POL 319
US-India-China
Dr. Lairson
US-China Rivalry and India
Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea
Sean Creehan
What are US preferences for SCS?
1)Free and open access to sea lanes passing through the South China Sea; and
2)Multilateral resolution of competing territorial claims according to the UN
Convention on the Laws of the Sea.
the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains remote, as instability in the
region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and
commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global
oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea— that represents more than three
times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic
through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of
all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from
the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China
Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the
language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually
assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all
participants. Further- more, with the United States continuing to operate from a position
of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances
China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small
military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic
risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are
unlikely.
The South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels (worth
approximately$700 billion at current market prices) and an estimated 900 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas (worth roughly $9 trillion assuming a market price of $10 per thousand
cubic feet).7 For countries like Malaysia (2010 GDP of $237 billion), the Philippines
($199 billion), and Vietnam ($122 billion), such resources offer tremendous economic
opportunity.8 To China, with a $6 trillion economy, these resources are less valuable for
their revenue potential, but they can offer substantial energy security.
Potential gains, however, cannot be realized if ongoing territorial disputes let resources
sit beneath the sea idly. Instead, these countries need to work out agreements to share the
wealth. As Asian energy demand is projected to double from its 2008 level by 2035, the
pressure for the claim- ants to settle will only increase.9 From the perspective of nonclaimants like the United States, tapping the natural resources is most important, as an
increase in supply will relieve upward pricing pressure on energy mar- kets. It is thus
important for all involved parties that there be a successful resolution to claims ratified by
all claimant states. One should also note that, beyond encouraging multilateral resolution
to disputes in the Sea, the United States can add to its credibility on the issue by ratifying
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which it signed in 1982 but has yet to ratify
some 30 years later.
Evaluate this passage:
In the new edition of his classic “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” John Mearsheimer of the
University of Chicago makes a powerful case for the inevitability of war in Asia as China rises:
“My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate
Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to
enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors,
including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the United States to
contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for
war.”
This is the core strategic question of the 21st century. History is not rich in peaceful transitions of power
from one hegemon to another. China needs resources. It will seek them near and far — and find America in
its path. As with the Soviet Union, but without the ideological conflict, the issue will be whether the
evident potential for a conflagration can be finessed through alliances or forestalled through the specter of
mutual assured destruction.
How can we infer China’s strategy from its actions?
Salami tactics
Establish a position of strength and control
Dare anyone to challenge
Defend the position with force
Portray challengers as aggressors; China is only defending
Political and economic historians said the China-Vietnam tensions signaled a hardening position by the
Chinese over what they regard as their “core interest” in claiming sovereignty over a vastly widened swath
of coastal waters that stretch from the Philippines and Indonesia north to Japan. In Chinese parlance, they
say, “core interest” means there is no room for compromise.
“I find it quite alarming, because it was not so many years ago that there was a relatively tranquil
relationship between China and its neighbors,” said Orville Schell, a China scholar who is the director of
the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York.
“Now we have a picture that’s slowly pixelating, from Indonesia, to Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Japan, up the neighborhood,” Mr. Schell said in a telephone interview. “We begin to get a picture of stress
and strain. This is not exactly the peaceful rise of China that we were advertised.”
While Mr. Schell said he did not necessarily foresee an armed conflict — a view echoed by others — he
said the Chinese had “created a climate where it will be very hard for China to exist in this state of fraternal
relations with its neighbors.”
In the new edition of his classic “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” John Mearsheimer of the
University of Chicago makes a powerful case for the inevitability of war in Asia as China rises:
“My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate
Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to
enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors,
including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the United States to
contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for
war.”
This is the core strategic question of the 21st century. History is not rich in peaceful transitions of power
from one hegemon to another. China needs resources. It will seek them near and far — and find America in
its path. As with the Soviet Union, but without the ideological conflict, the issue will be whether the
evident potential for a conflagration can be finessed through alliances or forestalled through the specter of
mutual assured destruction.
The U.S. response in support of Vietnam, its erstwhile enemy turned pivot-to-Asia partner, was firm:
“China’s decision to introduce an oil rig accompanied by numerous government vessels for the first time in
waters disputed with Vietnam is provocative and raises tensions,” Jen Psaki, a State Department
spokeswoman, said in a statement. “This unilateral action appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese
behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the
region.”
China is asserting sovereignty in the South China Sea, angering the Philippines and Vietnam. Its
actions appear to vindicate Mearsheimer, who writes that a more powerful China can “be expected
to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the
European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect
China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine” — the 19th century keep-out-of-thishemisphere message of the United States to Europe.
M. Taylor Fravel
Why is China trying to place an oil rig at this time in this location?
A.
The most likely reason is political and not economic. Economically, the area where the rig will drill has
few proven or probable hydrocarbon reserves. Moreover, the rig, which cost $1 billion to build, is
extremely expensive to operate on a daily basis, which begs the questions why Cnooc would explore in an
area with uncertain prospects.
Instead, China is most likely using the rig to assert and exercise its jurisdiction over the waters it claims in
the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, the timing of China’s action is puzzling. Next week, Asean will hold its annual summit in
Burma. China’s action ensures that its behavior in the South China Sea will be a key topic discussed at that
meeting and that greater international attention will be focused on its claims in the region. More generally,
in the past few years, China and Vietnam have improved their relations and managed their maritime
disputes peacefully. They reached an agreement on basic principles for resolving maritime disputes in
October 2011, established several hotlines and formed working groups on maritime demarcation and joint
development.
Given what has occurred in the last week and the history of the struggle between China and Vietnam
over the Paracels, could this situation escalate into a more intense or larger conflict?
A.
The risk of escalation is real. Offshore oil and gas play an important role in Vietnam’s economy. This gives
Hanoi a strong incentive to deter China from operating within Vietnam’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) even if this particular area may not hold large reserves. The proximity to both
countries facilitates the deployment of naval forces and government maritime law enforcement forces. The
prospect of many ships jostling for control of a small area increases opportunities for miscalculations and
collisions that could escalate into armed conflict.
In the past few years, Vietnam has demonstrated a willingness to use its government ships to challenge
what it views as assertive Chinese behavior threatening its interests. In 2007, Vietnam sought to prevent
China from conducting a seismic survey in waters near the Paracel Islands, north of where the rig is
located. In 2010, Vietnamese vessels surrounded a Chinese patrol ship from the Bureau of Fisheries
Administration in disputed waters. Now, the stakes are even higher for Vietnam, which suggests it may
choose to continue with efforts to prevent China’s rig from commencing drilling operations.
On what basis does China argue that the placement of this rig is within its legal rights?
A.
China claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese).
Mirroring Japan’s position on the Senkaku Islands, China maintains that no dispute exists with Vietnam
over these islands. China has controlled the northern portion of the Paracels since the mid-1950s and the
southern portion since 1974, when it clashed with South Vietnamese forces. According to China’s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the rig’s activities are occurring “within waters off China’s Xisha islands.”
The rig itself is located roughly 17 nautical miles south of Triton Island, the southwestern-most land feature
in the Paracels. In 1996, China drew baselines around the entire Paracel archipelago. Based on a 1998 law,
China claims from such baselines a 200-nautical-mile EEZ under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (Unclos) in which it has the sole right to exploit any maritime resources from such baselines. The
location of the rig falls within such an EEZ based on China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracels.
Does Vietnam have a legitimate case that the placement of the Chinese oil rig violates Vietnam’s
territorial sovereignty or is an action done in bad faith given the disputed nature of the Paracels?
A.
Vietnam objects to the location of the rig for two reasons. First, the rig is located within an EEZ that
Vietnam claims from its own coastline. The rig is approximately 120 nautical miles from Vietnam’s Ly Son
Island and thus on Vietnam’s continental shelf and well within a 200-nautical-mile EEZ.
Second, Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracels and contests China’s position that no dispute exists.
Although Vietnam has not drawn baselines around the Paracels, it does reject Chinese claims to
sovereignty over the islands and jurisdiction over the adjacent waters. In Vietnam’s view, China’s rig is
located in Vietnamese waters and China has no basis for drilling in this location.
What has been the position of the United States on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and
how do you think it will or should react in this case?
A.
