Soviet Union
Foreign Affairs
1929 - 1941
Foreign Policy in
the 1920s
• Memories of Civil War
– Foreign Intervention
• British, French, US, Japanese
• Capitalists fundamentally opposed to Communist system
• Lenin and Trotsky’s World View
– Marxism was a global phenomenon
– The Revolution had to be exported ASAP
• Russo-Polish War of 1920
– See-Saw War
– Both sides Overextended themselves
– Narrowly averted a disaster – allowed Whites to Resurrect
Civil War in South of Russia
• “Comrade Lenin
cleans the world of
filth.”
– The Promise of
exporting
Revolution
• COMINTERN set
up in 1919 to
achieve World
Revolution
The Bolshevik
Dilemma
• How to deal with the
nations of the world
– Work to undermine
them
• Or
– Develop Diplomatic
relations with them
• Consider
advantages/disadvanta
ges for both of the
them!
Source’s Author
Date
Desire to Spread
World Revolution
Socialism in One
Coutnry
Source 1
• “Comrade Lenin
cleans the world of
filth.”
– 1920
Source 2
• “We have always and repeatedly
pointed out to the workers that the
underlying chief task and basic
condition of our victory is the
propagation of revolution at least to
several of the more advanced
countries”
– Lenin, Feb 1921
Source 3
• “We go to it because trade with
Capitalist countries (so long as they
have not altogether collapsed) is
unconditionally necessary for us”
– Lenin explaining why he was attending
the International Conference at Genoa in
1922
Source 4
• “The way out lies only in the victory of
the Proletariat of the advanced
countries. Viewed from this
standpoint, a national revolution is not
a self-contained whole; it is only a link
in the internal chain. The international
revolution constitutes a permanent
process, despite declines and ebbs.”
– Trotsky, 1930
Source 5
• “The ensuring of peace cannot depend on
our efforts alone, it requires the
collaboration and co-operation of other
states. While therefore trying to establish
and maintain relations with all states, we
are giving special attention to strengthening
and making close our relations with those
which, like us, give proof of their sincere
desire to maintain peace and are ready to
resist those who break the peace.”
– Litvinov, 1933
Source 6
• “The USSR would never be swayed
by alliances with this or that foreign
power, be it France, Poland or
Germany, but would always base her
policy on self-interest”
– Stalin, 1934
Source 7
• “We toilers of the Soviet Union must
count on our own efforts in defending
our affairs and, above all, on our Red
Army in the defence of our Country”
– Molotov, 1936
Source 8
• “This time we shall observe the
contest between Germany and the
Western powers and shall not
intervene in the conflict until we
ourselves feel it fit to do so in order to
bring about the decision”
– Litvinov to Czech FO, 1938
Source 9
• “England and France have rejected the
policy of collective security…and taken a
position of non-intervention…the policy of
non-intervention reveals an eagerness not
to hinder Germany… from embroiling
herself in a war with the Soviet Union… be
cautious and do not allow Soviet Russia to
be drawn into the conflicts by wargmongers
who are accustomed to have others pull
their chestnuts out of the fire.”
