Use Theories
The Mirror Universe
Causal Isolation
However, it’s widely recognized that causation can’t be essential to all
meaning, because some things that are meant can’t be causes or
effects.
Causal Isolation
Consider words like ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘not.’
Conjunction can’t cause or be caused by anything.
There’s nothing to point to and say “let that be the meaning of ‘and.’”
Use to the Rescue
However, people who have mastered the meaning of ‘and’ are inclined
to use the word ‘and’ in the following ways:
If they believe ‘A and B’:
• Then they would be willing to believe ‘A’
• And they would be willing to believe ‘B’
Use to the Rescue
However, people who have mastered the meaning of ‘and’ are inclined
to use the word ‘and’ in the following ways:
If they believe ‘A’
And they believe ‘B’:
• Then they would be willing to believe ‘A and B’
Suggestion
So maybe ‘and’ means what it does because of how people use it in
inference.
If you didn’t use ‘and’ in those ways, you wouldn’t mean what
everyone else means by ‘and,’ and if you use ‘or’ in those ways, then by
‘or’ you mean what everyone else means by ‘and.’ Their meaning is
their use.
Further Suggestion
And maybe, just maybe, it’s wrong to think causation is involved at all
in meaning. Maybe all meaning is use.
Careful!
But be careful. It’s not enough to say that the meaning of the words is
“determined by how they’re used.” That’s in a way accepted by
everyone.
According to a causal theorist, the meaning of ‘water’ is determined by
the fact that your uses of the word ‘water’ are caused by a certain
substance (namely, water).
Careful!
A real “use theory” doesn’t say use merely plays a role in meaning– it
says that use is meaning!
The Denial of Denotation
One of the big reasons people have had for adopting use theories is
that they have come to deny that words (or all words, or many words)
have denotations.
They don’t think names refer to things, or that common nouns and
verbs apply to things, or that sentences can be true or false.
Denotation Relations
Why do I connect these ideas: refer to, apply to, and truth/ falsity?
Because truth/ falsity can be defined in terms of the former:
A sentence “Michael is hungry” is true := “hungry” applies to the
referent of “Michael.”
Denotation Difficulties
Why would anyone want to give up on these relations?
Usually, it’s out of an endless parade of historical failures in accounting
for denotation.
Denotation Difficulties
The idea theory can’t explain why ‘dog’ applies to dogs, because
resemblance is indeterminate.
Many non-dogs resemble the idea associated with ‘dog.’
Denotation Difficulties
The verification theory won’t work, for similar reasons.
Many non-dogs (e.g. fake dogs) confirm ‘dog’ more than some dogs do
(e.g. abnormal dogs).
Denotation Difficulties
And the causal theory won’t work, for similar reasons.
Dogs often cause me to say ‘dog’ or think DOG. But so do fake dogs,
and marsupial “dogs” and pictures of dogs, and so on.
The Denial of Connotation
The use theory thus denies that denotations even exist. But it does not
thus identify meanings with any of the classical connotations.
The Denial of Connotation
Remember that ideas (mental images) and verification conditions
(possible experiences) were posited as meanings (connotations) solely
to explain why words had the denotations that they did.
If you deny the existence of denotations, why do you think mental
images are meanings? What’s special about them?
The Middle Way
Instead, the use theorist maintains that meaning is non-mental (not
connotation). It’s out there in the world. But it’s not the stuff out there
in the world we think of as denotation either.
The Middle Way
‘Michael’ doesn’t, for instance, mean me. The meaning of an
expression = how it is used. Sure, use is out there in the world. But the
(relevant) use of ‘Michael’ need not involve me at all.
Logical connectives
&-Introduction
Consider the following rule:
A
__B__
A&B
Suppose it is valid.
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
?
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
T
&-Elimination (Left)
Consider the following rule:
A&B
A
Suppose it is valid.
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
T
?
?
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
T
F
F
&-Elimination (Right)
Consider the following rule:
A&B
B
Suppose it is valid.
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
T
?
F
F
Conjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A & B)
T
F
F
F
Disjunction
Here are the rules for ‘v’ (or):
A___
AvB
A___
BvA
AvB
~A___
B
AvB
~B___
A
Disjunction
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A v B)
The Standard View
The introduction and elimination rules for the logical connectives
determine truth-functions.
One view is that these rules (how we use the connectives) determines
their meaning (the truth-function).
Two Ways to Go Further
1. You could say that it’s not just logical expressions, but all words that
have their meaning determined by the “inference rules” that
govern them.
2. And you could say that the “inference rules” aren’t what
determines the meaning, but that they are the meaning.
This is what the Use Theory does say.
The Use Theory
The Use Theory
and
The Use Theory
means
AND
and
The Use Theory
A and B
B
AND
A and B
A
A, B
A and B
follows
The Use Theory
A et B
B
ET
A et B
A
A, B
A et B
follows
The Use Theory
AND
ET
same concept
Summary of Principles
1. Words mean concepts, and “meaning” is univocal– it always means
just “indication.”
