About MSDI & Missouri State U..
For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent educational experience in
the middle of the high school topic. MSDI is distinct from other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus
assures that a typical 2-week debater gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we
emphasize the largest cases on topic, with students getting both aff and neg rounds on each. Third, our
senior faculty are comparable with top lab leaders in any camp. Fourth, MSDI students can earn highly
transferable college credit in public speaking for a minimal cost. Fifth, we respect variance in home
debate circuits – our goal is to improve line by line debating in ways that will help students no matter
who judges in their home circuit. Finally, our price is below any comparable camp and far below most
camps. Our 2016 information will be available shortly at: http://debate.missouristate.edu/camp.htm.
Missouri State University is a large comprehensive university (enrollment over 24k), with nearly any
major you might want. The university has excellent academic scholarship support – most debaters
combine academic “entitlement” scholarships (guaranteed based on GPA/test scores) with debate
scholarships. The Spicer Debate Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: NDT and NFALD. We’ve national semis or finals in both in the last decade. Our debaters have an average GPA over
3.5, a 97% graduation rate, and 70% complete law/grad school afterward. Our program is a high-impact
academic experience with an exceptional alumni network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more
information (EricMorris@MissouriState.edu).
http://debate.missouristate.edu/
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Negative
Alt Causes
Other Muslim Surveillance
Tons of alt causes that cause the same impact
ACLU, 2013
American Civil Liberties Union, 6-17-2013, Factsheet: The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program,"
https://www.aclu.org/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program, Accessed: 7-1-2015, /Bingham-MB
HOW is the NYPD spying on Muslim communities? The NYPD ’s Intelligence Division uses a variety of
methods to spy on and monitor Muslim communities without any suspicion of wrongdoing. They
include: Mapping of Muslim Communitie s: The NYPD’s Demographics Unit (now the Zone Assessment
Unit) has mapped neighborhoods predominantly occupied by 28 so-called “ancestries of interest”—i.e.,
national origin associated with Muslim populations—as well as “American Black Muslims.” The NYPD
expressly excluded from its surveillance and mapping activities non-Muslims such as Coptic Christian
Egyptians or Iranian Jews. Photo and Video Surveillance : NYPD officers, stationed in cars outside of
mosques, have taken pictures and video of those leaving and entering places of worship, and recorded
the license plate numbers of worshippers attending services. Remotely controlled NYPD cameras have
also been placed on light poles, aimed at mosques. Police Informants : The NYPD has recruited socalled “mosque crawlers,” to act as inside observers in mosques. They report on sermons, provide
names of attendees, and take pictures inside of the mosques. Employing a method called “create and
capture,” the NYPD has instructed informants to “create” conversations about jihad or terrorism and
“capture” and report the responses to the police. Informants are often selected from a pool of
arrestees, prisoners, or suspects who are pressured into becoming informants. Police “Rakers ”: Teams
of NYPD plainclothes officers—called “rakers”—have been deployed to Muslim communities where they
can blend in “consistent with their ethnicity and or language.” They aim to compile information on the
community, listen in on conversations at Muslim restaurants and businesses, and identify Muslim
“hotspots.” Tracking Individuals : The NYPD tracks people who changed their names, investigating
those who could be Muslim converts or who were “Americanizing” their names. Intelligence
Databases : The Intelligence Division has generated daily reports on innocent Muslims’ lives. The names
of thousands of innocent New Yorkers have been placed in secret police files. Information is kept both in
an intelligence database and on a standalone computer used to generate intelligence reports.
Prison Conditions
Prisoners are held in various inhumane conditions
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
US prisons
held 475 people indicted on or convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses as of October 2013,
are held in prisons under harsh conditions that
include prolonged solitary confinement and severe restrictions on their communication with family and
others. Some restrictions are imposed pursuant to Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), which apply to certain prisoners—
not only terrorism detainees—on the grounds that they are necessary to protect national security or prevent
disclosure of classified material (as previously noted, these conditions may also be imposed pretrial, raising concerns over fair trial
rights). Other prisoners were placed in Communication Management Units (CMUs), which monitor
prisoners 24 hours a day. We reviewed the treatment and conditions of 35 defendants and prisoners in terrorism cases, 9 of whom
were not involved in the main cases we focused on for this report (for a list, see Appendix - B). While the Bureau of Prisons denied
16 out of 20 requests we made to meet with prisoners, we were able to communicate with 12 incarcerated men by phone,
letters, or email. In several of these cases, the Bureau of Prisons did not inform the detainee of the basis for
imposing the restrictions—whether it was based on an assessment of the severity of the crime, the
security of the facility or of the detainee, or for other reasons. Accordingly, it was impossible to independently assess
according to the government response to our FOIA request.584 Some
whether the restrictions were disproportionate to the government’s objective. In many cases, this secrecy also stymied prisoners’ ability to
learn about the basis for their treatment, or what steps they could take to end their solitary confinement or restrictions on their
communications with family.
Solitary confinement is imhumane
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
As Human
Rights Watch has previously documented,592 jails and prisons across the United States often
respond to prison or inmate management challenges by segregating individuals from the general
population, often through prolonged physical and social isolation, for hours, days, weeks, or even years.
Isolation for 22 hours per day or more, and for one or more days, fits the generally accepted definition of solitary confinement.593 When it is prolonged,
solitary confinement can constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment prohibited by human rights
treaties to which the US is party.594 For 23 men whose experiences we documented, the length of pretrial or post-conviction solitary confinement
was measured in months or years, not weeks.595 The mental pain and suffering caused by isolation was
sometimes exacerbated by uncertainty about how long solitary would last.596 Prisoners with whom we
spoke or corresponded described their solitary confinement as resulting from decisions to put them in administrative segregation based on their
security classification. Prisoners in medium-security and low-security prisons experienced solitary as punishment (often called disciplinary segregation).597
Prisons are dehumanizing
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
The Bureau of Prisons held 41 prisoners it designated as “terrorists” at ADX Florence, the federal supermax
where nearly all prisoners are held in at least 23- hour solitary confinement, as of October 2013.600 One of the
prison’s former wardens has described ADX as a “clean version of hell.”601 For two days a week, a typical ADX
prisoner spends the entire day secluded to his single cell, which measures between 75 and 87 square feet, depending on the unit.602 He is
deprived of almost all human contact during these periods, except for perfunctory, impersonal exchange
with correctional staff.603 On the other days, the prisoner remains confined this way for 22 or 23 hours a day, but is given an hour of
indoor recreation, alone in a room completely bare but for a pull-up bar; or an hour of outdoor recreation, in a cement enclosure so small that
he is only able to take a few steps in each direction.604 Every
time he leaves his cell for recreation, he is stripsearched.605 For most prisoners at ADX Florence, communication with other inmates is never directly face-to-face
and is always mediated by bars or concrete walls—or involves shouting through toilets and vents.606 Dritan Duka, who is held in solitary
confinement at ADX Florence,607 described even recreation time as dehumanizing: You can only see the sky. It’s all steel. You feel
like an animal in a cage. When it’s time to eat, they feed you... Actually [dogs] have more freedom than we do. ... We’re in a cage all day, they
shove foods in the cell. Then we got a little walk. Then they put us in another cell. I'd rather be in a zoo than over here. People walking by,
looking at you like an animal in a caged exhibition. 608 Dritan said he is able to communicate with other prisoners on his “range” (prison floor
and section) by screaming through doors and, during outdoor recreation, talking to prisoners who are in separate cages.609 These brief
periods of communication were insignificant compared to his overall experience of isolation: “There’s a lot of
times the walls are caving in. It’s—you can't talk to nobody… It's like staying alone in a bathroom for three days.”610 Human Rights Watch has
previously reported on conditions at ADX Florence, which houses not only terrorism detainees but also leaders of violent gangs and prisoners
with a history of committing violent offenses against other prisoners or corrections officers. We noted in 2001 that inmates there could
be subjected to “years of confinement in conditions of extreme social isolation, reduced sensory
stimulation, and rigorous security control.”611 After a 2007 visit to ADX Florence, Human Rights Watch wrote to the Bureau of
Prisons to express concern about serious problems, including the mental health impact of long-term isolation and highly limited exercise there,
and reports of force feeding inmates on hunger strikes.612 While we have not, for this report, conducted a thorough examination of conditions
at ADX Florence, the cases we examined continue to raise human rights concerns because of the degree of isolation for prisoners and the
inadequate process for securing transfer out of the prison into a less restrictive facility.
SAMS
Special Administrative Measures (SAMS) often qualify as cruel punishment but are
used on prisoners without reason
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 144-145)
SAMs often require the imposition of extreme physical and social isolation. In the orders we obtained
through a FOIA regarding 20 to 22 prisoners, SAMs banned at least 20 prisoners from “making
statements audible to other prisoners or sending notes” and required them to be housed in single cells
“separated as much as possible in cellblock area from other inmates.”642 As we described, Oussama
Kassir spent one and a half years in pretrial isolation because under SAMs he was barred from talking
with other inmates or correctional staff.643 He was permitted “virtually no recreation or exercise, and
[was] never allowed to be outside or enjoy natural light or air.”644 He was also barred from purchasing
food at the prison commissary to supplement his limited meals, a restriction with little evident
connection to national security.645 (SAMs orders we reviewed typically barred prisoners from access to
“any material/objects that could be converted to dangerous objects”). SAMs can also heighten social
isolation by blocking prisoners from receiving information about the outside world, including through
widely available books. 646 Prison officials initially denied Ahmed Omar Abu Ali access to President
Obama’s two memoirs, Dreams from My Father and the The Audacity of Hope.647 SAMs prisoners can
communicate with their immediate family members, but subject to restrictions that have no evident and
direct connection to the security risk they pose: letters are limited to “3 pieces of paper, double-sided,
once per week, single recipient”; family visits require 14 days’ notice and can include only one adult at a
time.648
Racism Alt Causes
Classified evidence is hidden from defense and delays trials, sometimes for years
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 107-109)
Another challenge for the defense in terrorism cases involves the frequent introduction of classified
evidence, which often causes delays and obstacles to discovery that may affect the fairness of the trial.
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), enacted in 1980, provides procedures for prosecuting
federal criminal cases involving classified information, including at both the discovery and trial
stages.473 CIPA was originally passed in 1980 to address cases of “graymail,” or “the tactic of a
defendant who threatens to disclose classified information in the course of a prosecution,” particularly
in cases of espionage.474 Today, CIPA and CIPA-inspired procedures (in civil cases) are frequently used
in terrorism cases where classified information is in play, usually in the form of classified evidence
provided by the government against the defendant.475 CIPA requires both parties to provide notice
when classified information is at issue, initially at a pretrial conference.476 Courts applying CIPA
procedures are called on to determine whether discoverable classified information can be “(1) omitted,
(2) summarized, or (3) substituted with an admission.”477 While this usually occurs ex parte, the record
is preserved for appeal.478 Upon the government’s request, the court can issue a protective order
preventing defense from disclosing classified information to a defendant.479 Where a court authorizes
disclosure of specific classified information, the government may request that in lieu of disclosure the
information be substituted with a summary or an admission.480 Finally, where fair trial necessitates the
disclosure of classified information that the government is unwilling to disclose, remedies include
dismissal of the indictment or of certain counts.481 Throughout this process, the defendant must retain
“substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information.”482 CIPA causes significant delays, both because counsel must obtain security clearances,
and because the process of substitutions and summaries can add months or even years to discovery and
pretrial proceedings. Several lawyers involved in the Barry Bujol case (see section II) said that key
evidence against Bujol was classified, and they faced delays in getting access to that evidence while
waiting for clearance. CIPA presents particular challenges when it comes to discovery. Defense counsel
may have trouble identifying what information they believe the prosecution has that would be helpful to
the defense. Defense counsel must do so without consulting their client, affecting the client’s ability to
have effective assistance of counsel. And even if defense attorneys do identify relevant material, CIPA
permits the court to provide summaries or make substitutions, meaning the defense will never have
access to the original evidence.483 Evidence obtained by foreign governments is frequently classified. In
the earlier post-September 11 cases, this tended to involve evidence obtained when Americans were
picked up in foreign countries and interrogated by foreign agents, often at the behest of the United
States. The following cases illustrate how the introduction of classified evidence can create serious
difficulties for the defense and undermine the fairness of the trial: • Case of Mohamed Warsame:
Warsame was held in solitary confinement while awaiting trial for five-and-a-half years, the longest
recorded period of time for any pretrial detainee in the federal system (see below). In an interview,
District Judge John Tunheim attributed part of that delay to the length of time involved in processing
classified material under CIPA.484 The district judge had personally compared all of the unclassified
substitutions proposed by the government with the classified source material.485 The slow process
contributed to Warsame’s lengthy pretrial detention under abusive conditions.
Anonymous juries in terror cases can’t be examined for bias
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pg 112)
Anonymous juries—that is, juries whose names and identities are shielded from the public, and
sometimes even from the parties and judge, in order to protect their safety—were used in several of the
cases we examined, including the cases of F66rt Dix Five, Abdelhaleem Ashqar and Mohammed Salah. If
a judge declares the jury “anonymous,” usually for security reasons, defense lawyers may be hampered
from examining prospective jurors for bias. Moreover, identifying unbiased jurors, whether anonymous
or not, is particularly challenging in terrorism cases, especially those involving Muslims. In federal
terrorism prosecutions, some judges have elected to use written jury questionnaires, which allow them
ask a broad range of questions that may root out more prospective jurors who may have bias towards
the defendant. In the case of Hossam Smadi (who pleaded guilty shortly before he was scheduled to go
to trial) the judge provided a questionnaire to the approximately 175 members of the jury pool. One of
Smadi’s defense attorneys, Richard Anderson, described the judge as “outstanding” and felt that the
questionnaire was appropriately crafted to identify bias.494 But many judges do not use questionnaires,
which can make it harder to identify biases.
Solitary confinement is cruel and violates human rights
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 112-114)
The US government frequently imposes solitary confinement on suspects in terrorism cases prior to
trial.495 Prolonged pretrial solitary confinement not only raises concerns of cruel and inhumane
treatment or punishment, but it also has an impact on defendants’ ability to assist in their own defense,
and may compel them to waive their trial rights and accept plea deals.496 We documented the
experiences of 24 men who were held in solitary confinement on terrorism charges prior to conviction,
often for months or years on end.497 In some of these cases, solitary confinement was imposed as
“administrative segregation,” that is, not for a disciplinary infraction but purportedly for the security of
the prison or the personal security of the detainee.498 For example, Syed Hashmi was held in solitary
confinement for about three years, imposed as administrative segregation and pursuant to Special
Administrative Measures (SAMs)—special restrictions imposed to protect national security or prevent
disclosure of classified material (SAMs are discussed in detail in section VI)—for much of that time.499
The UN special rapporteur on torture, Juan Mendez, who sought information from the US government
about Hashmi, said its explanation of the case “made no mention of Mr. Hashmi’s behavior in custody as
a reason for any disciplinary sanction” but appeared based on “the seriousness of the charges he
faced.”500 He concluded that Hashmi’s prolonged pretrial solitary confinement constituted a violation
of his rights under the Convention against Torture “absent contrary evidence.”501 Barry Bujol was kept
in isolation in his cell for 19 months prior to his sentencing, in the special housing unit of the federal
detention center in downtown Houston.502 Bujol had only one hour of recreation out of his cell each
day, during which he “occasionally, but rarely” had someone else in the recreation room with him.5
Bujol expressed his suffering in a story he drafted prior to his sentencing, titled Dungeon in the Sky. He
begins the piece: Solitude can be many things. It can be a time for reflection, a healthy and therapeutic
exercise that inspires creativity. It can be a sanctuary for spiritual growth and self-discovery…. Unless of
course solitude is how you live daily—and you’re forced to. Then it becomes much more than that. Then
it becomes what people in here call it—a hole. A hole that swallows the spirit like a black hole in space
swallows all light and matter. Then it strips the hours of their significance and the days of their
meaning[,] turning them instead into a perpetual void of timelessness. It becomes a living tomb
constricting movements, thoughts, and every thing else that makes us human[,] the way a boa constricts
its prey. At least for the prey death is imminent.504 In at least some cases we reviewed, the
government’s restrictions appear to have far exceeded what was necessary to address the stated
security concerns. For example, in the cases of Adnan Mirza and Tarek Mehanna, who were ultimately
convicted of non-violent crimes, each was held in pretrial solitary confinement for more than two years.