The U.S. policy is to not take a position on the sovereignty of the land features in the South China Sea,
including the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. At the same time, the United States has underscored its
key interests in the region, including freedom of navigation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the
avoidance of coercion and intimidation in the disputes. To support peaceful resolution, the United States
has urged China and Asean to reach a binding code of conduct and supports the use of international
arbitration, such as the case the Philippines recently filed before the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea.
Q.
How committed is China to using the “nine dashes” in the Republican-era map as the basis for its
territorial claims in the South China Sea?
A.
Although the nine-dashed line has appeared on Chinese maps for decades, China has maintained a curious
silence on the meaning of the line. China has never stated what the line depicts, either positively or
negatively. The line could represent a claim to sovereignty over the enclosed land features or it could be
much more expansive and represent a claim to an EEZ or historic rights (both of which would be
inconsistent with Unclos.)
Within China, disagreement exists over how to define the line. Nevertheless, Chinese actions in the past
few years, such as protecting fishermen in the southern reaches of the South China Sea or inviting foreign
oil companies to invest in exploration blocks off the coast of Vietnam, indicate that China may favor a
more expansive definition.
Regarding China’s claims to sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands, China asserts that the
nine-dashed line, which was officially published in the late 1940s, provides support for their claim to these
land features.
U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the
South China Sea Since 1995
Executive summary
U.S. policy toward the disputes in the South China Sea has four features.
First, the United States has altered the content of its declaratory policy in
response to changes in the level of tensions in the dispute. In other words,
the United States has increased its level of involvement following the
increase in tensions among the claimants. During periods of stability in the
dispute, the United States has not altered its policy or increased its
involvement.
Second, U.S. policy towards the South China Sea has been premised on
the principle of maintaining neutrality regarding the conflicting claims to
sovereignty. This means that the United States does not take sides and
support one state’s claim to sovereignty against the other claimants.
Taking sides would be costly for the United States, as the United States
does not want to increase its direct involvement in China’s sovereignty
disputes nor make the South China Sea a central issue in the U.S.-China
relationship. Nevertheless, a tension exists between the principle of
maintaining neutrality and greater involvement in efforts to manage
tensions in the dispute, especially when one country is identified as being
the primary source of increased tensions.
Third, as its involvement in managing tensions has increased, the United
States has emphasised the process and principles by which claims should
be pursued more than the final outcome or resolution of the underlying
disputes, especially conflict management through the conclusion of a
binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China. The focus on
process and principles aims to thread the needle of maintaining neutrality
over sovereignty while increasing involvement to reduce instability. The
general approach is to articulate principles that should be followed by all
claimants and to use those principles as the basis for U.S. policy.
Fourth, U.S. policy in the South China Sea has sought to shape China’s
behaviour in the region by highlighting the costs of coercion and the pursuit
of claims that are inconsistent with international law. Costs for Beijing
included a tarnished image as a state that acts in violation of international
law (especially UNCLOS), poor relations with other claimants, and an
improved position of the United States in the region as a partner for other
claimants in these disputes. Nevertheless, by adhering to the neutrality
principle, the United States has sought to increase its involvement without
defending the claims of other claimants.
Looking forward, the involvement of the United States in seeking to
manage tensions in the South China Sea is likely to continue so long as
the territorial and maritime demarcation disputes remain unresolved and
states take declaratory and operational actions to assert and defend their
claims. Nevertheless, if tensions are reduced even without the settlement
of the underlying disputes, then the involvement of the United States would
likely decline. To the degree that tensions in the South China Sea are
associated with Chinese behaviour, then the South China Sea will continue
to be an issue in U.S.-China relations. Nevertheless, by balancing
involvement regarding dispute management with neutrality over questions
of sovereignty, the United States has sought to limit the role of the South
China Sea in the U.S.-China relationship.
The United States has two principal interests in the South China Sea:
access and stability.
First, the United States has a powerful interest in maintaining unhindered
access to the waters of the region.
Unhindered access to the waters of the South China Sea is important for
two reasons. First, it underpins the economic dynamism of the region,
which is based on extensive intra-regional and international trade. More
than 5 trillion dollars’ worth of trade passes through these waters each
year, including more than 1 trillion with the United States.2 Second,
unhindered access sustains
America’s ability to project military power, not just in East Asia but also
around the world, as many U.S. naval vessels from the West Coast and
Japan pass through the South China Sea en route to the Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf. Third, upholding the principle of freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea is part of a desire to uphold this principle globally.
Second, the United States has a powerful interest in the maintenance of
regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Like open and unhindered
access, regional stability also sustains both East Asian and American
prosperity, as conflict or intense security competition would divert scarce
resources away from development, reduce trade by threatening the
security of sea-lanes, and reduce cross-border investment, both in the
region and across the Pacific.
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards the disputes in the
South China Sea has been largely reactive. The United States has altered
the content of its policy in response to events in the South China Sea that
threaten U.S. interests. Declaratory U.S. policy may be usefully divided
based on several distinct turning points.
What is India’s Position in the SCS?
India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership
Carl Thayer
The new government in India led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi views Vietnam as an essential partner
for its Act East Policy. Modi has injected new momentum in the 2007 India-Vietnam strategic partnership.
At the conclusion of President Mukherjee’s state visit he issued a joint statement with his counterpart,
President Truong Tan Sang. This statement declared “that cooperation in national defense was an important
pillar in their strategic partnership.”
To underscore this point President Mukherjee announced that the Export-Import Bank of India had signed a
$100 million line of credit agreement with Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance, with an annual interest rate of
two percent, to facilitate defense procurement over the next decade and a half.
Mukherjee also agreed to expand military training and assist Vietnam Navy’s strike capabilities.
In addition to defense and security, the joint statement enumerated five additional areas of cooperation:
political, economic, science and technology, culture and people-to-people links, technical, and regional and
multilateral diplomacy. Seven agreements across a number of areas were signed during Mukherjee’s visit
indicating the growing breadth of bilateral relations.
Modi: We have a shared interest in maritime security, including freedom of navigation and commerce
and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.”
Our defense cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the
modernization of Vietnam’s defense and security forces. This will include expansion of our training
program, which is already very substantial, joint exercises and cooperation in defense equipment. We will
quickly operationalize the 100 million dollars Line of Credit that will enable Vietnam to acquire new naval
vessels from India. We have also agreed to enhance our security cooperation, including counter-terrorism.
In private discussions the two prime ministers agreed to work with Japan in a trilateral format to
coordinate positions on security and economic policies.
The joint statement issued by Modi and Dung at the conclusion of the latter’s visit included important
commitments in five areas: defense, South China Sea, energy, trade and investment, and space.
India-Vietnam defense cooperation currently entails: high-level exchange visits, an annual security
dialogue, service-to-service interaction, naval port visits, ship construction, training and capacity building,
assistance in maintaining military equipment, multilateral exercises, and cooperation at regional forums
such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus.
Vietnam will use the lion’s share of the $100 million line of credit to procure four new Ocean Patrol
Vessels (OPVs). The OPVs are capable of performing constabulary duties such as coastal surveillance and
anti-piracy missions, as well as military missions. Vietnam is now considering whether to approach a
government or private shipyard to build the new vessels. When a contract is agreed it will mark the first
significant transfer of military platforms by India to Vietnam.
Vietnam is also exploring the possibility of acquiring Indian-manufactured surveillance equipment such as
unnamed aerial vehicles.
On the eve of Prime Minister Dung’s visit, P. K. Chakravorty, adviser to BrahMos Aerospace, revealed that
Russia had agreed to sell the BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile to Vietnam. The BrahMos missile is an
Indian-Russian joint venture and requires the agreement of both governments for the sale to a third party.
Discussions between India and Vietnam over the sale of the BrahMos missile and the naval platforms to
carry them reportedly were at an advanced stage.
Cooperation in the field of hydrocarbons represents the second most important component of the IndiaVietnam strategic partnership.
India’s Oil and Natural Gas Company Videsh Ltd. (ONGC/OVL) has been active in Vietnam since 1988,
when it was awarded an exploration license for Block 06.1 that is still producing natural gas. In 2006
ONGC acquired exploration Blocks 127 and 128. Block 127 was later relinquished on commercial grounds.
In 2012, when China objected to ONGC’s exploration activities in Block 128, ONGC tried to return the
block to Vietnam but was dissuaded after intervention by the Department of External Affairs. In November
2013, Vietnam offered ONGC five blocks.
