Source: IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Historical Table 23
US Top Marginal Tax Rate and Top Bracket Threshold
10000
Top MTR
90%
Threshold/Averag
e Income
80%
1000
70%
60%
100
50%
40%
30%
10
20%
10%
1
Source: statistics computed by the author
2008
2003
1998
1993
1988
1983
1978
1973
1968
1963
1958
1953
1948
1943
1938
1933
1928
1923
1918
1913
0%
Top Bracket Threshold/Average Income
Top MTR (Federal Individual Income Tax)
100%
Top MTR (Federal Individual Income Tax)
US Top MTR ordinary income vs. capital gains
100%
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
Top MTR
10%
Top MTR (capital gains)
10%
0%
Source: statistics computed by the author
2008
2003
1998
1993
1988
1983
1978
1973
1968
1963
1958
1953
1948
1943
1938
1933
1928
1923
1918
1913
0%
Source: Saez et al. (2010)
Table A1.
Top Federal Marginal Tax Rates
Ordinary Income
Earned Income
Capital Gains
Corporate Income
Year
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1952-1963
1964
1965-1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972-1975
1976-1978
1979-1980
1981
1982-1986
1987
1988-1990
1991-1992
1993
1994-2000
2001
2002
2003-2009
91.0
77.0
70.0
75.3
77.0
71.8
70.0
70.0
70.0
70.0
68.8
50.0
38.5
28.0
31.0
39.6
39.6
39.1
38.6
35.0
91.0
77.0
70.0
75.3
77.0
71.8
60.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
38.5
28.0
31.0
39.6
42.5
42.0
41.5
37.9
25.0
25.0
25.0
26.9
27.9
32.3
34.3
36.5
39.9
28.0
23.7
20.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
20.0
20.0
15.0
52
50
48
53
53
49
48
48
48
46
46
46
40
34
34
35
35
35
35
35
Notes: MTRs apply to top incomes. In some instances, lower income taxpayers may face higher MTRs because of income
caps on payroll taxes or the so-called 33 percent "bubble" bracket following TRA 86. From 1952 to 1962, a 87% maximum
average tax rate provision made the top marginal tax rate 87% instead of 91% for many very top income earners. From 1968
to 1970, rates include surtaxes. For earned income, MTRs include the Health Insurance portion of the payroll tax beginning
with year 1994. Rates exclude the effect of phaseouts, which effectively raise top MTRs for many high-income filers. MTRs on
realized capital gains are adjusted to reflect that, for some years, a fraction of realized gains were excluded from taxation.
Since 2003, dividends are also tax favored with a maximum tax rate of 15%.
US Top 0.01% Income Share and MTR (Piketty-Saez and Landais)
5.0%
100%
Top 0.01% MTR
4.5%
Top 0.01% Share
4.0%
2008
2003
1998
1993
0.0%
1988
0%
1983
0.5%
1978
10%
1973
1.0%
1968
20%
1963
1.5%
1958
30%
1953
2.0%
1948
40%
1943
2.5%
1938
50%
1933
3.0%
1928
60%
1923
3.5%
1918
70%
Top 0.01% Income Share
80%
1913
Top .01% MTR (Federal Income Tax)
90%
US Top 0.01% Income Share and MTR (Piketty-Saez and Landais)
5.0%
100%
Top 0.01% MTR
4.5%
Top 0.01% Share
4.0%
log(share)=a+0.617 (0.077)*log(1-MTR)+e
log(share)=a+b*t+0.666 (0.071)*log(1-MTR)+e
2008
2003
1998
1993
0.0%
1988
0%
1983
0.5%
1978
10%
1973
1.0%
1968
20%
1963
1.5%
1958
30%
1953
2.0%
1948
40%
1943
2.5%
1938
50%
1933
3.0%
1928
60%
1923
3.5%
1918
70%
Top 0.01% Income Share
80%
1913
Top .01% MTR (Federal Income Tax)
90%
A. Top 1% Income Share and Marginal Tax Rate
18%
60%
16%
50%
12%
40%
10%
30%
8%
6%
20%
4%
10%
Top 1% Marginal Tax Rate
Top 1% Income Share
2%
0%
Source: satistics computed by the author
B. Next 9% Income Share and Marginal Tax Rate
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
0%
Top 1% Income Share
Top 1% Marginal Tax Rate
14%
60%
30%
50%
25%
40%
20%
30%
15%
20%
10%
10%
Next 9% Marginal Tax Rate
Next 9% Income Share
Next 9% Marginal Tax Rate
B. Next 9% Income Share and Marginal Tax Rate
5%
Next 9% Income Share
0%
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
0%
FIGURE 1
Top Income Shares and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2006
Source: Updated version of Figure 8 in Saez (2004). Computations based on income tax return data.