They then were told they were being held in solitary for their own security. Yet it is hard to justify the
severe restrictions on their human contact on those grounds: it took three weeks for Mirza to receive
mail from his family, even from those who lived in Texas, and he was allowed only a single 15-minute
phone call to his family a month.505 Jay Carney, Mehanna’s attorney, noted that, “You can protect an
inmate and still allow him to have contact with other people on a regular basis, and not be put in that
cell sometimes 24 hours a day.”506
Plan does nothing to end the racism propagated by prison guards- no spillover (?)
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 117-118)
Uzair Paracha was held in pretrial solitary confinement at 10-South for 23 months. “Some officers…came
to the door and looked straight at me through the windows while I was sitting on the toilet,” he wrote.
“Other times I overheard them talking to me or about me while I was on the toilet, talking about how
we would clean ourselves afterwards.… I felt too embarrassed and humiliated to discuss or complain
about it.”517 Paracha also described guards taking his blankets and clothes in wintertime, and blasting
the radio while he and other Muslims prisoners were praying, turning it down when they finished. “They
knew we couldn’t talk or do other things during our prayer,” Paracha wrote, and would purposefully
deliver food or ask for food trays back while Paracha was praying.518 Some defendants or their families
also reported harassment by particular correctional officers at pretrial facilities. For example, all of the
Duka brothers described prison officials at Philadelphia FDC ransacking their cells and throwing religious
materials, including the Quran, on the floor while leaving non-religious materials untouched.519 Ahmed
Bilal, one of the “Portland Seven” (see section II), said that harassment by guards in one facility was so
severe that members of the white supremacist gang European Kindred, who were housed with him,
began standing up for him against the guards.520 Bilal said that attorney visits that took place through a
glass wall did not require strip-searching so he would request that type of visit, but the guards would
strip-search him anyway.521
Trials
Suspected terrorists are often denied their 6th amendment rights in trial
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 117-118)
Terrorism suspects, like all criminal defendants, have the right to a fair trial, guaranteed
under both the US Constitution and international human rights law. A fair trial requires
that defendants have access to competent counsel and adequate time and resources to
prepare their defense. In a fair trial, if prosecutors seek to introduce evidence that would
unfairly prejudice the jury, the judge will exclude the evidence. Defendants also have the
right to challenge the basis for any warrant and to test whether law enforcement complied
with the law during the investigation. Terrorism cases in the US since September 11, 2001
have raised serious fair trial concerns. This is largely due to investigative and detention
tactics that occur prior to trial including prolonged solitary confinement during pretrial
detention, as well as procedural impediments imposed by the US Congress or courts; use of
prejudicial evidence such as evidence obtained through coercion; classified evidence
obtained by warrantless wiretaps that cannot be fairly contested; and inflammatory
evidence, including evidence about terrorism in non-terrorism cases that unfairly plays on
jurors’ fears.
Suspected US citizens lose their Miranda Rights when interrogated by foreign agentseven when the trial is preformed in the US
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 117-118)
Under international law, evidence obtained from defendants by coercion cannot be
admitted against them. Similarly, US law, following the 1966 Supreme Court ruling in
Miranda v. Arizona, requires law enforcement to give the defendant a series of advisories
about his rights before the defendant’s confession can be admitted as evidence against him.
The Miranda requirements do not apply to evidence taken by foreign agents. Accordingly,
US courts have adopted a separate “voluntariness” standard, which provides that for a
confession obtained by foreign agents to be admitted in a US court, it must be the product
of the defendant’s “essentially free and unconstrained choice.” If the defendant’s “will has
been overborne and his capacity for self- determination critically impaired, the use of his
confession offends due process.” However, in terrorism cases in the US, prosecutors have
repeatedly introduced evidence that appears to have been the product of coercion, and
courts have accepted it.
Language barriers are often exploited in trial
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 117-118)
In many terrorism cases we reviewed, the prosecution’s experts asserted a singular,
extreme and contested meaning of an Arabic word, which failed to accurately represent the
subtleties of language. These translations often resulted in highly inflammatory—and
inaccurate—evidence being presented against the defendant. In some cases, mistranslation
of recorded conversations between the defendants and the informants, or misidentification
by the government of the speaker, may have distorted their meaning in ways that had a
negative impact on the defense.
Trials are racist
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014 (pgs 117-118)
Some of the most troubling evidence we examined was adduced in non-terrorism cases,
where the government nevertheless sought to draw connections between the defendant
and known terrorists or terrorist activities. The issue is closely tied to the government’s
use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) For example: In February 2005 the
government charged Pete Seda (born Pirouz Sedaghaty) with conspiracy to defraud the US
government and filing a false tax return, in connection with an investigation into AlHaramain Islamic Foundation, a charity based in Saudi Arabia; in 2000, Seda had founded
the Ashland, Oregon branch of Al-Haramain. Seda was living overseas at the time he was
indicted 2005; he voluntarily returned to the US to face charges in August 2005. At the
outset of the trial, the federal prosecutor stressed that the government was not seeking to
hold Seda to account for any terrorism offenses. However the Department of Justice touted
Seda’s conviction as a success in the fight against terrorism. In contrast, prominent local
attorney and Muslim convert Tom Nelson described Seda’s trial as “Islamophobia on
parade.”The appeal illustrates the fine line between the government’s use of relevant
evidence to document motive for a cover up and its use of inflammatory, unrelated
evidence about Osama Bin-Laden and terrorist activity that prejudices the jury.”
Unfair Punishments
Defendants of terrorism cases receive grossly disproportionate sentences – goes
against international human rights laws
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
Sentences in terrorism and terrorism-related cases vary considerably. In the 494 terrorism and
terrorism-related prosecutions we reviewed based on Department of Justice data, defendants who went
to trial received a median sentence of 11.3 years, while those who took plea agreements received a
median sentence of 3.2 years. More than one-third of those who took a plea deal received either no
prison sentence or a sentence of time served.[546] However, 91 defendants received sentences of 15
years or more, including 19 life sentences (which, in the federal system, means life without the
possibility of parole).[547] Over one in ten of defendants who were convicted by trial received a life
sentence.[548] In many of the cases we documented, these lengthy sentences appeared
disproportionate to the underlying offense. Lengthy sentences violate international human rights law
and US constitutional law when they are grossly disproportionate to the offense committed and the
individual’s culpability.[549] Both US and international human rights jurisprudence on sentencing
emphasize the importance of a judicial determination based upon individualized consideration of the
defendant.[550]Disproportionate sentences are a pervasive problem in the US criminal justice system,
as Human Rights Watch has documented in various contexts.[551] Under federal law, sentences should
be no longer than necessary to further the purposes of punishment.[552] In the terrorism context,
disproportionate sentences can occur due to the use of “terrorism adjustments” which may be based on
allegations of terrorist involvement that are not proven in a criminal trial.
Terrorism adjustment lengthens sentences regardless of whether the crime is violent or nonviolent
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
When the terrorism adjustment was first introduced in 1994, it applied to a relatively small category of offenses:
any felony that “involves or is intended to promote international terrorism” if the felony did not already involve
terrorism as an element of the crime.[571]However, in April 1996—in a law passed in response to the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing—Congress directed the US Sentencing Commission to expand the terrorism adjustment to
apply domestically, without requiring an international nexus.[572]Today, the terrorism adjustment applies to any
“federal crime of terrorism”—a category that is defined expansively by statute. Accordingly, the terrorism
adjustment may apply as much to violent offenses—such as using weapons of mass destruction and missile
systems designed to destroy aircraft—as it does to non-violent offenses such as engaging in financial transactions
with a country supporting international terrorism. Indeed, between 2006 and 2011, 46 of the terrorism
adjustments applied were for material support to a foreign terrorist organization, according to information publicly
available on the US Sentencing Commission website.In the Holy Land Foundation case, Shukri Abu Baker was
convicted of conspiracy to provide material support and providing material support (see sections III and V)—
charges that each carry a statutory maximum of 15 years. Yet Baker was sentenced to 65 years in prison based on
a terrorism adjustment.[573] The government did not allege that the Holy Land Foundation or Baker was involved
in violent activity of any kind, or that Baker or the organization ever provided money directly to a terrorist
organization. Instead, the allegations were that by contributing to charitable work in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, the Holy Land Foundation helped Hamas gain supporters among the civilian population. Though Baker
had no criminal history whatsoever, his sentence was based on a criminal history level equal to that of someone
who had been convicted of second-degree murder.[574]After Sabri Benkahla was acquitted of charges that he had
attended a terrorist training camp and fired weapons there, he was questioned by the FBI and subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury on the same matter. The government then launched a second prosecution, charging
that Benkahla had lied to the FBI and a grand jury by denying his personal involvement and knowledge of
acquaintances’ involvement in training camps. After a second trial, Benkahla was convicted of obstructing justice
on account of false declarations to a grand jury and of making false statements to the FBI. Though the judge
reasoned that Benkahla’s false declarations “neither directly ‘involved’ nor were ‘intended to promote’ a federal
crime of terrorism,” he applied the terrorism adjustment, reasoning that the false declarations had actually
obstructed the FBI’s investigation of a terrorism crime.[575] Without the adjustment, Benkahla faced a sentence of
two and three-quarters to three and a half years (33 to 41 months). With it, he faced a sentence of about 17 to 22
years (210 to 262 months)—the same or worse sentence as defendants who committed “more severe, violent
offenses,” like the kind of which Benkahla was acquitted in his first trial.[576]Judges have the discretion to “depart
downward” from sentences that the Guidelines recommend, but even where they exercise their discretion, the
terrorism adjustment drives up the length of sentences significantly. In Benkahla’s case, the judge concluded the
likelihood he would commit another crime was “infinitesimal,” and he sentenced Benkahla to 10 years. Yet this
was still almost seven years more than Benkahla would have faced without the terrorism adjustment.[577]
Current federal sentencing system allows government to punish defendants for
conduct not proven at trial
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
Under the federal sentencing system, sentences are not limited to the conduct for which an individual was
charged or convicted but rather are based on a court’s determination of a defendant’s “actual conduct.”[565]
As a result, an individual’s sentence may be dramatically lengthened based on accusations of conduct that
were not assessed by a jury, let alone determined beyond a reasonable doubt. (Mandatory minimum cases are
a recent exception.)[566] Although this sentencing scheme has been upheld by the Supreme Court,[567] it
raises due process concerns particularly in the context of the terrorism adjustment, where the potential for
government abuse—making inflammatory suggestions of a terrorism connection, invoking secrecy to explain
evidentiary gaps—is too high, and the cost of a vastly lengthened sentence is too great.For example,
Abdelhaleem Ashqar was sentenced to about 11 years (135 months) for obstruction of justice and criminal
contempt, after he refused to testify before a grand jury (see section IV). These offenses usually carry
sentences of five years or less, but after the trial and during the sentencing stage the prosecution asserted
Ashqar had “engaged in numerous violations of federal law”—offenses that it had not charged or convicted
him on—“all in the service of a terrorist organization.”[568] It asserted that Ashqar’s refusal to testify before
a grand jury was likewise “in the service” of a terrorist organization, although this question was never put to a
jury.[569]To punish defendants for conduct that was not alleged or proven at trial deprives them of the
opportunity to fully develop the facts and evidence necessary to refute accusations of terrorist connection or
affiliation. Moreover, it creates perverse incentives for the government, which can charge lesser conduct that
is easier to establish at trial, and then invoke inflammatory allegations of terrorist connection at the
sentencing stage.[570]
Terrorism adjustment in US Sentencing Commission guidelines unfairly cause
sentences to drastically lengthen regardless of the defendant’s criminal history
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
Federal judges making sentencing determinations for any federal crime are to take into account as a starting
point the guidelines issued by the US Sentencing Commission. Because the guidelines are advisory, judges
may depart from the sentencing ranges they establish to lengthen or reduce sentences.[553] By statute they
must consider a range of factors in sentencing, including the individual characteristics of the defendant and
the purposes of sentencing as applied to a particular case.[554]The sentencing guidelines establish
sentencing ranges based on a matrix, which cross-references 43 “offense levels” with six “criminal history”
categories.[555] For example, the offense level for homicide is the highest, 43, while involuntary
manslaughter starts at level 12.[556] The guidelines also contain “adjustments” based on qualities of the
offense, the offender, or the victim. These adjustments have the effect of raising, and in some cases lowering,
the offense level or criminal history category level. [557]Among all of the adjustments in the federal
sentencing guidelines system, the terrorism adjustment has the most drastic effect of lengthening sentences,
and it stands out for applying across a wide range of conduct.[558] (The history of the adjustment is briefly
explained below.) The adjustment raises the offense level by 12, and if the resulting offense level is less than
32, it creates a minimum offense level of 32—regardless of the character of the actual crime. It also
automatically raises a defendant’s criminal history level to category 6, the highest category, regardless of the
defendant’s actual criminal history.[559] As one judge in a terrorism case put it, the effect is to “impute to a
defendant who has had no criminal history a fictional history of the highest level of seriousness.”[560]The
government has successfully sought the terrorism adjustment for 259 individuals since 2002, the first year
statistics are available. In 2012, the adjustment applied to 46 defendants, while in previous years, it applied to
an average of 28 cases per year, according to our calculations based on information publicly available on the
US Sentencing Commission website.[561]In real terms, application of the terrorism adjustment results in an
absolute minimum sentence of 17.5 years for an offense (unless the offense carries a lesser statutory
maximum). On its own, an increase of 12 offense levels can add as much as 20 years to a sentence, while a
jump to the highest criminal history categorization can also add several years to a sentence. Taken together,
the two aspects of the terrorism adjustment have the potential to add 30 years to a sentence or lead to life
imprisonment for a crime that, without the adjustment, might otherwise entail only a sentence of five
years.[562]In addition, mandatory minimum sentences require judges to impose specified minimum prison
terms. Created by various federal statutes, mandatory minimum sentences are typically triggered by aspects
of criminal offense conduct or a defendant’s criminal history, and result in longer sentences.[563] As Human
Rights Watch has reported in the past, mandatory minimums are one of the most significant obstacles to fair
sentencing in the criminal justice system.[564]
AT: Terrorism Advantage
Can’t Solve Trust
Too many alt causes to building trust—can’t solve
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
Within the context of "new terrorism," building trust between police officers and Muslim communities is
incredibly difficult because of the wider arena of "hard" policing strategies. Indeed, this is illustrated by
the following quotation from a Muslim community member. And trust is not only a feeling it manifests
itself in actions and practices. Only when we do so, I mean it's no good saying or the police saying
"listen, we do not suspect the Muslim community" when the figures show that the stop and search rates
are through, are going through the roof. When Muslims are being detained and held by the terrorism
laws, for no reason but hearsay, suspicion, maybe they're up to something, maybe they looked at
something on the internet. It's no good just saying things when you're practising something else.