The Indian Ocean and Triangular Relations
Dhruva Janishanker, "India's Ocean," Foreign Policy, December 6,
2012
India's Ocean
A recent book by C. Raja Mohan, one of India's most influential strategic thinkers, explores the prospect of
Sino-Indian competition spilling from the Himalayas to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, risking a struggle
for maritime influence in the region among the United States, China, and India.
So it was all the more interesting, when, at a press conference Monday, India's top admiral appeared to
suggest that his navy would defend Indo-Vietnamese oil exploration efforts in the South China Sea
against Chinese aggression. An Indian state-owned oil company, ONGC Videsh, has been involved in
deepwater explorations with Vietnam in the South China Sea since 2006, despite Chinese claims of
sovereignty over that area.
But the reality of Admiral D.K. Joshi's statement was far less sensational. Rather than signalling a
deployment, he merely reinforced the longstanding Indian position that China's naval modernization
concerned India, and that like other maritime powers, India was preparing for worst-case scenarios.
The Indian Navy has historically been the smallest and most poorly-resourced of India's three military
services, in keeping with the country's security preoccupations at home and its unresolved land border
disputes with Pakistan and China. It has just 60,000 active personnel and a $7 billion annual budget,
roughly a quarter of the strength and resources of China's People's Liberation Army Navy. Its long-range
capabilities come from a single aircraft carrier, a second-hand amphibious transport dock, 14 German- or
Russian-designed diesel-powered submarines, and about 20 destroyers and frigates.
But power is relative, and this seemingly small flotilla today constitutes the largest naval presence in the
Indian Ocean after the U.S. Navy. Beyond the United States and China, only Japan, South Korea, and
perhaps Taiwan boast even comparable capacities for the region, although their navies are more narrowly
focused. But India's navy dwarfs those of other countries embroiled in territorial disputes with Beijing in
The temporary presence of even a small Indian squadron in the Pacific could make a meaningful
difference to the region's balance of power.
India's growing interests, resources, and technological capabilities will likely lead it to increased naval
activity east of the Strait of Malacca, the critical junction of the Pacific and Indian Oceans through which
40 percent of the world's trade and most of East Asia's oil imports flow. India is conducting sea trials of an
indigenously-designed nuclear-powered submarine, which will significantly increase its navy's operational
range. In the next two years, India willinduct a second aircraft carrier and modern French submarines into
active service, to upgrade its aging fleet.
India is able to work with other regional navies. Beginning with basic exercises in the early 2000s, the
Indian Navy's collaboration with the U.S. Pacific Command has evolved into complex war games. In 2004,
India tested its ability to respond to regional crises in coordination with the United States, Japan, and
Australia by performing humanitarian relief operations in Southeast Asia following the devastating Indian
Ocean tsunami. And the Malabar series of naval exercises between India and the United States, which
have also involved Japan, Australia, and Singapore, has strengthened the Indian Navy's ability to work
closely with partners far from its shores. Contrast this to China: Beyond dustups with Southeast Asian
countries, and with Japan over disputed islands -- which only generate further suspicion of Chinese
military intentions -- Beijing is also quick to break off military ties, like it did after Washington sold
weapons to Taiwan in 2010.
None of this means that India is looking to pick a fight with China in the South China Sea,
particularly as India has no territorial stakes there. Other facets of the Sino-Indian relationship -the fragile boundary talks over disputed Himalayan territory and bilateral trade of more than $70
billion and growing -- are of far greater importance to New Delhi. At the same time, renouncing
claims to its assets in Vietnam in response to perceived Chinese pressure could embarrass the Indian
government, both domestically and internationally. When confronted with pressure from Beijing -as during the Dalai Lama's 2009 visit to the disputed border town of Tawang or periods when China
has refused to issue visas in some Indian passports -- New Delhi's response has generally been to stick
to its guns.
For its part, China needs to appreciate that its aggressive pursuit of maritime territory compels India to
cooperate more closely with Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing's issuing of passports this November
featuring a map showing the fullest extent of its territorial claims was a remarkably clumsy gesture,
provoking simultaneous outrage in India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. China may have only itself
to blame if these states find greater common cause with one another, and with other regional maritime
powers.
David Scott, "India's Aspirations and Strategy for the Indian Ocean:
Securing the Waves?" Journal of Strategic Studies, 36.4 (2013) 484-511.
India has increasingly high aspirations in the Indian Ocean, as enunciated by
politicians, naval figures and the wider elite. These aspirations, its strategic discourse,
are of pre-eminence and leadership. India’s maritime strategy for such a self-confessed
diplomatic, constabulary and benign role is primarily naval-focused; a sixfold strategy of
increasing its naval spending, strengthening its infrastructure, increasing its naval
capabilities, active maritime diplomacy, exercising in the Indian Ocean and keeping
open the choke points. Through such strategy, and soft balancing with the United
States, India hopes to secure its own position against a perceived growing Chinese
challenge in the Indian Ocean.
The argument of this article is twofold and, despite caveats, simple. First, it argues that
the Indian Navy has clear-enough aspirations for the Indian Ocean which are being
supported by the government. Second, it argues that various successful strategies
designed to further these aspirations mean that India is gaining a sought-after
position of some eminence in the Indian Ocean.
First, it sets out to pinpoint what India’s aspirations actually are; through closely
following, contextualising and evaluating the strategic discourse circulating in India with
regard to the Indian Ocean. Second, it pinpoints and assesses India’s strategy for realising
such aspirations in the Indian Ocean; including examining whether India is effectively
matching political and strategic goals with maritime resources in the form of acquisition
and deployment of appropriate assets (ships and naval aircraft) and creation of
infrastructure, as well as considering India’s interactions in the Indian Ocean with local
and extra-regional powers.
this article argues that there is a significant meaningful degree of lower Service-level
naval strategy for the Indian Ocean backed up by the government, in which a degree of
consensus is noticeable over India’s aspirations in the Indian Ocean, even though
questions remain over the effectiveness and impact of the strategy to realise such
aspirations.
In 2009, the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stressed that ‘there can thus be no doubt
that the Indian Navy must be the most important maritime power in this region’.7 The
following year, the Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in her 2010 speech to the National
Maritime Foundation, argued that ‘as the main resident power in the Indian Ocean
region...India is well poised to play a leadership role’ with regard to maritime security in
the region.8 In turn, the Defence Minister A.K. Antony told the 2012 Naval Chiefs
Conference that ‘India’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean and the professional
capability of our Navy bestows upon us a natural ability to play a leading role in ensuring
peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region’.9
One general goal is that India wants to keep the Sea Lanes of Communication
(SLOCs) open, in order to maintain trade flows.
A second security concern is jihadist infiltration, heightened since ‘26/11’ when the
attackers came into Mumbai across the sea from Pakistan.
At the state level, a third security concern for India remains Pakistani competition. on
the maritime front, Pakistan’s navy (its submarine strength) clouds India’s local preeminence, there remain concerns over Pakistan setting up links with the governments of
the Maldives and Sri Lanka, and there remain concerns over Pakistan sponsorship of
jihadist groups slipping into India across the intervening waters. Furthermore, India
remains concerned over Pakistan’s military links with China, in particular with worries
over Gwadar’s role as a friendly naval base for the Chinese Navy operating in the Indian
Ocean, and thereby outflanking India.
This points to India’s fourth security concern, China’s growing presence in the Indian
Ocean. There is a palpable Indian sense of emerging ‘encirclement’ by China through the
appearance of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean and through worries for India of
facilities being set up for China in the Indian Ocean via proxy allies like Pakistan,
sympathetic states like Myanmar, and vulnerable island states like the Seychelles. China
is not readily acquiescing in any Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean.24 With
regard to China, India seeks to maintain (and not lose) its privileged diplomatic-security
links with Indian Ocean states and it seeks to maintain clear military superiority over the
Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean Region.
sixfold strategy by India is,
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first, increasing its naval spending. in local terms India’s military spending now
being channelled into naval purposes is significantly greater than naval spending
by all other Indian Ocean states. However, in comparison to the other extraregional actors like the US and China India’s spending strategy is perhaps less
impressive. A significant compensatory feature for India in the Indian Ocean is
that it enjoys local geographic advantages of closeness, concentration of forces
and prioritisation that magnify the impact of increased financial spending.
