China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
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China DA
Contents
China DA ........................................................................................................................................... 1
1NC Shell ....................................................................................................................................................2
UNIQUENESS ..............................................................................................................................................7
LINKS........................................................................................................................................................ 11
Ocean Cleanup Links ............................................................................................................................ 12
Aquaculture Links................................................................................................................................. 14
Precautionary Principle Links ............................................................................................................... 19
IMPACTS .................................................................................................................................................. 21
Impacts – Economic and Political Decline............................................................................................ 22
Impacts – Taiwan War.......................................................................................................................... 26
A2: Impact Turns – Economy ............................................................................................................... 28
AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS.................................................................................................................. 30
NON-UNIQUE ........................................................................................................................................... 31
NO LINK.................................................................................................................................................... 34
NO IMPACT .............................................................................................................................................. 38
No Econ Impact .................................................................................................................................... 39
No Government Collapse Impact ......................................................................................................... 43
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1NC Shell
A) Uniqueness
China is currently expanding its maritime influence in the Pacific. The current situation is stable but
uneasy, and China would consider US involvement an encroachment on its sphere of influence. Increasing
civilian maritime activity has the most potential to cause conflict.
International Crisis Group ’12 [Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional ResponsesCrisis Group Asia Report N°229, 24 July
2012. The International Crisis Group is an international collection of leading experts in international business and political affairs, made up
for current and former business executives and high level political officials]
The South China Sea dispute between China and some of its South East Asian neighbours – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – has reached an
impasse. Increasingly assertive positions among claimants have pushed regional tensions to new heights. Driven by
potential hydrocarbon reserves and declining fish stocks, Vietnam and the Philippines in particular are taking a more confrontational
posture with China. All claimants are expanding their military and law enforcement capabilities, while growing
nationalism at home is empowering hardliners pushing for a tougher stance on territorial claims . In addition, claimants
are pursuing divergent resolution mechanisms; Beijing insists on resolving the disputes bilaterally, while Vietnam and the Philippines are actively engaging
the U.S. and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To counter diminishing prospects of resolution of the conflicts, the countries should
strengthen efforts to promote joint development of hydrocarbon and fish resources and adopt a binding code of conduct for all parties to the dispute. The
extent and vagueness of China’s claims to the South China Sea, along with its assertive approach, have rattled
other claimants. But China is not stoking tensions on its own. South East Asian claimants, with Vietnam and the Philippines in the
forefront, are now more forcefully defending their claims – and enlisting outside allies – with considerable energy. Crisis Group’s first report in this twopart
series, Stirring up the South China Sea (I), described how China’s internal dynamics shape its actions in the region. This second report focuses on factors in
the other regional countries that are aggravating tensions. South China Sea claimants are all anxious to pursue oil and gas exploration
in the portions of the sea that they claim, and are concerned with protecting their claimed fishing grounds as
coastal waters become depleted. This makes skirmishes more likely. Further complicating matters, control over
resources in the sea is a nationalist issue for all claimants, making it more difficult for governments to de-escalate
incidents and restricting their ability to cooperate on initiatives that could lessen tensions. Among those in South East Asia,
the Vietnamese government is under the most domestic pressure to defend the country’s territorial claims against China. Although China and many
other[s] South East Asian states have embarked on modernisation programs for their navies, it is the increasing number
of civilian vessels patrolling disputed waters that presents the greatest potential for conflict. They have been
involved in recent incidents. In spite of being more lightly armed and less threatening than navy ships, civilian
law enforcement vessels are easier to deploy, operate under looser chains of command and engage more readily in
skirmishes. While incidents in the sea have not led to actual armed conflict since 1988, they have crystallised
anxiety about the shifting balance of power in the region. South East Asian claimants feel that their options are limited to bilateral
discussions with China; attempts to include other actors such as the U.S. and ASEAN; and arbitration provided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). South East Asian states know they lack the clout to face China one-on-one. Vietnam and the Philippines in particular are seeking to increase
their leverage vis-à-vis China by internationalising the issue. Beijing insists on resolving disputes bilaterally, where its economic and political clout carry the
most weight. [China] strongly opposes efforts of South East Asian countries to deepen cooperation with outside
actors, and perceives the U.S. strategic shift towards Asia as purposely containing its rise.
A lack of unity among China’s
rival claimants, coupled with the weakness of the regional multilateral framework, has hampered the search for a solution. International law has been used
selectively by claimants to justify assertive actions in the sea, instead of as a means to resolve disputes. ASEAN, the leading multilateral forum for
discussing the issue, has also proven ineffective in reducing tensions.Divisions between member states, stemming from different perspectives on the South
China Sea and differences in the value each member places on their relations with China, have prevented ASEAN from coming to a consensus on the issue.
China has worked actively to exploit these divisions, offering preferential treatment to ASEAN members that do not side with its rival claimants. As a result,
no code of conduct on the management of South China Sea disputes has been agreed, and ASEAN is increasingly divided. While the likelihood of major
conflict remains low, all of the trends are in the wrong direction, and prospects of resolution are diminishing. Joint
management of resources in the disputed areas could help reduce tensions among claimants, but the only attempt so far by China, Vietnam and the
Philippines to jointly conduct seismic survey in disputed areas failed in 2008. Since then, claimants have strongly resisted compromising their territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights, which would be necessary to undertake such projects. In the absence of regional agreement on policy options or an effective
mechanism to mitigate and de-escalate incidents, this strategically important maritime domain will remain unstable.
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B) Link
Maritime rights in the Pacific are a flashpoint. China will perceive the plan as an act of power politics,
resulting in economic conflict and military tensions.
Center for A New American Security ’12
[“Cooperation from Strength – The United States, China, and the South China Sea”.January
2012. Contributors: Patrick M. Cronin, Peter A. Dutton, M. Taylor Fravel, James R. Holmes, Robert D. Kaplan, Will Rogers and Ian Storey. Patrick M.
Cronin is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. Peter A. Dutton is a
Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College. M. Taylor Fravel is an Associate
Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. James R. Holmes is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Robert D. Kaplan is a
Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Will Rogers is a Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security. Ian Storey is a
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf]
The issue of whether the Western Pacific remains an open, stable and prosperous maritime commons
or increasingly
becomes a polarized hotbed of contestation with Cold War-like rigidities is likely to be settled in this critical body of water. The South China Sea is where
countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines face “Finlandization” by China if U.S. naval and air power diminishes. The South China Sea, in
short, is where globalization and geopolitics collide. […] Whereas the other countries of the region maintain specific
territorial claims based on their coastlines, China claims the vast middle of the Sea itself.
In the not-too-distant future,
China’s reemergence and its concomitant ability not only to press these claims but back them with military capabilities may call into question the credibility
of American military might and decades of U.S. regional predominance: predominance that has kept regional disputes from escalating into warfare. […]
Chinese commentators and officials deny any malevolent intent regarding the United States in the South China Sea and
sing the oft-heard refrain that such zero-sum thinking is a relic of the past. Yet although the Cold War is history,
power politics is not. These denials mask Chinese national interests. Although China has historically been a land power looking inward to
Eurasia, it is increasingly poised to become a naval power, a trend facilitated by China’s success in easing tensions on its numerous land
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borders. In the past three decades, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has grown from an auxiliary force supporting amphibious operations against Taiwan
to an offshore defensive force to a budding blue-wate naval force aiming to push foreign navies out of its “near seas.” China’s resources and
goods flow primarily through the oceans, and in at least this sense, geography appears to be destiny. Given that almost
all of the region’s countries depend on China for trade and economic development, most will be very cautious in their dealings with Beijing – whether it is
democratic or authoritarian – and will try to believe in China’s benign intentions. China’s power is not merely a matter of more
submarines and new military means. It is also based on China’s demographic heft, economic dominance and
geographical centrality to the region. China will be eager to leverage its relationships in the South China Sea to
accommodate its stature as a dominant power and to extract concessions or favorable conditions. On the other hand, the
closer countries move toward China, the more they also want to hedge against its power. Although China tries to use hard power softly (for instance, by
relying on civilian law enforcement rather than naval forces to support its maritime claims in the South China Sea), its neighbors sometimes flinch at even
Chinese soft power in the form of trade, aid and cooperation. The past few years suggest that most countries in the region are keen to preserve the presence
of U.S. warships and fighter jets as a safety net. Countries in the region are equally keen not to see the United States stir up tensions with China, which is
why, immediately after the United States flexes some muscle, the region is filled with stories asking whether the United States is instigating a new Cold
War.23 Chinese officials are seeking, as Taylor Fravel and Peter Dutton argue elsewhere in this volume, to exploit this constraint by balancing occasional
exertions of assertiveness with more frequent exercises of diplomatic reassurance. China will wish to prevent any anti-China balancing
behavior from emerging. […] Few believe that China seeks conflict. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case. China probably prefers an indirect
approach and may wish for influence without ever resorting to brute force. If China can tip the balance of power in its favor, it can
increasingly dominate its smaller neighbors while incrementally nudging the U.S. Navy further and further out
behind the Western Pacific’s first island chain.32 Experts on the region describe this as Finlandization. This term is defined by its
ambiguity: The Soviet Union’s dominance of Finland’s foreign policy during the Cold War was generally not overt. Yet Finland knew there were lines it
could not cross, and thus its sovereignty was demonstrably compromised. This is exactly what Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines
fear. Taiwan, at the South China Sea’s northern extremity, may already be in stages of Finlandization, with 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles focused on it
from the Chinese mainland, even as hundreds of commercial flights per week link it with China.33 […]Since 2009, the competition for
maritime rights in the South China Sea has emerged as the most important security issue in East Asia. Indeed, one
analyst even declared recently that the South China Sea is the “new central theater of conflict” in the world.1 […]
To analyze and assess the risk of armed conflict in the South China Sea, this chapter reviews trends in regional maritime security during the past few years,
including territorial sovereignty over island groups, maritime rights to exploit resources in the water column and seabed
and freedom of navigation. Competition over each of these issues could increase regional instability or even lead
to armed conflict. However, opportunities for increased cooperation on security issues also exist. Looking forward, the United States must balance
efforts to maintain stability in the South China Sea with actions that could inadvertently increase instability, such as becoming more involved in trying to
resolve the dispute – an action that many regional states would interpret as a move away from the traditional U.S. policy of neutrality in territorial disputes.
Many states, in the region and around the world, have maritime security interests in the South China Sea. These interests include claims to territorial
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sovereignty over islands and coral reefs, claims to exclusive rights to develop maritime resources, freedom of navigation on the high seas and the
consequences of ongoing naval modernization in the region.2 Competition over any or all of these interests could affect regional stability. Nevertheless, since
roughly 2006, the key maritime security issue in the South China Sea has been the competition to claim, assert and enforce maritime rights in these waters.
[…]Competition over these different maritime security interests could increase instability in the region. Among the
four categories, the disputes over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights could most easily escalate to the use
of military force. Two significant naval clashes have occurred between China and Vietnam, one in 1974 over the Crescent Group in the Paracels and
one in 1988 over Johnson Reef in the Spratlys. As the competition over maritime rights increases, the odds of armed clashes
between navies from the claimant states grows; such clashes would increase instability and raise questions about
the freedom of navigation in these waters for all sea-faring states. Conflict over the territorial sovereignty of the contested islands
and coral reefs is an enduring feature of maritime security in the South China Sea. However, regional tensions since 2006 have primarily
involved competing claims to maritime rights and jurisdiction over resources. The principal actors in this
competition include diplomats, commercial players such as fishermen and oil companies and national civil
maritime law enforcement agencies. Military power and naval forces have played a secondary role, as this competition over maritime rights
has not yet become militarized. […]As states asserted and defended their claims through diplomacy since 2006, they also
sought to demonstrate and enforce the maritime rights that they claimed. In particular, countries have sought to
exercise these rights through commercial fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities, as well as efforts, especially by China, to
enforce these claims by contesting the commercial activities of other states. […]The disputes in the South China Sea are
complicated and multifaceted. To the extent that U.S. policy takes sides in these disputes – or is perceived as taking sides
– it risks transforming these disputes into a bilateral conflict between the United States and China.