(Muslim Community Member [2] 2008)
Can’t Solve Hearts Minds
No Muslims will trust the federal government—can’t win hearts and minds
Daniel Benjamin, October 2008, Brookings Foreign Policy, Policy Paper 7, Strategic
Counterterrorism, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/terrorismbenjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf, /Bingham-MB
What principles should guide the policies to create those facts? If we understand the radical Islamist
challenge as one of narrative, it is not difficult to imagine what our counter-narrative should be: the U.S.
is a benign power that seeks to help all those who wish to modernize their societies, improve their
conditions, participate in the global economy, and create a better future for their children. Nations that
play by the international rules of the road will receive our assistance and our support in the global
community. We harbor no enmity for any religion or race or ethnic group. We recognize that our future
depends in no small measure on continuing improvements in conditions around the world. We know
that we cannot swim as others sink. Few, if any Americans, will find this account objectionable. Few
Muslims would believe it. Can we make that case? One frequently heard counter-argument is that we
cannot—that the structure of attitudes among most Muslims is so hardened that any effort to change
“hearts and minds” will fail , and that any U.S. action will be reinterpreted into the framework of
Muslim grievance. Unfortunately, this is not a frivolous objection . Among some Muslims, it is
accepted that the U.S. stood secretly behind the killing in Bosnia and Kosovo and only intervened when
events threatened to get out of hand; that the 1991 Gulf War was not about liberating Kuwaitis and
safeguarding other neighbors of Iraq so much as humiliating the one country in the region that stood up
to Washington—and so on.
International Alt Causes
Alt causes to trust deficit
Iraq
Daniel Benjamin, October 2008, Brookings Foreign Policy, Policy Paper 7, Strategic
Counterterrorism, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/terrorismbenjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf, /Bingham-MB
Three major efforts must be undertaken for the United States to regain the minimum level of trust
necessary to improve our image, counter the jihadist narrative and pursue a policy that brings positive
change. 1. Iraq : The United States needs to draw down its forces in Iraq. So long as it is seen as an
occupier, any kind of constructive engagement with most Muslim societies will be extremely
difficult . The departure of U.S. troops should not be precipitous, but it also should not be held hostage
to moderate fluctuations in the level of violence. Ideally, the withdrawals will be carried out in the
context of a broader political agreement involving the parties within Iraq and Iraq’s neighbors, though
this too cannot be a hard requirement for removing troops. A limited troop presence with the specific
mission of conducting counterterrorism operations—so long as it agreed to by the Iraqi government—
should be acceptable and desirable. Troop withdrawals will be seen by some, especially on the right, as
being at odds with our counterterrorism goals, since a U.S. departure will only strengthen the jihadists’
argument that the U.S. is a paper tiger. There is an element of truth to this—our opponents are good at
constructing a story that can cast us in the worst light no matter what we do. But we will be better off
getting out of Iraq and buttressing our support elsewhere in the region than allowing our enemies to
continue bloodying us and enhancing their own standing. Withdrawal will also reduce the terrorists’
ability to advance their more central claim that the United States is a predatory power that is
determined to occupy Muslim lands, steal Muslim wealth and destroy Islam. In addition, the U.S. must
stop talking about a long-term “Korea-like” presence in Iraq—a refrain that lends further confirmation to
the argument that Americans are both predators and liars, given all our earlier denials of interest in a
long-term occupation.
Middle east peace process
Daniel Benjamin, October 2008, Brookings Foreign Policy, Policy Paper 7, Strategic Counterterrorism,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/terrorismbenjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf, /Bingham-MB
2. The Middle East Peace Process and Support for the Palestinians: The United States must launch a
sustained effort to restart the Middle East peace process and ameliorate the plight of the Palestinians.
No issue is higher on the list of concerns for Muslims.5 Six years of neglect of the peace process have
done enormous harm to America’s standing in the region, and the efforts that emerged from hastily
assembled Annapolis Conference have hardly mitigated that damage. Given the extraordinary decay in
the socioeconomic conditions in the Palestinian Territories, more will also be required. The fact of a
Hamas-controlled Gaza complicates matters greatly, but the United States must work to change the
perception that it is indifferent to the sufferings of the Palestinians. As a concomitant to reenergized
negotiations, an economic package that strengthens job growth, infrastructure, and education in the
West Bank— and, if Hamas makes appropriate concessions, in Gaza—is essential. Peacemaking in the
Middle East is the paradigmatic example of an activity that United States pursues because it is a good in
itself, not simply because it will deflate anti-Americanism. As such, it should not be depicted as a bone
that is being thrown to anyone or as some kind defensive measure.
Torture, indefinite detention, other civil liberties violations
Daniel Benjamin, October 2008, Brookings Foreign Policy, Policy Paper 7, Strategic
Counterterrorism, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/terrorismbenjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf, /Bingham-MB
3. Revalidate America’s Moral Character: The international community, and Muslims in particular,
requires a revalidation of America’s moral character and mission.6 Before any deeper engagement is
possible, those who are on the fence about America’s global role need to be convinced that the U.S.
has not forsaken the rule of law and, following Vice President Dick Cheney’s famous remark about
needing “to work…the dark side,” has not made torture and other human rights violations a permanent
part of the struggle against terror. This will require at a minimum affirmative declarations by the next
president that America does not torture, investigations to clarify what was done, the closing of
Guantanamo military prison and any remaining “black sites,” a clear and sustainable policy on rendition
and compensation to those who have been mistreated. These inquiries must be carried out in a sensitive
and depoliticized manner—requirements that suggest that either a 9/11-type commission or a “truth
and reconciliation” effort be created. It is essential that such an undertaking not become another
incitement to partisanship, but, at the same time, there are doubtless numerous stories such as those of
the destroyed interrogation tapes waiting to come to light. A comprehensive effort is required to deal
with this chapter in American history, bring other such episodes to light and help establish the nation’s
post-Bush ethical standards. It bears emphasizing that whatever benefit this may have for our
international standing, it is even more vital that we do it for our own moral wellbeing.
Key to Solve ISIS
Over 60 percent of ISIS related arrests involve informants. Key to the war on terror.
The Wall Street Journal “In U.S. ISIS Cases, Informants Play a Big Role” April 21, 2015
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-u-s-isis-cases-informants-play-a-big-role-1429636206
Officials say the use of informants is invaluable and say there are strict guidelines to ensure they don’t
plant the idea for a crime in a suspect’s head.¶ “Agents and prosecutors are well-trained and are wholly
mindful of the law with respect to the entrapment issue,” said Paul Bresson, an FBI spokesman.¶ About
60% of the cases against Americans on ISIS-related charges have involved informants, versus under 30%
in terrorism indictments overall since 9/11, according to an analysis by the Center on National Security
at Fordham University’s School of Law. The FBI said it couldn’t verify those numbers.¶ The informants
aren’t always inserted from outside. In criminal charges filed against six Minnesota men on Monday,
federal agents relied on an informant who had allegedly conspired and tried to travel to Syria with some
of the men. The six men haven’t entered pleas.¶ Last month, the 9/11 Review Commission, which
studied five high-profile terrorist attacks since 2001, concluded that informants didn’t help prevent or
respond to any of them. Others say informants help stop violent terror plots before they get too far.¶
“Using confidential informants is just a tried and true proven effective method to…disrupt threats,” said
Robert McFadden, a former counterterrorism agent and a senior vice president at Soufan Group, a
security intelligence consultancy.
Key to Solve Home Grown Terror
The threat of home grown terror is high and growing. Must use every means
necessary, including informants
David Inserra ( Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber Security in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation) and Charles D. Stimson
(Manager of the National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow in the Davis Institute at The
Heritage Foundation. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs) “Three
Terrorist Plots Disrupted in Three Weeks: 66th Islamist Plot Reconfirms Scope of Threat” April 16,2015
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/04/three-terrorist-plots-disrupted-in-three-weeks66th-islamist-plot-reconfirms-scope-of-threat
On Friday, April 10, the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Topeka, Kansas, arrested John T. Booker
Jr., as he prepared a car bomb for use against the nearby Fort Riley Army post. Booker, a 20-year-old
U.S. citizen who goes by the name Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, expressed a desire to support the
Islamic State by engaging in violent jihad here in the U.S.[1] Through the use of confidential
informants, the FBI tracked Booker’s statements, plans, and actions, and arrested him before the
public was in danger .¶ This homegrown, lone-wolf terrorist plot is the 66th known Islamist terrorist
plot or attack aimed at the U.S. homeland since 9/11. It is also the third terrorist plot that has been
foiled in the past 17 days, and the fourth in the past four months in which the plotter expressed support
for ISIS. This surge in terrorism demonstrates yet again that the threat of terrorism continues to be very
real, and that stopping terrorists before they attack is more critical than ever.¶ The Plot¶ John Booker
was accepted into the Army in February 2014, but before he entered basic training the FBI became
aware of multiple messages on Facebook in which he claimed to be excited to wage jihad. When
interviewed, Booker “admitted that he enlisted in the United States Army with the intent to commit an
insider attack against American soldiers like Major Nidal Hassan had done at Fort Hood, Texas.”[2] As a
result, Booker was not allowed to join the military.¶ Starting in October of 2014, Booker began to
communicate with an FBI confidential informant, and “repeatedly expressed to [the informant] his
desire to engage in violent jihad on behalf of ISIL.”[3] Booker told the informant of his desire to go to the
Middle East to join ISIS and kill Americans. As their conversations continued into November, Booker
showed the informant videos of suicide bombers and spoke fondly of them. When the informant
indicated that he had a cousin who could get Booker overseas, Booker excitedly accepted the offer and
expressed a willingness to wage jihad in the U.S. to prove his dedication.[4]¶ In December 2014, Booker
told the informant that he was thinking about attacking American soldiers at a nearby military base with
a gun or a grenade, believing it justified by the Koran. Then in February, Booker referenced an ISIS
propaganda video and expressed a desire to create a similar video. Booker thought that capturing and
killing an American soldier in the U.S. would “scare this country” and warn it that “we will be coming
after American soldiers in the streets…we will be picking them off one by one.”[5]¶ In March, the
confidential informant introduced Booker to his “cousin,” another informant; the two told Booker that
the cousin was a sheik planning terrorist attacks. Booker said that he had studied suicide bombing and
wanted to build and detonate a truck bomb, following in the footsteps of an American called Jihad Joe,
who died as a suicide bomber in Syria.[6] Booker then filmed a video threatening the U.S. and rented a
storage unit for gathering bomb components.[7] By the end of March, Booker began purchasing bomb
materials and gathering information on military targets, settling on Fort Riley. Booker provided the
bomb components to the confidential informants, believing that they would provide the explosive
material, which was actually inert. He then proclaimed that “I am going to do this Friday,” meaning April
10, and prepared a second threatening video. On April 10, the two informants drove to Fort Riley and, as
Booker was arming the inert bomb, FBI agents arrested him.
FBI sting setups ensure justified arrests—cements incriminalization
Risa A. Brooks 2011 [Risa A. Brooks is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette University.] “In the
United States Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?” MIT
Press http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00055
By relying heavily on the use of informants and undercover agents, law enforcement may inadvertently
be helping to advance some terrorist plots, such that aspiring militants are better prepared or more
motivated to carry the plot forward to the point where the suspects warrant arrest on terrorism-related
charges. To observe that officials could be helping to promote plots does not mean that they are illegally
entrapping the militants.34 Rather the effect of law enforcement’s involvement may be more subtle.
Militants may be enthusiastic about the prospect of waging an attack, but they may lack the focus, skills,
and discipline to do it alone.
Public Supports
Public supports any means necessary to stop terrorism
Peter Sullivan “Public confidence builds in anti-terrorism effort” January 12 ,2015
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/229261-publics-rating-of-anti-terror-efforts-bounces-back
The public's rating of the government's ability to fight terrorism has bounced back up, according to a
new poll from Pew. The poll finds that 72 percent of adults say the government is doing "very" or "fairly"
well in reducing the threat of terrorism, while 26 percent say it is not. By contrast, in September, the
rating hit a recent low of 56 percent. That mark came amid the rise of ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq, and
before President Obama gave a speech laying out a strategy to fight the militants. ¶ The bump back up to
72 percent, including majorities of both parties, puts the rating in line with where it has been
throughout most of the Obama and Bush administrations. ¶ Despite the terror attacks in Paris last week,
the poll finds that the U.S. public's concern about an attack in the United States has not significantly
increased. ¶ Sixty-four percent are "very" or "somewhat" concerned that there will soon be another
terrorist attack in the United States, compared to 59 percent saying so in July. These levels are roughly
the same as they have been since the mid-2000s. ¶ As was also the case in September, the poll finds
that the public is more concerned with protecting the country than protecting civil liberties . It finds
that 49 percent say their concern with anti-terrorism policies is that they have not gone far enough,
compared to 37 percent who say they restrict civil liberties too much.
Public Supports use of informants
Jeffrey M. Jones (Quotes Gallop Poles) “Americans Still Say Liberties Should Trump Anti-Terrorism”
June 10, 2015 http://www.gallup.com/poll/183548/americans-say-liberties-trump-anti-terrorism.aspx
Some congressional critics of government anti-terrorism methods, most notably Kentucky Sen. Rand
Paul, argue that the government has too many powers in this area that violate citizens' rights. The
majority of Americans, 55%, disagree, saying they do not believe such government programs violate
their civil liberties . But that leaves a sizable minority of 41% who do feel the government is violating
their civil liberties. Gallup asked this question for the first time in the June 2-7 poll, so it is not possible to
know whether these views differ from those in the past.¶ Although members of key subgroups vary in
the extent to which they believe government efforts to prevent terrorism violate their civil liberties, all
groups fall below the majority level. Men are closest at 49%, and are much more likely than women
(33%) to believe government anti-terrorism programs violate their civil liberties. There are no
differences by political party, although political liberals are more likely than conservatives to say these
programs infringe on their liberties. Across age groups, senior citizens are less likely than younger
Americans to believe the programs violate their civil liberties.
Informants Work
Informants are key to stopping terror plots. Authorities have nothing more than
“educated guess work” with them
Sean Alfano “JFK Terror Plot Informant Crucial To Case” June 4, 2007
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jfk-terror-plot-informant-crucial-to-case/
The informant who helped break up the plot to bomb the jet fuel pipeline that supplies John F. Kennedy
Airport was so convincing that the suspects gave him unfettered access to their operation, federal
authorities said.¶ He made several overseas trips to discuss the plot, even visiting a radical Muslim
group's compound in Trinidad. Perhaps more important, the suspects were convinced he was guided by
a higher purpose: The ringleader believed the informant "had been sent by Allah to be the one" to pull
off the bombing, according to a federal complaint.¶ The case demonstrated the growing importance of
informants in the war on terrorism, particularly as smaller radical groups become more aggressive .¶
On Monday, the longtime leader of the Trinidadian Muslim group denied it had any connection to the
plot. "I know nothing about these men and I have nothing to do with whatever they are being charged
for," Yasin Abu Bakr, the leader of Jamaat al Muslimeen, told The Associated Press.¶ Bakr declined to say
whether he knew any of the suspects. U.S. authorities said the alleged plotters traveled to Trinidad to
secure support from Jamaat al Muslimeen.¶ The accused mastermind, Russell Defreitas, 63, is now in
custody in New York, where he will have a bail hearing on Wednesday.¶ But two other suspects, Kareem
Ibrahim and Abdul Kadir, a former member of Guyana's Parliament, will fight extradition to the United
States, their lawyer, Rajid Persad, told a Trinidadian court on Monday. The two made their initial court
appearance there on one count each of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act against the government of
the United States. The judge set a bail hearing for next Monday and an extradition hearing on Aug. 2.¶
Authorities in Trinidad are still seeking a fourth suspect, Abdel Nur.¶ While the intent to inflict major
damage was apparent, CBS News terrorism consultant Paul Kurtz said the men were "a long way off
from actually being able to carry out the plot."¶ Tom Corrigan, a former member of the FBI-New York
Police Department Joint Terrorism Task Force, said the Kennedy Airport case and the recent plot to
attack Fort Dix illustrated the need for inside information. Six men were arrested in a plot to attack
soldiers at the New Jersey military base after an FBI informant infiltrated that group.¶ "These have been
two significant cases back-to-back where informants were used," Corrigan said. "These terrorists are in
our own backyard. They may have to reach out to people they don't necessarily trust, but they need —
for guns, explosives, whatever."¶ Without informants , Corrigan said, investigators are often left with
little more than educated guesswork .¶ "In most cases, you can't get from A to B without an
informant," said the ex-NYPD detective. "Most times when an informant tells you what is going on,
speculation becomes reality. What an investigator thought or presumed is happening is (often) really
happening."
