Articles in Czech professional journals listed in Thomson ISI’s
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) leaning towards classical
liberalism (with abstracts and literature samples)
Politická ekonomie
Politická ekonomie 3/2013
AUSTRIANS’ TACTICAL MISTAKES THAT PREVENT THEM TO“CONQUER THE ORTHODOXY”
(Lukáš Kovanda)
411 – 427
Abstract
According to quite a number of scholars, even non-Austrian, some theories of Austrian school of economic
thought do provide an increasingly relevant material to explain recent boom-and-bust economic cycles as well
as financial crises. However, I argue, this development is not adequately reflected by a corresponding growth of
Austrian influence within the economic orthodoxy. Quite to the contrary, many orthodox scholars have taken
over rigidly Keynesian positions since the financial crisis culminated in 2008 and 2009. In my article I maintain
that Austrians themselves have contributed significantly to such a situation by not preventing three major
tactical mistakes, related to the domain of sociology of economics, from occurring. Firstly, they have not formed
a really unified and thus influential group of scholars; instead, they have been divided into a few streams,
sometimes with highly contradictory stances. Secondly, many Austrians have made bold predictions, especially
with regard to possible enormous inflation stemming from the unprecedented provision of liquidity to the
financial system during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, which have not been
fulfilled at all. Thirdly, a critical number of Austrian school’s economists do not effectively communicate with
the rest of the profession and even, it seems, fail to adequately comprehend the orthodox analytical tools and
theories.
HAYEK, F. A. 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
ISBN 978-0-226-32085-4.
ROTHBARD, M. 1989. The Hermeneutical Invasion of Philosophy and Economics. Review of Austrian
Economics. 1989, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 45–59. ISSN 0889-3047
Politická ekonomie 1/2013
STIMULATION OF ECONOMY ACCORDING TO THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL
(Eva Kindlová)
91 - 108
Abstract
The aim of the article is to explore how the results of the U. S. subprime mortgage crisis influenced economic
policy of governments in highly developed countries. It analyses consequences of a state intervention especially
for government budgets and a rise of government debts. Then the article discusses the point of view of the
Austrian school. Austrian economists argue a state is not an economic subject and its fiscal policy is very
dangerous for effective allocation of the available resources of production´s factors. They advocate a society
with a small government and liberal economic policy. The author believes that Austrian approach to economic
problems is more realistic and more pertinent than the approach of those, who demand more government
intervention.
HAYEK, F. A. 1937. Economics and Knovledge. Economica, N. S. IV (February) 1937
HAYEK, F. A. 1945. The Use Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review, XXXV (4),(Sept.) 1945.
HAYEK, F. A. 1972. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972. ISBN 0226320936.
HAYEK, F. A. 1990a. Cesta do otroctví. Praha: Academia, 1990. ISBN 80-200-0264-2.
HAYEK, F. A. 1990b. Economic Freedom and Representative Government. In LITTLECHILD, S. C. (ed.).
Austrian Economics. Vol. III, Aldershot, England and Brookfi eld, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.,
1990, pp. 439–454. ISBN 1-85278-352-4.
HAYEK, F. A. 1994. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda. Academia, Praha, 1994. ISBN 80-200-0241-3.
HAYEK, F. A. 1995. Osudná domýšlivost. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 1995. ISBN
80-85850-05-02.
HAYEK, F. A. 2007. The Pure Theory of Capital. The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Vol. 12.Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2007. ISBN 9780226320991.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1990a. Entrepreneurship and the Equilibrating Process. In LITTLECHILD, S. C.(ed.). Austrian
Economics. Vol. III. Aldershot, England and Brookfield, Vermont: Edward ElgarPublishing Ltd., 1990, pp. 73–
79. ISBN 1-85278-352-4
KIRZNER, I. M. 1990b. Government Regulation and the Market Discovery Process. In LITTLECHILD,S. C.
(ed.). Austrian Economics. Vol. III. Aldershot, England and Brookfi eld, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd., 1990, pp. 211–220. ISBN 1-85278-352-4
KIRZNER, I. M. 1998. Jak fungují trhy. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998. ISBN 80-902270-5-8.
MISES, L. von 1998. Liberalismus. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998. ISBN 80-86119-08-4.
MISES, L. von 2002. Byrokracie. Praha: Liberální institut, 2002. ISBN 80-86389-22-7.
MISES, L. von 2006. Lidské jednání: Pojednání o ekonomii. Praha: Liberální institut, 2006. ISBN 80-86389-456.
ROBBINS, L. 1935. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. (2nd rev. ed.), Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 1935.
ROTHBARD, M. N. 2001. Ekonomie státních zásahů. Praha, Liberální institut, 2001. ISBN
80-86389-10-3.
ROTHBARD, M. N. 2005. Zásady ekonomie: Od lidského jednání k harmonii trhů. Praha: Liberální institut,
2005. ISBN 80-86389-27-8.
INSTITUTIONS MATTER! BUT WHY?
(Lenka Slavíková)
121 – 127
Abstract
The commentary defends the central idea of current institutional social research – that institutions are
significant variables influencing the human action regarding the resource allocation. This idea was strongly
opposed by the scientific board of the Czech economic faculty (institutionally oriented economic research was
labeled as needless). The goal is to open the debate about this issue and ask the opponents to formulate concrete
objections. Theoretical arguments and empirical examples are raised in favor of the institutional economics.
NORTH, D. C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Institutional Change. 1. vyd. Princeton University Press,
2005. ISBN 978-1-4008-2948-4.
OLSON, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action – Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 2. vyd. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971. ISBN 0-674-53751-3.
OSTROM, E. 2007. Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary fi eld of institutional
analysis. Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007, No. 3, pp. 239–264.
OSTROM, E. 2006. Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.18. vyd. New
York: The Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 978-0-521-40599-7.
OSTROM, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. 1. vyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
ISBN 0-691-12238-5.
OSTROM, E.; BURGER, J.; FIELD, CH. B.; NORGAARD, R. B.; POLICANSKY, D. 1999. Revisiting the
Commons. Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science, Vol. 284, No. 5412, pp. 278–282. ISSN 0036-8075.
Politická ekonomie 5/2012
PROGRESSIVE OR “FLAT” TAX – ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DILEMMA
(Beáta Blechová)
649 – 667
Abstract
There are currently held tough discussions among economists and policy makers on the most appropriate form
of taxation that would be fair, simple, enough incentive to wage work and entrepreneurship and withal also
providing sufficient revenue for the state to fund the services provided to citizens. In this debate two opposing
views on the basic form of this system stand against each other, namely, whether it should tax the income in a
progressive manner, as is the case with tax systems applied today in most countries, or in a proportional
manner, which has been introduced in a limited extent in several countries, especially in Central and Eastern
Europe. This article provides a brief description of the basic characteristics of both these approaches and
summarizes the main arguments presented by their proponents and opponents. The next section describes the
different variants of a proportional system, also known as a flat tax system, some of which currently exist only in
the yet unrealized proposals, and in the end, then compare their pros and cons.
BÖHM-BAWERK, E. 1896. Karl Marx and the Close of his System. Augustus M. Kelley, New York,1949.
Dostupné na http://mises.org/books/karlmarx.pdf.
FRIEDMAN, M. 1962. Kapitalismus a svoboda. Praha: Liberální institut, 1994. ISBN 80-85787-33-4.
ECONOMIC HISTORY: WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF HISTORICAL EXAMPLE TO
UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMIC PHENOMENA?
(Tomáš Otáhal)
679 – 693
Abstract
What are the contributions of historical example to understanding of economic phenomena? Economists widely
adopt methods of natural sciences. But economics is a social science and the observed economic phenomena are
qualitatively different from phenomena observed by natural sciences. Thus the use of natural sciences methods
makes implications of economic theoretical models unrealistic. In this paper, I argue that the evidence of
historical example is a good method to illuminate the implications of economic theoretical models, because if
implications of economic theoretical models are illustrated in historical perspective, they can be more easily
verified by common sense thus particular historical circumstances may be partly revealed. Moreover, historical
examples also serve to demonstrate the qualitative content of casual economic relations based on human
historical experience, which is ignored by natural science methods. The historical example is thus not only more
realistic but it better corresponds with the social nature of economic science.
BUCHANAN, J. M. 1979. Is Economics the Science of Choice? In What Should Economist Do? Indianapolis
(IN): Liberty Fund, 1979
FRIEDMAN, M. 1997. Metodologie pozitivní ekonomie. Praha: Liberální institut, 1997.
FRIEDMAN, M.; SCHWARTZ, A. J. 1993. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.
Princeton (NJ): National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
HAYEK, F. A. 1980. Economics and Knowledge. In Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 33–56.
HAYEK, F. A. 1995. Kontrarevoluce vědy. Praha: Liberální institut, 1995.
HAYEK, F. A. 2001a. Teorie složitých jevů. In JEŽEK, T. (ed.). Zásady liberálního řádu. Praha: Academia,
2001.
HAYEK, F. A. 2001b. Stupeň vysvětlování. In JEŽEK, T. (ed.). Zásady liberálního řádu. Praha: Academia,
2001.
HAYEK, F. A. 2001c. Využití znalostí ve společnosti. In JEŽEK, T. (ed.). Zásady liberálního řádu. Praha:
Academia, 2001.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago (IL) and London (UK):
The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1976. The Economic Point of View: An Essay in the History of Economic Thought. tMenlo Park
(CA): The Institute for Human Studies, Inc., 1976.
MENGER, C. 2007. Principles of Economics. Auburn (AU): Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007.
MISES, L. v. 2006. Lidské jednání: Pojednání o ekonomii. Praha: Liberální institut, 2006.
MISES, L. v. 2007. Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution. Auburn (AL):
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007.
NORTH, D. C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York (NY) and London (UK): W.W.
Norton & Company, 1981.
NORTH, D. C.; WALLIS, J. J.; WEINGAST, B. R. 2009. Violence and Social Order: A conceptual framework
for interpretation recorded human history. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore,
Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Politická ekonomie 4/2012
ECONOMICS OF SCIENCE – A HOPE OR A PITFALL?
(Marek Loužek)
536 – 550
Abstract
The paper poses the question whether the economics of science could be the key to economic methodology. First,
the sociology of science, which tries to put science in social context, is described. Then, the economic approach
to science, inspired by Tullock, Stigler and Becker, is explained. We point out the problem of circle, according to
which putting science in context does not imply relativism as concerns the truth. This conclusion underlines the
Popperian message of the paper.
BECKER, G. 1993. Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education.
Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
STIGLER, G.; BLANK, D. M. 1957. The Demand and Supply of Scientifi c Personnel. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1957.
STIGLER, G. 1994. Pohyb a pokrok v ekonomii. In JONÁŠ, J. (ed.). Oslava ekonomie. Přednášky laureátů
Nobelovy ceny za ekonomii. Praha: Academia, 1994, pp. 475–488.
TULLOCK, G. 1966. The Organization of Inquiry. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1966.
Politická ekonomie 3/2012
FROM MISES TO SCHUTZ. A QUESTION OF APRIORISM IN ECONOMICS
(Petr Špecián)
395 – 410
Abstract
The study analyzes Mises‘s approach to the question of apriorism in a broader methodological context. It shows
that it is not inevitable to advocate the aprioristic character of economics (resp. science of human action), as
Mises does, to maintain the subjectivist-individualist methodology and the effort to adequately grasp the general
laws of human action from its perspective. The present redefinition of apriorism is developed on the basis of
thoughts of Barry Smith and Alfred Schutz. It suggests abandoning the apodictic character of apriori (which is
untenable) and move closer to a broadly defined empiricism. The methodological insights developed in the paper
are finally used to contribute to the debate between the behavioral economists and the proponents of rational
choice theory.
FRIEDMAN, M. 1953. Methodology of Positive Economics. In Essays in positive economics. 1. vyd. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953. ISBN 0-226-26403-5.
HAYEK, F. A. 1995. Kontrarevoluce vědy. Praha: Liberální institut, 1995. ISBN 80-85787-87-3.
MISES, L. 1962. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method. Van Nostrand: New
York, 1962.
MISES, L. 1969. Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution. 2. vyd. New
Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969. SBN 87000-070-5.
MISES, L. 2003. Epistemological Problems of Economics. Auburn: Ludwig Von Mises Inst., 2003. ISBN 0945466-36-6.
MISES, L. 2006. Lidské jednání: Pojednání o ekonomii. Praha: Liberální institut, 2006. ISBN 80-86389-45-6.
ROTHBARD, M. N. 1957. In Defense of ‚Extreme Apriorism‘. Southern Economic Journal. 1957, Vol. 23, No.
3, pp. 314-320.
Politická ekonomie 4/2011
INFLATION TARGETING AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NATURE OF THE MONEY SUPPLY AND
THE FINANCIAL IMBALANCES
(Tomáš Munzi, Petr Hlaváč)
435 – 453
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical framework for a thesis that the transition to the inflation targeting regime,
either explicit or implicit, may be one of the causes of the long-term latent accumulations of the financial and
structural imbalances, materializing much later and with more dire consequences. Due to the long-term
systematic manipulation of interest rates, within the operational framework of the stabilization of consumer
prices and the output gap, as well as of anti-deflationary fundamentalism, the economy can transform itself into
a kind of „black box“, gradually and over time causing an „escape“ of credit and monetary aggregates. Money
supply tends to be more endogenous and elastic, changing the causality within a link between the money supply
and its effective economic materialization, both in production processes of the real economy as well as in
banking and financial services. Thereby, the economy lacks a needful defensive mechanism that would pull the
overheating economy back through more exogenous and inelastic money supply, automatically adjusting market
interest rates. In the empirical part we employed VECM tests to show that the money supply was exogenous
before the implicit adoption of inflation targeting in the USA (1985), but endogenous after it.
FRIEDMAN, M. 1982. Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1982,
Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 98-118.
HAYEK, F. A. 2008. Prices and Production and Other Works. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute,
2008.
HAYEK, F. A. 1969. Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect. The Journal of Political Economy. 1969, Vol. 77,
No. 2, pp. 274-285.
HAYEK, F. A. 1978. Denationalisation of Money. 2d ed. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978.
MISES, L. von 1953. The Theory of Money and Credit. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953.
ROBBINS, L. 2007. The Great Depression. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007.
CREATION AND VIOLATION OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUILIBRIUM IN REDISTRIBUTION
SYSTEMS
(Petr Wawrosz)
526 – 546
Abstract
Institutional economics is one of the most developing fi elds of economics. However, many its issues still need to
be solved. For instance the theory does not give exact answer to why particular institutions (formal and informal
norms) occur, change and cease to exist. The paper tries to solve the topic through the model of establishing and
disrupting institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems. People live their whole lives in redistribution
systems and they can be members of a winning coalition and receive some redistribution or they are out of
coalition and the redistribution is made to their detriment. The members of a winning coalition are not, however,
automatically guaranteed ongoing membership. So they have interest to establish a structure of institutions
(institutional equilibrium) helping them to protect their position. The paper divides redistribution into two kinds:
necessary and unnecessary redistribution. The process of creating a winning coalition in a redistribution system
is described and it is shown how institutions help to facilitate the process. Then the paper defi nes the
institutional equilibrium (IEQ) and its conditions. They are explained the connections between IEQ and
redistribution systems, the conditions when is convenient for some players endeavour to create a equilibrium, the
reasons why IEQ does not occur. The theory of institutional change is hereto used - if somebody endeavours to
create a IEQ, (s)he also realizes a institutional change.
HAYEK, F. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review. 1945, Vol. 35, No. 2.
HAYEK, F. 1994. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda. 2. vydání. Praha: Academia, 1994. ISBN 80-200-0241-3.
MISES, L. 2006. Lidské jednání – pojednání o ekonomii. Praha: Liberální institut. ISBN 80-86389-45-6.
NORTH, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge (Ma): Cambridge
University Press, 1990. ISBN 978-0521397346.
NORTH, D. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspective. 1991, Vol. 5, No. 1.
NORTH, D. 1994. Economic Performance trough Time. American Economic Review. 1994, Vol. 84.
NORTH, D. 2005a. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
NORTH, D. 2005b. Institutions and Process of Economic Change. Management International. 2005, Vol. 9, No.
3.
NORTH, D.; WALLIS, J.; WEINGAST, B. 2009. Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders. Journal of
Democracy. 2009, Vol. 20, No. 1.
TULLOCK, G. 1987. „Rent seeking“. In. EATWELL, J. at all (ed). The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.
Palgrave Macmillan. Vol. 4. ISBN 978-0333372357.
TULLOCK, G. 2005. The Rent-Seeking Society: The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. 5. Liberty Fund
Inc. ISBN 978-0865975354.
Politická ekonomie 1/2011
REGULATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR FROM AN ECONOMIC THEORY POINT OF VIEW
(Martin Mandel, Vladimír Tomšík)
58 – 81
Abstract
The authors of the paper discuss reasons as well as current stage of the regulation of the financial (mostly
banking) sector. They are not in favor of strict rejection of the regulation, but they are not in favor of strong
regulation of the financial sector either. The article is based on the economic theory that there are objective
economic reasons as well as specific financial features which cannot recommend and provide clear, simple, and
unilateral solution about what level of regulation is appropriate in the financial market. The authors offer some
economic ideas that can be useful for preparing and evaluating new regulation of the banking sector. The paper
also defines theoretical assumptions of an ideal financial system. Based on those assumptions, the authors
formulate and describe problems of real working financial (banking) system, and these problems create
necessary condition, but not sufficient condition for imposing regulation. Finally, the paper describes and
discusses impacts of concrete new banking regulatory proposals (increasing capital requirements, creating
conservation and countercyclical capital buffers, calculating leverage ratio and liquidity ratio, and imposing
bank levy).
FRIEDMAN, M . 1948. A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability. American Economic Review.
1948, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 245–264
FRIEDMAN, M. 1953. The Case for Flexible Exchange Rate. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago:University
of Chicago Press. 1953, pp. 157–203.
FRIEDMAN, M. 1960. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University ress, 1960.
HAYEK, F. A. 1999. Soukromé peníze: Potřebujeme centrální banku? Praha: Liberální institut, 1999.
Politická ekonomie 5/2010
HOW COMMON METHODOLOGY PROBLEMS AFFECT THE UNSATISFACTORY STATUS OF
ECONOMIC SCIENCE
(Jaroslav Daňhel, Eva Ducháčková)
596 – 607
Abstract
The authors of the article point out that the theory of economics has failed to yield a solid theoretical
background in such critical situations as the period of the current financial and economic crisis and the
transformation period of post-communist economies. Mainly present crisis opens the question of unsatisfactory
status of economic science. While classical liberal or Keynesian concepts are failing, theorists cannot look to
mathematical modelling for help. It seems that traditional concepts are malfunctioning. Financial market is
particularly predisposed for this process. The use of mathematical model is overvalued. The article calls
attention on asymmetry of information problem and possible influence and adequacy of regulatory attitudes on
return to equilibrium level, particularly in EU. The challenge for today’s theoretical economists is to find a new
concept for today’s global era.
FRIEDMAN. M. 1992. Svoboda volby. Praha: Liberální institut, 1992.
HAYEK, F. A. 1995. Kontrarevoluce vědy. Praha: Liberální institut, 1995.
Politická ekonomie 5/2010
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN AUSTRIAN AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES?
(Ladislava Grochová, Tomáš Otáhal)
623 – 640
Abstract
What is the role of entrepreneurship in economic development from the perspective of neo-Austrian and new
institutional economics and what is the difference between these approaches? Neo-Austrian economists claim
that economic development is caused by entrepreneurial discovery. New institutional economists argue that
structure of incentives determined by the institutional environment provides a guideline for entrepreneurial
decision-making. Hence, an institutional environment that rewards rent-seeking does not provide opportunities
for economic development. In this paper we offer a comparison of these approaches to show that both
entrepreneurial discovery and institutional environment are closely related. Moreover, with the comparison we
demonstrate that entrepreneurial decision-making plays more important role in economic development when an
institutional change is taken into account.
HAYEK, F. A. v. 2002. Competition as a Discovery Procedure. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics. 2002,
Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 9–23.
HAYEK, F. A. v. 1980a. Economics and Knowledge. In HAYEK, F.A. v. (ed.). Individualism and Economic
Order. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ISBN 0226320936
HAYEK, F. A. v. 1980b. The Meaning of Competition. In HAYEK, F. A. v. (ed.). Individualism and Economic
Order. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ISBN 0226320936.
HAYEK, F. A. v. 1980c. Socialist Calculation III: The Competitive Solution. In HAYEK, F. A. v. (ed.).
Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ISBN 0226320936
HAYEK, F. A. v. 1980d. The Use of Knowledge in Society. In HAYEK, F. A. v. (ed.). Individualism and
Economic Order. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980. ISBN 0226320936.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,1973.