Income excludes realized capital gains, as well as Social Security and unemployment insurance benefits.
The figure displays the income share (right y-axis) and the average marginal tax rate (left y-axis)
(weigthed by income) for the top 1% (Panel A) and for the next 9% (Panel B) income earners.
Table 1.
Elasticity estimates using top income share time series
Top 1%
(1)
Next 9%
(2)
1981 vs. 1984 (ERTA 1981)
0.60
0.21
1986 vs. 1988 (TRA 1986)
1.36
-0.20
1992 vs. 1993 (OBRA 1993)
0.45
1991 vs. 1994 (OBRA 1993)
-0.39
A. Tax Reform Episodes
B. Full Time Series 1960-2006
No time trends
1.71
(0.31)
0.01
(0.13)
Linear time trend
0.82
(0.20)
-0.02
(0.02)
Linear and square time trends
0.74
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.03)
Linear, square, and cube time trends
0.58
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates in panel A are obtained using series from Figure 1 and using the formula
e=[log(income share after reform)-log(income share before reform)]/[log(1- MTR after
reform)-log(1- MTR before reform)]
Source: Saez et al. (2010)
Estimates in Panel B are obtained by time-series regression of log(top 1% income share)
on a constant, log (1 - average marginal tax rate), and polynomials time controls from 1960
to 2006 (44 observations). OLS regression. Standard Errors from Newey-West with 8 lags.
18%
Income Share(t)
A+1.58*log[1-MTR(t)]
16%
A+0.62*log[1-MTR(t)]-.018*t+.00077*t^2
Income Share
A+0.62*log[1-MTR(1960)]-.018*t+.00077*t^2
14%
12%
10%
8%
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
6%
FIGURE 5.
The Top 1% Income Share and fitted Values from Elasticity Regressions
Source: Series based on regression analysis presented in Table 3, columns (1) and (5).
The diamond line is the top 1% income share. The dotted line is the fitted regression curve
including only the net-of-tax rate. The solid line is the fitted regression curve including time controls.
The dashed line is the same fitted regression curve but freezes the marginal tax rate at the 1960 value.
Source: Feldstein (1995), p. 561
Source: Feldstein (1995), p. 565
Top MTR (Federal Individual Income Tax)
US Top MTR ordinary income vs. capital gains
100%
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
Top MTR
10%
Top MTR (capital gains)
10%
0%
Source: statistics computed by the author
2008
2003
1998
1993
1988
1983
1978
1973
1968
1963
1958
1953
1948
1943
1938
1933
1928
1923
1918
1913
0%
US Top 0.1% Income Share and Composition
12%
Capital Gains
10%
Capital Income
Business Income
8%
Salaries
6%
4%
2%
Source: Piketty and Saez QJE'03, updated to 2007
2006
2001
1996
1991
1986
1981
1976
1971
1966
1961
1956
1951
1946
1941
1936
1931
1926
1921
1916
0%
Source: Goolsbee (2000), p. 365
Source: Goolsbee (2000), p. 365
The Top 0.01% US Income Share, Composition, and MTR
90%
80%
3.0%
70%
2.5%
60%
2.0%
1.5%
Wages
S-Corp.
Partnership
Sole Prop.