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C) Impacts
China has a history of responding to disputes over maritime rights with economic sanctions, ultimately
leading to a downward spiral into economic crisis.
Council on Foreign Relations ‘13 [Council of Foreign Relations. “China’s Maritime Disputes”. 9/17/2013. Contributors: Shen Dingli Professor of International Relations, Fudan University. Elizabeth Economy C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies, CFR; Richard Haass
President, CFR; Joshua Kurlantzick Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia, CFR; Sheila A. Smith Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, CFR; Simon Tay Chairman,
Singapore Institute of International Affairs http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/]
Thousands of vessels ply the East and South China Sea waters, from fishing boats to coastal patrols and naval
ships. Increasingly frequent clashes between China and its neighbors heighten the risk that miscalculations by sea
captains or political leaders could trigger an armed conflict, which the United States could be drawn into through
military commitments to allies Japan and the Philippines. Policy experts believe that a crisis management system for the region is crucial. […]Despite
extensive trade ties, the parties to the dispute could respond to a rise in tensions by imposing economic sanctions.
In response to a Chinese action, for instance, Washington could sanction financial transactions, the movement of
some goods and services, and even travel between China and the United States. In retaliation, Beijing could bar
U.S. exports and cut back on its extensive purchases of U.S. Treasuries. Claimants could also manipulate exports
and relaunch boycotts of goods. Some signals of such a response have already been seen: in 2012 Chinese
protesters launched a wave of boycotts of Japanese-branded products. Japan also accused China of halting exports
of rare earth minerals after a territorial spat in 2010—a charge Beijing denied—causing a commodities crisis for
resource-dependent Japan.
China’s continued economic growth is critical to the world economy and China’s political stability.
Economic crisis would critically damage relations with the US and put the stability of the Party in extreme
jeopardy.
Mead 09 [Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You
Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9, http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8]
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not that China will rise
too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the
international economy will plunge China into a major economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will
implode as loans to both state and private enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be
unemployed in a country without an effective social safety net. The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and
property markets will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political
consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that blames others for
China's woes. (Think of Weimar Germany, when both Nazi and communist politicians blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.)
Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle, as nervous investors moved their money out of the country, further
slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting ever-greater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to manage
the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will happen if the growth stops.
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Political and economic collapse in China results in an anti-foreign military lash out that would include the
use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
The Epoch Times 04 [Renxing San, 8/4/2004, 8/4, http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-4/30931.html]
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not
hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its
ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against
humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In
China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails.
But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together
with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now
plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
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UNIQUENESS
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China would like to expand its maritime strength
Jun’Ichi ’14
[Takeda Jun’Ichi. “China’s Rise as a Maritime Power: Ocean Policy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping”. 4/23/2014. Foreign policy and
national defense journalist. Visiting Research Fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. Born in 1950. Graduated from the Tokyo University of
Foreign Studies. His published works include Jinmin Kaihōgun: Tō to kokka o sasaeru 230 man nin no jitsuryoku (The People’s Liberation Army: The
Power of the 2.3 Million People Supporting the Party and the State) and the coauthored Chūgoku no gunjiryoku: 2020 nen no shōrai yosoku (China’s
Military Power: Forecast for 2020) and Chūgoku no kaiyō shinshutsu: Konmei no Higashi Ajia kaiyōken to kakkoku taiō (China’s Maritime Expansion:
Confusion in East Asia’s Marine Zone and Individual Countries’ Responses). http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/research/a00011/#section3 ]
The international community has been viewing China’s recent moves relating to the seas as representing
“maritime expansion,” and the Chinese themselves have come to talk about making their country a maritime
power. In the political report he delivered in the autumn of 2012 to the eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which stands at the
top of the country’s power structure, General Secretary Hu Jintao declared, “We should enhance our capacity for exploiting
marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard
China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power.” [1] This was Hu’s final report as the top leader
of the CPC; after delivering it he stepped down from his posts as general secretary and chairman of the Central Military Commission and was succeeded by
Xi Jinping. And at the National People’s Congress, in March this year, Xi was elected to succeed Hu in the largely ceremonial post of state president. But the
leadership transition did not change the commitment to building China into a maritime power, which has been set as a medium- to long-term strategic
objective. So what do the Chinese mean when they speak of becoming “a maritime power”? Liu Cigui, director of the SOA, or
State Oceanic Administration, has offered this explanation: “Building China into a maritime power is an essential path on the way to the sustained
A ‘maritime power’ is a country that has great
comprehensive strength in terms of the development, use, protection, management, and control of the seas.” [2]
development of the Chinese nation and [achievement of the status of a] global power.
Ocean policy is the embodiment of this sort of maritime strategy. China’s latest white paper on ocean policy, China’s Ocean Development Report (2012),
explains the relationship between strategy and policy and their respective scopes as follows: “Ocean policy is a code of behavior established for the state’s
strategy, course, development plans, and external relations concerning the seas; it is a basic policy embodying the intentions and interests of the state.
It
encompasses policies concerning development and use of the seas, including utilization of sea areas, development
and protection of sea islands, protection of the marine environment, marine science and technology, marine
industry, publicity/education, and human resources development. Marine industry includes such fields as
transportation, travel/tourism, fisheries, oil and gas development, and manufacturing of engineering
equipment.” [3] The concept of “policy” in China differs from that of parliamentary democracies, but its scope is similar in general terms. The SOA is
the government organ in charge of ocean policy, but it does not have total authority in this area. As far as I can surmise from the fragmentary coverage in the
Chinese media, there are at least more than 30 diverse party and state organs involved in various aspects of ocean policy. There are also moves among the
provincial tier of local governments along the coast, of which there are 11 (the provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Guangdong, and Hainan; the province-level municipalities of Tianjin and Shanghai; and the autonomous region of Guangxi), and the jurisdictions under
them. The National People’s Congress in March 2013 approved a proposal from the State Council for an overhaul of the state organs handling ocean policy,
which made certain adjustments with respect to two points. [4] First, in order to strengthen the setup for integrated planning and comprehensive coordination
of oceanic issues, a new National Oceanic Commission is to be established as a high-level adjustment organ. It will unify and adjust research on the
formulation of the state’s medium- to long-term ocean development strategy and the handling of important matters relating to the seas. The practical
operations of this commission will be conducted by the SOA. Second, in order to achieve unified maritime law enforcement, four existing organs—China
Marine Surveillance (under the SOA), China Coast Guard (Ministry of Public Security), Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (Ministry of Agriculture),
and Anti-smuggling Bureau (General Administration of Customs)—are to be consolidated under unified management by the SOA, which is to safeguard
China’s maritime rights and interests and carry out maritime law enforcement activities under the name of “China Maritime Police Bureau” and the
operational direction of the Ministry of Public Security. Over the more than 60 years since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, ocean policy
has not developed from the start in a comprehensive, linear manner, but has gone through a number of phases. Though it is difficult to delineate these phases
precisely, we may identify them in rough terms as follows: (1) the period of getting started and going through gyrations in the early years after the
foundation of the PRC, (2) the post–Cultural Revolution period, which brought the introduction of market mechanisms following the shift to reform and
opening up, along with moves to improve the legal framework, (3) the period of increasing dependence on the seas and of stepped-up assertion of maritime
rights and interests, and (4) the current period of ocean development strategy and pursuit of maritime-power status. Below I will present an overview of this
history and look at prospects for the future.
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China aspires to expand its maritime sphere of influence
Robson ’13 [Seth Robson. “China's naval aspirations: A 'blue-water' force”. Stars and Stripes. 6/25/2013.
http://www.stripes.com/china-s-naval-aspirations-a-blue-water-force-1.226669 ]
A century before Columbus discovered America, Chinese naval vessels many times bigger than the Santa Maria sailed the high seas, reaching as far as
Africa. But, unlike European voyages of discovery, the Chinese efforts did not forge a global empire. Beset by internal strife, China abandoned its naval
efforts, and by 1500, it was a capital offense to build a seagoing junk with more than two masts.
Today, fueled by a booming economy,
Chinese naval power is on the rise again. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has been producing frigates, destroyers, submarines and
missile boats at an unprecedented rate. In September, it commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the 74,406-ton Liaoning. U.S. naval commanders, ordered to
move the bulk of their fleet to the Pacific theater, say it’s clear that China is building a “blue-water navy,” capable of sustained operations across oceans and
able toproject power far from the home country. The U.S. has denied its “Pacific pivot” is directed at China but has called for “transparency” from the PLA.
“They are not making clear why they require these sorts of forces,” said Jan Van Tol, a retired U.S. Navy captain who is a senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. He noted that China wouldn’t need an aircraft carrier to seize Taiwan since the island, which China
regards as rebellious province, is well within range of mainland air fields.
One reason for a blue-water navy could be for China to
protect its trade routes, rather than relying on the U.S. to guarantee freedom of navigation, Van Tol said. The Chinese
government reported imports and exports worth $3.87 trillion in 2012, surpassing, for the first time, those of the U.S. — valued at $3.82 trillion by the U.S.
Commerce Department.
China also could be seeking to emulate the U.S. ability to project naval power and build
influence, Van Tol added. “The Chinese now want to do whatever the Americans can do and say: `We are here in the region,’” he said. Col. Lui Mingfu,
of the PLA’s National Defense University, told Australian media in February that China’s goal is to force the U.S. out of the
Western Pacific. Mingfu said American strategic influence would be confined "east of the Pacific midline" as it is
displaced by Chinese power throughout East Asia, including Australia. Such rhetoric is being noted by people like Capt. James Fanell,
deputy chief of staff for intelligence and information operations at the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He recently told the U.S. Naval Institute in San Diego that the PLA Navy regularly
operates in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and maintains a robust presence around the East and South China seas. “These moves into the 'distant seas' would seem inevitable for a
nation as large as China,” he said. “But it goes without saying that this expansion into blue waters is largely about countering the Pacific Fleet.” China’s Xinhua news agency
reported that a PLA Navy destroyer and two frigates exercising in the Western Pacific earlier this year were practicing maritime confrontation, open-sea mobile combat, law
enforcement and open-sea naval commanding. “Make no mistake, the PLA Navy is focused on war at sea and about sinking an opposing fleet,” Fanell said. There is evidence that
the PLA Navy has ambitions even beyond the Pacific. Van Tol said China sent a frigate through the Suez Canal in 2011 to evacuate citizens during unrest in Libia, and Chinese
ships have participated in anti-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. According to a Dec. 10 Congressional Research Service report on Chinese naval modernization, the PLA
Navy comprises 275 vessels: 75 warships, 60 submarines, 55 amphibious ships and 85 small missile boats. The U.S. Navy’s current strength is 285 ships and submarines. Despite
the similarities in numbers, Van Tol said it’s hard to compare the navies. A vessel that the Chinese might describe as a “frigate” might not be deemed worthy of the class in the
U.S., he said, but added: “They have certainly been building at a vigorousrate.” China has a large commercial ship-building industry capable of producing high-quality vessels.
Some of its latest naval designs, such as the Lanzhou-class destroyers, are equipped with powerful radar. Since 2004, the Chinese have launched more than 80 new Houbei-class
missile boats, and they are acquiring increasingly advanced diesel submarines, Van Tol said. Ralph Cossa of the Pacific Forum in Hawaii said China’s submarine fleet is the best
that Russia will sell or can be copied. But he added: “The Russians aren’t selling their very best to China.” China’s anti-submarine warfare capability remains weak, said Lyle
Goldstein, an associate professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The Chinese have mounted a massive research effort to
improve their sonar capabilities but will likely lag at least two decades behind the U.S. and its allies, he said. “Certainly for the next decade there is a major gap to be exploited,” he
said. “We need to make the investments today to keep that gap in play.” U.S. attack submarines have the firepower and survivability to be a strong deterrent and should be spared
from budget cuts, he warned. “I think we could do with fewer carrier battle groups and putting that money towards attack submarines fleet, which is of primary importance,” he
said. “That is America’s sharpest weapon.” The anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that the Chinese are developing would be a powerful weapon although there’s no indication of a
successful test against a moving target at sea, he said. Compared with the Soviet Union’s naval build-up — which involved launching a new submarine every month during the
height of the Cold War — the Chinese effort is more deliberate, he said. “The carrier program has gone forward but it is fairly slow,” he said. “They don’t seem to be in a great
hurry. It is within China’s capabilities to build a navy that looks like the U.S. Navy in 15 years, but they may be more restrained.” The PLA Navy’s lack of combat experience is
another question. The U.S. Navy has had 90 years to reach its current level of proficiency in aircraft carrier operations, Van Tol said. “It took a lot of training and accidents before
we got good at it,” he said. “The Chinese are just starting down that road, and it’s hard to predict where they will go.” Cossa would rank the PLA Navy behind Japan’s Maritime
Self Defense Force. “The Chinese are improving, but there is no question that the Japanese navy is far superior in terms of technology, training and sustaining operations,” he said.
