Trade Core – DDI 2013
Trade Good
Trade Good – War (General)
Trade solves all conflict, inequality, and is a decision rule
Palmer 02 – senior fellow¶ at the Cato and director of Cato¶ University (Tom G., Fall 2002,
“Globalization Is Grrrreat!,”
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/catosletterv1n2.pdf)
Globalization Leads to Peace by ¶ Diminishing the Incentives for ¶ Conflict. Protectionism is
based on a¶ mentality and a corresponding set of¶ policies that emphasize the opposing ¶
interests of nations. Free trade, in contrast, links nations together in peace.¶ There’s an old
adage: when goods cannot cross borders, armies surely will. ¶ Trade Creates Wealth. Imagine
that¶ someone created a machine that would¶ allow you to push through one door¶ things you
can make cheaply and¶ through the other door would come¶ things you’d like to have but that
cost¶ you more to produce. Australians could¶ herd sheep in one door and out the¶ other door
would come cars and photocopiers. And Japanese could push VCRs¶ and stereos through one
door and pull¶ petroleum, wheat, and aircraft through¶ the other. The inventor of that machine¶
would be hailed as a benefactor of¶ mankind—until Ralph Nader or Pat¶ Buchanan showed that it
was … a port!¶ Then, instead of being hailed as a benefactor, the “inventor” would be vilified¶ as
a destroyer of jobs—and unpatriotic,¶ to boot. But what’s the difference between such a
marvelous machine and¶ trade? Trade Leads to Benefits for All. The¶ most common error of
protectionists is¶ to confuse absolute advantage with comparative advantage. Even if the
person in¶ the front row is better at everything than¶ I am, we each benefit from trade if he¶
specializes in what he does best and I¶ specialize in what I do best. The old example of the typist
and the lawyer applies across borders as well as within offices. The lawyer can both write legal¶
briefs and type better than the typist, but¶ both benefit by the lawyer specializing¶ in writing
legal briefs, which cost less in¶ terms of lost typing output, and the typist typing them up, which
costs less in¶ terms of lost legal argumentation, since¶ the typist is better at typing than at
arguing law. Total joint output is higher¶ and each receives more income. That’s¶ one reason
why trade is so closely connected with peace, as well. It’s because¶ people can see their fellow
humans as¶ partners in mutually beneficial cooperation, rather than as deadly rivals, that¶
human society is possible in the first¶ place. Trade is at the very foundation of¶ human
civilization. Free Trade Is the Fastest Route to¶ the Elimination of Child Labor.¶ Around the
world approximately 250¶ million children labor. The percentage¶ of children who labor has
fallen—not¶ risen—with rising trade and globalization, and for pretty obvious reasons.¶ Poor
countries are not poor because¶ children work. Children work because¶ they are poor. When
people become¶ richer through production and free exchange, they send their children to¶
school, rather than to the fields. Global¶ trade is the fastest route to the elimination of child
labor and its replacement¶ by child education.¶ Trade, Openness, and Globalization¶ Support
Accountable, Democratic¶ Government and the Rule of Law. ¶ As trade barriers have fallen,
the share of¶ world governments classified by Freedom House as democracies has increased
dramatically. Of the top 40 percent ranked according to economic¶ openness in Economic
Freedom of the¶ World (copublished by the Cato Institute), 90 percent are rated “free” by¶
Freedom House. By contrast, in the bottom 20 percent, that is, the most closed¶ economies,
fewer than 20 percent are¶ rated “free” and more than 50 percent¶ are rated “not free.” Mexico
is a good¶ case in point; the opening of the Mexican economy through the North American
Free Trade Agreement made possible the victory of President Vincente¶ Fox and the breaking
of the monopoly¶ on power of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Supporters of
democratically accountable government and the¶ rule of law should support globalization.¶ Free
Trade Is a Fundamental Human¶ Right. The anti-globalizers and protectionists start with the
assumption that¶ they have the right to use force to stop¶ you and me from engaging in
voluntary¶ exchange. But fundamental rights¶ should be equal for all humans, and the¶ right to
engage in trade is a fundamental right, one enjoyed by all humans, regardless of on which side
of a border¶ they may live. Free trade is not a privilege; it is a human right. ¶ Trading is
distinctively human. It distinguishes us from all the other animals.¶ It’s based on our faculty of
reason and¶ our ability to persuade. As Adam Smith¶ noted in a lecture on March 30, 1763,¶ “The
offering of a shilling, which to us¶ appears to have so plain and simple a¶ meaning, is in reality
offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as¶ it is for his interest.” As he noted,
other¶ animals may cooperate, but they don’t¶ trade, and they don’t trade because they¶ don’t
employ reason to persuade. ¶ Not only is trade distinctively¶ human, it is also a distinctive
feature of¶ civilization, as Homer observed in The¶ Odyssey. In Book 9, when Odysseus tells¶ of
reaching the land of the Cyclops, he¶ offers some thoughts on why the Cyclops is a “lawless
brute.” Odysseus observes that ¶ The Cyclops have no ships with¶ crimson prows,¶ No shipwrights
there to build them¶ good trim craft¶ That could sail them out to foreign¶ ports of call¶ As most
men risk the seas to trade¶ with other men.¶ The Cyclops is a savage because he does¶ not trade.
He lives in the preferred¶ world of the anti-globalizers, a world¶ without trade, a world in which
all production is local.¶ Protectionism should be rejected not¶ merely because it is inefficient. It
should¶ also be rejected because it leads to conflict and war, because it is immoral, and¶
because it is uncivilized.
Trade interdependence prevents conflicts by raising the economic costs of war
and increasing communication between borders
Daniel T. Griswold is the associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute in Washington. December 31, 1998 http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-31-98.html
accessed on 7-29-03
Advocates of free trade have long argued that its benefits are not merely economic. Free trade
also encourages people and nations to live in peace with one another. Free trade raises the
cost of war by making nations more economically interdependent. Free trade makes it more
profitable for people of one nation to produce goods and services for people of another nation
than to conquer them. By promoting communication across borders, trade increases
understanding and reduces suspicion toward people in other countries. International trade
creates a network of human contacts. Phone calls, emails, faxes and face-to-face meetings are
an integral part of commercial relations between people of different nations. This human
interaction encourages tolerance and respect between people of different cultures (if not
toward protectionist politicians). Ancient writers, expounding what we now call the Universal
Economy Doctrine, understood the link between trade and international harmony. The fourthcentury writer Libanius declared in his Orations (III), "God did not bestow all products upon all
parts of the earth, but distributed His gifts over different regions, to the end that men might
cultivate a social relationship because one would have need of the help of another. And so He
called commerce into being, that all men might be able to have common enjoyment of the fruits
of the earth, no matter where produced." Open trade makes war a less appealing option for
governments by raising its costs. To a nation committed to free trade, war not only means the
destruction of life and property. It is also terrible for business, disrupting international
commerce and inflicting even greater hardship on the mass of citizens. When the door to trade
is open, a nation's citizens can gain access to goods and resources outside their borders by
offering in exchange what they themselves can produce relatively well. When the door is closed,
the only way to gain access is through military conquest. As the 19th century Frenchman
Frederic Bastiat said, "When goods cannot cross borders, armies will."
