Family Provision
Part 1
8 July 2015
Craig Birtles 2015
1
Chapter 3 Succession Act 2006
• Applies to DOD after 1 March 2009
• Prior legislation is Family Provision Act 1982 (DOD 1 September
1983 – 1 March 2009)
• Before that Testator’s Family Maintenance and Guardianship of
Infants Act 1916 (DOD prior to 1 September 1983)
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• Eligibility
• Determining Applications
• General considerations
• Other matters
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S 57 Succession Act 2006
The following persons are eligible:
a. Husband or wife at DOD
b. De facto partner at DOD
c.
Child
d. Former husband or wife (factors warranting)
e. Dependent grandchild or dependent member of the household
(factors warranting)
f.
Close personal relationship at DOD (factors warranting)
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De Facto relationship
•
S 21C(2) Interpretation Act 1987 – relationship as a couple living together
and not married to one another or related by family
•
S 21C(3) – in determining whether two persons are in a “relationship as a
couple” take into account:
(a) the duration of the relationship,
(b) the nature and extent of their common residence,
(c) whether a sexual relationship exists,
(d) financial dependence or interdependence, and financial support
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property,
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life,
(g) the care and support of children,
(h) the performance of household duties,
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
No particular
finding in
relation to any of
those matters is
necessary in
determining
whether 2
persons have a
relationship as a
couple
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De Facto relationship (cont)
•
Roy v Sturgeon (1986) 11 NSWLR 454, value judgment having regard to all
of the circumstances
•
Simonis v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1987) 21 NSWLR 677 –
•
Estate Shelia Sarah Cohen; DOD 13/6/85; Will 7/6/83 appointed brother executor; he
renounced in favour of Perpetual.
•
Plaintiff and deceased met regularly at North Sydney Bowling Club from 1967 to 1980;
when Plaintiff separated from his wife in 1980 he moved in with deceased; there was
a sexual relationship; they cared for each other; they travelled together; publicly they
presented as a couple; when she became ill and was hospitalised he was a regular
visitor.
•
Defendant argued that they maintained their separate lifestyle; she had her own
friends and continued to play golf without him regularly; no intermingling of finances.
•
Court determined that the relationship had an element of permanence; each had rich
emotional support for the other; there was a merging of lives and they held out
themselves to friends as a couple
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De Facto relationship (cont)
• It has been argued that there could be an “exceptional case” whereby a
DFR existed even though the parties did not, and had never, lived
together in a single residence – based on comments made by the
Queensland Court of Appeal on hearing of property adjustment
proceedings (KQ v HAE [2007] 2 Qd R 32 at [20]; FO v HAF [2007] 2
Qd R 138)
• Argument only possible by reason of the way in which s 21C
Interpretation Act 1987 (and similar Queensland legislation) is framed
• Is this argument correct? Discussion
• Contrast where two persons of a long relationship have multiple periods
of temporary absence - eg Dion v Rieser [2010] NSWSC 50; or where
they lived together for a short part of each week – Vaughan v Hoskovich
[2010] NSWSC 706; compare Piras v Egan [2008] NSWCA 59
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Child
• S 95 Adoption Act 2000 – child includes adopted child
• S 9(1) Status of Children Act 1996 – child born to wife presumed to
be child of husband or (2) cohabiting partner
• Not step child or foster child
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Child – Fertilisation procedures
• S 14(1) Status of Children Act 1996 – husband presumed to be
father of child born to wife as a result of fertilisation procedure but
only if he consented to the procedure; wife presumed to be mother
even if she did not provide the ovum
• S 14(1A) same provisions apply for de facto partners
• S 14(2) man providing sperm presumed not to be the father
• S 14(3) woman providing ovum presumed not to be mother
• S 14 presumptions irrebuttable
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Former husband or wife
• Property settlement significant, usually but not necessarily
determinative
• Factors warranting required
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Dependent grandchild or dependent member of the
household
• May include parents, nephews and nieces, foster children, stepchildren, former de facto spouses, friends, carers
• Dependence at any time but degree and duration of dependence
relevant
• Financial dependence; or dependence analogous to financial
dependence (services)
• Can include accommodation; shared pool of resources for expenses
• Membership of household must have some continuity or
permanence
• Factors warranting required
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Dependence
• Ball v Newey (1988) 13 NSWLR 489 – “dependence” is the
condition of depending on something or on someone for what is
needed. It includes actual dependence not just for basic necessities
or sustenance but also to support a standard of life set by the parties
themselves.
• DOD 10/9/85; 1981 Plaintiff and deceased commenced homosexual
relationship; in 1983 they rented a house together; in 1984 they
decided to purchase a home together; St George bank provided 95%
of the capital for the house; both of their incomes was required to
meet the loan repayments; they had a joint savings account
• Appeal successful sent back to SCNSW for further trial
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Dependence (cont)
Benney v Jones (1990) 12 NSWLR 559 – NSWCOA
•
At first instance Young J determined that plaintiff and deceased were not
dependent on each other; they were not members of the same household
and if they were there were no factors warranting.