Second, strengthening its infrastructure presence. A substantial expansion of
bases and capabilities.
Third, increasing its naval capabilities. Domestic production of advanced ships
and weapons.
Fourth, active maritime diplomacy, including increased deployments of these
naval assets around the Indian Ocean. India’s naval diplomacy consists of
various elements involving personnel and assets. At the personnel level is India’s
training of naval officers of other countries, sending its own naval officers
(from Chief of Naval Staff downwards) on routine trips to these countries,
and regular exchanges at the officer’s level. showing the flag throughout the
whole region. Such deployments are recognised in India as a highly visible way
of reinforcing India’s position in the Indian Ocean.
Fifth, exercising in the Indian Ocean; unilaterally or bilaterally, trilaterally and
multilaterally with other actors. able to use its increased naval capabilities to carry
out an increasing number of naval exercises of increasing strength
Sixth, keeping open the choke points in and out of the Indian Ocean; in part
through its own unilateral deployments, and in part through cooperation with
other relevant choke point countries. ‘the choke points leading to and from the
Indian Ocean – principally the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait
of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Cape of Good Hope.’ India’s assuaging of the local
Strait states Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore; including joint exercises and
friendly deployments in the Strait area with them. India’s own regular ongoing
deployments into the South China Sea, which have been maintained since 2000,
also bring India down the Strait. With regard to the Strait of Hormuz, India has
developed close military links with Oman, which sits directly on the Strait. Since
2003, India has entered into defence agreements with Oman dealing with training,
maritime security cooperation and joint exercises.
China is not the biggest Great Power in the Indian Ocean for India to concern
itself with. Instead, the power that can still ‘shape’ Indian Ocean events is the
United States; given its military presence in Bahrein, Diego Garcia, and Western
Australia. However, the US has been accepting a growing Indian role in the
Indian Ocean. In 2008 the then US Secretary of the Navy, Donald Winter,
welcomed India ‘taking up the responsibility to ensure security in this part of the
world’

India now sees the US military presence as a stabilising factor in an otherwise
fragile region. This is a change from the 1980s, when the US arrival in the region,
and its setting up at Diego Garcia in particular, was seen by New Delhi as
unhelpful and detrimental to Indian interests.
China and the South China Sea
Sean Creehan, "Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China
Sea," SAIS Review, 32.1 (Winter-Spring 2012) 125-128.
Southchisearisks.pdf
Secretary Clinton defined two U.S. requirements in her Hanoi remarks:
1)Free and open access to sea lanes passing through the South China Sea; and
2)Multilateral resolution of competing territorial claims according to the UN Convention
on the Laws of the Sea.
Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South
China Sea remains remote, as instability in the region would affect the entire global
economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some
estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through
the South China Sea— that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the
Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no
country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic
importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and
energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through
the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory,
disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that
possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Further- more, with the
United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least
managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the
future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a
balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so
great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely.
Is this an example of deep interdependence?
Clinton’s second requirement of multilateral resolution of disputed claims becomes the
main point of contention.6 The South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of 7 billion
barrels (worth approximately$700 billion at current market prices) and an estimated 900
trillion cubic feet of natural gas (worth roughly $9 trillion assuming a market price of $10
per thousand cubic feet).7 For countries like Malaysia (2010 GDP of $237 billion), the
Philippines ($199 billion), and Vietnam ($122 billion), such resources offer tremendous
economic opportunity.
Potential gains, however, cannot be realized if ongoing territorial disputes let resources
sit beneath the sea idly. Instead, these countries need to work out agreements to share the
wealth. As Asian energy demand is projected to double from its 2008 level by 2035, the
pressure for the claim- ants to settle will only increase.9 From the perspective of nonclaimants like the United States, tapping the natural resources is most important, as an
increase in supply will relieve upward pricing pressure on energy mar- kets. It is thus
important for all involved parties that there be a successful resolution to claims ratified by
all claimant states.
Do nations also experience a deep interdependence in terms of the energy resources in
SCS?
Does the decline in oil prices affect national calculations on this issue?
Does this assessment of the interests ignore the Chinese interest in asserting a position of
dominance in the sea lanes around China? How important is this to the Chinese?
Does this analysis ignore the potential for an unintended outcome in which the sea lanes
are closed and/or the energy is never exploited.
China-Vietnam Conflict in the South China Sea: Events of May - July
2014
geopolflashpoints.docx
May 2014
The confrontation occurred just days after the Chinese state oil company Cnooc stationed
the oil rig 120 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam, in waters claimed by China and
Vietnam. The placement of the rig led to protests and demands by Vietnam that it be
withdrawn, and the deployment of a Vietnamese naval flotilla to the area.
The Chinese government initially said that it had “lost contact” with 11 fishermen in the
area and reported that the crew had been taken away Tuesday morning by armed men,
who had fired warning shots before boarding the vessel. But on Wednesday, China
acknowledged that the crew had been detained by the Philippine authorities near the
Spratly Islands.
A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said that China has called upon
authorities in the Philippines to “immediately” release the fishermen, to “make rational
explanations” of its actions and to “take no more provocative action,” the Xinhua news
agency reported.
Relations between China and the Philippines have grown increasingly tense over the last
year because of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The tensions are flaring at a time when the American and Philippine armed forces are
engaged in joint military exercises in the region and just after Washington and Manila
forged a new security agreement.
Political and economic historians said the China-Vietnam tensions signaled a hardening
position by the Chinese over what they regard as their “core interest” in claiming
sovereignty over a vastly widened swath of coastal waters that stretch from the
Philippines and Indonesia north to Japan. In Chinese parlance, they say, “core interest”
means there is no room for compromise.
The U.S. response in support of Vietnam, its erstwhile enemy turned pivot-to-Asia
partner, was firm: “China’s decision to introduce an oil rig accompanied by numerous
government vessels for the first time in waters disputed with Vietnam is provocative and
raises tensions,” Jen Psaki, a State Department spokeswoman, said in a statement. “This
unilateral action appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its
claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the
region.”
China is asserting sovereignty in the South China Sea, angering the Philippines and
Vietnam. Its actions appear to vindicate Mearsheimer, who writes that a more powerful
China can “be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region,
much as the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western
Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to devise its own version
of the Monroe Doctrine” — the 19th century keep-out-of-this-hemisphere message of the
United States to Europe.
The push here in Vietnam to hedge against China by strengthening ties with the United
States is evident. The “comprehensive partnership” announced last year indicates how far
the wounds of war have healed. Cooperation extends across trade, investment, education
(Vietnam is the eighth-largest provider of foreign students to the United States) and
defense areas. The proposed trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership in
which Vietnam would be a participant (but not China) is luring manufacturing investment
from China. So are lower wages. A joint U.S. exercise with the Vietnamese navy was
recently conducted.
Why Has China Done This?
The most likely reason is political and not economic. Economically, the area where the
rig will drill has few proven or probable hydrocarbon reserves. Moreover, the rig, which
cost $1 billion to build, is extremely expensive to operate on a daily basis, which begs the
questions why Cnooc would explore in an area with uncertain prospects.
Instead, China is most likely using the rig to assert and exercise its jurisdiction over the
waters it claims in the South China Sea. In light of President Obama’s recent trip to the
region, including visits to two states with claims in the SCS, Malaysia and the
Philippines, China may also be seeking to test the renewed U.S. resolve to “pivot” to
Asia.
The risk of escalation is real. Offshore oil and gas play an important role in Vietnam’s
economy. This gives Hanoi a strong incentive to deter China from operating within
Vietnam’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) even if this particular area
may not hold large reserves. The proximity to both countries facilitates the deployment of
naval forces and government maritime law enforcement forces. The prospect of many
ships jostling for control of a small area increases opportunities for miscalculations and
collisions that could escalate into armed conflict.
In the past few years, Vietnam has demonstrated a willingness to use its government
ships to challenge what it views as assertive Chinese behavior threatening its interests. In
2007, Vietnam sought to prevent China from conducting a seismic survey in waters near
the Paracel Islands, north of where the rig is located. In 2010, Vietnamese vessels
surrounded a Chinese patrol ship from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration in disputed
waters. Now, the stakes are even higher for Vietnam, which suggests it may choose to
continue with efforts to prevent China’s rig from commencing drilling operations.