The PLA Navy may soon be comparable in strength to the Spanish or Italian fleets, but launching an aircraft carrier isn’t enough to make it competitive with the top powers, Cossa
said. “You need to be able to support it (an aircraft carrier) with missile boats and submarines, and all this looks like it is years away for China,” he said. In an effort to gain
experience in blue-water operations, the PLA Navy is ranging further from its home ports than many people realize, said Goldstein. In recent years, it has made port calls in Fiji
and New Zealand. “China
is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China
Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve
broad security objectives,” a 2005 Department of Defense report said. China’s Global Times newspaper recently reported that a Chinese company
had taken over operation of the strategic Gwadar Port in Pakistan, at the door to the Strait of Hormuz and, according to some commentators, a potential naval
base. Goldstein said China’s presence in overseas ports has been almost entirely commercial so far, but he noted that if the PLA Navy wants to operate far
from home, it will need places to refuel and repair its vessels. “For years the Chinese have condemned countries having overseas bases,” he said. “We have
seen ship visits but we haven’t seen efforts to build and sustain a base overseas. Someday that may come.”
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China plans to establish control of the West Pacific with maritime power
Dupont ’14
[Alan Dupont. “China’s Maritime Power Trip”. The Australian. 5/24/2014. Alan Dupont is professor of international security at the
University of NSW and a non-resident fellow at the Lowy Institute.http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-maritime-power-trip ]
In early January, Australian intelligence analysts watched with increasing concern as three Chinese warships passed through Indonesia’s Sunda Strait on a
southerly course towards Australia in a powerful demonstration of China’s growing strategic reach. An AP-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft was
quickly sent to photograph and shadow the Chinese ships, which then turned east, sailing along Java’s southern coast before transiting the Lombok Strait
adjacent to Bali and returning to China. The message from Beijing to Australia and the region was unmistakable :
China is on the verge of
becoming a maritime power and it will send its ships wherever it pleases. But the deeper, more unsettling subtext to this message
illuminates this era’s most important foreign policy question. Will a rising China be a revisionist power or a responsible stakeholder in the existing
It is abundantly clear that China is intent on
challenging the status quo in Asia through the coercive use of its formidable economic and military power.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the western Pacific, where China is pursuing a high-stakes maritime strategy
aimed at dominating the seas that bear its name and maximising its territorial and resource claims. The dangerous
international system? Judging by its increasingly assertive behaviour, we now have an answer.
escalation in tensions with Vietnam triggered by Beijing’s decision to begin drilling for oil only 120 nautical miles from Vietnam’s coastline, and well
within its exclusive economic zone, is merely the latest example of China’s increasingly muscular unilateralism. When the offending HD 981 oil rig was
moved into position off Vietnam’s coast earlier this month, it was flanked by a supporting fleet of up to 80 Chinese paramilitary and naval ships. This was
clearly a premeditated strategic decision approved at the highest levels of government. The same disturbing pattern of coercive and unilateral decisionmaking is evident in many of China’s other maritime disputes with its neighbours.
Since 2010, there has been a worrying escalation in
the number and seriousness of confrontations in both the East and South China seas involving the Chinese fishing
fleet, the largest in the world, and ships from China’s maritime law-enforcement and fishing surveillance fleets,
many of which are armed. In tactics best described as “fish, protect, contest and occupy”, Chinese fishing vessels appear to have been given a government green
light to fish with impunity in contested maritime areas. If other claimant states diplomatically protest or physically challenge their presence, Chinese paramilitary ships are quickly
on the scene to “protect” their fishers, after which the island or reef is occupied and frequently garrisoned. This creeping annexation of contested islands and reef has been pursued
in the face of protests from not just Vietnam but an increasing number of other Asian countries. The Philippines is locked in a tense confrontation with China over disputed islands
in the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough/Half Moon Shoals on the eastern side of the South China Sea. Jakarta has recently toughened its rhetoric in response to repeated
incursions by the Chinese fishing fleet into the EEZ of the Indonesian owned Natuna Islands at the southern edge of the South China Sea, more than 2000km from China. In the
East China Sea, Japan, South Korea and even fraternal North Korea have all been involved in confrontations with Chinese fishing and paramilitary vessels. These range from lowlevel harassment to more serious incidents that include the ramming and sinking of ships, shootings and pitched battles between Chinese fishers and regional constabulary forces.
Beijing seems to believe that with the US distracted and preoccupied by domestic and other foreign policy challenges, a geopolitical full court press of its smaller and weaker
neighbours will deliver the resources, territory and regional pre-eminence that are its rightful patrimony. If so, this is a serious miscalculation that serves no one’s interests, least of
all China’s, serving as it does to heighten fears about China’s long-term intentions in Asia, stimulating reciprocal responses, militarising resource disputes and worsening existing
interstate rivalries. Beijing faces increasing regional isolation as other states line up to hedge against a China whose rise is beginning to look more threatening than benign. Five of
10 Southeast Asian states — Vietnam, The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei — have serious or potentially serious maritime disputes with China, along with Japan and
the two Koreas. If Taiwan is included, this adds up to more than half the polities in East Asia. China’s worst nightmare is a more assertive, independently minded, rearmed Japan.
But each outbreak of hostilities over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea makes this outcome more likely, with Tokyo moving to reverse nearly 70 years of
pacifism by allowing the Self-Defense Forces to be deployed for combat outside Japan. Perversely, China’s patent unwillingness to accommodate other countries’ equally strong
claims to the maritime features and resources that China covets has provided the opportunity for the US to reinvigorate its alliance system in East Asia and more effectively
balance against China. All this raises the question of why Beijing would engage in such an obviously counterproductive strategy if the consequences are likely to prove inimical to
China’s carefully cultivated international image and long-term relations with neighbouring states. There are several linked explanations. Like all rising powers, China wants to
change the regional order to advance its strategic ambitions, which cannot be met while the old, US-led order prevails.
Beijing’s long-term aim seems to be
what might be called a Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics.
From a Chinese perspective this makes perfect strategic
sense. If a rising America could construct a Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century as a blunt but effective instrument for keeping other powers out of the
eastern Pacific, why should an ascendant, 21st-century China not seek a comparable outcome in the western Pacific? This, of course, represents a direct
challenge to US pre-eminence in Asia and, more particularly, the US Navy’s dominance of the western Pacific, where the 7th Fleet has ruled the waves since
the destruction of the Japanese navy in World War II. Such challenges are representative of the structural problem in international relations — what the
eminent American strategist Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides trap”. Writing about the Peloponnesian wars in the 5th century BC, the Greek historian
Thucydides observed that the previously dominant Spartans felt threatened by Athens’s remarkable rise, leading to a 30- year conflict in which both states
were virtually destroyed. Could this happen in East Asia? Sceptics argue that such historical allusions are far-fetched, pointing out that the increasing trade
interdependence between China, the US and the wider region mitigates the risk of conflict because it raises the cost of war to all sides. True, but it should not
be forgotten that Britain and Germany’s extensive trade ties in the early 20th century did not prevent them going to war in 1914. And a recent study by
East Asian countries, including China, may be prepared to accept
significant economic losses to protect their sovereignty. So it would be wrong to conclude that deepening levels
of trade interdependence are a guarantee of peace.
Georgetown University’s Oriana Mastro suggests that
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LINKS
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China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
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Ocean Cleanup Links
China maintains jurisdiction over pollution prevention and cleanup efforts. The plan would
be seen as an affront to Chinese sovereignty.
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 98
[“The Development of China's Marine
Programs. May 1998. http://www.lib.noaa.gov/retiredsites/china/programs.htm ]
Safeguarding the new international marine order and the state's marine rights and interests. In February 1992 the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress (NPC) of China
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Seas and Adjacent
Zones. As China's important law in this particular field, it provides a legal basis for the country to exercise
sovereignty over its territorial seas and jurisdiction over the adjacent zones and safeguard the state's safety and
marine rights and interests. To uphold the new international marine legal system and the state's marine rights and interests, the NPC Standing
Committee approved the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in May 1996, and solemnly stated: "In accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the People's Republic of China enjoys sovereignty and jurisdiction over the EEZs and continental shelves up to 200 nautical miles off
its coasts. Together with the countries with opposite coasts or its neighboring countries, China shall, through consultation and on the basis of international
China has sovereignty over all archipelagoes
and islands listed in the Law of the People's Republic of China on Its Territorial Seas and Adjacent Zones. Regarding
laws and the principle of fairness, fix the dividing lines of each country's marine jurisdiction.
disputes over marine issues between China and its neighboring countries, the Chinese government shall, in view of the vital interests bearing on peace and
development, stand for their settlement through friendly consultation. With regard to issues that cannot be solved for the time being, China stands for
pigeonholing them and for strengthened cooperation and joint development. […] In recent years, an administration system for marine environmental
protection has been gradually set up: State environmental protection departments are in charge of marine environmental protection for the whole country;
state marine administrations are responsible for the organization of survey, monitoring and surveillance of the
marine environment, the conduct of scientific research and the prevention of pollution damage to the marine
environment resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation and the dumping of wastes at sea; state harbor
administrations are responsible for the supervision, investigation and disposal of pollutant discharge by ships, the surveillance of harbor waters and the
prevention of pollution damage to the marine environment caused by vessels; state fishing port administrations are responsible for the supervision of
pollutant discharge by fishing boats and the surveillance of fishing grounds; environmental protection organs of the armed forces are responsible for the
supervision of pollutant discharge by military vessels and surveillance of naval port waters; and environmental protection organs of the local people's
governments in coastal areas are responsible for the environmental protection work of preventing pollution damage resulting from coastal
construction projects and landsourced pollutants. This coordinated network plays an important role in the implementation of the related laws and the efficient
protection of the marine environment.
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China has the best precedent to combat pollution, otherwise we risk sovereignty disputes
NISCSS ’11 [National Institute for the South China Sea Studies 2011. China’s Role on the Prevention of Vessel-Source Pollution in the South China
Sea. Liu Nengye. PhD Candidate, Department of Public International Law, Ghent University. http://www.unepscs.org/google/South-China-Sea-TechnicalPublication-Land-Based-Pollution-South-China-Sea.pdf ]
As the biggest shipping and coastal State in the SCS area,
it is of China‟s interest to take the leading role for submitting a joint proposal of establishing
PSSAs in the SCS. The PSSA will be a regional regime for involved parties to take cooperative measures at sea . At the same time, it will avoid the thorny
sovereign issue. Prevention of vessel-source pollution is of particular importance for SCS area. Shipping activities
significantly contribute to marine pollution in the SCS area. Meanwhile, due to the international nature of shipping industry, it is necessary
for involved parties of SCS disputes to cooperate in order to effectively prevent vessel-source pollution. There are several legal options under international
the thorny sovereign issue might be an obstacle for involved parties‟ unilateral practice. China, as the
biggest shipping and coastal State in the SCS area is well equipped with its domestic legislation to deal with
vessel-source pollution. Politically, China is willing to cooperate with other countries for the protection of marine environment in the SCS.
Specifically, China can promote a mandatory port state control system as well as the establishment of a PSSA in the SCS area. These two issues may
improve the situation of preventing vessel-source pollution without raising unsolved sovereign disputes.
law. However,
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Aquaculture Links
China currently leads the world in aquaculture fish production. The plan would threaten
China’s exports and destabilize China’s aquaculture sector.