Trade promotes peace and prevents conflicts – Western Europe proves
O’Driscoll 03 Gerald P O’driscoll jr is senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Sara Fitzgerald is a
trade policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation. Orange County Register, Feb. 11, 2003
A report by the World Bank says that 2 billion people -- most of them in sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East and the former Soviet Union -- "live in countries that are being left behind." These
countries have failed to integrate with the world economy, failed to knock down barriers to
trade and investment flows, failed to establish property rights and, as a result, failed to grow
into modern economies.And, according to research by Edward Mansfield of the University of
Pennsylvania and Jon Pevehouse of the University of Wisconsin, that's a recipe for trouble.
Mansfield and Pevehouse have demonstrated that trade between nations makes them less
likely to wage war on each other -- and keeps internecine spats from spiraling out of control.
They also found these trends are more pronounced among democratic countries with a strong
tradition of respect for the rule of law.Countries that trade with each other are far less likely to
confront each other on the battlefield than are countries with no trade relationship. And the
size of the economies involved doesn't affect this relationship, which means small, weak
countries can enhance their defense capabilities simply by increasing trade with the world's
economic giants.Experts, including Mansfield and Pevehouse, say intensive trade integration,
perhaps more than any other factor, has led to an unprecedented five decades of peace in
Western Europe.
Trade Good – Democracy
Trade Good – Economy
Free trade is best for long-term economic stability of developing countriesempirics
Van de Walle 98
Nicholas van de Walle is a visiting¶ Fellow at the Overseas Development¶ Council and an
Associate Professor at¶ Michigan State University. “Economic Globalization¶ and Political Stability
in¶ Developing Countries.” PROJECT ON WORLD SECURITY¶ ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND.
1998. http://www.iatp.org/files/economic_globalization_and_political_stability.pdf
There can be little doubt that the highly volatile nature of international finance¶ complicates
economic management, particularly in the smaller, more vulnerable¶ countries of the developing
world. In the short run, markets are volatile: they¶ overreact to certain signals, can be slow to
respond to imbalances, and then overshoot¶ equilibrium prices when they do respond. Even
virtuous governments can find¶ themselves destabilized by international speculation, as
happened in Latin America¶ in the wake of the Mexican bond collapse in 1994. In what was
dubbed the Tequila¶ Effect, neighboring countries that did not always share Mexico’s
macroeconomic¶ weaknesses nonetheless found their stock markets plunging downwards and
their¶ bonds seriously undermined. Equity investments in emerging stock markets proved¶
particularly volatile: after a tenfold increase between 1990 and 1993, they were halved¶
between 1993 and 1995 (World Bank 1996). In the medium to long run, however,¶ steady and
sustainable macroeconomic management is consistently rewarded by¶ financial markets, as
indeed was demonstrated by many of the economies in Latin¶ America after the Tequila Effect
subsided, and the confidence of financial markets¶ was restored.
Trade creates conditions that promote democracy-Mexico proves
AERF 1
(The Atlas Economic Research Foundation is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization that is supported
by donations from individuals, foundations and corporations. It works with think tanks and
individuals in the United States and across the world who share a vision of the free society
based on certain common beliefs, “Free Trade Promotes Democracy”, summer 2001,
http://atlasnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/2001_h-summer.pdf)
Alzati acknowledged the standard efficiency arguments made for free trade by its proponents:
the enhancement of economic opportunities and the creation of wealth. Just as important,
however, is its role in promoting democracy. Using the Mexican case as an . example, he
described how free trade is gradually dismantling the traditional sources of revenue - customs
duties in his country - that have enabled authoritarian governments to remain in power.
Hence, free trade has a strong, dampening effect upon authoritarian rule, enabling greater
opportunities for democracy to take hold. In fact, Alzati said, Mexican President Vicente Fox
would never have been elected to office without the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). NAFTA started dismantling long-standing avenues of rent seeking, weakening the
abilities of corrupt leaders to fund their power bases. To nurture democracy, Alzati concluded,
we need to have "real free trade" - not purely for economic reasons, but also to enhance the
quality of life and democracy for people around the globe.
Democracy is d-rule
Diamond 95
(Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution senior fellow, co-editor of the Journal of Democracy, December 1995, A Report to the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and
Imperatives,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the
former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies
through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have
utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons
continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly
democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to
aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own
populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against
one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more
reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They
are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because
their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they
respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are
the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
Trade Good – Environment
Statistical analysis proves free trade is good for the environment (who knew!)
Taylor et al 98
Werner Antweiler, Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor. “Is Free Trade Good for the
Environment?” American Economic Association. July 1998. http://siti.feem.it/gnee/papabs/antweil.pdf
This paper sets out a theory of how openness to trading opportunities affects¶ pollution
concentrations. We started with a theoretical specification that gave pride of place¶ to scale,
technique and composition effects and then showed how this theoretical¶ decomposition is
useful in thinking about the relationship between openness to international¶ markets and the
environment. In our empirical section we adopted a specification directly¶ linked to our
earlier theory. We then estimated this specification paying special attention to the potentially
confounding influences introduced by the panel structure of our data set. Our¶ results
consistently indicate that scale, technique and composition effects are not just¶ theoretical
constructs with no empirical counterparts. Rather these theoretical constructs can¶ be
identified and their magnitude measured. Moreover, once measured they can play a¶ useful
role in determining the likely environmental consequences of technological progress,¶ capital
accumulation or increased trade. These estimates may also be useful in aggregate¶ CGE
modeling of the effects of various free trade agreements and other trade reforms [see¶ for
example, Ferrantino et al.,1996].¶ Overall the results indicate that increases in a country’s
exposure to international¶ markets creates small but measurable changes in pollution
concentrations by altering the¶ pollution intensity of national output. While our estimates
indicate that greater trade intensity¶ creates only relatively small changes in pollution via the
composition effect, economic theory¶ and numerous empirical studies demonstrate that
trade also raises the value of national output¶ and income. These associated increases in
output and incomes will then impact on pollution¶ concentrations via our estimated scale and
technique effects. Our estimates of the scale and¶ technique elasticities indicate that if
openness to international markets raises both output and¶ income by 1%, pollution
concentrations fall by approximately 1%. Putting this calculation¶ together with our earlier
evidence on composition effects yields a somewhat surprising¶ conclusion: freer trade is good
for the environment.
