OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
7
Culture, Context, and the Political
Incorporation of Immigrant-Origin
Groups in Europe
Rafael a M. Dancygier
Do the social and cultural resources characteristic of immigrant groups
guide their integration, or do host country receiving contexts have a greater
impact on this process? A large body of research has addressed this question,
aiming in particular to isolate these dueling effects on immigrants’ economic
fortunes. Studies have documented substantial variation in the occupational
and educational att ainment across immigrant groups, and some have found
that these differences remain when structural characteristics are accounted
for. While such fi ndings support the view that cultural and behavioral repertoires intrinsic to immigrant groups are ultimately responsible for socioeconomic mobility, other scholars point to such structural factors as labor
market conditions, economic restructuring, or welfare policy as essential
in holding back or promoting these groups’ economic advancement.1 Many
occupy the middle ground between these two poles: group-level att ributes
and host society structures interact to shape immigrants’ economic pathways and destinations in a nonlinear pattern (Marrow 2005; Zhou 2005;
Portes and Rumbaut 2006).
Turning to immigrants’ political incorporation, this chapter makes the
case that analysts benefit from considering both group traits and institutional sett ings, and it demonstrates how these two sets of variables shape
immigrants’ political incorporation across contexts. A host of behavioral
and structural features help set in motion immigrants’ path toward political
1
For reviews, see Rajman and Tienda (1999), Zhou (2005), and Portes and Rumbaut
(2006).
119
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:119
3/12/2013 5:28:51 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
120
incorporation. The importance of these features comes into sharp relief when
studying immigrant electoral participation across groups and across institutional contexts. Immigrant groups who face the same electoral institutions
may vary in their ability or willingness to rally the co-ethnic vote, resulting in divergent incorporation outcomes and supporting the notion that
group-level characteristics are key variables in shaping political incorporation. In this way, immigrants emerge as distinctive political actors. Variables
that usually go a long way in accounting for patterns of political participation
such as income, education, or age do not provide the same kind of explanatory leverage when it comes to immigrant groups’ electoral behavior.
Notwithstanding this distinctiveness, immigrant voters and candidates
confront the same electoral institutions as do natives or other nonimmigrant
minorities. As has been shown with respect to other groups—for example,
women, national minorities, the working class—electoral institutions matter in translating political mobilization into electoral inclusion. Comparing
across institutional sett ings, we thus observe that some electoral rules reward
immigrant groups for gett ing out the ethnic vote, while others do not turn
immigrants who may have what it takes to organize collectively into influential political actors.
In this chapter I illustrate how both culture and context matter in shaping
immigrants’ political incorporation. Figure 7.1 summarizes these dynamics.2
Within the same institutional contexts, differences in groups’ mobilizational
capacity lead to differences in immigrant political incorporation (arrow A).
Some groups may draw on social networks to raise turnout and to turn group
members into pivotal constituencies. Such networks can predate arrival in
the new country and shape the immigration and sett lement processes themselves. In the destination country, they may be utilized for electoral purposes.
Th is chapter will illustrate the electoral significance of these organizational
resources by comparing political behaviors of immigrant groups who vary in
such capacities within one institutional context—local elections in the United
Kingdom. To highlight the significance of institutions, I make reference to
immigrant political incorporation in a set of additional European countries.
When we hold constant group-level characteristics advantageous for mobilization, electoral institutions will, on their own, exert influences on immigrants’
political incorporation (arrow B). Some electoral rules are more conducive
to the election of immigrants and minority groups more generally than others. In this chapter, I focus on the size of the electoral arena and on rules that
2
For a comprehensive framework of immigrant political incorporation that also examines
group characteristics as well as macro- and meso-level institutions, see Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst
(2011).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:120
3/12/2013 5:28:51 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
Group Mobilizational
Capacity
A
C
Electoral Institutions
121
Immigrant
Political
Incorporation
B
Figure 7.1 Immigrant Groups, Electoral Institutions, and Immigrant Political
Incorporation
determine the importance of party elites in candidate nomination procedures,
institutions that vary across European countries.
In addition, electoral rules interact with groups’ ability to mobilize to produce distinct incorporation outcomes: the effect of groups’ mobilizational
capacity can be amplified—or blunted—by electoral institutions (arrow C).
Groups that have the capacity to mobilize collectively may confront institutions that make such mobilization more or less effective at the polls. Similarly,
institutions that may encourage immigrant participation and representation
are more likely to have such effects when groups have the social resources to
take advantage of the institutional sett ing.
The chapter is organized as follows. I fi rst illustrate the significance of
group-level social organization by investigating differences in turnout and
representation across groups in one country and in one electoral context: local
elections in the United Kingdom. The second part of the chapter then goes
on to show how cross-national differences in electoral rules have significant
implications for immigrant voting and representation and is followed by a discussion of the interactive effects of culture and context on immigrant political
incorporation. The last section concludes.