Gao
’12 [Mark Gao. “GONE FISHING: CHINA’S THREATENED AQUACULTURE
http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2012/12/14/china/chinese-aquaculture-chinas-threatened-aquaculture-exports/ ]
EXPORTS”
CKGSB
Knowledge.
Landy Chow plucks a shrimp and carefully checks the wriggling creature’s body length and weight. The weight and the skin seem right, nods Chow before returning the graybrown creature to the pond. The shrimp, one of millions he’s bought from a farmer for an American supermarket chain, will be washed, cooked and frozen in a Guangzhou plant
‘Made in China’ may not have appeared in their menus but seafood restaurants
from Beijing to Boston have enjoyed low-cost seafood supplies over the past decade thanks to China’s embrace of
aquaculture. Siam Canadian, the multinational seafood trading house where Chow works as the head of the mainland China sourcing operations, is one of the many
before being loaded into containers for the trans-Pacific voyage.
companies that source Chinese seafood for US supermarket and restaurant chains. Given China’s well-documented shortages of land and water it’s surprising, perhaps, that
China is the world’s number one seafood exporter. China’s annual exports account for almost 70% of global seafood
production in terms of quantity and 55% of global value, according to the latest data compiled by the Food & Agricultural Organisation (FAO), a UN
body. China’s seafood output clearly relies on aquaculture. In the period January to May 2012 China’s seafood output totaled 18.9 million tons, according to
data published by China’s Ministry of Agriculture. Of that total figure 13.5 million tons came from aquaculture compared to 5.39 million tons from non-farmed or wild catch.
China exported around a quarter–3.3 million tons of the total January-May output. Over 90% of China’s domestic seafood consumption is satisfied by aquaculture, according to the
China’s rise as an aquaculture power was achieved by low-cost cultivation of commercially important finfish (such as
catfish and tilapia) as well as mollusks (oysters, mussels and clams) and crustaceans (lobsters, shrimp and crabs) in onshore
ponds as well as in coastal enclosures. Much of the produce is processed and packaged at plants clustered around coastal cities like Qingdao, Dalian and Yantai,
FAO.
which have also proven to be competitive in processing imported fish fillets for re-export. China’s rise in aquaculture has been dizzying. The country grew its seafood exports from
$3.6 billion in 2001 to $13.2 billion in 2010 according to the FAO while second-placed Norway grew its exports from $3.5 billion to $8.8 billion in the same time frame. China
increased its exports further to $17.1 billion in 2011. A significant chunk of China’s exports are in fact re-exported frozen fish (such as cod from Russia and the US and salmon
from Europe), originally imported for processing. Figures for January to October 2011 published by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) show that over 1.7 million tons of
a total 2.2 million tons of seafood imported into China in that period were dominated by frozen fish, much of it likely for processing and re-export. China’s value-add from
processing is clear: China’s total exports in the January-October 2011 period was 2.9 million tons valued at $12.3 billion compared to imports of 2.2 million (value: $4.2 billion).
China produced almost 55 million tons of seafood products valued at $21.7 billion in 2011 (compared to $17.2 billion in 2010) according to Cui He, Secretary General, China
Aquatic Products Processing Marketing Association (CAPPMA). In 2010 China shipped 540,000 of the 5.01 million tons of seafood imported into the EU (from non-EU states) in
Aquaculture, consequently, has become a useful source of
jobs and export earnings for China, contributing over five million rural jobs and six million seasonal jobs in fisheries
harvesting according to Chinese government data. Weak Demand, Rising Costs There are signs of weakening demand for China’s key aquaculture export commodity, tilapia–
2010, making it the bloc’s second-placed supplier, behind Norway, according to EU statistics.
shipments to the US, the largest market for Chinese tilapia exporters, shrunk to 85,173 tons from 111,436 tons in 2010. The EU, which imports 62% of its seafood, imported
23,000 tons of tilapia from China in 2010. Statistics from Eurostat, the EU’s statistics agency, show shipments of tilapia from China slipped in 2011 to 22,000 tons. Siam
Canadian’s shipment volumes have fallen by 20% in the first six months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011, according to Chow, who blames weaker demand for
China’s top three indigenously produced export categories—tilapia, shrimp and squid.. Chow expects a 10-15% drop compared with last year in terms of container numbers. His
figures are corroborated by CAPPMA’s Cui He who reports that China’s shipments have dropped by between 15% and 20% in the first half of 2012 but exact volume figures are
not available.
While China remains dominant in key export markets like the US, Canada and Europe, the aquaculture trade is
starting to feel pressures from rising wages and environmental scrutiny. Rising labor costs have rattled processors and fish farmers. “Fish farming or processing is dirty,
hard work so finding workers has never been easy,” says Cui, adding that Chinese seafood firms have been taking a 15% rise in wages each of the past two years, which is making
things even more difficult for a low-margin business like theirs. He points to one of China’s seafood processing hubs, Guangzhou, which will increase its minimum monthly wage
Beyond the cost challenges, there is the
threat of lower-cost competitors. China’s tilapia farmers have been facing competition from peers in Vietnam farming a similar species, bassa
for the third consecutive year in 2012, to RMB 1,470 per month, up 13% on current wages. Competition from Vietnam
(also known as pangassisus), a freshwater species of catfish which offers 40% meat yields compared to 35% yields for tilapia–an important consideration for seafood traders and
restaurateurs seeking maximum value from a fish. Vietnam grew its exports from $1.4 billion to $5.1 billion between 2001 and 2010, putting it in fourth place in the FAO rankings
of seafood exporters. Simon Funge-Smith, Asia Fisheries Officer at the FAO, explains that Vietnam’s success is based on “incredibly low prices” achieved through “very intensive
farms with cheap labor and cheap feeds”. However, he also points to efforts by Vietnam’s government to cap production due to land and water shortages. The USDA’s Foreign
Agricultural Service in its report noted that an increasing challenge for the tilapia industry is “the increased production and exports” of basa by Vietnam. Imports of Vietnamese
basa into the EU have risen from 150,000 to 250,000 tons between 2007 and 2010, according to the EU Fish Processors and Traders Association. This figure may well rise further
given aggressive plans (which may conflict with government efforts to cap production) by the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP), an industry
umbrella body representing Vietnamese seafood producers to lift Vietnamese seafood exports from $6.1 billion to $10 billion in 2020 Adding Value Weaker export demand may
prompt China’s seafood sector to move up the value chain, improving product processing and marketing. Processors, feed millers and industry associations like CAPPMA are
talking about how to build up the brand and quality of Chinese tilapia and other farmed species, notes Han Han, Program Manager at the Chinese Tilapia Aquaculture
Improvement Project (AIP), run by the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Foundation. “But it takes a long time for the industry to reach agreement internally… On the other hand,
we are a bit worried if the pressure goes on to some point, the industry may collapse, or at least to some extent.” China’s highly fragmented aquaculture sector is likewise seeing
the emergence of large-scale players, among them fish farms such as the Dalian-based Homey Group and the Zhangzi Dao Fishery Group, also based in Dalian city on the
country’s northeast coast. Faced with tight export markets and falling prices, bigger players such as Homey and Zhangzi Dao have shifted to domestic markets and higher-margin
products. A spokesman for Homey Group said the company was shifting its focus from cultivating shellfish to breeding sea cucumber(also known as beche-mere) and fished in
deep-water seas, for use in Chinese cooking and medicine.
14
China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
WDCA 2014-15
Aquaculture is key to the Chinese economy. The plan threatens to destabilize it.
NBSO
’10 [Netherlands Business Support Office. Spring 2010. “An overview
http://china.nlambassade.org/binaries/content/assets/postenweb/c/china/zaken-doen-inchina/import/kansen_en_sectoren/agrofood/rapporten_over_agro_food/an-overview-of-chinas-aquaculture ]
of
China’s
Aquaculture”.
The People’s Republic of China has a surface of 9.6 million km2 and a population 1.3 billion with a yearly
growth rate of 0.6%. The country is divided into 22 provinces, 4 municipalities, 5 autonomous regions and 2 special administrative regions (Hong
Kong and Macau). China has a one-party political system in which the ruling party sets out the path for economic and social developments in so called “five
year plans”. The current policies are based on the 11th five year plan which was enacted in 2006 and will prolong till 2010 .
The spectacular
economic developments have received much attention worldwide in recent years and China will become the
second largest economy in the world. However, as the costs in all areas are gradually rising, the new challenge for
China is going to be how to transform from an economy dependent on low productions costs with relatively low
value added into a more knowledge based economy fit for international competition. Another challenge is how to
rapidly develop the rural areas in China which has somewhat been left out of the economic growth in recent years
in order to avoid social unrest and maintain economic stability. Given the above two challenges, it can be even
better understood why further development of China’s agriculture (aquaculture included) is high on the agenda of the
central government; a developed agricultural sector can alleviate both challenges at the same time.
15
China Disadvantage
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China wants to flex its muscles disputes over maritime rights, specifically using fisheries as a
primary method.
Lawrence ‘11 [Susan V. Lawrence. Analyst in Asian affairs. Congressional Research Service for Congress. “US-China Relations: Policy issues”.
1/12/2011. http://books.google.ca/books?id=wr5pB1m1eooC&pg=PA26#v=onepage&q=fisheries&f=false ]
Chinese maps dating to before the Communist revolution appear to claim most of the South China Sea as Chinese territory .
China explicitly claims
sovereignty over four groups of islets and atolls and their undefined “adjacent waters,” which are rich in fishing
resources and potentially in oil and gas deposits. Those islets and atolls are the Paracels (known in Chinese as the Xisha), the Spratlys (nansha in
Chinese), the entirely submerged Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha in Chinese), and the largely submerged Pratas (Dongsha in Chinese). Territory claimed by
China is also claimed in part by Brunei, Indonesia, malysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and in entirety by Taiwan.
In the case of disputed
maritime territory, China’s official policy is to set aside the issue of sovereignty and pursue joint development with other claimants. As its economic
and military might has grown, however, China has appeared increasing keen to assert its sovereignty in the south China Sea.
Examples of new Chinese assertiveness include China’s harassment of U.S. surveillance vessels (see “U.S. Military
Operations in China’ Exclusive Economic Zone,” above); China’s dispatch of Fisheries Administration patrol vessels to “protect
its sea territory”; Chinese pressure on international energy companies ExxonMobil and BP not to work with Vietnam to explore for oil and gas in areas
off Vietnam’s coast that China considers part of its Exclusive Economic Zone; and China’s suggestion in some closed-door meetings
with senior U.S. officials in the spring of 2010 that China now considers the South China Sea a “core national
interest.”
16
China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
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Increasing fishing activities in the Pacific will heighten tensions with China and contribute to
an increasing cycle of conflict
Gallo
‘14 [William Gallo. “US: Chinese Fishing Regulations 'Provocative, Dangerous'”.
http://www.voanews.com/content/us-chinese-fishing-regulations-provocative-dangerous/1827142.html ]
1/24/2014.
Voice
of
America.
The United States is criticizing new Chinese provincial regulations that aim to restrict fishing by foreign vessels
in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Under the rules passed by China's southernmost province of Hainan, all
foreign fishing boats must seek permission before entering waters claimed by Beijing. The law, which went into effect
January 1, covers more than half the 3.5 million square kilometer South China Sea, including parts claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. U.S. State
Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said Thursday
the move will raise tensions in the sea, which has seen a rising number of
small-scale clashes in recent years. Psaki said, "The passing of these restrictions on other countries' fishing activities in disputed portions of the
South China Sea is a provocative and potentially dangerous act." Psaki said it is the longstanding U.S. position that all sides avoid "unilateral action that
raises tensions and undermines the prospect for a diplomatic or other peaceful resolution of differences." The Philippines has said it is seeking more
information about the regulations, while Vietnam responded by emphasizing its own claims in the energy-rich area. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
Hua Chunying defended the move as unremarkable. "China is a maritime nation, so it is totally normal and part of the routine for Chinese
provinces bordering the sea to formulate regional rules according to the national law to regulate conservation, management and utilization of maritime
biological resources," said Hua. Sam Bateman, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, tells VOA
if Beijing
were to follow through with the restrictions, there is a "good chance" of heightened tensions.
