Airpower Through the
Cold War
Part II
1
Overview
• Vietnam
• Rebuilding the Air and Space Force
2
Intro to Vietnam
3
General Causes of the War in Southeast Asia
•
•
•
•
Regional power vacuum
existed in Southeast Asia
after WW II
South Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia politically unstable
North Vietnam wanted to
reunite North and South
Vietnam under communist
rule
America wanted to prevent
the spread of communism, by
force if necessary
4
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: August 1964
• Passed by Congress 5 August 1964
• Radically altered War in Southeast
Asia
• Empowered President Johnson to…
• “take all necessary steps to repel armed
attack against US forces”
• “take all necessary steps, including
force, to assist S Vietnam and any
member of SEATO”
• Committed US to fight for S.
Lyndon B. Johnson firmly believed
Vietnam President
in the use of military force to help achieve the
country's foreign policy objectives and
escalated American involvement in the
Vietnam War.
5
Gulf of Tonkin to Vietnamization
6
US Build-Up: 1965 to 1968
• March 1965—US Marines and Army arrive
• Rolling Thunder bombing campaign began
• By 1969, US troop strength reached 543,000
(500,000 supported the war from other Asian
countries and Pacific bases)
• US became heavily involved in fighting a guerrilla
war for which we were not prepared
• 30 Jan 1968—North Vietnam launched
Tet Offensive
7
Horner 1
8
Events Surrounding the Paris Peace Talks
• Talks began in 1968; achieved nothing
– North Vietnam knew time was on its side
• US units continued to withdraw from Vietnam
– By 1972, 200,000 US troops had left
• March 1972—North Vietnam launched Easter
Offensive against South Vietnam
– Attack repelled by US airpower
(Linebacker I)
9
Events Surrounding the Paris Peace Talks (cont’d)
• Talks resumed following Easter Offensive;
again, little movement occurred
• Late 1972—Nixon ordered massive bombing
of North Vietnam (Linebacker II)
• Linebacker II forced the North to negotiate in
earnest
• 27 Jan 1973—Peace Accords signed
– Called for US to withdraw all units by Mar
1973
10
Linebacker II and Beyond
11
The Fall of South Vietnam
• Between 1973 and 1975, North Vietnam
continued to build strength in violation of
Peace Accords
• Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate
scandal
• US Congress tired of Vietnam and refused to
help
• Feb 1975—North Vietnam launched the Ho
Chi Minh campaign against South Vietnam
– South Vietnam was easily defeated without
US air support
– Laos and Cambodia fell quickly thereafter12
Uses of Airpower: Background
• Vietnam War was primarily a land war
– Most air power was used in conjunction with
ground ops
• North stayed above DMZ, so air superiority
over the South was never a concern
• In-country operations centered around
– Interdiction
– Search and Rescue (SAR)
– Close Air Support (CAS) – Air-to-Air Refueling
– Airlift
– Reconnaissance
– Command and Control
(C2)
13
In-Country Air Operations: 1964-73
• After Gulf of Tonkin, air units
built up rapidly
• USAF occupied 10 major air
bases
–
–
All built and defended by the Air
Force
Huge logistical effort
• USAF also flew from six bases in
Thailand
• Navy flew from carriers in
Gulf of Tonkin
• B-52s flew from Guam; at
times even from the United
States
14
Uses of Airpower during Vietnamization
• Train South Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF)
• Support South Vietnamese
Army
• Prevent enemy attacks
against withdrawing
American units
15
Uses of Airpower: Interdiction
• Major mission during SEA war
• Aircraft used: F-4
Phantom, F-100 Super
