ActionAid South Africa
- Draft Discussion Paper –
Financing for Development?
The Development Bank of South Africa and its Footprint in Africa
30th November 2013
Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 2
2.
South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid ................................................................. 3
3.
DBSA – the early years ........................................................................................... 4
4.
The DBSA and the Transition ................................................................................. 4
5.
The DBSA Today .................................................................................................... 9
6.
Straddling the Tension between the “D” and the “B”?............................................ 10
7.
The Development Context .................................................................................... 11
8.
The DBSA beyond South Africa ............................................................................ 14
9.
Gearing for the Future – DBSA, BRICS and International Relations ..................... 16
10.
Conclusions and Recommendations for ActionAid and progressive civil society
more broadly ..................................................................................................... 19
References: ................................................................................................................. 23
1. Introduction
ActionAid South Africa, in partnership with ActionAid International seeks to embark on a
study project into the role, conduct, and impact of public finance institutions in Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) that provide development project finance in Africa.
Part of the study will also examine the role of South African public institutions, in particular
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) in promoting private investment in Africa, the
nature of these investments and the relevant policy framework/s under which these are
undertaken and its developmental impact.
In the context of BRICS and the announcement at the 2013 Durban Summit of its intention to
establish a development bank, this paper lays the basis for an understanding of the
mandate, strategy and operations of public finance institutions in South Africa e.g. The
Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Land and Agriculture Development Bank and
others such as the soon to be launched SA Partnership for Development Agency (SAPDA)
by the Department for International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO).
In the medium to long term ActionAid will examine:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
How and whether the mandate, strategy and operations are compatible with
similar institutions in Africa e.g. the African Development Bank and in other
selected countries.
How and whether land acquisition and usage projects financed and facilitated
by the South African institutions, either enable or prevent the promotion,
respect, and protection of rights-based approaches to sustainable
development which eradicates poverty and inequality and places human
development and environmental protection above profit.
How and whether such projects are aligned with SA’s foreign policy
commitments and relevant international treaties and instruments with
particular emphasis on human rights, equity and ecology issues.
What are the main issues and challenges for South African Development
Finance Institutions (DFIs) in the context of BRICS.
Multi state groupings and blocs both formal and informal are part and parcel of international
politics relations and co-operation. What makes the newly formed BRICS bloc significant is
the potential power it has in the context of the current global political economy to contribute
to build new narratives towards the realisation of a just, equitable, sustainable and peaceful
global society.
This paper is explorative. It is part of the process of understanding the DBSA and to make a
few initial suggestions of possible areas of engagement with the institution in line with its
mandate on working with people across the globe to eliminate poverty. As part of this
process the paper suggests some ideas on building collaboration and solidarity action with
potential civil society partners interested in issues of development and, whether and how
development finance institutions in BRICS and other developing economies could build new
models of sustainable development which emphasises the indivisibility between human
development and environmental protection for future generations.
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2. South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid
South Africa’s negotiated transition from an apartheid pariah state to a democratic state after
the first non-racial elections on 27 April 1994 and the subsequent adoption of a new
constitution, heralded an opportunity for the progressive forces to build a new agenda for a
better life for its people on the one hand and construct a new set of international relations
with nation states on the other. The former exiled liberation movements, led by the African
National Congress together with the internal mass democratic movement now in power, set
about dismantling old laws and institutions whilst simultaneously creating new laws and
building new institutions in line with prescripts of the new constitution and a vision of a
united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa. This period was described as the
“honeymoon period” and a new activist optimism swept the country.
Whilst the democratic government together with its social partners, civil society and citizens
as a whole were mobilised in transforming society as envisioned in the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP), this process was not immune and isolated from the global
political economy, including and more especially its role and relationships with African
states. The RDP was drafted by the African National Congress (ANC), the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) in
consultation with key mass based organisations and supported by a wide range of policy
research institutes.
It represented a programme by a government-in-waiting to build post-apartheid South Africa
– through reconstruction, restructuring and development. In summary the RDP created the
following development targets for the democratic government:
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The creation of 2.5 million jobs over a ten-year period;
The building of one million houses by the year 2000;
The connection to the national electricity grid of 2.5 million homes by the year
2000;
The provision of running water and sewerage to one million households;
The distribution of 30% of agricultural land to emerging black farmers;
The development of a new focus on primary health care;
The provision of ten years of compulsory free education for all children;
The encouragement of massive infrastructural improvements through public
works; and
The restructuring of state institutions by 1997 to reflect the broader race, class
and gender composition of society.
An important commitment of this programme was one of co-operation with Southern African
states. During this period, following the independence of Namibia and the transition to a
democracy in SA, the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) at a
conference in Windhoek in August 1992 adopted the Windhoek Declaration paving the way
for the formation of what we know today as the Southern Africa Development Community. It
must be noted that the precursor to the SADCC was the Frontline States, created in the
1960’s by the liberation movements and newly independent states with the sole purpose of
eliminating colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa.
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3. DBSA – the early years
One of the institutions earmarked for restructuring and transformation was the Development
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). Initiated in 1979 by then apartheid state Prime Minister
PW Botha to promote private sector financing for development in the “Southern Africa
region” and formally established in 1983, the DBSA comprised of South Africa on the one
hand, and the leaders of the four nominally independent homelands, Transkei, Venda,
Bophuthatswana and Ciskei (the so-called “TBVC states”) on the other.
Their grand plan was the creation of a “constellation of Southern African states” through the
policy of “separate development” with SA as a white republic at the helm and black citizens
assigned to a homeland according to their ethnic identity. A total of ten homelands were
created to facilitate the implementation of forced removals to their respective homelands
which then served as labour sending areas to South Africa and as reservoirs for the masses
of unemployed people. .
According to former Chairman, Jay Naidoo, the DBSA “was set up as part of a political
strategy aimed at strengthening the homelands, which the apartheid regime created under
its separate development policies”. This, together with other initiatives, formed part of the
apartheid state’s “securocrats’” determined to push for its programme of “winning hearts and
minds” against the perceived danger of communism in South Africa whilst they pursued their
military ventures in the frontline states.
According to the DBSA their primary role was then “to promote economic development in its
broadest sense, increase productivity and thus raise the standard of living of the people in
less developed areas of the Southern African economic region” of the Bank’s membership.
Within the first three years the Bank was administering projects to the value of R1, 5 billion.
(Note the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Rand at the time was USD 1 to
R2.23. See www.businesstech.co.za).
