abdulrahman-Alswayed
SAFETY AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL USED IN MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AND
THERAPY
by
Abdulrahman Alswayed
A dissertation submitted to the Department of Physics,
University of Surrey, in partial fulfilment of the degree of
Master of Science in Radiation and Environmental Protection
Department of Physics
Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences
University of Surrey
© September 2012
ABSTRACT
Ionising radiation is widely used in legitimate applications in industry, medicine, agriculture and scientific research. However and whether driven by politico-religious extremism or by fundamentalism, a clear danger described by some as the inevitable new terrorism is nowadays present from terrorists acquiring, developing and fabricating radiological weapons. This study was carried out to offer a review on how radioactive material can be used in “Dirty Bombs” for terrorist attacks. In addition, it also presents an assessment of the current safety and security measures put in place by relevant national and international communities for the proper and safe transportation, use and disposal of radioactive material.
Furthermore, this study comprised conducting a survey where qualitative data were collected from a cohort of experts in radiation safety and security from leading radiology departments in the UK. This was achieved using an in-house developed, online feedback questionnaire. The survey results, complemented by the literature review findings, confirmed that there is a great need for improvements to be brought forward to the security standards applied nationally and internationally, and in the way they should be enforced. Last but not least, the limitations of the study along with recommendations for future research have been presented.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Bahram Ghiassee, for his exceptional guidance and supervision, continuous support and endless patience, providing me with an excellent atmosphere for carrying out this work. Once again, I would like to thank him and, Professor Patrick Regan, for teaching and supporting me during the whole academic year 2011/2012. My thanks also go to all the experts that kindly offered their valuable time and advice and took part in this research.
Last but not least, I would have never been able to finish my dissertation without the kind help and unconditional support from my friends and family. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 – RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL....................................... 1
CHAPTER 4 – ASSESSING UK SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS .......... 28
iii
APPENDIX 1: SURVEY COVERING LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE ........................ E
iv
LISTS OF TABLES AND FIGURES
SHELLS PADDLED FROM THE FORMER
............................................................................................ 31
.......................................................................................... 31
EACTOR RADIOISOTOPES USED IN THERAPEUTIC MEDICINE
) ..................................................... 6
v
CHAPTER 1 – RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Radioactive sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of peaceful and productive purposes in industry, medicine, research and education (IAEA, 2010; Ferguson, 2004). This research work focuses on the use of radioactive material in the medical field, and the associated security risk present. Accordingly, this offers an introduction that defines the nature of radiation and radioactive material; and offers a review on their sourcing, production and areas of application in medicine in specific.
Definitions
Radiation is a form of energy naturally present around and widely used in legitimate applications. Different types of radiation exist (alphaparticles, electrons, neutrons, X and gamma-rays); some of which have more energy than others, and some of which can be more harmful than others. The dose of radiation that a person receives determines the extent of harm caused (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011b;
IAEA, 2012). Harm is induced electromagnetic radiation or subatomic particles emitted by radioactive decay (Medalia, 2004b); which is the process by which an atomic nucleus of an unstable atom loses energy by emitting ionising particles (ionising radiation). Emission of photons
(typically gamma rays or high-energy x-rays) often accompanies decay, and the emitted particles and photons are radiation (Medalia, 2004b).
Each radioactive element decays by steps into isotopes of other elements, ending as a stable atom. While the instant when one atom will decay cannot be predicted, each isotope has a “half-life” – the time for half the atoms in a mass of that isotope to decay (Medalia, 2004b). The decay process reflects the release and exhaustion of radiation in radioactive material; for example, Cobalt-60 with a half-life of 5.3 years is highly radioactive, while Uranium-235 with a half-life of over 700 million years is not (Medalia, 2004b).
When a combination of neutrons and protons, which does not already exist in nature, is produced artificially, an atom will be unstable and is called a radioactive isotope or a radioisotope (overall there are some 1800 radioisotopes). There are also a number of unstable natural isotopes a
arising from the decay of primordial Uranium and Thorium. (NRC, 2011b). At present, there are up to 200 radioisotopes used on a regular basis, and most must be produced artificially. Radioactive products which are used in medicine are referred to as radiopharmaceuticals (NRC, 2011b).
Hazard from Exposure to Radioactive Sources
In general, protection from radiation is realised by minimising the time of exposure to radioactive materials; maximising the distance from the source of radiation and shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive material (NRC, 2010). The biological effects of ionising radiation really depend on the amount of energy deposited in the body – called the absorbed dose. Hence, absorbed dose depends on some straightforward (source strength, distance, shielding, time of exposure and energy per particle/photon) and other more complex factors. Higher doses produce direct clinical effects including tissue damage, radiation sickness and, at very high levels, rapid death. With chronic low-level exposure, no clinical effects are observed, but the exposed individual may have an increased lifetime risk of developing cancer (Medalia, 2004b).
In regulated use, radioactive sources pose no undue radiological hazard to workers or the public. Problems arise when radiation sources are involved in accidents (damaged or lost) or in a terrorist attack scheme. Some sources contain large amounts of radioactive material and have the potential to cause serious radiological harm if they were involved in accidents or used in malicious acts (IAEA, 2010).
Radioactive Material in Nuclear Medicine
Nuclear medicine is a branch of medicine that falls broadly into two categories: diagnostic and therapeutic Nuclear medicine uses radioactive materials referred to as radiopharmaceuticals (Ferguson, 2004; NRC, 2011b). b
Application of Radioisotopes
Radiation can provide diagnostic information about the functioning of specific organs. In most cases, the information is used by physicians to make a quick, accurate diagnosis of the patient's illness (locating and identifying tumours, size anomalies or other physiological or functional organ problems). The thyroid, bones, heart, liver and many other organs can be easily imaged, and disorders in their functions revealed. In other cases, radiation can be used to treat diseased organs or tumours, especially cancer, using region-specific radiation to weaken or destroy particular targeted cells (WNA, 2011).
These procedures are carried out routinely in radiology departments around the world as tens of millions of nuclear medicine procedures are performed each year, and demand for radioisotopes is increasing rapidly. Over 10,000 hospitals worldwide use radioisotopes in medicine, and about 90% of the procedures are for diagnosis (WNA, 2011). The most common radioisotope used in diagnosis is Technetium-99, with some 30 million procedures per year, accounting for 80% of all nuclear medicine procedures worldwide (WNA, 2011). In developed countries (26% of world population) the frequency of diagnostic nuclear medicine is 1.9% per year, and the frequency of therapy with radioisotopes is about one tenth of this (WNA, 2011). In the USA there are some 18 million nuclear medicine procedures per year among 311 million people, and in Europe about 10 million among 500 million people. In Australia there are about 560,000 per year among 21 million people, 470,000 of these using reactor isotopes. The use of radiopharmaceuticals in diagnosis is growing at over 10% per year (WNA, 2011).
Diagnostic Radioisotopes
Computerised Tomography (CT) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan procedures are the main techniques that employ the use of
c
exposure to the US population, according to a US National Council on Radiation Protection & Measurements report in 2009. On the other hand, industrial radiation exposure, including that from nuclear power plants, is less than 0.1% of overall public radiation exposure (WNA, 2011).
Figure 1: PET-CT – Combined Positron Emission Tomography and Computerised Tomography Scanner (Concordia University, 2012)
Diagnostic techniques in nuclear medicine use radioactive tracers/radioisotopes that emit gamma rays from within the body. These tracers are generally short-lived isotopes linked to chemical compounds which permit specific physiological processes to be scrutinised. For most diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures, a small amount of radioactive material is administered, either by injection, inhalation or oral administration (WNA,
2011). A distinct advantage of nuclear imaging over x-ray techniques is that both bone and soft tissue can be imaged very successfully. This has led to its common use in developed countries where the probability of anyone having such a test is about one in two and rising (WNA, 2011).
Carbon-11, Nitrogen-13, Oxygen-15 and Fluorine-18 are positron emitters used in PET scans for studying brain physiology and pathology (in localising epileptic focus; and in dementia, psychiatry and neuropharmacology studies). These cyclotron isotopes also have a significant role in cardiology. F-18 in FDG (fluorodeoxyglucose) has become very important in detection of cancers and the monitoring of progress in their d
treatment, using PET (NRC, 2011b). In addition, Cobalt-57 (272 d) is used as a marker to estimate organ size and for in-vitro diagnostic kits, while Copper-64 (13h) is used to study genetic diseases affecting copper metabolism, and for PET imaging of tumours, and therapy. Copper-67
(2.6d) is a Beta emitter isotope used in therapy (NRC, 2011b).
Moreover, Fluorine-18 is used as FLT (fluorothymidine), F-miso (fluoromisonidazole) or 18F-Choline (tracer). Gallium-67 (78h) is another diagnostic isotope used for tumour imaging and localisation of inflammatory lesions/infections; Gallium-68 (68min) is a positron emitter used in
PET & PET-CT units and is derived from Germanium-68 (271days). The latter is used as the 'parent' in a generator producing Ga-68. Additional
Table 1: List of isotopes used in diagnostic nuclear medicine
Indium-111 (2.8d)
Iodine-123 (13h)
Used for specialist diagnostic studies, e.g. brain studies, infection and colon transit studies
Increasingly used for diagnosis of thyroid function, it is a gamma emitter without the beta radiation of I-131
Iodine-124
Krypton-81m (13sec)
A tracer
From Rubidium-81 (4.6 h), Kr-81m gas can yield functional images of pulmonary ventilation, e.g. in asthmatic patients, and for the early diagnosis of lung diseases and function
Rubidium-82 (1.26min) Convenient PET agent in myocardial perfusion imaging
Strontium-82 (25d)
Thallium-201 (73h)
Used as the 'parent' in a generator to produce Rb-82
Used for diagnosis of coronary artery disease other heart conditions such as heart muscle death and for location of low-grade lymphomas
Therapeutic Radioisotopes
For some medical conditions and as discussed before, it is useful to destroy or weaken malfunctioning cells using radiation. The radioisotope that generates the radiation can be localised in the required organ in the same way it is used for diagnosis – through a radioactive element following e
its usual biological path, or through the element being attached to a suitable biological compound. In most cases, it is beta radiation which causes the destruction of the damaged cells. This is radionuclide therapy (RNT) or radiotherapy (NRC, 2011b).