M. Taylor Fravel, "U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South
China Sea Since 1995," 2014
uspolicyscs.pdf
U.S. policy toward the disputes in the South China Sea has four features.
First, the United States has altered its policy in response to changes in the
level of tensions in the dispute. Second, U.S. policy toward the South
China Sea has been premised on the principle of maintaining neutrality
regarding the conflicting claims to sovereignty. Third, as its involvement in
managing tensions has increased, the United States has emphasized the
process and principles by which claims should be pursued more than the
final outcome or resolution of the underlying disputes, especially conflict
management through the conclusion of a binding code of conduct between
ASEAN and China. Fourth, U.S. policy in the South China Sea has sought
to shape China’s behaviour in the South China Sea by highlighting the
costs of coercion and the pursuit of claims that are inconsistent with
customary international law. Looking forward, the involvement of the
United States in seeking to manage tensions in the South China Sea is
likely to continue so long as the territorial and maritime jurisdictional
disputes remain unresolved and states take declaratory steps and
operational actions to assert and defend their claims.
An important addition to the analysis by Fravel is the level of US
involvement in this SCS issues is proportional to the actions taken by
China to assert its positions that create conflict in the area. The more
China presses its position, the higher is the US response. This outcome
cannot be one China prefers.
Rong Chen, "A Critical Analysis of the U.S. "Pivot" Toward the AsiaPacific: How Realistic is Neo-realism?" The Quarterly Journal,
Summer 2013, 39-62.
uspivotreal.pdf
There are many articles analyzing the reasons why the United States undertook
this strategic readjustment or “rebalancing” that ask the fol- lowing question:
What are the implications of this shift on the Asia-Pacific region, and especially
on emerging powers in the region such as China and India? However, these
questions are not the topic of this essay.
Although the officially stated fundamental goal underpinning the U.S. pivot is “to
devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacific’s norms and
rules,” and “deepen U.S. credibility in the region at a time of fiscal constraint,” the
move has raised considerable controversy.2 For some observers, the U.S. pivot is
not only a response to the growing significance of the Asia-Pacific region to the
United States’ interests, but also a response to the increasing power of China.3 To
some degree, the U.S. pivot has triggered some distrust and may cause negative
consequences in the region, but from another perspective it is understood as
extending strategic reassurance to U.S. allies and partners in the region. However,
more than one year after the announcement of the realignment of U.S. policy, the
overall state of relations between the U.S. and China has generally been fairly
smooth. So, what was the purpose of the U.S. pivot? Do Chinese analysts and
strategic thinkers and commentators really understand it, or correctly interpret it?
This article aims to achieve three objectives. First, by focusing on the U.S. pivot as
a case study, it seeks to identify and critically assess debates among Western
realist scholars as to whether or not the U.S. is balancing/containing China or
whether the U.S. is seeking regional hegemony. Is there a gap between how
realist international relations theorists conceptualize the pivot and its
strategic effects and the reality of its effects? Second, the article informs the
ongoing debate about the utility of international relations theory and academic
studies for the policy-practitioner world. Third, it is hoped that this essay may
contribute to shaping Chinese perceptions/misperceptions of U.S. strategic
intent, and so modify Chinese policy responses. In other words, it tests the
extent to which neo-realist theory shapes, informs, and justifies real-world
strategic and policy choices. In order to achieve these objects, this paper is split
into six parts. Following this introduction, the second section takes a close look at
the evolution of the U.S. pivot to Asia. The third part reviews the literature on key
proponents of defensive and offensive realist propositions and studies. The fourth
section is application of the theory to the pivot toward the Asia-Pacific, the fifth
part offers an assessment of results, and the final draws conclusions from the
study.
“by 2020 the Navy will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent
split be- tween the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those
oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our
cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.”
Announcing new troop deployments to Australia, new naval
deployments to Singapore, and new areas for military cooperation with the
Philippines
Stating that, notwithstanding reductions in overall levels of U.S.
defense spend- ing, the U.S. military presence in East Asia will be
strengthened and be made “more broadly distributed, more flexible, and
more politically sustainable”
Joining the East Asia Summit (EAS), one of the region’s premier
multinational organizations, and securing progress in negotiations to form a
nine-nation Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) free trade
agreement (FT A).12
the reason for the pivot lies in three major developments. First, The Asia-Pacific
region is more and more important to the United States’ economic interests, and
China is of particular importance to the nation’s economic future. Second, the
United Sates’ ability to project power and the freedom of navigation in the region
may be challenged by China, in light of its growing military capabilities and its
claims to disputed maritime territory. Third, U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific doubt the
United States’ commitment to the region, taking into consideration the U.S.
government’s budget cutting, particularly the defense budget. However, many
observers have argued that the most important impetus explaining the pivot is the
growing U.S. perception of a potential military and political challenge from China.
The U.S. alliances in Asia are primarily politico-military in nature, and the most
significant elements of the U.S. pivot have been in the military realm. From a
U.S. perspective the pivot represents an attempt to reassure its allies and other
countries, while dissuading China from using military means to solve its disputes
with its neighbors, such as squabbles over maritime territory in the South and East
China Seas, thus contributing to an easing of tensions. However, from a Chinese
perspective, such moves appear to be an attempt to contain China’s development
in the region and to divide China from its neighbors.
Realism and the Pivot to Asia
Defensive realists such as Stephen Walt, who has written extensively on this topic,
assumes that the U.S. and China can coexist and cooperate peacefully through
balancing, although the level of uncertainty derived from their direct, bilateral
conflicts remains high. However, offensive realists such as Mearsheimer see
competition for hegemony between the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
which may lead to a future conflict.
When we reflect on how Western scholars and IR theorists understand the
significance of the U.S. pivot in terms of their own theoretical inclinations, what
can we discern? As a general point, it is clear that both offensive and defensive
neo-realist IR theorists evaluate the significance of the U.S. pivot in terms of
expected realist behavior – for them, the theory explains the practice. Indeed,
although official statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs are
careful to express mild disapproval and not at- tribute the pivot to competitive
behavior, it is also clear that the “commentariat” in China brings a realist
understanding to current events in the Asia-Pacific region, as was noted above.82
Therefore, a combination of offensive and defensive realism may better explain
the U.S. pivot than other alternative explanations.
Neo-realists argue that their theories, which place an emphasis on changes in
power distribution, explain the reasons behind the U.S. pivot. For realists, the
international system is governed by power politics. Neo-realism, in particular, is
primarily concerned with the structure of the international system, with a special
emphasis on the interna- tional distribution of power. It is commonplace to note
that in recent years, the world power distribution is shifting from West to East, and
China is the biggest variable. The sustained economic growth of China and Asia,
combined with the Western economic downturn since the 2008 global financial
crisis, has accelerated this process of power redistribution, a trend that continues.
Geopolitical Features of Conflict in Asia
What territories are involved and disputed?
The South China Sea comprises a stretch of roughly 1.4 million square miles in the Pacific Ocean
that encompasses an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, spanning
west of the Philippines, north of Indonesia, and east of Vietnam. The South China Sea islands
number in the hundreds, although the largest and most contentious territories include the Spratly
Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal, to which all of
the six major Southeast Asian nations lay various claims. The islands are mostly uninhabited and
have never had an indigenous population, making the issue of historical sovereignty a thorny one to
resolve.
The disputes aren't limited to land, however; each country has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), over which it
has special rights to marine resources and energy exploration and production. An EEZ spans
outward 200 nautical miles from the coast of the each state's territorial sea, and may include the
continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. These zones come into play during disputes over sea
territory, as displayed in China's December 2012 spat with Vietnam over oil and fishing activity in
the waters near the Paracel Islands.
What is the 9-Dash Line?
The 9-Dash line is a controversial demarcation line used by China for its claim to territories and
waters in the South China Sea, most notably over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and
Spratly Islands—the two most important disputed island groups. The line, which is contested by the
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, encompasses virtually the entire South China
Sea region and caused immediate controversy when China submitted a map to the UN in 2009 that
included the demarcation. Beijing's issuance of a new passport in late 2012 containing a map of the
disputed region based on the line drew fresh international criticism and backlash.
ASEAN countries have contested this boundary, but China has insisted on the historical legitimacy of
the line based on survey expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols dating as far back as the
fifteenth century, putting it at odds with the boundaries UNCLOS has enforced for the region since
1994.