Following the unbanning of the liberation movements in February 1990 and the release of
Nelson Mandela, the big issue was whether the Bank created to support apartheid would
survive and be relevant in a post-apartheid South Africa. The government had committed to
providing funding of R2,5 billion over a five year period (note the average exchange rate in
this period was USD 1 to R3, 55). The leadership of the Bank adopted a strategy called
“DBSA 2000” aimed at escalating its anti-poverty programme.
4. The DBSA and the Transition
Between 1990 and 1994 during the negotiations towards the transition to democracy, the
Bank began corporate governance restructuring and repositioning of the institution. Since
1994 the Bank has gone through a process of evolution. The demise of the apartheid
homelands and their reincorporation into a unified South Africa rendered the 1993 DBSA
founding agreement invalid and the role of the council of governors was transferred to the
treasury with the Minister of Finance as the political head.
In the words of Professor
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Wiseman Nkuhlu, the then Chairman and a development academic, the “DBSA has a crucial
role to play in shaping the future development of the country”. By 1994 over a 10 year
period the Bank’s assets had increased to R6 billion (USD 1 : R3,55).
However, after the democratic elections on 27 April 1994 with the installation of the new
ANC-led government of national unity, there was uncertainty over the Bank’s future and
status. Given the human and financial resources at its disposal the new government
enlisted the Bank’s support in a range of new interventions in support of priorities under its
RDP. One of the main over-arching principles of the RDP was a policy of growth through
redistribution.
However, barely two years into its implementation, the government unilaterally adopted a
new conservative macro-economic policy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR), as a sign of its commitment to high economic growth by reducing state spending
and the budget deficit, lowering corporate taxes, relaxing foreign exchange controls,
promoting privatisation and encouraging wage restraint. These neo-liberal economic policy
prescripts were taken largely from the development models of the World Bank and the IMF
and was designed to attract foreign investment. Under this policy, unlike the RDP, the state
would play a facilitation role rather than an interventionist role.
Internally though the Bank was going through a tough period adapting to the prescripts of a
united, non-racial, non-sexist democracy. Several senior managers deserted the Bank due
to uncertainty. The discriminatory pay scale based on race and gender had to be eliminated
and parity achieved. At the end of 1994 the Minister of Finance appointed a transformation
team, headed by the Chairman of the Board, Prof Nkuhlu, to consult with stakeholders on a
future role and governance of the Bank.
Whilst the DBSA was positioning itself for the new dispensation, the new government
outlined a proposal to develop a family of five development finance institutions each focusing
on specific areas. These were 1) Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), 2) Land Bank,
3) National Housing Finance Corporation, 4) Khula, which later became the Small Enterprise
Finance Agency (SEFA) and 5) DBSA.
The main government strategy for the DFIs was that they:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Must be independent and under the control of their boards which in turn are
accountable to government;
Should be capitalised but not sustained by the state;
Should maximise the development impact of the government and at the same
time not crowd out the private sector;
Should be able to take risks that the private sector will not take.
The transformation task team had made proposals for the Bank’s internal restructuring,
focusing on human resources and affirmative action in management positions and attempts
to modernise and streamline operations. New units such as gender and affirmative action,
risk management and operations evaluation were set up. Job evaluation and performance
management systems were also set up.
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By April 1997, through the passing of the DBSA Act (No.13 of 1997), the Bank was
repositioned and declared a statutory body with a development mandate to fund public
infrastructure. At this stage the Bank had an asset base of R12-billion. It had disbursed
over R2-billion in project funding, more than double the previous year on projects at local
government level and for policy development. It had streamlined its business units from 57
down to 24 and reduced the number of managers by a similar ratio.
By the time of its 20th anniversary in 2003, and as South Africa approached its first “decade
of freedom and democracy”, the Bank had grown from a staff compliment of 198 since its
inception to 485 and defined its role as a financer, advisor and partner with a new vision,
which was:
“To further the progressive realisation of an empowered and integrated region, free of
poverty, inequality and dependency. To be a leading change agent for sustainable
socio-economic development in the SADC region and a strategic partner in Africa south
of the Sahara.”
In February 2007 the SA government undertook a comprehensive high-level presidential
review of South Africa’s DFIs. The review, which ran for just over a year was headed by the
national treasury and conducted in consultation with the national departments responsible
for these institutions: the Departments of Trade and Industry, Public Works, Labour,
Housing, and Agriculture and Land Affairs.
This review focused on 12 institutions, including the four major DFIs: the Development Bank
of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the Land and
Agricultural Development Bank (Land Bank) and the National Housing Finance Corporation
(NHFC). Other institutions included were the Khula Enterprise Finance, the National
Empowerment Fund (NEF), the Independent Development Trust (IDT), the Umsobomvu
Youth Fund (UYF), the National Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency (NURCHA), the
Rural Housing Loan Fund (RHLF), the Micro Agricultural Finance Institutions of South Africa
(MAFISA) and the South African Micro Finance Apex Fund (SAMAF). Taken as a whole, the
DFIs form South Africa’s development finance system (DFS).
As a developmental state, the DFIs exist as public institutions to promote social and
economic development in line with the public policy objectives by providing finance that
supports job creation, low-cost housing, agricultural development, micro, small, and medium
business development, industrial development and infrastructure development. In doing so,
the state attempts to intervene and direct the nature and from of development rather than
leaving this to market forces.
The review reports that each of the twelve DFIs have different histories and were developed
by the different departments. Together they have total assets of more than R120 billion
whilst as the report notes that only half of this is dedicated to development. The report
further notes the limited impact, issues of overlap and duplication of funding as a result of
the lack of coordination and alignment with government policy.
A key recommendation that emerged from the review was the need by government through
legislation to establish “as a matter of urgency” a Development Finance System Council
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(DFSC) to “monitor and make decisions concerning development finance institutions for the
optimal functioning of the development finance system” to avoid overlap and duplication of
funding. This council will operate under the leadership of the national minister of finance and
comprises the executive authorities of each institution and those at a provincial level.
The report also proposes that the minister in consultation with the DFSC will appoint a panel
of local and international experts to advise on lessons learnt and best practice in the field of
development and development finance. However, to date there has been a lack of progress
in establishing the DFSC.
Specifically the report recommends that the DBSA should remain a “high focused
infrastructure development institution and its SADC mandate should concentrate on
economic infrastructure”.
