee has verified, in its annual review conducted pursuant to G/SCM/3974, that the transparency and standstill requirements under G/SCM/39 were fulfilled during 2006. (c) As provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the continuation of extensions by the SCM Committee pursuant to these procedures shall be subject to annual reviews in the form of consultations between the Committee and the Members receiving continuations of extensions. These annual reviews shall be conducted on the basis of annual updating notifications from the Members in question, as referred to in 2(a). The purpose of the annual reviews shall be to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled. (d) During the period 2008-2012, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions pursuant to these procedures, subject to verification through annual reviews as provided for in 1(c) that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled. The "last authorized period" referred to in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall not extend beyond 31 December 2013, and the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall end not later than 31 December 2015. (e) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall take, from 1 January 2008, the necessary internal steps with a view to eliminating export subsidies under the programme before the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. These steps shall include consultations with relevant government bodies and organisations and any necessary technical and/or legal assessments, as well as a notification to each beneficiary under the programme indicating that no export subsidies within the meaning of SCM Article 3.1(a) will be granted or maintained beyond the end of calendar year 2015. 72 The programmes eligible for continuations of extensions under these procedures are programmes providing export subsidies in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal taxes for which the SCM Committee continued extensions of the transition period under SCM Article 27.4 for calendar year 2007 pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. 73 At the regular meeting of the Committee in April 2007, these Members were reminded to submit their updating notifications by 30 June 2007. 74 The procedures in G/SCM/39 shall cease to be effective upon completion of this 2007 annual review. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 89 (f) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall provide, for transparency purposes, an action plan for eliminating export subsidies under the programme, as an integral part of the annual updating notification submitted for the annual review to be conducted in 2011.75 As part of this review, the SCM Committee shall undertake a mid-period assessment of each programme for which it has continued an extension under these procedures. During this mid-period assessment, the SCM Committee shall take stock of the steps undertaken as of that point by the notifying Member pursuant to 1(e), and shall discuss the action plan provided by the Member. (g) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures may request the WTO Secretariat to provide technical assistance for eliminating export subsidies under the programme. 2. Transparency (a) The annual updating notifications shall follow the agreed format for subsidy notifications under SCM Article 25 (found in G/SCM/6/Rev.1). Beginning with the updating notifications covering calendar year 2008, notifying Members also shall provide information regarding the actions they have taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). (b) During the annual reviews by the SCM Committee referred to in 1(c), notifying Members can be requested by other Members to provide additional detail and clarification with a view to maintaining transparency in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes in question 69 and the form of the subsidies provided thereunder; and in respect of the actions taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). Any information provided in response to such requests shall be considered part of the notified information. (c) The provisions in 2(a) and 2(b) regarding the submission of updating notifications and the conduct of annual reviews shall also apply to the final two-year phase out-period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. 3. Standstill (a) Through the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the programmes for which extensions are continued under these procedures shall not be modified so as to make them more favourable than they were as at 1 September 2001, as specified in the notified information previously submitted pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. The continuation of an expiring programme without modification shall not be deemed to violate standstill. (b) The verification of standstill in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes shall be based on the notified information referred to in 1(c), 2(a), 2(b) and 3(a). 75 The action plan shall indicate how the Member intends to eliminate export subsidies under the programme not later than the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4, including information as to legislative changes, administrative amendments and/or other procedures as may be necessary, and whether any of these actions have been undertaken or are in the process of being undertaken. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 90 4. Product graduation on the basis of export competitiveness Notwithstanding these procedures, Articles 27.5 and 27.6 shall apply in respect of export subsidies for which extensions are continued pursuant to these procedures. 5. [Members listed in Annex VII(b) which reserved rights pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39] To be further discussed in the light of the proposal from Honduras that was considered in informal consultations on 4 June 2007. 6. Final provision These procedures shall cease to be in effect upon the completion of the annual review covering calendar year 2015. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 91 5. Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Decision of the Committee of 13 July 2007– G/SCM/120 (17 July 2007) At a special meeting held on 12-13 July 2007, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures decided to forward the attached draft decision to the General Council, for consideration for adoption by the Council at its meeting scheduled for 27 July 2007. ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES Draft Decision The General Council, Having regard to Articles IV:1 and 2 and IX:1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") and Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"); Recalling that the Members of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Committee" or "Committee"), as directed by the Ministerial Conference76 have granted, pursuant to the procedures set forth in document G/SCM/39, extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement of the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for the elimination of export subsidies, in respect of certain programmes of certain developing country Members; Noting the proposals submitted by those developing country Members to extend the procedures contained in G/SCM/39;77 Noting the terms of paragraph 5 of this Decision; Recognizing the economic, financial and development needs, as well as the capacity and administrative constraints, of those Members in implementing their commitments pursuant to the SCM Agreement in respect of the elimination of export subsidies; On the basis of the commitment of those Members to eliminate the export subsidies in question not later than 31 December 2015, with no requests for extension beyond those foreseen pursuant to this Decision; Decides to adopt the following procedures. PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUATION OF EXTENSIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 27.4 OF THE SCM AGREEMENT OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 27.2(b) OF THE SCM AGREEMENT FOR CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS The SCM Committee shall follow the procedures set forth below in respect of the continuation of extensions pursuant to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement ("SCM Article 27.4") of 76 Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, (WT/MIN(01)/17), paragraph 10.6. 77 See documents G/SCM/W/535 and G/SCM/W/537 and addenda. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 92 the transition period under Article 27.2(b) of the SCM Agreement for certain programmes, identified in the Annex.78 1. Mechanism for continuation of extension (a) A Member that wishes to seek a continuation, for calendar year 2008, of the extension under SCM Article 27.4 for a programme listed in the Annex, shall submit a request to that effect to the SCM Committee not later than 3 September 2007. The request also shall include a reference to the WTO document containing the corresponding updating notification covering calendar year 2006, which the Member shall have submitted to the SCM Committee pursuant to 1(d) of G/SCM/39.79 (b) Not later than 26 October 2007, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions, for calendar year 2008, for programmes listed in the Annex in respect of which requests have been submitted pursuant to 1(a) and for which the Committee has verified, in its annual review conducted pursuant to G/SCM/3980, that the transparency and standstill requirements under G/SCM/39 were fulfilled during 2006. (c) As provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the continuation of extensions by the SCM Committee pursuant to these procedures shall be subject to annual reviews in the form of consultations between the Committee and the Members receiving continuations of extensions. These annual reviews shall be conducted on the basis of annual updating notifications from the Members in question, as referred to in 2(a). The purpose of the annual reviews shall be to verify that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled. (d) During the period 2008-2012, Members of the SCM Committee shall agree to continue the extensions pursuant to these procedures, subject to verification through annual reviews as provided for in 1(c) that the transparency and standstill requirements set forth in 2 and 3 are being fulfilled.81 The "last authorized period" referred to in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall not extend beyond 31 December 2013, and the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 shall end not later than 31 December 2015. (e) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall take, from 1 January 2008, the necessary internal steps with a view to eliminating export subsidies under the programme before the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4. These steps shall include consultations with relevant government bodies and organisations and any necessary technical and/or legal assessments. In addition, from 1 January 2008 and in no case later than 31 December 2009, the Member shall notify each beneficiary under the programme indicating that no export subsidies within the meaning of 78 The programmes eligible for continuations of extensions under these procedures are programmes providing export subsidies in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal taxes for which the SCM Committee continued extensions of the transition period under SCM Article 27.4 for calendar year 2007 pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. 79 At the regular meeting of the Committee in April 2007, these Members were reminded to submit their updating notifications by 30 June 2007. 80 The procedures in G/SCM/39 shall cease to be effective upon completion of this 2007 annual review. 81 This extension mechanism shall cease to be effective upon completion in 2012 of the annual review by the Committee to continue the extensions for calendar year 2013, such that there will be no basis for requests for extension beyond those foreseen in this Decision. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 93 SCM Article 3.1(a) will be granted or maintained beyond the end of calendar year 2015. 2. 