Before proceeding it is important to point out that in this chapter immigrant
political incorporation refers specifically to electoral participation and descriptive representation, mainly at the local level. These are only two dimensions of
the broader concept of political inclusion of newcomers, but they are worthy
of study. Research has shown that group-level turnout is usually related to the
election of group members and, moreover, that the election of group members tends to be associated with substantive representation of group interests. 3
3
On such linkages, see, for example, Kasinitz et al. (2008), Dancygier (2010a, 2010b), and
Tatari (2010). Note that some have called into question that descriptive representation leads to
policy gains (e.g., Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996). For a discussion of the importance
of descriptive representation, even in the absence of substantive representation, see Mansbridge
(1999).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:121
3/12/2013 5:28:51 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
122
Though this chapter does not intend to argue that mobilization at the group
level is the only or the best way to achieve political incorporation and representation, empirically such collective organization has been linked to these outcomes. Furthermore, to keep this chapter manageable I restrict my discussion
to contexts where large shares of immigrants are eligible to vote. Though many
immigrant-receiving countries allow noncitizens to cast ballots in local elections (Bauer 2007), this is not the case when it comes to national polls. Here,
cross-national differences in citizenship rules still prove to be decisive, and previous research has highlighted the significance of citizenship regimes in molding various dimensions of immigrant political behavior (Koopmans et al.
2005). The present analysis follows this research in considering the important
impact of institutions on immigrant political incorporation, but it focuses on
contexts where immigrants are allowed to participate in elections.4
Group Differences in Immigrant Political Incorporation
When attempting to explain differences in voter turnout, political scientists
often begin by analyzing differences in the att ributes of individual voters, such
as age, socioeconomic status, or gender (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady
1995). Empirical studies of immigrant turnout have likewise focused on individual characteristics (see Ramakrishnan 2005 and sources cited therein),
though prominent accounts also view electoral participation and immigrant
political incorporation more generally as a collective, group-level process (e.g.,
Wolfi nger 1965; Uhlaner 1989).
The remarkable differences in turnout rates across immigrant groups cannot be easily accounted for by such variables as immigrants’ gender or their
socioeconomic achievement. Figure 7.2 depicts self-reported turnout rates of
several immigrant groups in the United Kingdom, broken down by the share of
co-ethnics who live in a respondent’s neighborhood (data are derived from survey responses of foreign-born UK citizens, contained in the 2003 Citizenship
Survey; see Office for National Statistics and Home Office 2005). 5 Several
4
Though I limit my discussion to this group for reasons of space, it should be borne in mind
that countries vary in the extent to which they confer such eligibility (via citizenship or local
voting rights). Eligibility in itself may thus denote varying degrees of political engagement across
contexts.
5
Specifically, respondents were asked: “What proportion of people in your neighborhood
is from the same ethnic group as you?” Respondents answered “less than half,” “about half,” or
“more than half.” According to cognitive tests conducted at the pilot stage of the survey, respondents tended to associate the neighborhood with their street or their block (Green and Farmer
2004, 63).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:122
3/12/2013 5:28:51 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
123
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi Caribbean
Co-ethnics < half
African
Chinese
Co-ethnics half or > half
Figure 7.2 Local Election Turnout across Immigrant Groups in the United Kingdom
in 2003
patterns stand out. First, turnout varies considerably across groups. Migrants
from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh register the highest turnout rates, with
averages of 68, 67, and 63 percent, respectively. These impressive turnout rates
easily surpass those of the white British native-born population, 54 percent of
whom reported to have voted in local elections. By contrast, only 47 percent
of those born in the Caribbean isles and 38 percent of migrants hailing from
Africa cast ballots in the previous local elections. Among Chinese migrants,
turnout is as low as 21 percent.
Studies about the voting behavior of immigrants in the United States have
found that turnout tends to rise with the time migrants have spent in the destination country (e.g., Gordon 1964; Ramakrishnan 2005), a fi nding in line
with assimilation theory. Yet, the aforementioned differences do not map onto
groups’ immigration histories. Among the groups shown here, Caribbeans
started arriving in England in great numbers in the late 1950s, a few years
before large-scale immigration from the Indian subcontinent began. Similarly,
the majority of Chinese immigrants—the group with the lowest turnout
rates—trace their origins to postwar migration that began in the mid-1950s.
Most of the United Kingdom’s African immigrants have more recent origins
(Hiro 1991; Wei 1994; the survey does not ask respondents when they arrived
in the United Kingdom).