ASIN B001DDI9CO.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1985. Discovery and Capitalist Process. London; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1985. ISBN 244386611.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1988. The Economic Calculation Debate: Lessons for Austrians. Review of Austrian
Economics. Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1–18.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1997a. How Markets Work: Disequilibrium, Entrepreneurship and Discovery [IEA Hobart
Paper No. 133]. The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1997. ISBN 0255364040.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1997b. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach.
Journal of Economic Literature. 1997, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 60–85.
MISES, L. v. 1990. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth. In HAYEK F.A. v. (ed.). Collective
Economic Planning, Clifton, NJ: Kelley Publishing, pp. 87–130. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990.
MISES, L. v. 1996. Human Action: a Treatise on Economics. 4th edition, San Francisco, CA: Foundation for
Economic Education, Inc., 1996. ISBN 0-930073-18-5.
NORTH, D. C. 1994. Economic Performance Through Time. American Economic Review. 1994, Vol. 84, No. 3,
pp. 359–368.
NORTH, D. C. 2002. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University
Press, 2002. ISBN 0521397340.
NORTH, D. C., WALLIS, J. J., WEINGAST, B. 2009. Violence and Social Order: A conceptual framework for
interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São
Paulo: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
TULLOCK, G. 1967. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal. 1967,
Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 224–232.
Politická ekonomie 3/2010
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT AND ITS ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONNECTIONS FROM THE
LIBERAL ECONOMIC VIEW
(Dagmar Brožová)
357 – 373
Abstract
The article deals with sex discrimination prohibition in the European community law as well as in the Czech law
and it describes antidiscrimination juridical practise in the Czech Republic. It judges selected institutes of the
antidiscrimination act from the point of view of their economic consequences. It shows to which behaviour the
economic subjects are forced and analyses whether this behaviour is in accordance with economic rules of
market economy, with principle of private property and free choices. It pays attention to equal opportunities and
affi rmative action as measures to ensure them, and the institute of burden of proof transfer to the accused. It
concludes that the antidiscrimination act does not respect the natural rules of people´s behaviour in real
economic relations and it seems to be an artificial authority construct, which serves special purposes.
HAYEK, F. A. 1994. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda. Praha: Academia 1994. ISBN 80-200-0241-3.
ROTHBARD, M. 2001. Ekonomie státních zásahů. Praha: Liberální institut 2001. ISBN 80-86389-10-3.
Politická ekonomie 5/2009
THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
(Tomáš Otáhal)
677 – 695
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an
emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical
concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second
section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of
asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous
historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and
empirical research.
DEMSETZ, H. 1969. Information and Efficienecy: Another viewpoin. Journal of Law and Economics. 1969,
vol. 12, no. 1, s. 1–22.
DEMSETZ, H. 1967. The Cost of Transacting. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1967, vol. 57, no. 2, s. 33–53.
DEMSETZ, H. 1964. The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics. 1964,
vol. 7, s. 11–26.
DEMSETZ, H. 1988. The Theory of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 1988, vol.
4, no. 1, s. 141–1161.
DEMSETZ, H. 1968. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review. 1968, vol. 62, no. 5, s.
347–359.
HAYEK, F. A. 1980. Individualism and Economic Order. London, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1980.
HAYEK, F. A. 1973. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda. Praha: Academia, 1991.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. London, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1973.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1998. Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”. Constitutional Political
Economy. 1998, vol. 9, no. 4, s. 289–301.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1999. “Creativity and/or Alertness” A Reconsideration of Schumpeterian Entrepreneur. Review
of Austrian Economics. 1999, vol. 11, no. 1–2, s. 5–17.
NORTH, D. C. 1994. Economic Performance Through Time. American Economic Review. 1994, vol. 84, no. 3,
s. 548–577.
Politická ekonomie 2/2009
IS THE ASSUMPTION OF VOTER RATIONALITY JUST A MYTH?
(Dalibor Roháč)
163 – 176
Abstract
This paper discusses recent claims made by Caplan (2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2002, 2007) who argues that
democracies produce bad policies as a result of voters’ irrational beliefs. We start by outlining the motives
which led Caplan to amend classic Public Choice in such a radical fashion. We analyze the likely repercussions
that his hypothesis might have on the future of the profession. We provide a critique of Caplan’s distinction
between experts and ordinary people and we conclude by suggesting an important degree of caution in
interpreting Caplan’s results and in providing any policy advice based on his hypothesis.
BECKER, G. S. 1983. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1983, vol. 98, no. 3, s. 371-400.
BECKER, G. S. 1968. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy,1968, vol.
76, no. 2, s. 169-217.
BUCHANAN, J. M.; BRENNAN, G. 1984. Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives. American
Behavioral Scientist, 1984, vol. 28, no. 2, s. 185-201.
BUCHANAN, J. M.; TULLOCK, G. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1962.
OLSON, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge
(MA) : Harvard University Press, 1965.
TULLOCK, G. 1967a. The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1967, vol. 81, no. 2, s. 256-270.
TULLOCK, G. 1967b. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 1967,
vol. 5, s. 224-232.
ECONOMICS AND HAPPINESS – AN OVERVIEW
(Pavel Štika)
250 – 262
Abstract
In this paper I am trying to provide the reader with a brief overview of contemporary discussion about recently
frequently mentioned topic of economics and happiness. In the last few years the number of publications related
to happiness from the economic perspective growth exponentially. As the importance of this topic seems to grow
significantly, I modestly intend to provide Czech public with a very starting reference point for further research
in this field. In the first part I sum up the basic terms of subjective well-being and Easterlin paradox and give an
overview of the most striking empirical observations. The second part shortly describes approach to the
happiness problem of selected key historical personalities, namely Aristotle, Smith and Genovesi. In the third
part I outline present key challenge for the economic theory – tackling with the reciprocity phenomenon.
BECKER, G. 1974. A Theory of Social Interactions. Journal of Political Economy. December 1974, vol. 82, s.
1063-1093. ISSN 1558-0970
BECKER, G. 1996. Accounting for Tastes. Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1996. ISBN 978-0674543560
BECKER, G.; RAYO, L. 2007. Habits, Peers, and Happiness: An Evolutionary Perspective. American Economic
Review. May 2007, vol. 97, s. 487-491. ISSN 0002-8282.
Politická ekonomie 5/2008
ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP – TOWARDS A THEORY OF NON-MARKET
ORGANIZATIONS
(Pavel Chalupníček)
643 – 655
Abstract
Almost all of us sometimes voluntarily give up some scarce resources to make someone else better. Not only the
amount of resources used for such purposes, but also other wider concerns (implications for private and
government sector) have drawn the attention of economists in recent decades. In this paper I develop a
theoretical framework underlying such activities, which can be in short termed as “altruistic”. To do so, I first
explain the notion of “altruism”, as can be found in the works of Adam Smith, Gary Becker and Ludwig von
Mises. On these grounds, we can say that by voluntary altruistic transactions the utility of both sides of the
transaction has been increased. The main differences between the market and non-market sectors are described
and the concept of “social entrepreneurship” is developed. The analysis is concluded by application of this
theoretical framework to the case of altruism as a “public good”.
BECKER, G. S. 1998. Accounting for Tastes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Spouses and Beggars
- Love and Sympathy, s. 231-240.
BECKER, G. S. 1981. Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place. Economica: New Series.
1981, vol. 48, no. 189, s. 1-15.
BUCHANAN, J. M.; FAITH, R. L. 1981. Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities. Journal of
Law and Economics. 1981, vol. 24, no. 1, s. 95-111.
FRIEDMAN, M. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 202 s.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1978. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 246 s.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1997. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach.
Journal of Economic Literature. 1997, vol. 35, no. 1, s. 60-85.
MISES, L. von 1990. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises
Institute, 1990. 74 s.
MISES, Ludwig von 2006. Lidské jednání: Pojednání o ekonomii. Praha: Liberální institut, 2006. 956 s. ISBN
80-86389-45-6.
ROTHBARD, M. N. 2005. Zásady ekonomie. Praha: Liberální institut, 2005. 755 s. ISBN 80-86389-27-8.
THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL DISCOVERY
(Tomáš Otáhal)
669 – 683
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to introduce Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurial discovery as a complement and an
alternative to the mainstream theory. In the first and the second sections, the author explains the main influences
of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek’s works on entrepreneurial theory. Section three analyzes
pure entrepreneurial profit and logical construction of theory as a complement to mainstream theory. To
introduce the entrepreneurial market process as an alternative to mainstream theory, the fourth section begins
by explaining Kirzner’s approach to the critique of the possibilities for economic calculation in the system of
public ownership of the means of production and his theory of monopoly. The last section is a conclusion.
ALCHIAN, A. A.; DEMSETZ, H. 1973. The Property Rights Paradigm. The Journal of Economic History.
1973, vol. 33, no. 1, s. 16–47.
FRIEDMAN, M. 2001. Tržní mechanismy a centrální ekonomické plánování. In JEŽEK, T. (ed.). Zásady
liberálního øádu. Praha: Academia, 2001.
HAYEK, F. A. 2002. Competition as a Discovery Procedure. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics.
2002, vol. 5, no. 3, s. 9–23.
HAYEK, F. A. 1980. Individualism and Economic Order. London; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1980.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. London; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1973.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1999. Creativity and/or Alertness: A Reconsideration of the Schumpeterian Entrepreneur. The
Review of Austrian Economics. 1999, vol. 11, s. 5–17.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1985. Discovery and Capitalist Process. London; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1985.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1999. The Economic Calculation Debate: Lessons for Austrians. The Review of Austrian
Economics. 1999, vol. 11, s. 5–17.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1997. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach.
Journal of Economic Literature. 1997, vol. 35, no. 1, s. 60–85.
KIRZNER, I. M. 2000a. Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Law of Supply and Demand. Ideas on Liberty. 2000,
vol. 50, s. 17–19.
KIRZNER, I. M. 2005. Human Attitudes And Economic Growth. Cato Journal. 2005, vol. 25, no. 3, s. 465–469.
KIRZNER, I. M. 2000b. The Irresistible Force of Market Competition. Ideas on Liberty. 2000, vol. 50, s. 11–14.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1998. Jak fungují trhy. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998.
KIRZNER, I. M. 2000c. Toward an Austrian Critique of Governmental Economic Policy. Ideas on Liberty.
2000, vol. 50, s. 16–18.
MISES, L. von. 2002. Byrokracie. Praha: Liberální institut, 2002.