But he says it would be
difficult for China to enforce the policy because of the massive effort needed to patrol the area. Bateman said, "This is not just surface ships, but also air
surveillance of the area, because normally maritime surveillance and fishery surveillance of that nature is primarily carried out by air and then you use
surface vessels to respond to any suspicious sighting." Bateman, a retired rear admiral in the Royal Australian Navy, says the regulations go "beyond
anything acceptable under the International Law of the Sea," making China vulnerable to legal challenges. "I think if China tried to start enforcing the
regulation, and particularly if it arrested a vessel, it would run fairly quickly into a legal dispute, which frankly I don't think China would have any chance at
all of winning," said Bateman. An official representing Vietnamese fishermen said his country will lodge a protest against China's latest move in the
disputed South China Sea. Vo Van Trac, Vice Chairman of Vietnam Association of Fishery, told VOA's Vietnamese service that Vietnamese fishermen
strongly oppose China's rules and will continue fishing in areas in the South China Sea where Vietnam also claims sovereignty. He said, "The rules will
obviously have an impact on our fishermen's lives. We will ask our fishermen to keep fishing. We will tell them those areas [in the South China Sea] that are
within our sovereignty. The most important thing right now is to reassure them about that". China's claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of
ASEAN members Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. All four are seeking multilateral talks to resolve the disputes. But Beijing has said it will
only hold one-on-one negotiations. The U.S. says it does not take a position on the sovereignty disputes, but has consistently criticized Chinese moves it
calls aggressive. Washington has also expanded military alliances with Southeast Asian nations involved in the disputes. The fishing rules follow China's
announcement last year of a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed waters in the East China Sea. The zone has drawn criticism from
Japan, South Korea and the United States. Analysts are now debating whether China will declare a similar ADIZ in the East China Sea.
17
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Fish stocks will be key to geopolitical conflict as China expands its operations to meet
growing demand. The inherent problems described by the affirmative are exactly what will
drive conflict with China.
Dupont and Baker ’14 [The Washington Quarterly. Spring 2014. Alan Dupont is Professor of International Security at the
University of New
South Wales in Sydney and can be reached at a.dupont@unsw.edu.au. Christopher G. Baker is a PhD candidate at the Centre for International Security
Studies
at
the
University
of
Sydney
and
can
be
contacted
at
Christopher.baker@sydney.edu.au.
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Dupont_Baker_PDF.pdf ]
Nations have long fought for control of critical resources. People often think of gold, silver, and in more recent times,
oil, gas, and precious metals. But fish has begun to assume comparable strategic significance for China because of both
its scarcity and centrality to the economy, lifestyles, and diet of many Chinese people. Of course, the depletion of fish stocks is not
solely a Chinese problem. It is an emerging global security issue rooted in the burgeoning international demand for food,
coming at a time when the fishing industry faces a host of supply-side problems including chronic overfishing, the
environmental destruction of fish habitats, a massive increase in world fishing fleets, and ill-directed state subsidies.
Since 1950, the total annual catch of wild and farmed fish from aquaculture has grown five-fold (to 148 million tons with a market value of US$217.5 billion).4 Far
from being a triumph of postindustrial technology and farming practices, this unprecedented harvest has taken a severe toll on the wild fish population. Less than 15
percent of all fisheries have room for growth, with the remaining 85 percent categorized by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) as fully exploited,
depleted, or recovering from depletion.5 These global trends are mirrored in the seas near China. Fish yields in the Yellow and East China Seas have fallen dramatically
over the past 20 years. In the South China Sea, which produces about 10 percent of the annual global fisheries catch, overfishing has severely depleted fish stocks to
the point where coastal areas are down to only 5-30 percent of their unexploited stocks.6 This
worries Beijing because China is both the world’s
largest fish producer and consumer. More than nine million fishers—a quarter of the world’s total —are Chinese, and the
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture estimates that, if fisheries-related household income and value-added revenue is included, the fishing sector contributes $330 billion
(1.992 trillion yuan) to the Chinese economy annually, about 3.5 percent of GDP. 7 However, despite impressive absolute and relative gains in supply that have allowed
Chinese per capita consumption of fish (31.9 kg)
is now more than double that of the rest of the world (15.4 kg) and threatens to outrun supply.8 If this were not
sufficient cause for concern, three other negative developments threaten a perfect storm for China’s hard-pressed
fishing industry. First, the country’s booming population, fast growing middle-class, and rapid economic transition
have forced millions of farmers and workers from the hinterland to coastal provinces, increasing demand for fish
products and adding both to the pool of itinerant fishers as well as pressure on the supply of wild fish. At the same time, economies of scale favoring larger
China to increase its proportion of world fish production from 7 percent to 34 percent since 1961,
commercial operations have reduced incomes and food security for traditional fishing communities in a “complex, negative feedback cycle.”9 Second, since more
China has been at the forefront of a major expansion in the size and power of
Asia’s fishing fleets. While other regions stabilized the size of their fishing fleets in the last quarter of the 20th century, Asia’s doubled
fishers seek to exploit the remaining reserves of fish,
in size during the same period and today makes up three quarters of the world’s powered fishing fleet. 10 China has the world’s largest by number and tonnage if the
inland fleet is included.11 Regulating and reducing the size of the fleet to sustainable levels has been problematic, complicated
by domestic political and economic pressures to support local fishing communities and by an unwillingness to impose license restrictions and catch
limits. The Chinese government has not helped matters, providing subsidies to the fishing sector of over $4 billion annually,
12
roughly a quarter of all Asian subsidies and around 15 percent of the world total. 13 Subsidies artificially prop up prices and encourage unprofitable fishers to stay in
business when the money would be better spent restructuring the industry and reducing the number of fishing vessels over time. In recent years, Beijing has made
serious efforts to address the supply imbalance by attempting to downsize the national fishing fleet, accelerate investment in the fishing industry, retrain unemployed
fishers, and impose fishing bans and catch caps, all with limited success. 14 There are still too many fishing boats chasing too few fish, and it is difficult for traditional
fishers to give up their trade which remains a lucrative occupation as prices continue their steady rise. Third ,
international legal constraints as codified in
have both reduced the area of open ocean for fishing and linked fishing rights
to sovereignty issues, which has complicated the adjudication and settlement of both territorial and fishing disputes in the
the 1982 UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
East and South China Seas. The declaration of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)—a sea-zone extending 200 nautical miles from a state’s coastline, islands, and other
sovereign maritime features—is a further complication, allowing states to claim all the resources beneath the sea in the EEZ including fish, oil, gas, and valuable seabed minerals. As a result, Chinese and fishers from other countries face an unpalatable choice: either abide by the rules and see their catches and income severely
reduced, or risk fishing illegally and face the possibility of arrest and impoundment of their catches.
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Precautionary Principle Links
China says environmental preservation directly clashes with desired economic growth
Anderson, Dept of Anthropology at University of California, 12
(E.N., 11/9/12, “Environmental Ruin: The Drag on China’s future”, http://www.krazykioti.com/articles/chinafaces-environmental-ruin-updated-may-2014/, AL)
Communist China’s economic success is due to a number of things. Some of these are commendable, at least in general principles if
not always in detail. China now has mass education, scientific research, generally available health care, a vastly improved infrastructure, and law and
order.¶ However, some other features
of China’s economy have caught the eyes of foreign observers. Many American
observers, including Mitt Romney to judge from his statements, ascribe China’s success to four things. First is keeping wages low and
preventing workers from grassroots organizing. Second is massive government support for primary production. Third is an autocratic government that
suppresses dissent and free speech. Fourth is the concern of the present paper: the relative lack
of meaningful environmental
regulations or protection. China has decided that environmental protection is in conflict with economic
growth. ¶ In this, Communist China has reversed China’s 5000-year history of trying to live and work with the
environment. Imperial China often failed in the execution, but at least had a reasonably consistent belief that a well-managed environment is
necessary to the survival of agriculture and civilization. The Chinese Communist under Mao Zedong reversed this policy, and adopted the
Marxist-Leninist idea of “struggle against nature”—a favorite phrase of Mao’s. Marx shared the 19th-century European belief in
progress through destroying nature and substituting an industrial landscape. Marx himself was quite moderate about this,
and had some sense of a need for environmental management (Foster 2000), but Lenin and Stalin opted for heavy industrialization at all
costs.
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Plan Conficts With China - empirically proven in veto of MPAs
Denholm, Tasmania Correspondent at The Australian, 13
(Matthew, 10/22/13, “Russia, China could veto marine reserves”, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/policy/russia-china-could-veto-marine-reserves/story-fn59nm2j1226744094732?nk=470381775b41d7fa5b694f273ab71734, AL)
AUSTRALIA wants to create the world's largest marine parks, in the oceans around Antarctica, but there are concerns
Russia and China may veto the move. The global body responsible for marine life in Antarctica begins meeting in Hobart this week amid intense
diplomatic lobbying over plans to declare marine protected areas covering almost three million square kilometres. Sponsored by Australia, the US, New
Zealand, France and the EU, the
proposed MPAs have been scaled back to try to win over reluctant nations, who fear the
impact on toothfish and krill harvesting.¶ Global environment groups, also converging on Hobart to monitor the meeting of the Commission for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, are disappointed that a plan to protect 2.3 million square kilometres
of the Ross Sea has been almost halved. Instead, the proposed Ross Sea MPA has been shrunk to 1.3 million square kilometres and its
"no-take" area banning fishing has been reduced from 1.6 million square kilometres to 1.25 million square kilometres.
Even so, conservation groups are urging all 25 members of the commission to end years of haggling and lock in the proposed MPAs. "It would still be the
largest no-take reserve on the planet and we wouldn't scoff at that -- it would be a very, very significant move," Antarctic Ocean Alliance campaign director
Steve Campbell said.¶ Australia is "hopeful" the commission, which makes decisions by consensus, meaning one or two nations can veto proposals, will
back its plan for a 1.6 million square kilometre MPA in East Antarctica. Australian delegation leader Tony Fleming said the areas of the Southern Ocean in
question were vulnerable and critical to Antarctic ecosystems, including krill and toothfish nurseries and seal and penguin foraging habitat. Russia and
China defeated the proposals put forward late last year and a further commission meeting in Germany in July
failed to break the deadlock. However, Dr Fleming said Australia and other countries had worked to refine the MPA proposals to try to
overcome concerns. "We remain positive," he said.
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IMPACTS
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Impacts – Economic and Political Decline
China economic decline causes nuclear war
Yee and Storey 02 [Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin
University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 ]
political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in
territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of
these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the
problems are putting a strain on the central government’s
ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese
refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe
strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a
disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These
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Chinese economic collapse causes World War III
Plate 3 [Tom is the Distinguished Scholar of Asian and Pacific Studies at Loyola Marymount University. Mr. Plate is a member of the Pacific Council on
International Policy, the Century Association of New York and the Phi Beta Kappa Society. “WHY NOT INVADE CHINA?” June 30, The Straits Times,
Lexis]
imagine a China disintegrating -- on its own, without neo-con or CIA prompting, much less outright military invasion -- because the
economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. Refugees by the
gazillions would head for Indonesia and other poorly border-patrolled places, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in
Japan might lick their chops for World War II Redux and look to annex a slice of China. That would send small but successful
Singapore and Malaysia -- once Japanese colonies -- into absolute nervous breakdowns. India might make a grab
for Tibet, and while it does, Pakistan for Kashmir. Say hello to World War III Asia-style!