Moreover, research on nonimmigrant and immigrant voting behavior has
found that electoral participation increases with age (e.g., Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Ramakrishnan 2005). In the present sample,
immigrants from the Caribbean isles are, on average, the oldest group, followed by Indians and Pakistanis. Nonetheless, turnout among Caribbeans is
at the low end of the scale and indeed much below the participation exhibited
by South Asian migrants. Immigrant voting patterns at the group level are also
not easily reconciled with the long-established fi nding that turnout rises with
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:123
3/12/2013 5:28:51 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
124
socioeconomic status. Sixty percent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (compared to 27 and 26 percent of black Caribbeans and Indians, respectively) fi nd
themselves in the bottom fi ft h of the income distribution, but these groups are
near the top when it comes to electoral participation.6
Another interesting pattern to emerge from Figure 7.2 relates to neighborhood effects. Though turnout increases among all groups as the concentration of co-ethnics in the neighborhood rises, this effect appears to be more
substantive and significant among South Asian migrants than it does among
those originating from the Caribbean and Africa (Chinese turnout in ethnic
neighborhoods is not shown because too few Chinese respondents live in such
areas).7 The data in Figure 7.2 cannot tell us whether immigrants that live in
areas with high ethnic concentrations have different preferences for electoral
participation—irrespective of the makeup of the neighborhood—than do
immigrants who live in low-concentration areas, whether mobilization is more
effective in areas with a high share of co-ethnics, or both. Either way, ethnic
neighborhoods, rather than signaling a retreat from mainstream political culture or a withdrawal from political information, may be associated with electoral participation, though turnout rates still vary considerably by group.8
To gain a better understanding of the ways in which group features matter in patterning immigrant political incorporation as outlined in the model
in Figure 7.1 (arrow A), scholars can draw on qualitative and ethnographic
accounts of voter behavior across groups and over time. With respect to immigrant political behavior in the United Kingdom, previous research has shown
that nonimmigrant candidates have relied on ethnic intermediaries to turn out
the community vote while immigrant candidates have engaged co-ethnic electorates directly, with the incidence of these strategies depending on the mobilizational capacity at the group level (e.g., Solomos and Back 1995; Dancygier
2010a). Indeed, accounts of immigrant political mobilization in England going
back to the postwar years already hint at such dynamics. Sett lers from the
Caribbean were more loosely connected with one another than migrants from
the subcontinent, who displayed tight social networks butt ressed by links of
kin, clan, and caste. Political entrepreneurs have made use of these networks
6
These statistics refer to disposable incomes net of housing costs; see Saggar (2009). For
a similar fi nding with respect to the second generation in New York City, see Kasinitz et al.
(2008).
7
When regressing local turnout on the three-point ethnic concentration variable, ethnic
concentration is statistically significant (at p = 0.1 or less) among Indians and Bangladeshis and
insignificant among Pakistanis, Caribbeans, and Africans.
8
In the United States, residential ethnic concentration has likewise been shown to promote turnout in some sett ings, but it is also believed to depress electoral participation in others
(Ramakrishnan 2005; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:124
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
125
but have found it more challenging to approach and mobilize the Caribbean
electorate.9 As early as the 1960s, South Asian immigrants regularly fielded
their own candidates and relied on strong social networks to get out the vote.
Numerous studies of voter mobilization illustrate how so-called ethnic leaders
within South Asian communities were able to rally their compatriots to the
polls.10
Such dynamics appear to have persisted over the decades: on the basis of
research conducted in Birmingham, Solomos and Back (1995, 79) fi nd that “the
whole process of vote brokering also often involved the mobilization of kin and
clan relations.” Among Birmingham’s Pakistani-origin migrants in particular,
“Caste plays a significant role in defi ning lines of support and recruitment. . . .
Th is was the mechanism by which supporters could not only be recruited but
also [be] persuaded to support particular candidates.” In brief, South Asian
local electoral participation in the United Kingdom has been high, and it has
been reinforced by mobilization at the group level.
By contrast, local electoral participation among migrants from the West
Indies has been much more subdued. Students of Caribbean immigration
noted early on that West Indians were “on the whole not yet used to being
‘organization men’” (Glass 1961, 200–201). The apparent absence of ethnic
leaders, an election researcher in Birmingham concluded, made it “very difficult for anyone, whether West Indian or English, to try to speak to or influence
the West Indian community as a whole,” contributing to low turnout rates
(Shutt leworth 1965, 73). Even where Caribbean-origin migrants had sett led
in large numbers, such as in Brixton (south London), their “sett lement . . .
lack[ed] a potential élite or internal leadership” (Patterson 1963, 59), which
in turn made it more demanding for party elites to mobilize this electorate.
More recently, scholars have asserted that West Indians are “ill-equipped
by tradition and disposition to provide an exclusively ‘ethnic’ leadership. . . .
West Indians are disinclined to base social and political action on ethnicity”
(Goulbourne 1990, 297).
Th is dislike for communal political organization is hardly a problem from
the perspective of assimilation theory. But it has also been associated with
lower levels of electoral participation and descriptive representation. The
rejection of ethnically based electioneering among Britain’s Caribbean-origin
migrants has contributed to the group’s relative underrepresentation in local
politics. By the early 1990s, when South Asians constituted about half of the
ethnic minority population, they fielded the majority (70 percent) of ethnic
9
The discussion about electoral mobilization among South Asians and West Indians in the
United Kingdom draws on fi ndings from Dancygier (2010a).