Trade Good – Hegemony
Trade Good – Liberty
Trade Good – Political Stability
No correlation between free trade and political instability in developing
countries
Van de Walle 98
Nicholas van de Walle is a visiting¶ Fellow at the Overseas Development¶ Council and an
Associate Professor at¶ Michigan State University. “Economic Globalization¶ and Political
Stability in¶ Developing Countries.” PROJECT ON WORLD SECURITY¶ ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS
FUND. 1998. http://www.iatp.org/files/economic_globalization_and_political_stability.pdf
Third World governments, it has been concluded, are powerless to fight the diktat of¶
international finance, or as Mkandawire puts it, developing countries have been left¶
“choiceless” by international economic forces (Mkandawire 1996; see also Ake 1998).¶ At the
present, this remains an exaggeration. To understand exactly how economic¶ globalization
circumscribes policy choices, it is useful to distinguish the short and¶ long run. In the long run, I
would argue that Economic globalization is serving to¶ lessen the number of good choices.
Developing countries can still choose to adopt¶ policies of economic isolation and autarchy—
witness countries like Libya, North¶ Korea, or Cuba. Such policies have always led to slower
growth and endemic balanceof-payments crises; today, in addition, the growing availability of
international capital¶ dramatically increases the opportunity cost of not engaging the world
economy.¶ Closed economies forgo not only access to international capital, but also access to¶
technology transfers, commercial expertise and skilled labor that comes with it. ¶ That does not
mean that all countries are forced into a single, “neoliberal” policy¶ mold, as is sometimes
argued. The sharp differences which remain among the highly¶ integrated economies of the
OECD suggest that governments retain important¶ degrees of policy initiative and discretion, at
least at present levels of global¶ integration. After all, Scandinavian and Northern European
social democracy, with¶ its higher levels of taxation, public expenditures, and various
corporatist arrangements¶ between the state, business, and labor, appears to be as
sustainable as the more laissezfaire regime in the United States (Stallings 1995; Berger and
Dore 1996). Even within¶ the European Union, where policy convergence has been actively
promoted for¶ several decades, there remain sharp differences in the position of the state, with
the¶ proportion of central government expenditures in total GDP varying between some¶ 30 and
50 percent.
Trade Good – Poverty
Trade Good – Terrorism
Free Trade combats Islamic extremism
Lindsey 3
Brink Lindsey in his years with Cato, Lindsey has served as director of regulatory studies, founder
and director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, and vice president for research. He was a
senior editor of Regulationmagazine and he created and was the original editor of Cato
Unbound. From 2010 to 2012, Lindsey was a senior scholar in research and policy at the Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation. He currently serves as a senior fellow with the Kauffman
Foundation. The Trade Front
“Combating Terrorism with Open Markets.” Center for Trade Policy Studies. August 5, 2003.
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tpa-024.pdf
The new trade initiative aims to combat¶ terrorism, and the Islamist extremism that¶ underlies
it, by promoting economic and political development in the Muslim world. “The¶ Arab world has
a great cultural tradition, but is¶ largely missing out on the economic progress¶ of our time,”
the president declared in his May¶ 9 speech. “Across the globe, free markets and¶ trade have
helped defeat poverty, and taught¶ men and women the habits of liberty.”1 The¶ hope is that
better integration of Arab countries into the global economy will initiate a virtuous circle of
increased growth and broader¶ economic reforms and that, in turn, a freer and¶ more
prosperous Middle East will be less susceptible to the radical Islamist movements that ¶
support and perpetrate terrorism.
Islamic extremism exists because liberal institutions of free trade haven’t
spread to the area
Lindsey 3
Brink Lindsey in his years with Cato, Lindsey has served as director of regulatory studies, founder
and director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, and vice president for research. He was a
senior editor of Regulationmagazine and he created and was the original editor of Cato
Unbound. From 2010 to 2012, Lindsey was a senior scholar in research and policy at the Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation. He currently serves as a senior fellow with the Kauffman
Foundation. The Trade Front
“Combating Terrorism with Open Markets.” Center for Trade Policy Studies. August 5, 2003.
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tpa-024.pdf
The rise of Islamist extremism over recent¶ decades is a complex historical phenomenon,¶ and
it would be facile to try to ascribe it to any¶ single root cause. That said, the Muslim¶ world’s
woeful deficits in economic and political freedom surely deserve much of the blame.¶
Widespread poverty, high unemployment, the¶ absence of opportunities for upward
mobility,¶ brutal and corrupt ruling elites, the stifling of¶ dissent, the exasperation caused by
seeing spectacular successes elsewhere in the world—all¶ stoke the rage and despair that win
new converts to Islamist extremism. And all are traceable to the failure of liberal
institutions—market competition, the rule of law, popular selfgovernment—to take root in
the region. ¶ The past quarter century has seen a dramatic, worldwide turn away from old
ideologies of¶ central planning and top-down control and¶ toward more market-oriented
models of economic policymaking.4¶ In much of the Muslim¶ world, however, the dead hand
of the collectivist¶ past has hardly relaxed its grip at all. Pervasive¶ government controls
continue to suffocate competition and throttle entrepreneurship.
Trade is key to decrease terrorism
McGinnis 3
John O. McGinnis. Professor John O. McGinnis is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law
School where he was an editor of the Harvard Law Review. He also has an MA degree from
Balliol College, Oxford, in philosophy and theology. Professor McGinnis clerked on U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. From 1987 to 1991, He was deputy assistant attorney
general in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. Professor McGinnis is a
scholar in both the areas of constitutional and international law. The Office of the U.S. Trade
Representatives has added him to the roster of Americans who can be appointed as panelists to
resolve World Trade Organization disputes. He is a past winner of Paul Bator award given by the
Federalist Society to an outstanding academic under 40. “Expanding Trade: A Powerful Weapon
against Terrorism” Federalist Society. December 1, 2003. http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/expanding-trade-a-powerful-weapon-against-terrorism
But defending the Homeland also requires us to focus on broader issues and longer term threats
to American security. One such threat is the desperate poverty in many Muslim nations poverty that deprives hundreds of millions of people of both the physical necessities of life
and hope for any improvement in their tomorrows. These environments produce receptive
audiences for the radical, hate filled anti-American harangues of Osama Bin Laden. American
generosity must now be extended beyond our traditional humanitarian efforts. We must now
reach out to the developing nations of the world in ways that help them develop their
economies. Economic development brings jobs, improvements in health and education
standards, and overall rising standards of living, bringing a new sense of hope to turn aside
the false appeal of Osama Bin Laden and other would -be terrorists. The link between trade
and economic development is well established. Less developed countries must be encouraged
and helped to produce goods and services, and those goods and services must be allowed to
enter the world's economy through trade with other nations. The United States and other
developed countries must be willing to engage developing countries as full economic partners each country using its comparative advantage to increase its trade and create economic
growth for its people. In addition to economic growth, trade brings two other critically
important values to the developing world, values that ultimately benefit the United States as
well. Trade brings new products and services to the developing world. It brings new people
and new ideas into contact with peoples in the developing world and opens them to ideas of
freedom and democracy - powerful weapons against tyrranny and terrorism. Second, trade is
a potent weapon against corruption in government. The transparent regulations that the world
trade regime encourages will improve social governance in the developing world. Clean
government will facilitate economic development and simultaneously remove a weapon from
Bin Laden's armory.