The report criticises the Bank for not keeping pace with best development practice. Whilst
the Bank’s balanced scorecard emphasises the volume of inputs, that is the total number
and value of projects funded, it does not evaluate its development impact. The report also
notes that whilst the DBSA’s governance structure is based on the states’ requirements for
state-owned enterprises and in line with good practice in the private sector, the conclusion is
that these arrangements do not emphasise the institutions role and commitment to
“development as its primary goal”.
The review therefore recommends the establishment of a board “development effectiveness
committee” to provide leadership to meeting the Bank’s development objectives, to define its
key development indicators and to use these in monitoring and evaluation. In the current
DBSA governance structure there is no dedicated sub-committee established to date. This
is an issue worth pursuing with the current leadership of the Bank.
There have been further developments at a government policy level that will shape the
medium to long term strategy of the Bank. The adoption of the New Growth Path in 2011
(NGP) sets out an ambitious framework for job creation in priority sectors and emphasises
infrastructure development as a key driver for creating new jobs and addressing rural
development. It sets a target of 5 million new jobs by 2020.
At a continental level the policy states that support for regional growth “is both an act of
solidarity and a way to enhance economic opportunities”. It proposes that SA be a driving
force behind the development of energy, transport and ICT infrastructure and work with
DFI’s to address backlogs. Key priorities include improvements in the road, rail and ports
system serving central and southern Africa and strengthening the Southern African Power
Pool.
A new bill, the Infrastructure Development Bill, will be tabled in parliament before the end of
the year. The main purpose of this bill is to provide for the facilitation and co-ordination of
public infrastructure development, to ensure that infrastructure development is given priority
in planning, approval and implementation and to ensure that that the development goals of
the State are promoted through infrastructure development.
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In addition to the NGP, another important policy framework is the adoption in 2011 by the
government of the National Development Plan 2030 – Our Future Make it Work, and which
was subsequently adopted by the ANC at its national conference in 2012. Again the plan
emphasises infrastructure development in South. Whilst the Plan is SA-centric , it also
contains a chapter titled “Positioning South Africa in the World” and by linking domestic
growth to regional growth, calls for SA to “play a more pivotal role in regional development”
and encourages SA firms to participate in regional infrastructure projects and supply chains
to promote industrialisation. The Trade Law Centre calls on SA to “show sensitivity to the
plight of its neighbours” and calls for constructive and active engagement with countries in
the region. Anything less will “again see accusations of South Africa being a bullying boy of
regional integration arrangements”.
A further important policy framework currently under discussion is the restructuring of state
owned enterprises (SOEs). The last review of SOEs was undertaken in 2000. A report
released by the Presidential Review Committee in 2012 identifies the need for a framework
to govern a new round of restructuring to address the needs of a development state and
calls on government to “initiate a new and revised comprehensive policy that will guide and
regulate restructuring of public enterprises”. It further recommends that an “appropriate
consultation framework which genuinely considers the views and submissions of the public”
must be developed. All options must be considered “on merit and there are no holy cows”.
The PRC outlines a framework timeline for this large-scale restructuring exercise.
diagram below:
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5. The DBSA Today
Whilst the Bank has relative autonomy, the environment in which it operates is determined
by the political, economic and social priorities of the government of the day. It could be
argued that the DBSA has undergone a painful process of change but has successfully
survived the democratic transition. Today, thirty years on, the Bank has grown its asset
base to just under R54 billion and has recently undergone another restructuring process.
The Bank, which has increasingly sourced loans from private capital markets, is not immune
from the prolonged global financial crisis. The crisis has limited the ability of African states
to expand their public investments in social infrastructure and as a result widened the gap
between needs, expectations and delivery of social infrastructure projects. Increased private
sector funding for local government and state-owned enterprises has also resulted in
competition between private and public sector banks. The latter has seen its market share
of loans reduced.
In the 2011-2012 financial year the Bank reported a huge loss of almost R403- million largely
due to “shoddy work” in making the wrong investment decisions, called “non-performing
loans”. In the current financial the Bank records a net loss of R825,9-milion. It is understood
that these were loans particularly to the private sector. As a result almost half of this had to
be written down. In anticipation of continued poor financial performance in the 2012/2013
financial year, in June 2012 the government, as shareholder in consultation with the Board,
reviewed the Bank’s strategy “in order to better focus the Bank’s activities to enhance its
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development impact, improve the efficiency of its operations and to increase the scale of the
DBSA’s activities in order to expand the Bank’s developmental reach”.
The African Union estimates spending in continental infrastructure to boost social
development, trade and economic growth will need investments of approximately R93-billion
per annum to clear the infrastructure backlog on the continent. In SADC countries the Bank
had set a loan target of R20-billion. In South Africa the government had announced planned
infrastructure spending of R850-billion between 2013-2015 and a total of R4-trilion over 15
years. Given the importance of the Bank as a development finance institution and the large
infrastructure project spending planned it was vital for the government to ensure the Bank
stays afloat and play a leading role and increase its lending within the country and on the
continent.
In late 2012 the DBSA Board, in return for a R7.9-billion three-year 2013-2016
recapitalisation facility, adopted a new strategy for the Bank. In return for this lifeline,
government expectations were that the Bank would remain effective, efficient and financially
sustainable. As the result the first casualty was staff following a decision to announce a cut
back from 870 in 2012 to about 450 by May 2013.
The plan is to grow development finance assets from R47.1 billion to R91 billion by 2016/17
with annual disbursements increasing from the current levels of around R9 billion to around
R19 billion by 2016/17. At a regional level the Bank wants to increase its loan distribution to
around R20bn by 2017, expanding beyond SADC and focusing on commercially viable
projects in priority sectors such as energy, transport and bulk water as well as on fasttracking priority projects to improve connectivity and trade.
As a result of the latest round of restructuring an important phase of the evolution of the
Bank has started and the core structure of the Bank significantly changed. According to the
2013 Annual Report, the Bank “will accelerate its infrastructure to municipalities, stateowned enterprises, regional partners and public-private partnerships”. More importantly, the
Bank has set itself a strategic financial and operational goal of “sustainability with the
objective of generating and sustaining inflation-linked growth”.
6. Straddling the Tension between the “D” and the “B”?
It would appear that the balance between the development and the financial goals of the
Bank are now in favour of the latter. In the context of addressing the massive backlog in
quality social infrastructure at local level, the logic of the market economy and profit
maximisation would prevail in the Bank’s personnel, performance, organisational culture and
operations. This should sound the alarms bells in those sectors of society that are keenly
interested in the Bank’s catchy headline slogan of “development activism through
development finance”.