The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict
The 21st century's defining battleground is going to be on water.
BY ROBERT D. KAPLAN | SEPT/OCT 2011
Foreign Policy
Even accounting for how dramatically technology has compressed distance,
the sea itself still acts as a barrier to aggression, at least to a degree that dry
land does not. The sea, unlike land, creates clearly defined borders, giving it
the potential to reduce conflict. Then there is speed to consider. Even the
fastest warships travel comparatively slowly, 35 knots, say, reducing the
chance of miscalculations and giving diplomats more hours -- days, even -- to
reconsider decisions. Navies and air forces simply do not occupy territory the
way that armies do. It is because of the seas around East Asia -- the center of
global manufacturing as well as rising military purchases -- that the 21st
century has a better chance than the 20th of avoiding great military
conflagrations
As for the comparison between China today and Germany on the eve of World War
I that many make, it is flawed: Whereas Germany was primarily a land power,
owing to the geography of Europe, China will be primarily a naval power, owing to
the geography of East Asia.
Naval powers create global empires; land powers create world wars through land
conquest
Southeast Asia, by contrast, is already deep into the post-Cold War phase of history.
Vietnam, which dominates the western shore of the South China Sea, is a capitalist
juggernaut despite its political system, seeking closer military ties to the United
States. China, consolidated as a dynastic state by Mao Zedong after decades of
chaos and made into the world's most dynamic economy by the liberalizations of
Deng Xiaoping, is pressing outward with its navy to what it calls the "first island
chain" in the Western Pacific.
The composite picture is of a cluster of states, which, with problems of domestic
legitimacy and state-building behind them, are ready to advance their perceived
territorial rights beyond their own shores. This outward collective push is located in
the demographic cockpit of the globe, for it is in Southeast Asia, with its 615 million
people, where China's 1.3 billion people converge with the Indian subcontinent's 1.5
billion people. And the geographical meeting place of these states, and their
militaries, is maritime: the South China Sea.
More than half the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through these
choke points, and a third of all maritime traffic. The oil transported through the
Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean, en route to East Asia through the South
China Sea, is more than six times the amount that passes through the Suez Canal
and 17 times the amount that transits the Panama Canal. Roughly two-thirds of
South Korea's energy supplies, nearly 60 percent of Japan's and Taiwan's energy
supplies, and about 80 percent of China's crude-oil imports come through the South
China Sea. What's more, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7 billion
barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge
bounty.
The result is that all nine states that touch the South China Sea are more or less
arrayed against China and therefore dependent on the United States for diplomatic
and military support. These conflicting claims are likely to become even more acute
as Asia's spiraling energy demands -- energy consumption is expected to double by
2030, with China accounting for half that growth -- make the South China Sea the
ever more central guarantor of the region's economic strength. Already, the South
China Sea has increasingly become an armed camp, as the claimants build up and
modernize their navies, even as the scramble for islands and reefs in recent decades
is mostly over. China has so far confiscated 12 geographical features, Taiwan one,
Vietnam 25, the Philippines eight, and Malaysia five.
Indeed, China's position here is in many ways akin to America's position vis-à-vis
the similar-sized Caribbean in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The United States
recognized the presence and claims of European powers in the Caribbean, but
sought to dominate the region nevertheless. It was the 1898 Spanish-American War
and the digging of the Panama Canal from 1904 to 1914 that signified the United
States' arrival as a world power. Domination of the greater Caribbean Basin,
moreover, gave the United States effective control of the Western Hemisphere,
which allowed it to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere. And
today China finds itself in a similar situation in the South China Sea, an
antechamber of the Indian Ocean, where China also desires a naval presence to
protect its Middle Eastern energy supplies.
. The Chinese regime demonstrates only a low-calorie version of authoritarianism,
with a capitalist economy and little governing ideology to speak of. Moreover, China
is likely to become more open rather than closed as a society in future years. Instead
of fascism or militarism, China, along with other states in East Asia, is increasingly
defined by the persistence of old-fashioned nationalism: an idea, certainly, but not
one that since the mid-19th century has been attractive to intellectuals. And even if
China does become more democratic, its nationalism is likely only to increase, as
even a casual survey of the views of its relatively freewheeling netizens makes clear.
But can conflict in the South China Sea be properly controlled? My argument thus
far presupposes that major warfare will not break out in the area and that instead
countries will be content to jockey for position with their warships on the high seas,
while making competing claims for natural resources and perhaps even agreeing to
a fair distribution of them. But what if China were, against all evidential trends, to
invade Taiwan? What if China and Vietnam, whose intense rivalry reaches far back
into history, go to war as they did in 1979, with more lethal weaponry this time?
The United States presently guarantees the uneasy status quo in the South
China Sea, limiting China's aggression mainly to its maps and serving as a
check on China's diplomats and navy (though this is not to say that America is
pure in its actions and China automatically the villain). What the United States
provides to the countries of the South China Sea region is less the fact of its
democratic virtue than the fact of its raw muscle. It is the very balance of
power between the United States and China that ultimately keeps Vietnam,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia free, able to play
one great power off against the other.
What does China want? White posits that the Chinese may desire in Asia the
kind of new-style empire that the United States engineered in the Western
Hemisphere once Washington had secured dominance over the Caribbean
Basin (as Beijing hopes it will over the South China Sea). This new-style
empire, in White's words, meant America's neighbors were "more or less free
to run their own countries," even as Washington insisted that its views be
given "full consideration" and take precedence over those of outside powers.
The problem with this model is Japan, which would probably not accept
Chinese hegemony, however soft.
Instead, America's aim in Asia should be balance, not dominance. It is precisely
because hard power is still the key to international relations that we must make
room for a rising China. The United States need not increase its naval power in the
Western Pacific, but it cannot afford to substantially decrease it.
The loss of a U.S. aircraft carrier strike group in the Western Pacific due to
budget cuts or a redeployment to the Middle East could cause intense
discussions in the region about American decline and the consequent need to
make amends and side deals with Beijing. The optimal situation is a U.S. air
and naval presence at more or less the current level, even as the United States
does all in its power to forge cordial and predictable ties with China.
Oil Rigs
Q1: Where is the rig, really?
A1: The war of words between Beijing and Hanoi has largely focused on the
status of the area where HD-981 was placed. Vietnamese officials insist that it
lies on their continental shelf, where according to the UN Convention on the
Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), Vietnam has exclusive rights to all mineral and
hydrocarbon resources.
The rig was placed near the edge of two hydrocarbon blocks already created
by Hanoi, though not yet offered for exploitation to foreign oil and gas
companies. It also sits near blocks 118 and 119, where U.S.-based
ExxonMobil discovered substantial oil and gas reserves in 2011 and 2012. In
2013, Exxon and Vietnam’s state-owned PetroVietnam announced plans to
build a $20 billion power plant to be fueled by the oil and gas from those
blocks. Those discoveries help explain why CNOOC chose to place HD-981
nearby.
HD-981 was placed at 15°29’58’’ north latitude and 111°12’06’’ east
longitude. It is about 120 nautical miles east of Vietnam’s Ly Son Island and
180 nautical miles south of China’s Hainan Island—the two nearest features
that indisputably generate a continental shelf. As such, it not only sits on
Vietnam’s claimed extended continental shelf, but also well on the
Vietnamese side of any median line that might be negotiated between the two
shelves from the Chinese and Vietnamese coasts, as indicated by the white
lines in the map below.
Q2: Who is in the right?
A2: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be basing its case on the
assumption that Triton Island, 17 miles to the north of HD-981, or another of the
Paracels meets the UNCLOS habitability requirement for generating its own
continental shelf. If that were assumed to be true, then HD-981 would indeed fall
within the maximum hypothetical area of dispute generated by the Paracels, shown
in red below. This is the maximum dispute because it gives the tiny Paracel Islands
equal weight in delimitation with the entire Vietnamese coast facing them—a
proposition that borders on the absurd.
So China can make a legal case, however flimsy, for control over the
continental shelf on which HD-981 sits. But that area is clearly in dispute. To
unilaterally drill on it is a violation of UNCLOS’s admonition that states in a
dispute
NYT Foreign Factories in Vietnam Weigh Damage in Anti-China Riots
By CHAU DOAN and THOMAS FULLERMAY 14, 2014
Photo
Smoke and flames billowed from a factory window in the southern Vietnamese
province of Binh Duong during anti-China protests on Wednesday.