Trade Good – Women
Free trade increases women’s role in the economy and increases household
power
NBER 10
(Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez Jim Airola Chinhui Juhn “Did Trade Liberalization Help Women? The Case Of Mexico In The 1990s” National
Bureau Of Economic Research. July 2010)
With the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, Mexico entered a bilateral free
trade
agreement which not only lowered its own tariffs on imports but also lowered tariffs on its exports to the U.S. We find that
women’s relative wage increased, particularly during the period of liberalization. Both between and
within-industry shifts also favored female workers. With regards to between-industry shifts, tariff reductions expanded
sectors which were initially female intensive. With regards to within-industry shifts, we find a positive association between
reductions in export tariffs (U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods) and hiring
of women in skilled blue-collar
occupations.¶ Finally, we find suggestive evidence that household bargaining power shifted in favor of
women.¶ Expenditures shifted from goods associated with male preference, such as men’s clothing and tobacco and
alcohol, to those associated with female preference such as women’s clothing and education.
Free trade increases women’s wages and employment rates, even in highskilled jobs
NBER 10
(Ernesto Aguayo-Tellez Jim Airola Chinhui Juhn “Did Trade Liberalization Help Women? The Case Of Mexico In The 1990s” National
Bureau Of Economic Research. July 2010)
To summarize our findings, we find that trade
liberalization policies improved women’s labor market
outcomes in Mexico. First, relative wages of women increased even as employment rates
increased, and this pattern is particularly pronounced during the trade liberalization period, 1990 to 2000. In contrast to studies
conducted in the U.S. (Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)) and Mexico in an earlier period (Revenga (1997), Hanson and Harrison
(1999)), we find¶ Weinberg (2000) shows that female employment growth is positively related to computer-use across industries
and occupations. Also using U.S. data and Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) Rendall (2010) shows that occupations
which
are more “brain” intensive have expanded over time, favoring female workers.¶ 6Artecona and
Cunningham (2002) employ the same methods for Mexico but do not find a significant relationship ¶ between tariff changes and
reductions in the gender wage gap across industries. 4¶ ¶ evidence of substantial labor reallocation across industries,
shifting employment towards initially female-intensive sectors. Between-industry shifts, usually thought to be consistent with tradebased explanations, account for up to 40 percent of the increase in wage bill share of women from 1990 to 2000. Comparing across
industries, we find that tariff reductions were positively related to industry growth and concentrated in initially female-intensive
industries. We also find evidence that within-industry shifts favored women. Using establishment-level data for the manufacturing
sector we find that larger declines in export tariffs (U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods) are associated with larger increases in wage bill
shares of women in skilled blue-collar occupations. This result suggests that the exports and technology channel emphasized in the
recent trade literature may be important for explaining gender outcomes as well as skill premiums. We find a much weaker
relationship between reductions in import tariffs and female wage bill shares, however, suggesting that reductions in discrimination
brought about by trade liberalization played a relatively minor role in the Mexican case.
WTO Good – Democracy (Multilat)
Multilateral institutions promote democracy – democratic participatory
enhancement
Robert O. Keohane et al., Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University, editor of
the journal International Organization and as president of the International Studies Association
and the American Political Science Association, Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World
Order, 1989, and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, 2005, National Academy of Sciences
member, winter 2009 [Stephen Macedo -- Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the
University Center for Human Values, chairperson of Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction,
vice president of the American Political Science Association; and Andrew Moravcsik -- rofessor
of Politics and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton, Non-Resident Senior
Fellow of the Brookings Institution “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,” International
Organization Foundation -- Cambridge University Press, JSTOR] jmin
First, multilateral institutions in which countries with well-functioning domestic constitutional
democratic procedures predominate are more likely to function ¶ in such a way as to enhance
domestic democracy than those dominated by nonde- ¶ mocracies. Since the establishment of
multilateral institutions involves constitutional commitments that may attenuate subsequent
democratic control, we might ¶ expect that the democratic standard for authorization will be
particularly high - ¶ and this is indeed what we observe. Consent of each participant member
state is ¶ required, and must be ratified using whatever domestic constitutional procedures it
¶ specifies: a parliamentary vote, occasionally a referendum, and never less than pro- ¶
mulgation by an elected government. All other things equal, the more representa- ¶ tive this
process and the higher the standard of domestic democracy by which ¶ delegation took place,
the more likely it will be to enhance domestic democracy in ¶ the future. Where, by contrast,
representative governments represent the interests ¶ of powerful minorities, as in cases such as
the nineteenth-century gold standard or ¶ the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, the resulting
organizations are more likely ¶ to be captured by special interests.84 This effect is even clearer at
the extremes: coop- ¶ eration among nondemocratic states - as in organizations like the Concert
of Europe ¶ and the Holy Alliance of nineteenth-century Europe, or the Shanghai Cooperation ¶
Organization - is more likely to undermine domestic democracy. ¶ Second, multilateral
institutions that generate and involve civil society net- ¶ works and organizations can thereby
enhance transnational discussions, creating ¶ new forms of participation that may partially
compensate for participatory forms ¶ that are lost. Tarrow has persuasively argued that
transnational activists increas- ¶ ingly find in multilateral institutions "a 'coral reef where they
lobby and protest, ¶ encounter others like themselves, identify friendly states, and from time to
time, ¶ put together successful global-national coalitions."85 New forms of participation ¶ are
arising, largely through the Internet, facilitated by multilateral organizations. ¶ Some multilateral
organizations, such as the World Bank, have begun actively to ¶ engage civil society in quite
institutionalized ways.86 Insofar as domestic debates ¶ and deliberation are enhanced by
these forms of transnational participation, multilateral institutions may thereby enhance
democracy at home. ¶ Third, the costs and risks of multilateralism for democracy are likely to be
some- ¶ what different between countries that are large and heterogeneous and those thatare
small and homogeneous. Participation costs may be higher for small and homo- ¶ geneous
societies, in which national governments are closer to the people and lev- ¶ els of citizen
satisfaction about the functioning of democracy tend to be higher ¶ than in their larger
counterparts.87 Smaller and more homogeneous societies may ¶ have more to lose in terms of
citizen participation by shifting some decision mak- ¶ ing toward multilateral institutions.
Participation represents only one strand of dem- ¶ ocratic value and most democracies are too
large to place great weight on direct ¶ citizen participation in national-level policy deliberation. In
these relatively large ¶ countries, the scope of government and the gap between government
and citizen ¶ are already relatively large, so losses in the ability of individuals to participate ¶
directly will be less meaningful.88 Yet it is worth emphasizing that this need not ¶ translate into a
loss of accountability - also a democratic value, but one that should ¶ not be confused with
participation. If we focus on accountability rather than par- ¶ ticipation, the risks of
multilateralism may be lower in small, homogeneous soci- ¶ eties because there it remains easier
for publics to monitor both their own ¶ governments and multilateral organizations.89 Small and
homogeneous political ¶ communities may also stand to gain most in terms of faction control
and rights ¶ protection. Since most multilateral organizations continue to offer opportunities ¶
for individual governments to exercise influence, citizens in smaller polities can ¶ exercise a
consistently influential role - as they do, for example, in some smaller ¶ EU member states.