But
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CPP decline bypasses all defense—the economy is key, decline causes lash out
Friedberg 10, [Professor of Politics and International Affairs – Princeton, Asia Expert – CFR (Aaron, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the USChina Rivalry,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 4, August, p. 31 – 54)]
Despite its magnitude, Beijing's
stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime
of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to
their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been
accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called 'mass incidents' (such as riots or
strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign
investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things
got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of
business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought
acknowledges that upwards
before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official
news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, 'without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents'.12 In anticipation of
an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to
learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 Beijing's stimulus was
insufficient At least for
the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next
several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will mount. The regime
probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a
protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party's leadership and thus to its continued
grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but
from above. Rising societal discontent 'might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation
to their own political advantage' using 'populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the
party's seemingly unified upper ranks'.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody
civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever
differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-
Short of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could
induce it to abandon its current, cautious policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the
elements of 'comprehensive national power'. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be
tempted to lash out, perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying domestic support
and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to implement a policy of 'military Keynesianism',
further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a
sagging domestic economy.15 In sum, despite its impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground. The
reverberations from the 2008-09 financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave
in unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.
up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012.
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Growth decline threatens CCP rule—they’ll start diversionary wars in response
Shirk 07 [Susan L. Shirk is an expert on Chinese politics and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State during the Clinton administration. She was in
the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia). She is currently a professor at the Graduate
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. She is also a Senior Director of Albright Stonebridge Group,
a global strategy firm, where she assists clients with issues related to East Asia. “China: Fragile Superpower,” Book]
By sustaining high rates of economic growth, China’s leaders create new jobs and limit the number of
unemployed workers who might go to the barricades. Binding the public to the Party through nationalism also helps preempt opposition.
The trick is to find a foreign policy approach that can achieve both these vital objectives simultaneously. How long can it last? Viewed objectively, China’s
communist regime looks surprisingly resil- ient. It may be capable of surviving for years to come so long as the economy continues to grow and create jobs.
Survey research in Beijing shows wide- spread support (over 80 percent) for the political system as a whole linked to sentiments of nationalism and
acceptance of the CCP’s argument about “stability first.”97 Without making any fundamental changes in the CCP- dominated political system—leaders from
time to time have toyed with reform ideas such as local elections but in each instance have backed away for fear of losing control—the Party has bought
itself time. As scholar Pei Minxin notes, the ability of communist regimes to use their patronage and coercion to hold on to power gives them little incentive
to give up any of that power by introducing gradual democratization from above. Typically, only when communist systems implode do their political fundamentals change.98 As China’s leaders well know, the
greatest political risk lying ahead of them is the possibility of an
economic crash that throws millions of workers out of their jobs or sends millions of depositors to withdraw their savings from the
shaky banking system. A massive environmental or public health disaster also could trigger regime collapse, especially if people’s
lives are endangered by a media cover-up imposed by Party authorities. Nationwide rebellion becomes a real possibility when large
numbers of people are upset about the same issue at the same time. Another dangerous scenario is a domestic or international
crisis in which the CCP leaders feel compelled to lash out against Japan, Taiwan, or the United States because from
their point of view not lashing out might endanger Party rule.
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Impacts – Taiwan War
China growth key to preventing Taiwan invasion
Lewis 7—Dan, Director of the Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,”
World Finance, 4-19-07, http://www.worldfinance.com/news/137/ARTICLE/1144/2007-04-19.html
According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far
more serious
though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite
simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies,
reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable
Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yen. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the
the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the
yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and
dollar, sterling and
much of Euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It
to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without
devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the
massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule
becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that
communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when
multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history
suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go
the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a
Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is
pledged to defend. Today, people are looking at Chang’s book again. Contrary to popular belief, foreign investment has actually deferred political
has been calculated that
reform in the world’s oldest nation. China today is now far further from democracy than at any time since the Tianneman Square massacres in 1989. Chang’s
pessimistic forecast for China was probably wrong. But my fear is there is at least a chance he was just early.
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China war causes extinction
Straits Times 2000 (The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000, L/N)
The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between
the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war
becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the
possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support
to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser
extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try
Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power
in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own
nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew
to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted,
Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear
weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the
conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war,
which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar
capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US
estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A
Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General
Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in
Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders
considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should
that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of
a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above
everything else.
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A2: Impact Turns – Economy
Chinese growth is key to multilateral free trade—this evidence answers all turns.
Kenny 11—Charles Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America
Foundation, a senior economist on leave from the World Bank, and author [September 6, 2011, “Red Dawn,” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/06/red_dawn?page=full]
But if the world is underestimating the accelerating speed of China's rise, Subramanian's analysis also suggests that we're overestimating the problems that
an economically ascendant China will impose on the rest of us.
The country's rise, he points out, has been intimately connected with
globalization, including the expansion of trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO) umbrella as well as growing
cross-border flows of finance and technology. In 1820, during the last period in which China was the world's economic heavyweight -- and
a fiercely isolationist one -- exports accounted for 1 percent of global GDP and considerably less than 1 percent of China's economy. In 2008, the same
statistics were 29 percent for the world and 35 percent for China. China is already a far more globally integrated economy than either Britain or the United States
was in their respective heydays. In 1870, exports accounted for only 12 percent of Britain's output. In 1975, they accounted for a mere 7 percent of the U.S.
economy. The same percentages for imports were 7 percent for the United States in 1975 and 25 percent for China in 2008. And the fact that much of today's trade
is part of multicountry production processes for goods makes China even more bound to an open global economic system than the raw numbers would
suggest. Furthermore, China
will become the dominant economic power in a period where the international trading
regime appears likely to have weathered the threat of a retreat behind tariff walls that doomed the last great period
of globalization during the Great Depression. And it will do so as an economy still benefiting from "catch-up
growth" -- the low-hanging economic fruit that China, as a poorer country, can grab by adopting innovations already widely used in richer countries -which, because it involves exploiting technologies and processes developed in those rich countries, demands a
level of openness to the world. Both of these points suggest that China will remain a fair-dealing member of the
WTO out of self-interest. Certainly, it is an active one. In 2009, half of the WTO disputes filed involved China on one side or the other. Most
are still working their way through the settlement process, so it is too early to say with certainty how law-abiding China will be; nonetheless, Subramanian
notes that the WTO has been a powerful mechanism for controlling the bullying instincts of economic heavyweights in the past. The United States, for
example, has been subject to complaints in 88 WTO disputes, leading to findings of 33 violations, and the United States has complied or is complying in 26
cases. Meanwhile, China's rise -- and the United States' concomitant decline -- is likely to increase the likelihood of the renminbi becoming a global reserve
currency, a prospect that economic prognosticators have begun to consider with some seriousness since the 2008 economic crisis. But if anything, this shift - if it happens -- is likely to mitigate some aspects of China's role in the global economy that the rest of the world finds most problematic. As Subramanian
notes, China will have to develop financial markets that are deep, liquid, and open to foreigners . At the moment, the
country's capital market is closed, the renminbi is undervalued and not fully convertible, and domestic financial markets are rudimentary. At the same time,
there are signs that the government is responding to some of these challenges, for example by issuing 6 billion renminbi-denominated sovereign bonds to
offshore investors in Hong Kong in 2009. And further
steps in that direction would increase the export competitiveness of the
rest of the world's goods as well as create an exciting investment opportunity for those few in the rich world still
actually saving money. In short, China will be a different kind of global power because the nature of global power
has changed dramatically over the past two centuries. Geographical domination is no longer necessary; today a
considerable part of power does not even involve physical goods, let alone land, but rather is tied up in finance,
technologies, and services. Just as the United States demonstrated in its eclipse of Britain that a sovereign empire
wasn't needed to dominate the world economy, China may not need even the military strength that the United States
exercised for the last 50 years to remain preeminent. And China's reliance on global trade and financial links,
underpinned neither by force of arms nor sovereign control, means the newly dominant power has considerable
self-interest in maintaining multilateralism. That suggests the more China embraces its role as economic heavyweight
in an integrated world, the better for the rest of the world -- and perhaps in particular the United States -- in terms of national
security and economic opportunity. Even for Americans who fear the rise of China, then, the best advice is to embrace the
inevitable.
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Asian economic decline sparks multiple scenarios for nuclear war.
Auslin 9—Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. [February 5, 2009,
“Averting Disaster,” The Weekly Standard,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp]
when a depression
strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with
ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts,
growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No
one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep
the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore,
China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability.
This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move
toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the
general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of
economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the
uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the
country.Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any
AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that
previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural
resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of
democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How
will overburdened political
leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese
naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong
enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster
turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of
all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them
come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's
credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military
presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a
systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the
American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it
clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more
blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous
region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor.
India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There
is no
reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed
international systems in the past.
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AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
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NON-UNIQUE
Non-Unique – China’s maritime rise is exaggerated
Lou ’13 [Chunhao Lou. “Power politics in the Indian Ocean: don’t exaggerate the China threat”. East Asia Forum.
10/24/2013. Chunhao Lou is the Assistant Director at the Institute of Maritime Studies, China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations. East Asia Forum is a platform for analysis and research on politics,
economics, business, law, security, international relations and society relevant to public policy, centred on the
Asia Pacific region. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-the-indian-ocean-dontexaggerate-the-china-threat/ ]
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is becoming increasingly significant in the world arena. Recent discourse has focused on China’s naval ambitions in the IOR
and potential US–India cooperation in response to China’s presence. To some extent, the ‘China Factor’ is one explanation behind the recent improvement
of US–India relations, as both the US and India are anxious about Chinese entry into IOR. Particularly in India, many strategists are concerned about the
imaginary Chinese ‘string of pearls strategy’. However, an in-depth analysis of the three countries’ strategic outlook could lead to a different conclusion.
The perception of the ‘China threat’ mainly derives from a fear of China’s different political system and its
astonishing rise, both in scale and speed. But when analysed in relation to intention, capability, or aspiration, it
is clear that the potential threat of China has always been over-exaggerated. China’s strategic focus is the Pacific
rather than the Indian Ocean. It lags far behind the US in terms of maritime power and does not enjoy India’s
geographic advantages. More importantly, China has traditionally had a peaceful maritime policy. Even when
China was a pre-eminent maritime power, it promoted peace and commerce, as was clearly illustrated during
the Ming Dynasty. Today, China’s naval strategy is to ensure a ‘harmonious sea’ through capacity building and
international cooperation. China views the region surrounding the Indian Ocean as a vital energy and trade route, not a battlefield for power
struggle. China’s seaward policy is strongly influenced by trade and energy motives, and its open economy is becoming more interdependent with the
outside world, particularly the Indian Ocean. Chinese involvement in building infrastructure in IOR littorals is part of China’s economy-oriented ‘Going
Although it is frequently argued that China should and must develop into becoming a strong
maritime power, the Chinese government has always emphasised that their maritime power is totally different
from Western-style maritime power. Many Chinese scholars even warn against having a military presence in the
IOR. Nonetheless, the US and India have a history of having different Indian Ocean strategies. Although China’s presence will always promote US–India
Global’ strategy.
cooperation, the democratic peace theory will not supersede realistic politics, and the differing interests of the US and India in the IOR will be difficult to
reconcile. The US and India have had contradictory strategic policies regarding the Indian Ocean since the Cold War era. In the 1960s, when the US wanted
to inherit Britain’s influence in IOR, India opposed the “theory of power vacuum” and instead supported the idea of an ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’. During
the 1971 Indo–Pakistan War, the US dispatched its Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, causing great concern from the Indian side. India’s view of the IOR
can be summarised as a sense of crisis and destiny. Regarding the sense of crisis, Indian politicians and strategists pay great attention to the linkages
between Indian Ocean and India’s national security. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru argued that India’s independence and survival depended
on India’s control of the Indian Ocean. India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007) highlighted that ‘whatever happens in the IOR can affect our national
security and is of interest to us’. As for destiny, India’s unique geographic location forms the cornerstone of India’s aspiration to dominate Indian Ocean or
even to transform Indian Ocean into India’s Ocean. Many Indian strategists view the Indian Ocean as India’s ‘rightful domain’ and contend that ‘India will
have to play a very large role (in the Indian Ocean) if the prospects for peace and cooperation are to grow’. In contrast, the US seeks to be a hegemonic
maritime power that is not only dominant in the Atlantic or Pacific, but also in the Indian Ocean. Although it stresses the importance of a cooperative
maritime strategy, the US is still trying to maintain its status as a pre-eminent maritime power. In accordance with the shift of the world power balance,
the US will seek to sustain its strong presence in the Indian Ocean. The US has taken many measures to achieve this goal, including strengthening its
presences in Diego Garcia and Bahrain, updating its military cooperation with established allies, and setting up forward military networks to control key
choke points. Thus, although confrontations and conflicts between China, US and India have been predicted in this region, particularly with the rise of
China’s maritime power, their different strategic goals may lead to different results. Given the China’s policy aims, intent and capability, China cannot
afford to challenge either the United States or India. But with the rapid growth of its economic and military power, India is likely to adopt a more assertive
maritime presence in the Indian Ocean. Thus, considering that the US wants to maintain its maritime dominance, an India–US potential power struggle in
the Indian Ocean is more likely to characterise the IOR landscape than the ‘China threat’.