10
See, for example, Bentley (1972/1973), Scott (1972/1973), Le Lohé (1979), and Eade
(1989).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:125
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
126
minority councilors. Moreover, in a number of cities, South Asians had almost
reached representational parity: the share of elected councilors who were
South Asian mirrored this group’s share in the cities’ population. By contrast,
descriptive representation of Caribbean immigrants has been found to be lagging (Le Lohé 1998; Maxwell 2008). The pronounced differences in mobilizational capacities across groups have thus had lasting impacts.
The comparison of South Asians and Caribbeans in the United Kingdom
illustrates the importance of the effect of group mobilizational capacity on
immigrant political incorporation within one institutional sett ing (arrow
A). The substantial and persistent group differences in turnout rates support
the view that characteristics of ethnic groups explain differences in immigrant political behavior. Similar to studies that have att ributed differentials
in immigrant groups’ economic advancement to an intangible and unobservable “ethnic-group effect” (Chiswick 1978, 914), the group-level variation in
turnout rates in the face of similar immigration histories, societal contexts,
and economic conditions in the receiving country (see Dancygier 2010a) suggests that the cultures and behavioral patterns that immigrants carry over
from their homelands crucially influence their political incorporation in the
destination country. Yet, as the model of immigrant political incorporation
presented earlier implies, an account that focuses on such group-level traits
alone is incomplete when analysts want to understand differences in political
inclusion of newcomers across contexts.
Differences in Electoral Institutions and Immigrant
Political Incorporation
The differences in turnout and representation across groups within one institutional context reveal the importance of group characteristics. Once we vary
the institutional sett ing, however, we begin to appreciate the power of electoral rules in shaping immigrant electoral participation and descriptive representation (this section refers to arrow B in Figure 7.1). For reasons of space, I
will only focus on two types of institutions here: the size of the electoral arena
and the role of party elites in the nomination process (keeping in mind that
macro-variables, such as citizenship regimes, can have additional influence).
The expanse of electoral boundaries can dilute or expand the potential
immigrant electoral clout and thereby influence both immigrants’ turnout
rates and the likelihood of electing a co-ethnic. At-large elections, where the
entire city forms one electoral district, have thus been shown to be less favorable to the election of minorities than have elections that divide the city into
districts. Th is logic holds when groups are not evenly distributed across the
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:126
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
127
city (as is often the case with immigrant populations), and it has been used to
explain the election of African Americans in US cities.11 In district-based elections, groups may constitute a large enough share of the electorate to motivate
participation and to facilitate the election of a group member. When the entire
city forms one district, relative group size declines and groups will be less likely
to elect a fellow immigrant, holding constant a group’s capacity to mobilize.
Differences in the size of the electoral arena can help explain part of the
variation in immigrant political incorporation across Britain and France.12
British cities are divided into wards, which, on average, contain about 6,000
residents.13 Given this size, a small number of immigrant voters can in fact
swing election outcomes. Moreover, immigrant newcomers themselves may
be more comfortable and successful accessing local ward party organizations
in their neighborhoods compared to party organizations at the city level.
In France, by contrast, the entire city forms one electoral district, considerably enlarging the electoral arena. Th is arrangement makes it easier for political candidates to ignore immigrant electorates without incurring high costs
at the polls. Indeed, party leaderships in French cities have been found to pay
less attention to immigrant voters than have their counterparts in Britain.
Attempts to incorporate immigrant voters in France have often failed to move
beyond symbolic tokenism (Geisser 1997; Bird 2005; Maxwell 2012).
To be sure, a host of additional contextual features contribute to differential incorporation outcomes in Britain and France, including, on one hand,
French-style republican assimilationism, which shuns the recognition of communal bonds, and British-style multiculturalism on the other, which, at least
in the past, has not only recognized but also reinforced such ties (Koopmans
et al. 2005). Yet, that even within one country, the United States, at-large
elections have been systematically linked to the underrepresentation of
11
See, for instance, Trounstine and Valdini (2008) for such a fi nding and for a concise review
of the literature relating these institutions to the election of minorities in American municipalities. See also Davidson and Grofman (1994) and Cameron et al. (1996) on how redistricting
influences descriptive and substantive representation of African Americans in Congress. See also
Posner (2004) on how political boundaries can change the relative sizes of ethnic groups, thereby
affecting incentives for interethnic coalition building and, subsequently, influencing the political
salience of ethnic cleavages across contexts.
12
See Garbaye (2005) and Maxwell (2012) on this topic. Note that British local elections
operate according to plurality rule and wards typically elect between one and three candidates.
French local elections follow semiproportional rules that heavily favor winning parties by allotting disproportionate seat shares to them. For instance, a party that wins 60 percent of the vote
receives half of all council seats in addition to another 60 percent of the remaining seats, for a
total of 80 percent of all seats (see Bird 2005).