Multilateralism solves domestic democracy – increases democratic deliberation
and restricts special interest factions
Robert O. Keohane et al., Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University, editor of
the journal International Organization and as president of the International Studies Association
and the American Political Science Association, Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World
Order, 1989, and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, 2005, National Academy of Sciences
member, winter 2009 [Stephen Macedo -- Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the
University Center for Human Values, chairperson of Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction,
vice president of the American Political Science Association; and Andrew Moravcsik -- rofessor
of Politics and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton, Non-Resident Senior
Fellow of the Brookings Institution “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,” International
Organization Foundation -- Cambridge University Press, JSTOR] jmin
Many scholars and popular commentators assert that international organizations ¶ undermine
democracy. Global governance, they argue, is distant, elitist, and technocratic. Debates over
multilateralism are increasingly waged between critics, who ¶ point to the ways in which
international institutions undermine domestic democratic processes, and defenders, who stress
pragmatic benefits. In this article we ¶ challenge this conventional framing of the issue. ¶ We do
so by arguing that participation in multilateral institutions - defined ¶ broadly to include
international organizations, regimes, and networks governed by formal international
agreements - can enhance the quality of domestic democracy. To be sure, some instances of
multilateralism have undemocratic implications, but multilateralism can also enhance
domestic democracy in a number of ¶ important ways. Involvement with multilateral
institutions often helps domestic ¶ democratic institutions restrict the power of special
interest factions, protect individual rights, and improve the quality of democratic deliberation,
while also ¶ increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes. Under some plausible
¶ circumstances international cooperation can thus enhance the quality of democracy even in
reasonably well-functioning democratic polities.
Multilateralism helps correct the flaws of democracy
Robert O. Keohane et al., Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University, editor of
the journal International Organization and as president of the International Studies Association
and the American Political Science Association, Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World
Order, 1989, and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, 2005, National Academy of Sciences
member, winter 2009 [Stephen Macedo -- Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the
University Center for Human Values, chairperson of Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction,
vice president of the American Political Science Association; and Andrew Moravcsik -- rofessor
of Politics and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton, Non-Resident Senior
Fellow of the Brookings Institution “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,” International
Organization Foundation -- Cambridge University Press, JSTOR] jmin
The claim that multilateralism degrades democracy rests on a second fallacy as ¶ well: the
unwarranted assumption that existing domestic institutions always adhere ¶ to high
democratic standards. Most critics of multilateralism idealize domestic polit- ¶ ical institutions.
Yet in classically sovereign national democracies, existing mechanisms such as elections and
other forms of political representation and deliberation ¶ often contain biases, imperfections,
and weaknesses. Involvement with multilateral institutions could help to correct some of
these flaws.
The most important reason why critics overlook the potential for multilateral- ¶ ism to improve
the functioning of democracy lies in a third fallacy. Critics typically conflate the ideal of
"constitutional democracy" with maximizing direct ¶ popular participation. Such a participatory
definition of democracy gives intuitive ¶ force to the claim that "distant" international
organizations undermine democracy. ¶ Yet popular participation is only one among a number of
political values to be ¶ balanced in a well-ordered constitutional democracy. Other normatively
important ¶ objectives include the suppression of faction, minority inclusion, and deliberation
- ¶ ideals that are sometimes, as we show below, promoted by multilateral institutions. Before
moving on to this empirical analysis, we examine these ideals more ¶ closely.
WTO Good – Human Rights
WTO PTA’s solve human rights – “hard” and “soft” standards
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, professor at the School of
International Relations and Pacific Studies and director of the School’s new Laboratory on
International Law and Regulation, professor of politics and public policy at Princeton University,
research scholar at Stanford Law School and fellow of Stanford’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation, postdoctoral prize research fellow at Nuffield College at Oxford
University, summer 2005 [“Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements
Influence Government¶ Repression,” International Organization – Cambridge University Press,
JSTOR] jmin
Yet HRAs are no longer the only alternative for international regulation of domestic human
rights policy. Few realize that the governance menu has recently expanded ¶ to include a
growing number of formal institutions that embed human rights stan- ¶ dards4 into rules
governing market access-preferential trade agreements (PTAs).5 ¶ PTAs are a rapidly growing
class of international institutions that govern market ¶ access between member states of an
economic region.6 Semi-autonomous from ¶ the global structure of the World Trade
Organization (WTO),7 PTAs frequently ¶ regulate spheres of social governance that
increasingly include human rights stan- ¶ dards. Some, such as the Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreements, supply ¶ "hard" standards that tie agreement benefits to member
compliance with specific ¶ human rights principles. Others, such as the West African Economic
and Mon- ¶ etary Union, supply "soft" standards that are only vaguely tied to market access ¶
and unconditional on member states' actions.8 ¶ My argument is a simple one about
institutional design and influence. In the ¶ area of human rights, hard laws are essential:
change in repressive behavior almost always requires legally binding obligations that are
enforceable.9 HRAs, on the ¶ whole, do not supply adequate enforcement, but there are strong
reasons to expect ¶ that a growing number of PTAs with hard standards now govern state
compliance ¶ with international human rights principles, with considerable potential to
influence states' behaviors toward citizens. Indeed, these agreements may often be more ¶
effective than HRAs in changing the basic conduct of repressive governments ¶ toward greater
protection for some fundamental rights. Certain PTAs enforce many ¶ principles of
international law that most HRAs cannot. I offer three hypotheses. ¶ First, most HRAs are not
likely to effectively reduce violations most of the time. ¶ As I will elaborate in this article, HRAs
are principally soft: they influence gov- ¶ ernments' human rights practices through persuasion
rather than coercion, supply- ¶ ing weak obligations.10 Persuading repressive actors to change
their preferences ¶ for behavior requires a supply of convincing argumentation, a long-time
horizon, ¶ simultaneous targeting of multiple actors, and access to the target abusers. HRAs, ¶
unfortunately, do not supply many of these conditions.
WTO Good – War
Multilateral organizations solve global security and welfare – quid pro quo
agreements
Robert O. Keohane et al., Professor of International Affairs, Princeton University, editor of
the journal International Organization and as president of the International Studies Association
and the American Political Science Association, Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World
Order, 1989, and the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science, 2005, National Academy of Sciences
member, winter 2009 [Stephen Macedo -- Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the
University Center for Human Values, chairperson of Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction,
vice president of the American Political Science Association; and Andrew Moravcsik -- rofessor
of Politics and Director of the European Union Program at Princeton, Non-Resident Senior
Fellow of the Brookings Institution “Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,” International
Organization Foundation -- Cambridge University Press, JSTOR] jmin
This is the state of the current debate: critics of multilateralism point to the ¶ ways in which
international institutions undermine democracy; defenders respond ¶ by stressing pragmatic
benefits. Clearly this simple dichotomy contains some truth: ¶ there can be tensions among
democratic costs and pragmatic benefits of multilat- ¶ eralism, and such tensions need to be
managed. Yet we believe that the "multilateralism versus democracy" framework also restricts
the debate, obscuring as ¶ much as it illuminates. Scholarly and public discussion needs to be
broadened. In ¶ particular, those who accuse multilateralism of degrading democracy overlook ¶
important ways in which international institutions can enhance democracy. Critics overlook the
democracy-enhancing potential of multilateralism because their ¶ criticisms rest on three
related fallacies. ¶ The first fallacy is that unfettered legal sovereignty is a necessary
prerequisite ¶ of democracy. Some critics of multilateralism argue that only externally
unfettered sovereignty properly represents a state's collective capacity and obligation, ¶ as a
democratic political community, to make its own decisions regarding its law.10 ¶ We disagree.
