Job Openings:
– Daniel Rusu, Dreamgol, LLC
– drusu9@gmail.com
– 803-727-5634
– www.dreamgol.com
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Job openings:
–
–
–
–
Peter J. Johnson, Staffing Consultant
978.927.7000 (m) / premagni@verizon.net
(e) www.linkedin.com/in/peterjjohnson (linkedin)
Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Ohio for computer scientists and software engineers with credentials in the fields of security, networking and privacy
– US citizenship
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Job Openings:
–
–
Charleston, system development
C, Python, and Java, Linux, specifically Fedora 14, cellular communications, electrical engineering or the basic principles, and mysql
– Android, iPhone / iPad developers to build the follow on versions of a current geo-location / SMS application
– Contact info upon request
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Requirements available at http://www.cse.sc.edu/~farkas/csce548-
2012/csce548-project-requirements.htm
Useful links:
– OWASP, Open Web Application Security
Project, https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page
– Sample projects
CSCE 548 - Farkas 5
Choose a team member among your class mates. This selection is for this exercise only.
List the steps of RMF for the "KillerAppCo's iWare 1.0 Server" given in your text book. (3 points)
Carry out similar RMF on the computing resources owned by your team member. For example, understand the "business" context may include goals like graduating from USC, making profit from writing software to a company, etc. Document your RMF activities and findings. (7 points)
BONUS points (2 points): Have your partner evaluate your risk management report and comment on it.
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This lecture:
– McGraw: Chapter 2
– Recommended:
Rainbow Series Library, http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow.htm
Common Criteria, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
Next lecture:
– Software Development Lifecycle – Dr. J. Vidal
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Threats
Vulnerabilities
CSCE 548 - Farkas
RISK
Consequences
8
Dollar Amount Losses by Type
Total Loss (2006): $53,494,290 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
Computer Security Institute
CSCE 548 - Farkas 9
Percentage of IT Budget
Spent on Security
Percentage of Organizations
Using ROI, NPV, or IRR Metrics
CSCE 548 - Farkas
CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
Computer Security Institute
10
Damage of the target may not reflect the real amount of damage
Services may rely on the attacked service, causing a cascading and escalating damage
Need: support for decision makers to
– Evaluate risk and consequences of cyber attacks
– Support methods to prevent, deter, and mitigate consequences of attacks
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Specify System
Architecture
Identify Threats,
Vulnerabilities, Attacks
Identify and
Install Safeguards
Estimate
Risk
Risk is acceptably low
Prioritize
Vulnerabilities
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Understand Business
Context
Identify Business and Technical Risks
Synthesize and Rank
Risks
Carry Out Fixes and Validate
Define Risk
Mitigation Strategy
Measurement and Reporting
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“Who cares?”
Identify business goals, priorities and circumstances, e.g.,
– Increasing revenue
–
–
Meeting service-level agreements
Reducing development cost
– Generating high return investment
Identify software risk to consider
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“Why should business care?”
Business risk
– Direct threat
– Indirect threat
Consequences
– Financial loss
–
–
Loss of reputation
Violation of customer or regulatory constraints
– Liability
Tying technical risks to the business context in a meaningful way
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“What should be done first?”
Prioritization of identified risks based on business goals
Allocating resources
Risk metrics:
–
–
Risk likelihood
Risk impact
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Risk severity
Number of emerging risks
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“How to mitigate risks?”
Available technology and resources
Constrained by the business context: what can the organization afford, integrate, and understand
Need validation techniques
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Perform actions defined in the previous stage
Measure “completeness” against the risk mitigation strategy
– Progress against risk
–
–
Remaining risks
Assurance of mechanisms
Testing
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Continuous and consistent identification and storage of risk information over time
Maintain risk information at all stages of risk management
Establish measurements, e.g.,
– Number of risks, severity of risks, cost of mitigation, etc.