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Non-unique – threat of Chinese expansion exaggerated
Xiaokun ’10 [Li Xiaokun. “’China Threat’ Exaggerated”. China Daily. 8-31-2010.
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-08/31/content_11232579.htm ]
Despite Japan's escalated maritime disputes with China, discussion about "military threats from China" in Japan
is indeed exaggerated, Japan's former defense minister said on Monday. "There is no need for us to keep
stressing that China is a threat. The China-threat theory in Japan has turgidly stirred unease among the people,"
Shigeru Ishiba said when talking with diplomats and scholars from China and Japan on diplomatic and security
affairs at the Beijing-Tokyo Forum. Japanese scholars attending the forum, however, were still extremely
concerned about China's naval development. "China insists on self-defense, but the stance of its military is more
and more aggressive," said Masashi Nishihara, director of Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security. A
series of Chinese naval exercises this year have shown a different stance, he said, warning that the US has been
more and more active in containing the Chinese navy based on Washington's joint military actions with Seoul
and Hanoi this summer. The US has conducted condensed military drills with the Republic of Korea and Vietnam,
its old rival, in the neighborhood of China since July and vowed to remain in the South China Sea where China
has overlapped territorial disputes with some countries. Media reports have linked China's military exercises to
its discontent with the US moves. Chen Jian, former Chinese ambassador to Japan, said Japan's views on the
Chinese military have long been disturbed by the Cold War thinking pattern. "Some of our problems are due to
lack of confidence and mutual trust," Chen said. "We both have our own advantages and there is no need to be
overly concerned." Liu Jiangyong, a senior scholar on Japanese studies with Tsinghua University, said China
would not choose to expand across the world as the US and the former Soviet Union did. He, however, warned
of the shift of Japan's military attention to the Southwest toward China. Japan's National Defense Program
Outline, scheduled to be finished this year, is highly dangerous, Liu said. "That will draw China's unease toward
Japan," he said. "This is the first such revision of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and I hope they do not
choose the wrong direction." Now there is noticeable imbalance between China and Japan over each other's
military intention, Liu said. "China used to believe Japan would become a strong military power. But we noticed
the Chinese government changed its attitude after Shinzo Abe (former Japanese prime minister) took office," he
said. Li Wei, chief of Japanese studies with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said getting Tokyo to
understand Beijing is not as difficult as getting the US to understand Beijing. "Japan is a country that listens to
others, unlike the US," she said.
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Non-Unique – China lacks ability to project maritime power and prefers multilateral
cooperation.
Taylor ’14 [Dr. Brendan Taylor is Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National
University. “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint”. The Washington Quarterly. Spring 2014.
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Taylor_PDF.pdf ]
Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijing’s approach toward the South China Sea disputes has
traditionally been one of conflict de- escalation. Beijing’s clear preference has been to manage such tensions
bilaterally. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of
clashes with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October
2011 on principles for settling maritime disputes. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish
new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes. Beijing has also shown
some willingness to take the multilateral route. Most famously, China signed a non-binding “Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues,
the official position of both China and ASEAN remains to establish a legally binding code of conduct in the South
China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence
building measures, and joint development. Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of
its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off
limits in Asia’s multilateral forums. […]That said, it is equally important not to exaggerate the pace and scope of
China’s military modernization, conflating trends in the Southeast Asian distribution of power with a potential
Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy in the broader Western Pacific. China currently does not possess the capability
to project substantial power into the South China Sea, and will likely remain unable to do so for at least another
two decades, its ongoing experimentation with aircraft carriers notwithstanding. As Dan Blumenthal has
observed, “the PLA lacks a sustained power projection capability associated with asserting full control over the
area, including sufficient at-sea replenishment and aerial refueling capabilities, modern destroyers with
advanced air defense capabilities, and nuclear submarines, as well as regional bases to support logistical
requirements.”42 Added to this, questions have risen regarding the as yet largely unproven ability of PLA Navy
crews to undertake prolonged operations at sea, particularly under conditions of high-intensity conflict.43
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NO LINK
No Link – China and the US have a history of cooperating on maritime issues.
China Institute of International Studies ‘ 14 [Li Fanjie. “The Prospect of Sino-US Maritime Conflict and
Cooperation”. 1/20/2014. China Institute of International Studies. China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
is the think tank of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It conducts research and analysis on a wide range of
foreign policy issues. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/20/content_6623542.htm ]
After the Kitty Hawk Incident in 1994 and the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, the US army began to seek dialogs
with China. The two countries eventually signed an agreement on incident prevention at sea. During Chinese
President Jiang Zemin’s visit to the United States in 1997, Sino-US dialog on maritime security as a topic was
officially included in the joint statement of the two state leaders. In January 1998, an agreement on the
establishment of consultation mechanism to strengthen military and maritime safety was signed between
China’s Ministry of National Defense and US Department of Defense. Considering that the two countries
experienced a series of clashes over issues from security to application of international law in the past, the
consultation mechanism as a platform to implement the consensus reached between the leaders would
doubtlessly play an indispensable role in promoting Sino-US military relationship by strengthening the
understanding and communication between Chinese and US navies and preventing their misunderstanding and
misjudgments at sea. Following this spirit, the two countries organized a series of high-level visits and warship
visits to each other, launched joint military exercises and arranged military academic and technical exchanges.
For example, in 2009, the US Chief of Navy Operations was invited to attend activities celebrating the 60th
anniversary of Chinese navy’s founding; in 2012 and 2013, the two navies launched two joint piracy-fighting
exercises in the Gulf of Aden and cooperated well with each other in related escort operations. The consultation
mechanism and cases of successful cooperation described above doubtlessly laid a solid foundation for the two
countries to consolidate their relationship and further their maritime security cooperation in the future. The
initiative by the Chinese leadership to construct a new mode of major-country relationship with the United
States after 2012 received positive feedback from the United States. Describing Sino-US relationship as the
“most important bilateral relationship”, President Obama confirmed that he was willing to cooperate with China
for the construction of a Sino-US partnership based on the new mode of major-country relationship. In June
2013, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, the leaders of both countries stressed the
importance of Sino-US relationship and suggested that China and the United States should and could create a
new path essentially different from the historical path of power clashes. They believed that the two countries,
based on the principles of “no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation”, could also
find a new path for their maritime and military security cooperation. During Chang Wanquan’s visit to the
United States, the two countries eventually reached five consensuses to strengthen the relationship between
the two armies. These consensuses have since then played an important role in guiding, facilitating and
deepening maritime security cooperation between the two countries.
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No Link – China and the US have a history of cooperating on various maritime issues
Fan ’11 [Gaoyue Fan. “Maritime Interests: China-US Cooperation and Conflicts” Center for Strategic
International Studies. Issues and Insights Vol.11-No. 10.
http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol11no10_English.pdf ]
This analysis makes clear that China and US maritime interests converge at (1) defending critical maritimerelated infrastructures; (2) protecting and facilitating maritime trade; (3) protecting sea lines of communication
and maintaining freedom of navigation; (4) safeguarding the ocean and maritime resources. Given these shared
interests, China and the US also face the same threats and challenges: (1) terrorist attacks; (2) piracy; (3)
transnational crimes; (4) drug and arms trafficking; (5) WMD and nuclear materials proliferation; (6) illegal
seaborne immigrants; (7) illegal exploitation of resources, including illegal fishing; (8) maritime disasters such as
typhoons, tsunami, earthquakes, shipwrecks, oil leaks, and radioactive contamination; (9) greenhouse gases and
pollution. As “no one nation has the resources required to provide safety and security throughout the entire
maritime domain,” China and the US have to enhance their cooperation in dealing with these threats and
challenges. China and the US have already cooperated in maritime affairs. In 1974, China joined the
International Maritime Organization and designated 620 port facilities for port inspection. In 1998, China and
the United States concluded the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) and began to conduct
consultations on military maritime security issues. In 2003, China formally joined the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) and later joined CSI-related programs such as the US Coast Guard Program, the Megaports/Secure Freight
Initiative and Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program. In 2006, China and the US began
joint maritime search-and-rescue exercises. Cooperation has effectively promoted the maritime interests of
both sides.
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No Link – United States and China have agreed to cooperate on aquaculture and fisheries
projects
Office of the Spokesperson ’14 [Office of the Spokesperson. Washington, D.C. July 14th, 2014. Press Release.
“U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track”.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229239.htm ]
At the Sixth Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) July 9-10, 2014, in Beijing, State
Councilor Yang Jiechi, special representative of President Xi Jinping, and Secretary of State John Kerry, special
representative of President Barack Obama, chaired the Strategic Track, which included participation from senior
officials from across both governments. The two sides reviewed the successful implementation of the Strategic
Track outcomes of the Fifth Round of the S&ED, held in-depth discussions on major bilateral, regional, and
global issues, and recommitted to the S&ED’s role in deepening strategic trust, expanding practical cooperation,
and constructively managing differences to build a new model of relations between the United States and China.
The dialogue on the Strategic Track produced the following specific outcomes and areas for further cooperation.
The United States and China: […]Recognizing our mutual interest in healthy oceans and sustainable fisheries and
aquaculture, and our important roles as fishing nations, the two sides re-established regular U.S.-China fisheries
dialogues to discuss issues of mutual interest related to the science and management of fisheries and
aquaculture, with a first meeting to take place in the summer of 2015, followed by regular meetings, as
appropriate.
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No Link – EPA already collaborates closely with China on environmental issues
EPA.gov ’14 [“EPA Collaboration with China”. For additional information about EPA's work with China, contact:
Luis Troche, Greater China Program Manager. Office of International and Tribal Affairs (2650R) U.S. EPA 1200
Pennsylvania Ave., NWWashington, DC 20460 http://www2.epa.gov/international-cooperation/epacollaboration-china ]
EPA’s bilateral relationship with China is one of its most significant. EPA partners with China’s national ministries
and commissions, provincial and special administrative regions, and other key partners to share expertise and
experience to advance environmental protection in support of EPA’s and China's international priorities.
Cooperative activities are aimed at building capacity to reduce emissions of pollutants, toxics, and greenhouse
gases and limiting threats to public health caused by pollution. Emphasis is placed on jointly addressing shared
current and emerging environmental challenges, such as global climate change, and working together to create
a foundation for long-term sustainability. EPA and China have many active engagements and have collaborated
on environmental issues for over three decades. EPA and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)
accomplish work under a Memorandum of Understanding addressing: air pollution; water pollution; pollution
from persistent organic pollutants and other toxics; hazardous and solid waste; prevention and restoration of
contaminated sites; emergency preparedness and response and development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental law; and environmental law and institutions. Initiatives are also in place to
collaborate on sustainable movement of goods, management of electronic waste, and management of mercury.
EPA’s relationship with China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) advances cooperation on
climate change policies and other initiatives such as cookstoves. In addition to these and other bilateral
relationships, EPA participates in broader government-wide initiatives with China including the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the U.S. Ten Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and
Environment (TYF).
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NO IMPACT
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No Econ Impact
No Impact – Chinese economic downturn has minimal impact on the US and Global economy
Davis 04 [Joseph, Analyst @ Vanguard China's slowing economy, September,
https://institutional5.vanguard.com/iip/pdf/chinaslowdown.pdf]
Overall, our simulations indicate that a Chinese hard landing would have a minimal impact on the U.S. economy.