•
Plaintiff and deceased had a homosexual relationship from 1970’s. They
each had their own residence. Deceased purchased farm property in June
1985; DOD was 16/12/88; each of plaintiff and deceased was financially
capable of buying premises elsewhere
•
Plaintiff’s Counsel submitted that dependency could be emotional
dependency alone – this submission was rejected; but Priesley JA said there
was some financial dependence referring to Samuels JA in Ball v Newey “If it is relevant, it cannot be said that what they chose to do (ie their living
arrangements) was unreasonable; and in order to support the mode of life
they wished to pursue, each was, it is open to find, partially dependent on
the other.”
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Dependence (cont)
Petrohilios v Hunter (1991) 25 NSWLR 343 – NSWCOA
•
Step child claim; appeal from decision of Master Windeyer who determined
that plaintiff was not eligible; there were no factors warranting and no case
made for provision.
•
Plaintiff lived with deceased from 1946 to 1959 (when she was married at
18). The evidence was that the deceased step mother treated her as her
own child during that time.
•
COA found dependence and factors warranting, ordering provision of
$20,000. – “Dependence … is not limited to financial or material matters but
also includes other forms of dependence analogous to but distinct from
financial dependence such as a mother’s services to a young child.”
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Grandchild
Vanvalen v Neaves [2005] NSWSC 593 (Estate Alma Sherborne)
•
Applications by two children and one grandchild.
•
DOD 21/2/01; Will 22/2/01; H1 was John Chivery DOD 1947; two children
Barbara and Helen; Helen’s daughter was Julia; He owned the Tarlo
property which devolved to deceased and was the deceased’s home.
•
H 2 was William Sherborne DOD 1976; one child of marriage Grant;
deceased inherited Willow Vale from William Sherborne.
•
Will provided that Grant take the real estate and the interest in the farming
partnership if he paid each of Barbara and Helen $20,000; Barbara and
Helen entitled to residue.
•
Grandchild alleged four periods of dependence; (1) when Julia, her mother
and sibling stayed with deceased for three months after father became
violent; (2) school holidays from age of 12 to 16; (3) when Julia lived and
worked, by her own choice, from the end of year 10 (1985) to 1993 on
Willow Vale; (4) 1993 to 1994 when she lived and worked on Tarlo
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Vanvalen v Neaves [2005] NSWSC 593 (cont)
•
Court found no dependence.
•
Period 1 was support for Helen;
•
Period 2 was hospitality;
•
Period 3 was a different property; was Julia’s choice and she was not
financially dependent.
•
Period 4 was Julia’s choice and she was not financially dependent (then
aged 24).
•
Grandchild dependence must be direct and immediate not indirect and
incidental such as a grandparent providing support and maintenance of the
grandparent’s own child.
•
See postscript – Sherborne Estate (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 1003
•
More recent grandchild case – Chapple v Wilcox [2014] NSWCA 392
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Close personal relationship
• S 3(3) Succession Act 2006 – defined as a relationship between two
adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living
together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic
support and personal care.
• S 3(4) – not for fee or reward; or on behalf of another person or
organisation (eg government agency)
• Not de facto partners
• Factors warranting required
• Skarica v Tosha [2014] NSWSC 34 an example of a successful claim
by CPR plaintiff; note difficulties for defendant executor
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Ye v Fung [2006] NSWSC 243
• Estate of Frances Lan Fong Fung DOD 21/6/01
• Plaintiff Chinese immigrant; came to Australia to study; non-sexual
relationship; they lived together but deceased was 37 years older;
• Free accommodation; paid $22k towards tuition and other benefits
totalling $70k; said in letters “I will treat him as my own nephew”;
shared domestic duties; complex additional facts
• Plaintiff claimed DFR (unsuccessful); Court found CPR
• Fung v Ye [2007] NSWCA 115; Estate appealed; claimed that CPR
ended prior to death; COA dismissed appeal; mere temporary
absence does not mean that relationship had ended (attendance at
hospital).
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• Eligibility
• Determining Applications
• General considerations
• Other matters
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SS 58-59 Succession Act 2006
• An order may be made if:
‒ S58 – application filed within 12 months of DOD (FPA 18 months)
‒ S59(1)(a) – applicant is an eligible person
‒ S59(1)(b) – where necessary there are factors warranting the
making of the application
‒ S59(1)(c) – the Court may make an order if, at the time of hearing,
adequate provision has not been made
• THEN - S59(2) – such provision as the Court thinks ought to be
made for the maintenance education or advancement in life of the
applicant.