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Threats compromise assets
Threats have a probability of occurrence and severity of effect
Assets have values
Assets are vulnerable to threats
Threats Assets
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Risk: expected loss from the threat against an asset
R=V*P*S
R risk
V value of asset
P probability of occurrence of threat
V vulnerability of the asset to the threat
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Estimate probability of highly undesirable events
Risk: likelihood of undesirable outcome
Threat
System
Undesirable outcome
CSCE 548 - Farkas 22
Certification
How well the system meet the security requirements (technical)
Accreditation
Management’s approval of automated system
(administrative)
CSCE 548 - Farkas 23
CSCE 548 - Farkas 24
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide,
Recommendations of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-
61-rev1/SP800-61rev1.pdf
Actions to avoid further loss from intrusion
Terminate intrusion and protect against reoccurrence
Law enforcement – prosecute
Enhance defensive security
Reconstructive methods based on:
–
–
Time period of intrusion
Changes made by legitimate users during the effected period
– Regular backups, audit trail based detection of effected components, semantic based recovery, minimal rollback for recovery.
CSCE 548 - Farkas 26
User:
–
–
Vigilant for unusual behavior
Report incidents
Manager:
–
–
Awareness training
Policies and procedures
System administration:
– Install safeguards
– Monitor system
– Respond to incidents, including preservation of evidences
CSCE 548 - Farkas 27
Assist in handling security incidents
– Formal
– Informal
Incident reporting and dissemination of incident information
Computer Security Officer
– Coordinate computer security efforts
Others: law enforcement coordinator, investigative support, media relations, etc.
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Preparation
–
–
Baseline Protection
Planning and guidance
–
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Roles and Responsibilities – Training
Incident response team
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Identification and assessment
– Symptoms
– Nature of incident
Identify perpetrator, origin and extent of attack
Can be done during attack or after the attack
–
Gather evidences
Key stroke monitoring, honey nets, system logs, network traffic, etc.
Legislations on Monitoring!
– Report on preliminary findings
CSCE 548 - Farkas 30
Containment
– Reduce the chance of spread of incident
– Determine sensitive data
– Terminate suspicious connections, personnel, applications, etc.
– Move critical computing services
– Handle human aspects, e.g., perception management, panic, etc.
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Eradication
– Determine and remove cause of incident if economically feasible
– Improve defenses, software, hardware, middleware, physical security, etc.
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–
Increase awareness and training
Perform vulnerability analysis
CSCE 548 - Farkas 32
Recovery
– Determine course of action
– Reestablish system functionality
– Reporting and notifications
– Documentation of incident handling and evidence preservation
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Incident evaluation:
– Quality of incident (preparation, time to response, tools used, evaluation of response, etc.)
– Cost of incident (monetary cost, disruption, lost data, hardware damage, etc.)
Preparing report
Revise policies and procedures
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Major weakness: users unawareness
Organizational effort
Educational effort
Customer training
Federal Trade Commission: program to educate customers about web scams
CSCE 548 - Farkas 35
1960s: US Department of Defense (DoD) risk of unsecured information systems
1970s:
– 1977: DoD Computer Security Initiative
– US Government and private concerns
– National Bureau of Standards (NBS – now NIST)
Responsible for standards for acquisition and use of federal computing systems
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS PUBs)
CSCE 548 - Farkas 36
Two initiatives for security:
– Cryptography standards
1973: invitation for technical proposals for ciphers
–
1977: Data Encryption Standard
2001: Advanced Encryption Standard (NIST)
Development and evaluation processes for secure systems
Conferences and workshops
Involves researchers, constructors, vendors, software developers, and users
1979: Mitre Corporation: entrusted to produce an initial set of criteria to evaluate the security of a system handling classified data
CSCE 548 - Farkas 37
1981: National Computer Security Center (NCSC) was established within NSA
– To provide technical support and reference for government agencies
– To define a set of criteria for the evaluation and assessment of security
– To encourage and perform research in the field of security
–
–
To develop verification and testing tools
To increase security awareness in both federal and private sector
1985: Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) == Orange Book
CSCE 548 - Farkas 38
Orange Book objectives
– Guidance of what security features to build into new products
– Provide measurement to evaluate security of systems
– Basis for specifying security requirements
Security features and Assurances
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) security components of the system: hardware, software, and firmware + reference monitor
CSCE 548 - Farkas 39
Supply
Users: evaluation metrics to assess the reliability of the security system for protection of classified or sensitive information when
–
–
Commercial product
Internally developed system
Developers/vendors: design guide showing security features to be included in commercial systems
Designers: guide for the specification of security requirements
CSCE 548 - Farkas 40
Set of criteria and requirements
Three main categories:
– Security policy – protection level offered by the system
– Accountability – of the users and user operations
– Assurance – of the reliability of the system
CSCE 548 - Farkas 41
Concerns the definition of the policy regulation the access of users to information
– Discretionary Access Control
– Mandatory Access Control
– Labels: for objects and subjects
– Reuse of objects: basic storage elements must be cleaned before released to a new user
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Identification/authentication
Audit
Trusted path: no users are attempting to access thr system fraudulently
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Reliable hardware/software/firmware components that can be evaluated separately
Operation reliability
Development reliability
CSCE 548 - Farkas 44
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–
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During system operation
– System architecture: TCB isolated from user processes, security kernel isolated from non-security critical portions of the TCB
– System integrity: correct operation (use diagnostic software)
Covert channel analysis
Trusted facility management: separation of duties
Trusted recovery: recover security features after TCB failures
CSCE 548 - Farkas 45
System reliable during the development process.