MISES, L. von. 1990. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth: a Treatise on Economics. Auburn,
AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990.
MISES, L. von. 1996. Human Action. San Francisco, CA: Foundation for Economic Education, 1996.
MISES, L. von. 1998. Liberalismus. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998.
NORTH, D. C. 1992. Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic Performance. San Francisko, CA: An
International Center for Economic Growth Publication, 1992.
Politická ekonomie 2/2008
COMPETITIVENESS AND STATE AID TO ENTERPRISES
(Alena Zemplinerová, Patrik Paneš)
182 – 195
Abstract
This paper attempts to contribute to the analysis of links between state aid and competitiveness of manufacturing
industries during 1998–2002. Statistical source on subsidies include all subsidies to capital gathered on
enterprise level by Czech Statistical Office. The enterprise data have been aggregated by economic activity on
3digit level and competitiveness was defined as adjusted market shares of 3digit industries. Competitiveness on
domestic markets is defined as the share of industry output sold on domestic market on the total domestic
demand and competitiveness on the European market is defined as the share of industry export to EU market on
the total European demand. In the first step we described subsidies to manufacturing industries and we aimed to
answer the question what industries get the subsidies. In the second step we identified competitive industries on
domestic and foreign markets. In the core part we analyzed links between subsidies and competitiveness of
manufacturing industries in both static as well as dynamic perspective based on correlations. Our analysis
confirmed that state subsidies are allocated to industries that have a strong position on the domestic markets and
that state subsidies are not related to the competitiveness improvement.
BECKER, G. S. 1983. Theory Of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence. Quarterly
Journal of Economics. 1983, vol. XCVIII, s. 371–400.
HAYEK, F. A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review. 1945, vol. XXXV, no.4, s.
519–30.
BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINT OF THE QUALI TY OF REGULATION
(Lenka Gregorová, Milan Žák)
196 – 228
Abstract
The paper analyzes an important part of the institutional quality - regulation and studies relation between the
regulatory environment and the bureaucratic barriers. The analysis is based on theoretical models of the
comparative institutional economics. In the paper, we discuss possibilities of measurement and evaluation of
regulation and bureaucracy. We compare the quality of regulatory environment in the EU-25 countries for
which we construct specific index. Given principles of the good regulation we characterize basic determinants of
the regulatory environment and we try to evaluate how these principles are fulfilled in countries of the EU-25.
Additionally, we aim to evaluate the quality of bureaucracy. Finally, we study how the regulatory environment is
related to the bureaucratic barriers.
BECKER, G. 1983. A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence. Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 1983, no. 3, s. 371–400.
HAYEK, F. A. 1990. Cesta do otroctví. 2. vyd. Praha: Academia, 1990. ISBN 80-200-0264-2.
KIRZNER, I. M. 1998. Jak fungují trhy. 1. vyd. Praha: Liberální institut, 1998. ISBN 80-902270-5-8.
MISES, L. V. 2002. Byrokracie. 1. vyd. Praha: Liberální institut, 2002. ISBN 80- 86389-22-7.
OLSON, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. 1st edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
ISBN 0-674-53751-3.
STIGLER, G. J. 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science. 1971, no. 2, s. 3–21.
TULLOCK, G. 1965. The Politics of Bureacracy. 1st edition. Washington, DC: Public Affair Press, 1965.
Politická ekonomie 5/2007
COMPLEX SYSTEMS IN THE THEORIES OF F. A. HAYEK AND H. A. SIMON
(Julie Chytilová, (Natálie Reichlová)
694 – 707
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to introduce roots of multi-agent approaches in economic theory. From the beginning,
the opinion that economic system should be investigated on the basis of comprehension to its basic units was
expressed by many scientists. Friedrich A. Hayek and Herbert A. Simon are two important scientists who may be
designated as predecessors of multi-agent modeling. They incorporated similar principles as applied by multiagent system approaches into their works before it was possible to deal with these principles through artificial
intelligence. This paper links ideas of Hayek and Simon with multi-agent modeling, common principles and ideas
are identified.
HAYEK, F. A. 1949. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949.
HAYEK, F. A. 1994. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda. Praha: Academia, 1994. ISBN 80-200-0241-3.
HAYEK, F. A. 1990. Cesta do otroctví. Praha: Academia, 1990. ISBN 80-200-0264-2.
Politická ekonomie 4/2007
BEYOND THE HORIZON OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: NAVIGATION TO PRINCIPLES OF
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
(František Svoboda)
539 – 557
Abstract
This paper starts with discussion about enhanced and frequently used conceptions of free markets, market
failures and market primacy. There are pointed some simplifications due to the man should be prospective while
using them, especially in applied economics. We have no positive definition of a free market and it is not clear,
how often and if any we can observe such market about us. Troubles with market failures are derived from
different meanings in different schools of economic thought. The market primacy is an abstract concept more
than historical fact. Because of such difficulties the paper is inscribed to institutional alternative which is able to
evolve complex research of institutions and to involve useful aspects of neoclassical economics. Useful ground
for this analysis is institutional individualism which defines program for research of institutional framework of
economy.
HAYEK, F. A. 1994. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda: nový výklad liberálních principù spravedlnosti a politické
ekonomie. Praha: Academia, 1994.
ROTHBARD, M. N. 2001. Ekonomie státních zásahù. Praha: Liberální institut, 2001.
Politická ekonomie 2/2007
MONETARY CYCLE THEORY, DEBT PROBLEM AND FINANCIAL CRISES
(Pavel Dvořák)
183 – 205
Abs tract
In at tempts to explain the mechanism of a financial crisis of the third generation, the basic problem is to specify
the basic causes of its emergence. In the text of the paper we have formulated a hypothesis saying that the basic
cause of the emergence of a systemic financial crisis of the Asian type is an overall unsound indebtedness,
initiated – using the terminology of a monetary theory of cycles – by malinvestment, caused by an excessive
credit boom. If these investments are financed through credits, their systematic liquidation leads not only to
recession, but also to the development of unsound indebtedness and nonperforming loan problem. If the credits
are granted in the local currency, there develops an internal debt problem, a banking crisis and subsequently a
monetary crisis. If the credits are given in foreign currencies, there develops an external debt problem, a
monetary crisis and subsequently a banking crisis. Debt, banking and monetary problems are mutually amplified
and lead to the emergence of a systemic financial crisis.
GARRI SON, R.W. 2004. Overconsumption and forced saving in the Mises-Hayek theory of the business cycle.
History of political Economy, 2004, vol. 36, no. 2.
HAYEK, F. A. 1996. Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1996.
MISES, L. 1963. The theory of money and credit. New Haven and London: Yale university press, 1963. Monthly
bulletin, 2006. European central bank, February 2006.
Politická ekonomie 5/2006
THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION SELECTED PROBLEMS
(Dagmar Brožová)
646 – 660
Abstract
Paper outlines economic connections of labor market discrimination. It is intended on discrimination based
upon gender, because this type of discrimination is on the point of our social background. In the introductory
part are defined discrimination and delineated the various types of discrimination. Further there are presented
data to suggest the possibility of discrimination. The major part of paper presents four important labor market
models of discrimination: taste for discrimination model, monopsony model of discrimination (market power
model), statistical discrimination model and the crowding model of discrimination (occupational segregation).
In the following part are discussed the other nondiscriminatory factors determinating male – female earnings
differentials. Discrimination in law is the last part of this paper.
BECKER, G.S. The Economics of Discrimination. Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1957.
BECKER, G.S. Human Capital, Effort and the Sexual Division of Labor. Journal of Labor Economics. January
1985.
Politická ekonomie 2/2006
EFFECTS OF STATE AID TO ENTERPRISES
(Alena Zemplinerová)
204 – 213
Abstract
The aim of the article is to describe theoretical concepts related to the effects of state subsidies on enterprises
and to discuss the magnitude and effect of state aid on enterprises during the transformation of the Czech
economy. Subsidies to enterprises during transformation were high, often transparent, and above the European
Union average. During 1997-2003 registered state aid reached 362 bn. CZK. More than 90 per cent of the total
registered state aid went to awards the rescue and restructuring of enterprises. It can be roughly estimated that
during 1997-2000 state aid was twice as high as officially registered. Share of state aid to enterprises in public
debt in creased and reached 70 per cent by 2003. Non-transparent channels of state aid distribution decrease
the efficiency of state aid, as they dis tort market signals and decrease motivation for fair competition.
BUCHANAN, J., TOLLISON, R., TULLOCK, G. Towards a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society, College
Station, Texas, Texas A & M University Press 1980.
HAYEK, F.A. The Use of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review, 1945, 4, s. 519-30.
OLSON, M.: The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press 1965.
STIGLER, G.: The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 1971,. 2, s. 3-21.
TULLOCK, G.: The Politics of Bureaucracy, Washington D.C., Public Affairs Press 1965.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN ECONOMIC THEORY
(Eliška Kotíková)
Abstract
The paper shows the current state of environmental concerns in economic theory. Different economic schools
have incorporated the environmental analysis into their theoretical framework. They use different presumptions,
focus on different environmental aspects and come to diverse conclusions and political recommendations.
However, there are many unclear frontiers between one another. This paper would like to help to understand
these differences. It characterises and compares the main economic schools and theories. The paper focuses on
environmental economics, ecological economics, new institutional economics, free market environmentalism,
coevolutionary theory in economics and bioeconomics.
Politická ekonomie 1/2006
THE FAILINGS OF LEGAL CENTRALISM FOR HELPING STOCK MARKETS IN TRANSITION
(Edward Stringham, Peter Boettke)
22 – 34
Abstract:
After Czech voucher privatization many companies simply ignored the interests of their shareholders. The
government has since increased the amount of regulation, but they have failed to establish significant investor
confidence. This article offers some explanations of why their legal centric approach remains unlikely to create
good corporate governance. Mandating that companies maximize shareholder value is easier said than done
because it requires government to assess whether companies are making optimal business decisions. In former
communist countries especially, government officials are ill suited to make such judgments because they lack the
knowledge of how businesses should be properly run. Increased bureaucratic oversight in the Czech Republic
has simply burdened markets without any noticeable positive results. This article discusses how good corporate
governance can only be a byproduct of markets where managers compete for investors rather than something
that can be created by law.
BUCHANAN, J. (1969), Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
BUCHANAN, J. (1975), The Limits of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago.
BUCHANAN, J., TOLLISON, R., TULLOCK, G. (1980), Toward a Rent Seeking Society. College Station:
Texas A&M Press.