Given decades of skewed apartheid styled development in the country, the context of a
democratic dispensation, good development practice involves the right of all people to
access basic goods and services in order for them to attain a decent standard of living and
to be able to meaningfully participate in policy development and decision making processes
that affect their lives.
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In the Bank’s stakeholder engagement strategy in addition to organs of the state, financial
institutions, clients and partners, employees, the category of community is included. From a
“development activism” perspective, the community is the central and most critical
stakeholder in the assessment of needs and the design, planning, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of projects. From a development impact perspective, this aspect
of stakeholder involvement is critical. Whilst the Bank may have built a reputation with its
peers and shareholders, it is not clear how the Bank engages in meaningful consultations
with the “community” as its end beneficiary and if and where it does, to what end.
In the context of its municipal infrastructure support, it would be vital to undertake further
research into the role of the community in the Bank’s projects within municipalities in South
Africa and assess how and whether these have been able to contribute to the active
involvement of community organisations on the one hand and the delivery of quality public
services on the other. It would be necessary to further investigate the link, if any, between
Bank funding and “service delivery protests” by residents in municipalities. In the context of
the aspirations of the government to build a “democratic developmental state” to address the
developmental challenges facing the country, achieving this goal requires effective public
institutions at every level to achieve equity and social development for the poor.
7. The Development Context
Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and with its
successor the Africa Union (AU), the pan-African dream of continental integration has been
on the table. In January 2013, at one of many celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the
founding of the OAU, AU commission chairperson, Dr Dlamini-Zuma noted that the AU and
the African Development Bank (AfDB) together with the support from the UN’s Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) undertook to “cooperate on the development of a
transformation agenda for the continent for the next fifty years”.
Based on figures on sustained GDP growth and steady progress in good governance, a key
issue she raised was the immense challenges the continent faced in terms of “structural
underdevelopment and dependency, huge backlogs in infrastructure, basic services and
human resource development and the need to build people-centred, inclusive and
developmental public and private cultures and institutions”. She pointed out that Africa has a
“window of opportunity” to set sail for the next 50 years towards integration, prosperity and
peace by mobilising sources of funding including “tapping into Africa’s own resources” and
those available globally.
This window of opportunity is reinforced by “continental endowments (a youthful and growing
population, the potential unleashed by women’s empowerment, urbanization) and natural
resources (land, minerals, energy and marine resources), which if harnessed in the interest
of Africa’s people, bodes well for the future.”
On 1 February 2013 the UN High Level Panel released the preliminary Post 2015
Development Agenda, a new vision and action plan around a set of goals and targets that
will replace the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000. In the words of the Eminent
Panel the Post 2015 Agenda is not “business as usual and is not an option”. This is a very
bold statement and hopefully marks a turning point in which the UN family, nation states, civil
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society, corporations and citizens interact with each other. Serious civil society
commentators have criticised the report as being big on rhetoric but weak on detail and
based on previous promises will deliver little yet again.
The report articulates the need for the agenda to be driven by “five, big transformative shifts”
viz. “ leave no one behind, put sustainable development at the core, transform economies for
jobs and inclusive growth, build peace and effective open and accountable institutions for all
and forge a new global partnership”. The panel believes that these five shifts can end the
“inequality of opportunity” suffered by billions of people and bring together social, economic
and environmental issues in a coherent, effective and sustainable way that can build a new
generation not only to believe in but also act collectively in different ways to build a better
world that “leaves no one behind”.
The African Economic Conference hosted by the AfDB, the UNECA and the UNDP, in South
Africa will take place under the theme of “Regional Integration – Key to Transformation and
Development”. In a press release issued before the conference the three organisers noted
that whilst Africa is experiencing high levels of (economic) growth, there has been limited
impact on ordinary people. They note that “weaknesses persist in the quality of institutions;
infrastructure, macroeconomic policies, education and adoption of new technologies, while
there are big gaps between its highest and lowest ranked economies”.
They go on to state that “… this great gathering should do more than restate the case for
regional integration: it must examine how to push the African continent to the next level, to
become a global growth pole in its own right,”
In addition, they state that “because of its focus on capital-intensive, commodity-based
industries, Africa has seen limited economic transformation” and therefore job creation for
the youth to “build better futures has lagged behind.” The conference looked at how
integration could be achieved by harmonising laws and standards, common approaches to
macro-economic policy and job creation and effective management of natural resources for
sustainable poverty reduction and structural economic transformation. They urge “greater
political will and vision” to address this problem.
The hunger and thirst for Africa’s natural resources driven by the mineral commodity boom in
Asia and the global food shortage crisis have been the prime drivers of export-led growth in
many countries in Africa. Narratives on “Africa Rising” are been written by both
governments and the global finance industry. One of the key barriers to further growth listed
by these institutions is the lack of transport and energy infrastructure – roads, bridges, larger
ports and power generation and distribution plants. These kinds of projects are long-term,
high risk and low-returns from an investment perspective and therefore not particularly
attractive for the private sector.
Under colonialism the political economies of SADC countries were primarily commodity
producers of minerals and agricultural products for export. The majority of the people
remained poor and lived in under-developed rural areas without access to basic public
services and social infrastructure. When global commodity prices dropped, countries were
forced to adopt economic structural adjustment programmes in return for bail out loans from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund leading to major cuts in public
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expenditure for basic goods and services e.g. education, health and welfare and reduced
state investments and involvement in strategic sectors and the privatisation of state owned
enterprises in energy, water, housing and agriculture.
The impact of these policies not only reduced the capacity of states to meet basic needs of
the poor majority but also the growing indebtedness through servicing loans to these finance
institutions. This created increased poverty, unemployment and the through
deindustrialisation, the collapse of local indigenous industry and growth of informal
unregulated sectors in the economy particularly in fast moving consumer goods.
Following almost three decades of IMF-World Bank policies and the poor overall
performance in achieving targets under the Millennium Development Goals, countries are
working on new long term plans to drive socio-economic development and regional
integration. Given the relative stages of development between states and within states, one
of the most important challenges facing SADC is the creation of a regional framework to
promote inter-generational social, economic and environmental development that is
sustainable.