Sabre, F-105 Thunderchief
(Thud), AC-130 Gunships
• B-52—nuclear bomber modified
to carry conventional weapons—
was best known interdiction
aircraft
F-100 Supersabre
– Arc Light: Name for B-52
interdiction missions
16
Uses of Airpower: Close Air Support (CAS)
• Missions to support forces on
the ground
• Aircraft used
• A-4
Skyhawk
• F-4
• F-100
• A-37
Dragonfly
• A-1
Skyraider
• AC-47
Gunships
• Gunships—cargo aircraft
armed with rapid-fire
machine guns—were very
effective
• Forward Air Controllers
(FACs) were used to locate the
enemy and mark targets for
faster flying jets
A-4 Skyhawk
A-1 Skyraider
17
Uses of Airpower: Close Air Support (cont’d)
• B-52 Arc Light aircraft were occasionally used for close
air support
– Used extensively in close air support at Khe
Sanh
• Flew 2,548 sorties
• Dropped bombs within 300 yards of US Marine perimeter
– Credited with saving Khe Sanh and
repelling the Tet and Easter
Offensives
18
Uses of Airpower: Tactical Airlift
• Vital to successful US operations because of poor security
on roads
• Aircraft used—UH-1 Hueys, C-7 Caribous, C-123
Providers, and C-130 Hercules
• Missions often flown while under attack
• Supplies often air-dropped because of enemy fire and
poor landing facilities
• A major factor in keeping Khe Sanh alive
19
C-123 Provider
C-7 Caribou
Uses of Airpower: Reconnaissance
• Aircraft used—RF-4C, RB-57 Canberra, and RB66 Destroyers
• Aircraft were equipped with variety of cameras
and sensing devices
• Missions—Locating lucrative targets and assessing
battle damage
• Valuable player in repelling Tet and protecting Khe
Sanh
20
RB 57 Canberra
RB 66 Destroyer
Uses of Airpower: Search and Rescue (SAR)
• Extremely important part of air
support mission throughout Southeast
Asia
• Strengthened aircrew morale; fliers
knew every effort would be made to
save them if shot down
• Aircraft used—HH-3 Jolly Green
Giants and HH-53 Super Jolly
Greens
• By 1973, USAF had rescued 3,883
Americans
21
Uses of Airpower: Air-to-Air Refueling
• Indispensable! Extended range of combat aircraft and
enabled many to return safely
• C-130s refueled helicopters; KC-135s refueled fixedwing aircraft
• Strategic Air Command tankers flew 195,000 sorties,
unloaded 9 billion pounds of fuel, and took part in
814,000 individual refuelings
22
Major Campaigns: Rolling Thunder
• Officially began 2 March 1965
• Objectives
• Interdict flow of supplies from the North
• Force the North to stop supporting Vietcong and
quit the war
• Raise South Vietnamese morale
RF 4 Phantom
23
Rolling Thunder (cont’d)
• Strategic bombing and interdiction campaign
• Strategic because it was aimed at the North’s will to wage war
• Interdiction because the North had few large industries and got most
of their material from China and the Soviet Union
• Employed mostly tactical aircraft: F-105s, F-4s,
and F-111s. In 1966, B-52s were used in
southern part of North Vietnam
F-105
F-111
24
Rolling Thunder: Restrictions
• Johnson administration controlled campaign
tightly
• Targets declared off limits by civilians
included…
• Targets in Hanoi, Haiphong, China border area
• MiG bases and nonfiring SAM sites
• Dams, dikes, hydroelectric plants
• White House selected targets, weapons, and
flying routes with little military input
25
Rolling Thunder: Effect of Restrictions
• Graduated increases in bombing intensity
worked to advantage of N. Vietnamese
– Gave them time to recover from damage
– Enabled them to establish world’s most
intense antiaircraft defense system
– Provided them will to fight on and a sense
they could survive
• By 1965, it was clear that
Rolling Thunder did not
work!