HAYEK, F. A. (1948), Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
KIRZNER, I. (1985), Discovery and the Capitalist Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
MISES, L. V. (1990), Economic Calculation in the Socialist Common wealth. Auburn, AL Mises Institute.
MISES, L. V. (1998), Human Action. Auburn, AL: Mises Institute.
OLSON, M. (1996), “Big Bills Left on the Side walk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others poor.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 10, pp. 3-24.
STIGLER, G. (1964), “Public Regulation of the Securities Market.” Journal of Business, 38, pp. 117-142.
STIGLER, G. (1975), The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
SOWELL, T. (1980), Knowledge and Decisions. New York: Basic Books.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MORAL HAZARD
(Guido Hülsmann)
35 – 47
Abstract
Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper
proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of
moral hazard and that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral
hazard also results from government interventionism. And in this case negative consequences are systematic and
do result even in the absence of information asymmetries.
BECKER, G. (1983), “Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 98 (3), pp. 371-400.
BECKER, G., EHRLICH, I. (1972), “Market Insurance, Self Insurance and Self Protection.” Journal of Political
Economy, 80 (4), pp. 623-648.
FRIEDMAN, M. (1959), A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham University Press.
_______ (1969), “The Optimal Quantity of Money.” The Optimal Quantity of Money and other Essays. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
HAYEK, F. A. (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review, 35 (4), pp. 519-530.
MISES, L. (1922, 1981), Socialism. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
_______ (1928), Geldwertstabilisierung und Konjunkturpolitik. Jena: Fischer.
_______ (1929), Kritik des Interventionismus. Jena: Fischer.
______ (1940), Nationalõkonomie. Geneva: Union.
_______ (1949,1998), Human Action. Auburn, Ala: Mises Institute.
ROBBINS, L. (1932), The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. London: Macmillan.
ROTHBARD, M. N. (1956), “Toward a Reconstruction of Welfare and Utility Economics,” in Sennholz, M. ed.,
On Freedom and Free Entreprise. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
_______ (1998), The Ethics of Liberty. 2nd Ed. New York: New York University Press.
SMITH, V. (1936), The Ra tionale of Central Banking. London: King.
Politická ekonomie 6/2005
FRIEDRICH VON WIESERS´S THEORY OF SOCIALISM: A MAGNIFICENT FAILURE
(Samuel Bostaph)
723 – 732
Abstract
This paper examines Friedrich von Wieser's theory of the socialist or communist planned economy. It identifies
in Wieser's Law of Power (1926) the abiding interests that stimulated his attempt to use Carl Menger's theory of
subjective value to present a theory of socialism, first in Natural Value (1889) and later in Social Economics
(1914). It discusses his conception of a unit of marginal utility, or "natural value," as the basic unit of economic
calculation in his imputation theory and his use of that building block in his consequent theory of production and
distribution in a socialist economy. Lastly, it argues that Wieser's theory attempts to socially objectify subjective
values and is actually a return to a pre-Mengerian supply-side, real cost approach to the theory of value.
Wieser's theory of economic calculation under socialism thus represents a failure to understand the radical
contribution of Menger's value theory to the theory of exchange.
HAYEK, F. A. (1935), “The Nature and History of the Problem,” and “The Present State of the Debate,” in
Hayek, F. A., ed., Collectivistic Economic Planning. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
________ (1940, 1972), “Socialist Calculation III: The Competitive ‘Solution,’” in Individualism and Economic
Order. Chicago, Regnery.
MENGER, C. (1871, 1976), Principles of Economics. New York: NYU Press.
MISES, L. VON (1920, 1935), “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” in Hayek, F. A., ed.,
Collectivist Economic Planning. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
________ (1936, 1951), Socialism. London: Jonathan Cape.
________ (1949, 1966), Human Action, 3rd Ed. Chicago: Regnery.
WIESER, F. VON (1893, 1971), Natural Value. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
________ (1876, 1994), On the Relationship of Cost to Value, translated and reprinted in Israel by M. Kirzner,
Classics in Austrian Economic. London: William Pickering.
________ (1914, 1967), Social Economics. New York: Augustus M. Kelly.
________ (1926, 1983), The Law of Power. Lincoln: University of Nebraska – Lincoln.
THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC COMPETITION
(Patrik Paneš)
811 – 825
Abstract
This paper describes the main theoretical concepts of the competition, which is thought to be the fundamental
social process in the economy. The protection of competition (or the competition policy) is the one of the most
important parts of economic policy, because the competition ensures the freedom of choice. The theory of
competition provides large number of assumptions, which were developed within the frame of various economic
schools and approaches. This paper starts with the description of the history of competition policy before the
coming of Adam Smith. In the middle part of the work there have been formulated basic ideological theses about
economic policy. Represented are, for example, the Classics, Ordo-liberalism or Neo-austrian School. Paper is
finalized by the major theses of the Harvard and Chicago school.
ARMENTANO, D. T.: Proč odstranit protimonopolní zákonodárství. Praha, Liberální institut 2000.
EUCKEN, W.: Zásady hospodářského řádu. Praha, Liberální institut 2004.
FRIEDMAN, M.: Kapitalismus a svoboda. Praha, Liberální institut 1993.
FRIEDMAN, M., FRIEDMANOVÁ, R.: Svoboda volby. Praha, Liberální institut 1991.
HAYEK, F. A. von: Cesta do otroctví (2. vyd.). Praha, Academia 1990.
HAYEK, F. A. von: Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda - nový výklad liberálních principů spravedlnosti a politické
ekonomie. Praha, Academia 1994.
KIRZNER, I.: Jak fungují trhy. Praha, Liberální institut 1998.
MISES,
L.
von:
Human
Action
–
A
Treatise
on
Economics,
1996.
(URL:
http://www.mises.org/humanaction/pdf/humanaction.pdf)
MISES, L. von: Liberalismus. Praha, Liberální institut 1998.
MISES, L. von: Economic Policy – Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, 2002. (URL:
http://www.mises.org/etexts/eco pol.pdf).
ROTHBARD, M. N.: Ekonomie státních zásahů. Praha, Liberální institut 2001.
STIGLER, G. J.: The Organization of Industry. Homewood, Irwin 1968.
STIGLER, G. J.: The Citizen and the State (Essays on Regulation). Chicago, The University of Chicago Press
1975
Politická ekonomie 3/2005
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS AN OBSTACLE TO PROSPERITY
(Josef Šíma)
369 – 382
Abstract
The article describes the nature and importance of the concept of private property. It traces back the logical
necessity of the respect for property as a safeguard of both peace and prosperity. Then, it surveys arguments in
favor of intellectual property that allegedly coincide with those of the tangible property. It shows, however, that
after careful research into the origin of patents and copyrights many problems arise. The analysis shows that
there are no parallels between private property in tangible goods and property in intangible goods (ownership
of ideal objects). Intellectual "property" fails in bringing about both peace and prosperity. The last part of the
article suggests how a truly free market - a system that does not recognized intellectual property - might
function.
KIRZNER, I.: Jak fungují trhy. Praha, Liberální institut 1998.
MACHLUP, F., PENROSE, E.: The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century. Journal of Economic
History, 1950, 1, s. 1-29.
MISES, L.: Human Action. New York, Fox & Wilkes 1966.
MISES, L.: Liberalismus. Praha, Liberální institut 1998.
NORTH, D. C.: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press 1990.
ROTHBARD, M.: Ekonomie státních zásahů. Praha, Liberální institut 2001.
ROTHBARD, M.: Man Economy and State. Au burn, Mises Institute 1993.
ROTHBARD, M.: The Ethics of Liberty. New York, New York University Press 1998.
Ekonomie + management
2/2014, Vol. 17
THE ECONOMICS OF BEING STUPID: A NOTE ON (IR)ATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS
(Daniel Štastný)
4-13
Abstract
Economists’ habit of imputing rational motives to all human behavior gives rise to ‘rational riddles’: rational
explanations for seemingly irrational behavior. In the article I argue that economists’ solutions to these riddles
are, despite their sophistication, of limited scientific value as they describe mechanisms that are never both new
and correct: they may be empirically correct but not new as these mechanisms have been practiced (hence
known) by some people before; or they are genuinely new (previously unknown to anybody), but empirically
wrong as they fail to account for the real reasons of observed behavior. I further show that the hypothesized
solutions to the riddles could be easily tested by consulting the people whose behavior is examined, and point to
the strange lack of economists' efforts to do so. Finally I present results of a micro survey relating to one such
rational riddle: ticket underpricing (why prices of tickets for various events do not adjust to eliminate the excess
demand). By interviewing managers of theatres known to sell tickets at prices that create lines, I present some
evidence showing that it is much easier to explain the observed behavior in terms of plain ignorance of some
elementary economic principles or facts rather than in terms of some economic sophistication on the part of the
managers. No interviewees, for example, explicitly related the existence of lines to ticket underpricing, and some
actually denied any link there even if prompted. I conclude by pointing to the real cost to the economic
profession stemming from its decision to ignore the possibility of irrationality in economists' research program.
BECKER, G.S. A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Prices. The Journal of
Political Economy. 1991, Vol. 99, Iss. 5, pp. 1109-1016. ISSN 0022-3808.
CAPLAN, B. The Myth of Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007. ISBN 978-0-691-129-426.
3/2013, Vol. 16
THE REGIONAL MULTIPLIER EFFECT AS A LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR
(Jaroslav Macháček, Hana Silovská, Gabriela Říhová, Petr Jílek)
20 – 33
Abstract
Lots of knowledge and historical experience in regional policy constantly bring new impulses to explore different
regions, entities, institutions and individuals. Especially mutual comparison leads to the desire for new
possibilities and methods of analysis or modeling. The purpose of this paper is to approach one of the methods
that can be sorted into groups that is still not explored enough, but still has many supporters and opponents.
This contribution highlights the role of multiplier effects in the regional and local economies, both from the
theoretical and the practical perspective. It briefly presents several methods, including the multiplier effect, and
their usage in practice. The method of the “local multiplier” is explored more in detail and the paper shows its
possible use in everyday life. This method is quite new and there do not exist many studies about it at the
moment. It was created to help both public and private organizations and individuals to evaluate the impact of
their expenditures on the local economy. Local multiplier observes the money trail and its flow after it is spent
by local organization or individual. Maintaining the money flow is important especially for small open
economies to strengthen their self-sufficiency. Despite all the pitfalls of the local multiplier method, that are
represented mainly by obtaining and identifying required data and accurate information, the contribution tries
to show possible use in practice. At the same time it is trying to answer the question whether the right "value
multiplier" can be considered as one of the support criterions when deciding on issues of regional policy.