Figure 2: A Linear Accelerator comprising Cobalt-60 and used for External Beam Radiotherapy (OSU, 2012)
Therapeutic uses of radioactive materials include teletherapy (an intense beam of radiation from a powerful source, e.g. Cobalt ‑ 60, external to
radiotherapy (main means of treatment, where one or more lower-activity radioactive sources encapsulated in sealed “seeds” are placed close to, or within, cancerous tissue – e.g. targeting breast cancer, prostate and cervix cancer) and therapeutic nuclear medicine (where high dosages of radioactive materials are injected into, or ingested by, the patient – e.g. the use of radioactive iodine to destroy or shrink a diseased thyroid). The purpose of all three is to kill cancerous tissue, reduce the size of a tumour or reduce pain (WNA, 2011).
Although radiotherapy is less common than diagnostic use of radioactive material in medicine, it is nevertheless widespread, important and growing. An ideal therapeutic radioisotope is a strong beta emitter with just enough gamma rays to enable imaging, e.g. Lutetium-177. This is f
prepared from Ytterbium-176 which is irradiated to become Yb-177 which decays rapidly to Lu-177. Yttrium-90 is used for treatment of cancer, particularly non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and its more widespread use is envisaged, including for arthritis treatment. Lu-177 and Y-90 are becoming the main RNT agents. Moreover, Iodine-131 and Phosphorus-32 are also used for therapy. I-131 is used to treat the thyroid for cancers and other abnormal conditions – e.g. hyperthyroidism; whereas in a disease called Polycythemia vera, an excess of red blood cells is produced in the bone marrow and that can be controlled by use of Phosphorus-32 (NRC, 2011b). A new and still experimental procedure uses Boron-10, which concentrates in the tumour. The patient is then irradiated with neutrons which are strongly absorbed by the Boron, to produce high-energy alpha particles which kill the cancer (NRC, 2011b).
For targeted alpha therapy (TAT), Actinium-225 is readily available, from which the daughter Bismuth-213 can be obtained (via 3 alpha decays) to label targeting molecules. The Bismuth is obtained by elution from an Ac-225/Bi-213 generator similar to the Mo-99/Tc-99 one. Bi-213 has a
46-minute half-life. The Actinium-225 (10d) is formed from radioactive decay of Radium-225, the decay product of long-lived Thorium-229, which is obtained from decay of Uranium-233, which in turn is formed from Th-232 by neutron capture in a nuclear reactor (NRC, 2011b).
Another radionuclide recovered from used nuclear fuel is Lead-212 (10.6h), which can be attached to monoclonal antibodies for cancer treatment. Its decay chain includes the short-lived isotopes Bismuth-212 by beta decay, Polonium-212 by beta decay and Thallium-208 by alpha decay of the Bismuth, with further alpha and beta decays respectively to Pb-208, all over about an hour. Considerable medical research is being conducted worldwide into the use of radionuclides attached to highly specific biological chemicals such as immunoglobulin molecules
(monoclonal antibodies). The eventual tagging of these cells with a therapeutic dose of radiation may lead to the regression, or even cure, of
g
Table 2: Reactor radioisotopes used in therapeutic medicine (NRC, 2011b)
Bismuth-213 (46min)
Used for targeted alpha therapy (TAT), especially cancers, as it has a high energy (8.4MeV)
Chromium-51 (28d) Used to label red blood cells and quantify gastro-intestinal protein loss
Cobalt-60 (5.27yr) Formerly for external beam radiotherapy, now more for sterilising
Dysprosium-165 (2h) Used as an aggregated hydroxide for synovectomy treatment (arthritis)
Erbium-169 (9.4d) Use for relieving arthritis pain in synovial joints
Holmium-166 (26h) Being developed for diagnosis and treatment of liver tumours
Iodine-125 (60d)
Used in cancer brachytherapy (prostate and brain), also diagnostically to evaluate the filtration rate of kidneys and to diagnose deep vein thrombosis in the leg. It is also widely used in radio-immuno-assays to show the presence of hormones in tiny quantities
Iodine-131 (8d)
Iridium-192 (74d)
Iron-59 (46d)
Lead-212 (10.6h)
Lutetium-177 (6.7d)
Molybdenum-99 (66h)
Palladium-103 (17d)
Phosphorus-32 (14d)
Potassium-42 (12h)
Fission product isotope used in treating and imaging thyroid cancer, liver abnormal function, renal (kidney) blood flow and urinary tract obstruction diagnosis.
Supplied in wire form for use as an internal radiotherapy source for cancer treatment (used then removed) – a beta emitter
Used in studies of iron metabolism in the spleen
Use in TAT for cancer – decay products Bi-212, Po-212 & Tl-208
This is increasingly important as it emits just enough gamma-ray for imaging while beta radiation does the therapy on small tumours (e.g. endocrine). Its half-life is long enough to allow sophisticated preparation for use – usually produced by neutron activation of natural or enriched Lutetium-176 targets
A fission product isotope used as the 'parent' in a generator to produce
Technetium-99m
Used to make brachytherapy permanent implant seeds for early stage prostate cancer
Used in the treatment of polycythemia vera (excess red blood cells) – used with beta emitters
Used for the determination of exchangeable potassium in coronary blood flow h
Rhenium-186 (3.8d)
Rhenium-188 (17h)
Samarium-153 (47h)
Selenium-75 (120d)
Sodium-24 (15h)
Strontium-89 (50d)
Technetium-99m (6h)
Used for pain relief in bone cancer – a beta emitter with weak gamma for imaging
Used to beta irradiate coronary arteries (angioplasty balloon)
Sm-153 is very effective in relieving the pain of secondary cancers lodged in the bone, sold as Quadramet. Also very effective for prostate and breast cancer. Beta emitter
Used in the form of seleno-methionine to study the production of digestive enzymes
Used for studies of electrolytes within the body
A fission product isotope that is very effective in reducing the pain of prostate and bone cancer. Beta emitter
Used in to image the skeleton and heart muscle in particular, but also for brain, thyroid, lungs (perfusion and ventilation), liver, spleen, kidney (structure and filtration rate), gall bladder, bone marrow, salivary and lacrimal glands, heart blood pool, infection and numerous specialised medical studies. Produced from Mo-99 in a generator
Xenon-133 (5d) A fission product isotope used for pulmonary ventilation studies
Ytterbium-169 (32d) Used for cerebrospinal fluid studies in the brain
Ytterbium-177 (1.9h) Progenitor of Lu-177
Yttrium-90 (64h)
A fission product isotope used for cancer brachytherapy and as silicate colloid for the relieving the pain of arthritis in larger synovial joints.
Pure beta emitter and of growing significance in therapy
Radioisotopes of caesium, gold and ruthenium are also used in brachytherapy
Production of Medical Radioisotopes
Radioisotopes can be manufactured in several ways. The most common is by neutron activation in a nuclear reactor. This involves the capture of a neutron by the nucleus of an atom resulting in an excess of neutrons (neutron-rich). On the other hand, some radioisotopes are manufactured in a cyclotron, in which protons are introduced to the nucleus resulting in a deficiency of neutrons (proton-rich). In other words, neutron-rich ones and those resulting from nuclear fission are made in reactors, while neutron-depleted ones are made in cyclotrons. There are about 40 activation i
product radioisotopes and five fission product ones made in reactors (Fisher, 2009; NRC, 2011b; NRC, 2011a). In addition, there are 5 main international nuclear reactors that produce radioisotopes around the world (Fisher, 2009):
Figure 3: The NRU Reactor, Canada (left) & the HFIR reactor, Tennessee (Fisher, 2009)
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It is the world’s major isotope-production facility, producing Mo-99, I-131, I-125, Xe-133 and Ir-192. The 135MW reactor serves the needs of 20million patients per year.
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The Advanced Test Reactor in Idaho, U.S.: This 85 MW facility mainly produces Co-60 (for medical gamma knife irradiators).
The Brookhaven Linac Isotope Producer on Long Island, New York in the U.S.: This facility comprises a 200MeV/150μA proton beam reactor mainly produces Ge-68/Ga-68 and Sr-82/Rb-82 (along with Zn-65, Mg-28, Fe-52 and Rb-83).
The Isotope Production Facility at Los Alamos, New Mexico in the U.S.: This reactor comprises a 100MeV/250μA proton beam, mainly producing Ge-68/Ga-68 and Sr-82/Rb-82; along with smaller amounts of Al-26 and Si-32. j
Some isotopes are produced by commercial cyclotrons (energies ranging from 13-40MeV, up to 100MeV, with currents up to 2mA). These are efficient and reliable, yet expensive to operate. They are used for the production of proton-rich isotopes (e.g. F-18, Sr-82, Cu-64, O-15, C-11, Br-
77, I-124…etc.). There are several manufacturers around the world that produce isotopes using cyclotrons; including Ion Beam Applications
(Belgium); Ebco Technologies (Canada); Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd (Japan); General Electric (US) and Siemens (Germany) amongst others (Fisher, 2009). Other new means of producing radioisotopes are being developed and planned, such as “compact systems” that are benchscale electronic devices for achieving various high-energy nuclear reactions and isotope enrichment processes (Fisher, 2009).