Within the region, efforts have been made to advance a civic movement to come together to
advance a people-centred development strategy. The Southern Africa Civil Society Forum
(CSF) is an alliance of faith based organisations under the Fellowship of Christian Councils
in Southern Africa, and national trade union federations affiliated to the Southern African
Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee and non-governmental organisations affiliated to the
SADC Council of NGO’s. One of the most important reasons for the alliance is to bring the
“collective experiences, knowledge, strengths and capacities to work together” towards
people-centred regional integration and development.
In 2008, the SADC Council of NGO’s initiated a regional wide study into poverty and a
consultative process to develop a basis for a common analysis and the causes of poverty,
and to develop a position on regional integration and development within SADC that is
sustainable and people-centred. The purpose of the study was to lay the basis for an agenda
for engagement by civil society in SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategy and Development
Plan.
In a process involving over 1800 civil society organisations through direct and representative
participation over a two-year period, the organisation developed and adopted at a regional
assembly a “Southern Africa Civil Society Poverty and Development Charter” aimed at
building a consensus on the vision, the necessary steps, partnerships and structures to
implement the provisions of the charter. Another outcome of the study was proposals for the
establishment of a Regional Poverty Observatory
The charter notes that “poverty is not a natural phenomenon as often there is a paradox of
abundant natural resources co-existing with widespread poverty. In this regard, poverty is
socially constructed globally and locally, and can be deconstructed”. In the region poverty is
“fuelled by deindustrialisation under neo-liberal economic reforms” which promote primary
export of mineral and agricultural products without value-added manufacturing and in the
process perpetuates the historical “colonial dual economies” (in which women which
comprise the majority of the population) remain marginalised.
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The charter describes the “SADC we wish to live in” as “people-centred, free from poverty
within the context of pro-poor, high and sustainable economic growth and development and
dynamic economies underpinned by equitable distribution of productive assets and income.
Such a region “guarantees the rights to dignity, economic and social justice for all”. The
charter proposes five areas of policy dialogue and engagement for poverty eradication in the
region viz., pro-poor economic policies; social and human development; agriculture, food
security and natural resources, governance and accountability, and infrastructure for
regional integration. The latter pillar specifically highlights the transport, energy, water,
sanitation and ICT sectors.
According to the organisation, there are approximately 35 legal instruments and protocols
which bind SADC to poverty eradication and the “full implementation of these will go a long
way to eradicating poverty in the region”. As regards financing, the charter notes that
resource mobilisation at national and regional levels is a priority but calls for “effective,
transparent, and regular monitoring and evaluation.
At the annual meeting of the CSF in 2012, delegates met under the theme “The SADC We
Want” which expressed the ‘desire for a SADC that is characterised by a people-centred
development paradigm; which guarantees rights and dignity of every citizen of being free
from poverty; gender discrimination; with stable economies underpinned by equitable and
sustainable development, fair and just trade, and redistribution of wealth and productive
assets; which respects rule of law and upholds democratic values and human rights.”
Delegates also decried the structural problems in the political economy of the region that
perpetuates high levels of poverty and inequality based on “increasing economic growth
through trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment and export driven policies at the
expense of the needs of the people of SADC.” Citing weak leadership and a lack of political
will to implement SADC protocols, they resolved to embark on a campaign to take “The
SADC We Want” to all countries and review the work done at the 2013 annual meeting.
8. The DBSA beyond South Africa
The DBSA is regarded as a key player in “development” infrastructure in South Africa and
beyond its borders. Within Southern Africa and increasingly within Sub-Saharan Africa, it is
both a “financier of infrastructure, a manager of project preparation facilities, a catalyst for
partnership among neighbouring countries, a capacity builder and a knowledge broker”.
The work of the Bank is undertaken through the International Financing Division. The DBSA
and the African Development Bank are the two main indigenous state-owned public
development finance institutions based in Africa. According to the Bank’s 2013 Integrated
Annual Report, the main role of this division is to “leverage infrastructure development
opportunities and stimulate economic growth” in Southern Africa, beyond South Africa.
In 2012, SADC adopted 15-year Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP),
which provides a framework for cooperation amongst member states in energy, transport,
information and communications, water and tourism projects. Current estimates of the
overall plan are in the region of US$500-billion.
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At an investor’s conference in Maputo last year, a short term action plan, estimated at
US$63-billion, and key factors to guide the implementation of the RIDMP was agreed.
These included issues such as project preparation, financing and implementation, building
institutional capacity and the importance of coordination. A committee of SADC finance
ministers has been established to discuss mechanisms to oversee project financing and
institutional mechanisms. Once such mechanism put in place is the Project Preparation and
Development Facility (PPDF). Seed capital of just $US1.2-billion is provided but way below
the projected budget. SADC governments are committed as the primary funders of the
RIDMP through the offering of international bonds.
The DBSA is currently involved in several infrastructure projects in the region. In the 20112012 financial year, disbursements amounted to R3,2 billion. For the 2012-2013 financial
year, in what the Bank describes as a “challenging trading environment”, loan approvals
totalled R5.6-billion but actual disbursements amounted to R665-million. Net profit grew
year on year from just over R18-million to just over R294-million. Within SADC, the
international development agencies of countries as Japan, China, India, the UK and
Germany are already involved with other multi-lateral agencies such as the World Bank and
the African Development Bank.
The DBSA has loans committed mainly in the transportation, energy, mining, ICT, health,
financial services and manufacturing in Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and small multi-country projects. A key project towards regional integration is the
agreement by the regional economic communities – SADC, Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) – to develop the NorthSouth Corridor by upgrading the road, rail and port infrastructure and the concept of “onestop border posts” in the countries involved. This agreement is known as the “Tripartite
Agreement” and endorsed by the African Union through its Presidential Infrastructure
Champions Initiative which SA President, Jacob G Zuma, chairs.
As part of its new mandate emphasising project preparation, the Bank has focused on
project origination as an “important element for generating business and improving
development impact”. According to the Bank this enables the international financing division
to “play a proactive role in shaping projects” whilst supporting the development of
“infrastructure solutions for the region”. This is a shift from the Bank approving funds for
externally designed projects.
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Currently one such large scale project appraisal in the energy sector is the Ruzizi 3 Hydro
Project on the border between the DRC and Rwanda which will generate electricity for the
two countries and Burundi. Another is the Zizabona Energy Interconnector covering
Namibia, Botswana and Zambia to power generation sources in Zimbabwe.