Muslim informants have stopped no less than 23 terror plots in the last 15 years
Aziz Poonawalla (member of the Dawoodi Bohra Muslim community who participates in FBI
informant programs) “Muslim informants prevent domestic terror: the data” 2012
http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/cityofbrass/2012/02/muslim-informants-prevent-domesticterror-the-data.html
Ever since 9-11, accusations against muslim Americans have been made that we do not “condemn”
terrorism. In fact, we have been doing better than condemning it – we have been actively preventing it,
in cooperation with the FBI and local law enforcement agencies. We are the first line of defense. Here is
the proof: a list of domestic terror plots from October 2001 to January 2012 where muslim informants
helped prevent the attack and helped prosecute the perpetrators:¶ October 2001: The conviction of
“Portland 7” case was substantially helped after a local police officer encountered the suspects engaged
in target practice. The police officer was sent to the area after a local citizen notified police he heard
gunfire.¶ September 2002: Members of the “Lackawanna 6” are arrested. FBI first becomes aware of
their activities in June 2001 when a local Muslim community member tips off the FBI.¶ April 2003: A
citizen notifies local police after he mistakenly receives a suspicious package sent by anti-government
terrorist William Krar. The tip-off starts a Federal investigation eventually leads to Krar’s arrest and the
discovery of small arms and chemical weaponry.¶ June 2003: FBI receives two tips from community
members notifying them “military-style training” being conducted suspect by Ali Al-Tamimi. The tips
start an investigation leading to the arrest of the “Paintball 11” in Northern Virginia.¶ August 2004:
James Elshafay and Shahwar Matin Siraj are arrested largely based on the controversial use of an
informant in the investigation. However NYPD were first notified of Siraj after a Muslim community
member anonymously notifies New York police about consistently troubling rhetoric coming from the
suspect.¶ February 2006: Muslim community members in Ohio provide information help into arrest and
eventually convict 3 suspects planning attacks in Iraq.¶ August 2006: British authorities arrest a group of
British Muslim violent extremists suspected of plotting to blow up several airplanes over the Atlantic.
Authorities first become aware of the plot based on a tip from a Muslim community member.¶
November 2006: Neo-Nazi terrorist Demetrius “Van” Crocker is arrested after an investigation is set in
motion by a tip-off from a concerned citizen.¶ November 2006: Adnan Babar Mirza, a Pakistani national
studying in Houston, TX and is arrested for illegal firearms training and possession. Adnan come to the
attention of the FBI when local Houston community members tip them off about Adnan’s activities and
alleged intentions.¶ October 2008: Neo-Nazis Daniel Cowart and Paul Schesselman are arrested by local
police, who received a tip from a concerned friend of the two suspects, before seeking to go on a
shooting spree against African-Americans.¶ July 2009: Mosque leaders in Raleigh, North Carolina contact
law enforcement to notify them of “violent, threatening action… considered to be dangerous” leading to
the arrest of Daniel Boyd and 6 other individuals.¶ September 2009: Queens Imam Ahmad Afazali, a
community liaison to the NYPD, helps local police and the FBI in the investigation and arrest of suspect
Najibullah Zazi. Though Zazi is initially accused of tipping off Zazi to police surveillance, information in
the court complaint and corroborating reporting from mainstream media sources found this notion to
be false. (Afzali was, however, deported on charges of lying to FBI agents, but subsequent media
reporting also strengthens Afzali’s claims that he was scapegoat for getting caught up in a turf battle
between NYPD and FBI officials.)¶ November 2009: Five Virginia Muslim youth are arrested in Pakistan,
allegedly seeking to join a terrorist group, after family members told American federal authorities they
went missing.¶ March 2010: Michigan Militia member and Muslim convert Matt Savino refuses aid to a
fugitive member of the Hutaree Militia and instead helps law enforcement authorities track him down.¶
April 2010: Senegalese Muslim Alioune Niass first spots the suspicious vehicle used as a bomb to attack
Times Square in New York City. Clues from the vehicle and defused explosive immediately led to the
suspect, Faisal Shahzad’s, arrest.¶ June 2010: Suspects Mohammed Mahmoud Alessa and Carlos Eduardo
Almonte are arrested, after the FBI first receives an anonymous report in 2006 from one of the suspects’
family members. News reports indicate one of Alessa’s family members provided the tip.¶ October 2010:
Former Hawaii resident Abdel Hamid Shehadeh is arrested for attempting to join the Taliban. Local
media noted that the Muslim Association of Hawaii “assisted law enforcement agencies in the case” and
that it has “in the past reported suspicious activities.”¶ October 2010: Farooque Ahmed is arrested on
charges of allegedly attempting to bomb the Washington, DC metro railway system. The FBI first learns
of Ahmed’s intentions from a community tip-off.¶ October 2010: An attempt by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula to bomb Western targets using air cargo transportation is prevented by US and European
authorities. Intelligence that prevented the plot came from ex-militant Jabr al-Faifi, who voluntarily
handed himself into Saudi authorities.¶ November 2010: Mohamed Osman Mohamud is arrested for
attempting to bomb a Christmas tree-lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The New York Times notes,
“In the Oregon [Mohamud] case, the FBI received a tip from a Portland Muslim.”¶ December 2010:
Antonio Martinez is arrested for attempting to bomb a military recruiting center in Maryland.
Statements from Justice Department officials indicate a Muslim community member reported Martinez
to the FBI during its ongoing investigation.¶ June 2011: Two Al-Qaeda inspired violent criminals planning
to attack a military installation in Seattle are arrested by law enforcement. FBI officials first become
aware of the planned attack after a fellow Muslim who was trying to be recruited into the conspiracy
went to Seattle Police and informed them of the plot.¶ January 2012: Violent Al-Qaeda sympathizer Sami
Osmakac is arrested for planning to attack several sites in Tampa, Florida using guns and explosives. The
U.S. Attorney for Central Florida noted, “This investigation was also predicated, in part, by assistance
from the Muslim community.Ӧ This data was compiled by MPAC in a detailed and exhaustive report
(PDF link) – in the executive summary, they note:¶ Muslim communities helped U.S. security officials
to prevent nearly 2 out of every 5 Al-Qaeda plots threatening the United States since 9/11 . Muslim
communities helped law enforcement prevent 1 out of every 2 of all Al-Qaeda related plots threatening
the U.S. since the December 2009 “underwear bomber” plot. This is an important parallel trend to the
recent spike of arrests. It also highlights the importance of partnering with society through good
relations and community oriented policing
Deterrent Effect
Informants are important even if they don’t stop terror attacks. The sense of
suspicion it creates amongst aspiring terrorists stops attacks
NPR “Entrapment Defense Hasn't Worked In Terror Cases” December 2010
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/02/131758291/entrapment-defense-hasn-t-worked-in-terror-cases
DAN: Thanks. I just wanted to say that if I was an aspirational terrorist and I had been reading stories like
this in the paper, I'd be suspicious of any colleagues that I had and contacts. And I was wondering if your
guest knows that if the FBI or other law enforcement agencies have ever used a sting operation like this
as a deterrent, just to sort of promote distrust within a network of terrorists.¶ COX: That's an interesting
question. Thank you very much, Dan. What about that, Dina?¶ TEMPLE-RASTON: It's a great question. It's
one of the reasons why they say they do these kinds of sting operations. They think they have an
enormous deterrent effect. If somebody is sort of on the fence as to whether or not they want to do
something, suddenly, there's suspicion all around, and they're very worried that maybe they are being
set up by someone and they're - that is exactly what they're hoping is happening.¶ COX: So they
infiltrate, and they push the envelope as much as they legally - at least as much as they legally think that
they can. And it does have a deterrent effect is what you're saying?¶ TEMPLE-RASTON: Well, suspicion
is a wonderful thing within a cell . I mean, this doesn't just happen in this country. It happens overseas
as well. I mean, when you see all these drone attacks that have been happening in Pakistan, one of the
things that is happening as a result of them is that you have al-Qaida members who are actually
suspecting each other because these drones are coming so close. And there have been a number of
executions of members who are thought to have given up al-Qaida positions. Whether it's true or not, I
don't know, but it certainly is having that chilling effect on the group.
No Impact
Lone wolves focused on local issues and don’t have the capacity for existential attacks
Jason Burke '13 the South Asia correspondent for The Guardian, 1/28/13, "Al-Qaida: how great is the
terrorism threat to the west now?," The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/29/alqaida-terrorism-threat-west
The high point, however, was reached around 2004 or 2005. Even as it appeared to peak, the wave of extremism
was receding. Since
then, the central leadership of al-Qaida has suffered blow after blow. It is not just Bin Laden who has been killed or
rendered inactive, but pretty much everyone else in the senior and middle ranks of the organisation. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaida
central, may be an effective, utterly dedicated and experienced organiser but he lacks Bin Laden's charisma. Saif al Adel, the only other veteran
leader remaining, lacks his stature and may not be at liberty at all but detained in Iran.¶ Key players who few, beyond specialists, had ever
heard of – such as the very capable Libyan Atiyah Abd al-Rahman – have gone. British security officials
describe "al-Qaida central"
as being "hollowed out", largely by the controversial drone strikes. Equally damaging for the group, al-Qaida's
training infrastructure is minimal, certainly compared with the dozens of fully fledged camps that were in use on the eve of the
9/11 attacks. Back in 2008, according to interrogation documents, handlers were forced to admit to new recruits coming straight from Europe
that their facilities unfortunately bore no resemblance to those depicted in recruiting videos.¶ Nothing
has improved since.
Volunteers are fewer than before. There are younger members rising up the thinning ranks, but this is
promotion by default not merit.¶ Equally damaging has been the rejection by successive communities
over the past two decades. Almost every attempt by al-Qaida central to win genuine popular support
has failed – in Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Polls show approval ratings for Bin Laden peaking around 2004-5 and then steep
decline. This is particularly true when communities have direct experience of extremist violence or rule. The al-Qaida brand is
irremediably tarnished. Even Bin Laden was apparently thinking of relaunching the group under a new name, his correspondence
reveals.¶ The two most spectacular attacks in recent years – in Algeria and the strike on Mumbai by Pakistan-based militants from the Lashkare-Taiba organisation – were carried out by entities that have, in the first instance, tenuous connections with al-Qaida's senior leadership and, in
the second, none at all. This indicates the degree to which the remnant led by al-Zawahiri have become, at best, only one player among many.¶
The result is that the
centripetal force the group once exerted has gone and we have returned to a situation
similar to that of the old "pre-al-Qaida" days with a whole series of different local groups involved in
local struggles with negligible central co-ordination.¶ There are major differences with the previous period, of course.
Decades of violence have led to much higher structural levels of radicalisation and polarisation. The technology and tactics used by all
protagonists in these current "shadow wars" has evolved. Then there are the consequences of the Arab spring – for the Sahel and Syria and
elsewhere. But, nonetheless, the unthinking use of the term al-Qaida, as has so often been the case in the past, obscures rather than illuminate
the real chaotic and fractured, if still dynamic, nature of modern Islamist militancy. This is something Cameron's own security services will have
told him.¶ Of course a threat remains.
But the big attacks – those that could potentially pose something a little
closer to "an existential threat" – are unlikely.
No Nuke Terror – Deterrence
No nuclear terror—deterrence and prevention solves
Mearsheimer ’10 John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Professor of Political
Science at the University of Chicago, “Imperial by Design,” The National Interest, 12/16/2010,
http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576
This assessment of America’s terrorism problem was flawed on every count. It was threat inflation of the highest order. It made no sense to
declare war against groups that were not trying to harm the United States. They were not our enemies; and going after all terrorist
organizations would greatly complicate the daunting task of eliminating those groups that did have us in their crosshairs. In addition, there was
no alliance between the so-called rogue states and al-Qaeda. In fact, Iran and Syria cooperated with Washington after 9/11 to help quash
Osama bin Laden and his cohorts. Although the Bush administration and the neoconservatives repeatedly asserted that there was a genuine
connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, they never produced evidence to back up their claim for the simple reason that it did not
exist. The fact is that states have strong incentives to distrust terrorist groups, in part because they might turn on them
someday, but also because countries cannot control what terrorist organizations do, and they may do something that gets their patrons into
serious trouble. This
is why there is hardly any chance that a rogue state will give a nuclear weapon to
terrorists. That regime’s leaders could never be sure that they would not be blamed and punished for a
terrorist group’s actions. Nor could they be certain that the United States or Israel would not incinerate
them if either country merely suspected that they had provided terrorists with the ability to carry out a
WMD attack. A nuclear handoff, therefore, is not a serious threat. When you get down to it, there is only a remote possibility
that terrorists will get hold of an atomic bomb. The most likely way it would happen is if there were
political chaos in a nuclear-armed state, and terrorists or their friends were able to take advantage of the ensuing confusion to
snatch a loose nuclear weapon. But even then, there are additional obstacles to overcome: some countries keep their
weapons disassembled, detonating one is not easy and it would be difficult to transport the device
without being detected. Moreover, other countries would have powerful incentives to work with
Washington to find the weapon before it could be used. The obvious implication is that we should work with other states
to improve nuclear security, so as to make this slim possibility even more unlikely. Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the
American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government
officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil
is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few
failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an
American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest
Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an
existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John
Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . .
. is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer,
or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”
No Nuke Terror – Motivation
Also no motivation—nuclear attack is suicide—terrorists prefer smaller strikes
Umana ’11 Felipe Umana, “Loose Nukes: Real Threat?” Foreign Policy in Focus, 8/17/2011,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/loose_nukes_real_threat?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&ut
m_campaign=Feed%3A+FPIF+%28Foreign+Policy+In+Focus+%28All+News%29%29
The threat of military,
political, and economic repercussions from foreign actors provides another viable
deterrent. For example, the existence of a nuclear weapon or the confirmed knowledge that a belligerent
non-state actor has developed a feasible nuclear weapon can goad major world governments to join
forces and unleash a rapid and strong military operation on the region where these non-state actors.
Atomic weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations are likely to remain immobile (seeing as the
proper resources to move and handle it carefully are likely absent or of low quality), so an allied military
procedure from the world’s most powerful militaries could then aim to neutralize an entire organization.
The complete annihilation of a group’s membership and hideouts is an extremely unattractive measure
from the perspective of any terrorist organization. The country that hosts these organizations,
deliberately or inadvertently, would face severe opprobrium if it did not deal with radicals within its own
borders. Diplomatic and economic sanctions could similarly be used to dissuade these states from
potentially aiding the belligerent non-state actors, while also restricting corruption tactics from diverting
financial flows to radical groups. Even more importantly, sanctions could serve as punishment or
discouragement against states seeking nuclear capabilities for an offensive atomic program. Iran, for
instance, has faced a long history of economic sanctions, partly because of its nuclear program.
No Nuke Terror – Logistics
High chance of detection, logistic problems and just unlikely
Mannes 11 [Aaron, former Director of Research @ Middle East Media Research Institute, “Schelling
on nuclear terrorism,” http://terrorwonk.blogspot.com/2011/09/schelling-on-nuclear-terrorism.html,
AD: 10-16-11]JN
A Nobel on Nukes Those thoughts were in the back of my mind when I attended a lecture by Nobel Laureate in Economics and University of
Maryland Professor Thomas Schelling. Uppermost in my mind however, was the topic of his talk - what happened to nuclear terrorism. Back in
1982 Schelling wrote an article stating that sooner rather then later a non-state armed group would
acquire a nuclear weapon. This became conventional wisdom, gathering steam particularly after 9/11 when we had an all too
frightening demonstration of how capable and creative terrorist groups can be. Schelling, as a towering intellectual figure, has the presence of
mind to admit that it hasn't happened and wonder why. Much
of the focus on nuclear terrorism is in stealing fissile
material and then constructing a weapon. This is not as easy as it seems. He compared it to stealing a
Picasso - all respectable figures in the art community would be on the lookout for it so, as valuable as it
is in theory, it is very difficult to sell it. Moving fissile material out of a country, say an FSU state, to a terrorist
haven in Pakistan or Yemen requires traveling long distances across many borders and languages. These
barriers present multiple opportunities for the nuclear terrorists to be detected. It is an added factor that the people
one is likely to interact with are extremely nasty (criminals, murderers etc.) Schelling went on to speculate, suppose they can get the
stuff, a terrorist group would need a highly skilled team to build the device including metallurgists and engineers.