3. (f) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall provide, for transparency purposes, an action plan for eliminating export subsidies under the programme, as an integral part of the annual updating notification submitted for the annual review to be conducted in 2010.82 As part of this review, the SCM Committee shall undertake a mid-period assessment of each programme for which it has continued an extension under these procedures. During this mid-period assessment, the SCM Committee shall take stock of the steps undertaken as of that point by the notifying Member pursuant to 1(e), and shall discuss the action plan provided by the Member. (g) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures may request the WTO Secretariat to provide technical assistance for eliminating export subsidies under the programme. Transparency (h) The annual updating notifications shall follow the agreed format for subsidy notifications under SCM Article 25 (found in G/SCM/6/Rev.1). Beginning with the updating notifications covering calendar year 2008, notifying Members also shall provide information regarding the actions they have taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). (i) During the annual reviews by the SCM Committee referred to in 1(c), notifying Members can be requested by other Members to provide additional detail and clarification with a view to maintaining transparency in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes in question83 and the form of the subsidies provided thereunder; and in respect of the actions taken pursuant to 1(e) and 1(f). Any information provided in response to such requests shall be considered part of the notified information. (j) A Member receiving a continuation of an extension under these procedures shall ensure transparency in respect of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4 by submitting updating notifications under paragraph 2(a), which shall be subject to annual review by the Committee. Standstill (c) 82 Through the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in SCM Article 27.4, the programmes for which extensions are continued under these procedures shall not be modified so as to make them more favourable than they were as at 1 September 2001, as specified in the notified information previously submitted pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. The continuation of an expiring programme without modification shall not be deemed to violate standstill. The action plan shall indicate how the Member intends to eliminate export subsidies under the programme not later than the end of the final two-year phase-out period provided for in the last sentence of SCM Article 27.4, including information as to legislative changes, administrative amendments and/or other procedures as may be necessary, and whether any of these actions have been undertaken or are in the process of being undertaken, including how the individual beneficiaries have been notified pursuant to 1(e). 83 The scope, coverage and intensity of benefits of the programmes in question will be determined on the basis of the legal instruments underlying the programmes. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 94 (d) 4. The verification of standstill in respect of the scope, coverage and intensity of benefits (the "favourability") of the programmes shall be based on the notified information referred to in 1(c), 2(a), 2(b) and 3(a). Product graduation on the basis of export competitiveness Notwithstanding these procedures, Articles 27.5 and 27.6 shall apply in respect of export subsidies for which extensions are continued pursuant to these procedures. 5. Members listed in Annex VII(b) which reserved rights pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39 (k) This Decision does not prejudge rights of Annex VII Members. (l) If, during the period 2008-2015, the per capita GNP of a Member that reserved rights under paragraph 6(b) of G/SCM/3984 reaches the level provided for in Annex VII(b) of the SCM Agreement such that the Member is no longer included in Annex VII(b), that Member shall be able to make use of these procedures as from the date at which its per capita GNP reaches that level and for the remainder of that period. The effective date for the standstill requirement referred to in 3(a) shall be the year in which that Member's GNP per capita reaches the level provided for in Annex VII(b) such that it is no longer included in Annex VII(b). 84 The Members that reserved rights, and the programmes in respect of which these rights were reserved, are identified in documents G/SCM/N/74/BOL & Suppl.1, G/SCM/N/74/HND, G/SCM/N/74/KEN, and G/SCM/N/74/LKA. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 95 ANNEX LIST OF PROGRAMMES ELIGIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF EXTENSIONS UNDER THE PROCEDURES85, AND DOCUMENT REFERENCES FOR THE EXTENSION DECISIONS BY THE SCM COMMITTEE COVERING CALENDAR YEAR 2007 Antigua & Barbuda Fiscal Incentive Act Cap 172 (December 1975) (G/SCM/50/Add.4) Free Trade and Processing Zone Act No. 12 of 1994 (G/SCM/51/Add.4) Barbados Fiscal Incentive Programme (G/SCM/52/Add.4) Export Allowance (G/SCM/53/Add.4) Research & Development Allowance (G/SCM/54/Add.4) International Business Incentives (G/SCM/55/Add.4) Societies With Restricted Liability (G/SCM/56/Add.4) Belize Fiscal Incentives Act (G/SCM/57/Add.4) Export Processing Zone Act (G/SCM/58/Add. 4) Commercial Free Zone Act (G/SCM/59/Add.4) Conditional Duty Exemptions Facility under Treaty of Chaguaramas (G/SCM/60/Add.4) Costa Rica Free Zone Regime (G/SCM/61/Add.4) Inward Processing Regime (G/SCM/62/Add.4) Dominica Fiscal Incentives Programme (G/SCM/63/Add.4) 85 Programmes for which the SCM Committee continued extensions of the transition period under SCM Article 27.4 for calendar year 2007 pursuant to the procedures in G/SCM/39. It is recalled that the eligibility criteria in G/SCM/39 on the basis of which the original extension decisions pursuant to those procedures (for calendar year 2003) were taken for the listed programmes were as follows (footnotes omitted): "Programmes eligible for extension pursuant to these procedures, and for which Members shall therefore grant extensions for calendar year 2003 [...], are export subsidy programmes (i) in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal taxes, (ii) which were in existence not later than 1 September 2001, and (iii) which are provided by developing country Members (iv) whose share of world merchandise export trade was not greater than 0.10 per cent, (v) whose total Gross National Income ("GNI") for the year 2000 as published by the World Bank was at or below US$20 billion, (vi) and