• CONSIDER factors in s 60(2) SA
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S 60(2) Succession Act 2006
The Court may consider:
(a) relationship including the nature and duration of the relationship,
(b) the nature and extent of any obligations or responsibilities owed to
applicant and to other beneficiaries,
(c) the nature and extent of the estate and notional estate,
(d) the financial resources (including earning capacity) and financial
needs, both present and future, of the applicant and of any beneficiary
(e) the financial circumstances of anyone cohabiting with the applicant,
(f) any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant, or any
beneficiary,
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S 60(2) Succession Act 2006 (cont)
(g) the age of the applicant when the application is being considered,
(h) any contribution by the applicant to the acquisition, conservation
and improvement of the estate or to the welfare of the deceased, for
which adequate consideration was not received,
(i) any provision made during the deceased person’s lifetime or made
from the deceased person’s estate,
(j) any evidence of the testamentary intentions of the deceased
(k) whether the applicant was being maintained by the deceased
(l) whether any other person is liable to support the applicant,
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S 60(2) Succession Act 2006 (cont)
(m) the character and conduct of the applicant,
(n) the conduct of any other person before and after the date of the
death of the deceased person,
(o) any relevant Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander customary law,
(p) any other matter the Court considers relevant, including matters in
existence at the time of the deceased person’s death or at the time the
application is being considered.
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A two stage process?
Under the Family Provision Act 1982, the Court developed a “two-stage”
process as described in Singer v Berghouse [1994] HCA 40; 181 CLR
201 at 208-211 per Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ:
“The first stage calls for a determination of whether the applicant has
been left without adequate provision for his or her proper maintenance,
education and advancement in life. [the jurisdictional question]
The second stage, which only arises if that determination be made in
favour of the applicant, requires the court to decide what provision
ought to be made out of the deceased's estate for the applicant. [the
discretionary question]”
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Singer v Berghouse - Facts
•
Plaintiff was widow; second marriage for both deceased and plaintiff; each
had children from prior marriage; 12 month marriage DOD;
•
Prior to marriage Deed entered under which each agreed that they would
leave their own property to their children from the prior marriage; release not
approved by Court under s 31 FPA; relevant only as evidence as to what
parties thought was fair at the time it was entered into.
•
Dismissed at first instance and on appeal. At first instance Master Windeyer
said that there was nothing to suggest that the plaintiff could not live a
perfectly satisfactory life based on her own assets (consider evidence)
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Singer v Berghouse (cont)
•
Two stage test relevant because Court required to consider how it should
approach appeal
•
House v The King (1936) 44 CLR 499 principles applied
•
HCA determined that principles which govern appellate review of
discretionary decisions should apply to jurisdictional question as well as
discretionary question
•
Appellant did not show that first instance decision was erroneous
•
Plaintiff relied solely on “moral claim” that a widow might have on a
deceased’s estate. Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ said (obiter) “moral
claim” may be understood as a “gloss” on the statutory language.
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A two stage process - discussion
Note Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191 Callinan and Heydon JJ at [121] –
“we do not therefore think that the questions which the Court has to answer in
assessing a claim under the Act necessarily always divide neatly in two”
In Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308, Basten JA seemed to suggest that
Chapter 3 of the Succession Act 2006 has done away with the two-stage
process, although Barrett JA disagreed and Allsop P thought it didn’t matter.
Andrew v Andrew [2011] NSWSC 115 Hallen J
•
Estate Rita Melba Andrew - Claim by daughter.
•
Will provided 40% of home at Chifley to the executor son.
•
$10,000 pecuniary legacy to the Plaintiff.
•
Residue to be divided between Defendant, Jennifer, Lisa and Tracey (ie
other children).
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Andrew v Andrew [2011] NSWSC 115 (cont)
• Net distributable estate $800k.
• Reasons given in Will.
• Plaintiff had no assets apart from super ($4k). She was looking for work.
Shared care of foster child. Sought altruistic goals rather than material
gain. Centrelink Newstart allowance. Plaintiff's son Nicholas was 20 and
was not dependent on her. Plaintiff resided in her friend's flat.
• Estrangement and some disentitling conduct; lack of contact over long
periods (no evidence about cause) and general put downs.
• In considering the totality of the relationship his Honour determined that
additional provision was not appropriate.
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Andrew v Andrew [2011] NSWSC 115 (cont)
“[141] I have set out the provision made for the Plaintiff in the deceased's Will. Judged by quantum and
looked at through the prism of her financial and material circumstances, adequate provision for her
proper maintenance or advancement in life was not made by the Will of the deceased, or by the
operation of the intestacy rules, in relation to the estate of the deceased, or both.
[142] Whilst an additional lump sum, by way of advancement in life, in other circumstances, would be
appropriate, that is not all that I am required to consider at the first stage. The totality of the relationship
of the Plaintiff and the deceased, the age and capacities of the other beneficiaries, and the claim of
each on the bounty of the deceased, are very relevant factors in determining the answer at the first
stage.
[143] Those considerations lead me to find that there was no failure, on the part of the deceased, to
make adequate provision for the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Plaintiff fails at the jurisdictional stage. That
finding concludes the matter and must lead to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's proceedings.
[144] However, even if I were wrong in coming to that conclusion, the same considerations, which I
summarise below, would, at the second stage, produce the result that, as a matter of discretion, I would
not be satisfied that a family provision order ought to be made.”
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308
• Plaintiff appealed.
• Successful – in lieu of provision of $10,000, Plaintiff to receive
$60,000, drawn unequally from provision made for others.
• Defendant to pay Plaintiff's costs including of appeal.