Dividends
Interest
40%
Other
MTR
30%
1.0%
50%
20%
0.5%
10%
0%
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
0.0%
Source: Saez et al. (2010)
Marginal Tax Rate for the top 0.01%
Top 0.01% share and composition
3.5%
US Top Marginal Tax Rate (Federal Individual Income Tax)
100%
Top MTR (Federal Individual Income Tax)
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
Source: statistics computed by the author
2008
2003
1998
1993
1988
1983
1978
1973
1968
1963
1958
1953
1948
1943
1938
1933
1928
1923
1918
1913
0%
US Top 0.1% Income Share and Composition
12%
Capital Gains
10%
Capital Income
Business Income
8%
Salaries
6%
4%
2%
Source: Piketty and Saez QJE'03, updated to 2007
2006
2001
1996
1991
1986
1981
1976
1971
1966
1961
1956
1951
1946
1941
1936
1931
1926
1921
1916
0%
Top 0.1% WAGE Share and Marginal Tax Rate in US
6%
70%
10%
0%
Source: statistics computed by the author
2005
1%
2000
20%
1995
2%
1990
30%
1985
3%
1980
40%
1975
4%
1970
50%
1965
5%
Top 0.1% WAGE Income Share
Top 0.1% Share
60%
1960
Marginal Tax Rate
Top 0.1% MTR
Top 0.1% WAGE income Share and MTR in Japan
6%
70%
1%
10%
0%
Source: statistics computed by the author
2000
20%
1995
2%
1990
30%
1985
3%
1980
40%
1975
4%
1970
50%
1965
5%
Top 0.1% WAGE Income Share
Top 0.1% Share
60%
1960
Marginal Tax Rate
Top 0.1% MTR
SOURCE IS LANDAIS '09
Charitable contributions as a % of total income and MTR on ordinary income
Top .01% tax units, United States, 1915-2005
(fractiles computed by total income excluding capital gains)
% of income
16%
MTR
100%
90%
MTR
14%
contributions
12%
80%
70%
60%
10%
50%
8%
40%
6%
30%
4%
20%
Note:
MTR is for Federal Income Tax only
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
1935
1930
0%
1925
0%
1920
2%
1915
10%
Introduction
Research Design
Estimation
Welfare
Conclusion
I specifically focus on households located within 1 mile of the utility border
Edison (Southern California Edison) provides electricity for the north side
San Diego
Source: Ito, (San
2011Diego Gas & Electric) provides electricity for the south side
19 / 69
Introduction
Research Design
Estimation
Welfare
Conclusion
In contrast, they experience substantially different nonlinear pricing
Edison and San Diego: Cents per kWh in 2002
25
Edison
20
San Diego
15
10
Monthly Consumption
Source: Ito, 2011
22 / 69
DD = (mean % change in San Diego) - (mean % change in Edison)
Relative changes for SDG&E customers relative to SCE customers.
30
3
20
2
10
1
0
0
−10
−1
−20
−2
−30
−3
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Year
Marginal Price
Source: Ito, 2011
Average Price
Consumption
Difference−in−Differences in Consumption (%)
Difference−in−Differences in Price (%)
Panel A: Top Decile (90% - 100%) of Consumption Distributions
DD = (mean % change in San Diego) - (mean % change in Edison)
Relative changes for SDG&E customers relative to SCE customers.
30
3
20
2
10
1
0
0
−10
−1
−20
−2
−30
−3
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Year
Marginal Price
Source: Ito, 2011
Average Price
Consumption
Difference−in−Differences in Consumption (%)
Difference−in−Differences in Price (%)
Panel A: Top Decile (90% - 100%) of Consumption Distributions
DD = (mean % change in San Diego) - (mean % change in Edison)
Relative changes for SDG&E customers relative to SCE customers.
30
3
20
2
10
1
0
0
−10
−1
−20
−2
−30
−3
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Year
Marginal Price
Source: Ito, 2011
Average Price
Consumption
Difference−in−Differences in Consumption (%)
Difference−in−Differences in Price (%)
Panel A: Top Decile (90% - 100%) of Consumption Distributions
DD = (mean % change in San Diego) - (mean % change in Edison)
Relative changes for SDG&E customers relative to SCE customers.
30
3
20
2
10
1
0
0
−10
−1
−20
−2
−30
−3
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Year
Marginal Price
Source: Ito, 2011
Average Price
Consumption
Difference−in−Differences in Consumption (%)
Difference−in−Differences in Price (%)
Panel B. Fifth Decile (40% - 50%) of Consumption Distributions
Introduction
Research Design
Estimation
Welfare
Conclusion
Estimation results: Marginal Price v.s. Average Price
2SLS Estimates: Marginal Price vs. Average Price
Distance from border
1 mile
(1)
ln(MP)
0.5 mile
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-.087
-.007
-.092
-.009
(.007)
(.015)
(.011)
(.020)
ln(AP)
-.112
-.108
(.006)
(.013)
Observations
6,513,600
-.121
-.114
(.011)
(.017)
3,520,320
Dependent variable: ln(Electricity consumption)
Standard errors are clustered at city-deciles levels
Source: Ito, 2011
48 / 69
Figure 2. Two Decades of Danish Tax Reform
Panel B. Marginal Tax Rate on Negative Capital Income
75
75
70
70