– Stalin, 1939
Source 10
Development of Soviet Foreign
Policy
• Phase 1 (1917 – 8)
– Revolutionary Period
• Phase 2 (1918 – 1920)
– Civil War Period
• Phase 3 (1921 – 1927)
– Recovery and Peace
• Phase 4 (1928 – 1933)
– The Left Turn
• Phase 5 (1933 – 1938)
– Collective Security
• Phase 6 (1938 – 1941)
– Self-Preservation
Development of Soviet Foreign
Policy - Phase One
• The Revolutionary Period
– October 1917
• Bolshevik Revolution
– February 1918
• Cancellation of all Foreign debts
– March 1918
• Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
– Humiliating but a price worth paying
according to Lenin
– Allows Bolsheviks to consolidate power
Phase Two
• The Civil War
– 1918 - 1919
• Foreign Intervention in
Civil War
– March 1919
• COMINTERN
established
– Apr-Oct 1920
• Russo-Polish War
– Nov 1920
• Evacuation of Crimea
G. V. Chicherin
Foreign Commissioner
1918 - 1930
• Ex-Menshevik and Ex-Aristocrat
– Worked for Tsarist Foreign Ministry
• Educated but emotional
– Converted to Bolshevism whilst forcibly sent on holiday to
‘Cure’ his Homosexuality – Chance meeting with Lenin
• Pro-German
– Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
– Treaty of Rapallo
• Anti-British
– Had been imprisoned by British 1917 – 1918 for anti-war
– Disliked Curzon
• Advocated policy of engagement
– Engage Capitalists in order to stop them uniting against
Communist Russia
• Not a member of the Politburo
Phase Three
• Recovery and Peace 1921 – 1927
– 1921
• Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
– 1922
• Treaty of Rapallo
– 1923
• Curzon Ultimatum over Central Asian communist adventures
• Threatened suspension of trade agreement
– 1924
• USSR officially recognised by GB, France & Italy
• Forged Zinoviev Letter
– COMINTERN urging propaganda in British Armed Forces
– Victorious Conservatives cold shouldered USSR for a year
– 1926
• Treaty of Berlin extended Treaty of Rapallo
• General Strike in Britain – Comintern involvement
• Socialism in One Country idea proposed by Stalin
– 1927
• Chinese communists massacred by Chiang Kai Shek
• Diplomatic Relations suspended with Britain
Why did Soviet Foreign Policy become
more Conservative in the 1920s?
• Russian Polish War disaster
• Bolshevik Consolidation
– Internal positioning within Politburo
• Conservatives backed safe Stalin
• Leftists backed the more aggressive Trotsky
• Economic Disaster in Post World War One and Post Civil War
Russia
– Economically backward when Tsarist
• Myriad National Identities within USSR
– Plenty to keep Red Army busy regaining the old borders of Tsarist
Russia
• Fear of Capitalists
– Had to prepare for a re-invasion of Foreigners
– Fear of Proxy wars
• Capitalists might use Turks, Poles or Persians to reignite RCW
• Avoid War on Two Fronts – Japan and Germany
• Unstable Borders
– Germany, China, Japan in Korea, British in India
Relations with Britain
•
1921 Anglo-Soviet Trade
Agreement
–
–
•
•
Conservatives suspicious of
Communists
•
Seizure of private property
Curzon ultimatum 1923
Zinoviev letter
Arcos Raid 1927
•
•
Labour shifts from positive to
suspicious
–
–
Recognises USSR 1924
1926 General Strike
•
•
Soviet Trade delegation accused
of spying
Diplomatic relations suspended
TUC returns £26,000 cheque
Labelled Social Fascists by Stalin
in 1930
1918 – 1922
–
Positive on both sides
Pragmatic
–
–
–
–
•
•
1922 – 23
–
Conservative
1929 – 1931
–
•
First ever Labour minority
government
1924 – 1929
–
•
Conservative
1924
–
•
Lloyd George Liberal Coalition
Labour minority
1931 – 1940
–
National governments
Relations with Germany
• Rapallo Treaty 1922
– Stresemann stabilises
Eastern borders
– Helps get around T of V
• Active Comintern activity in
uprisings
– 1919, 1921, 1923
• Locarno Treaties
– Worried Soviets that
Germans were being
reintegrated into Europe
• Treaty of Berlin 1926
– Included pledge of
Neutrality if either were
attacked by a Third nation
• Weak Weimar
Governments
– Conservative Stresemann
most positive towards
USSR
• Germany has enough
problems!