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308
•
Allsop P – “This is a difficult case. The difficulty arises from the need to
apply a statutory test couched in evaluative language embodying human
values and norms of conduct deeply personal to those involved and often
incapable of clear expression. The human expression of will concerning the
disposition of property flowing from considerations of emotion (including love
and disappointment), reason and societal and family obligation cannot often
be fully understood.”
•
"I agree with Basten JA that the expression of the task in s 59 is subtly
different from the previous legislation. A prohibition against making an order
unless satisfied of circumstances of an evaluative character is different in
emphasis from a permission to make an order if satisfied of circumstances
of an evaluative character. Whether the process engaged by the Court in s
59 can still be described as "two staged" in the sense discussed in Singer v
Berghouse may be an analytical question of little consequence.”
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308 (cont)
• Moral duty discussed – “…the notion of compliance by the testator
with a moral duty (on what he or she knew) (is) apt to distract from
the statutory task of the Court.”
• "Accepted and acceptable social and community values permeate or
underpin many, if not most, of the individual factors in s 60.”
• Above paragraphs cited by Family Provision List Judge in recent
decisions eg Weekes v Barlow [2014] NSWSC 1776
• Allsop P (cont) “Given the fact of estrangement and not hostility, it is
not to be supposed that if the testator had known and appreciated all
the circumstances of the appellant, including the detail of the
appellant's lack of means, her responsibilities to a young foster child
and her inability to see her own adult son through lack of funds, that
she would have closed her bounty to her daughter."
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308 (cont)
Basten JA contrasted provisions of FPA - "the Court shall not make an
order… unless it is satisfied that" provision is inadequate.
With provisions of Chapter 3 SA - "the Court may make an order if it is
satisfied that the testator has not made adequate provision"
“Under the former scheme the statute identified a non-inclusive list of
considerations which might be taken into account in determining what
provision (if any) ought to be made, a step only to be taken once the
prohibition had been lifted. That is not to say that the listed
considerations were not relevant to the first stage of the enquiry, but
only that the earlier statute did not address the issue. The Succession
Act, by contrast, states that the listed factors may be taken into account
in determining whether to make a family provision order and the nature
of any such order. The intention of a two stage process is no longer
apparent in the structure of either s 59 or s 60 of the Succession Act.”
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308 (cont)
Basten JA (cont) (on estrangement)
“Estrangement does not describe conduct, but the condition which
results from the attitudes or conduct of one or both parties. It is a term
sometimes applied to the natural process of separation of child from
parent, which often takes place in adolescence but which may continue
into adult life sometimes without resolution of the underlying tension. At
least when kept within reasonable bounds, the negative consequences
of such a process should arguably be ignored or at least not given
disproportionate significance when assessing the expectation that a
parent will provide for a child whose condition in life is financially
advantageous when compared with other claimants on the testator's
conscience.”
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Andrew v Andrew [2012] NSWCA 308 (cont)
Barrett JA [91] “I am not persuaded that any change is evident here…
The identified aim is to address cases in which the Court assesses the
provision (if any) actually made to be not adequate. Once the Court has
found lack of adequacy, it must make a discretionary judgment as to
what, if any, order should be made.
There is nothing in the present Act indicating that the court is to take an
approach more "generous" to claimants than previously. It is true that s
60(2) refers to a greater number of matters that may be taken into
account in deciding what order, if any should be made but, as I have
said, to the extent that these go beyond the list in the former s 9(3) they
reflect things to which it was open to the Court to pay attention under
the superseded legislation in any event.”
• Barrett JA dismissed the appeal
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A two stage process? - discussion (cont)
In Wheat v Wisbey [2013] NSWSC 537, Hallen J expressed the view
that the legislation does not alter the two stage test. Reference was
made in his Honour’s judgment to:
• a differently constituted NSW Court of Appeal finding (prior to
Andrew v Andrew) that the two stage test continued to apply - Keep
v Bourke [2012] NSWCA 64;
• Ball J expressing the view that the task of the trial judge is to follow
the latter decision of Andrew v Andrew – Oldfield v Chan [2013]
NSWCA 434; and
• an again differently constituted NSW Court of Appeal adopting the
two stage process – Franks v Franks [2013] NSWCA (to which Ball J
in Oldfield v Chan was not directed).
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A clarification? – Poletti v Jones [2015] NSWCA 107
Basten JA from [19]: In Andrew v Andrew, I suggested that the changes in
the structure of the legislative provisions resulting from the enactment of
ss59 and 60 of the Succession Act meant that a two stage process was no
longer required. That was not to say that there might not be circumstances
in which such an approach was the preferable way to proceed. My only
point was that the legislation no longer dictated such an approach in
circumstances where a rigid demarcation of issues along those lines would
be artificial, a point made by Callinan and Heydon JJ in Vigolo v Bostin, a
case under different legislation. …
In the present case the appellant submitted that a failure to address
separately the precondition in s59(1)(c) was apt to distort the application of
the power conferred on the court, because it would lead too readily to a
conclusion that some provision should be made. In other words, the court
should ask first whether the testator acted appropriately in excluding the
respondents from any share in his estate, before asking what kind of
provision might have been appropriate… Accepting that there will be cases
in which that approach should be adopted, this is not such a case.