There are a limited number of loyal terrorists with needed skills and hiring people would be difficult. People with the
requisite skills usually can earn money legitimately, might turn them in after they are approached, and probably wouldn’t want to join the
project since they might just be murdered after it was complete. Schelling’s analysis, tracks with my own analysis that counter-terror is the
application of Murphy’s Law, which emphasizes the logistics of terrorism – always good to be on the same page as a Nobel Laureate!
(Thedifficulties Aum Shinrikyo faced in developed chemical and biological weapons provides a telling example of the logistics of WMD terror.) I
would add, that trucking
in nuclear material across borders might bring the group under additional
intelligence Schelling then asks what would a group do with a nuclear weapon, simply blowing up a city would
be a waste – it makes more sense for the group to seek influence. Presumably any organization sophisticated enough to
build a weapon is also capable of strategic thought. I am not as certain of this, some terrorist groups are
very strategic in their thinking but others are eschatological. For that matter, for some strategy and eschatology are
tightly linked! Further, humiliation and revenge are key motives for many terrorists so that simply inflicting pain and destruction may be its own
end. Schelling also discussed the difficulties in proving the possession of a weapon. Detonating one is the best proof, but a terrorist group might
only possess one. Another option is showing to experts (perhaps kidnapping them.) This is possible but difficult. Schelling
dismisses the
possibility of an insider handing a complete nuke to a group, since it would be impossible to be certain the device was a
nuclear bomb that would work without dismantling it – which would render it inoperable. Finally, Schelling argued that a group that did possess
a bomb would be wise to secrete it in an American city – tell the government it was in one of several cities and threaten to detonate it. This
would create an enormous panic. But ultimately, such a terrorist
group would, Schelling argues, seek to acquire influence
and a seat at the table. Schelling doesn’t mention that transporting and secreting a nuke also has logistical
challenges. It would probably be easier then acquiring the materials, but there would still be numerous opportunities for
things to go wrong. For a related comparison, see my analysis one why a Mumbai style attack in the US would be difficult to undertake.
This summary is pretty dry, Schelling is very funny and – having been deeply engaged in these issues for decades – has some illuminating
anecdotes about these issues. Finally, unaddressed was the question of a nuclear state being taken over by terrorists or a state with nuclear
weapons supporting terrorism. These are different issues. Schelling
examines the nightmare scenario of an
unaccountable terrorist group acquiring nukes and finds it unlikely. There are many potential nuclear dangers in the
world, but this one in particular, while it cannot be dismissed, does not need to be the focus of enormous government
resources.
No Solvency – Warrants Rubber Stamp
Warrants are issued on account of a person being foreign, even if they are not
suspected of an crime – Practically a Rubber Stamp
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
In dozens of terrorism cases, prosecutors have used as evidence information obtained by wiretaps or
physical searches not subject to the standard probable cause requirements in criminal cases. In these
cases, the government obtained information pursuant to either the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), or the FISA Amendments Act (FAA)—two statutes that permit surveillance without a traditional
warrant. Applications under FISA are reviewed by the specially created Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), which sits in secret and does not have any structures in place that would offer meaningful
opposition to government requests. The FISC issues warrants based only upon a showing of probable
cause that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, not that there
is probable cause that the target is suspected of criminal activity. The FISC has rarely rejected a
government request for a surveillance warrant. Since its inception, the FISC has received more than
30,000 applications for authority to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches. Of those, it
has denied nine , and partially denied another three.417 Under the FAA, the government does not
need any kind of warrant at all. Rather, it obtains year-long authorizations from the FISC to collect
“foreign intelligence information,” defined broadly (see below) so long as one end of the communication
is “reasonably believed” to be outside the US and the government follows certain procedures it submits
to the FISC for approval, intended to minimize the amount of information collected on “US persons.”418
In practice however, an enormous number of US-person communications are still swept up in the
surveillance .4
Warrants can be acquired for the sole purpose of criminal prosecution – regardless of
if they are suspected of criminal activity.
Humans Rights Watch, “Illusion of Justice”, Humans rights Institute, Columbia Law school, July
2014
However, after 9/11, Congress amended FISA in 2001, substantially broadening its scope. The
amendments took down the wall, permitting law enforcement to become more directly involved in
coordinating surveillance under FISA.427 And Congress changed the requirement that foreign
intelligence collection be “a primary purpose” to merely “a significant purpose.a result of the
amendments, the government has contended that not only can the information from a FISA order be
used in criminal prosecution , but intended criminal prosecution can be a reason for obtaining the
FISA order in the first place , so long as it is not the sole purpose.429
AT: Entrapment Advantage
Law Still Racist
Ending informants doesn’t solve racist law practices—new york proves
Adam Serwer, 4-16-2014, NYPD ends controversial Muslim spying unit," MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/nypd-bill-de-blasio-shutters-controversial-muslim-unit, Accessed: 7-12015, /Bingham-MB
As a candidate, de Blasio had said that “we need to do a full review of all surveillance efforts, and
anything that is not based on specific leads should not continue.” Yet the Center for Constitutional
Rights and the Muslim civil rights group Muslim Advocates said they were uncertain whether the end of
the Demographics Unit means the end of what they called “the practice of suspicionless surveillance
of Muslim communities .” “It is not at all clear that the NYPD is ending the unconstitutional practice of
spying on innocent Muslims in New York, New Jersey and throughout the northeast,” said Glenn Katon,
an attorney with Muslim Advocates. “An internal NYPD structure is going away but we still don’t have
assurances that the practice of broad surveillance is ending.” Muslim Advocates is in the process of suing
the NYPD over its surveillance of Muslim communities in New Jersey. A federal judge sided with the
NYPD in February, justifying the surveillance by stating that “The police could not have monitored New
Jersey for Muslim terrorist activities without monitoring the Muslim community itself,” and that any
harm done to the Muslim community was the result of leaks to the press, not the surveillance itself.
Not Illegal
Its not illegal—multiple agencies confirm
Mitra Ebadolahi, 5-11-2012, Resolution Introduced in House to Condemn NYPD Muslim Spying,"
American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/blog/resolution-introduced-house-condemn-nypdmuslim-spying, Accessed: 7-1-2015, /Bingham-MB
Given all this, it is deeply disturbing that so many of New York City's leaders have defended the NYPD's
unconstitutional tactics instead of condemning them and promising investigation and reform. Mayor
Michael Bloomberg praised the NYPD's efforts as " legal," "appropriate," and constitutional " — and
has implied that suspicionless surveillance of innocent communities is ongoing, boasting "we have not
let down our guard." Police Commissioner Ray Kelly insists that the NYPD's mapping of American Muslim
communities is authorized by FBI guidelines and a federal court consent decree , and maintains that
the AP did not "do its homework" before publishing dozens of the NYPD's own investigative reports
detailing police misconduct. And, most recently, New York City Council Speaker Christine Quinn has also
implied that the NYPD's practices are legal, stating "[u]nless we know that laws were broken or
someone's civil liberties were violated, I do not think the NYPD should stop the practice" of monitoring
innocent American Muslims.
Don’t Violate 4th Amendment
There is a distinction between rules placed on criminal informants and those related
to national security threats. There are almost zero regulations on the use of these
informants
Daniel V. Ward “Confidential Informants in National Security Investigations” Boston College Law
Review May 01, 2006
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2333&context=bclr
The law imposes a number of restrictions on the use of informants¶ in criminal investigations. Under the
Fourth Amendment, courts¶ may issue search warrants on the basis of information provided by an¶
informant, but only upon a preliminary demonstration that the¶ source of such information is
somewhat reliable. 9 An even more stringent¶ standard of review is imposed upon the use of
informants to¶ support an application for electronic surveillance. 19 In addition to¶ these warrant
requirements, other defenses and remedies exist for the¶ criminally accused whose rights may have
been violated during an investigation¶ involving the use of informants. 11 Furthermore, the Attorney¶
General has issued detailed guidelines regulating the manner inwhich federal agents should handle
confidential informants in criminal¶ investigations."¶ When conducting national' security
investigations, however, federal¶ agents have broader discretion regarding the use of informants .
13¶ A 1981 Executive Order grants'authority to the FBI and other agencies¶ to collect domestic national
security intelligence when the target¶ of the investigation is an agent of a foreign power. 14
Furthermore, an¶ act of Congress—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978¶ ("FISA")—sets forth
procedures for investigating an agent of a foreign¶ power that depart from the requirements of a
criminal search or surveillance¶ warrant. 15 Under these provisions, federal agents may initiate¶
electronic surveillance or even physical searches without following¶ ordinary warrant procedures, and
as a result, courts are less involved¶ in supervising the use of informants. 16 Additionally, new
guidelines¶ from the Attorney General relating to national security investigations¶ effectively remove
the restrictions placed on federal agents when it¶ comes to handling informants. 17
Coercion Legal
Justice department says citizens have NO constitutional right to refuse to become an
informant. Basically government coercion
KEVIN GOSZTOLA “US Government Notifies American Muslims, Who Refused to Be FBI Informants, of
Removal from No Fly List” June 10, 2015 http://firedoglake.com/2015/06/10/us-government-notifiesamerican-muslims-who-refused-to-be-fbi-informants-of-removal-from-no-fly-list/
None of the changes would help American Muslims like Tanvir, Algibhah, Shinwari or Sajjad. The
notification they received would not have to confirm that the FBI was responsible for their placement or
that there was any wrongdoing by agents. It would not have to confirm that rights had been violated—
and probably would not to protect the government from lawsuits.¶ “It remains far too easy for the
government to place people on the No-Fly List and far too difficult for those people to challenge that
decision,” Ramzi Kassem of the Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility (CLEAR)
Project, co-counsel in the lawsuit.¶ The notification letters suggest that the best way for American
Muslims to get off the No Fly List is to sue the government, however, not every American Muslim on the
watch list has the will to challenge the government and risk further intimidation and harassment.¶ The
Justice Department maintains there is “no constitutional right not to become an informant .” No
“religious burden” is imposed if an FBI agent demands that an American Muslim spy for the government.
If it did burden them, it is an American Muslim’s responsibility to inform agents of their “religious
objections.” And, despite losing multiple No Fly List lawsuits, the Justice Department is still unwilling to
recognize that Americans have a “liberty interest” in air travel.
Informants Aren’t Bad
There are significant barriers in place to hiring human rights abusers but we MUST
have people with inside knowledge
GPO “GOOD INTELLIGENCE IS THE¶ BEST WEAPON AGAINST¶ INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM “ 2001
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-COUNTERINGTERRORISM/pdf/GPO-COUNTERINGTERRORISM-1-41.pdf
Inside information is the key to preventing attacks by terrorists. The CIA¶ must aggressively recruit
informants with unique access to terrorists’ plans.¶ That sometimes requires recruiting those who
have committed terrorist acts¶ or related crimes, just as domestic law enforcement agencies routinely¶
recruit criminal informants in order to pursue major criminal figures.¶ CIA has always had a process for
assessing a potential informant’s¶ reliability, access, and value. However, the CIA issued new guidelines
in¶ 1995 in response to concern about alleged serious acts of violence by¶ Agency sources. The guidelines
set up complex procedures for seeking¶ approval to recruit informants who may have been involved in
human¶ rights violations. In practice, these procedures have deterred and delayed¶ vigorous efforts to
recruit potentially useful informants. The CIA has created¶ a climate that is overly risk averse. This has
inhibited the recruitment¶ of essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants and forced the¶
United States to rely too heavily on foreign intelligence services. The¶ adoption of the guidelines
contributed to a marked decline in Agency¶ morale unparalleled since the 1970s, and a significant
number of case¶ officers retired early or resigned.¶ Recruiting informants is not tantamount to condoning
their prior crimes,¶ nor does it imply support for crimes they may yet commit. The long-standing¶
process in place before 1995 provided managers with adequate guidance¶ to judge the risks of going
forward with any particular recruitment.
AT: No War
Yes Nuclear War
Probability of nuclear war is more than 30% and increasing every year. But even a 1%
risk is enough to justify action, the impact is devastating.
Farber, Sho Sato Professor of Law; Co-Director, Center for Law, Energy & the Environment, 2010
***remember he cites Hellman, qualifications for Hellman near the bottom, and 2 years has passed so
the probability has increased
(Dan, Nuclear Attack a Ticking Time Bomb Experts Warn, CBS News,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nuclear-attack-a-ticking-time-bomb-experts-warn/, 7-2-14, MRZ)
Unfortunately, the fact that August 9, 1945 was the last time a nuclear bomb was detonated and 189
countries are discussing how to stop the spread of nuclear weaponry doesn't mean that the likelihood of
a nuclear bomb detonating and killing tens of thousands or even millions of people is anywhere near
zero. Various experts estimate the chances of a nuclear detonation in the next 10 years at somewhere
between 10 and 30 percent. Martin Hellman, professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford
and co-inventor of public key cryptography, estimates the odds at 1 percent per year going forward. "If
the odds are 1 percent per year, in 10 years the likelihood is almost 10 percent, and in 50 years 40
percent if there is no substantial change," he said. Martin Hellman Hellman, who has been focusing on
nuclear deterrence for the past 25 years, said that a baby born today, with an expected lifetime of 80
years, faces a greater than 50-50 chance that a nuclear weapon attack will occur unless the number of
weapons and available weapons-grade material is radically reduced. Even if the horizon for a nuclear
detonation were extended to 1,000 years, with the threat calculated at 0.1 percent per year, a child
born today would have about a 10 percent chance of not living out his or her natural life, Hellman
estimated. "The risk would be equivalent to having your home surrounded by a thousand nuclear power
plants (each with a one million year time horizon) or the equivalent of sky diving twice a week, but with
the whole world in the harness," he said. (A full explanation of Professor Hellman's modeling can be
found here.) In a 2005 survey of 85 national security experts, 60 percent of the respondents assessed
the odds of a nuclear attack within 10 years at between 10 and 50 percent, with an average of 29.2
percent. Nearly 80 percent of respondents expected the attack to originate with a terrorist group.
Matthew Bunn "Even a 1 percent chance over the next 10 years is a huge risk," said Matthew Bunn, an
associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and an expert on
nuclear proliferation and terrorism. "No one in their right mind would put a nuclear power plant upwind
of a major city that had a 1 percent chance over 10 years of blowing up." The effects of a nuclear
detonation would be catastrophic. According to Bunn, a 10-kiloton bomb (equivalent explosive power to
10,000 tons of TNT and modestly smaller than the Hiroshima bomb) detonated in midtown Manhattan
in the middle of workday could kill half a million people and cause $1 trillion in direct economic damage.
Escalation control fails in nuclear war—Differences of view and miscommunication
sparks inadvertent escalation
Krepon, 04 (Michael, Author and President Emeritus of the Henry Stimson Center, “Limited War,
Escalation Control, and the Nuclear Option in South Asia,”
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER7.pdf)
This kind of strategic analysis did not provide political leaders much comfort as to how escalation might be
controlled up to and across the nuclear threshold. Will strategists and military planners in South Asia have more
success in developing a plausible theory of, and military plans for, escalation control? Escalation control
presumed mutual agreement between nuclear rivals to fight for limited stakes. As Brodie explained,
“[T]he curtailing of our taste for unequivocal victory is one of the prices we pay to keep the physical violence, and
thus the costs and penalties, from going beyond the level of the tolerable.”5 Robert Osgood defined limited war as
“part of a general ‘strategy of conflict’ in which adversaries would bargain with each other through the medium of
graduated military responses, within the boundaries of contrived mutual restraints, in order to achieve a negotiated
settlement short of mutual destruction.”6 This assumed, of course, that both nuclear-armed adversaries
were willing to play by the same general rules – a condition, as Osgood subsequently acknowledged, that did
not apply during the Cold War. “One trouble with all strategies of local war in Europe,” he wrote in 1979, “is that
the Soviet Union has shown virtually no inclination to be a partner to them.”7 While US strategists were
constructing rungs along the escalation ladder, the Soviet General Staff was planning for a blitzkrieg across Europe .