26
Rolling Thunder: Conclusions
• Impacts
– South’s morale improved as the North
suffered under bombing
– North used frequent halts and restrictions to
repair damage and resupply forces in South
– Criticism grew at home and internationally
• Johnson ended Rolling Thunder prior to
1968 elections
• Rolling Thunder campaign, America’s
longest, was a failure
27
Major Campaigns: Linebacker I
• Easter Offensive (Mar 1972) made it apparent
the North was not willing to negotiate
• Objectives of Linebacker I
– Initially—Close air support effort to aid retreating
South Vietnamese forces
– Later—Changed to interdiction campaign against
North Vietnam
– Unlike Rolling Thunder, a systematic campaign with
little civilian control
B 52 Stratofortress
28
Linebacker I (cont’d)
• Civilian casualties a consideration, but not the
determiner of how missions were flown
• Haiphong harbor mined for first time to restrict
delivery of supplies to the North
• Strikes flown over Hanoi and Haiphong
• B-52 strikes on Haiphong began in April 1972
• “Smart bombs” used extensively
29
Linebacker I: Successes
• Linebacker I was the most successful US
bombing campaign of the war
– Had more impact on the North in 9 months than
Rolling Thunder did in 4 years
• Successful largely because Easter Offensive was
a conventional, mechanized attack
• Peace Talks resumed in July 1972
– Nixon restricted Linebacker I attacks to below the
20th parallel
30
Major Campaigns: Linebacker II
• Peace Talks stalled again in Dec 1972
• Nixon ordered Linebacker II to run concurrently
with Linebacker I
• Purpose of Linebacker II—Force the North
Vietnamese to negotiate and sign peace treaty
• Ran from 18 Dec to 30 Dec 1972; referred to as
“The Christmas Campaign”
31
Linebacker II (cont’d)
•
•
•
•
Very intense and logistically complex
Specific targets in Hanoi and Haiphong
B-52s used for first time over Hanoi
By end of Linebacker II, N. Vietnam was
defenseless
– 1,200 SAMs were fired
– 80% of the North’s electrical
systems and 25% of their
POL facilities were destroyed
32
Linebacker II: Results
• North Vietnam returned to the bargaining table
on 30 Dec 1972
• All bombing ceased on 15 Jan 1973
• Peace treaty was signed on 27 Jan 1973
(http://www.davka.org/what/theleft/peoplespeacetre
atyvietnam.html)
• Linebacker II was a success
• Some believe that if Rolling Thunder had been
conducted like Linebacker II, the war would
have ended in 1965—unlikely
33
Interim Summary
•
•
•
•
Uses of Airpower
Rolling Thunder
Linebacker I
Linebacker II
Vietnam Service Medal
34
Post
Vietnam
Vietnam War Results
• US reluctance to enter military conflicts that
don’t directly threaten national interests
• Congressional restriction on President’s ability
to commit US military forces
• Lowered public opinion of government and
military
• The all-volunteer military force
• Increased emphasis on military resources,
training, and weapons
36
Results for Southeast Asia
• North Vietnam and South Vietnam joined into
one country dominated by North Vietnamese
communists
• Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City
• Exodus of boat people, many to America
• Hundreds of thousands of US supporters sent
to "reeducation" camps
• Over 6.5 million displaced Vietnamese war
refugees
• Expected postwar blood bath never
materialized
37
The Vietnam War: Lessons Learned
• US can’t win a counterinsurgency war in
another country; only people of that
country can
• Force and technology of limited value in a
“people’s war”
• Realistic assessments by national leaders
required before forces are committed
• “Know your enemy and know yourself”
• “Graduated Response” is an ineffective
way to employ airpower
38
Lessons Learned (cont’d)
• In a democracy, congressional and public
support are critical and difficult to get
• Modern war is open to public scrutiny
• Let those who understand war conduct it
• Need for revolutionary not evolutionary
technology
• Need for precision munitions
39
Review of CFD Model
• Distinctive Capabilities: Air and space
expertise, capabilities, and technological
know-how that produces superior military
capabilities
• Functions: Broad, fundamental, and
continuing activities of air and space
power
• Doctrine: Fundamental principles that
military forces use to guide their actions in
support of national objectives
40
Review of Distinctive Capabilities
• Air and Space Superiority—With it, joint forces can dominate
enemy operations in all dimensions of land, sea, air, and space.
• Global Attack—Because of technological advances, the USAF can
attack anywhere, anytime and do so quickly and with greater
precision than ever before.
• Rapid Global Mobility—Being able to respond quickly and
decisively anywhere we're needed is key to maintaining rapid global
mobility.
• Precision Engagement—The ability to apply selective force against
specific targets because the nature and variety of future
contingencies demand both precise and reliable use of military
power with minimal risk and collateral damage.