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Discussion – moral claim
• Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Fraser (1995) 36 NSWLR 24 –
NSWCOA decision shortly after Singer v Berghouse obiter re “gloss”
• Kirby P said “moral claim” merely a shorthand reference to the
legislation; verbal not substantive error; and did not require
additional proof beyond the terms of the legislation.
• Sheller JA said that prevailing community standards of what is right
and appropriate must inform consideration of the legislative test.
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Discussion – moral claim (cont)
• Vigolo v Bostin (2005) 221 CLR 191
•
Plaintiff unsuccessful at first instance and on appeal; WA legislation;
•
Submitted that “moral claim” arose from past business and family dealings.
•
Gleeson CJ – “fitness and propriety are value-laden concepts… Morality is
the source of many of the values that are expressed in the common law, in
statutes and in discretionary judicial decision making” – “Moral claim” is a
gloss on the statutory language but it may be a helpful gloss; as a guide to
the operation of the statute not a substitute for it.
•
Callinan and Heydon JJ – the Act makes moral considerations relevant –
“proper”, “maintenance”, “support”, “advancement” and disentitling conduct –
but use of the words “moral claim” cannot make considerations outside the
terms of the Act relevant.
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Discussion – moral claim (cont)
More recent decisions of the Family Provision List Judge refocus on the
legislation; eg Weekes v Barlow [2014] NSWSC 1776 Hallen J
“[37] Other than by reference to the provision made in the Will of the
deceased, or, if relevant, by the operation of the intestacy rules in
relation to the estate of the deceased, or both, s 59(1) (c) of the Act
leaves undefined the norm by which the court must determine whether
the provision, if any, is inadequate for the applicant's proper
maintenance, education and advancement in life. The question would
appear to be answered by an evaluation that takes the court to the
provision actually made in the deceased's Will, or on intestacy, or both,
on the one hand, and to the requirement for maintenance, education
and advancement in life of the applicant on the other. No criteria are
prescribed in the Act as to the circumstances that do, or do not,
constitute inadequate provision for the proper maintenance, education
and advancement in life of the applicant. (In this case, the intestacy
rules are irrelevant.)”
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Factors warranting
•
Sometimes described as part of the jurisdictional test but cannot usually be
determined as a preliminary question unless case so hopeless that question
can be determined without service of evidence by defendant.
•
In Re Fulop (1987) 8 NSWLR 679 at 681D, McLelland J said that claimants
in paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) need to show that they have "the status of a
person who would be generally regarded as a natural object of testamentary
recognition by a deceased": at 681D.
•
Reasoning – other claimants (widows, children) would usually be natural
objects of testamentary affection
•
Two claims – Janos Fulop was deceased’s stepson; FW included (1)
established relationship, as if child of deceased; (2) deceased benefitted
from his father’s estate; (3) description as “son” in prior Will
•
Rose Fulop was foster child; FW included (1) integration into family as a
young child; (2) close and loving relationship (3) reference in Will as “my
daughter”; (4) provided care and support after death of Mr Fulop Snr
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Factors warranting (cont)
Churton v Christian (1988) 13 NSWLR 241 – claims by ex wife and
step child; Mrs Christian FW (1) upon marriage her entitlement to a war
widow’s pension came to an end; (2) no property settlement; (3) no
moral blame for divorce; (4) continuation of family ties after divorce
Mrs Bailey FW - lived in household from age 5 to age 20; asked to leave
for a trivial reason; relationship as parent and child.
In Vo v Lai & Anor [2013] NSWSC 1693 at [57], Windeyer AJ said that
the considerations in continue to be applicable.
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Vo v Lai (cont)
In Vo v Lai (summarising para 59 of judgment)
(a)
The claim was by a former de facto spouse where the relationship ended 2 years
before DOD and was ended by the plaintiff
(b)
Plaintiff maintained contact with deceased for the purpose of taking part in the care
of their daughter
(c)
Plaintiff did not live with deceased at DOD
(d)
Plaintiff did not provide any financial support
(e)
Plaintiff would be expected to have care of the child after DOD
(f)
Plaintiff was not a good financial manager
(g)
Plaintiff had qualifications and capacity to earn an income
(h)
Deceased left entire estate for the benefit of daughter
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Skarica v Toska [2014] NSWSC 34
Lindsay J
Estate of Neda Duracic DOD 18/3/12; Will 9/11/07
Gave 1/3 interest in real estate to plaintiff in 1989
Estate valued at $850,000; small legacies; residue left to “my very poor
sister” (resident in Croatia).
Clause 6 of Will provided:
“I hereby declare that I do not wish to make any further provision to my
boyfriend the said NEVENKO SKARICA because I already gave him
one third of my property at [address].”