Formal methods.
– System testing: security features tested and verified
– Design specification and verification: correct design and implementation wrt security policy. TCB formal specifications proved
– Configuration management: configuration of the system components and its documentation
– Trusted distribution: no unauthorized modifications
CSCE 548 - Farkas 46
Defined set of documents
Minimal set:
–
–
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Trusted facility manual
Security features user’s guide
Test documentation
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Design documentation
Personnel info: Operators, Users, Developers,
Maintainers
CSCE 548 - Farkas 47
Highest Security
– A1 Verified protection
– B3 Security Domains
– B2 Structured Protection
– B1 Labeled Security Protections
– C2 Controlled Access Protection
– C1 Discretionary Security Protection
– D Minimal Protection
No Security
CSCE 548 - Farkas 48
Orange : Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria
Yellow : Guidance for applying the Orange
Book
Red : Trusted Network Interpretation
Lavender : Trusted Database Interpretation
CSCE 548 - Farkas 49
Preliminary technical review (PTR)
– Preliminary technical report: architecture potential for target rating
Vendor assistance phase (VAP)
– Review of the documentation needed for the evaluation process, e.g., security features user’s guide, trusted facility manual, design documentation, test plan. For B or higher, additional documentations are needed, e.g., covert channel analysis, formal model, etc.
Design analysis phase (DAP)
– Initial product assessment report (IPAR): 100-200 pages, detailed info about the hardware, software architecture, security relevant features, team assessments, etc.
–
–
Technical Review Board
Recommendation to the NCSC
CSCE 548 - Farkas 50
Formal evaluation phase (FEP)
–
–
Product Bulletin: formal and public announcement
Final Evaluation Report: information from IPAR and testing results, additional tests, review code (B2 and up), formal policy model, proof.
–
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Recommends rating for the system
NCSC decides final rating
Rating maintenance phase (RAMP)
– Minor changes and revisions
–
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Reevaluated
Rating maintenance plan
CSCE 548 - Farkas 51
German Information Security Agency: German Green
Book (1988)
British Department of Trade and Industry and Ministry of
Defense: several volumes of criteria
Canada, Australia, France: works on evaluation criteria
1991: Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
(ITSEC)
–
–
For European community
Decoupled features from assurance
–
–
Introduced new functionality requirement classes
Accommodated commercial security requirements
CSCE 548 - Farkas 52
January 1996: Common Criteria
– Joint work with Canada and Europe
–
–
Separates functionality from assurance
Nine classes of functionality: audit, communications, user data protection, identification and authentication, privacy, protection of trusted functions, resource utilization, establishing user sessions, and trusted path.
– Seven classes of assurance: configuration management, delivery and operation, development, guidance documents, life cycle support, tests, and vulnerability assessment.
CSCE 548 - Farkas 53
Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL)
– EAL1: functionally tested
– EAL2: structurally tested
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–
–
–
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EAL3: methodologically tested and checked
EAL4: methodologically designed, tested and reviewed
EAL5: semi-formally designed and tested
EAL6: semi-formally verified and tested
EAL7: formally verified design and tested
CSCE 548 - Farkas 54
1997: National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), National Security Agency
(NSA), and Industry
Aims to improve the efficiency of evaluation
Transfer methodologies and techniques to private sector laboratories
Functions: developing tests, test methods, tools for evaluating and improving security products, developing protection profiles and associated tests, establish formal and international schema for CC
CSCE 548 - Farkas 55
Software Development Lifecycle
CSCE 548 - Farkas 56