13
Th is figure is based on 2001 census data (author’s calculation, available at htt p://) and will
be somewhat higher in urban areas where immigrants tend to sett le.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:127
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
128
minorities at the local level when compared to district-level elections speaks
to the importance of this institutional difference in shaping political incorporation of immigrants.14
Another set of institutional variables that can have significant effects on
immigrant electoral participation and representation pertains to the role
of party elites in the nomination and election process. In some countries,
incumbent party elites exercise considerable control over nomination procedures, while in others, this process is more open to outsiders, including to
immigrant newcomers. Moreover, in systems that use party lists, once candidates are selected to run for office, elites may influence their shot at gett ing
elected by determining their placement on the list. When examining how
nomination procedures affect immigrant political incorporation, analysts
should investigate at what stage immigrants can be involved in the nomination process and, where applicable, if they can influence the placement of
candidates.
Continuing with the juxtaposition of Britain and France, we once again
observe that British elections are more open to immigrants than are French
elections. Though rules vary somewhat by party (Ali and O’Cinneide 2002),
local parties in Britain tend to play a large role in the selection of candidates.
Here, ward party members are involved in the selection process by voting for
their preferred candidate at ward party meetings. Ward party membership is,
in turn, open to local residents, including to immigrants. In wards that are
home to sizable immigrant-origin electorates, immigrants have joined ward
parties in great numbers and have thereby been able to select co-ethnics to
run in local elections. There is, of course, no guarantee that these comparatively open rules are indeed followed in practice, and researchers have to check
to what extent formal rules are followed in practice. In the United Kingdom,
for instance, party elites at higher levels have at times stepped in on behalf
of nonimmigrant candidates who lost nomination to immigrant-origin candidates, and established members have accused immigrants of bending the
rules when undertaking membership drives (Solomos and Beck 1995; Geddes
1998; Purdam 2001). Furthermore, party elites do play an important role in
approving candidates’ eligibility for selection, and it is also at this stage that
immigrant-origin office seekers have encountered discrimination, especially
when they wish to represent safe seats in mostly white, nonimmigrant areas
(Ali and O’Cinneide 2002; Dancygier 2010b). Nevertheless, immigrants have
been shown to enter local ward parties with great success and to elect fellow
co-ethnics to run in their ward party (Dancygier 2010a).
14
For a review of the US literature, as well as further evidence of this patt ern, see Trounstine
and Valdini (2008).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:128
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
129
Party elites are more influential in selecting candidates in French elections.
As Bird (2005, 438) explains, the “selection of candidates is controlled by the
mayor and his local power barons. While visible minorities might be included
on the list, they are rarely given key positions.” Elites thus not only determine
who may run, but also what position a candidate receives on the list. Once
immigrant-origin politicians succeed in securing a spot on the party list, the
party leadership may still place them on the bottom of this list, ultimately
thwarting these candidates’ chances of being elected (Garbaye 2005).
Note that voters can also influence the placement of candidates on party
lists, and this ability may be conducive to political inclusion of migrants.
Though elites are generally crucial in determining candidates’ entry and position on party lists, electoral rules that allow voters to register preference votes
for specific candidates can diminish the importance of elites. Such a system
characterizes local elections in several European countries, including Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Denmark.15 Here, voters can choose to cast votes for the
party as a whole, or they can elect to allocate personal votes for preferred candidates. Candidates who obtain sufficient personal votes can improve on their
list position and thus enhance their chances of gett ing elected. Th is system
thus places more power in the hands of voters compared to elites, and it allows
immigrant voters to express a preference for co-ethnics, if they choose to do so.
Studies have indeed documented that immigrants are more likely than native
voters to make use of personal votes to boost the descriptive representation of
the immigrant electorate (Togeby 1999, 2008; Bird 2005; Teney et al. 2010).
Interactive Effects
Th is chapter has traced how group traits and electoral institutions shape patterns of immigrant electoral incorporation. In addition to their independent
effects, group features and institutions interact to enhance or dampen the
impact of each on immigrant political incorporation (arrow C in Figure 7.1).
As we have seen, for example, district-level elections have contributed to
political inclusion of newcomers when compared to at-large contests, but it is
especially in the presence of groups that organize collectively that small electoral wards can promote turnout and the election of immigrant candidates.
The contrast between Caribbeans and South Asians in the United Kingdom
makes this point. Similarly, though candidate nomination procedures are
comparatively open in the United Kingdom, it is groups who have the capacity
15
All three countries permit noncitizens to vote in local elections, which operate according
to proportional representation rules.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:129
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
130
to recruit co-ethnics to become party members and to thereby increase their
chances of nomination that have been particularly effective in using this system to advance group-level turnout and representation (Dancygier 2010b).