Plaintiff and deceased did not live together until plaintiff moved into
property shortly prior to deceased’s death
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Skarica v Toska [2014] NSWSC 34 (cont)
Lindsay J at [32] regarding eligibility:
“Objectively, what emerges from the evidence, with all its contradictions,
is a personal relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased which
was geographically proximate, familial and characterised by a special
friendship, sometimes volatile, attended by the provision of support,
care and attention by the other.”
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Skarica v Toska [2014] NSWSC 34 (cont)
Lindsay J at [51] regarding factors warranting:
(a) Plaintiff provided the deceased with domestic support and care after
the date upon which she made her will incorporating declaration in
clause 6
(b) Element of doubt about plaintiff’s mental stability
(c) Misguided pursuit of appeal/challenge to Guardianship Tribunal
orders affecting the deceased, was encouraged or condoned by the
deceased.
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Jurisdictional test (if still applicable)
• S 59(1)(c) SA – Has adequate provision for the proper maintenance,
education and advancement for the plaintiff been made by the Will or
by the rules of intestacy?
• Eg Weekes v Barlow [2014] NSWSC 1776 at [40], citing Lord Romer
in delivering the advice of the Privy Council in Bosch v Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd [1938] AC 463, at 476:
•
"The use of the word 'proper' in this connection is of considerable importance. It
connotes something different from the word 'adequate'. A small sum may be sufficient
for the 'adequate' maintenance of a child, for instance, but, having regard to the child's
station in life and the fortune of his father, it may be wholly insufficient for his 'proper'
maintenance. So, too, a sum may be quite insufficient for the 'adequate' maintenance
of a child and yet may be sufficient for his maintenance on a scale that is 'proper' in all
the circumstances."
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Jurisdictional test (if still applicable) (cont)
• Weekes v Barlow (cont) at [43] citing Vigolo v Bostin [2005] HCA
11; 221 CLR 191, at [114], Callinan and Heydon JJ
"[T]he use of the word 'proper' ... implies something beyond mere dollars and
cents. Its use, it seems to us, invites consideration of all the relevant
surrounding circumstances ... The use of the word 'proper' means that attention
may be given, in deciding whether adequate provision has been made, to such
matters as what use to be called the 'station in life' of the parties and the
expectations to which that has given rise, in other words, reciprocal claims and
duties based upon how the parties lived and might reasonably expect to have
lived in the future.“
• Discussion – what is left for the Court to consider after answering
the jurisdictional question?
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What order should be made?
S 65(2) SA sets out the types of orders which can be made including:
(a) Lump sum;
(b) Periodic payments;
(c) Application of existing or future property;
(d) Absolute or limited interest in property;
(e) Set aside property as a class fund for the benefit of 2 or more
persons;
(f) In any other manner the Court thinks fit.
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What order should be made?
• Court must specify burden of order
• Orders operate as a codicil to the Will
• Orders can be enforced by an administration suit (proceedings in
which a beneficiary compels the executor to administer the estate).
• Form of order may allow for re-listing before Trial Judge or Family
Provision List Judge.
• Abatement or adjustment may be necessary if estate on distribution
found not to be large enough to meet all claims (Third Schedule Part
2 Probate and Administration Act 1898)
• Court may make consequential and ancillary orders – s 66 SA
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• Eligibility
• Determining Applications
• General considerations
• Other matters
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“General Considerations”
Weekes v Barlow [2014] NSWSC 1776 per Hallen J
[81] “As I have stated in a number of cases (see, for example, Bowditch
v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2012] NSWSC 275), I do not intend what
I have described as "principles" to be elevated into rules of law,
propositions of universal application, or formulae. Nor do I wish to
suggest that the jurisdiction should be unduly confined, or the discretion
at the second stage should be constrained, by statements of principle
found in dicta in other decisions. Decisions of the past do not, and
cannot, put any fetters on the discretionary power, which is left largely
unfettered. I identify them merely as providing useful guidance, which
may be applied, with circumspection, in considering the statutory
provisions, the terms of which must remain firmly in mind.”
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Husband and Wife – General Considerations
Eg Jagoe v Maguire [2013] NSWSC 1283 at [137] per Hallen J
(a) There is no different approach to widowers than to widows.
(b) As a broad general rule, and in the absence of special circumstances, the general duty
of the deceased to his, or her, spouse, to the extent to which his, or her, assets permit
him, or her to do so, is:
(i) To ensure that she, or he, is secure in the matrimonial home;
(ii) to ensure that she, or he, has an income sufficient to permit her, or him, to live in
the style to which she, or he, is accustomed; and
(iii) to provide her or him with a fund to enable her, or him, to meet any unforeseen
contingencies.
(c) Generally speaking, the amount should be sufficient to free the spouse's mind from
any reasonable fear of any insufficiency as she, or he, grows older and her, or his, health
and strength fail.
.
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General Considerations Jagoe v Maguire (cont)
(d) Concern as to the capacity of the spouse to maintain herself, or himself,
independently, and autonomously, may also bear upon the notion of what is proper
provision.
(e) what is have said above is not of immutable application.
(f) The three elements identified above are not necessarily mutually independent.
(g) The position of surviving spouse does not attract primacy (having regard to the strict
terms of the legislation).