Another reason why US strategic thinkers failed to devise a plausible theory of escalation control
during the Cold War was the inherent difficulties in communicating with an adversary whose
differences of view and objectives were so great that they would result in conflict. If
miscommunication with, or misreading of, an adversary lead to conflict, this would suggest that
communication to keep that war limited might also fail – assuming that lines of communication
remain intact. But, as Barry Posen has noted, “Inadvertent escalation may also result from the great
difficulty of gathering and interpreting the most relevant information about a war in progress and
using it to understand, control, and orchestrate the war.”8
Limited nuclear war is impossible—Fog of war, lack of intelligence, and attacks on
population centers cause escalation
Salik, 04 (Brig, Security and Defense Analyst in the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate,
“Perils of ‘Limited War’ in a Nuclear Environment,”
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_4/article/1a.htm)
Dangers of ‘Limited Nuclear War’The risks involved in a ‘limited nuclear war’ are of far greater
proportions as compared to its conventional version and, therefore, is even more undesirable as compared to
limited conventional war. This is mainly due to the tremendous destructive potential of even a limited
number of nuclear weapons, even of a less potent variety, and the universal risk of vast collateral
damage in case of any use of nuclear weapons in a supposed ‘limited war’. Another very serious practical
problem is based on the reality that any decision to use nuclear weapons would have to be taken in the midst of
ongoing conventional operations in an environment where, due to the fog of war, accurate and timely
intelligence about the adversary would be a rare commodity and the stressful conditions which the
decision makers would already be enduring would make any rational decision-making even more
difficult. Kissinger has drawn attention to another dichotomy in the thinking about ‘limited nuclear war’ saying
that, ‘as long as nuclear war is considered by analogy to conventional war, strategy will be stymied by the
incommensurability between the power of the new weapons and the rigidity of traditional tactics’30 Another
difficulty in the concept of ‘limited nuclear war’ is the fact that large population centres continue to
remain the most attractive targets for a nuclear strike. It is not hard to fathom that besides the
material destruction caused by such strikes they would also cause very serious scars on the psyche of
the decision makers, with the result that their responses will be driven more by emotions rather than
rational cost-benefit calculations. Kissinger, however, believes that, the threat of ‘limited nuclear war’ is more
credible in terms of its impact on the credibility of deterrence as opposed to conventional war. This would obviously
entail the possession of a wider variety of nuclear weapons to compound the aggressor’s risk-gain analysis. Whether
a ‘limited war’ nuclear or otherwise may remain limited would depend on the working out of a subtle equation
between the willingness of the contenders to assume risks and their ability to increase their commitments.31
Limited nuclear wars inevitably escalate because of miscalculations and inaccuracies
made by leaders
Salik, 04 (Brig, Security and Defense Analyst in the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Directorate,
“Perils of ‘Limited War’ in a Nuclear Environment,”
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_4/article/1a.htm)
‘Limited War’ can be criticised on many counts. The fundamental problem is that while a war may be
planned as a ‘limited war’ it is difficult to guarantee that it would remain limited once it is executed.
As Clausewitz rightly pointed out all war plans are only good enough till the first bullet is fired, then the
fog of war and friction takes over. Moreover, once the battle is joined the events it generates acquire a
momentum of their own and, above all, one cannot realistically predict with any degree of accuracy
the intensity and persistence of the likely responses of the adversary. The chances of events spinning
out of control and escalating to a level beyond the ‘limited war’ cannot be ruled out. Many analysts
are, therefore, critical of the concept especially in a mutual nuclear deterrent environment. In the words
of Professor John Garnett, ‘it takes two to play a game and if one side neither acknowledges nor
approves of the rules, then the game is out of the question; He forwards some key arguments militating
against the concept of ‘limited war’ as follows: ‘…that ideas of ‘limited war’ are dangerous because they
undermine rather than complement the strategy of deterrence. …that such ideas brought war back into
the realm of political practicability. …that the whole body of reasoning implied a level of rationality on
the part of decision takers that was quite unrealistic and a degree of control over the battlefield that
was technically impossible.’26 Lawrence Freedman is of the view that, ‘no operational nuclear
strategy has yet been devised that does not carry an enormous risk of degenerating into a bloody
contest of resolve, or a furious exchange of devastating and crippling blows against the political and
economic centres of the industrialised world.’27 The biggest paradox of ‘limited war’ is that the
escalation it is intended to avoid may become a necessary requirement for its termination. Garnett
has summed up the views of many Western strategists who point out that: ‘…military force is a blunt,
crude instrument, better compared with the wood cutter’s axe than the surgeon’s scalpel. Inevitably,
therefore, war is not usually a nicely calculated, precisely controlled business. More frequently it is a
bloody, messy, painful and savage affair, which because it inflames the passions, provides an
emotionally charged environment in which miscalculations and misperceptions flourish. The theory of
controlled escalation ignores the crudity of the military instrument and seriously underplays the
psychological pressure on each belligerent to misread his enemy’s moves and to misjudge his own.’28
While discussing the problems of ‘limited war’, Kissinger has highlighted its complexities and is of the
view that it poses much greater psychological problems as compared to an all-out war. He goes on to
argue that, ‘since limited wars offer no inherent guarantee against their expansion, they may
gradually merge into an all-out war’29
Weigh Consequences
It is racist not to consider consequences – the only moral stance is to consider link
turns and long-term effects.
Marc Trachtenberg, professor in the department of history at the University of Pennsylvania. He also
teaches political science courses. Source: Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Ethics and
Nuclear Deterrence (Apr., 1985), pp. 728-739 Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381047
No one today would defend slavery, of course; but the more I thought about it, the clearer it seemed
that before the Civil War one should have indeed tried to balance all the relevant considerations: that
the institution of slavery was not so absolute an evil that it was morally imperative to do whatever was
necessary to eradicate it immediately, without regard to any other consideration. In fact, if it was
obvious that it would take a war-as it turned out, a long and gruesome war-to abolish slavery, the
suffering and anguish that that war would produce should certainly have been taken into account. And
one should have given some thought to what would happen to the ex-slaves, even in the event that the
North were to win: if one could predict that there was a good chance that slavery would be replaced by
another brutal and repressive system-by in fact the kind of system that took root in the South after
Reconstruction- then this too should have been entered into the balance. And it also would have made
sense to look at just how brutal the slave system was: there are different degrees of loathsomeness, and
this could have made a difference in one's assessments. (Questions of degree are of course crucial if we
are interested in striking a balance.) Finally, arguments about peaceful alternatives -the bidding up of
the price of slaves by the federal government, for instance, to make the institution economically
irrational in comparison with free labor-would certainly have had a place; historical experience-an
analysis of the peaceful way slavery had in fact been ended in the British Empire is the most obvious
case-might also have played a central role. Why shouldn't these things all be taken into account? Are
we so convinced of the rightness of our personal moral values that we can turn a blind eye to the kinds
of considerations that might moderate the force of our commitment? One wonders even whether it
can ever be truly moral to simply refuse to weigh these sorts of factors seriously. One can take the
argument a step further by means of a hypothetical example. Suppose, in this case, that the
Southerners had told the abo- litionists that, if the North did come down to free the slaves, before
they arrived the slaves would all be killed. Certainly at this point considerations other than the moral
impermissibility of slavery would have to be taken into account. In such a case, an absolutist positionthat the institution of slavery was so great an evil that it had to be rooted out without regard to
consequence-reveals itself as inhuman and, indeed, as morally pre- posterous. There has to be some
point where issues of balance become morally salient; and thus in general these basic moral issues have
to be approached in nonabsolutist-and by that I mean more than just non- deontological-terms.
Extinction is the worst impact—prioritizing anything else puts the cart before the
horse
Schell 1982
(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 uw//wej)
Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take
up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament.
I
have pointed out that our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a
common world, we inherit from the past generations, but it does not go far enough to point out this
superior importance, as though in making our decision about ex- tinction we were being asked to
choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For the
species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of
sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to
de- stroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an
attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character. ,but even to point out this absurdity
fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for mankind is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must
protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value. To say
this is another way of saying that extinction is unique not because it destroys mankind as an object but because it destroys mankind
as the source of all possible human subjects, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that extinction is a second death, for one's
own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects. Death, how- ever, places the
mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely
because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. One even
feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us
and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are. It would be
more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever
we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.
Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent
the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life
Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at
American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online:
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm
All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist
must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said,
postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue
about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We
can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put
differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all
of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who
do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in
turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by ecocritics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental
preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty
of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if
there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the
individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as
Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity
toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept
the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in
contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience
and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At
the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and
age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead,
however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems.
Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual
insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.
War Turns Racism
Wars employ institutional racism to fuel foreign exploits
Cynthia Peters, No Date, Life After Capitalism Essays. U.S. Anti War Activism
This is a new element of war -- one that the anti-war movement needs to be more conscious of. And
that is that the war isn't limited to the bombings, nor even the economic sanctions and the free trade
agreements (which also kill and destroy), but it continues on with the waves of immigrants who come to
our country out of desperation only to do our dirty work and expose themselves to yet new ways of
being exploited by the empire beast of the north. Now they're in the belly of the beast, facing racist and
sexist institutions that humiliate them and use them as pawns in our own domestic race and class wars.
In Massachusetts, now, as well as many other communities in the United States, failing schools are being
blamed on brown Spanish-speaking people from Latin America. It's easy for the government and the
privileged to use Latin American immigrants as scapegoats because our society and our popular culture
supports the idea that you can blame what is wrong on minority communities rather than on the
powerful institutions that actually orchestrate what happens. Domestic racism makes it possible for
states to get rid of bilingual education, and allow urban schools to deteriorate to the point where even
the army finds they cannot recruit from communities of color because the kids in those communities
have not been taught how to read and write. For those people of color who can't escape the ghetto
via the military, there's always incarceration, where no education is required. Where you simply rot inside one of the main growth
industries in the United States -- prisons -- the destination for a hugely disproportionate number of those people of color. We live in a world where the lucky
immigrants in El Norte are the ones who are taking out the trash for those that sent down the helicopters and machine guns and financial planners tasked with
systematically dismantling their homes, their native economies, their way of life. So you see, the
U.S. anti-war movement has to have
fighting domestic racism on its agenda as well. Racism at home not only destroys lives inside our borders, it props up a foreign policy
that needs to be able to kill brown people with impunity. Part of the reason -- let's be frank -- that there isn't more grassroots pressure against the is war is because
N. Americans are so thoroughly steeped in racism that we
are trained to believe that brown people's lives are not worth as
much. Even if, for some reason, U.S. institutions did not need racism to help protect power and privilege for the few, we would still need racism because it is
integral to rationalizing our foreign policy. The same is true of sexism. As I was leaving Boston a few days ago, there was an article in the paper about the ongoing
defunding of the UN Family Planning Agency and Bush's imposing of the Global Gag Rule on health clinics that receive U.S. funding. That means they're not allowed
to talk about abortion as an option for pregnant women. Does Bush really care whether women in other countries have access to abortion? No. What he cares
about is having mechanisms in place that allow for the control of populations. He cares about undermining democracy and building alliances with oppressive
To enhance social control, Bush has to
daily construct and support patriarchal and social and cultural practices at home. Why? Partly because men don't
fundamentalist regimes that have their own reasons for limiting women's reproductive choices.
want political participation of women domestically, and partly because they have to create the rationalizations for the alliances they are building with elites from
other countries. By the way, I just want to texture what I am saying here by adding that the women served by these agencies are poor women. It's poor women
who won't get the abortions. George Bush doesn't want his own daughters to have to resort to back-alley abortions. And they won't have to because they have
Racism and sexism and U.S. global wars came together rather
poignantly recently. For months, in the States, the corporate media has been eagerly following the fate of Guatemalan Siamese twins who were born joined
money and they would be able to find other means.
at the head. They were brought to the UCLA Mattel hospital for months of surgeries and treatments, and Mattel picked up the bill. For those of you who don't
know, Mattel is the toy company that makes dolls for little girls. There are dolls that actually drool and pee, and give little girls early lessons in the joys of cleaning
up baby's body fluids. There are Barbie dolls with impossibly huge and gravity-defying breasts that give girls early lessons in how inherently flawed they are. So
while 200,000 peasants died in the 1980s in Guatemala at the hands a of U.S.-armed and trained military, many of these peasants brutally tortured and killed, and
all of it very easily avoidable with a few minimum policy changes in the United States, you won't hear too much talk about that in my country. We don't know the
first thing about Guatemalan peasants except that there are two lucky beneficiaries of the charitable Mattel.
War increases racism
Federal News Service, May 3, 1991, LN
As Talat has indicated, during the Second World War, when I was 10 years old, I was interned in a prison
camp by the United States government for only one reason: my heritage. By accident of birth, I am an
American of Japanese ancestry. But when the Japanese empire attacked Pearl Harbor, they attacked
every American, including Americans of Japanese ancestry. But in times of war facts are too often
waived in favor of hysteria and racism. That was a fact during World War II. It's a lesson of history that I
believe our nation has learned. But it is a lesson that must be remembered and practiced to have true
meaning. That's why I spoke out when the FBI began interviewing Americans of Arab ancestry during the
Middle East crisis. Loyal Americans of Arab ancestry targeted solely on the basis of their ethnic heritage
were being asked about their political views. They were being asked, "Are you a loyal American?" They
were being asked for the names of, quote, "disloyal," unquote, Americans of Arab ancestry. In all, it was
a specter of a new McCarthyism that was too obvious and dangerous to be ignored. If the FBI or any
other government agency chooses to tear indiscriminately at the thread or at any thread of our tapestry,
then every American must be concerned.
War causes racism
Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), March 18, 1991, LN
Unfortunately, in
times of war it is common to demonize one's enemies and to slide into the kind of racism of
which our treatment of Japanese Americans in World War II is one of the most shameful examples. It is no
small irony that one of my Saudi graduate students receives hate calls because of his Arab family name, even though Saudi Arabs have risked
their lives as our allies.
War Turns Oppression
Nuclear war increases political oppression and turns the K
Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, 1982, “How the
Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War” Published in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.
13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/82bpp.html
In addition to the important physical effects of nuclear war there would be important indirect political
effects. It seems very likely that there would be strong moves to maintain or establish authoritarian
rule as a response to crises preceding or following nuclear war. Ever since Hiroshima, the threat of
nuclear destruction has been used to prop up repressive institutions, under the pretext of defending
against the 'enemy'.[3] The actuality of nuclear war could easily result in the culmination of this trend.
Large segments of the population could be manipulated to support a repressive regime under the
necessity to defend against further threats or to obtain revenge. A limited nuclear war might kill
some hundreds of thousands or tens of millions of people, surely a major tragedy. But another tragedy
could also result: the establishment, possibly for decades, of repressive civilian or military rule in
countries such as Italy, Australia and the US, even if they were not directly involved in the war. The
possibility of grassroots mobilisation for disarmament and peace would be greatly reduced even
from its present levels. For such developments the people and the peace movements of the world are
largely unprepared.
Nuclear war causes government crackdown—turns the alt
Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, 3 September
2002, “Activism after nuclear war?” http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/02tff.html
Nuclear war would also lead to increased political repression. Martial law might be declared. Activists
would be targeted for surveillance or arrest. Dissent would become even riskier. War always brings restraints on civil liberties.
The political aftermath of September 11 - increased powers for police forces and spy agencies, increased intolerance of and
controls over political dissent -
is just a taste
of what would be in store in the aftermath of nuclear war.
Nuclear war causes exploitation of marginalized groups
Brian Martin, Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong, Australia, 1982, “How the
Peace Movement Should be Preparing for Nuclear War” Published in Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.