Similarly, systems that allow voters to cast personal votes have raised immigrant turnout and representation of groups that show a penchant for ethnically
based campaigning and voting. In Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark,
preferential voting has thus been used to great effect by immigrants of Turkish
origin, many of which appear to view local elections through the prism of community interest and organization and who can parlay the strength of their social
networks into political capital. As suggested by the model presented earlier, in
these countries, strong mobilizational capacity converges with electoral institutions to provide incentives for electoral participation among voters and elites
alike. Nonimmigrant party elites have not shied away from relying on this system
to “conquer local ethnic electoral niches,” hoping to appeal to immigrant communities that can rally their members on election day (Teney et al. 2010, 293).16
Note also that one implication of the model proposed here is that incentives
produced by specific electoral rules and groups’ mobilizational capacity can
be at least as significant in molding immigrant political incorporation as are
national citizenship regimes (though, importantly, the latter help determine
eligibility for participation in the fi rst place). As Teney et al. (2010, 279) point
out with reference to the effects of preferential voting and ethnic mobilization among immigrant-origin minorities in Belgium, given these institutions’
and groups’ mobilizational capacity, party elites are not reluctant to mobilize
voters on the basis of their ethnicity even though elections in Belgium and
immigrant incorporation more generally take “place in a discursive context in
which political mobilization on an ethnic ticket was—fairly hypocritically—
being presented by all political parties as something undesirable.” Students of
immigrant political incorporation may therefore fi nd that an assimilationist
national ethos may matter less than do electoral institutions and group mobilizational capacity on the ground.
On the fl ipside, the model of political incorporation presented in this
chapter suggests that the capacity of groups to organize collectively may promote immigrants’ electoral incorporation only provided that institutions are
responsive to such behavior (arrow C). In France, for instance, even groups
that are characterized by dense social networks and high organizational
capacities confront a closed political environment. The example of the French
Maghrebian population is instructive here. Th is group is relatively rich in
community associations and has created an array of social organizations that
16
See also Togeby (1999, 2008); Bousett a, Gsir, and Jacobs (2005); Dekker and Fatt ah
(2006); and van Londen, Phalet, and Hagendoorn (2007).
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:130
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
131
political actors—immigrant and native alike—can liaise with to coordinate
political actions in the electoral arena.17 Yet, evidence from localities across
France demonstrates that established party elites sideline this group’s attempts
to gain access to city hall. In Lille, for example, a majoritarian electoral system
and a powerful Socialist establishment inhibited minority electoral participation in the 1980s and 1990s (Garbaye 2005). Attempts to increase the number
of ethnic minority candidates have similarly been thwarted by local elites who
ultimately control selection procedures (Bird 2005). Though Maghrebians’
mobilizational capacity has increased electoral incorporation when compared
to Caribbean immigrants who are (as in the United Kingdom) less likely to be
connected to such networks, at-large elections and the dominance of incumbent party elites are some of the institutions that have helped stunt the impact
of group mobilizational capacity on immigrant inclusion. As Maxwell (2012)
has shown, Maghrebian turnout only exceeds that of French Caribbeans by a
few percentage points and falls significantly below that of native-born white
French voters. Moreover, rates of Maghrebian descriptive representation have
generally been lower than those of South Asians in the United Kingdom. These
outcomes are in line with the prediction of this chapter’s model of immigrant
political incorporation embodied by arrow C.
Conclusion
Diverse outcomes of immigrant political incorporation in Europe are products of culture and context. In this chapter, I have highlighted how group-level
mobilizational capacity can promote immigrant turnout and descriptive representation when paired with institutions that allow immigrants to utilize their
organizational resources for electoral purposes—provided immigrant groups
have an interest in such mobilization.
Though ethnically based electioneering has been associated with raised
electoral participation and representation in these sett ings, as mentioned
earlier, this road toward immigrant inclusion may not necessarily be accompanied with incorporation in other domains. While facilitating immigrants
to have a political voice, it may also reinforce ethnic cleavages and engender
confl ictual intergroup relations.18 Assimilation and political incorporation
thus do not move in tandem. Likewise, in light of the diversity in group traits,
electoral institutions, and their combinations across contexts, we should not
17
Th is discussion is necessarily stylized. For more details on the development of Maghrebian
organizations see Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau (2001) and Maxwell (2012).
18
See Dancygier (2010a) for an account that links immigrant political power to
immigrant-native confl ict.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:131
3/12/2013 5:28:52 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
Politics
132
assume linear processes of integration, whereby immigrant political inclusion
correlates with variables such as time in the adopted home country or socioeconomic characteristics. Nor would it be reasonable to presume that political incorporation tracks integration in other domains. Indeed, the confluence
of economic advancement and political participation—so prevalent in studies of voting behavior of nonimmigrant populations—appears to be absent in
the case of immigrant electorates, at least in European cities. As seen earlier,
for example, British voters of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent have particularly high turnout and representation rates, but they are among Britain’s
most economically disadvantaged groups. Similarly, economic achievements
among Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands and Belgium still have to
catch up with these groups’ advancements in the political arena. That political
incorporation does not go hand in hand with other aspects of incorporation
should in turn lead to interesting and challenging questions when it comes
to the substantive representation of minority interests. Do groups that successfully participate in politics on an ethnic basis diminish their members’
chances of integration in other realms? Or does ethnically based electoral
inclusion deliver the policy gains that groups require for social integration
and economic advancement?19
Another set of interesting questions pertains to the role of electoral institutions in shaping intergroup and intragroup relations. Do electoral institutions
that place a premium on the mobilization of co-ethnics inhibit the formation of intergroup coalitions between different immigrant groups or between
immigrants and the native population?20 In the case of list-based preference
voting, for instance, aspiring candidates still rely on (mostly nonimmigrant)
elites to secure a place on the ballot, but once nominated their campaigns may
exclusively target the immigrant vote. By contrast, in ward-level elections in
areas of high immigrant concentration, immigrant politicians may not have to
depend on native elites or voters, especially when local ward members decide
selection outcomes.