2. For any word, all of its uses may be explained by a basic acceptance
property: a regularity in the use of the word, that explains irregular
uses as well.
3. Concepts are individuated by the basic acceptance properties of the
words that express them.
Three Problems for Horwich
Natural Meaning
One meaning of the word ‘meaning’ is indication.
Indication
Smoke means (indicates the
presence of) fire.
Indication
These Koplik’s spots mean your
child has measles.
Indication
The fact that there’s 16 rings on
this tree stump means that the
tree was 26 years old when it was
cut down.
Features of Natural Meaning
• We can’t say “these spots mean the child has measles, but the child
doesn’t have measles.”
• We can’t say “these spots mean ‘the child has measles.’”
• It can’t be true that someone means the child has measles by these
spots.
Non-Natural Meaning
• We can say “John’s utterance ‘l’enfant a la rougeole’ means the child
has measles, but the child doesn’t have measles.
• We can say “This sentence (‘l’enfant a la rougeole’) means ‘the child
has measles.’”
• It can be true that someone means the child has measles by “l’enfant
a la rougeole.”
‘Meaning’ is Ambiguous
Grice thus concludes that there are two English verbs ‘to mean.’ One
just expresses natural meaning, roughly: “A means B = Whenever A is
true, it’s a fact of nature that B is true as well.”
‘Meaning’ is Ambiguous
The other is non-natural meaning, and it’s what we’re trying to analyze
when we do metasemantic theorizing.
The Univocality of Meaning
Horwich, however, claims that there’s only one sense of ‘meaning,’ the
natural one.
The Univocality of Meaning
The way he understands natural meaning is: ‘smoke means fire = smoke
gives us a good reason to believe there’s fire.’
So he says ‘cat’ means the concept CAT = (utterances of) ‘cat’ give us a
good reason to believe there’s (in the speaker’s mind) CAT.
Univocality as Virtuous
“It is a virtue of this account that
it respects the relational
appearance of meaning
attributions and that it calls for no
special, ad hoc assumption about
the meaning of ‘means’ in
semantic contexts.”
Virtue?
Horwich, in his ‘ad hoc’ remark, seems to forget that there were
principled reasons for denying the univocality of ‘meaning.’
Natural Meaning is Transitive
Furthermore, natural meaning is transitive:
1. Thunder means there’s lightning.
2. Lightning means there’s unbalanced electric charges in the clouds.
3. Therefore, thunder means there’s unbalanced electric charges in
the clouds.
Non-Natural Meaning is Not Transitive
If all meaning were natural meaning we’d expect:
• ‘salt’ means there’s SALT
• SALT means there’s PEPPER
• Therefore ‘salt’ means PEPPER
Tonk
Consider the following connective:
A______
A tonk B
B______
A tonk B
A tonk B
A
A tonk B
B
Tonk
A
T
T
F
F
B
T
F
T
F
(A tonk B)
Proof Involving Tonk
Michael is a philosopher = A
Michael is the greatest philosopher = B
1. A
2. A tonk B
3. B
Premise
Tonk Introduction
Tonk Elimination
Tonk vs. the Use Theory
• The rules are supposed to be the meanings, but it seems like ‘tonk’
doesn’t mean anything, even when we know its meaning.
• If the rules are just the meaning of the word, then why is it wrong to
use the word this way. And if it isn’t wrong, does that mean that
Michael is the greatest philosopher!
Compositionality vs. the Use Theory
Does knowing how word W1 is used and how W2 is used suffice for
knowing how [W1 W2] is used?
This seems unlikely.
Imagine teaching a
Martian how the word
‘black’ is used.
We might show it color
samples or something.
Similarly we might teach the
Martian how ‘people’ is used, by
giving examples.
Black Person?
Fundamental Acceptance Property
Recall that for Horwich, the fundamental acceptance property
underlying all uses of ‘black’ is to apply ‘black’ to surfaces that are
clearly black. Suppose we taught a Martian this. And suppose we
taught a Martian how to apply ‘human’ or ‘person’ (distinguishing us
from other apes). Could the Martian work out how to use ‘black
person’? I think not.
Interests in Exaggeration
We (humans) have a vested
interest in exaggerating
differences in skin tone in
order to effect a certain
constructed social order.
Interests in Exaggeration
Unless you know about this
proclivity to exaggerate,
(which doesn’t affect normal
color ascriptions), then you
can’t predict ascriptions of the
form ‘COLOR + person.’
Interests in Exaggeration
Using ‘black’ (or ‘red’ or
‘yellow’) for a color and using
‘person’ for a certain sort of
animal doesn’t determine how
to use the ‘COLOR + person’
form.