When radiography sources have decayed to a point where they are no longer emitting enough penetrating radiation for use in treatments, they are considered as radioactive waste; and sources such as Co-60 are treated as short-lived Intermediate-Level Wastes (ILWs). The use of radioisotopes for medical diagnosis and treatments results in the generation of mainly Low-Level Waste (LLW); which includes paper, rags, tools, clothing and filters, containing small amounts of mostly short-lived radioactivity. These types of waste often undergo decay storage for periods of months to a few years before being disposed of at urban land-fill sites (NRC, 2011a). Other sources such as Radium-226 (used in cancer therapy) will however require long-term storage and geological disposal as ILW, due to their higher level of long-lived radioactivity
(NRC, 2011a).
CHAPTER 2 – DIRTY BOMB OR RDD ATTACKS
There are different ways through which radioactive substances can endanger the public: through accumulated radiation, in the case of nuclear accidents or due to a malicious terrorist attack – the focus of this research. In this chapter, the nature of the problem of radiological terrorism and the potential risk of terrorists acquiring radioactive sources and using them to induce terror is explored and explained; along with the development, deployment and potential impact of using a dirty bomb in an attack. k
Radiological Terrorism
All risks are not equal. The definition of ‘terrorism’ may be disputed but, as a risk, it can easily be distinguished from others such as natural and man-made disasters by the ‘characteristic extensive fear, loss of confidence in institutions, unpredictability and pervasive experience of loss of safety’. Although there have been no reported uses of radiological attacks, the perceived threat of one has increased in recent years; especially after the 9/11 attacks on the US, and which resulted in an increased awareness of the need for safety and security measures to protect against terrorism (The National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012; Ferguson, 2004; Gleeson, 2005; James, et al., 2007).
The potential use of radiation sources in terrorism, in particular radioactive sources, was actually recognised prior to the 9/11 attack, but has taken on new significance since then, as it has become the most serious terrorist threat in our current times (Joel & Daniel, 2002). Among 10 incidents or phenomena that could have disastrous consequences for the world – including organised crime, nuclear power station accidents, epidemics and world wars – the threat of international terrorism was the highest-ranked fear across the EU (James, et al., 2007). Likewise, the fear of a nuclear accident repeatedly tops the list of concerns in public surveys of perceived risk. While there are important differences between a radiological incident and a nuclear one, they are not widely understood. A radiological terrorist attack, therefore, has the potential to combine two of the strongest fears held by members of the public: terrorism and radiation (James, et al., 2007; Gleeson, 2005).
Dirty Bombs or RDDs
The simplest and most primitive terrorist nuclear device is a radiological weapon, commonly called a dirty bomb. It is a speculative radiological weapon that can be thought of as the easy, primitive version of a nuclear weapon. Its purpose is to contaminate the area around the explosion with radioactive material, hence attributed the term "Dirty" (Barnaby, 2005). l
Definition
Also referred to as a "Radiological Dispersion Device" or RDD, a dirty bomb is actually in no way similar to a nuclear weapon or nuclear bomb which creates an explosion that is millions of times more powerful and devastating. It combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with
conventional explosives and radioactive material, the detonation of which would result in the dispersion or release of the radioactive material contained in the bomb (IAEA, 2010; World Nuclear News, 2011; United States Department of Labor, 2009; National Counter Terrorism Security
Office, 2010; NRC, 2010; Pennsylvannia DOH, 2012).
Figure 4: A compact Dirty Bomb or RDD comprises combining radioactive materials with explosives (CBS News, n.d.).
Nature of explosion and dispersion
Many types of radioactive material (radioisotopes) could be used in a dirty bomb. The most likely to be used are the ones that are relatively easily available, have relatively long half-lives and emit energetic radiation. Suitable examples include Caesium-137, Cobalt-60 and Iridium-192. In addition, Strontium-90 – which is concentrated in bone – is another possible candidate. Perhaps the use of Plutonium in a dirty bomb would m
cause the greatest threat to human health, because of its very high inhalation toxicity, and the most extensive contamination. If Plutonium is inhaled into the lung, its intense ionisation is likely to produce cancer; however, terrorists would find it difficult to acquire significant amounts of it (Barnaby, 2005).
Most RDDs are generally designed to disperse the radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city-blocks, and would not release enough radiation to kill people or cause severe illness (United States Department of Labor, 2009). In a matter of fact, the conventional explosive itself would be more harmful to individuals than the radioactive material (NRC, 2010). According to a United Nations report, Iraq tested a dirty bomb device in 1987 but found that the radiation levels were too low to cause significant damage; thus abandoned any further use of the device
(The National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012).
The people in the immediate vicinity of a dirty bomb explosion could be killed or injured by the blast itself, as is the case with any explosion, and indeed many people are likely to suffer from acute radiation poisoning (hair loss, vomiting, diarrhoea…etc.) than would actually die in the near term (James, et al., 2007; World Nuclear News, 2011). In addition, the dispersed radioactive material, and depending on the situation, creates fear and panic, contaminating property and the surrounding environment by dispersing radioactive material within a few blocks or miles of the explosion and making buildings or land unusable for a long period of time; which in turn requires potentially costly cleaning-up (IAEA, 2010;
Pennsylvannia DOH, 2012).
Accordingly, a dirty bomb and as opposed to a nuclear weapon, is not a “Weapon of Mass Destruction” but one of “Mass Disruption” – although some sources disagree with that (The National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012) – where contamination, social disruption, panic, anxiety and terror (i.e. psychological rather than physical harm) in the target population are the terrorists’ major objectives (NRC, 2010; Medalia, 2004;
Barnaby, 2005). The term dirty bomb is repeatedly used by policymakers and the media, and members of the public are more familiar with the n
injuries caused by conventional explosions; yet are not used to seeing people who have been exposed to massive radiation doses (James, et al.,
2007). This lack of awareness magnifies the psychological harm dirty bombs cause.
Expertise Required for Producing a Dirty Bomb
The expertise required to make a dirty bomb is really not much more than it takes to make a conventional one, as long as the terrorists have possession of the radioactive material. No special assembly is required; the regular explosive would simply disperse the radioactive material packed into the bomb. As described before, the hard part is acquiring the radioactive material. Still, the relative ease of constructing such weapons if access to radioactive material ever becomes possible (e.g. due to chaos hitting a producing country) makes them a particularly worrisome threat. Even so, expertise matters. Not all dirty bombs are equally dangerous: the cruder the weapon, the less damage it can cause
(The National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012).
Additionally, the type of dirty bomb constructed can vary in sophistication depending on the quantity and type of radioactive material used and the amount of time provided to assemble the device. The level of the terrorist’s expertise in balancing the use of explosives with the nature and quantity of radioactive material also determines the severity of the blast effect and plume formation. In addition, the time allocated for bomb construction is sensitive to the possibility of detection following material theft or black market purchase. If detected, only limited time may be provided for building the bomb. Under time constraints, the terrorists might simply use the vehicle carrying the radioactive material as the detonation device (Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007). o
History of Radiological Attacks
The murder of Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006 by Polonium-210 ingestion was likely the first provable act of radiological terror (James, et al., 2007; Peter, et al., 2007). This incident involved radioisotope poisoning with Po-210 (of short half-life, and about 5000 times as radioactive as 1g of Radium) was administered in a cup of tea. It has a half-life of 138 days – long enough for it to be manufactured, transported and administered before it loses its potency, without putting the carrier at much risk since its alpha radiation is only hazardous inside the body. About 10μg (2 GBq) was said to have been used (NRC, 2011b). In addition, a Briton (Dhiren Barot) was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2006 for planning for an RDD, out of some 10,000 smoke detectors, each of which contains a small radioactive source, for use in London (James, et al., 2007). In addition, some terrorist groups (e.g. Al-Qaeda) have expressed interest in using such means to further their objectives, while some others (e.g. Chechen rebels in 1995) even demonstrated their possession of radioactive materials (Ferguson, 2004;
Edwards, 2004).
Means of Terrorist Radioactive Attacks
In order for a terrorist organisation to construct and detonate a dirty bomb, they must acquire radioactive material by stealing it or buying it through legal or illegal channels. Stealing radioactive material would require of the terrorists to target radioactive material sites, and this most probably involves attacking a nuclear facility (e.g. nuclear-power station, the high-level radioactive waste tanks, industrial sites that use radioactive material or radiology departments in hospitals); attacking, sabotaging or hijacking a transporter carrying nuclear materials or radioactive waste or acquiring fissile material – highly enriched Uranium or Plutonium (Barnaby, 2005).
Presumably, a dirty-bomb terrorist attack releasing radiological matter would involve a limited or wide-scale inhalation, ingestion or immersion – the I-3 attacks. Poisoning by inhalation can be carried out by releasing small radioisotopes in the air. In such a scenario and while the resulting p
area of contamination would be large, the concentration of radioactivity would be small, probably leading to limited casualties. However, the impact on the public perception of risk and levels of anxiety would be considerable, as would the clean-up costs and those resulting from lost economic activity in evacuated areas. A more enclosed attack (i.e. indoor) would result in limited and controlled, yet more certain, impact on casualties (James, et al., 2007; Peter, et al., 2007).