There would be the usual temporary effects of dramatic economic news-a few days or weeks of market swings,
together with much dire prophesizing in the media. But, as stated above, the true result of a sharp drop in
China's GDP should be much like that of past emerging-market hard landings, which have not significantly
detracted from U.S.-and hence, global-economic growth. Despite the initial drop-off in local demand, global
deflationary pressures would quickly act to stimulate demand worldwide. Indeed, the VAR model demonstrates
that the second-round feedback effects of lower commodity and import prices would reduce input costs worldwide sufficiently to create a bounce-back effect: The lower costs eventually would counteract the first-round
fall-off in Chinese demand. Conclusion. While recent Chinese policy responses suggest that a soft landing is the
most likely outcome for the nation's economy, the risks to this assessment lie overwhelmingly on the downside.
Regardless of the path that China's economy takes over the next year, our analysis shows that the potential
ramifications for long-term investors are more modest and short-lived than commonly feared. Using
quantitative techniques, we find that the implications of a soft landing in China are relatively benign for the
global economy. A potential hard landing would have more harmful effects on the Asian economy and emerging
markets generally, but relatively minor impact on the U.S. economy.
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No impact to Chinese economy
Coonan 8 [October 25, 2010, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,”
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html]
All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long,
and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite.
Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge
facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically,
are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however,
writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the
worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the
overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first
place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in
six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and
allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the
property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese
banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful
war chest to call on in a downturn. The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give
China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan
economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively
underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised
economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no
real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy
start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash
on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent
years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but
perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold. It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the
global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States
with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that
European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to
be able to present to their constituencies.
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U.S. and China’s economies are too intertwined to go to war
Shor 12 (Francis, Professor of History – Wayne State, “Declining US Hegemony and Rising Chinese Power: A
Formula for Conflict?”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 11(1), pp. 157-167)
While the United States no longer dominates the global economy as it did during the first two decades after
WWII, it still is the leading economic power in the world. However, over the last few decades China, with all its
internal contradictions, has made enormous leaps until it now occupies the number two spot. In fact, the IMF
recently projected that the Chinese economy would become the world's largest in 2016. In manufacturing China
has displaced the US in so many areas, including becoming the number one producer of steel and exporter of
four-fifths of all of the textile products in the world and two-thirds of the world's copy machines, DVD players,
and microwaves ovens. Yet, a significant portion of this manufacturing is still owned by foreign companies,
including U.S. firms like General Motors. [5] On the other hand, China is also the largest holder of U.S. foreign
reserves, e.g. treasury bonds. This may be one of the reasons mitigating full-blown conflict with the U.S. now,
since China has such a large stake in the U.S. economy, both as a holder of bonds and as the leading exporter of
goods to the U.S. Nonetheless, "the U.S. has blocked several large scale Chinese investments and buyouts of oil
companies, technology firms, and other enterprises." [6] In effect, there are still clear nation-centric responses
to China's rising economic power, especially as an expression of the U.S. governing elite's ideological
commitment to national security.
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Economic decline doesn’t cause war
Tir 10 [Jaroslav Tir - Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate
Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, “Territorial Diversion:
Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]
Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is
associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak
results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant
relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S.
President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s
attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination
to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a
poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating
behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani
(2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a
significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic
recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002)
revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report
that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal
and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett
(1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani
and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir
and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic
ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings
for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives
strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These
results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs
of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic
malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take
a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious,
fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky
diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs
of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming
economy).
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No Government Collapse Impact
No Impact – China’s government would not collapse in an economic crisis
Giley 07 [Bruce Gilley, January 2007. Assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada, and
former contributing editor at the Far Eastern Economic Review, “Is China Stuck?” Journal of Democracy, 18.1,
Project Muse]
Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to
move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of [End Page
173] popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as
one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a
regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44).
Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in
urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign
sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy
to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will stir the regime to recognize that its time has
come, and to do the right thing by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a
relatively smooth democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely
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No Impact - Catastrophic consequences to CCP collapse are just fear-mongering—political
instability won’t cause chaos
Giley 4 [Bruce Gilley, 2004, PhD Candidate Politics @ Princeton U. and Adjunct Prof. Int’l Affairs @ New School
U. “China's Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and where it Will Lead,” p. 115-116, Google Print]
Would the entire PRC edifice simply collapse from the accumulated pressures of crisis and mass protest? In
cross-country comparisons, "post-totalitarian" states like China are the most vulnerable to collapse because they
are unable to respond creatively to protest and yet there is no organized opposition to assume control. The East
German regime was a perfect example. It simply collapsed when huge defections from the state occurred at
every level and there was no organized opposition ready to take over. In the German case, there was a
neighboring fraternal state whose arms provided some cushion for the collapse. China would not have the same
support. For this reason, the CCP and many of its supporters have warned of the dangers of collapse in words
designed to scare the regime's opponents into quiescence. Fear-mongering about the consequences of regime
collapse in China has been a staple of PRC propaganda since reforms began. Deng said: "If the political situation
in china became unstable the trouble would spread to the rest of the world, with consequences that would be
hard to imagine." Foreign scholars have taken up the histrionics with relish. One has worried about "societal
disintegration" and even "the fragmentation of China into several competing polities." Another warns: "At worst
the resulting chaos from a collapsing China would have a profound effect on the stability of Asia and on the U.S.
policy to guarantee the security of its Asian allies. At the least, China could turn to the West for economic relief
and reconstruction, the price tag of which would be overwhelming." Yet these fears appear overblown or
misplaced. First, as we saw in the last part, many of these dire predictions are an accurate portrayal of China
today. The problems of Party rule have created the very crisis that the fear-mongers alluded to. China already
has an AIDs crisis, an illegal emigration crisis, a pollution crisis, and an economic crisis. Given its well-established
state and social cohesion, China has far more to gain than to lose from political liberalization. Second, there is a
good argument that governance in China will not collapse further even with a top leadership in crisis. The
country actually functioned quite normally during the Cultural Revolution, when there was often no rule at the
top, as a result of strong local governments and a social fabric that held together. At this state, with protests in
full swing, a military on good behavior and a regime trying to confront the possibility of change, there is no
reason to believe that the country will abruptly disintegrate. As in 1989, in fact, there is every reason to believe
that people will act better toward each other and that local governments will look kindly upon the movement,
an outpouring of civic behavior linked with the ideals of democracy. Finally, as above, if we are concerned with
the creation of a more just system, then some degree of "chaos" relating to unstable government may be a
worthwhile price to pay, including for the world. Claims by some U.S. foreign policy analysts that "there is as
great a 'threat' to US interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China"
are based on a highly instrumental and even the flawed view of U.S., and world, interests. A world community
committed to the principles of justice through democracy has an overriding interest in its realization in China. To
the extent that instability in China worsens conditions for greater justice there or abroad, it would indeed
"threaten" world interests. But if the instability, despite its costs, leads to greater gains through a more just
order in China and, through it, abroad, then this is very much in the world's interests. Few Americans, French,
Croats, Romanians, South Africans, Filipinos, South Koreans, or Indonesians would say the "chaos" of their
democratic revolutions was not a price worth paying. China's people should be allowed to make the same
choice.
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No Impact - Chinese government won’t collapse
Time 08 [December 25 2008, “Will the Financial Crisis Bring Upheaval to China?”
www.time.com/time/world/article/0%2C8599%2C1868402%2C00.html]
Just as the political elite is united, the forces that would have to oppose them in any move to change the
country's political order are fragmented, says David Zweig, a political science professor at Hong Kong's
University of Science and Technology. Though it is miserable for those thrown out of work, millions of peasants
going back to their villages are highly unlikely to pose a threat to Beijing. "Remember, Beijing has done this
before: between 1998 and 2000, the government put tens of millions of workers at state-owned enterprises out
of work. There were plenty of strikes and protests that made the government a little nervous, but overall, they
were able to survive pretty well." Currently, the official figure is 4 million unemployed; but other estimates have
the number at twice or three times that. (See pictures here of China's dust bowl.) "For regimes to be overthrown
you need an overriding ideology like democracy or the mysticism of the Taiping and Boxer rebellions in the mid
1800s and early 20th Century," Says Zweig. "For regimes to collapse now you also need the middle class, and I
just can't see that happening. They have been the core of Communist Party support for a decade or more and
their future is still very much tied up with the Party's." "You can tell that the senior leaders know political change
will come to China eventually and that the Party can't hang on indefinitely," says the diplomat. "That's why 90%
of their children are in business, not working their way up the Communist Youth League or whatever. But that
change is 15, 20 years down the road. That's not going to happen now, even if it is a very bad downturn. Change
will come to China. But not yet. Not now."
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China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
WDCA 2014-15
No CCP collapse—the government represses instability
Pei 09 (Minxin, Senior Associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3/12.
“Will the Chinese Communist Party Survive the Crisis?” Foreign Affairs.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64862/minxin-pei/will-the-chinese-communist-party-survive-the-crisis)
It might seem reasonable to expect that challenges from the disaffected urban middle class, frustrated college
graduates, and unemployed migrants will constitute the principal threat to the party's rule. If those groups were
in fact to band together in a powerful coalition, then the world's longest-ruling party would indeed be in deep
trouble. But that is not going to happen. Such a revolutionary scenario overlooks two critical forces blocking
political change in China and similar authoritarian political systems: the regime's capacity for repression and the
unity among the elite. Economic crisis and social unrest may make it tougher for the CCP to govern, but they
will not loosen the party's hold on power. A glance at countries such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba, and
Burma shows that a relatively unified elite in control of the military and police can cling to power through brutal
force, even in the face of abysmal economic failure. Disunity within the ruling elite, on the other hand, weakens
the regime's repressive capacity and usually spells the rulers' doom. The CCP has already demonstrated its
remarkable ability to contain and suppress chronic social protest and small-scale dissident movements. The
regime maintains the People's Armed Police, a well-trained and well-equipped anti-riot force of 250,000. In
addition, China's secret police are among the most capable in the world and are augmented by a vast network of
informers. And although the Internet may have made control of information more difficult, Chinese censors can
still react quickly and thoroughly to end the dissemination of dangerous news. Since the Tiananmen
crackdown, the Chinese government has greatly refined its repressive capabilities. Responding to tens of
thousands of riots each year has made Chinese law enforcement the most experienced in the world at crowd
control and dispersion. Chinese state security services have applied the tactic of "political decapitation" to great
effect, quickly arresting protest leaders and leaving their followers disorganized, demoralized, and impotent. If
worsening economic conditions lead to a potentially explosive political situation, the party will stick to these
tried-and-true practices to ward off any organized movement against the regime.
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China Disadvantage
Novice Packet
WDCA 2014-15
Collapse of the CCP will not lead to escalation
Copley 07 – Award-winning historian and global strategist; founding Director of Future Directions International
Pty. Ltd. and its Acting Chief Executive; Editor, GIS (Gregory, 3/30. "Avoiding an Economic Pandemic: The Critical
Global Significance of the Health of the PRC Economy," Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, Lexis.)
There is scope or flexibility for the PRC to somewhat transform its energy demands in the global marketplace.
Amb. Freeman makes the point that domestic and international pressures seem likely to cause the PRC to
improve its energy efficiency through internal innovation. He noted that despite the PRC's "very low rates of per
capita energy consumption (which are only about 14 percent of US per capita consumption), China consumes
between seven and 111/2 times more energy than Japan to produce one dollar of gross domestic product (GDP),
and it's about 41/2 times less efficient than is the United States". And many of the innovations which the PRC is
exploring are in the area of clean coal and nuclear energy. It seems clear that it is in the interests of the
international community to help the PRC stabilize its energy situation, and to improve energy usage efficiency, in
order to minimize risks to the global security framework, within the framework of competing energy needs. The
only alternative, from the standpoint of external powers, to assisting in the process of stabilizing the PRC's
energy supply, currency credibility, and population unrest is to plan for the containment of any implosion of
political stability within the PRC should its transition during the next two decades to entrenched power status be
interrupted.
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