From a SADC perspective a key issue is the character and governance of the DBSA. On
the one hand, it is an institution created by an act of parliament in South Africa and is owned
and accountable to its shareholder which is the South African government. Yet on the other
hand, its development finance mandate extends to Southern Africa and beyond. This has
created tensions within the region, particularly within civil society, and questions are posed
as to whether in name it could truly live up to its name as a “Southern African development
bank”, given its limited funding, its mandate and shareholder accountability.
9. Gearing for the Future – DBSA, BRICS and International
Relations
According to DBSA estimates, average forecasted growth across Africa is expected to be
between 4 and 5 per cent. Foreign direct investments are projected to increase to
approximately US$54-billion in 2015 for infrastructure particularly roads, rail, ports, airports
and in sanitation, water and energy. Based on these forecasts the DBSA believes it is “well
positioned” to increase its footprint on the continent by investing in core sectors viz., energy,
water and transport and bring about “immense strategic benefits to both South Africa and the
rest of the continent”.
The key issue is whether the DBSA will be able to compete with the finance and investment
institutions in the US and Europe which combined hold the largest share of projects on the
continent. According to Deloitte’s latest research report on the construction industry, of the
total $222-billion in infrastructure projects currently underway in Africa, thirty seven per cent
are worked on by US and European companies, 12 per cent by Chinese companies and the
rest are undertaken by contractors from Korea, Brazil, Japan, Australia and South Africa.
One way of reducing the costs and risk exposure is to work with international partners
outside of the region. The DBSA, together with institutions such as the European
Investment Bank, the French Agency for Development, the UK’s Department for
International Development, the German Credit Agency for Reconstruction and the UN’s
Office for Project Services, has led technical and grant assistance facilities to support
regional integration. Recently the European Union (EU), under the terms of the South
Africa-EU Infrastructure Investment Programme approved a facility of GBP 100-million to be
managed by the DBSA on behalf of the SA government. In addition, the Bank seeks to
“leverage its relationships” with leading institutions from Asia and the BRIC nations to secure
co-financing for regional projects.
The fifth meeting of the BRICS countries was held for the first time South Africa in March
2013 under the theme “BRICS and Africa – partnerships for integration and industrialisation”.
Over the last few years trade and foreign direct investment between Africa and the countries
in this new economic bloc has surged. Trade between China and Africa increased from US
$10 billion in 2000 to US $190 billion in 2012. India, Brazil and Russia have been active in
promoting small- and medium-scale enterprises, mining and energy projects on the
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continent. As a result the BRICS bloc is now Africa’s largest trading partners with trade
expected to reach more than US $500 billion by 2015, with 60 per cent from China alone.
As stated earlier, their presence and involvement is largely based on their domestic demand
for the abundant minerals and land on the continent as well opportunities to tap into the
rising middle class estimated at about one third of Africa’s one billion population. According
to UNCTAD, as a result of the large demand for infrastructure in the resources sector, the
most significant area of trade between BRICS and Africa is in the manufacturing and
telecommunication, financial and retail services sectors.
Boosting growth in food production in particular and the agricultural sector in general is vital
for African countries. Brazil, which in recent years has emerged as a leading global player in
agricultural production particularly in sugar, coffee, soybeans, ethanol, poultry and beef,
wants to support Africa in this area and reduce the impact of food insecurity. However there
are serious concerns over the takeover of land in Africa by many countries including those in
BRICS to produce for their own domestic markets. The problem of “land grabs” has been
well documented by civil society organisations in Africa and elsewhere. This, however, will
also form part of another ActionAid study.
It is common knowledge that South Africa is the smallest BRICS country both in terms of
population as well as in the size of its economy. However, because South Africa currently
accounts for one third of Sub-Saharan African economy, it is regarded as strategic from a
geo-political view and a “gateway” for BRICS into Africa, and especially its abundant natural
resources. As the BRICS are consolidating their positions in Africa through massive
investments, by the time of the Durban conference, negotiations were at an advanced for the
establishment of a new funding model to finance BRICS projects, to enhance their global
funding role, and to foster south-south cooperation.
During the conference, agreement was reached and the leaders announced their intentions
to launch their own “development bank”. According to South African International Relations
Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, the decision was made “as a result of the need to change the
way business is conducted in international finance institutions”. Prior to becoming a formal
member of the BRICS bloc, South Africa was a founding member of the India-Brazil-SA
(IBSA) group of countries. The DBSA will be the government’s lead agency in the BRICS
discussions on the new development bank and it is likely that at the next BRICS meeting in
Brazil in 2014 more light will be shed on the details of the Bank.
This places South Africa in a position in which it has to manage its political, social and
economic relations with African countries with mutuality, care and respect. Already, as the
so-called gateway, it has to manage perceptions of playing “gatekeeper” and in the case of
the G20, the role of “interlocutor”. There’s also the position of “big brother”. SA’s
commitment to promoting regional interests whilst also advancing national interests will
place it between a rock and a hard place. As the same time SA plays a key role in a range
of multi-lateral institutions trying very hard to balance national policy and interests with those
of Africa and allies in the global north and south.
Coordinating this work, whilst balancing the different interests and managing bilateral
agreements in pursuit of a “better world”, is a huge responsibility. There are times when the
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country gets it right and there are others when it goes wrong. Given the country’s recent
history in overthrowing apartheid and replacing it with a progressive rights-based
constitution, there are valid expectations that in everything it does, it is guided by a
progressive vision, principles and values for a just, sustainable and peaceful world. In the
course of this work, the country and especially its citizens must remain vigilant against any
repetition of old systems and practices of colonial thinking and imperial designs.
DIRCO’s Strategic Plan 2013-2018 sets out a vision and strategy for how SA will conduct it’s
relationships with other countries. According to Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane,
“Our struggle for a better life in South Africa is intertwined with our pursuit for a better
Africa in a better world. Our destiny is inextricably linked to that of the Southern
Africa Region. Regional and continental integration is the foundation of Africa’s
socio-economic development and political unity, and essential for our own prosperity
and security”.
To this end, the plan articulates a role for SA in the AU and the UN systems to find “just and
lasting solutions to “outstanding issues of self-determination and decolonisation” on the
continent. In supporting socio-economic development the government will continue to
disburse funding through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund.