Following Chayes and Chayes, we maintain that in the modern world, ¶ one of the most
important elements of legal sovereignty is that it confers on ¶ national communities the
power to enter into binding international legal agreements granting states reciprocal
influence over each other's policies.11 States ¶ affected by the policies of a foreign
government gain influence over those ¶ policies, in exchange for surrendering some domestic
discretion. Since such interstate arrangements are crucial for citizens to achieve security,
welfare, and other ¶ legitimate public purposes, refusing to delegate some authority to
multilateral ¶ institutions represents a self-defeating and arbitrary restriction on national
dem- ¶ ocratic deliberation. Far from restricting and degrading national democracy, the ¶
constitutional option of pooling and delegating sovereignty in this way expands ¶ the scope of
democratic choice and improves democratic control over policies that actually affect citizens, as
long as procedures adhere to basic democratic ¶ standards.
AT: Trade Causes Poverty
No correlation between free trade and wealth inequality
Van de Walle 98
Nicholas van de Walle is a visiting¶ Fellow at the Overseas Development¶ Council and an
Associate Professor at¶ Michigan State University. “Economic Globalization¶ and Political Stability
in¶ Developing Countries.” PROJECT ON WORLD SECURITY¶ ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND.
1998. http://www.iatp.org/files/economic_globalization_and_political_stability.pdf
On the other hand, there is little hard evidence to support the argument that¶ inequality is
increasing in developing countries. Data on income and asset¶ distribution in the Third World
is notoriously weak, perhaps the primary reason that¶ controversies about inequality tend to
persist. Luckily, over the course of the last¶ couple of years, significantly improved cross-national
data have come to be available.¶ Deininger and Squire (1996) report on a new data set
assembled at the World Bank¶ that includes 682 observations for 108 countries of Gini
coefficients7¶ and the national¶ income distribution by population quintiles. In both scope
and reliability, these data¶ represent a considerable improvement over all previously available
data sets, even if¶ they remain imperfect. Most useful, the data set includes fifty-eight countries
with¶ four or more quality observations spaced out from the 1960s to 1990s, thus allowing¶ for a
better understanding of the evolution of intra-national inequalities over time.¶ A number of
scholars have now taken advantage of this new data and have generated¶ several findings of
interest for our purpose here (Bruno, Ravallion, and Squire 1996;¶ Deininger and Squire 1996;
Ravallion and Chen 1996; Chen, Datt, and Ravallion¶ 1994). Some of this data is related in the
Appendix table.¶ First, the data suggest that income distribution has been fairly steady in
most¶ developing countries over the course of the last forty years. As Bruno, Ravallion, and¶
Squire put it, there is “substantially greater variation in inequality across countries at¶ a given
time than over time for a given country” (p. 5). Parallel research on the¶ evolution of poverty
in developing countries (Ravallion and Chen 1996) suggests a¶ similarly static evolution
overall, although with sharper regional variation: the¶ absolute incidence of poverty
increased in Africa and Latin America (and the exsocialist states) during the 1980s, while
declining in East and South Asia. Overall, the¶ absolute numbers of the poor have grown
roughly as fast as population growth
Trade Bad
Trade Bad – War (General)
Multilateral trade and globalization increase the likelihood of bilateral conflict
escalation – no trade dependency
Philippe Martin et. al, Thierry Mayer, Mathias Thoenig, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
School of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
school fo Economics CEP11 and Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Geneva and
Paris School of Economics, First version April 06, final version November 07, published 2008
[Make Trade Not War?, The Review of Economic Studies Limited, <http://econ.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf>] jmin
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the following question: If trade promotes¶ peace as
suggested by the European example, why is it that globalization, interpreted as trade¶
liberalization at the global level, has not lived up to its promise of decreasing the prevalence
of¶ violent interstate conflicts? We offer a theoretical and empirical answer to this question.
On the¶ theoretical side, we build a framework where escalation to military conflicts may occur
because¶ of the failure of negotiations in a bargaining game. The structure of this game is fairly
general:¶ (1) war is Pareto dominated by peace, (2) countries have private information, and (3)
countries¶ can choose any type of negotiation protocol. We then embed this game in a
standard new trade¶ theory model. We show that a pair of countries with more bilateral trade
has a lower probability of¶ bilateral war. However, multilateral trade openness has the
opposite effect: Any pair of countries¶ more open with the rest of the world decreases its
degree of bilateral dependence and its cost of a¶ bilateral conflict, and this results in a higher
probability of bilateral war. A theoretical prediction¶ of our model is that globalization of trade
flows changes the nature of conflicts. It decreases the¶ probability of global conflicts (maybe
the most costly in terms of human welfare) but increases¶ the probability of any bilateral
conflict. The reason for the second result is that globalization¶ decreases the bilateral
dependence for any country pair, and this weakens the incentive to make¶ concessions in
order to avoid the escalation of a dispute into a bilateral military conflict. This¶ is especially true
for countries with a high probability of dispute with a local dimension such as¶ disputes on
borders, resources, and ethnic minorities.