– SPD hostile to USSR due
to uncompromising
attitude of KPD
– Rising spectre of Nazis
• 1933 electoral success
• Hitler represented the
final stage of monopoly
capitalism – he would
inflame social tensions
making revolution more
likely in Germany - Stalin
Phase 4 – The Left Turn
• Follows Stalin’s Domestic U-Turn
– Ditched Bukharin’s Right Wing Policies
– Stalin able to dominate Politburo and Comintern
• Bukharin replaced by compliant Molotov
• Foreign Communist Party leaders replaced
– Intellectuals replaced by pliant working class
» German Communist Party Scandal – Corrupt
Thaelmann reinstated by Stalin
– Back to basics (and Anti-Trotskyite)
• Socialists labelled as Social Fascists and CounterRevolutionaries
– KPD fails to help SPD as a result
» “Nach Hitler Uns – After Hitler Us”
M. M. Litvinov
Foreign Commissar 1930 - 1939
• Chicherin’s deputy in 1920s
• Ex-Menshevik, Jewish
– Married to a British woman
• Talented negotiator
• Proposed Disarmament first
– Helps to defend USSR
– Helps Communist Revolutions
– Kellogg-Briand Pact
• Pro-British
• Anti-German
• Proposed Collective Security otherwise
– In favour of League of Nations
• Joins in 1934
• Not a member of the Politburo
Phase 5 – Collective Security
•
March 1934
– Trade agreement with Germany
•
Sept 1934
– League of Nations - Litvinov’s Collective Security Policy
•
May 1935
– Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia
•
August 1935
– COMINTERN supports Popular Fronts
•
1936 – 1939
– Spanish Civil War
•
Nov 1936
– Anti-COMINTERN pact of Germany & Japan (Italy 1937)
•
Sep 1938
– Munich agreement (USSR excluded)
•
1938/9
– Japanese military attacks in Far East (Manchukuo)
•
April 1939
– Litvinov proposes triple Military alliance – Britain, France and USSR
•
May 1939
– Litvinov replaced by Molotov
Spanish Civil War
• Intervention or NonIntervention?
• Second Republic established
1931
– Republicans, Socialists,
Communists, Anarchists,
Separatists
• Traditional Nationalist Hostile
– Army, Catholic Church,
Landowners, Centralists
• Nazi Germany and Italy
supported Nationalists
• Britain and France wanted to
let Spain sort itself out.
• Stalin’s dilemma?
– What should he do?
Reasons to intervene
• Ideological battle
– Communism versus Fascism
• Soviet Security
– Keep Germany and Italy busy
– Help Natural anti-German ally
France from being surrounded by
Fascists
• Fight Trotskyites
– Trotskyite Communists were
flocking to Spain to show a viable
alternative form of Communism
from Stalinism
• Military practice
– Allow hardware and tactics to be
tried out on the battlefield
• Prestige
– Be seen as standing up to the
forces of Fascism
Reasons not to intervene
• Strategic Concerns
– Spain is far from Soviet borders
• Reaction of Italy and Germany
– Force the two countries closer together in an AntiCommunist crusade
• Reaction of Britain and France
– A successful communist intervention might scare Britain
and France closer to Germans
– Show disregard for League of Nations and of collective
security
• Domestic Concerns
– Busy with anti-Trotskyite Purges
• Military in particular
– Five year plans less successful than hoped for
– USSR not prepared for sustained war of any kind
Stalin’s Decision
• Limited “Secret” Intervention
– Can help fight Fascists but avoid any blame if intervention
fails (or succeeds)
– Particularly worried about the position of France
• Helping to keep France ‘Democratic’ and not fall into hands
of Fascists.
• NKVD directed to control Comintern activities
– Channel funds
– Ship goods secretly
• Via neutral countries
– Kindly volunteer to look after Spanish Gold Reserves
– Caballero Letter, 1936
• Calm down Communist demands
– No social or economic radicalism
– Foreign property to be respected
– Attract non-communist sympathisers
Civil War within a Civil War
• Barcelona, 1937
– Safe in Republican hands but Anarchists and
POUM (Trotskyite Communists) think that
Republican (and Soviet) Communists are being
too pragmatic
– Uprising – Fighting in the Streets
• Stalin asks NKVD to crush POUM
• Feeds into Purges in USSR
– People being denounced left, right and centre
– NKVD executing anyone ‘accused’ of being Trotskyite
• Infighting fatally weakened Republicans
and allowed united Nationalists to ultimately
triumph by 1939
• Positives
Was it worth it?
– 4th largest Gold Reserves in
the world
– Seen Fascist Equipment and
Tactics in Operation
– Limited Trotskyism as an
international alternative to
Stalinism
• Negatives
– Failed to save Republican
Spain
– Seen Fascist Equipment and
Tactics in Operation
– Ruthless Communist tactics
revealed to the world
• Infighting and purges
discredited Communism
– Serving Officers and Diplomats
were ‘tainted’ by exposure to
Trotskyite ideas
• Most executed or re-educated
on return
• Experiences wasted
– Britain and France less than
impressed by their potential
ally
• Nail in coffin of Litvinov’s
collective security philosophy
What! No Chair for me?