(h) Where, after competing factors have been taken into account, it is possible to do so, a
spouse ought to be put in a position where she, or he, is the master of her, or his, own
life, and in which, for the remainder of her, or his, life, she, or he, is not beholden to
beneficiaries.
(i) Usually, a mere right of residence will be an unsatisfactory method of providing for a
spouse's accommodation.
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De Facto relationship – General considerations
• The general considerations relating to claims made by de facto
partners are similar to those applicable to claims by a widow or
widower – see Re Marcuola-Bel Estate; Marcuola-Bel v Thi Ly Tran
[2005] NSWSC 1182 at [31] cited by Hallen J in Vidler v
Ivimey [2013] NSWSC 1605 at [121]
• Perhaps give more weight to length, duration and nature of
relationship
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Child – General considerations
Eg Hedman v Frazer; Egan v Frazer [2013] NSWSC 1915 at [177]:
a) The relationship between parent and child changes when the child leaves home.
However, a child does not cease to be a natural recipient of parental ties, affection or
support, as the bonds of childhood are relaxed.
b) It is impossible to describe in terms of universal application, the moral obligation, or
community expectation, of a parent in respect of an adult child. It can be said that,
ordinarily, the community expects parents to:
i.
raise, and educate, their children to the very best of their ability while they remain
children; probably to assist them with a tertiary education, where that is feasible;
ii.
where funds allow, to provide them with a start in life, such as a deposit on a
home, although it might well take a different form.
c) The community does not expect a parent, in ordinary circumstances, to provide an
unencumbered house, or to set his or her children up in a position where they can
acquire a house unencumbered, although in a particular case, where assets permit
and the relationship between the parties is such as to justify it, there might be such an
obligation.
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Child – General considerations
Eg Hedman v Frazer; Egan v Frazer (cont)
d) Generally, also, the community does not expect a parent to look after his, or her, child
for the rest of the child's life and into retirement, especially when there is someone
else, such as a spouse, who has a primary obligation to do so.
e) Where a child, even an adult child, falls on hard times, and where there are assets
available, then the community may expect a parent to provide a buffer against
contingencies; and where a child has been unable to accumulate superannuation or
make other provision for their retirement, something to assist in retirement where
otherwise, they would be left destitute.
f)
If the applicant has an obligation to support others, such as a parent's obligation to
support a dependent child, that will be a relevant factor in determining what is an
appropriate provision for the maintenance of the applicant. But the Act does not permit
orders to be made to provide for the support of third persons that the applicant,
however reasonably, wishes to support, where there is no obligation of the deceased
to support such person.
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Child – General considerations
Eg Hedman v Frazer; Egan v Frazer (cont)
g) There is no need for an applicant adult child to show some special need or some
special claim.
h) The adult child's lack of reserves to meet demands, particularly of ill health, which
become more likely with advancing years, is a relevant consideration. Likewise, the
need for financial security and a fund to protect against the ordinary vicissitudes of
life, is relevant. In addition, if the applicant is unable to earn, or has a limited means of
earning, an income, this could give rise to an increased call on the estate of the
deceased.
i)
The applicant has the onus of satisfying the court, on the balance of probabilities, of
the justification for the claim.
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Former husband or wife general considerations
Eg Glynne v NSW Trustee and Guardian; Lindsay v NSW Trustee
and Guardian [2011] NSWSC 535 at [89]:
(a) "The policy of the law is to promote the finality of settlements of property disputes by
orders made in the Family Court or by the amicable division of matrimonial property
prior to death.
(b) Another policy of the law is that parties whose marriage has been dissolved, and in
respect of whom orders have been made disposing of their matrimonial property, or
where there has been an amicable division of that property, should be able to go their
own separate ways. Except for the specific cases provided for under the Family Law
Act 1975 (Cth), and provided there has been compliance with the orders, or the
agreement for amicable division, made, such parties should, thereafter, face no
financial obligation, one to the other.
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Eg Glynne v NSWTAG; Lindsay v NSWTAG (cont)
c) A settlement, whether by order of the Family Court, or by agreement reached
amicably, and complied with, however, does not preclude a claim by a former spouse
for a family provision order, but, in those circumstances, additional, and different,
considerations will arise. The Act gives a specific entitlement to a former spouse to
make a claim. That provision contemplates there will be cases where such a claim will
succeed, notwithstanding the public policy of the finality of a property settlement.
d) It is not the task of this Court to go behind the orders made in the Family Court or the
amicable agreement of the parties unless a specific basis is advanced for this Court to
do so (e.g. fraud).
e) In every case involving a former spouse, it will be necessary to examine the actual
relationship between the two people concerned, as far as possible without
preconceptions based only on the fact of the dissolution of their marriage and their
property division.