US trade dominance decreases local economic interdependence, increasing the
likelihood for regional conflicts
Philippe Martin et. al, Thierry Mayer, Mathias Thoenig, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
School of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
school fo Economics CEP11 and Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Geneva and
Paris School of Economics, First version April 06, final version November 07, published 2008
[Make Trade Not War?, The Review of Economic Studies Limited, <http://econ.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf>] jmin
We test the theoretical prediction that bilateral and multilateral trade have opposite effects¶
on the probability of bilateral military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period using a data set from¶
the Correlates of War (COW) project that makes available a very precise description of
interstate¶ armed conflicts. The mechanism at work in our theoretical model rests on the
hypothesis that the¶ absence of peace disrupts trade and therefore puts trade gains at risk. We
first test this hypothesis.¶ Using a gravity-type model of trade, we find that bilateral trade costs
indeed increase significantly with a bilateral conflict. However, multilateral trade costs do not
increase significantly.¶ Second, we test the predictions of the model related to the contradictory
effects of bilateral and¶ multilateral trade on conflict. We address the endogeneity issue by
controlling for various codeterminants of conflict and trade; by including country pair fixed
effects and time effects; and,¶ finally, by implementing an instrumental variable strategy. Our
results are robust to these different estimation strategies. The quantitative impact of trade is
surprisingly large for proximate¶ countries (those with a bilateral distance less than 1000 km),
those for which the probability of¶ a conflict is the highest. We estimate the quantitative effect
of the globalization process of the¶ past 30 years that is characterized by expansion of both
bilateral trade flows (with a negative¶ impact on the probability of conflict) and multilateral
trade flows (with a positive impact on this¶ probability). We find that its net effect has been to
increase the probability of a bilateral conflict by around 20% for proximate countries. However,
for more distant countries, the effect of¶ globalization on their bilateral relation has been very
small. This fits well with the stylized fact¶ depicted by Figure 2. This strongly suggests that
conflicts have become more localized over time¶ as the average distance between two countries
in military conflict has been halved during the¶ 1950–2000 period. It is consistent with the
changing nature of war as discussed by historians¶ (Keegan, 1984; Bond, 1986; Van Creveld,
1991).¶ The related literature ranges from political science to political economy. The question of
the¶ impact of trade on war is an old and a controversial one among political scientists (see
Barbieri¶ and Schneider, 1999; Kapstein, 2003, for recent surveys). From a theoretical point of
view, the¶ main debate is between the “trade promotes peace” liberal school and the neoMarxist school¶ which argues that asymmetric trade links lead to conflicts. The main difference
between these¶ two positions comes from the opposing view they have on the possibility of
gains from trade for¶ all countries involved. From an empirical point of view, recent studies in
political science test¶ the impact of bilateral trade (in different forms) on the frequency of war
between country pairs.¶ Many find a negative relationship (see, e.g. Polachek, 1980; Mansfield,
1995; Polachek, Robst¶ and Chang, 1999; Oneal and Russet, 1999). However, some recent
studies have found a positive¶ relationship (see Barbieri, 1996, 2002). These papers, however,
do not test models in which trade¶ and war are both endogenous.¶ 3¶ In economics, related
empirical papers on the issue are recent¶ papers by Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Glick and
Taylor (2005). They, however, focus on the¶ reverse causal link, that is on the effect of war on
trade. They control for the standard determinants¶ of trade as used in the gravity equation
literature. To our knowledge, our paper is, however, the¶ first to derive theoretically the twosided effect of trade on peace (positive for bilateral trade and¶ negative for multilateral trade)
and to empirically test this prediction.¶ Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) show in a
theoretical model that terms of trade¶ effects may intensify conflict over resources, a
mechanism from which we abstract in the theoretical model. We also abstract from internal
conflicts between factors of production that may be¶ generated by opening to trade as in
Schneider and Schulze (2005). The recent literature on the¶ number and size of countries (see
Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003) has also clear connections¶ with our paper because in both
frameworks, a key mechanism is that globalization reduces local¶ economic dependence. In
Alesina and Spolaore, the consequence is an increase in the equilibrium number of countries.
In our framework, it decreases the opportunity cost of conflict and¶ increases the equilibrium
number of local wars. Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) also study¶ the link between conflicts,
defence spending, and the number of countries. Their model aims to¶ explain how a decrease in
international conflicts can be associated with an increase in localized¶ conflicts between a higher
number of smaller countries. Their explanation is the following: When¶ international conflicts
become less frequent, the advantages of large countries (in terms of provision of public and
defence goods) weaken so that countries split and the number of countries¶ increases. This itself
leads to an increase in the number of (localized) conflicts. In our paper, the¶ number and size of
countries are exogenous but trade and the probability of escalation to war are¶ endogenous¶
More trade interdependence reduces the opportunity cost of wars, increasing
the probability for a third party conflict
Philippe Martin et. al, Thierry Mayer, Mathias Thoenig, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
School of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
school fo Economics CEP11 and Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Geneva and
Paris School of Economics, First version April 06, final version November 07, published 2008
[Make Trade Not War?, The Review of Economic Studies Limited, <http://econ.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf>] jmin
Our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to highlight the opposite effects of bilateral and
multilateral trade on the probability of war and to base the empirical analysis on testable
predictions¶ generated by a theoretical model. We have shown that even in a model where
trade increases¶ welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not
lead to more peaceful¶ relations. Indeed, what matters ultimately is the geographical
structure of trade and its balance¶ between bilateral and multilateral openness. Bilateral
trade, because it increases the opportunity¶ cost of bilateral war, deters bilateral war.
Multilateral trade openness, because it reduces this¶ opportunity cost with any given country,
weakens the incentive to make concessions during negotiations to avert escalation and
therefore increases the probability of war between any given¶ pair of country. From this point
of view, an increase in trade between two countries pacifies relations between those but
increases the probability of conflict with third countries. Our econometric¶ analysis validates
this prediction using a large number of alternative specifications and empirical¶ strategies. Trade
globalization also affects the nature of war: Multilateral openness increases the¶ probability of
local wars but should deter global conflicts. This last point, a logical consequence¶ of our results
but that we cannot test directly, is important. Given that these conflicts are certainly¶ the most
costly in terms of human welfare, this is not a small achievement.
Increasing trade power causes erosion of peaceful policy
P.R. Goldstone, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and a member of the Security Studies
program at MIT. Non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies at
Georgetown University, 9/24/2007 [article title, publication, <URL>] jmin
American policymakers should beware claims of globalization's axiomatic pacifying effects.
Trade creates vested interests in peace, but these interests affect policy only to the extent
they wield political clout. In many of the states whose behavior we most wish to alter, such
sectors -- internationalist, export-oriented, reliant on global markets -- lack a privileged place at
the political table. Until and unless these groups gain a greater voice within their own political
system, attempts to rely on the presumed constraining effects of global trade carry
substantially greater risk than commonly thought.¶ A few examples tell much. Quasi-democratic
Russia is a state whose principal exposure to global markets lies in oil, a commodity whose
considerable strategic coercive power the Putin regime freely invokes. The oil sector has
effectively merged with the state, making Russia's deepening ties to the global economy a
would-be weapon rather than an avenue of restraint. Russian economic liberalization without
political liberalization is unlikely to pay the strong cooperative dividends many expect.¶ China
will prove perhaps the ultimate test of the Pax Mercatoria . The increasing international
Chinese presence in the oil and raw materials extraction sectors would seem to bode ill, given
such sectors' consistent history elsewhere of urg[e]ing state use of threats and force to secure
these interests. Much will come down to the relative political influence of export-oriented
sectors heavily reliant on foreign direct investment and easy access to the vast Western market
versus the political power of their sectoral opposites: uncompetitive state-owned enterprises,
energy and mineral complexes with important holdings in the global periphery, and a Chinese
military that increasingly has become a de facto multi-sectoral economic-industrial
conglomerate. Actions to bolster the former groups at the expense of the latter would be effort
well spent.¶ At home, as even advanced sectors feel the competitive pressures of globalization,
public support for internationalism and global engagement will face severe challenges. As
more sectors undergo structural transformation, the natural coalitional constituency for
committed global activist policy will erode; containing the gathering backlash will require
considerable leadership.