Czechoslovakian Crisis
• Stalin’s last attempt at Collective Security
– Willing to consider aiding Czechs
– However,
• No Physical border with Czechs
• Polish antipathy
– French and British allied to Poles
– Allies found it frustrating dealing with one dictator let alone a
second.
– Allies suspicious of Communist motives after Spanish Civil War
debacle
– Mussolini was supposed to be the neutral Referee – hostile to
USSR
• Lessons learnt
– Stalin – Trust no-one USSR must look after its own security
– Hitler – The Allies are weak and divided
– Chamberlain and Briand – Allies made to look ridiculous –
determination not to be pushed around again
• Reaffirm Polish treaties
– Further antagonises Stalin
Molotov
Foreign Commissar
1939 - 1949
• Replaced anti-German
Litvinov
– Litvinov had failed to
cement deal with British
and French
• Stalin stooge
– The ultimate Yes Man
• Leader of Comintern
from 1929
• Member of Politburo
• Stalin’s Deputy
The Nazi Soviet Pact
•
•
•
The most startling diplomatic event of the 1930s
One week before Second World War
Treaty of Neutrality
– Secret Additional Protocol
• Carved up hated Poland and marked out spheres of influence in Eastern Europe
•
Why
– Relative weakness of Russian Armed Services
• 1938 purge of Red Army
– Japan border disputes
• Open warfare in Siberia
• One enemy at a time
• Worried at being surrounded
– Relative ineffectiveness of Five year plans
• Not delivering fully advertised output
– Need more time to deal with German army
– Create a Buffer zone for added defence against German Army
– Not yet fully aware of capabilities of German Army
• Pre-Blitzkrieg
• Hopes France and Germany will fight long drawn out attritional war a la WWI
– Begrudging Respect for Hitler and Nazi regime
– After Czechoslovakia Realised that he cold not rely on Capitalist British and
French
Phase 6 – Nazi
Soviet Love-in
•
8 May 1939
– Britain rejects military alliance with Russia
•
20th May 1939
– Germany asks for trade talks
•
27th May 1939
– Chamberlain restarts talks with Russia
•
18th July
– Soviets offer Trade deal to Germans
•
23rd July
– Britain and France ask for military talks
• Drax arrives 11th August
•
14th August 1939
– Ribbentrop asks to see Stalin personally
•
19th August
– Anglo-Soviet negotiations break down
– German Soviet Trade deal announced
•
20th August
– Hitler asks Stalin to meet Ribbentrop
•
21st August
– Stalin agrees
•
22nd August
– Ribbentrop flies to Moscow
•
23rd August
– Nazi Soviet Non-Aggression pact signed
•
The Government of the German Reich and The Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between
Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the
Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926 between Germany and the
U.S.S.R., have reached the following Agreement:
•
Article I. Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act
of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually
or jointly with other Powers.
Article II. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of
belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no
manner lend its support to this third Power.
Article III. The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future
maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order
to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.
Article IV. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties
shall participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly
aimed at the other party.
Article V. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties
over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or
conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through
the establishment of arbitration commissions.
Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the
proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not advance it
one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall
automatically be extended for another five years.
Article VII. The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time.
The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement shall enter into force
as soon as it is signed.
•
•
•
•
•
•
• Secret Additional Protocol.
• Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in
the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the
boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In
this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is
recognized by each party.
• Article II. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of
the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of
Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the
line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.
• The question of whether the interests of both parties make
desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish States and
how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely
determined in the course of further political developments.
• In any event both Governments will resolve this question by
means of a friendly agreement.
• Article III. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called
by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side
declares its complete political disinteredness in these areas.
• Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly
secret.
Essay Question
• Did Stalin make the correct strategic
decision by signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in
1939?
– Debate
• The failure of Collective Security in Europe
in the late 1930s was not the fault of Stalin.
Discuss
• Stalin’s Foreign Policy was an extension of
his Domestic Politics. Discuss.