In this period, DIRCO also plans to replace this fund with the establishment of the South
African Development Partnership Agency to “manage all outgoing development cooperation
programmes. One of the key challenges with the cabinet will be the ability to effectively
coordinate policy and policy implementation across departments – finance, trade and
industry, DIRCO, economic development and the presidency amongst others - beyond the
country’s borders. A similar challenge exists within South African civil society with many
organisations working separately on different issues such as migration, trade, worker rights
and foreign policy. The recently formed South African Forum for International Solidarity
provides a networking space to for these organisations to share their work and collaborate in
monitoring government plans and action.
In the context of the current global financial architecture, development financing has been
dominated by the Bretton Woods institutions established to finance post-World War II
reconstruction in Europe. The countries from the BRICS bloc have accused the World Bank
and IMF of representing the interests of powerful northern countries and slow in transforming
to meet the development financing needs of fast growing countries such as Brazil, India and
China. Together the five BRICS countries account for 40% of the world’s population and a
25% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and together have currency reserves of over
$4-trillion. Whilst the Durban Summit announced the formation of a development bank with
seed capital of $10-billion from each country, the exact details regarding the role, structure,
location and operations of the Bank are still in the development phase.
The mere establishment of BRICS, still in its infancy stage, has generated new debate about
the political economy of a multipolar world. New donor funding, policy think tanks, private
sector research institutions, business to business councils, academic cooperation,
development finance cooperation committees and new government departments amongst
others have been established as result. Regular meetings, conferences, seminars are
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funded to exchange knowledge and strategy. Within civil society debate rages as to whether
the new bloc will constitute a “potential radical shift from the prevailing global political
economic framework” or merely a “relocation of power” to the elites in the global south.
In an article published in Pambazuka, the director of ActionAid South Africa, Fatima
Shabodien, cautions against the proposed BRICS development bank “becoming an
‘emerging economies’ version of the World Bank”. She goes on to say that the “ideology
represented by the World Bank has not worked for us, and has been largely inimical to the
needs and aspirations of the poor, and of African women in particular”. The focus on
infrastructure development in Africa, whilst important and necessary, must have a “defined
redistributive mechanism” to ensure that “the poor have access to water, electricity, decent
housing and quality education for children”.
She warns that countries in BRICS must go beyond their own narrow national interest.
South Africa in particular, must ensure that our membership of BRICS represents not only
the business interest of SA, but that of the continent more broadly in this formation. BRICS
members have to ensure that development in their respective regions happens in a manner
as inclusive as possible.
10.
Conclusions and Recommendations for ActionAid and
progressive civil society more broadly
In the ANC’s 2012 national conference the role of state-owned institutions was discussed in
a policy paper presented by the National Executive Committee. The paper noted the
“absence of a common comprehensive policy framework” that guides DFIs. An important
point made in the paper that such institutions are not created to “maximise profits or incur
losses” but for the dual mandate of achieving a “balance between the required level of selffunding and undertaking development projects that the private sector would ordinarily not”.
The purpose of DFIs was to operate as “powerful instruments of economic transformation
and remain firmly within the control of the state in order to have the capacity that is capable
of responding effectively and efficiently to the developmental agenda of the ANC
government”.
The policy proposes that “Government as shareholder managers must build relationships
with likeminded shareholder managers from around the world, with a particular emphasis on
the BRICS alliance, so as to enable knowledge sharing and international collaboration
between SOEs and DFIs to achieve mutual strategic objectives. BRICS partners are of
necessity in terms of seeking to advance their own national interests. In this context the
position is that the South African government must be “well coordinated with respect to its
own SOEs and DFIs in these interactions.”
In the context of the role of the DBSA these policy pronouncements together with the new
mandate requires astute political management if it is to meet its development finance role as
a publically owned institution competing with private sector banks in the in the country and in
the region. Whilst the DBSA has only a 20% target for projects outside South Africa, the
institutional expertise and knowledge developed within bank over the years is regarded as
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an important asset to be constructively used by amongst others NEPAD, BRICS DFIs and
the Pan-African Parliament. The Bank houses the Pan-African Development Facility.
The agreement to house the EU-SA Infrastructure Investment Programme was preceded by
stringent tests which the DBSA successfully passed. The Bank is seen by its peers in the
region, on the continent and globally as an important player in the field of development
finance and has established a set of strategic institutional learning partnerships for example,
together with the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), the DBSA also supports and
hosts the SADC Development Finance Resource Centre, which provides support to similar
agencies in the region.
In addition that bank is part of a network, the African Association of Development Finance
Institutions (AADFI) which provides information, training and policy development advice for
African bankers, finance officers and other DFI’s. The Bank also works with the UN
Environment Programme Finance Initiative, a network of over 200 financial institutions to
promote linkages between sustainability and financial performance.
There have been a few studies by the for example the World Bank, the AfDB and by the
Bank itself to address institutional and project weaknesses in development financing. At a
global level, following the financial crisis and the resultant economic climate, the financial
sector is now under greater scrutiny by citizens across the globe.
Globally there are several progressive reputable civil society organisations working on
issues of development and on development finance institutions that have a long history of
engagement and institutional knowledge to promote better engagement. On the back of the
global financial crisis, the main weakness has been the lack of shared information, insights
and strategies on the DFIs could be transformed to achieve global socio-economic and
environmental equity and sustainable development goals. Organisations such as
ActionAid International are well positioned to initiate a more collaborative approach to
dealing with this gap within global civil society.
One of the challenges facing SA civil society is to build a critical group of key activist
“experts” on development finance and to collaborate, share knowledge and build a strategy
for proactive engagement with the SA-based DFIs particularly on good development
practice. In the course of this report, several discussions were help with current and former
senior leadership and board members. There is a unanimous view that the tension between
the development mandate and financial sustainability is an on-going and dynamic one.
There is a willingness to engage. ActionAid should consider taking forward an
agreement reached in principle on the proposal of a civil society –bank executive
roundtable discussion.
In SA, there is no civil society watchdog dedicated to monitoring and evaluating the country’s
DFI’s. In Brazil, the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE) has
secured state funding for independent research into the role and impact of the country’s
largest development finance institution, BNDES. Given future growth and expansion
plans for SA DFIs in terms of domestic policy and international agreements, the
conceptualisation and establishment of a similar institution in SA is necessary and
timely. This will enhance the building of capacity inside and across organisations and with
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the constituencies they serve and represent. In this way we could build a network of
community based activists keen on engaging the issue of development finance locally and
globally.