who are otherwise eligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 27.4, and (vii) in respect of which these procedures are followed." It is further recalled that, in respect of the above eligibility criteria, G/SCM/39 also provided that: "The criteria set forth in these procedures are solely and strictly for the purpose of determining whether Members are eligible to invoke these procedures. Members of the Committee agree that these criteria have no precedential value or relevance, direct or indirect, for any other purpose." WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 96 Dominican Republic Law No. 8-90 to "Promote the Establishment of New Free Zones and Expand Existing Ones" (G/SCM/64/Add.4) El Salvador Export Processing Zones and Marketing Act, as amended (G/SCM/65/Add.4) Fiji Short-Term Export Profit Deduction (G/SCM/66/Add.4) Export Processing Factories/Export Processing Zones Scheme (G/SCM/67/Add.4) The Income Tax Act (Film Making and Audio Visual Incentive Amendment Decree 2000) (G/SCM/68/Add.4) Grenada Fiscal Incentives Act No. 41 of 1974 (G/SCM/69/Add.4) Statutory Rules and Orders No. 37 of 1999 (G/SCM/70/Add.4) Qualified Enterprises Act No. 18 of 1978 (G/SCM/71/Add.4) Guatemala Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for Companies under Special Customs Regimes (G/SCM/72/Add.4) Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for the Production Process Relating to Activities of Managers and Users of Free Zones (G/SCM/73/Add.4) Exemption from Company Tax, Customs Duties and Other Import Taxes for the Production Process of Commercial and Industrial Enterprises Operating in the Industrial and Free Trade Zone (G/SCM/74/Add.4) Jamaica Export Industry Encouragement Act (G/SCM/75/Add.4) Jamaica Export Free Zone Act (G/SCM/76/Add.4) Foreign Sales Corporation Act (G/SCM/77/Add.4) Industrial Incentives (Factory Construction) Act (G/SCM/78/Add.4) Jordan Partial or Total Exemption from Income Tax of Profits Generated from Exports under Law No. 57 of 1985, as amended (G/SCM/79/Add.4) Mauritius Export Enterprise Scheme (G/SCM/80/Add.4) Pioneer Status Enterprise Scheme (G/SCM/81/Add.4) Export Promotion (G/SCM/82/Add.4) Freeport Scheme (G/SCM/83/Add.4) Panama Official Industry Register (G/SCM/84/Add.4 Export Processing Zones (G/SCM/85/Add.4) Papua New Guinea Section 45 of the Income Tax (G/SCM/86/Add.4) WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 97 St. Kitts and Nevis Fiscal Incentives Act No. 17 of 1974 (G/SCM/90/Add.4) St. Lucia Fiscal Incentives Act No. 15 of 1974 (G/SCM/87/Add.4) Free Zone Act, No. 10 of 1999 (G/SCM/88/Add.4) Micro and Small Scale Business Enterprises Act, No. 19 of 1998 (G/SCM/89/Add.4) St. Vincent & Grenadines Fiscal Incentives Act No. 5 of 1982, as amended (G/SCM/91/Add.4) Uruguay Automotive Industry Export Promotion Regime (G/SCM/92/Add.4) WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 98 XI. AID FOR TRADE TASK FORCE 1. Aid for Trade - WT/AFT/W/18 (15 June 2006) Proponent: Barbados III. SCOPE FOR AFT 9. In general, AFT should cover the following: Trade Policy and Regulations, (i.e. regional and multilateral negotiations, standards, implementation of trade agreements, trade policy and planning); Trade-Related Infrastructure (i.e. transport and storage, communications, energy, trade facilitation, etc); Trade Development (i.e. trade promotion strategy and implementation, market analysis and development); Productive Supply-Side Constraints, (i.e. banking and financial services, research and development and innovation; business and other services, agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry and mining, tourism etc.); and Trade Adjustment (abnormal adjustment resulting from severe adverse trade shocks). IV. PRIORITY AREAS FOR INTERVENTION A. TRADE POLICY AND REGULATIONS B. TRADE ADJUSTMENT C. TRADE-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE D. TRADE DEVELOPMENT E. PRODUCTIVE SUPPLY-SIDE CONSTRAINTS V. A PRIVATE SECTOR AID FOR TRADE PROGRAMME 29. A special effort should be made to ensure the involvement of the private sectors in both developed and developing countries and to connect them to each other. 30. The scope of a Private Sector Aid For Trade Programme should relate to activities capable of supporting private sector efforts to export. The identification of gaps in current Official Development Assistance in the trade-related field would be an appropriate starting point. 31. The delivery and monitoring of Private Sector AFT programmes should be vested in an organization agreed between interested multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and sector specific representative institutions on a country basis or, where appropriate, on a regional basis. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 99 32. AFT participants should aim for a feasible programme of assistance that is based on professional diagnostic studies and needs assessments and on arrangements for a monitoring system using mutually agreed benchmarks. Improving coherence and coordination of action among multiple donors should also be part of this approach. 33. An existing international trade-related organization that has a comparative advantage in this field, and also enjoys the confidence of developing countries, should be given responsibility for managing the programme. On the recipient side, the executing agency could be the agreed representative institution such as regional development banks. VI. VOLUME AND NATURE OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT A. MOBILIZING ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES 34. According to the paragraph 57 mandate, additional funding is required. Between 1994-2004, development aid has been decreasing as debt relief became an increasing part of ODA. It would be important therefore that current aid budgets are not depleted in order to support AFT but rather additional resources would be tapped to add "new money" to ODA budgets. 