Marginal Tax Rate
Marginal Tax Rate
Panel A. Marginal Tax Rate on Labor Income
65
60
55
50
65
60
55
50
45
40
45
35
40
30
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
Bottom bracket
1994
1996
1998
2000
Middle bracket
2002
2004
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Bottom bracket
Top bracket
Panel C. Marginal Tax Rate on Positive Capital Income
Top bracket
Panel D. Share of Taxpayers in the Three Tax Brackets
0.6
75
Share of all taxpayers (%)
70
Marginal Tax Rate
Middle bracket
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
Source: Kleven and Schultz '12
Bottom bracket
Middle bracket
1998
2000
2002
2004
Top bracket
1984
1986
1988
Bottom bracket
1990
1992
1994
1996
Middle bracket
1998
2000
2002
2004
Top bracket
Figure 6. Graphical Evidence on the Effects of the 1987‐reform on Taxable Income
Source: Kleven and Schultz '12Panel A. Labor Income
Labor income (ind
dex 1986=100)
120
DD1 Elasticity = 0.214 (0.011)
DD2 Elasticity = 0.257 (0.013)
115
110
105
100
95
90
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Treatment 1
1988
1989
Treatment 2
1990
1991
1992
1993
1991
1992
1993
Control
Panel B. Positive Capital Income
Positive Cap
pital Income (index 1986=1
100)
130
DD Elasticity = 0.278 (0.063)
120
110
100
90
80
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Treatment
1988
1989
1990
Control
Notes: Panel A considers the effect on labor income under two treatment group definitions using the grouping in Figure 3. Treatment 1 includes all
groups in Figure 3 who experience an increase in the marginal net‐of‐tax rate on labor income as a result of the reform (1986‐1989 difference),
while treatment 2 includes the same groups except those in the middle bracket ("stay middle" group in Figure 3) who experience a relatively small
net‐of‐tax rate increase. The control group includes those groups in Figure 3 who experience a decrease in the marginal net‐of‐tax rate as a result
of the reform. Panel B considers the effect on positive capital income based on the grouping in Figure 5, with the treatment (control) group defined
as those who experience an increase (decrease) in the marginal net‐of‐tax rate on positive capital income resulting from the reform. In both panels,
only taxpayers who are in the sample in every year of the period under consideration (1984‐1993) are included, and income levels in 1986 are
normalized to 100 in both treatment and control groups (without loss of generality as identification come from percentage changes over time, not
from
absolute
levels).
that
(1982‐1986)
f
b l
l l ) Both
h panels
l show
h
h trends
d are extremely
l parallel
ll l in
i the
h years prior
i to the
h reform
f
(1982 1986) and
d start to diverge
di
precisely in 1987 which is the first year with tax cuts. Most of the effect of the tax reform takes place within a period of 3 years. The figure also
reports basic difference‐in‐differences estimates of the elasticity of taxable income (standard errors in parentheses), comparing treatment and
control groups over the 3‐year interval from 1986 to 1989. The estimates DD1 and DD2 in Panel A refer to treatment 1 and treatment 2,
respectively. DD estimates in both panels are based on 2SLS regressions of log income on an after‐reform time dummy, a treatment‐group dummy
and the log marginal net‐of‐tax rate, the latter variable being instrumented by the interaction of the after‐reform and treatment‐group dummies.
Figure 1 : Total number of foreigners in different income groups
Control #1: .8 to .9*threshold
Control #2: .9 to .99*threshold
Treatment: earnings> threshold
DD elasticity:
Long−term: 1.62 (.16)
Short−term: 1.28 (.15)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Source: Kleven, Landais, Saez, Schultz QJE (2014)
Control 1= annualized income between .8 and .9 of threshold
Control 2= annualized income between .9 and .995 of threshold.
DD specifications
16
18
A. Top 1% Share and Top Marginal Tax Rate in 1960−4
Top 1% Income Share (%)
8
10
12
14
Elasticity= .07 (.15)
Germany
Switzerland
Netherlands
Finland
France
Canada
Japan
Spain
6
Australia
Sweden
NZ
Ireland
US
UK
Italy
Norway
Portugal
4
Denmark
40
50
60
70
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%)
Source: Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva AEJ-EP (2014)
80
90
US
Elasticity= 1.90 (.43)
UK
Canada
Ireland
Germany
Norway
Portugal Italy
Spain Australia
NZ
France
Japan
Finland
Switzerland
Netherlands
Sweden
6
Top 1% Income Share (%)
8
10
12
14
16
18
B. Top 1% Share and Top Marginal Tax Rate in 2005−9
4
Denmark
40
50
60
70
Top Marginal Tax Rate (%)
Source: Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva AEJ-EP (2014)
80