In this chapter I have largely examined the implications of a model in which
institutions and group attributes affect immigrant political incorporation in the
short term, viewing group identities as more or less fi xed. Taking a more dynamic
view, one could extend the model presented in Figure 7.1 to further explore
which identity categories gain salience given varying electoral arrangements.
Research on the political mobilization of ethnic groups has shown that electoral institutions can powerfully shape voters’ identity choices and politicians’
19
See Maxwell (2012) for a stimulating discussion of these potential trade-off s.
See Rogers (2009) on the difficulty of coalition building between immigrants and African
Americans in US cities.
20
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:132
3/12/2013 5:28:53 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
133
messages (e.g., Fearon 1999; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). Do electoral rules
play similar roles with respect to immigrant communities in European cities?
For example, do immigrant-origin politicians competing for the immigrant
franchise in ward-level elections play up regional or religious differences that
set immigrant candidates apart? Do immigrant voters respond to such more differentiated appeals because they prefer to be members of a minimum-winning
coalition rather than of a more undifferentiated immigrant electorate?
Questions such as these imply that the model of immigrant political incorporation presented here can include additional analytical steps. For instance,
if groups grow in size over time, arguments about minimum-winning coalitions would imply that differentiation—rather than assimilation—becomes
more likely as time passes. Further, this differentiation should occur sooner
the smaller the electoral arena relative to the group size. Additionally, external
developments that are exogenous to local political events and that are not captured in the model offered here may guide which identity categories have the
potential of being politicized. Attention to how such dynamic processes and
external events influence the identity of groups, as well as the effects of group
traits and electoral institutions, can provide additional richness and complexity to our understanding of immigrant political incorporation.
References
Ali, Rushanara, and O’Cinneide Colm. 2002. Our House? Race and Representation in British
Politics. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
Bauer, Werner. 2007. Das kommunale AusländerInnenwahlrecht im europäischen Vergleich.
Österreichische Gesellschaft f ü r Politikberatung und Politikentwicklung. htt p://
www.politikberatung.or.at/wwwa/documents/kommunalesauslaenderwahlrecht.pdf
(accessed February 5, 2013).
Bentley, Stuart. 1972/1973. “Intergroup Relations in Local Politics: Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis.” New Community 2 (1): 44–48.
Bird, Karen. 2005. “The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies:
A Comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11 (4):
425–465.
Bird, Karen, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas Wüst, eds. 2011. The Political Representation of
Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. New
York: Routledge.
Bousett a, Hassan, Sonia Gsir, and Dirk Jacobs. 2005. Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in
Belgium. Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS. htt p://
www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Belgium.pdf (accessed September 13,
2010).
Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1996. “Do Majority-Minority
Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” American Political
Science Review 90 (4): 794–812.
Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in
India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:133
3/12/2013 5:28:53 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
134
Politics
Chiswick, Barry. 1978. “The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of Foreign-Born Men.”
Journal of Political Economy 86 (5): 897–921.
Dancygier, Rafaela. 2010a. Immigration and Conflict in Europe. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
———. 2010b. “Identity, Institutions, and the Election of Muslim Candidates in Europe.”
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington, DC, September 2–5.
Davidson, Chandler, and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1994. Quiet Revolution in the South: The
Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965–1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dekker, Lisette, and Brahim Fatt ah. 2006. “Meer Diversiteit in de Gemeenteraden.”
Amsterdam: Instituut voor Participatie en Politiek.
Eade, John. 1989. The Politics of Community. Aldershot: Avebury.
Fearon, James. 1999. “Why Ethnic Politics and ‘Pork’ Tend to Go Together.” Stanford, CA:
Stanford University, Department of Political Science.
Garbaye, Romain. 2005. Gett ing into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and
French Cities. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Geddes, Andrew. 1998. “Inequality, Political Opportunity, and Ethnic Minority Parliamentary
Candidacy.” In Race and British Electoral Politics, edited by S. Saggar, 145–171. London:
UCL Press.
Geisser, Vincent. 1997. Ethnicité R épublicaine. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Glass, Ruth. 1961. London’s Newcomers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gordon, Milton M. 1964. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National
Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.
Goulbourne, Harry. 1990. “The Offence of the West Indian: Political Leadership and the
Communal Option.” In Black and Ethnic Leaderships, edited by P. Werbner and M. Anwar,
296–322. London: Routledge.
Green, Hazel, and Christine Farmer. 2004. “2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey: People,
Families and Communities—Technical Report.” Office for National Statistics.