ASEAN Reaction
The group’s refusal to weigh in appeared to be a victory for China and underlines
how there does not yet appear to be a willingness or ability to address the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea collectively. At least five nations claim islands in the
sea, a major shipping lane and potential flash point as China becomes more
assertive and hungry for resources.
Murray Hiebert, an expert on Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, said Vietnam and the Philippines, another
vocal critic of Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea, “clearly wanted
something a lot stronger” out of the meeting.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, has been unable in recent
years to reach a common position on the South China Sea even as China’s claims
have reached more than 1,000 miles southward from the Chinese mainland. A
summit meeting in Cambodia two years ago failed to produce a final statement
because leaders quarreled over the issue.
China Tensions Grow After Vietnamese Ship Sinks in Clash
By JANE PERLEZMAY 27, 2014
BEIJING — Hair-trigger tensions in the South China Sea escalated Tuesday as China and Vietnam traded
accusations over the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the vicinity of a Chinese oil rig parked in
disputed waters off Vietnam’s coast.
The incident was almost certain to aggravate the already charged diplomatic and economic tensions
between China and Vietnam, whose relations have plummeted to the worst in decades following antiChinese riots two weeks ago that killed at least four people.
In the latest incident, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat about 17 nautical miles
southwest of the rig on Monday afternoon, the state-run Vietnamese television network, VTV1, reported.
All 10 crew members were rescued, the network said.
In a signal of how China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, now views
the South China Sea as a top foreign policy priority, the country’s vice foreign
minister said Tuesday that the sea was central to China's very existence as a global
economic power.
“Being the lifeline for China, the South China Sea is far more important to China
than to other countries,” the minister, Liu Zhenmin, told reporters in Beijing.
In his strongest words yet on the territorial disputes, Mr. Hagel on Saturday morning implicitly
accused China of “intimidation and coercion” as he delivered his keynote address to the conference.
China has called the South China Sea “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation,” Mr. Hagel said.
“But in recent months, China has undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims in
the South China Sea.”
China’s goal is to show Washington that if it maintains alliances in Asia, it risks a fight with Beijing,
said Hugh White, a former senior Australian defense official who worked closely with Washington
and is now professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University.
“China is deliberately doing these things to demonstrate the unsustainability of the American
position of having a good relationship with China and maintaining its alliances in Asia, which
constitute the leadership of the United States in Asia,” Mr. White said.
China is betting that America, tired and looking inward, will back off, he said, eroding its traditional
place of influence in Asia and enhancing China’s power.
While much of the maritime and air disputes go back to ancient territorial claims,
the Obama administration may have fanned the tensions with its shift toward Asia,
some foreign policy experts said. Many Chinese believe that shift is intended to
check China’s rise.
“For that reason, you cannot expect China to welcome the alliance system because it
doesn’t serve China’s interest,” said Wu Xinbo, the director of the Center for
American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.
China’s president, Xi Jinping, gave a strong hint of his objectives in a speech in
Shanghai on May 19, when he outlined a new Asian security strategy that would
deliberately exclude the United States, analysts said.
“We need to innovate our security concepts, establish a new regional security
cooperation architecture and jointly build a shared win-win road for Asian
security,” Mr. Xi said at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia, a group that includes China, Russia and Asian countries but
not the United States, according to the state-run news agency Xinhua.
Islands
“By creating the appearance of an island, China may be seeking to strengthen the
merits of its claims,” said M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
China says it has the right to build in the Spratlys because they are Chinese
territory. “China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands,” a Foreign
Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said last month, using the Chinese name for
the Spratlys. Chinese officials also contend that Vietnam and the Philippines have
built more structures in the disputed region than China, so China is free to pursue
its projects.
But analysts note that other countries did not build islands, and that they generally
erected their structures before 2002, when China and nine Southeast Asian nations
signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. One clause
says the parties must “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities” that would
escalate tensions and must refrain from inhabiting any currently uninhabited land
features.
Although the agreement is nonbinding and does not explicitly ban building on the
islands or the creation of new ones, some analysts say those activities are covered.
“It’s changing the status quo,” said Carlyle A. Thayer, an emeritus professor of
politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “It can only raise
tensions.”
Since January, China has been building three or four islands, projected to be 20 to
40 acres each, one Western official said. He added that there appeared to be at least
one installation intended for military use, and that the new islands could be used for
resupplying ships, including Chinese maritime patrol vessels.
Le Hai Binh, a spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, said in an email
statement that Vietnam had sovereignty over the entire Spratly archipelago and
that “China has been illegally implementing activities of expansion and
construction” around Johnson Reef and other sites claimed by Vietnam.
He said Vietnam demanded that China “immediately stop illegal activities of
expansion and construction” on the reef and “withdraw its vessels and facilities
from the area.”
The Spratlys comprise hundreds of reefs, rocks, sandbars and tiny atolls spread
over 160,000 square miles. Six governments have overlapping claims in the area.
China and Vietnam also have competing claims for the Paracel Islands, in the area
where the Chinese oil rig still sits. Both areas have abundant fish and some oil and
gas reserves.
China
Philippines
Vietnam
Malaysia
Taiwan
Mr. Yang, China’s most senior diplomat and a former foreign minister, met in
Hanoi with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Pham Binh Minh, and then with Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and the general secretary of the Communist Party,
Nguyen Phu Trong.
China Plans to Send Second Oil Rig to Waters Near Vietnam
By JANE PERLEZJUNE 19, 2014
HANOI, Vietnam — The day after tough talks between Vietnam and China that made no progress over a
Chinese oil rig in the South China Sea, Beijing said Thursday it was sending a second rig to waters close to
Vietnam.
The move, announced on China’s Maritime Safety Administration website, appeared to be an unabashed
signal that China will press ahead to secure what it sees as its rights in the commercially and strategically
vital waterway despite rising anxiety in the region.
NYT Editorial
The Spratly Islands are uninhabited and of no economic value in themselves. But
the archipelago covers rich fishing grounds and is believed to harbor large oil and
gas reserves, and China could claim an exclusive economic zone within 200 nautical
miles of each of the three or four islands it is creating. The new islands, projected to
reach 20 to 40 acres in area, would also serve the projection of Chinese military
power by providing bases for surveillance and resupply.
China insists that the Spratlys, Paracels and other islands have always belonged to
China. But Vietnam also claims sovereignty, and parts of them are claimed by the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In 2002, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, agreeing to resolve territorial disputes “without resorting to the threat
or use of force.” That declaration is not legally binding, and China has argued that
Vietnam and the Philippines have already developed some facilities in the islands,
though without adding acreage.
The real problem, in any case, is not the muddled question of sovereignty, but the
way China appears to believe that its expanding military and economic power
entitle it to a maximalist stance in territorial disputes. Certainly the smaller nations
abutting the South China Sea are no match for China in a fight, but the fear and
anger that China’s aggressive actions have generated among its maritime neighbors,
and the tensions they have raised with Washington, hardly seem to be in Beijing’s
interest, or in keeping with the image China’s president, Xi Jinping, tried to project
when he said in Paris in March that “the lion that is China has awoken, but it is a
peaceful, amiable and civilized lion.”
Asia Pacific
Kerry Urges China to Reduce Tensions in Nearby Seas
By JANE PERLEZJULY 9, 2014
Photo
Secretary of State John Kerry spoke with Yang Jiechi, a state councilor who deals
with foreign policy, on Wednesday in Beijing. Credit Pool photo by Jim Bourg
BEIJING — In a closed-door session at a high-level gathering of Chinese and
American officials here on Wednesday, Secretary of State John Kerry urged China
to follow maritime law in nearby seas to reduce regional tensions, a senior American
official said.
Mr. Kerry called on China to support the creation of a legally binding code of
conduct that other Asian nations are considering to enforce rules of navigation and
inhibit unilateral actions in the South China and East China Seas, said the official,
who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity under standard protocol.
The secretary met with Yang Jiechi, a state councilor who deals with foreign policy,
on the first day of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, an annual gathering of
senior officials from both countries where differences on issues including national
security, the economy, climate change and human rights are aired.