On the other hand, the number of fatalities resulting from an ingestion attack could be much larger, and perhaps an obvious means of achieving this is by contaminating the water supply with radioactivity, but fortunately this is extremely ineffective. While at a concentration of about 3Ci per litre (just 1–2ml; less than a teaspoon) would be a fatal dose if swallowed, the huge volume of water – most of which not used for drinking – involved would dilute the radioactivity to the point where it becomes harmless (James, et al., 2007). Another approach would be by contaminating food (ingredients or finished/nearly-finished products), but this might also prove hard to kill many people as a very large number of items would have to be ‘spiked’ (James, et al., 2007); having said that, none of the problems and challenges that could face the terrorists are insurmountable, and the number of fatalities resulting from an ingestion attack could reach the mid to high hundreds. Last but not least, immersion attacks are potentially simpler to carry out than ingestion or inhalation attacks, and the maximum credible number of fatalities probably lies somewhere between them. Credible immersion scenarios are not published for the obvious safety reasons (James, et al., 2007).
Risk Evaluation of Radiological Terrorist Attacks
Since the construction and use of a dirty bomb is the simplest type of nuclear terrorism, it is the most likely form to occur, at least in the short term (Barnaby, 2005). The use of radioactive sources in industry, medicine and research is so widespread that even with the strongest conceivable regulatory framework in place; the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorist groups cannot be ruled out (James, et al., 2007).
London’s Metropolitan Police have stated that they believe a ‘dirty bomb attack on London is a certainty’. Governments have therefore long recognised that they must take steps to mitigate the consequences of a radiological attack (James, et al., 2007). q
Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “security” of radioactive material was regarded as the prevention and mitigation of thefts in ignorance of the hazard, such as persons stealing objects for scrap metal resale (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2012). High activity sources were thought to have a degree of “self-protection”, and the experts gave no consideration to the possible deliberate acquisition of radioactive sources for malicious use.
Following 9/11 however, and the recognition of the role that dirty bombs or RDDs could become a part of terrorists’ plans, strengthened controls which had received little support in 2000 were thereafter embraced. These included new provisions relating to national registers of high-activity sources; the international trade in radioactive sources; strengthened security requirements; confidentiality of information and the prompt notification to potentially affected states of incidents of loss of control of sources, or incidents with potential trans-boundary effects (Evans &
Kawaguchi, 2012).
Potential Impact of RDD Attacks
The whole picture of an environmental impact induced by an explosion of a “dirty bomb” depends on the method of dispersion, post-accidental spatial distribution of radioactivity and the time of the materials’ evolution. The featured targets for explosive radiation contamination include settlements, facilities, public places, agricultural lands, drinking water supplies (Medalia, 2004b; Peter, et al., 2007). Studies of these aspects of explosive dispersion, including numerical emulations and field testing, provide a basis for development of security measures for transportation, storage and operation of specific radioactive material to prevent their malevolent use (Medalia, 2004b).
Examples of potential sources used in RDDs
The physical and chemical form of the radioactive material dispersed by an RDD attack determines the character of the induced radioactive contamination. An RDD poses a greater health threat if its material is finely powdered — and thus more readily dispersed and inhaled — rather r
than granular. Certain organs concentrate particular elements – Strontium in bone and radioactive St-90 can cause bone cancer, breast cancer, and leukaemia. The thyroid gland concentrates Iodine and radioactive I-131 causes thyroid cancer (Medalia, 2004b).
With regards to using Po-210 and considering the levels at which it is created by most probable sources, not enough radiation would be present in a dirty bomb to cause severe illness from exposure to radiation (NRC, 2010). In addition, using an alpha source (such as Po-210) in a dirty bomb that dispersed the material in the air would be extremely ineffective. This is because alpha particles (the nuclei of helium atoms) are almost completely harmless outside the body (are stopped by the skin layer); but the danger they posed inside the body is much greater (James, et al.,
2007). Because alpha emitters produce the most localised, intense tissue damage their radiation can be up to 20 times more lethal than beta or gamma sources when ingested. In an I-131 attack, any type of radioactive source – alpha, beta or gamma – could be employed. Accordingly, the
Litvinenko affair graphically illustrates something known for a long time: once inside the body, even a minute quantity of a radioactive material can be deadly. In light of this reminder it is important to carefully evaluate the threat posed by radiological terror (James, et al., 2007; The
National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012).
Once terrorist groups move beyond a fixation with externally delivered radiation, the range of radioactive sources that they can employ becomes larger. Gamma sources are the most suitable type for use in a dirty bomb, as they produce highly penetrating gamma-rays (very short wavelength rays). Beta sources could also be used in a dirty bomb, but would be considerably less effective because they emit electrons (beta-emitters), which are considerably easier to shield against (James, et al., 2007).
Casualties and Contamination
Although frightening and disruptive, spreading radioactive material widely would be unlikely to kill large numbers by direct irradiation (James, et al., 2007). In reality, the death toll from a dirty bomb would be very unlikely to reach three figures. Immediate health effects from exposure to s
the low radiation levels expected from an RDD are likely to be minimal. If low-level radioactive sources were to be used, the primary danger from a dirty bomb would be the blast itself (NRC, 2010). This is due to the fact that the effects of radiation exposure are determined by the amount absorbed by the body; the size and type of radiation (gamma, beta, or alpha); the distance from the radiation to an individual; the means of exposure-external or internal (absorbed by the skin, inhaled, or ingested) and the length of time of exposure. What is more likely to happen is that persons could be exposed to low levels of radiation that would slightly increase their risk of cancer in the long-term (IAEA, 2010; The
National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012; NRC, 2010; Peter, et al., 2007).
The potential consequences of an act of terrorism using radioactive sources can be gauged from the consequences of serious accidents that have occurred involving radioactive sources. These include fatal and injurious radiation exposures, contamination of the environment, and serious economic and psychosocial costs, the total effect of which is mass disruption (Joel & Daniel, 2002). Simulation scenarios of such terrorist attacks; such as the one carried out by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) in 2002 for the scenario of RDD attacks on Washington DC and New York City; show the extent of potential damage and disruption that can be caused. Such attacks could turn targeted cities into new
“Chernobyl” nightmares with large areas becoming heavily contaminated with radiation (Ferguson, 2004; Davidson, 2006).
If the cost in lives of a dirty-bomb attack is small, its financial cost would certainly not be. It is possible, but expensive, to decontaminate an area following a small dirty-bomb attack (James, et al., 2007). After a larger attack, however, it might prove necessary to raze whole city blocks, remove topsoil and bury the debris. The extent of local contamination would depend on a number of factors; including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, the means of dispersal, and weather conditions (NRC, 2010). As radioactive material spreads, it becomes less concentrated and less harmful. Prompt detection of the type of radioactive material used – with equipment already carried by many emergency responders – will greatly assist local authorities in advising the community on protective measures, such as sheltering in place, or t
quickly leaving the immediate area. So in general, the cost of the clean-up would largely be determined by the standards imposed by government; the higher the residual radiation allowed, the less costly the operation (James, et al., 2007).
The cost would be compounded by the loss of economic activity during clean-up and by a frightened public refusing to visit the affected area. In fact and due to their disruptive nature, the economic costs of a dirty-bomb attack could well be comparable with those sustained by New York and Washington DC on the 9/11 attack (James, et al., 2007).
Response
Unlike a nuclear weapon, which is much more powerful, the radioactive materials in a dirty bomb play no part in creating the explosion itself
(James, et al., 2007). Still, in the public imagination, dirty bombs have the potential to ‘kill hundreds if not thousands’ and are often discussed by governments in the same breath as nuclear and biological weapons. The fact that the effects of radiation and radioactivity are not well known among the general population, emergency responders, or medical personnel, could lead to unwarranted panic, refusal to respond to the incident, inappropriately delaying or denying treatment to injured victims, and other unfortunate reactions during the emergency phase of any response
(Ferguson, 2004; Karam, 2005).
Following any kind of radiological incident, people tend to flee the scene of the attack; which could exacerbate the spread of radiation, increasing the impact of the attack. Analysing the public perception of risk is particularly important in formulating a communication strategy, an essential part of any emergency response programme (James, et al., 2007). Failure to understand how the public would react greatly hinders realistic planning. Accordingly, an effective policy response to the threat posed by radiological terror must be based around ‘defence in depth’. Steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood or intensity of an attack. In addition, appropriate preparations can mitigate the consequences of an attack, should one occur (James, et al., 2007). So perhaps the best and most effective means for facing such potential attacks are not only governments’ u
and regulatory bodies’ security plans over access to radioactive material; but also informing the public of the strategies that will work best when coupled with effective risk communication about the real consequences of radiation (James, et al., 2007). A public that understands the risks associated with radiation and has confidence in the authorities’ ability to respond to an attack will be less likely to panic, spread radiation needlessly or overwhelm medical services with unnecessary requests for treatment (James, et al., 2007).
Providing that individuals leave the affected area quickly, remove contaminated clothing, avoid transferring material to their mouths or inhaling radioactive dust, and wash off debris within a few hours, they are unlikely to be exposed to sufficient external radiation to cause lasting harm.
The only people likely to be killed or seriously injured by radioactivity are the small number of people that are alive but immobile following the initial blast, and very close to the site. This is not to say that the threat posed by dirty bombs can be ignored. Once ingested or inhaled, radioactive materials can be lethal in tiny quantities (e.g. Po-210) (James, et al., 2007; Ferguson, 2004; Karam, 2005).
The IAEA has assisted countries in responding to emergencies involving radioactive sources that caused deaths or injuries. The incidents have intensified efforts to solve problems and ensure the application of international standards on radiation safety and security developed by the IAEA and partner organizations. IAEA programmes are helping countries to share experience and to apply the standards, but more needs to be done
(IAEA, 2010).