NORTH, D.C. Exports and Regional Economic Growth: A Reply. The Journal of Political Economy. 1956, roa.
64, a. 2, s. 65–168. ISSN 0022-3808.
NORTH, D.C. Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth. The Journal of Political Economy. 1955, roa.
63, a. 3, s. 243–258. ISSN 0022-3808.
1/2013, Vol. 16
THE CAUSES OF NON-CONVERGENCE OF EAST GERMANY
(Luděk Kouba, Hana Křížová)
5 – 17
Abstract
In 1990, East Germany had significant preconditions for successful economic development and rapid
convergence: the former GDR was the most developed country in the former Soviet bloc and had a long tradition
of cultural affiliation with the West. Moreover, its centrally planned economy obtained a complete institutional
framework of a capitalist economy of the FRG at the moment of reunification and consecutively got long-term
financial support from West Germany. Nevertheless, the real economic results during the last two decades have
been a monumental disappointment: GDP per capita is still lagging behind West Germany by approximately 30
percent. The rate of growth remains constantly slow, especially in comparison with other post-communist
countries. The rate of unemployment has been oscillating between 15 and 22 percent since 1995 etc. Thus a key
question is: what are the main causes of such a long economic stagnation? The topical literature particularly
deals with the following factors: too strong appreciation of the east currency (the so-called Ostmark), too high
wage growth, problematic privatization and so on. However, from our point of view, the mistakes in economy
policy in the early 1990s cannot explain such a long unsuccessful economic development. Besides, East
Germany has an advanced and stable political, institutional and legal environment and is a part of an
economically prosperous region. In our opinion, the incompatibility between West Germany formal institutions
and East Germany informal institutions is another crucial cause of the long-lasting decline in the productive
activities.
After forty years of socialism, people in East Germany failed to behave according to the western rules.
Moreover, we can see some social-psychological factors affecting specially East Germany. These factors
(feelings of inferiority in relationship with West Germans, inadequately optimistic expectations) contributed to
the consequent frustration and pessimism of East Germans that is reflected in low economic activity in East
Germany.
CLAGUE, CH., KEEFER, P., KNACK, S., OLSON, M. Institutional and Economic Performance: Property
Rights and Contract Enforcement. In Clague, CH. (ed.). Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and
Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Countries. London: The John Hopkins Universtity Press,
1997. ISBN 0-8018-5493-8.
NORTH, D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press,
1990. 159 s. ISBN 9780521397346.
NORTH, D. C. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University Press, 2005. ISBN 978-14008-2948-4.
OLSON, M. Big Bills Left on Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich and Other Poor. Journal of Economic
Perspectives. 1996, Vol. 10, Iss. 2, s. 3–24. ISSN 0895-3309.
3/2012, Vol. 15
CONTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SHAREHOLDER VALUE: EXPERIMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE
(David Martinčík, Martin Polívka)
108 - 124
Abstract
The article deals with the possibility of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept to increase the shareholder
value. This value is expressed as Economic Value Added in conjunction with business science. Firstly, the
theoretical analysis of separate parts of EVA is carried out and the influence of CSR on EVA is discussed.
Mostlythe neutralor negative effectis deducted and only one possibility of positive effect is identified, namely in
the possibility of using CSR to increase the firm's revenues. This could be realized only on condition of
customers’ altruism. Only altruistic customers are willing to pay higher price to help some other people. The
second part of the article describes and sums up our own experiment on altruism testing. We modified the
standard one-round design of the Dictator Game in three ways: firstly, more rounds are played, secondly, we
differentiate stable and unstable pairs of players and thirdly, we differentiate certain and uncertain ends of the
game. According to the second and third points we have obtained four different experimental sessions. We used
standard methods of experimental economics as regards the instructions and subjects' motivation. Each session
was played twice so that one hundred and sixty students could participate on this experiment. More than three
thousand figures were acquired. Then the three hypotheses of altruistic or egoistic behavior were tested. The
ANOVA, the sign test, and the paired t-test were carried out. The egoistic behavior was confirmed twice and one
time we could not confirm either egoistic or altruistic behavior of experimental subjects. According to these the
CSR cannot increase shareholder value.
CARABINI, L. E. Inclined to liberty – The futile attempt to suppress the human spirit. Auburn (Alabama):
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. ISBN 978-1-933550-29-9.
FRIEDMAN, M. Capitalism and Freedom.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. ISBN 0-226-26421-1.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Methodology of Positive Economics. In Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953. pp. 3–43. ISBN 0-226-26403-3.
Friedman, M. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. The New York Times Magazine.
September 13, 1970. [online]. [cit. 2012-06-01]. Available from:
<http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedm an-soc-resp-business.html>.
HAYEK, F. A. Pravo, zakonodarstvi a svoboda,Nov˘ v˘klad liberalnich principU spravedlnosti a politicke
ekonomie. Dotisk 2. vyd. Praha: Academia, 1998. ISBN 80-200-0278-2.
MISES von, L. Interventionism: An Economic Analysis. New York: The Foundation for Economic Education,
Inc., 1998. ISBN 1-57246-071-7.
4/2011, Vol. 14
DIMENSIONS OF BUSINESS AND EDUCATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS IN THE ECONOMY
OF SLOVAKIA
(Viera Kuzmišinová, Peter Kuzmišin)
32 – 45
Abstract
Paper focuses on role and influence of business and tertiary education into economic development and analyzes
selected aspects of the problem in conditions of the regions of the Slovak economy. The theoretical part is
focused on knowledge as products of educational and scientific research institutions which are transformed into
innovations in enterprises and this way are becoming a driving force of regional development and society. On
the background of theoretical generalizations of essential parts of the subject and using an appropriate range of
statistical methods (correlation and regression analysis) article examines especially how a dimension of
business and dimension of education affects regional development of Slovakia measured by GDP, with the
regions of Slovakia as an object of analysis and studied statistical figures are dimension of business, education
and the regional performance. Statistical evidence was drawn from a database of Slovak Statistical Office.
The specific result of the analysis is to identify readiness for new challenges of the knowledge economy, as
demonstrated by business dimension in all regions of Slovakia. Dimension of education has not taken the
challenge yet. At the same time both dimensions in Slovakia should change culture of isolation to culture of
partnership and cooperation in favour of development and prosperity for everybody within the concept presented
by Triple Helix.
HAYEK, F. A. The Use of Knowledge in Society.Individualism and Economic Freedom. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980.
KIRZNER, I. M. Discovery and the Capitalist Process. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985. 192 p.
ISBN 0226437779.
MISES, L. Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth: a Treatise on Economics. Aubum, AL:
Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990, 74 s. ISBN 0945466072.
INDIVIDUALISTIC MENTALITY AND ECONOMIC EDUCATION
(Jozef Horeháj, Ľuboslava Kubišová)
45 – 54
Abstract
The article focuses on economic education broadened by the effects of market mechanism on social system. In
economic and social research, the two basic approaches are individualism and collectivism. The article
emphasises that individualism is of great importance for market functioning and for an efficient economic
system. It clarifies chosen market categories – optionality, reciprocity and solidarity, competition, which formed
and confirmed personality traits of people, social rules and institutions – and relationship between economy and
policy as important elements of formation of individualistic mentality. Relation between economy and policy
becomes crucial and in principle contradictory one. Policy requires legalisation of means of power, coercion
and force which brought permanent threat of their abuse. Despite of this threat collectivisation of economic
activity and expansion of public needs changed state from “inevitable evil” to the “creator of prosperity”.
Market economy changed to mixed economy and collectivistic concepts begin prevail in social mentality
promising faster and “more comfortable” solutions to economic and social problems usually resulting in
negative economic and social consequences in the long run. In spite of expansion of collectivistic mentality in
transitive economies and also in advanced democracies (through the impact of integration trends) especially in
the twentieth century, individualistic mentality is considered by the authors as more adequate not only for
efficient economic but also for optimal social development. Economic education can significantly contribute to
formation of individualistic mentality.
HAYEK, F. A. Právo, zákonodárství a svoboda.Praha: Academia, 1991. ISBN 80-200-0378-9
HAYEK, F. A. Osudná domýšlivost. Omyly socialismu. Praha: SLON, 1995. ISBN 80-85850-05-2.
VON MISES, L. Lidské jednání. 1st ed. Praha: Liberální institut, 2006. 964 p. ISBN 80-86389-45-6.
1/2010
TERTIARY EDUCATION AS A PART OF THE GENDER EQUITY INDEX
(Václav Urbánek, Kateřina Maršíková, Pavla Řehořová)
37 – 46
Abstract
The net of civic associations Social Watch created the alternative indicators for measurement of situation
development within equality of males and females (GEI – Gender Equity Index) and satisfying of basic human
needs (BCI – Basic Capability Index). This paper is devoted to gender inequity, i. e. education, socioeconomic
standing and share of authority. The primary attention is devoted to the education, let us say tertiary education.
The questions of tertiary education are solved not only from the global view, but also from the national view, i. e.
from the view of the Czech Republic. Within this Gender Equity Index dimension is our republic in the front
places of the imaginary rank, within the remaining two dimensions there is not the situation so positive and it is
necessary to find any solution leading to the improvement of the current position, preferably in the near future.
The last part of this paper is devoted to the research realized within the Technical University of Liberec: during
the academic years 2004/2005 – 2007/2008 survey of earnings expectations was undertaken. First year students
(Technical University of Liberec, University of Economics Prague, University of Pardubice, University of
Huddersfield Business School -UK) were surveyed. The result of the surveys of Czech and British students show
that students are very well aware of their possible (expected) earnings. Although the results of this study show a
striking similarity between student perceptions in the Czech Republic (GEI 69) and United Kingdom (GEI 75),
this does not automatically mean that the same will be true in other countries.
BECKER, G. S. 1997. Teorie preferencí. Praha: Grada Publishing. ISBN 80-7169-463-0.