NYT
Chinese Oil Rig Near Vietnam to Be Moved
By JANE PERLEZJULY 15, 2014
Photo
Chinese ships guard the HD 981 in the South China Sea on Tuesday. Credit Martin
Petty/Reuters
BEIJING — A Chinese energy company announced Wednesday that a giant oil rig that was deployed in
disputed waters off the coast of Vietnam two months ago had completed its exploration work and would be
moved.
The China National Petroleum Corporation, a state-owned company, said the billion-dollar rig, known as
HD 981, would be relocated to an area around the Qiongdongnan basin, closer to Hainan Island, a southern
province of China, and apparently in undisputed waters.
The Cow Tongue
Nine-Dashed Line
Resolving the Disputes
There are three ways that coastal countries might resolve their disputes in the South
China Sea:


First, they could continue to arm their marine patrol vessels and
intimidate or coerce each other into compliance. As noted above, this
increases the risk that a local confrontation might escalate into a
violent conflict;
Second, they could refer the territorial sovereignty dispute to an
international court or tribunal and ask them to decide which State has
the better claim to sovereignty. This was done by Malaysia and
Indonesia over a maritime border dispute in the Celebes Sea and by

Singapore and Malaysia over several small islands near the entrance to
the Singapore Strait. These cases where the states agreed to refer their
sovereignty disputes to the International Court of Justice are rare.
Current nationalist concerns over preserving national sovereignty
make it difficult to turn any territorial disputes over to international
courts; and,
Third, countries could agree to set aside their sovereignty disputes and
jointly manage resources in the disputed area. The most successful
example of this is the standardisation, automation and regulation of
shipping traffic and container movements in the world’s busiest ports
of Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Busan, Ningbo-Zhoushan,
GuangzhouHarbor, Qingdao, Tianjin, Kaohsiung, Taiwan and Port
Kelang. Clearly, co-operation pays, especially when it provides prompt
and tangible mutual benefits. This is also the case among former
adversaries, China and Vietnam, in their Tonkin Gulf Joint Resource
Management Zone. China and the Philippines could do something
similar in the Scarborough Shoal region [3].
NYT
Maps @ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/world/asia/malaysia-risks-enraging-china-by-inviting-us-spyflights.html?hpw&rref=world&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=HpHedThumbWell&module=wellregion&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bottom-well&_r=0
Asia Pacific
Malaysia Risks Enraging China by Inviting U.S. Spy Flights
By JANE PERLEZSEPT. 13, 2014
BEIJING — Malaysia’s reported invitation to the United States to fly spy planes out
of East Malaysia on the southern rim of the South China Sea seems likely to
intensify China’s anger at American surveillance of the strategic waterway and its
disputed islands, analysts say.
The United States’ chief of naval operations, Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert, told a
forum in Washington last week that the recent offer by Malaysia for P-8 Poseidon
aircraft to fly out of the country’s most eastern area would give the United States
greater proximity to the South China Sea.
Malaysia, which has had warm ties with China, has not confirmed whether it made
the offer. The United States has vowed to maintain its influence in the region in the
face of China’s rise, and this year won an agreement with the Philippines to give
American troops, warships and planes greater access to bases there.
The Malaysian offer to the United States came, in part, because “China has
surprised Malaysia by bringing military ships into its waters and tacitly threatening
offshore Malaysia oil and gas exploration,” said Ernie Bower, senior adviser for
Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington.
Malaysia has also felt pressure from China after a Malaysia Airlines jet disappeared
en route to Beijing with 153 Chinese passengers on board in March.
China would interpret an accord between the United States and Malaysia as a direct
challenge to Beijing’s insistence that the American spy flights were an infringement
of China’s sovereignty, said Wu Xinbo, the director of the Center for American
Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.
The United States says that foreign aircraft have the right to fly over waters beyond
a nation’s 12-mile territorial line. China asserts that foreign aircraft do not have the
right to fly within its 200-mile exclusive economic zone without permission.
Simulation of SCS Crisis
Why China's South China Sea Diplomacy Will Frustrate Claimants
International frustration over outcomes in the South China Sea is a fine outcome for China.
By Robert Farley
November 21, 2014
What assumptions did the Chinese team make? How realistic and accurate are
these assumptions? Especially important were the assumptions about the
leverage provided by power asymmetries favoring China.
Should China be satisfied with the outcome?
Could a stronger position by the US unite ASEAN in an anti-Chinese coalition?
The Diplomat
Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea
Prospects for regional security hinges heavily on how these actors relate to the South China Sea issue.
By Alexander L. Vuving
November 26, 2014
Use this article to describe the strategies pursued by Vietnam against China.
How do you evaluate these strategies?
1) At the hard extreme of the spectrum, Vietnam tries to strengthen its presence and
forces, both military and non-military, in the SCS. During the “scramble for the
Spratlys” in 1988, when Beijing and Hanoi competed for foothold on the Spratly
Islands, Vietnam set up permanent military garrisons on 11 land features in the
archipelago, increasing its possessions here from 10 to 21 land features. From 1989
to 1991, Vietnam went out to occupy six underwater shoals on its continental shelf
southwest of the Spratlys by putting up permanent high-pillar structures and
manning them with garrisons. Slowly but surely, Vietnam continues to consolidate
and increase its presence in these areas with more troops, facilities, equipment, and
civilians. Since 2007, Vietnam started to populate the largest of its possessions in the
Spratly Islands with permanent civilian habitants. Taking a leaf out of China’s
playbook, Vietnam decided in 2012 to create a fisheries surveillance force as a third
force, after the navy and the coast guard, to patrol its maritime waters, and in 2014,
after the oil rig crisis, to lightly arm these vessels. To build a minimum deterrent
force on the sea, Vietnam continued to modernize its navy and air force. A key
element in this deterrent force is a submarine fleet it is building with six Kilo-class
vessels.
2) get powerful third parties involved. Vietnam’s application of this strategy is,
however, limited to the oil and gas industry in the SCS only. But perhaps Hanoi has
no other option but to give concessions in the oil blocks that lie within China’s Ushaped line to large companies from major powers, something it has done so far to
ExxonMobil from the United States, ONGC from India, and Gazprom from Russia.
The extent to which Vietnam has limited its pursuit of this strategy is remarkable; it
has repeatedly pledged that it will not form an alliance with any other country
against a third party, a coded statement to reassure China of Vietnam’s non-aligned
posture. Instead of forming alliances with powerful partners, Vietnam places more
emphasis on internationalization of the issue to interlock and deter China. During
most of the 1990s and 2000s, Vietnam remained largely modest in its attempt to
internationalize the SCS issue. But responding to Chinese assertiveness in the region
since 2008, Vietnam has become increasingly proactive and determined to bring the
issue to the world’s attention and enlist the support of foreign partners.
3) Not only does Vietnam take advantage of all possible channels to talk with China,
it is also proud of being able to maintain those channels. Besides the government-togovernment channel, Vietnam also cultivates ties between the two Communist
Parties and the two militaries to keep special access to China. The uniqueness of the
party-to-party and the military-to-military relations between Vietnam and China
lies in the fact that both sides emphasize their ideological bonds and, particularly for
the militaries, their common interests in opposing the West. With regard to
negotiation to resolve the territorial disputes, Vietnam accepts a bilateral approach
to the Paracel Islands while insisting on a multilateral approach to the Spratly
Islands, arguing that the multilateral nature of the dispute over the latter requires
multilateral negotiation.
Chinese Weapons Spotted on Disputed Island, U.S. Says
By MATTHEW ROSENBERGMAY 29, 2015
SINGAPORE — The United States has spotted a pair of mobile artillery vehicles on an artificial island that
China is building in the South China Sea, a resource-rich stretch of ocean crossed by vital shipping lanes,
American officials said.
China’s construction program on previously uninhabited atolls and reefs in the Spratly Islands has already
raised alarm and drawn protests from other countries in the region, whose claims to parts of the South
China Sea overlap China’s.
Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter called this week for China to halt the construction, saying that
international law did not recognize Chinese claims of sovereignty over the new territories and that
American warships and military aircraft would continue to operate in the area.
The artillery was spotted by satellites and surveillance aircraft about a month ago, and the two vehicles
have since been either hidden or removed, according to an American official who spoke about intelligence
matters on the condition of anonymity. The official added that even if the weapons remain on the island,
they pose no threat to American naval forces or aircraft in the region, though the guns could reach some
nearby islands claimed by other countries.