13, No. 2, 1982, pp. 149-159, http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/82bpp.html
There are very strong links between militarism and repression[18]: hierarchical, centralised
bureaucratic structures underlie and thrive on each of them. Any fundamental challenge to war must
challenge these structures as well. A nuclear emergency would greatly intensify the pressures both for
military intervention in civil affairs and for state-sponsored repression. This points to the need to build
very strong links between peace activists and those who are struggling against state power, such as
groups opposing political police, civil liberties groups, groups defending the rights of racial minorities,
women, homosexuals and prisoners, and groups supporting freedom of information and other checks
on bureaucracies. Also important are strong links - as already exist in many cases - between peace
groups and Third World groups struggling for justice and equality. Exploitation of people, especially in
poor countries, is as major feature of the institutions which spawn the threat of nuclear war. Third
World justice struggles are a continuing threat to these institutions. In a nuclear crisis or nuclear war,
there would be strong pressures from exploiting groups to continue or expand repression and
exploitation, for example to provide for recovery from nuclear attack. If opposition groups in exploited
countries were prepared to push their claims harder and oppose repression in a nuclear crisis, this could
both reduce the risk of nuclear war and lay the basis for ever stronger challenges to the institutions
underpinning war. This will be especially effective if opposition groups in both power blocs - for example
both eastern Europe and Latin America - increase their efforts in tandem.
Terror DA
Link – Informants Key
Informants solve counter terror—it’s a tested law enforcement tactic
Joseph Goldstein, 5-10-2014, New York Police Recruit Muslims to Be Informers," New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/nyregion/new-york-police-recruit-muslims-to-be-informers.html,
Accessed: 6-28-2015, /Bingham-MB
Detectives have long relied on informants, including drug addicts and underworld figures. But the
informants are typically asked to provide information about crimes they know about or other criminals
with whom they are acquainted. By contrast, the Citywide Debriefing Team has sought to recruit
Muslims regardless of what they know. Police officials described the interviews as voluntary, but several
Muslim immigrant interviewees reached by The Times said they were shaken by the encounters. John
Miller, the deputy commissioner in charge of the Police Department’s Intelligence Division, said the
debriefing team had emerged from the department’s urgent need in the aftermath of the Sept. 11
attacks for a cadre of sources around the city who might be helpful in counterterrorism. One way to fill
that gap, he said, was to look to the hundreds of thousands of people arrested by the department every
year. “We were looking for people who could provide visibility into the world of terrorism,” he said.
“You don’t get information without talking to people.” The debriefing team, he said, was extending an
old, proven police technique — debriefing prisoners for what they might know about local crimes — and
applying it to counterterrorism. “Has it had a learning curve?” said Mr. Miller, who previously led police
counterterrorism efforts in Los Angeles under Commissioner William J. Bratton. “Yes, but it has also
been effective.” A former lieutenant in the Intelligence Division, William McGroarty, who retired last
year, described the team as a “great asset” and said it provided “a big percentage” of the informants
who were later parceled out to other units in the Intelligence Division .
Informants are critical to stop terror attacks
Kitfield, 2011
Kitfield, James. senior fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress and a Defense
One contributor, National Journal (Jan 27, 2011)., Preventing Attacks Without Alienating Muslims,
/Bingham-MB
These Potemkin plots are part of the new normal in homeland security--and, law-enforcement officials
say, they are an indispensible tool in stopping terrorism inspired by extremist Islamist ideology. Rather
than trying to penetrate thickening layers of U.S. security, al-Qaida and its affiliates are increasingly
recruiting U.S. citizens remotely, inspiring them to launch terrorist attacks on their homeland. That
development has pushed the FBI away from its traditional role as a post-facto criminal investigative
service and transformed it primarily into a domestic intelligence agency with a mission to preempt acts
of terrorism, but in a way that still wins convictions in federal courts. On this count, the FBI has accrued
a 92 percent conviction rate in major federal terrorism cases.
Current FBI tactics are key to counter terrorism
Kitfield, 2011
Kitfield, James. senior fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress and a Defense
One contributor, National Journal (Jan 27, 2011)., Preventing Attacks Without Alienating Muslims,
/Bingham-MB
The changes in law enforcement tactics that have alarmed civil libertarians and American Muslim
advocates, however, are in many ways a direct result of the hard lessons learned in a decade of the
"global war on terror." That mission has driven the feds to explore the elusive seam between
radicalization and mobilization, and to act as circuit breaker between millions of sparks of overheated
rhetoric and the potential currents of lethal terrorist intent. It was in that seam, FBI officials say, that
they discovered an apparent live wire named Mohamed Osman Mohamud of Corvallis, Ore. Mohamud
might have lacked the know-how to pull off a terrorist spectacular, as some have contended, but
according to the Justice Department affidavit, he was searching for an experienced enabler by reaching
out to a suspected extremist in Pakistan. The plot to bomb a crowded square during a Christmas treelighting ceremony may have been grandiose, but as was the case in other recent FBI stings, it was a
scheme he designed. Mohamud might have had second thoughts, recoiling from the mental image of all
those mangled bodies of women and children; yet every time undercover agents offered him that offramp, Mohamud drove on. He may be just another hotheaded young man willing to pull the trigger, but
that profile matches a lot of successful terrorists. In balancing security and civil liberties, FBI officials
insist they don't launch investigations or surveillance without some indication of wrongdoing, and they
deny engaging in ethnic or religious profiling. "But we are ... focused on identifying and preempting the
threats we see on the horizon," a senior bureau official said. "That means our special agents in charge
have to reach out and interact with all the communities we are supposed to protect, and to see in the
seams between cases.... There's no question that we have adopted a zero-tolerance attitude in terms of
terrorism, because we think that's what the American public expects of us."
Key to counter terror—can’t let down our guard
Michael Howard Saul, 2-24-2012, Bloomberg Defends NYPD Monitoring of Muslim Groups," WSJ,
http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/02/24/bloomberg-defends-nypd-monitoring-of-muslim-groups/,
Accessed: 7-1-2015, /Bingham-MB
Mayor Michael Bloomberg declared Friday the New York Police Department will not back away from its
controversial monitoring of Muslim groups in several states and suggested the surveillance practices
that have sparked a firestorm of criticism could be ongoing today. Asked specifically whether the NYPD
continues the very practices that have been described by elected officials in New Jersey and elsewhere
as deeply offensive, Bloomberg replied, “Let me be careful how I phrase it — we have not let down our
guard.” “We take the threats of today just as seriously as the threats of Sept. 12, 2001,“ he added,
referring to the day after terrorists toppled the Twin Towers. “We have not forgotten the lesson of that
terrible day on 9/11 and we are not going to forget that .” The mayor described the monitoring of
Muslim groups as “legal,” “appropriate,” and “constitutional.” While the mayor declined to detail the
specifics of current NYPD practices, he made it clear Friday that the Police Department would not
hesitate to employ the same tactics that have sparked the controversy. “We are going to continue to
take all possible legal steps to keep this city safe,” he said. “We are going to follow all possible leads,
wherever they take us. We’re not going to let up. We’re not going to walk away. We are going to,
however, at the same time, obey the law.”
American Muslim informants have successfully prevented a terrorist attack on the US.
(Daniel Greenfield, a Shillman Journalism Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center, is a New York
writer focusing on radical Islam,
6-21-2015, "Ohio "Islamic State in America" Muslim Wanted to
Behead Christians, Jews, his Own Son," Front page Mag,
http://www.frontpagemag.com/point/258827/ohio-islamic-state-america-muslim-wanted-beheaddaniel-greenfield)//Colt45
The religion of peace really seems to be making Muslims converts better people. Just take Amir Said
Abdul Rahman Al-Ghazi aka Robert C. McCollum aka Amir al Ghazi who was really committed to this
whole Islamic State thing. Al-Ghazi made comments to a total of three FBI informants, according to the
complaint, at times stating he thinks it's okay to behead Christians, Jews, and atheists. Al-Ghazi also
referred to Iraqis as his "brothers and sisters," the complaint states, and told one informant that he had
ideas for a terrorist attack in the U.S., including attacking a police station or derailing a train. But, AlGhazi said he wasn't interested in becoming a martyr, but rather told an informant that he "wanted to
get away with it," the complaint states. Al-Ghazi Tweeted that he was the "Islamic State in America". On
Twitter, he said, "We have to fight, we are commanded by Allah to fight" and "Jihad is our only option to
establish the law of Allah everywhere." He told an informant he "had no qualms with killing kuffar (nonMuslims") and declared, "If I kill one of these mother f___ I go to heaven." "The Mujahadeen of America
will realize that we will be the tip of the sword of the Caliphate," he claimed. Al-Ghazi's crimes were
guided by Islamic law, inquiring about the right to rob non-Muslims. "Can I rob house to get what I
need? Kuffar houses... Like they're wealth is lawful right?"
Informants necessary for solving the war on terror
Meghan Neal “You'll Never Guess How Many Terrorist Plots the NSA's Domestic Spy Program Has
Foiled” January 13, 2014 http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/youll-never-guess-how-many-terroristplots-the-nsas-domestic-spy-program-has-foiled
At the end of this week President Obama is expected to finally answer the mounting calls to curtail the
NSA's bloated power to invade its citizens' privacy by spying on millions of Americans' communications.
But the president is going to have a hard time falling back on the old standby explanation that massive
data collection is a necessary evil to protect the country from terrorism.¶ A new analysis of terrorism
charges in the US found that the NSA's dragnet domestic surveillance "had no discernible impact" on
preventing terrorist acts. Instead, the majority of threats over the last decade were detected by regular
old intelligence and law enforcement methods—tips, informants, CIA and FBI ops, routine law
enforcement.
Informants involved in a substantial number of terror cases
Bailey Cahall David Sterman Emily Schneider Peter Bergen (Internet Security Advisory Council)
“PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS?” January 13, 2014 https://www.newamerica.org/internationalsecurity/do-nsas-bulk-surveillance-programs-stop-terrorists/
Additionally, a careful review of three of the key terrorism cases the government has cited to defend
NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals that government officials have exaggerated the role of the NSA
in the cases against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of the threat posed
by a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange. In 28 percent of the cases we reviewed, court
records and public reporting do not identify which specific methods initiated the investigation. These
cases, involving 62 individuals, may have been initiated by an undercover informant, an undercover
officer, a family member tip, other traditional law enforcement methods, CIA- or FBI-generated
intelligence, NSA surveillance of some kind, or any number of other methods. In 23 of these 62 cases (37
percent), an informant was used. However, we were unable to determine whether the informant
initiated the investigation or was used after the investigation was initiated as a result of the use of some
other investigative means. Some of these cases may also be too recent to have developed a public
record large enough to identify which investigative tools were used.
Politics
Link – Unpopular
Plan is politically controversial
Associated Press 6/8/2009 “FBI chief defends use of informants in mosques”
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31177049/ns/world_news-terrorism/#.VZVmkvlViko
FBI agents and prosecutors say spying on mosques is one of the best weapons to uncover lurking
terrorists or threats to national security, but it has posed a politically and legally thorny issue with
Muslims who see themselves as unjustly monitored.¶ "The FBI needs to do what it needs to do,
certainly," Syed said. But the agency is "trying to incite and entrap" law-abiding people.¶ Mueller also
said that there will be no change in the FBI's priorities in the new administration.¶ "I would not expect
that we would in any way take our foot off the pedal of addressing counterterrorism," he said.¶ "My
expectation is that we'll see an uptick in terms of resources devoted toward our domestic criminal
responsibilities, but we will not ... relax our responsibilities when it come to counterterrorism or
counterintelligence," he added.
Link – Muslim Surveillance – Fights
Changing surveillance causes anti-Muslim fights
Jeremy Herb, TheHill, 10-22-2013, Reps. King, Ellison clash over surveillance of Muslim community,"
http://thehill.com/video/house/296613-lawmakers-clash-over-surveillance-of-muslim-community,
Accessed: 7-2-2015, /Bingham-MB
Reps. Peter King (R-N.Y.) and Keith Ellison (D-Minn.) sharply disagreed Sunday over whether the FBI
needs to do more to watch U.S. Muslim communities in the wake of the Boston attacks. King, former
chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that the terrorism
threat is coming from the Muslim community, even if most Muslims are not involved in it. “It’s coming
from the community,” King said. “In previous times when certain elements of a community were
responsible for crime, the police focused on it.” But Ellison, who was the first Muslim elected to
Congress, said that focusing on a community based on religion or ethnicity was “ineffective” law
enforcement. “What you do is you ignore dangerous threats that are not in that community, and you go
after people who don’t have anything to do with it,” Ellison said in a panel discussion with King.
“Muslim leaders all across the country have roundly condemned most recent attack, and terrorism more
broadly,” he added.
Link – Spying Popular – Conservatives
Muslim spying is popular with conservatives
Adam Serwer, 4-16-2014, NYPD ends controversial Muslim spying unit," MSNBC,
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/nypd-bill-de-blasio-shutters-controversial-muslim-unit, Accessed: 7-12015, /Bingham-MB
Nevertheless, conservatives have generally been supportive of the NYPD spying on Muslim
communities without evidence of a crime , despite the absence of any evidence at all that the
Demographics Unit was effective in protecting the city. New York Republican Congressman Peter King,
who is seeking to become the next chairman of the House intelligence committee, said on Fox News in
2012 that “almost 90% of terrorist crimes are carried out by the Muslim community” and called for the
NYPD not to “give into political correctness.”
Anti-Muslim sentiment in congress
Miranda Blue, 9-11-2014, GOP Members Of Congress Join Anti-Muslim Group ACT For America At
Capitol Hill Briefing," No Publication, http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/gop-members-congressjoin-anti-muslim-group-act-america-capitol-hill-briefing, Accessed: 7-2-2015, /Bingham-MB
ACT for America, the anti-Muslim group run by Brigitte Gabriel, held a legislative briefing on Capitol Hill
today where it was joined by Republican members of Congress including Minnesota Rep. Michele
Bachmann, Texas Rep. Louie Gohmert, South Carolina Rep. Jeff Duncan, Illinois Rep. Peter Roskam, and
Arkansas Sen. John Boozman. Gabriel posted pictures on Facebook and Twitter of Boozman, Bachmann
and Gohmert speaking and of Roskam receiving the group’s “Patriot Award.” Duncan tweeted that he
was planning on speaking to the gathering. Gabriel wrote that she had planned on presenting another
award to Sen. Ted Cruz, but that he was unable to attend.
Counterplan
CP – End Racial Profiling Act
Counterplan – End Racial Profiling act
Hanley, 2012
Hanley, Delinda C. executive director and news editor at The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs31.4 (Jun/Jul 2012): 27-28., It's Time to End Racial,
Religious and Ethnic Profiling of Americans, /Bingham-MB
Glenn Katon of the organization Muslim Advocates called on concerned Americans to urge Congress to
pass the End Racial Profiling Act. It may not wipe racial profiling, bigotry and discrimination offthe map,
he acknowledged, but it could bring about civilized discussions on race, religion and ethnic origin.
Among other things, this legislation, sponsored by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Rep. John Conyers (DMI), would provide training to help police avoid responses based on stereotypes and unreliable
assumptions about minorities. Katon also called for members of Congress and all public officials to
refrain from making false and inflammatory statements about any religion, or ethnic, racial or religious
group, and to condemn those public officials who engage in hateful rhetoric or actions.
CP – Reform Entrapment
CP—reform entrapment laws
Said, 2010
Said, Wadie E. Professor of Law, graduate of Princeton University and the Columbia University School of
Law, where he served as an articles editor of the Columbia Human Rights Law Review."The terrorist
informant." Washington Law Review 85.4 (2010): 687+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015.