Hiro, Dilip. 1991. Black British White British: A History of Race Relations in Britain. London:
Grafton.
Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway. 2008. Inheriting the
City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy. 2005. Contested
Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Le Lohé, Michel. 1979. “The Effects of the Presence of Immigrants upon the Local Political
System in Bradford, 1945–77.” In Racism and Political Action in Britain, edited by R. Miles
and A. Phizacklea, 184–203. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
———. 1998. “Ethnic Minority Participation and Representation in the British Electoral
System.” In Race and British Electoral Politics, edited by S. Saggar, 73–95. London: UCL
Press.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. “Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A
Contingent ‘Yes.’” Journal of Politics 61 (3): 628–657.
Marrow, Helen B. 2005. “New Destinations and Immigrant Incorporation.” Perspectives on
Politics 3 (4): 781–799.
Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2012. Ethnic Minority Migrants in Britain and France: Integration Trade-Offs.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Office for National Statistics and Home Office. 2005. 2003 Home Office Citizenship Survey
[computer fi le]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor].
Patterson, Sheila. 1963. Dark Strangers. London: Tavistock Publications.
Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait. 3rd ed. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:134
3/12/2013 5:28:53 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
C u l t u r e , C o n t e x t , a n d Po l i t i c a l I n c o r p o ra t i o n i n E u r o p e
135
Posner, Daniel. 2004. “The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and
Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi.” American Political Science
Review 98 (4, November): 529–545.
———. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Afr ica. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Purdam, Kingsley. 2001. “Democracy in Practice: Muslims and the Labour Party at the Local
Level.” Politics 21 (3): 147–157.
Raijman, Rebeca, and Marta Tienda. 1999. “Immigrants’ Socioeconomic Progress post-1965:
Forging Mobility or Survival?” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American
Experience, edited by C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind, 239–256. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. 2005. Democracy in Immigrant America. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Rogers, Reuel. 2009. “Political Institutions and Rainbow Coalitions: Immigrant-Minority
Relations in New York and Hartford.” In Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives
on Immigrant Political Incorporation, edited by Jennifer Hochschild and John H.
Mollenkopf, 93–110. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Rosenstone, Steven, and John Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in
America. New York: Macmillan.
Saggar, Shamit. 2009. Pariah Politics: Understanding Western Radical Islamism and What
Should Be Done. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott , Duncan. 1972/1973. “West Pakistanis in Huddersfield: Aspects of Race Relations in
Local Politics.” New Community 2 (1): 38–43.
Shutt leworth, Alan. 1965. “Sparkbrook.” In Colour and the British Electorate, edited by N.
Deakin, 54–76. New York: Praeger.
Solomos, John, and Les Back. 1995. Race, Politics, and Social Change. London: Routledge.
Tam Cho, Wendy, James Gimpel, and Joshua Dyck. 2006. “Residential Concentration, Political
Socialization, and Voter Turnout.” Journal of Politics 68 (1): 156–167.
Tatari, Eren. 2010. “The Contingency Theory of Descriptive Representation: Muslims in
British Local Government.” Department of Political Science, Indiana University,
Bloomington.
Teney, Celine, Dirk Jacobs, Andrea Rea, and Pascal Delwit. 2010. “Ethnic Voting in Brussels:
Voting Patterns among Ethnic Minorities in Brussels (Belgium) during the 2006 Local
Elections.” Acta Politica 45 (3): 273–297.
Togeby, Lise. 1999. “Migrants at the Polls: An Analysis of Immigrant and Refugee Participation
in Danish Local Elections.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25 (4): 665–684.
———. 2008. “The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Denmark as a Deviant
Case.” Party Politics 14 (3): 325–343.
Trounstine, Jessica, and Melody Valdini. 2008. “The Context Matters: The Effects of
Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity.” American Journal
of Political Science 52 (3): 554–569.
Uhlaner, Carole. 1989. “Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups.” American Journal
of Political Science 33 (2): 390–422.
van Londen, Marieke, Karen Phalet, and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. “Civic Engagement and
Voter Participation among Turkish and Moroccan Minorities in Rotterdam.” Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (8): 1201–1226.
Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism
in American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wei, Li. 1994. Three Generations, Two Languages, One Family: Language Choice and Language
Shift in a Chinese Community in Britain. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine, and R émy Leveau. 2001. La Beurgeoisie: Les Trois  ges de la Vie
Associative Issue de l’Immigration. Paris: CNRS.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:135
3/12/2013 5:28:53 PM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Mar 12 2013, NEWGEN
136
Politics
Wolfi nger, Raymond. 1965. “The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting.” American
Political Science Review 59 (4): 896–908.
Zhou, Min. 2005. “Ethnicity and Social Capital: Community-Based Institutions and
Embedded Networks of Social Relations.” In Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Public
Policy: Comparing the USA and UK , edited by G. Loury, T. Modood, and S. Teles, 131–
159. New York: Cambridge University Press.
07_Hochschild_Ch07.indd Sec1:136
3/12/2013 5:28:53 PM