4/2009
AN IN-CLASS EXPERIMENT WITH AUGUSTIN COURNOT
(DomeNico Raguseo, Mária Horehájová)
40 – 45
Abstract
This paper illustrates the results of an experiment where students were made to play quantity- -setting game
based on the Cournot theory of duopoly. The aim of the in-class experiment was to provide student with a more
active way of oligopoly strategy learning. At the same time the experiment served teachers to earn some
experiences from learning-by-doing method of teaching. Based on this experiment teachers suppose to introduce
similar activities to the study of different decision-making models of firms. Strictly theoretical approach to the
study of the oligopolistic market structure was replaced with a learning-by-doing method. Although only a short
theoretical lecture preceded quantity-setting game (essential assumptions of Cournot duopoly model were
explained), students were able to develop their own strategies from the very beginning of the experiment. Each
group of students has understood that their decision about quantity produced was not independent but
determined by the decision of the other group. Hence, they had to make assumptions about its rival’s strategy
and learn from each additional round of the game. At the end of the experiment students were asked to describe
anonymously their opinion about new learning method. They found experiment interesting, stimulating and
challenging. They have reported that they have really understood that free rider behavior might harm efficient
outcome in market structures where firms can influence the main market variables but not absolutely control
them. This experiment shows further possible extension of duopoly in-class game and it also justifies new
approach to the study of different market structures.
SMITH, V. Bargaining and Market Behavior.1st ed. Cambridge: University Press, 2000.ISBN-10: 0521584507.
2/2009
FAIR VALUE IN THE PRICE REGULATION OF NATURAL MONOPOLY
(Jaroslav Sedláček, Petr Valouch)
6 – 14
Abstract
This paper deals with the regulation of the prices of natural monopoly in Czech Republic namely in the area of
distribution of electricity. Monopoly is the sole supplier of the product on the market faces competition from
other companies supplying the same or similar product and can sell at higher prices than in the markets of
perfect competition. Therefore, there is a need for regulation by the State to ensure an adequate level of profit
for manufacturers and sufficient quality of service for customers. In the Czech Republic is responsible for the
functions of the electricity regulator Energy Regulatory Institute, which uses method price regulation by the
form of allowed revenues. The goal of a specific research conducted by Faculty of Economics and
Administration at Masaryk University was to identify the theoretical methods that allow the establishment of
regulated prices and to analyze factors influencing the amount. The methodology of Energy Regulatory Institute
consists in the calculation of allowed costs, depreciations and profit. The base for calculating of depreciation of
fixed assets are historical costs, which do not price developments and thus can not create sufficient resources for
the reproduction of consumed assets. Similarly, in the calculation of the profit is used regulatory asset base,
which represents the residual value of operating assets, taken from the firm‘s accounting for the year. It is
obvious that the value of the assets taken from the balance sheet the company does not take into account possible
investment opportunities for the company, which forms part of its market value. The result of the research is to
propose a model of fair value revaluation, which eliminates the shortcomings of historical costs (of purchase
price) and allows included the existing fixed assets in the calculation of allowed revenues and also the present
value of its investment opportunities. The model of fair value is preferred also by International accounting
standards because brings the accounting near to actually existing market conditions and eliminates the
underestimation of business assets and depreciations.
HAZLIT, H. Ekonomie v jedné lekci. 1. vyd. Praha: Alfa Publishing, 2005. ISBN 80-86851-18-4.
ROTHBARD, M. N. Zásady ekonomie. 1.vyd. Praha: Liberální institut, 2005. ISBN 80-86389-27-8.
REFLECTION OF CORRUPTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORIES
(Jolana Volejníková)
35 – 54
Abstract
Data relating to corruption could fill up the whole library. Nevertheless, the object of interest could be
categorized to different spheres: causes of corruption, results of corruption, analyses of corruption level in
accordance with states, concrete corruption causes, anti-corruption experience in single countries and so on.
However, a great deal of scientists defends against research on corruption and affirms that „what should not
have been, it even may not be“. After all, even anti- -corruption legislation had originated practically always
behind schedule (in England not till year 1889) because there dominated hypocritical tendency to affirm that the
problem of corruption in this country does not exist. Although there had been written a number of books about
corruption during overpast decades, really scientific (not only tabloid and journalistic) books and articles on the
theme of corruption exist only on a small scale, both in terms of foreign and internal literature. Approaches to
corruption are fragmented and only few approaches try to view to corruption as economic problem. That is why
we attempt to map the reflection of corruption in historical development of economic theories in this text. This
article is concerned with problems of corruption and its theoretic reflection in historical development of
economic theories. In this context we analyse the period of origin of early economic thinking, the period of
separation of economics as independent branch of science and the period of development of economics during
nineteenth and twentieth century that reflected paradigm changes within economic theories. We lay specific
stress on analysis of the theory of public choice and the conception of new institutional economics. In the paper
we appear from the fact that corruption was, is and as well as in the future it will stay with the most probability
one of the possible forms of economic behaviour of economic entities with significant impact on quality of
economy of individual as well as economy of government. Our purpose in submitted paper is to discuss whether
and which way the problems of corruption was analysed and interpreted by economists during historical
development of economic theories.
BECKER, G. S. K potlačení korupce je třeba zmenšit vládu. Ekonom, 1994, roč. 38, č. 11, s. 54. ISSN 12100714.
BUCHANAN, J. M., TOLLISON, R. D., TULLOCK G. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. 1st ed.,
College Station, USA: Texas A&M University Press, 1980. ISBN 0-89096- 090-9.
BUCHANAN, J. M. Svět bez etiky je nevýkonný. Ekonom, 2002, roč. 46, č. 42. s. 36-37. ISSN 1210-0714.
BUCHANAN, J. M. Politika očima ekonoma. 1. vyd. Praha: Liberální institut, 2002. ISBN 80-86389-21-9.
FRIEDMAN, M., FRIEDMANOVÁ, R. Svoboda volby. 1. vyd. Jinočany: H & H, 1992. ISBN 80-85467-85-2.
LACHMANN, L. M. Metodologický individualismus a tržní hospodářství. In JEŽEK, T. Liberální ekonomie kořeny euroamerické civilizace. 1. vyd. Praha: Prostor, 1993. ISBN 80-85190-21-4.
NORTH, D. C. Vývoj ekonomické výkonnosti v čase. Politická ekonomie, 1994, roč. 42, č. 4. ISSN 0032-3233.
NORTH, D. C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990. ISBN 0-521-39734-0.
ROTHBARD, N. M. Ekonomie státních zásahů.1. vyd. Praha: Liberální institut. MegaPrint Praha, 2001. ISBN
80-86389-10-3.
3/2008
GOING BEYOND THE DEROGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE WITHIN PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITIES
(Aleksandar Keseljevic)
73 – 84
Abstract
By establishing his own theoretical model, the author is seeking to approach to knowledge in an entirely new
way. From the aspect of substance the author understands knowledge, as the key source of competitive
advantage in the markets at the brake of the millennium, as information, cognitive process, and capital.
Knowledge is understood in the article as a set of experiences where information is classified into patterns of
thought cognitive processes. Cognitive processes are important for understanding of all processes related to
knowledge, as knowledge cannot exist without its subject, to which the capacity of cognition is ascribed.
Characterizing knowledge as capital brings economic effects to its owners, as it is ascribed certain economic
market value to knowledge. Author believes that cohabitation of human, social, and intellectual capital enables
understanding knowledge as capital in its full meaning. From a holistic-cognitive aspect the author argues that
inadequate understanding of knowledge is a consequence of an over-institutionalization of science within
particular scientific communities. The author wishes to stress that adequate and correct understanding of
knowledge requires a high level of scientific interdisciplinarity. Deeper understanding of knowledge requires
that we overcome the traditional divisions in the scientific community, since this is the only way of going beyond
the derogative attitude towards knowledge within particular scientific communities. For economic theory to fully
understand knowledge within its own scientific community, it will have to devote less attention to its own
expansion, and more to cooperation with other scientific disciplines.
BECKER, S. G. Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education.
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964. ISBN 0-226-04119-0.
BECKER, S. G. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976. ISBN
0-226-04112-3
HAYEK, F.A. The Use of Knowledge in Society.The American Economic Review, 1945, Vol. 35, Iss. 4, pp.
519-530. ISSN 00028282.
MACHLUP, F. Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and Economic significance: Knowledge and Knowledge
Production. 1st ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. ISBN 0691042268.
MACHLUP, F. Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and Economic Significance: The Branches of Learning.
2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. ISBN 0601042306.
MACHLUP, F. Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and Economic Significance: The Economics of
Information and Human Capital, 3rd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. ISBN 0-691-04233-0.
STIGLER, G. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 1961, Vol. 69, pp. 213-225. ISSN
00223808.
STIGLER, G. Economics-the Imperial Science? The Scandinavian Journal of Econo mics, 1984, Vol. 86, Iss. 3,
pp. 301-313. ISSN 03470520.
2/2008
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
(Mária Horehájová, Jana Marasová)
58 – 64
Abstract
There is a one important reality economists agree on and it is the changing role of businesses in society. The
way in which the role of businesses in society is growing is given by increased sensitivity to and awareness of
environmental and ethical issues. Issues like environmental damage, improper treatment of workers, and faulty
production that inconveniences or endangers customers are more and more in the centre of peoples‘ attention.
These trends contribute to the pressure on companies to operate in an economically, socially, and
environmentally sustainable way. One of the solutions that can improve corporate social behaviour is the CSR
policy. The European Commission published several Communications on CSR with the objective to help
companies integrate corporate social responsibility into the way they do business, every day. With the
enlargement of the European Union the issue of the development of CSR in the Central European Countries
appeared. The transformation of centrally planned economy to free market economy brought a new view of the
role of company in society. It was necessary to reformulate company‘s objectives on one hand and its roles on
the other hand. In this situation the way of implementation of the CSR policy to the company‘s behaviour,
especially company‘s investment decisions, became the issue of economic research. Considering continual
institutional changes in the CEC the evolutionary approach to institutions was chosen as the research method. In
order to identify the specific features of introduction of CSR in the CEC, Bulgarian, Czech, Slovak and
Romanian companies were chosen as the case studies. The application of the evolutionary approach to
institutions required defining what an institution means. At the same time the three institutional dynamics
principles were identified based on several theoretical analyses of the institutional dynamics: the causes of
emergence of CSR, the mechanism at work, and the actors involved in this dynamics. The evolutionary approach
to institutions in the CEC also required reminding of the main features of the socialist unit of production. The
first outcome of the research of companies‘ behaviour lies in the identification of several main causes of
company‘s acting in a social responsible way. Secondly, the mechanism of CSR was described in two ways as
the continuity-based and innovation-based CSR. Finally, the main actors of the CSR were analysed in terms of
hierarchical, participative and minimalist CSR. In spite of the EU integration process, this research showed that
it seemed difficult to expect in a near future a convergence of the socially responsible practises in the new EU
member states. The main reasons for that are linked to the resistance and the legacies of the new member states
as well as to the heterogeneity of the European model of CSR.