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Eg Glynne v NSWTAG; Lindsay v NSWTAG (cont)
f)
The terms of the parties division of property will be relevant in determining the
Plaintiff's needs and the extent to which those needs may have been satisfied in the
deceased's lifetime, as will be the length of time from the separation of the former
spouse to the death of the deceased, and the course that the lives of the two spouses
have followed since separation.
g) There is a distinction between "factors which warrant the making of the application'
and the factors that warrant the making of an order. Merely establishing that an
applicant is a former spouse and that she, or he, has a financial need, would not, as
such, entitle her, or him, to an order. In addition, even if there are factors that warrant
the making of the application, the applicant may fail in establishing that an order for
provision should be made.
h) What has to be decided is whether what is relied upon in the case by the applicant, in
association with all other relevant matters, puts her, or him, within the class of persons
to whom the deceased had an obligation to make provision."
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General considerations grandchildren
Eg Sammut v Kleemann [2012] NSWSC 1030 at [107]:
a) "As a general rule, a grandparent does not have an obligation or responsibility to
make provision for a grandchild; that obligation rests on the parent of the grandchild.
Nor is a grandchild, normally, regarded as a natural object of the deceased's
testamentary recognition.
b) Where a grandchild has lost his, or her, parents at an early age, or when he, or she,
has been taken in by the grandparent in circumstances where the grandparent
becomes a surrogate parent, these factors would, prima facie, give rise to a claim by
a grandchild to be provided for out of the estate of the deceased grandparent. The
fact that the grandchild resided with one, or more, of his, or her, grandparents is a
significant factor. Even then, it should be demonstrated that the deceased had come
to assume, for some significant time in the grandchild's life, a position more akin to
that of a parent than a grandparent, with direct responsibility for the grandchild's
support and welfare, or else that the deceased has undertaken a continuing and
substantial responsibility to support the applicant grandchild financially or emotionally.
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Eg Sammut v Kleemann (cont)
c) The mere fact of a family relationship between grandparent and grandchild does not,
of itself, establish any obligation to provide for the grandchild upon the death of the
grandparent. A moral obligation may be created, in a particular case, by reason, for
example, of the care and affection provided by a grandchild to his, or her,
grandparent.
d) It has been said that a pattern of significant generosity by a grandparent, including
contributions to education, does not convert the grandparental relationship into one of
obligation to the recipients, as distinct from one of voluntary support, generosity and
indulgence.
e) The fact that the grandparent occasionally, or even frequently, made gifts to, or for, the
benefit of the grandchild does not, in itself, make the grandchild wholly, or partially,
dependent on the grandparent for the purposes of the Act.
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Eg Sammut v Kleemann (cont)
f)
The grandchild's dependence, whether whole or partial, on the grandparent must be
direct and immediate; it is not sufficient that the grandchild's dependence is the
indirect result of the deceased providing support and maintenance for his, or her, own
adult child, and thereby, incidentally, benefiting the deceased's grandchildren who are
directly dependent on that child.
g) It is relevant to consider what inheritance, or financial support, a grandchild might
fairly expect from his, or her, parents. Yet, the obligation of a parent to provide for his,
or her child does not, necessarily, negate, in an appropriate case, the moral obligation
of a grandparent to make provision for the maintenance, education or advancement in
life of a grandchild out of her, or his, estate.
h) The fact that the parents, or either of them, of a grandchild have, or has, predeceased
the grandparent may be a relevant factor in support of the claim made by a
grandchild."
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• Eligibility
• Determining Applications
• General considerations
• Other matters
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Other matters
• S 59(3)(a) SA – further provision can only be made if substantial
detrimental change in the eligible person’s circumstances since order
last made;
• S 59(3)(b) SA - or at the time of order there was undisclosed estate
property which would result in the estate being substantially greater
and which would have resulted in a different order
• S 59(4) SA – similarly for applications previously refused if
circumstances in (3)(b) apply
• Further application by initial applicant only
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Other matters (cont)
• S 61 SA – Court may disregard interests of other potential applicants
if notice served or Court considers that service is unnecessary,
unreasonable or impracticable
• Note Luciano v Rosenblum (1985) 2 NSWLR 65
• S 62(1) SA – Court may make interim family provision order if it is
satisfied that on final hearing no less provision would be made
• S 62(3) SA – Court may make order restraining distribution of estate
pending determination of the FP application
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Release of Family Provision rights
• Release of rights not effective unless approved by the Court. The
Court must be satisfied that:
‒ Release to the benefit of the releasing party and prudent for them
to make (now or at the time made)
‒ The agreement is or was fair and reasonable.
‒ The releasing party has taken independent advice and has given
due consideration to it.
• S 95(4) SA; s 31(5) FPA
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Discussion points
If a solicitor is given instructions to draft a Will and the testator expressly
states that he or she wishes to disinherit (or simply does not wish to
benefit) a person who would have an expectation to inherit:
1. Should the solicitor give advice about:
a) the existence of Family Provision legislation?
b) how the Court would determine a claim?
c) what in the solicitor’s opinion the Court might award a
prospective plaintiff?
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Discussion points (cont)
2. Is a testator better off making a gift to the person whom they wish to
exclude?
3. If the testator with the benefit of advice does not wish to make a gift
for the person, is there anything else which could be done?
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Next week
• Family provision – notional estate
• Family provision – estrangement
• Other matters if not covered today
• Discussion examples
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