CHAPTER 3 – SECURITY AND REGULATIONS
When safely used and regulated, the social and economic benefits from the many applications of radioactive sources are high, in the billions of dollars worldwide each year (IAEA, 2010). The focus in this dissertation is on the potential risk of terrorists acquiring radioactive sources and using them to induce terror and achieve their objectives. This chapter is dedicated for the review of the current regulatory plans and codes of v
conduct in security of radioactive material; with a comprehensive assessment to their effectiveness in preventing terrorists from acquiring radioactive material, and also in realising adequate response plans if dirty bomb or RDD attacks ever take place.
Regulating Radioactive Material
Radioactive sources vary widely in physical size and properties, the amount of radiation they emit, and type of encasing. Some are portable instruments, such as gauges for taking measurements, while others are fixed pieces of equipment, such as a radiotherapy machine for cancer treatment. In definition, a “radioactive source” is a radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded in a solid form, and which is not exempt from regulatory control; while an “orphan source”, on the other hand, is one that is not under regulatory control, either because it has never been regulated, or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without proper authorisation (IAEA,
2010). Now considering that intentional exposure of people by radioactive contamination may be extremely harmful, the reduction of the threat of radiological weapon attack by terrorist groups using dirty bombs is one of the priority tasks of the IAEA Nuclear Safety and Security
Programme. Several projects of the nuclear security plans of the agency (e.g. the 2012 & 2013 ones) address these security issues (IAEA, 2012).
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has categorised radioactive sources, to identify the ones that require particular attention for safety and security. Most significant ones used as medical radioactive sources include Cobalt-60, Caesium-137, Strontium-90, and Iridium-192, all of which emit high levels of radiation (IAEA, 2010).
National and International Regulatory Bodies
An entity or organisation or a system of entities or organisations that are designed by the government of a State as having legal authority for exercising regulatory control with respect to radioactive sources, regulating one or more aspects of the safety or security of radioactive sources, is referred to as a “regulatory body”. The form of control or regulation applied to facilities or activities by such regulatory bodies for reasons related w
to radiation protection or to the safety or security of radioactive sources, is thereby referred to as “regulatory control”. The term “safety” describes the measures intended to minimise the likelihood of accidents involving radioactive sources and, should such an accident occur, to mitigate its consequences (IAEA, 2005).
The IAEA
Internationally, over 70 states have joined with the IAEA, forming the leading international regulatory body that collects and shares information on various security-related incidents involving both radioactive sources and other radioactive materials. For example, the IAEA's Illicit
Trafficking Database produced contains information reported and confirmed by the states that report trafficking incidents. Thanks to such coordinated regulatory work, radioactive sources can be detected and their movement monitored (IAEA, 2010). The IAEA has categorised radioactive sources to identify those types that require particular attention for safety and security reasons. It is also assisting countries in responding to emergencies involving radioactive sources that may cause deaths or injuries or be security problems (IAEA, 2010). The incidents have intensified the efforts to solve problems and ensure a truly international application of radiation safety and security standards developed by the IAEA and sister organisations.
The IAEA has taken the leading role in the United Nations system in establishing standards of safety, the most significant of which are the Basic
Safety Standards and the more recent Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. These guidelines promote consistent international approaches to radiation protection, safety and security (IAEA, 2010). The effective detection range depends on the amount and type of radiation emitted by the source and also on the possible presence of shielding materials that may reduce the amount of radiation that reaches the detector (IAEA, 2010). Fortunately, the most intense and dangerous sources normally are the most susceptible to detection. Several types of advanced instruments are already in use for detecting radioactive materials. More advanced systems that will be more sensitive, easier to use, or more capable of identifying exactly what kind of radioactive materials are under development (IAEA, 2010). x
The NRC and the FDA
In the US, regulation of radioactive material is managed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Its purpose is to offer regulation of medical use of radioactive material so to prevent needless radiation exposures (Medalia, 2004a). The NRC works with other Federal agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and licensees to protect radioactive material from theft and unauthorised access (World Nuclear
News, 2011; Medalia, 2004a). The NRC and its Agreement States – states who have been given authority to regulate nuclear materials within its borders – have worked together to create a strong and effective regulatory safety and security framework that includes licensing (for use or storage of radioactive material), inspection, monitoring (record keeping) and enforcement (World Nuclear News, 2011).
The agency has made improvements and upgrades to the joint NRC-DOE (Department of Energy) database that tracks the location and movement of certain forms and quantities of special nuclear material. In addition, in early 2009, NRC deployed its new National Source Tracking
System, designed to track high-risk sources in the United States on a continuous basis (World Nuclear News, 2011). Moreover, the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) body which oversees approval of radiation-producing machines and radiopharmaceuticals for safety and efficacy; coordinates with the NRC on regulating the safe use of radiopharmaceuticals and sealed sources, or devices containing radioactive material, clarified and agreed upon (NRC, 2011a).
The NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency – or NEA – is a specialised agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organisation of industrialised countries based in Paris, France (NEA, 2012). Its goal is to help member countries identify, collate, develop and disseminate basic scientific and technical knowledge required to ensure safe, reliable and economic operation of current nuclear systems and to develop next-generation technologies. The objectives of the NEA include helping advance the existing scientific y
knowledge needed to enhance the performance and safety of current nuclear systems; contributing to building a solid scientific and technical basis for the development of future-generation nuclear systems and supporting the preservation of essential knowledge in the field of nuclear science. Such objectives are achieved by ensuring an effective exchange of safety-relevant information among the member countries, and developing common understandings and approaches on current safety issues (NEA, 2012).
Also, generic issues and trends that may affect the safety of nuclear installations are identified, and problems of potential safety significance are anticipated. The NEA also assists member countries in the resolution of safety issues and strengthen confidence in the solutions and their implementation; one of its core objectives. Furthermore, it addresses the safety issues associated with new technologies and reactor designs. The
NEA also helps maintain an adequate level of capability and competence necessary to ensure the safety of existing and future nuclear facilities.
Last but not least, it helps obtain better understanding of national regulatory requirements, encourage harmonisation of regulatory standards where appropriate, and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory process (NEA, 2012).
The WINS
The World Institute for Nuclear Security – or WINS – is another international body established to provide an international forum for those accountable for nuclear security to share and promote the implementation of best security practices (WINS, 2012). The WINS’ importance lies in the fact that it promotes public-private dialogue and help nuclear operators, security practitioners and stakeholders improve their corporate governance of security arrangements. Currently, there is no other forum like WINS for the exchange of best security practice in the nuclear field
(WINS, 2012). z
Security of Radioactive Material
As a thumb rule, reducing the likelihood of an attack involves enhancing the security of radioactive sources – prevent terrorists from acquiring radioactive material, you prevent them from building an RDD. Over the past few years, governments and the IAEA have made great strides in this regard. Nevertheless, further regulatory changes are required (James, et al., 2007). In their excellent paper titled “Beyond the Dirty Bomb:
Re-thinking Radiological Terror” published in 2007, James et al. suggest the following:
Firstly, gamma and beta sources are currently subject to more stringent controls than alpha sources. The IAEA assigns radioactive sources to five categories (category I sources being the most dangerous, and category V the least). Most states use this scheme or a variant as the basis for national regulation. The thresholds between categories are generally smaller for alpha sources than for beta and gamma sources. However, the differences are too small to reflect the fact that, when ingested, alpha emitters are up to 20 times more toxic than beta or gamma emitters.
Rectifying this should be a priority (James, et al., 2007).
Secondly, further steps could be taken to make radioactive sources intrinsically more secure. For instance, Caesium-137 (the most widely used radioisotope) is supplied as powdered Caesium-137 chloride. This material, which is chemically and physically similar to normal table salt, is highly soluble. Moreover, because it is easily dispersed, it is also ideal for use in a dirty bomb. Soluble Caesium-137 chloride powder should be replaced as quickly as possible with an insoluble glassy form of the substance to make it harder to weaponise. Another example of powdered alpha-emitting radioisotopes is Americium-241 (James, et al., 2007; Peter, et al., 2007). It is thought that the regulatory commissions have not been diligent in checking the bona fides of applicants for licenses for large sources of any kind, but thankfully this is being changed (Peter, et al.,
2007). aa
Thirdly, it has been suggested that failure to comply with regulations relating to the security of radioactive sources should be made a criminal offence. Regulations are designed to deter, prevent and detect the acquisition of radioactive sources by unauthorised parties. Users are required, for example, to store sources securely; conduct regular inventories; report the loss or theft of sources and transfer or dispose of them in a specific manner. Failure to comply with such regulations is almost exclusively, if not entirely, a civil offence. Compliance with these regulations would be enhanced if national governments made responsible staff become criminally responsible in cases of serious violations – as has been adopted by the UK and other countries that promote compliance with health and safety regulations by making company directors criminally responsible for death and injury resulting from negligence (James, et al., 2007).
Since the early 1990s and as a result of the alarming interest in the use of radioactive material that some terrorist groups expressed, new regulatory regimes for the security of radioactive material started emerging, one of which was the Security Requirements for Radioactive Sources document introduced in early 2006 (National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2010). The document provides detailed information for radiation and security professionals on the specific security measures that must be applied to sources as part of the regime. It also sets out the more general security requirements for site protection where radiological sources are based. This regime applies to most of the sealed radioactive sources; e.g. those used in universities, hospitals and industrial establishments, as well as mobile units designed for off-site use, such as radiography and well-logging equipment (National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2010). However, these regulations do not apply to some low activity sealed sources or to unsealed sources. The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO), working in cooperation with the
Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) network, seeks to protect radioactive materials from such exploitation by implementing this regime in accordance with recommendations made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2010).