35. The pledges so far for 2010 are promising but the challenge remains to realize additionality. In this respect, it is essential that in finalizing commitments to the provision of these resources that long-term sustainability of the AFT process and predictability in the provision of funds are assured. B. NATURE OF AFT FINANCIAL SUPPORT 36. In order to avoid an increase in the debt burden of developing countries, particularly LDCs and small, vulnerable developing countries, aid-for-trade financial support should be provided primarily in the form of grants. However, for certain high cost physical infrastructure projects, these could be co-financed with long-term concessional loans from other multilateral financial institutions (e.g., regional development banks and the World Bank). Such loans should be on terms no less favourable than those of IDA or IFAD. 37. Funding should also not involve any burdensome conditionalities. The latter should be limited to monitoring and governance. 38. With regard to the financial instruments, there is as much a need for budgetary support that is available for sector-wide approaches on a multi-annual basis, as for specific "project financing". Budgetary support in situations of fiscal imbalance and balance-of-payments deficit ensures macroeconomic stability through quicker disbursement and a focus on the areas of adjustment most in need. It facilitates the development of projects by ensuring the correct macroeconomic environment. C. DURATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF AFT FUNDING 39. The problems related to supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure must be tackled on a sustainable basis. This essentially implies that projects must be developed and implemented over many years and be funded on a multi-year basis. AFT funds would therefore have to be replenished periodically according to an agreed schedule, and procedures would have to be established to ensure this. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 100 40. Access to these funds would also have to be guaranteed and predictable, and to achieve this purpose, some agreement between donors and recipients would be needed to provide such security. In this context, some consideration could be given to strengthening the role of multilateral sources in the provision of the additional resources. VII. MONITORING AND GOVERNANCE OF AFT A. MONITORING MECHANISM 41. The role of the WTO in monitoring and evaluating performance of AFT programmes should be paramount, and this responsibility could be assigned to its highest Council and its subsidiary bodies (particularly the Committee on Trade and Development). The Joint WTO/OECD Database on TRTA/CB already constitutes a useful monitoring tool which could be further enhanced by improved supervision of the collection and processing of information. In addition, a mechanism would be needed to assess the impact of AFT. Monitoring should permit the involvement of recipients, donors and other interested parties. B. GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 42. The wide range of bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms now in operation would suggest that the AFT governance mechanism should first explore the comparative advantage of existing institutions and seek to improve functioning where gaps exists. 43. Several forms of assistance suffer from insufficient resources as well as a lack of coordination between the institutions managing the projects. These weaknesses should be avoided in AFT. 44. There is need for credible mechanisms for delivering AFT and ways of improving existing national and regional mechanisms must be found. Regional development banks should play a key role in this area. 45. Any governance structure should ensure WTO involvement as well as provide for adequate coordination where gaps have been observed. The effective participation of WTO Members or their representatives – which again could be the regional development banks should be assured. It should also draw into the process international and regional financial agencies, the private sector, bilateral donors along with experts, and other interested parties. There should be an agreed administrative framework with agreed principles of management and allocation of funds. Institutional conditionalities should be avoided. C. ELIGIBILITY 46. In terms of country coverage, AFT should address the relevant needs of all WTO developing-country Members with priority to LDCs, SVEs and acceding small developing countries. VIII. PROCESSES TO IDENTIFY TRADE-RELATED NEEDS AT THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY LEVEL 47. In view of the wide variation in country situations, a country-specific approach to needs assessment will be necessary in order to identify both the priority needs of individual countries and the additional assistance required in each case. This effort should take into account the needs of the private sector. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 101 48. For countries that are part of a regional integration scheme and would wish their national approaches to be complimented by a regional needs assessment approach, the latter should also be undertaken. 49. Aid for trade should allow policy flexibilities and national ownership as mandated in the Paris Declaration of June 2005. Adopted at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (March 2005) the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness has been prepared with broad participation from development practitioners, through a process coordinated by the High-Level Forum Steering Committee. The declaration outlines a set of joint commitments and targets for governments and multilateral donors to reach over the next five years. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 102 XII. COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT DEDICATED SESSION ON SMALL ECONOMIES 1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: WT/COMTD/SE/W/15 (18 October 2005) Designation of a Regional Body – Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the contribution that international standards and conformity assessment systems can have in improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to provide such technical support as is necessary to assist them in fulfilling their obligations under the TBT Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide the technical and financial assistance required to enable these small, vulnerable economies to fulfil their objectives under this Agreement. 2. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16 (18 October 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the special difficulties encountered by the co-sponsors of this proposal in complying with SPS measures, and as a consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and application of SPS in their own territories, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition that WTO Members may designate a regional body to provide technical support as is necessary and to carry out the functions necessary to assist them in implementing the provisions of the SPS Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide the technical and financial assistance required to enable these small, vulnerable economies to fulfil their objectives under this Agreement. 3. Accession to the WTO - WT/COMTD/SE/W/17 (18 October 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Specific Proposals 3. It should be agreed that, in both the negotiations on rules in accession Working Parties and in the negotiations on market access commitments, acceding small, vulnerable economies will only be required to undertake commitments WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 103 commensurate with their level of development. In determining the terms of reference for accession Working Parties, appropriate consideration should be given to the specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of acceding small, vulnerable economies. 4. It should also be agreed that if a party to the negotiations on the accession of any applicant country considers that the terms of reference of the relevant Working Party are not being observed, it may request the establishment of a panel. This panel would be appointed by the Director-General from a roster of independent experts, to examine the case and report with recommendations to the General Council/Ministerial Conference. 4. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18 (18 October 2005) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives, and also the need to enable these small, vulnerable economies to create a sound and viable technological base, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to provide such technical support as is necessary to assist them in fulfilling their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide the technical and financial assistance required to enable these small, vulnerable economies to fulfil their objectives under this Agreement. 5. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) Designation of a Regional Body – Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the contribution that international standards and conformity assessment systems can have in improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to provide such technical support as is necessary to assist them in fulfilling their obligations under the TBT Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide technical and financial assistance at mutually agreed terms to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this agreement. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 104 6. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the special difficulties encountered by the co-sponsors of this proposal in complying with SPS measures and, as a consequence in access to markets and also in the formulation and application of SPS in their own territories, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition that WTO Members may designate a regional body to provide technical support as is necessary and to carry out the functions necessary to assist them in implementing the provisions of the SPS Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide technical and financial assistance at mutually agreed terms to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this agreement. 7. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.1 (10 April 2006) Designation of a Regional Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives, and also the need to enable these small, vulnerable economies to create a sound and viable technological base, the General Council is to recommend to the Ministerial Conference that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to provide such technical support as is necessary to assist them in fulfilling their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Members and the WTO, within its competence, shall provide technical and financial assistance at mutually agreed terms to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this agreement. 8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade: WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.2 (18 July 2006) Designation of a Regional Body – Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the contribution that international standards and conformity assessment systems can have in improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade, the General Council is to recommend that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 105 provide technical support86 as is necessary to assist them in implementing the provisions of the TBT Agreement. 5. Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this Agreement, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body, where such exists. 4. Issues for Consideration 6. The co-sponsors of this proposal are of the view that this explicit recognition of regional bodies would lead to greater legal certainty. In addition, it would lead to an improvement in levels of transparency and predictability thereby enhancing the ability of SVEs to fulfil their legal and notification obligations arising out of the TBT Agreement. 7. It should be further noted that this proposal does not seek to change the legal architecture of the TBT Agreement nor would it impact on the balance of rights and obligations of any WTO Member. In addition, the individual Members benefiting from this proposal will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual obligations which include notifications. 9. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Designation of a Regional Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.2 (18 July 2006) Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the special difficulties encountered by the co-sponsors of this proposal in complying with obligations under the SPS Agreement, the resulting difficulties in accessing markets and the complexity of the formulation and application of SPS measures for their domestic markets, the General Council is to recommend that there shall be explicit recognition that WTO Members may designate a regional body to provide technical support87 as is required to carry out the functions necessary to assist them in implementing the provisions of the SPS Agreement. 5. Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this Agreement, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body, where such exists. 86 Such technical support could include the development of TBT measures; assistance in the preparation of TBT notifications; assistance with the response to any queries received on the notifications; and any analysis or research that would enhance the understanding of the TBT obligations. 87 Such technical support could include the development of SPS measures; assistance in the preparation of SPS notifications; assistance with the response to any queries received on the notifications; assistance in establishing and maintaining risk assessment systems and control, inspection and approval procedures and any analysis or research that would enhance the understanding of the SPS obligations. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 106 4. Issues for Consideration 6. The co-sponsors of this proposal are of the view that this explicit recognition of regional bodies would lead to greater legal certainty. In addition, it would lead to an improvement in levels of transparency and predictability thereby enhancing the ability of SVEs to fulfil their legal and notification obligations to the WTO under the SPS Agreement. 7. It should be further noted that the proposal does not seek to change the legal architecture of the SPS Agreement nor would it impact on the balance of rights and obligations of any WTO Member. In addition, the individual Members benefiting from this proposal will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual obligations which include notifications. 10. Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement: Body – WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.2 (18 July 2006) Designation of a Regional Proponents: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3. Proposals 4. Recognising the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives, and also the need to enable these small, vulnerable economies to create a sound and viable technological base, the General Council is to recommend that there shall be explicit recognition of Members' rights to designate a regional body to provide such technical support88 as is necessary to assist them in implementing the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. 5. Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under this Agreement, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body, where such exists. 4. Issues for Consideration 6. The co-sponsors of this proposal are of the view that this explicit recognition of regional bodies would lead to greater legal certainty. In addition, it would lead to an improvement in levels of transparency and predictability thereby enhancing the ability of SVEs to fulfil their legal and notification obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 7. It should be further noted that the proposal does not seek to change the legal architecture of the TRIPS Agreement nor would it impact on the balance of rights and obligations of any WTO Member. In addition, the individual Members benefiting from this proposal will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual obligations which include notifications. 88 Such technical support could include the development of TRIPS measures; assistance in the preparation of TRIPS notifications; assistance with the response to any queries received on the notifications; and any analysis or research that would enhance the understanding of the TRIPS obligations. WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 107 11. Draft Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS (27 September 2006) 1. In paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,89 Ministers established a work programme under the auspices of the General Council to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies with the objective of framing responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, without creating a sub-category of WTO Members. 2. On 1 March 2002, the General Council took note of a framework and procedures for the conduct of the Work Programme on Small Economies90 and instructed the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to conduct this programme of work in Dedicated Sessions and to report regularly on the progress of its work to the General Council. This mandate was reaffirmed by the 1 August 2004 Decision of the General Council.91 At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to this Work Programme and urged Members to adopt specific measures that would facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system.92 3. In discussions in the CTD in Dedicated Session, the proponents of small economies identified, as one of the trade-related issues affecting the fuller integration of their economies into the multilateral trading system, their limited administrative capacities to implement complex rules and procedures and, in particular, to fulfil their obligations under the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 4. In documents WT/COMTD/SE/W/15, WT/COMTD/SE/W/16 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18, the proponents suggested that they be allowed to designate regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations in the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements and sought explicit approval from Members to do so. The proposals underwent two revisions93 to take into account the concerns raised by other Members in the Dedicated Session and at informal and/or formal meetings of the SPS and TBT Committees and the TRIPS Council. 5. Reports from the Chairpersons of these bodies were sent to the Chairperson of the CTD in Dedicated Session. The proponents of small economies also clarified that it was not their intention to modify, amend or alter the balance of rights and obligations contained in the SPS, TBT or TRIPS Agreements and that they, as Members, remain ultimately responsible for adhering to the obligations they contain. 