In the 2013 Integrated Annual Report, the DBSA annexes a Sustainability Report based on
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The three broad categories (there are over a hundred
sub indictors) are institutional, social and environmental. In introducing this annexure the
CEO is “proud to announce” and publish its third sustainability report as reviewed by its
Internal Audit Department. It is noted that the report is not externally reviewed but important
to note that it is published as part of its annual report. The process of stakeholder input as
part of the report is regarded as good practice. This is over and above the AAA scores
benchmarked against models used rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and
Poor.
The DBSA Appraisal Guidelines have recently undergone an internal revision and at the time
of writing there were not available. It is necessary for ActionAid and civil society
organisations to study the revised guidelines when available and assess whether
these are useful and suggest any improvements based on comparable instruments
available in other civil society allies. In the sustainability report the overwhelming result for
the respective indictors – over hundred and ten including sub-indicators - are “fully” met
whilst in only three the result is “partially” met.
An area that will need further investigation is monitoring and evaluations at the coal face the actual development impact of the DBSA for each project. A critical issue here is the role
of “beneficiaries” described as the “poor” and the extent to which their lives and areas in
which they live have changed for the better. It is possible that NGOs in such communities
have their own policies and instruments by which good development projects and practice is
measured. If not then, if requested, ActionAid, with its knowledge, skills and
experience could assist them develop their own.
In the context of SADC, SA civil society has strong connections with the SADC-NGO Council
which is based in Botswana. It is suggested that ActionAid in partnership with the South
Africa Forum for International Solidarity (SAFIS), explore the possibilities of a joint
conversation and or study on the experiences and development impact of DFI’s in
general and the DBSA in particular in the region and what the lessons were and what could
from the basis of a future policy intervention in the region.
Beyond SADC, ActionAid has already begun work on DFIs in BRICS countries. It is
understood that globally the organisation is working towards developing a strategy for
engagement in the event a BRICS Development Bank is established.
At the continental level the AfDB has developed a Framework for Engagement with Civil
Society. A copy of this policy is available on the website of the AfDB. SA civil society could
learn from the process and outcomes of the AfDB approach by engaging with our
counterparts on the continent. Similar work has been undertaken by EU NGOs such as
Concord, Eurodad and Climate Action Network for EU development finance institutions.
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Given sustained average growth in member countries and the view that African countries
can finance their own growth through revenues whether from increased taxes, inward
remittances and investment, the AfDB believes that this requires an effective governance
framework to manage these in order to meet the demands and expectations of citizens. The
Bank recently launched an online public consultation on its new Governance Strategic
Framework and Action Plan (2014 – 2018). The main purpose of this plan according to the
Bank is to strengthen transparency and accountability in the use of state resources and to
promote an enabling environment which supports Africa’s socio-economic transformation,
job creation and financial inclusion. In the words of Donald Kaberuka, the AfDB President,
quoted in the Bank’s magazine, the African Banker (Issue No. 24, second quarter 2013):
“We will need leadership and I mean leadership at all levels – political leadership,
business leadership and civil society leadership to all pull in one direction, the
direction which gets Africa to the next level, which is economic transformation. This is
vital”.
To this end, it is worth exploring within civil society networks how to effectively and
positively engage so that peoples’ voices are amplified within institutions such as the
AfDB, the Pan African Parliament, the AU and NEPAD to achieve these democratic
development goals at a Pan-African level.
Another example of consultations on transparency and accountability is that of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), which operates in Latin America and the Caribbean
countries. Two months ago the IDB launched a public consultation process to review their
Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (ICIM) Policy and its operation. The
Bank’s board mandates this review in order to increase transparency and accountability and
to strengthen its mission, accessibility, independence and responsiveness.
In conclusion, there is an ambitious continent wide vision and plans for infrastructure
development as a necessary pillar to drive socio-economic growth for the decades to come.
With the DBSA, a relatively young and influential global player undergoing its own
evolutionary phases within its structure and strategy, it is an opportune time to set the
basis now for a medium to long term civil society engagement strategy with the Bank
on its domestic, regional and continental policies and practices.
A successful engagement strategy will ensure that citizens in general and their organisations
will play an active role in ensuring development needs are planned, designed, implemented
and monitored effectively this contribution to the principles of active citizenship, effective
institutions and accountability on the continent.
If we do preferably take a long-term view, we might want to explore the possibility of
creating a more permanent mechanism as a resource for building civil society’s capacity
to engage effectively with the DBSA and other DFIs on the continent and globally.
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References:
DBSA, The Evolution of the Development Bank of South Africa, 2010. Midrand, DBSA.
DBSA, Integrated Annual Report, 2013. Midrand, DBSA.
SADC Council of NGO’s, Poverty Eradication in Southern Africa, April 2011. SADC-CNGO,
Gaborone.
SADC-CNGO, Concept Note – 9th Southern Africa Civil Society Forum, 2013. Botswana.
Zarenda, H. South Africa’s National Development Plan and its implications for regional
development, June 2013. Tralac, Stellenbosch.
DBSA, The role of South Africa FDI’s in regional infrastructure development in Africa, March
2011. Midrand, DBSA.
NEPAD, African Heads of State to be held accountable for regional infrastructure projects,
July 2013. www.nepad.org.
Hall,R. The Many Faces of Investor Rush in Southern Africa: Towards a Typology of
Commercial Land Deals, February 2011. PLAAS, University of Western Cape, Cape Town.
AU Commission, Statement of the Chairman to the Roundtable on financing Africa’s
transformation, July 2013. Tunis.
Omotola, A.H., What the BRICS Development means for Africa, August 2013.
Johannesburg. Economy Watch.
DBSA, Perspectives of DBSA on Infrastructure Investments in the SADC Region, March
2011. Japan, DBSA.
Mwanza, W., Operationalising the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan,
July 2013. Stellenbosch, Tralac.
DIRCO, Strategic Plan 2013-2018, 2012. Dirco, Pretoria.
Bond, P., Is post-apartheid South Africa still “sub imperialist”? BRICS banking and frustrated
global development finance reform, September 2013. Durban.
CONCORD, Financing for development negotiations – what should the EU bring to the table,
August 2013. Brussels.
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ActionAid South Africa
Physical Address
16th Floor Edura House
41 Fox Street
Johannesburg
Postal Address
Postnet Suite 235
Private Bag X30500
Houghton
2041
Tel: +27 (0) 11 731 4560
Fax: +27 (0) 86 543 2557
http://www.actionaid.org/south-africa
www.twitter.com/actionaid_sa
www.facebook.com/actionaidsafrica
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