/Bingham-MB
All of the above analysis underscores the ineffectiveness of the entrapment defense in its current guise
in a terrorism case involving an informant. Some scholars advocate that courts should apply the
objective test in cases involving informant-driven stings. (291) In a recent article analyzing several of the
prosecutions discussed here, Jon Sherman makes a series of sensible recommendations on how to
reform the entrapment defense. (292) He first proposes to alter the definition of entrapment to require
the government to demonstrate that the defendant initiated the contact with the informant. Sherman
goes on to argue that some acts should be complete bars to prosecution: constant government
persuasion to commit the felony over the defendant's hesitance; misrepresenting the illegality of the
conduct; the only connection to the jihadist organization being the informant's cover story; and
government incitement of religious fervor. (293) He argues that evidence of a defendant's political and
religious views should be allowed only when it is probative of the defendant actually committing the
crime in question. (294) He concludes with a series of policy arguments supporting his
recommendations, which essentially state that informant use is inefficient, of dubious constitutionality,
and risks alienating the Muslim community, whose assistance is crucial to investigating terrorism in the
United States. (295)
CP – Community Policing
Increasing community policing solves trust
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
Community policing is not something that can be easily defined because it involves an organizational
strategy that redefines the goals of policing while leaving the means to achieve those goals to police
officers. Therefore, community policing models are diverse (Herbert 2006; Skogan and Hartnett 1997).
According to Skogan and Hartnett (1997, 5), [c]ommunity policing relies upon organizational
decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way communication between
police and the public. It assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and
requires that police be responsive to citizens' demands when they decide what local problems are and
set their priorities. It also implies a commitment to helping neighbourhoods solve crime problems on
their own, through community organizations and crime prevention programs. What is particularly
surprising about the definition of community policing as set out above is the absence of the notion of
trust. This serves to illustrate the lack of any substantial focus upon trust within literature on community
policing. Therefore, it seems that future definitions of community policing should include the notion of
trust. As the findings of this article suggest, an absence of trust can put severe limitations on
community-police initiatives. One suggested definition of community policing here is: community
policing comprises community-oriented goals and objectives. It relies upon community consent in
relation to policing initiatives and operations within communities. Trust between community members
and police officers is an essential component of community policing.
Solves cooperation and intelligence
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
Importantly, Skogan and Roth (2004) view community policing as being the most important
development in policing over the last 25 years. Indeed, according to Virta (2008), although it has
previously been argued that community policing is no longer "en vogue," having been replaced by
intelligence-led policing, community policing is still very much prominent in policing agendas. In Britain,
since 9/11, and as a result of events, such as the urban disturbances in northern English towns in 2001,
and the more recent spate of terror attacks in the United Kingdom, community-based and intelligenceled policing models have come to be viewed as being complementary, with police services engaging with
communities as part of a wider strategy of securing community-based intelligence so as to respond to
local, regional, national, and international security risks (Hughes and Rowe 2007). Community
intelligence might be thought of as comprising of community sentiments and concerns, concerns that
may be linked to more standard forms of intelligence that police gather in terms of information about
criminal activities, but which may also go beyond this to include information concerning tensions
between individuals and communities, tensions which may have cultural, geographical, religious, racial,
and other underpinnings. Community intelligence also includes citizens' stories concerning their lives,
which may, in a counter-terrorism context, be particularly pertinent given that some individuals may
have first-hand accounts of their interactions with terrorist suspects, either in the United Kingdom or in
other places around the world (see Haqq-Baker 2010).
Community policing overcomes trust deficit in national policies
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
At the same time, national politics also come into play. Within the Prevent agenda, there appear to be
normative assumptions concerning what kinds of Muslim identities should be engaged by the police and
other state authorities. Muslim identities that appear to value the ummah over or even alongside
feelings of Britishness, or who appear to isolate themselves from wider society, can be negatively
judged, viewed as a threat to social cohesion and thus actively marginalized from engagement processes
(Spalek, El-Awa, and McDonald 2009; Spalek and Imtoual 2007; Spalek and Lambert 2008). Events that
take place outside of police-community engagement, for example the bugging of MP Sadiq Khan, can
create tension, placing strain upon ongoing dialogue and partnership work. As one Muslim community
member observed, the main issue just at the minute is the bugging of the MP when he visited Babu
Ahmed recently... bugging an MP in this country is totally illegal and...of course why was it a Muslim
MP? I can not imagine the authorities going eavesdropping upon a non-Muslim MP. Directly we get the
impression well we are being targeted. It's always our community that seems to be zoned in on or
focused upon as being a threat. (Muslim Community Member [6] 2007) It may be the case that while
trust existed between MCU police officers and members of Muslim communities, there was also a
degree of trust in the MCU as a small policing unit, and so wider events like the bugging of a Muslim MP
did not necessarily impact negatively upon trust between community members and police officers
within the MCU. This suggests that in contexts characterized by a quick turnover of police officers then
incoming police officers might be able to build on the trust already placed in a specific policing unit like
the MCU. The work of the MCU demonstrates that implicit trust between police officers and members
of Muslim communities can enable effective partnerships to exist despite considerable strains being
placed due to international and national political and other processes. MCU officers built implicit trust
through officers spending many years gaining an in-depth understanding of the Muslim population of
London, a major task due to the layers of complexity making up this diverse population. This has
involved many years of sustained and focused engagement, which may include things like taking part in
seminars concerning terrorism hosted by community members, attending wedding or death
ceremonies, responding to religious hate crimes experienced by community members. As one Muslim
community participant observed, and he [MCU officer] used to visit people in their homes. Not to ask for
information, but on social gatherings. To participate in weddings, in death ceremonies. So he made good
social relations... This is social. So they [MCU officers] attended all my seminars, especially on terrorism
and the training courses. (Muslim Community Member [7] 2008)
Bottom up approaches solve
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
Underpinning the methodology of the MCU has been an active concern to understand and explore the
root causes of terrorism and ways of countering it from the perspectives of Muslim community
members. This methodology, implicit within the working practices of the MCU, may be conceptualized
as a more grass roots orientated, horizontal "bottom-up" approach to engagement , within a counterterrorism arena dominated by state-centric "top-down" approaches that fail to understand terrorism
and counter-terrorism through the perspectives and experiences of those who comprise "suspect
communities." Meaningful dialogue also involves police officers endeavoring to answer queries that
communities have in relation to issues such as the scope of counter-terror powers and investigations
and possible impacts on communities, and reassuring community members that police officers are keen
to support communities if experiencing Islamophobic attacks and/or racism. For example, one MCU
officer said, we are very transparent you know, we are counter-terrorism police officers, our interest is
Al-Qaeda, you know, do you have any kind of, any broad knowledge of this phenomena, can we have a
discussion and that was our question that I think we, at the outset, we were also very equally interested
in communities' wider responses you know, how they felt, how they felt about 9/11, how they felt about
the response to 9/11 so far, so those early discussions were very broad ranging. (Police Officer [2] 2007)
CP – Higher Muslim Police
CP higher Muslim police officers
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
The role of Muslim police officers within the MCU also has to be noted here, as Muslim police officers
have been instrumental in building bridges with members of mosques, developing trusting relationships
with mosque communities and then extending these relationships to the non-Muslim police officers
working on the MCU. They have also brought important cultural and religious understandings to the
unit. The following is a quotation from an interview with a Muslim MCU police officer. Well one critical
factor in our success is having officers on the unit who are experienced Special Branch officers, working
together hand in hand with Muslim officers who have an experience in policing community matters and
live and work amongst that community with a certain degree of religious credibility and respect. Why?
Because when you're dealing with people who are very passionate about their religion, who are
prepared, in many cases, to die for their religion because Jihad or whatever, they feel very strongly ...
You have to have religious sincerity and credibility, again community credibility and respect to be able to
turn round and engage and help engage. There are people that we go and talk to where we open the
doors for our colleagues to come and join us and talk to them. (Police Officer [3] 2008) This article
illustrates the importance of police officers' religious identities as Muslims when considering the role of
trust. It appears that, within the context of "new terrorism," Muslim police officers working within the
MCU had to trust the role, focus, and methodology of this policing unit, as the following quotation from
a Muslim MCU officer illustrates.
CP – Community Building
Developing Muslim communities solves
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
It may be that in a low-trust context, as characterized by "new terrorism," it is more important for police
officers to focus initially upon building contingent trust which, Goldsmith (2005) argues, can later
become implicit trust which is a more advanced type of trust that can be found in committed, stable
relationships. Contingent trust is about building trust through being engaged in trust-building activities
and through actors demonstrating their trustworthiness (Goldsmith 2005). Contingent trust is likely to
be instrumental in that it looks at shorter-term rather than longer-term objectives and seeks
confirmation through exchange relations. Goldsmith's conceptualization of contingent trust appears to
be validated by the research data in this article, for example one community member observed. Now,
there is this, this, formality, this relationship which has been built on trust, the police service have had
to trust us and have had to see our competences and our, our results, our activities. And we also have
had to trust them as well and, and see some of their, you know, what they've done. And so now at least
these thing can come to, you know, they can come to an eventual end, whether it's been achieved or it
hasn't been achieved and then we can go back to the community and say "you know what? There's no
point in engaging with them because they never do anything." Because look, this is it. We've got
evidence. These are our minutes, these are our activities, and this is what they have said. So I think this
is positive and this accountability and this partner...and this is where the partnership is. (Muslim
Community Member [3] 2008) Research data in relation to the MCU would suggest that MCU police
officers were engaged in activities underpinned by an implicit methodology of building instrumental,
contingent, trust. MCU officers were demonstrating their trustworthiness to Muslim community
members through supporting independent community interests, and providing advice or other forms of
support to help communities develop their own projects aimed at preventing terrorism. For example,
community members have approached the MCU with ideas for projects which officers have been
instrumental in facilitating, such as helping to provide advice on sources of funding and the writing of
applications, as the following quotation from an MCU officer illustrates. It's not X and me sort of working
with people who want to run a boxing club or people who want to do a project to keep young kids off
the street and so on. We don't say to them you should do this, this and this. Where we see them is this,
is this a project? Will it fit counter-terrorism objectives and things? And then we will again, brokering is a
good word. We will help them to go and arrange a meeting with them, help them with whatever else
help they need. And that's the partnership. (Police Officer (1) 2007)
Community building establishes reciprocity
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
This study has found that an important way for police officers to build instrumental trust with
communities within the low-trust context of "new terrorism" is through empowering them by helping
individuals and groups to access funding for projects as well as helping communities to implement
changes that they wish to make in order to prevent terror crime. Thus, the MCU has worked toward
contributing to Muslim community members' security through empowering communities with some of
the resources they need for managing unease and uncertainty (Loader 2006). The work of the MCU
illustrates the importance of reciprocity--that for communities to work with police, it is important for
officers to reciprocate efforts by helping communities tackle issues of concern to them. This includes
responding to violence experienced by members of Muslim communities and has involved MCU officers
helping to facilitate public demonstrations, as the following quotation from a Muslim community
member illustrates. I mean to be honest, you know, X [MCU police officer], he was the guy who I think
on most things was great, you know, any issues that I had with regards to whether it's people that had
been beaten up by the police, to something like a demonstration when we wanted to get permission to
have a march through Y and the police were being difficult there... ring X [MCU police officer] and he
would sort it out. (Muslim Community Member [4] 2008)
Community building police offers best way to build trust
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
Importantly, another aspect to the work of the MCU was in building implicit relationships of trust with
some community members. Implicit trust is found in committed, stable relationships and is less focused
upon short-term outcomes than contingent trust (Goldsmith 2005). It may be that while building
contingent trust should be an aim for police officers when interacting with members of Muslim
communities generally due to the low-trust context of "new terrorism," building implicit trust is key for
establishing long-term partnerships with those key members (notably, but not exclusively, members of
Islamist and Salafi minorities) of Muslim communities who are best placed for intervention work with
those deemed "at risk" from committing acts of terrorism. This suggests that while contingent trust can
be a goal for police officers generally, building implicit trust requires specialist police officers based in
specialist units as this requires more time, for established relationships to develop between officers and
community members. Within the current context where police officers are rapidly moved from one
policing area and unit to the next, it may be that the goal of building contingent trust is achievable due
to the short-term and instrumental nature of the trust that is being built. However, in order for the most
sensitive prevention work to take place it may be that implicit trust is an important feature between all
those engaged in such initiatives and this implies the need for specialist police officers working within
specialist policing units who are not subject to being moved so quickly from one area of policing to the
next.
CP – Transparency
Transparency solves
Spalek, 2010
Spalek, Basia. "Community policing, trust, and Muslim communities in relation to 'new terrorism'."
Politics & Policy 38.4 (2010): 789+. Academic OneFile. Web. 28 June 2015. /Bingham-MB
The research data from the study of the MCU being reported in this article would suggest that an
important part of building actual trust within a counter-terrorism context between MCU officers and
Muslims has been openness and transparency. This has involved MCU police officers openly telling
community members that they are counter-terror police officers working within a specialist unit. MCU
officers that were interviewed argued that to be trusted by community members they have had to build
up sincere relationships that are based upon being frank concerning the unit's remit. Without such
honesty, the climate of fear generated by counter-terror laws and operations in Muslim communities
cause people to be distrustful of any approaches from police, particularly those that are not clearly
defined. Thus, as one MCU officer argued, we talked to people sometimes that ordinarily wouldn't have
even dreamed about talking to us as a Police Service, let alone as a Intelligence Service or counterterrorism officers, okay, cause that's what we are, we're counterterrorism officers. You can't get away
from that okay, so we don't pretend that we're anything else, we don't go round here and have a false
identity or anything like that, you can't have that. It has to be trusted, open, sincere relationship and if
it's not sincere, you can forget it. (Police Officer (1) 2007) While this transparent approach to counterterrorism policing is not one that has been adopted by all police services around the United Kingdom,
it would suggest that transparency can be an effective way through which to build actual trust
between police officer and Muslim community members . Indeed, the MCU has, within its remit,
succeeded in reclaiming a mosque from hardcore violent extremist supporters and helped to put
together community-based initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism in London (Lambert 2010).
CP – Attack ISIS
Adv CP – hard terror tactics k2 solve ISIS
Boot, 6/28/15
Max Boot, 6-28-2015, leading military historian and foreign-policy analyst. The Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations , An ISIS Terror Attack on
US Is Coming," Commentary Magazine, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/2015/06/28/isisterror-attack-on-the-us/, Accessed: 6-29-2015, /Bingham-MB
How should the U.S. respond? There will be calls, of course, for greater international cooperation
against the ISIS threat, and that’s fine as far as it goes. But no amount of international policing can stop
every nutcase who, inspired by ISIS’s example, decides to kill some of his neighbors. There is only one
way to dispel the appeal of ISIS, and that is to destroy its self-styled caliphate . Even suicide bombers
are reluctant to fight in a losing cause. ISIS has been so appealing of late, especially to foreigners (more
than 1,000 of whom flock to join its ranks every month), precisely because it has been so successful. But
dispelling that aura of success will require doing a heck of a lot more than the U.S. is doing at present.
Michele Flournoy, a former under secretary of defense in the Obama administration, has just coauthored an op-ed with Richard Fontaine, president of the Center for a New American Security, which
offers some sensible suggestions. They suggest, among other steps, providing arms directly to Sunni
tribes and the Kurdish peshmerga, without channeling all aid through Baghdad as the U.S. is now doing;
allowing Special Operations Forces and forward air controllers to accompany Iraqi forces into battle,
intensifying air strikes, and increasing support to the non-jihadist Syrian opposition. These are all
sensible ideas, which echo suggestions long put forward by many other analysts (including me). But they
all have one thing in common: They haven’t been implemented by the Obama administration, because is
putting his non-interventionist ideology ahead of the need to destroy ISIS (a goal that Obama explicitly
set for the U.S. armed forces). I hope that President Obama pays greater attention to the advice offered
by one of his own erstwhile high-level appointees than to the views of the rest of us, but I’m not terribly
optimistic. Obama, despite sending 350 more personnel to Iraq recently, appears to be in a holding
pattern with ISIS, doing some damage but not doing enough to defeat it. That’s a recipe for disaster
because as long as ISIS appears secure in its caliphate it will be free to extend its international reign of
terror.