90
10
Change in Top 1% Income Share (points)
0
2
4
6
8
US
Elasticity= .47 (.11)
UK
Ireland
Portugal
Norway
Canada
Italy
Australia
Spain
NZ
Japan
Sweden
Denmark
France
Finland
Germany
Switzerland
Netherlands
−40
−30
−20
−10
Change in Top Marginal Tax Rate (points)
0
10
Change in Top Tax Rate and Top 1% Share, 1960-4 to 2005-9
Source: Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva AEJ-EP (2014)
Top tax rates and top 1% income share 1960-2009
Piketty, Saez & Stantcheva ()
Three Elasticities
November 2012
33 / 62
Ireland
Japan
Portugal
Norway
Finland
Spain
Italy
US
Netherlands
France
Canada
UK
Australia
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
NZ
Switzerland
1
GDP per capita real annual growth (%)
2
3
4
A. Growth and Change in Top Marginal Tax Rate
−40
−30
−20
−10
Change in Top Marginal Tax Rate (points)
0
10
Change in Top Tax Rate and GDP per capita growth since 1960
Source: Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva AEJ-EP (2014)
Norway
Ireland
Japan
US
Netherlands
Australia
Italy
Canada
UK
France
Finland
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Switzerland
NZ
1
GDP per capita real annual growth (%)
2
3
4
B. Growth (adjusted for initial 1960 GDP)
−40
−30
−20
−10
Change in Top Marginal Tax Rate (points)
0
10
Change in Top Tax Rate and GDP per capita growth since 1960
Source: Piketty, Saez, Stantcheva AEJ-EP (2014)
Top tax rates and average growth 1960-2009
Piketty, Saez & Stantcheva ()
Three Elasticities
) No or signi…cantly
negative
November 2012
36 / 62
3.5
A. Average CEO compensation
Elasticity= 1.97 (.27)
Italy
Switzerland
2.0
Germany
Canada
United Kingdom
Ireland
Netherlands
1.5
Australia
Sweden
France
1.0
CEO pay($ million, log-scale)
2.5
3.0
United States
Norway
Belgium
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Top Income Marginal Tax Rate
Piketty, Saez & Stantcheva ()
Three Elasticities
November 2012
50 / 62
3.5
B. Average CEO compensation with controls
United Kingdom
Australia
2.5
Italy
United States
Canada
Ireland
2.0
Switzerland
Germany Netherlands
1.5
Norway
France
Belgium
Sweden
1.0
CEO pay($ million, log-scale) with controls
3.0
Elasticity= 1.90 (.29)
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
Top Income Marginal Tax Rate
Piketty, Saez & Stantcheva ()
Three Elasticities
November 2012
51 / 62
International CEO Pay: Governance
Piketty, Saez & Stantcheva ()
Three Elasticities
November 2012
53 / 62
US Top 0.1% Pre-­‐Tax Income Share and Composi:on
12%
Capital Gains
10%
Capital Income
Business Income
8%
Salaries
6%
4%
Source: Piketty and Saez, 2003 updated to 2013. Series based on pre-tax cash market income
including or excluding realized capital gains, and always excluding government transfers.
2011
2006
2001
1996
1991
1986
1981
1976
1971
1966
1961
1956
1951
1946
1941
1936
1931
1926
1921
0%
1916
2%
Top MTR
Top 1% (excl. KG)
MTR K gains
1913 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013
Year
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Marginal Tax Rates (%)
Top 1% Share
0
0
Top 1% Income Shares (%)
5
10
15
20
25
Tax Avoidance: Top 1% Income Shares and Top MTR
0
Top MTR
Bottom 99%
1913 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013
Year
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Marginal Tax Rate (%)
Top 1%
0
Real Income per adult (1913=100)
100
200
300
400
500
Top 1% and Bottom 99% Income Growth
Top 1% (excluding Capital Gains)
Top MTR
1913 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013
Year
0
0
Top 1% Income Shares (%)
5
10
15
20
25
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Marginal Tax Rates (%)
Top 1% Income Share and Top MTR
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% Mean charitable giving of top 1% divided by mean income [leA y-­‐axis] 2010 2006 2002 1998 1994 1990 1986 1982 1978 1974 1970 0% 1966 10% 1962 Mean charitable giving of top 1% incomes / mean income Charitable Giving of Top 1% Incomes Source: Appendix Table XX. The figure depicts average charitable giving of top 1% inomes (normalized by average
income per family) on the left y-axis.
90% 25% 80% 60% 15% 50% 40% 10% 30% Mean charitable giving of top 1% divided by mean income [leA y-­‐axis] 20% 2010 2006 2002 1998 1994 1990 1986 1982 1978 1974 1970 0% 1966 Top 1% Income Share [right y-­‐axis] 10% 5% 0% Source: Appendix Table XX. The figure depicts average charitable giving of top 1% inomes (normalized by average
income per family) on the left y-axis. For comparison, the figure reports the top 1% income share (on the right y-axis).
Top 1% income share 20% 70% 1962 Mean charitable giving of top 1% incomes / mean income Charitable Giving of Top 1% Incomes, 1962-­‐2012