6. On the basis of the discussions that have been held on this matter, the CTD in Dedicated Session considers that the use by small, vulnerable economies of regional bodies to provide technical support and assistance as necessary could help them implement their obligations in the areas of SPS, TBT and TRIPS, and thereby facilitate their fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. Accordingly, and in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 41 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the CTD in Dedicated Session 89 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. WT/L/447. 91 WT/L/579. 92 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, paragraph 41. 93 The latest versions have been circulated WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.2 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.2. 90 as WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.2; WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 108 recommends that the General Council agrees that small economies are allowed to use such regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations under the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements. It also recommends that Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under the agreements concerned, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body where such exists. It is understood that individual Members benefiting from these recommendations will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual notifications and other obligations under these Agreements. This recommendation is without prejudice both to the identification of other specific measures in due course to facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system and to measures taken by other Members with regard to this issue. 12. Draft Report to the General Council on Measures to Assist Small Economies in Meeting their Obligations under the Agreements on SPS Measures, TBT and TRIPS (28 September 2006) 1. In paragraph 35 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration,94 Ministers established a work programme under the auspices of the General Council to examine issues relating to the trade of small economies with the objective of framing responses to the trade-related issues identified for the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, without creating a sub-category of WTO Members. 2. On 1 March 2002, the General Council took note of a framework and procedures for the conduct of the Work Programme on Small Economies95 and instructed the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) to conduct this programme of work in Dedicated Sessions and to report regularly on the progress of its work to the General Council. This mandate was reaffirmed by the 1 August 2004 Decision of the General Council.96 At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to this Work Programme and urged Members to adopt specific measures that would facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system.97 3. In discussions in the CTD in Dedicated Session, the proponents of small economies identified, as one of the trade-related issues affecting the fuller integration of their economies into the multilateral trading system, their limited administrative capacities to implement complex rules and procedures and, in particular, to fulfil their obligations under the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 4. In documents WT/COMTD/SE/W/15, WT/COMTD/SE/W/16 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18, the proponents suggested that they be allowed to designate regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations in the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements and sought explicit approval from Members to do so. The proposals underwent two revisions98 to take into account the concerns raised by other Members in the Dedicated Session and at informal and/or formal meetings of the SPS and TBT Committees and the TRIPS Council. 94 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. WT/L/447. 96 WT/L/579. 97 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, paragraph 41. 98 The latest versions have been circulated WT/COMTD/SE/W/16/Rev.2 and WT/COMTD/SE/W/18/Rev.2. 95 as WT/COMTD/SE/W/15/Rev.2; WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.3 Page 109 5. Reports from the Chairpersons of these bodies were sent to the Chairperson of the CTD in Dedicated Session. The proponents of small economies also clarified that it was not their intention to modify, amend or alter the balance of rights and obligations contained in the SPS, TBT or TRIPS Agreements and that they, as Members, remain ultimately responsible for adhering to the obligations they contain. 6. On the basis of the discussions that have been held on this matter, the CTD in Dedicated Session considers that the use by small, vulnerable economies of regional bodies to provide technical support and assistance as necessary could help them implement their obligations in the areas of SPS, TBT and TRIPS, and thereby facilitate their fuller integration into the multilateral trading system. Accordingly, and in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 41 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the CTD in Dedicated Session recommends that the General Council agrees that small economies are allowed to use such regional bodies to assist them in the implementation of their obligations under the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements. It also recommends that Members and the WTO, within its competence, when providing technical and financial assistance to support small, vulnerable economies in fulfilling their rights and obligations under the agreements concerned, shall consider the advantages of providing that assistance to the regional body where such exists. It is understood that individual Members benefiting from these recommendations will continue to be legally responsible and accountable for their individual notifications and other obligations under these Agreements. This recommendation is without prejudice both to the identification of other specific measures in due course to facilitate the fuller integration of small economies into the multilateral trading system and to the use of regional bodies as described in this report by other developing country Members. __________