Working closely with representatives of trade organisations and professional bodies, the CTSA’s role is also to identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that may be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack, then devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and the surrounding community (National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2010). bb
Another important document in establishing security around radioactive material and access to them is the Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources and the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources released by the IAEA
(IAEA, 2005). This important code was developed in the aim to assist and support national policies establish adequate regional regulatory systems that achieve and maintain high levels of safety and security of radioactive sources; and to prevent unauthorised access or damage to such material to reduce the risk of accidental harmful exposure to radiation, or the malicious use (IAEA, 2005). In addition, it also aims to mitigate radiological consequences when accidents happen.
The Washington Post reported in March 2002 that the Bush administration’s consensus view was that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network probably had often-stolen radioactive contaminants as Strontium-90 and Cesium-137, which could be used to make a dirty bomb (The
National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012). In January 2003, British officials found documents in the Afghan city of Herat that led them to conclude that al Qaeda had successfully built a small dirty bomb. In late December 2003, homeland security officials worried that al Qaeda would detonate a dirty bomb during New Year’s Eve celebrations or college football bowl games, according to The Washington Post (The
National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012).
An example of regions, actively moving forward and taking actions in improving their radiation security standards in response to the increasing threat, is what has been announced by the Beijing Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision (BBQTS) this year. Beijing city, which is home to 283 institutions and companies that possess radioactive materials, will enforce a new standard on the use and storage of radioactive materials to guard against possible terrorist threats. The new, stricter regulations taking effect in late 2012, are called the Security Requirements for
Radioactive Material Warehouse, and will require all radioactive material warehouses to improve their guard staffing, monitoring systems and alarms, and enhanced record keeping (Li, 2012). cc
Malicious Access to Radioactive Material
There are literally millions of radioactive sources used worldwide in medicine, industry and agriculture; and many of them could be used to fabricate a dirty bomb. They are often not kept securely, making the possibility of terrorists acquiring them possible, as the quality of both regulatory and physical security arrangements is highly variable; even a highly developed states – e.g. the US and the UK – have difficulties in keeping track of all its radioactive material (James, et al., 2007; Barnaby, 2005). For example, in the U.S. it is estimated that every day one radioactive source becomes orphaned through theft or abandonment. Commercial users in the US lose about one radioactive source a day through theft, accidents or poor paperwork. While most are recovered, many of the losses occur due to the license holders’ negligence (Peter, et al.,
2007). In developing countries, accountancy and control is generally much weaker.
There has been a lot of speculation about where terrorists could get radioactive material to place in a dirty bomb. The most harmful radioactive materials are found in nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons sites. However, increased security at these facilities makes them less likely options for terrorists. Hence, there is a greater chance that the radioactive materials used in a dirty bomb would come from low-level radioactive sources. These are found in hospitals, and they are used to diagnose and treat illnesses, sterilize equipment, inspect welding seams and irradiate food to kill harmful microbes (The National Terror Alert Response Center, 2012).
The worst radiological accident to date was the 1987 incident in Goiâna, Brazil, where thieves stole a large radiotherapy source from a disused hospital (to sell the metal container for its scrap value); not realising it contained 1,400Ci of radioactive Caesium. Another earlier incident took place in Juarez, Mexico in 1983, where a medical centre that had purchased a US second-hand radiotherapy unit (incorporating 37TBq of Co-60 pellets), and due to lack of resources in handling its transportation and handling, ended up poorly stored in a warehouse without any safety precautions. It was never used until a technician dismantled it without authorisation, in order to sell it for its scrap value (IAEA, 1999). Although regulations have been tightened in Brazil and other countries since then, they remain lax in many others. Concern is particularly acute in Central dd
Asia and the Caucasus, unstable regions which inherited many radioactive sources following the collapse of the Soviet Union (James, et al.,
2007).
Figure 5: Two HEU shells paddled from the former USSR and seized in Slovakia by the police (CBS News, 2008)
Russia is believed to house thousands of orphan sources, which were lost following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ferguson, 2004). An
variable. For instance, the lethal dose for alpha emitters is typically a few thousandths of a curie, whereas for gamma emitters it is around a few hundredths of a curie. Thus and although alpha sources are generally used in much smaller quantities than gamma sources, they are much more potent (James, et al., 2007). ee
Figure 6: Cesium-filled package uncovered in Moscow (left) and another radioactive device and its containment bucket in Georgia (right) (Krock & Deusser,
2003).
Terrorists can potentially have access to radioactive material at different levels in the process of managing them (nuclear plants, radioactive sources, transporters…etc.). The process of “disposal” of radioactive material, for instance, involves emplacing radioactive sources in an appropriate facility without the intention of retrieval (IAEA, 2005). These can be particularly appealing for terrorists to target.
Indeed, alpha sources are often among the least well protected. This is in part because they are subject to weaker regulation than beta and gamma sources. However, the applications in which they are used are also a factor. Well-logging devices, for example, which are used in prospecting for coal, oil and gas, are often employed in very remote regions. They can contain up to 23Ci of Americium-241 (this represents over 4,000 lethal doses in theory, although such a large number would not be attainable in practice) (James, et al., 2007). In December 2002, two such devices were stolen from an oil company truck in Nigeria. They were eventually recovered in Europe, eight months later, in a shipment of scrap metal
(James, et al., 2007). ff
The IAEA recently secured a powerful Cobalt-60 source abandoned in a former hospital. Soon afterwards in Uganda, the IAEA secured a source that was stolen for illicit resale. And the IAEA is searching through remote areas of the Republic of Georgia to locate and recover a number of missing powerful strontium sources (Barnaby, 2005). Even in the US and Europe, where security is relatively strong, thousands of radioactive sources have been lost or stolen; their present whereabouts are unknown (Barnaby, 2005). Clearly, the lack of security on radioactive materials around the world is a major cause for concern (Barnaby, 2005).
CHAPTER 4 – ASSESSING UK SECURITY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Having explored radiation and radioactivity, the associated aspects of safety and security, and what could be expected to happen if an attack is to take place; this chapter offers a survey of experts’ perception of the levels of security of radioactive material in the UK, along with their effectiveness in preventing dirty bomb attacks from ever taking place. This chapter illustrates the material developed and used to conduct such research, and presents the results obtained.
Security of Radioactive Material in the UK
There are literally millions of radioactive sources used worldwide in medicine, industry and agriculture; many of them could be used to fabricate a dirty bomb. Radioactive materials are stored in thousands of facilities in the UK and other industrialised countries (Barnaby, 2005). They are often not kept securely, turning the scenario of terrorists’ ability to acquire them a worryingly plausible one.
An average-size British hospital will have several types of radioisotopes suitable for use in a dirty bomb, ranging from the micro-curie level for diagnosis, to the milli-curie level for therapy and curie-level for radiotherapy. Blood transfusion centres, for example, have significant quantities of Ca-137 to irradiate transfused blood to prevent transfusion-related ‘graft vs. host disease’ or GVHD (Barnaby, 2005). In order to assess the gg
level of security currently in practice in the UK, the researchers developed an in-house questionnaire that was forwarded to leading radiology departments in the country.
Qualitative data collection
A covering letter explaining the nature of the research was emailed to experts from selected leading departments in the country. For easy and quick feedback data collection process, the e-mail included a link to the questionnaire that was made available online, and which offered userfriendly interface for quick and easy registration of answers. Comment boxes were also made available to allow the experts to share their opinions and recommendations, and to offer more comprehensive feedback, with each question.
The aim of the survey was to address the key aspects of current security levels and areas needing of improvements, so to build a good assessment and understanding of the UK levels of security applied for radioactive material in medical institutions. Copies of the questionnaire and the covering letter are included in hh
Appendix 1: Survey Covering Letter and Questionnaire.
The Questionnaire
The main points addressed in this study broadly fall under the experts’ perception of the risk associated with radiology in relation to terrorism, and how prepared both the international and the British community and radiology regulatory bodies are for it. In addition, it probes what an expert thinks of the adequacy of the current practices, along what they recommend with regards to potential changes in both the practice and the
regulations. The questionnaire comprised 10 questions listed in Table 3.
Table 3: The Questionnaire
1 In your view, should nuclear security be considered an issue of global concern?
2
Do you believe that the international community has established the requisite ‘legal framework’ to address the global nuclear security threat?
Are you of the view that the current ‘International Institutional Framework’ adequately
3
4 meets the global nuclear security concerns?
In your expert opinion, should nuclear security encompass both ‘nuclear materials’ and
‘radioactive substances’?
5
6
7
Could Medical Diagnostic equipment pose a nuclear security risk, in particular, in relation to the manufacture of dirty bombs (Radiological Dispersion Devices)?
Are you of the view that the use of radionuclides in the medical field could pose a nuclear security threat?
In your view, could radioactive sources used in Medical applications (e.g. Co-60 or Cs-
137 gamma-irradiators) be used for malicious purposes, thus posing a security threat?
8
9
10
Do you believe that the production of medical radioisotopes using highly enriched uranium (HEU) - as fuel and target plates - should be phased out as it poses a nuclear security risk?
Are you of the opinion that using low enriched uranium (LEU) for the production of medical radioisotopes would reduce nuclear proliferation and nuclear security risks?
In your view, would the development of International Nuclear Security Standards in relation to the use of radioisotopes and equipment in the medical field enhance nuclear security?
Using the SurveyMonkey© free online survey questionnaire generation tool
(SurveyMonkey©, 2012), the questionnaire was made available online for experts to access and register their answers. The researchers would then receive the results automatically online, making the review and analysis processes a straight-forward one.