• Information Superiority—The ability of joint force commanders to
keep pace with information and incorporate it into a campaign plan
is crucial.
• Agile Combat Support—Deployment and sustainment are keys to
successful operations and cannot be separated; agile combat support
applies to all forces, from those permanently based to contingency
41
buildups to expeditionary forces.
Review of Air and Space Functions
•
•
•
•
•
•
Strategic Attack
Counterair
Counterspace
Counterland
Countersea
Information Operations
(IO)
• Combat Support
• Command & Control
• Airlift
•
•
•
•
•
Air-to-Air Refueling
Spacelift
Special Ops
Intelligence
Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
• Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR)
• Navigation and Positioning
• Weather Services
42
CFD Model
Distinctive
Capabilities
Time Period
Berlin Airlift
Korean Conflict
Vietnam
Functions
(missions)
Doctrinal Emphasis
• Rapid Global Mobility
• Airlift
• Strategic Airlift
• Theater Airlift
• Air and Space Superiority
• Precision Engagement
• Agile Combat Support
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Counterland
Close Air Support
Interdiction
Airlift
Reconnaissance
Search and Rescue
Air-to-Air Refueling
Strategic Attack
• Theater attack of
military targets
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Counterland
Close Air Support
Interdiction
Airlift
Reconnaissance
Search and Rescue
Air-to-Air Refueling
Strategic Attack
• Strategic attack and
nuclear deterrence prior
to Vietnam
• Shift towards deterrence
through strength and
global attack
Air Superiority
Precision Engagement
Global Attack
Rapid Global Mobility
Agile Combat Support
43
Rebuilding the Air and Space Force
44
Rebuilding for Air and Space Video
45
Weapon Systems
• Two key fighters
developed
– McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
– General Dynamics F-16
Fighting Falcon
• Close Air Support led to
A-10 Thunderbolt
• Rockwell B-1B Lancer
• Boeing E-3 Sentry
(AWACS)
• Peacekeeper Missile
46
Second Generation Weapons
• Stealth aircraft
– Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk
– Northrop B-2 Spirit
• New airlifter
– McDonnell Douglas C-17
Globemaster
• Boeing/Grumman E-8
Joint STARS
• New advanced fighter
– Lockheed Martin F-22
47
Boyd 1
48
Military Operations in the 1980s
49
Grenada
• Prime Minister killed in coup in 1983; increased
Russian/Cuban influence
• US Objectives
– Protect US citizens—1000 medical students
– Neutralize hostile Grenadian/Cuban elements
– Restore legitimate government
• Operation URGENT FURY
– Army Rangers and 82d Airborne Division
– Supported by USAF resources
50
Grenada (cont’d)
• Lessons Learned
– All services must plan and coordinate jointly
before operation occurs
– Applying overwhelming force quickly is key to
victory
51
James Video
52
Libya
• Muammar Qaddafi linked to terrorism;
specifically, bombing of disco in Berlin
• Libyan targets struck in April 1986
• Operation EL DORADO CANYON
– Air Force F-111s
– Navy and Marine aircraft
– Four of five main targets severely damaged
53
Libya (cont’d)
• Lessons Learned
– Superb joint coordination
– United States able to
strike terrorists when
targets identified
– United States willing to
strike terrorist targets
54
Panama
• General Noriega
– Indicted on drug trafficking charges
– US forces harassed in the Canal Zone
– Implied threats to security of the
Canal
– Marine Lieutenant killed in an
incident
• President George H.W.
Bush ordered
Operation JUST CAUSE
55
Panama (cont’d)
• Objectives of Operation JUST CAUSE
• Remove Noriega from power
• Safeguard Panama Canal
• Restore democratic government in Panama
• JUST CAUSE began 20 December 1989
• AC-130 Spectre gunships used
• First use of F-117
• Noriega surrenders after seeking refuge in Vatican
embassy
56
Panama (cont’d)
• Lessons Learned
• Strike quickly with overwhelming force
using mobility, surprise, and precision
• Army and Marines recognized need for light
deployable forces
• Joint coordination had vastly improved since
Grenada
57
Summary
• Vietnam
• Rebuilding the Air and Space Force
58