FRIEDMAN, M. Kapitalismus a svoboda. Praha: Liberalni institut, 1993. ISBN 8085787334.
HAYEK, A. F. Pravo, zakonodarstvi a svoboda, Pravidla a řad. Praha: Academia, 1991, pp. 25. ISBN 80-2000279-0.
NORTH, D. C. Institutional change: a framework of analysis. In: SJOSTRAND, S. E., Institutional Change.
Theory and Empirical Findings.New York: M. E. Sharp, 1993, pp. 35 - 46.
1/2008
MILTON FRIEDMAN: REMEMBRANCE OF PERSONALITY AND ECONOMIST
Iva Nedomlelová
6 – 13
Abstract
On 16th November 2007, a year after the death of one of the most remarkable liberal economists of the twentieth
century, Nobel price winner, Milton Friedman. The aim of this article is not to list his theoretic-economical,
economic-political ideas and analyze them. The aim is to recall a personality of Milton Friedman, who
significantly influenced macroeconomic theory and economic policy in an outright original approach to a range
of economic problems. His main contribution to economic theory involves the idea that household consumption
is not influenced by temporary income changes, but depends on so-called permanent income. Permanent income
can be explained as an average income, which an individual expects to earn during his life using his labour and
capital. It depends on household welfare (human capital, education, health included), interest rate, and expected
job vacations etc. Friedman‘s new interpretation of quantity theory of money leads to explaining the stable
character of demand of money and insignificance of the short-term neutrality of money. He proved that sudden
changes in the money supply are destabilizing in economy because they lead to changes in prices and real
variables. Inflation is according to Friedman entirely a money phenomenon in case that money stock grows
faster than the real GDP. The effects of Philips curve are only short- -term; the unemployment rate fluctuates at
the level of the natural rate of unemployment in a long- -term horizon. According to Friedman, only verifying
empirical fact can prove the correctness of theory. This approach explains Friedman‘s continuous interest in
empirical development. The society became aware of Milton Friedman because of his strong opinions on the
methodological issues in economy. Verifying hypothesis should come out from the methodological positivism. In
relation to economic policy, Friedman criticized mainly Keynes oriented economic policy concerning increasing
supplies and budgetary deficit and the interest rate targeting policy. Friedman suggested managing the money
stock. He defined „golden rule of money stock growth“. According to this rule, the central bank should maintain
the constant growth of money stock, three to five per cent annually, depending on the real GDP growth.
FRIEDMAN, M. Čím víc je svobody, tím lepší je život. [online]. New York, 5. 6. 2006. Rozhovor M. Friedmana
pro Handelsblatt. [cit. 2007-06-09] Available at: <http://hn.ihned.cz/3-18602890-Friedman-500000_d-79>.
FRIEDMAN, M. Kapitalismus a svoboda. 1. vyd. Praha: Liberální institut, 1993. ISBN 80-85787-33-4.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other essays. Chicago: Aldine, 1969. ISBN
0202060306.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 4. ISBN 0226264041.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. ISBN 0226264041.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement. In Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 181. ISBN 0226264041.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Role of Government in our Society. [online]. The John M. Oli Lecture Library. [cit. 200706-08]. Available at: <http://www.isi.org/lectures/lectures.aspx?SBy=lecture&Sfor=463835cf-f922-4c6a-b4f884b68e3b472e>.
FRIEDMAN, M. The Role of Monetary Policy.American Economic Review. 1968, March, no.58, p. 8. ISSN
0002-8282.
FRIEDMAN, M., SCHWARTZ, A. The Monetary History of the United States. Princeton,1963.
4/2007
THREE HEURISTICS IN THE SEARCH FOR A LOW PRICE IN A LITTLE-KNOWN MARKET
(Michal Skořepa)
100 – 112
Abstract
One of the most rapidly growing fields within modern economics is so-called behavioural eco-nomics, which
stems from an effort to enrich the methodological and conceptual apparatus of tra-ditional economics with
approaches and concepts originating in psychology. This paper belongs to this research stream, but the focus of
the paper specifically on the decision-making of buyers makes it relevant also for marketing.In traditional
economics, buyer behaviour is usually modelled under the assumption of full infor-mation either on prices and
their locations within the market or at least on the probability distribu-tion of prices in the market. Neither of
these assumptions seems appropriate in some cases such as when the buyer enters the specific market only very
infrequently (e.g., markets for durables, but in the opposite role also the labour market).This paper, using the
method of an economic experiment, studies the search rules that buyers might use in this case of extreme lack of
information on prices. The paper identifies three general search heuristics: Adaptation Heuristic (a priori idea
of the highest acceptabe price changes in the light of actual price quotes observed during the search), Bargain
Heuristic (idea of the highest acceptabe price is located at a certain distance below the estimated average price
calculated from price quotes observed during the search) and Improvement Heuristic (idea of the highest
accepta-be price is equla to the forecast of the price quote to be observed in the next search step, increa-sed by
the cost of this step). On the bais of these three heuristics, the paper derives three specific search rules and,
using data from a small-scale experiment, estimates parameters of the rules.
STIGLER, G. J. The Economics of Information. Journal of Political Economy, 1961, Vol. 69, p. -225. ISSN
0022-3808.
STIGLER, G. J. Information in the Labor Market Journal of Political Economy. 1962, Vol 70, p. 94-105. ISSN
0022-1808.
Finance a úvěr
Volume 64, Issue 1, 2014
MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION WITH VARIOUS DEGREES OF COMMITMENT
(Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Libich, Jan; Stehlík, Petr)
2-29
Abstract
Well before the global financial crisis, the long-term trend in fiscal policy had raised concerns about risks for
the outcomes of monetary policy. Are fears of an unpleasant monetarist arithmetic justified? To provide some
insights, this paper examines strategic fiscal-monetary interactions in a novel game-theory framework with
asynchronous timing of moves. It generalizes the standard commitment concept of Stackelberg leadership by
making it dynamic. By letting players move with a certain fixed frequency, this framework allows policies to be
committed or rigid for different periods of time. We find that the inferior non-Ricardian (active fiscal, passive
monetary) regime can occur in equilibrium, and that this is more likely in a monetary union due to free-riding.
The bad news is that, unlike under the static commitment of Sargent and Wallace (1981), this may happen even if
monetary policy acts as leader for longer periods of time than fiscal policy. The good news is that under some
circumstances an appropriate institutional design of monetary policy may not only help the central bank resist
fiscal pressure and avoid the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, but also discipline excessively spending
governments. By acting as a credible threat of a costly policy tug-of-war, long-term monetary commitment (e.g.
a legislated inflation target) may induce a reduction in the average size of the budget deficit and debt, and move
the economy to a Ricardian (passive fiscal, active monetary) regime. More broadly, this paper demonstrates
that our game-theoretic framework with dynamic leadership can help to uniquely select a Pareto-efficient
outcome in situations with multiple equilibria where standard approaches do not provide any guidance.
FRIEDMAN M. (1948): A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability. American Economic
Review, 38(2):245–264.
Volume 59, Issue 2, 2009
REVISITING THE GOVERNMENT REVENUE-EXPENDITURE NEXUS: EVIDENCE FROM 15 OECD COUNTRIES
BASED ON THE PANEL DATA APPROACH
(Chang, Tsangyao; Chiang, Gengnan)
165-172
Abstract
This paper utilizes panel unit root, panel cointegration, and panel Granger causality test techniques to examine
the inter-temporal relationship between government revenues and government expenditures in a panel of 15
OECD countries over the period 1992–2006. We find evidence of bidirectional causality between government
revenues and government expenditures, supporting the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. The findings of this
paper have important implications for fiscal policy decision-making in these 15 OECD countries after the
signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on February 7, 1992.
BUCHANAN J., WAGNER R. (1978): Dialogues concerning fiscal religion, Journal of Monetary Economics,
4:627–36.
FRIEDMAN M. (1978): The limitations of tax limitation. Policy Review, 7–14.
Volume 59, Issue 1, 2009
TIME DISCOUNTING, EDUCATION, AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE AND A SIMPLE MODEL
(Bauer, Michal; Chytilová, Julie)
71-86
Abstract
In the paper we propose a new channel through which education may promote economic growth: education
makes people more patient, and more patient people are more likely to save, invest, or send children to school.
The paper first summarizes the results of field studies which we conducted in two very different poor countries:
Uganda and India. In both countries the findings are consistent with the causal effect of education on the
subjective discount rate. In the second part of the paper, we build a simple two-period human-capital- driven
growth model where the subjective discount rate depends on the level of human capital. This new assumption
gives rise to the possibility of multiple development regimes and the model illustrates a wider role of education
in tackling possible development traps.
BECKER G.S., MURPHY K.M., TAMURA R. (1990): Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth.
Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):12–37.
BECKER G.S., MULLIGAN C.B. (1997): The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(3):729–758.
Volume 58, Issue 1 – 2, 2008
THE 2007 NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMICS: MECHANISM DESIGN THEORY
Čihák, Martin
82-89
Abstract
The 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics has been awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson, for
their contributions to mechanism design theory. The article discusses the importance of mechanism design
theory for modern economics, focusing on some of its implications for economic policy making.
HAYEK, F.A. (1945): The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35:519–530.
Volume 55, Issue 5-6, 2005
ON THE EMPIRICS OF THE NON-NEUTRALITY OF MONEY: EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (IN
ENGLISH)
(Duczynski, Petr)
267-282
Abstract
The paper examines the cyclical behavior of money and prices in a sample of developed countries dating from
1951 to 1990. Evident in the data is a tendency toward an average countercyclical behavior of the price level
and a weakly procyclical behavior of nominal monetary aggregates. For money (M1) and money plus quasimoney (M2), correlation coefficients between the real per capita output growth rate and the half lag in the
money growth rate are higher on average than correlation coefficients between the real per capita output
growth rate and the half lead in the money growth rate, thus indicating that money changes precede output
changes. There is at least some evidence that M2 is more strongly associated with real output M1 or highpowered money (M0). As opposed to developed countries, high-inflation Latin American countries exhibit a
countercyclical behavior of money.
FRIEDMAN, M. (1961): The Lag in the Effect of Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 69,
October 1961, pp. 447–466.
FRIEDMAN, M. – SCHWARTZ, A. J. (1963a): A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960.
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963.
FRIEDMAN, M. – SCHWARTZ, A. J. (1963b): Money and Business Cycles. Review of Economics and
Statistics, vol. 45, February 1963, pp. 32–64.