Each question offered a 3-choice answer: “Yes”, “No” and “Do not know”. A comment box for additional feedback was also made available for each question. e
Participating Institutions and Departments
With the guidance and support of the project supervisor, and by referring to a number of sources from material made available by international and national regulatory and radiological professional bodies, a total of 88 departments were identified and approached to take part in this study. A total of 40 responses (45.5% response rate) were received back. Unfortunately and due to a technical issue, the researchers were unable to identify which of the experts responded back, so the returned forms were anonymous.
A full list of the 88 approached contacts, including details regarding their departments/organisations and contact details, is provided in f
Survey Results
The green sectors refer to “Yes” answers, red sectors refer to “No” while blue sectors refer to a “Don’t Know” answer. The comments received
for each question, on the other hand, have been provided in
i
Appendix 3: Results. These, along with the percentages scored for the 10 questions, are
discussed in Efficacy and limitations of the research study tools
indicative of how debateable, argument-triggering and open for refinement the addressed subjects and points are. In other words, questions with higher numbers of comments may very well be convenient or popular for discussion.
Q-1: In your view, should nuclear security be considered an issue of global concern?
Q-2: Do you believe that the international community has established the requisite ‘legal framework’ to address the global nuclear security threat?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 7: Q1 Results
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 8: Q2 Results
1
Q-3: Are you of the view that the current
‘International Institutional Framework’ adequately meets the global nuclear security concerns?
Q-4: In your expert opinion, should nuclear security encompass both ‘nuclear materials’ and ‘radioactive substances’?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 9: Q3 Results
Q-5: Could Medical Diagnostic equipment pose a nuclear security risk, in particular, in relation to the manufacture of dirty bombs
(Radiological Dispersion Devices)?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 10: Q4 Results
Q-6: Are you of the view that the use of radionuclides in the medical field could pose a nuclear security threat?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 11: Q5 Results
Q-7: In your view, could radioactive sources used in Medical applications (e.g. Co-60 or Cs-
137 gamma-irradiators) be used for malicious purposes, thus posing a security threat?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 12: Q6 Results
Q-8: Do you believe that the production of medical radioisotopes using highly enriched uranium (HEU) - as fuel and target plates should be phased out as it poses a nuclear security risk?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 13: Q7 Results
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 14: Q8 Results
2
Q-9: Are you of the opinion that using low enriched uranium (LEU) for the production of medical radioisotopes would reduce nuclear proliferation and nuclear security risks?
Q-10: In your view, would the development of
International Nuclear Security Standards in relation to the use of radioisotopes and equipment in the medical field enhance nuclear security?
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 15: Q9 Results
YES NO DON’T KNOW
Figure 16: Q10 Results
Figure 17: Number of comments received
Efficacy and limitations of the research study tools
The list of contacts populated and approached was considered an adequate one; as it provided the researchers with a decent cohort of 40 participants at just below 50% response rate from those approached. For such preliminary results and for the limited nature of this study, this is considered sufficient.
The tool itself – i.e. as an online survey questionnaire – proved a great success; due to the fact that it offered a fast, easy, flexible and convenient data entry (for the
3
participant) and collection (for the researcher) process. However, one element was missing and which was in the researchers’ inability in identifying the respondents. In other words, a questionnaire filled and submitted by a participant maintained their anonymity. This could have been overcome by modifying the settings of the tool itself, choosing a different one or asking for initials/names at the top of the form as part of filling out the form. One may argue though that the latter option compromises anonymity in data collection, yet perhaps that is of little concern in such a study.
CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results obtained from the survey questionnaires returned very useful information about both the current nature of security culture practiced in the UK; along with areas to which improvements and rectification can be brought forward. In this chapter, the answers given by the experts, along with their feedback comments and recommendations, are discussed and analysed. These, along with the literature review, form the basis for conclusions built regarding the currents state of security codes of practice, and the recommendations suggested for future security standards.
Deductions from the feedback
Firstly, the experts unanimously agreed that nuclear security should in deed be considered, and accordingly dealt with, as a global concern, requiring the cooperation and combined efforts of the concerned international community altogether. However, when asked regarding the extent of accomplishment of establishing the adequate legal framework that addresses global nuclear security threats, there was a split in opinions.
Half the experts considered such framework absent, whereas 30% disagreed and thought that it was in deed present. This dispute was then further elucidated by a majority of 53% stating that the current “International Institutional Framework” did not adequately meet the global security concerns (27% opposed that). Accordingly, one could argue that the majority of experts feel there is a need to improve the legislations and increase the international efforts to achieve more adequate frameworks. The comments additionally provided more insight on what makes the experts feel that way towards such an aspect. Many highlighted the facts that the frameworks do not effectively cover all concerned nations, and hence are not truly “global”; and that they are neither enforced nor comprehensive enough. Some further argued that a legal
4
framework cannot actually tackle such issues and prevent terrorists’ access. But most were consistent about the fact that more work need to be put into improving them.
On the other hand, the majority agreed that nuclear material need to be treated as radioactive substance. When asked regarding the risk posed by the radioisotopes used in medicine on potential use in building dirty bombs or RDDs, 74% agreed that that was the case. Their comments further clarified that while the radioisotopes in use in dirty bombs would not cause devastation in loss of lives, they still impose enough threat that causes panic and huge economic losses. The 6 th
question in the survey, which addressed the point regarding whether the use of radionuclides in medicine could pose a nuclear threat, did not return decisive results. Just over half the participants agreed that that was the case, whereas just over a quarter disproved. Quite a few comments were left though; these included the ideas that the pros of using radionuclides out-weigh the risks, and that if considered not posing nuclear security threat, radionuclides can still be used in dirty bombs. As a conclusion, a threat of using radionuclides is definitely there. The latter point was further affirmed in the responses obtained in question 7, where most experts (66% against 14%) agreed that medical radioactive sources can indeed be used in malicious purposes – e.g. RDDs.
Perhaps the largest dispute was around the 8 th question, where there was an even split
(~33% each way) between participants who agreed, those who disagree and the ones that expressed lack of sufficient knowledge when asked whether they believe that HEU
– used in production of medical radioisotopes – should be phased out as it poses a nuclear threat. Reviewing the comments, it seemed that those who disagreed thought so for the facts that (a) again the benefits out-weigh the risk, and (b) alternatives are not available. So perhaps most experts agree it is a threat, but would prefer phasing-out the use of HEU if it was viable option. With regards to using LEU on the other hand, the majority (53%) agreed to the idea that using LEU would reduce nuclear proliferation and hence the risks, with 40% answering with “Do not know”.
Finally and from the results obtained from the 10 th
question, the experts almost unanimously agreed (93%) that development of International Nuclear Security
Standards in relation to the use of radioisotopes and equipment in the medical field would in deed enhance nuclear security. This in a way sums the conclusions built in this
5
study – there is a real need for improved security standards to tackle the threats imposed by terrorists acquiring radioactive material that can be used in RDDs or dirty bombs.
References to other security measures
A number of recent events have clearly shown that nuclear materials and technology are becoming increasingly available to terrorists and rogue states. To effectively counter radiological terrorism, it is important to prevent such groups from acquiring radioactive material through the enforcement of national and international measures that reduce the risks (Barnaby, 2005). Such measures can be summed in developing new, and improving existing, international safeguards system, applied by international bodies
(e.g. IAEA) and more regional and national ones (e.g. UK SRP); tightening security measures around sites of radioactive sources (e.g. in medical and research institutions); funding research to find alternatives to using radioactive materials in as many areas (in medicine) as possible; and expanding the use of radiation detection systems (gates).
While a great deal has indeed been achieved in the field of safety and security in radiation (protecting the workers, the public and medical patients), the IAEA continues to recommend far more effort to be put into new standards that overcome the current downsides and system holes (IAEA, 1999; IAEA, 2009). This was in deed complemented by the results obtained from the experts’ survey conducted.
Conclusions and recommendations
In the dirty bomb scenarios addressed and discussed in this research, the findings suggest that the most cost-effective solution is to prevent or interdict the unauthorised access or theft of radioactive material, by simply improving the security of the facility in which the radioactive material is stored (Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007).
Referring to the results obtained from the experts’ feedback, one aspect agreed amongst most, if not all, was the fact that more work is indeed required for developing more robust, effective and comprehensive security standards on the UK and international levels. The opinions varied between describing the current legal frameworks as being too soft, not comprehensive enough, not reaching all nations it is meant for, or lacking some clarity with definitions and recommendations for alternatives. Reviewing the rates of comments returned amongst the 10 questions, the ones that had unanimity or near-
6
absolute majority recorded fewer comments; whereas the ones that showed more split
(especially questions 2, 6 and 8) showed more contribution from the experts with more comments returned. It is suggested that the global-aspect of nuclear security as an issue, and need for increased international efforts to improve the security standards, were the more obvious and fact-accepted points. The subjects that triggered most disputes (i.e. more diverse comments) were the ones discussing the use of radionuclides – HEU and
LEU – in medicine, and the corresponding threat imposed. The main theme around such questions was the assessment of pros and cons.
While medical radiation sources in the UK are considered to be subject to relatively high levels of monitoring, security is still considered too loose. An important factor in making radioactive sites more secure is to show less tolerance to negligence. Another is by enforcing procedures for more extensive and thorough record keeping and surveillance system for anyone to be allowed to hold or use radioactive sources (SRP,
2007). Another means of reducing the risk is by limiting the availability of the huge range of radioactive material now in medical, research and commercial use, which could be misused for RDD purposes (Evans & Kawaguchi, 2012). Avoiding the need to use radioactive sources makes them less available and also easier to secure and manage
(Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007). This can be achieved by funding research that leads to producing alternatives to use of radioactive material, e.g. in medical diagnosis. Also, avoiding production of radioactive sources in a weaponise form would massively help.
Conferences held by international bodies and organisations of great influence on the security of radiation around the world, such as the IAEA (International Conference on
Security of Radioactive Sources; 2000 & 2003) and the G-8 or Group of Eight (holding conferences on the prevention of terrorists from acquiring or developing RDDs; 2002) also help the UK and other nations face the challenges and improve, for instance, management of radiological waste sites and orphan or surplus radioactive sources.
These are achieved through producing non-binding codes of conducts, issuing recommendations and informative reports and initiating cooperative programs for safer disposal of radioisotopes used in medicine (Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007; IAEA, 2009).
This goal is important; as according to one expert, over 100 countries in 1999 were
“known or thought to lack effective control over radiation sources and radioactive materials” (Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007).
7
Last but certainly not least, raising the public awareness of the nature of the problem, and securing more funding for bringing forward policies that improve security measures in the country, is of core value. The government and people need to have a conversation about radiation terrorism before an attack actually takes place. The easiest way for such a conversation to take place is through solid reporting and discussion (e.g. via media) focused on the science instead of the hype and scary language (Peter, et al., 2007).
Positively, the UK is taking seriously the threat of radiological attack and work on improving the means of securing radioactive sources is on-going. International cooperative efforts prove to be an essential means of progressing in such areas, but the
UK professional bodies still need to invest more time, resources and attention to working on security measures carried out in medical radiology departments. Criminal penalties should be enacted, as they are for some other hazardous materials, to allow prosecution of license holders in the most serious cases (Peter, et al., 2007).
Recommendations for future qualitative data collection include having a larger cohort, longer questionnaires that could perhaps skip the points that seem unanimously agreed upon by the experts and rather more focused questions. Conducting focus groups is another tool that could prove helpful and productive in bringing forth more useful conclusions for assessment of current UK security policies in radiation; and also for producing good recommendations for potential areas of improvements in the international legal frameworks. Last but not least, a more detailed revision of the process in place for security of radioactive material in a number of radiology departments in the UK would be rather satisfactory for a more informed impression of the extent of the problem.
8
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Appendix 1: Survey Covering Letter and Questionnaire
Covering Letter
Dear Sir/Madam
I am a postgraduate student studying for a Masters (MSc) degree in Radiation and
Environmental Protection, in the Physics Department, at University of Surrey.
I am currently conducting research for my dissertation on "Security Aspects of
Radionuclides used in Medical Diagnosis and Therapy.
I would be most grateful, given your expertise, if you could kindly complete the attached questionnaire. It should take no more than 5 minutes to complete.
The questionnaire may be accessed directly from the following link: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SNZ9SWH .
Should you have any question about the survey, or would like to have further information, please feel free to contact me or my supervisor Dr Bahram Ghiassee.
I would like to stress that the data collected from the questionnaire is for my own research, and not for publication.
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire.
Yours sincerely,
Abdulrahman Alswayed aa00515@surrey.ac.uk e
Questionnaire
f
g
Using SurveyMonkey engine, the questionnaire was made available and accessable online by following this link: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SNZ9SWH .
This was last checked on September the 2 nd
, 2012. h
Appendix 2: Contact List
i
j
k
Appendix 3: Results
Q-1: In your view, should nuclear security be considered an issue of global concern?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
COMMENTS: 1
100%
0%
0%
40
0
0
It is a worldwide issue, there are large nuclear weapons stockpiles and nuclear power waste which need to be accounted for this and future generations.
Q-2: Do you believe that the international community has established the requisite
‘legal framework’ to address the global nuclear security threat?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
35%
50%
15%
14
20
6
COMMENTS: 8
There are international treaties but not all countries are signatories (e.g. Israel and Pakistan)
There are many countries which are outside global provision
The framework in place is ok, but the situation of a 'rogue' state developing and potentially using a nuclear weapon continues to pose a threat, at least psychologically.
However it does not seem that the correct level of sanctions can be brought upon countries who withdraw from the NPT
I’m not sure how the global nuclear security threat can be addressed by simply a legal framework - although a legal framework can address how to apportion liabilities and responsibilities in respect of nuclear issues and security matters, the threats to nuclear security such as terrorism, irresponsible proliferation, and irresponsible operators, transporters and other parties in the nuclear supply chain are probably more an issue for the authorities' and how they apply policy and rules. I don’t think a legal framework could on its own address the threat.
In the most part, although areas still exist where nuclear security is less of a priority
Fragmented regulation. Missing inventories etc.
May be not comprehensive but provide robust foundations. Further developments in this respect are needed. l
Q-3: Are you of the view that the current ‘International Institutional Framework’ adequately meets the global nuclear security concerns?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
27%
53%
20%
11
21
8
COMMENTS: 6
Framework in place but not all countries are signed onto (see above)
The framework needs to be truly global
But unfortunately not all countries have ratified the Conventions and Treaties so Safeguards cannot be applied globally.
Within the limitations of the framework itself
Still need a lot of cooperation/coordination among various stakeholders
Yes; but the international community needs to enhance the capabilities of the existing institutions further.
Q-4: In your expert opinion, should nuclear security encompass both ‘nuclear materials’ and ‘radioactive substances’?
YES 93% 37
NO
DON’T KNOW
7%
0%
3
0
COMMENTS: 6
Radioactive substances occur in many forms naturally and have many uses, there should be a distinction made.
In the UK it does by regulation under the Radioactive Substances Act (now the Environmental Permitting Regulations)
Although my answer is generally yes, there should be a graded approach.
Some radioactive material, such as naturally occurring material or source material, pose little treat in themselves and the form and quantity of nuclear or radioactive material does matter.
Medical isotopes could be used in a 'dirty bomb' which is a psychological terror weapon.
Absolutely. The threat from non-state actors who are more likely to use radioactive substances than nuclear materials may be far more real than from rogue states
The current definitions of nuclear materials and radioactive substances can still effectively lead to release of ionisation that can be damaging while still not be considered a nuclear incident and therefore requires less protection re insurances etc. m
Q-5: Could Medical Diagnostic equipment pose a nuclear security risk, in particular, in relation to the manufacture of dirty bombs (Radiological Dispersion Devices)?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
74%
13%
13%
30
5
5
COMMENTS: 6
Although they generally have a short half-life there is still a fear factor
Possibly, even if radiation levels are not harmful to health directly, high levels may cause panic and harm.
Again, form and quantity matter.
More from a psychological point of view than a real radiological hazard probably.
In the right hands
Not in my knowledge (or very limited and very specific). Equipment for medical treatment may pose a risk.
Q-6: Are you of the view that the use of radionuclides in the medical field could pose a nuclear security threat?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
53%
27%
20%
21
11
8
COMMENTS: 8
The IAEA Code of Conduct is surely not strong enough and the problem of trafficking radionuclides poses greater problems than for the radionuclides produces in the hospitals.
But benefits far outweigh risk
Any material can be misused these materials have the potential to be harmful
but that risk must be weighed against their usefulness to society
No but a radiation threat via a dirty bomb.
In some limited circumstances
Unlikely in terms of nuclear security, but could as use in a dirty bomb.
I suspect that it is far easier to acquire materials via this route than via the nuclear energy industry
There are more benefits than risk. n
Q-7: In your view, could radioactive sources used in Medical applications (e.g. Co-60 or Cs-137 gamma-irradiators) be used for malicious purposes, thus posing a security threat?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
66%
14%
26
6
20% 8
COMMENTS: 5
See above, radiation levels can cause panic and harm even where their actual health effects are not dangerous to individuals
Theft of gamma irradiators would pose a threat to the criminal.
In some circumstances.
Could be a terrorist target.
But see answer to question 6
Q-8: Do you believe that the production of medical radioisotopes using highly enriched uranium (HEU) - as fuel and target plates - should be phased out as it poses a nuclear security risk?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
33%
33%
33%
13
13
14
COMMENTS: 7
Benefits outweigh risk but controls needed and use of HEU avoided where possible
See above
But not entirely and not until satisfactory alternatives exist. The balance of lives saved against risk of a radiation scare from a weak radiation threat must be taken into account.
They world need (e.g.) 99Mo for medical purposes. Reactors are an efficient way of making these.
I am not aware of the benefits of using HEU as opposed to some other means.
If there is significant benefit then long as it is placed under the correct safeguards it should be ok. If the benefit is marginal it should be phased out
Provided the requisite safety and security safeguards are in place, the potential benefits greatly outweigh the potential disadvantages of such uses, and no substitutes are available, personally I would encourage such uses for medical purposes
Only if cost effective and not impacting the supply chain (i.e. you have other means of production) o
Q-9: Are you of the opinion that using low enriched uranium (LEU) for the production of medical radioisotopes would reduce nuclear proliferation and nuclear security risks?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
53%
7%
21
3
40% 16
COMMENTS: 2
See above
Probably. But again see answer to question 8. Cost benefit analysis should be performed first.
Q-10: In your view, would the development of International Nuclear Security
Standards in relation to the use of radioisotopes and equipment in the medical field enhance nuclear security?
YES
NO
DON’T KNOW
93%
7%
0%
37
3
0
COMMENTS: 4
I have been writing a paper indicating that there is "Too Much Soft Law in
Nuclear Safety", and stressing the need for an EU Nuclear Safety
Standardization Model and an EU Control Body. Typically for Nuclear
Security, you better address your questionnaire to the Chairman of WINS,
Roger Howsley (roger.howsley@wins.org). See the WINS website and please look for R. Howsley's publications.
Extra security and standardisation of measures is a positive way of managing risks.
To some extent this already exists.
Only if well designed and if the security standards do not prevent the cost effective use of radioisotopes and equipment p
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