Interconnectivity makes economic collapse more likely
Hetes 10
Roxana Hetes, Lecturer Ph.D. West University of Timisoara, Faculty of Economy and Business
Administration. “STABILITY VERSUS INSTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT ¶ OF FINANCIAL
GLOBALIZATION.” 7/19/10. http://www.rebs.ro/articles/pdfs/35.pdf
Financial instability describes a situation of price volatility of financial assets, ¶ a situation that
may entail some costs. In the absence of appropriate remedial ¶ measures, it may even lead to
bankruptcy of several financial institutions, ¶ infrastructure problems in the financial system
and ultimately affect all financial ¶ markets, which, through the effect of contagion could
spread worldwide, thus ¶ risking of destabilizing the global financial system and economy. ¶ A
financial crisis can be regarded as a severe form of instability, representing ¶ a situation where, after an episode of
instability, the system does not return to the ¶ normal state, just by simple remedial
measures. Thus, there are required more ¶ extensive and more severe masures, which will
restore discipline in the financial ¶ markets, sometimes accompanied by the restructuring of
the system [Laeven, ¶ 2008, 3]. ¶ The term financial crisis is applied to a variety of situations in which many ¶ financial
institutions or financial assets suddenly lose a large part of their value. ¶ Depending on how defined, there are various ways in which
financial crises can be ¶ classified. Other cases bearing the name of the financial crisis include crahs of the ¶ stock exchanges and the
emergence of new types of speculative bubbles, as well as ¶ phenomena like currency or debt crisis [Allen, 2005, 4]. ¶ In the light of
their effects, financial
crises have led affected economies into ¶ deep recessions and caused
sudden inversions in the current account. Some of these ¶ phenomena were marked by
contagion, rapidly propagating to countries that had not ¶ experienced vulnerabilities in the
financial sector. Among the many causes of ¶ financial crisis we can find a combination of
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, ¶ credit expansion, massive inputs of capital and
fragile balance sheet, combined with ¶ a variety of economic and political constraints [Reinhart,
2008, 7].
Trade is militaristic and leads to war and proliferation
Staples 2k (Steven, Steven Staples is a Canadian policy analyst. He is president of Public Response, a digital agency that
services non-profit organizations and trade unions in the fields of online engagement and government relations. The Relationship
Between
Globalization and Militarism, Social Justice magazine, Vol. 27, No. 4 20000
Globalization and militarism should be seen as two sides of the same coin. On one side,
globalization promotes the conditions that lead to unrest, inequality, conflict, and, ultimately, war.
On the other side, globalization fuels the means to wage war by protecting and promoting the
military industries needed to produce sophisticated weaponry. This weaponry, in turn, is used-or its use is
threatened-to protect the investments of transnational corporations and their shareholders.¶ 1.
Globalization Promotes Inequality, Unrest, and Conflict¶ Economic inequality is growing; more conflict and civil
wars are emerging. It is important to see a connection between these two situations.¶ Proponents of global economic
integration argue that globalization promotes peace and economic development of the Third World. They assert that "all boats rise
with the tide" when investors and corporations make higher profits. However, there is precious little evidence that this is true and
substantial evidence of the opposite.¶ The
United Nation's Human Development Report (U.N.
Development Programme, 1999: 3) noted that globalization is creating new threats to human
security. Economic inequality between Northern and Southern nations has worsened, not
improved. There are more wars being fought today-mostly in the Third World-than there were during
the Cold War. Most are not wars between countries, but are civil wars where the majority of deaths are civilians, not soldiers.¶ The
mainstream media frequently oversimplify the causes of the wars, with claims they are rooted in religious or ethnic differences. A
closer inspection reveals that the underlying source of such conflicts is economic in nature. Financial
instability,
economic inequality, competition for resources, and environmental degradation-all root
causes of war-are exacerbated by globalization.¶ The Asian financial meltdown of 1997 to 1999 involved a terrible
human cost. The economies of Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia crumbled in the crisis. These countries, previously held up by
neoliberal economists as the darlings of globalization, were reduced to riots and financial ruin. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) stepped in to rescue foreign investors and impose austerity programs that opened the way for an invasion by foreign
corporations that bought up assets devalued by capital flight and threw millions of people out of work. Political upheaval and
conflict ensued, costing thousands of lives.¶ Meanwhile, other
countries watched as their neighbors suffered
the consequences of greater global integration. In India, citizens faced corporate
recolonization, which spawned a nationalistic political movement. Part of the political
program was the development of nuclear weapons-seen by many as the internationally
accepted currency of power. Nuclear tests have put an already conflict-ridden region on the
brink of nuclear war.¶ 2. Globalization Fuels the Means to Wage War¶ The world economic system promotes
military economies over civilian economies, pushing national economic policies toward
military spending. The World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the main instruments of globalization, is largely based on the
premise that the only legitimate role for a government is to provide for a military to protect the interests of the country and a police
force to ensure order within. The WTO attacks governments' social and environmental policies that reduce corporate profits, and it
has succeeded in having national laws that protect the environment struck down. Yet the WTO gives exemplary protection to
government actions that develop, arm, and deploy armed forces and supply a military establishment. Article X~ of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows governments free reign for actions taken in the interest of national security.¶ ***¶
The Military-Corporate Complex¶ Since the end of the Cold War, President Eisenhower's 196.0s-era military-industrial complex has
been fundamentally challenged by globalization. Globalization has weakened the powers of the nation-state, while freeing
corporations to move profits and operations across national boundaries. Defense/military contractors, once considered part of the
national industrial base and regulated and nurtured as such, are becoming detached from the nation-state and are able to pursue
their interests independently.¶ Globalization and the transnationalization of defense / military corporations have replaced the
military-industrial complex of the Cold War economy with a military-corporate complex of the new global economy. This is based
upon the dominance of corporate interests over those of the state. The weakened state is no longer able to reign in weapons
corporations and is trapped increasingly by corporate interests: greater military spending, state subsidies, and a liberalization of the
arms trade.¶ ***¶ The Threat of Military Force Is Used to Protect Corporate Interests¶ According to New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman, "the hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist. McDonald's cannot flourish without
McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called
the United States Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps" (Friedman, 1999).¶
Friedman illuminates the strategic
relationship that exists between corporations and militaries. As globalization extends the
reach of corporate interests around the world, a matching military capacity must be deployed
to protect those interests. This is the underlying reason the U.S. military maintains the
capacity wage two major wars in different regions of the world simultaneously.¶ ***¶ Conclusion¶
Globalization is driving a global war economy and creating the conditions for tremendous loss of human life. Many writers and
researchers have documented the decline in human rights, social justice, environmental standards, and democracy caused by
globalization. The inevitable outcome of globalization will be more wars-especially in the Third World where globalization has its
harshest effects. Meanwhile, the elites of the industrialized world are confident that the global economy will continue to provide
them with wealth created from the resources and labor of the Third World. Their technologically advanced militaries will protect
them and their investments, insulating them from the violent effects of globalization.
Trade Bad – Civil War
Globalization leads to ethnic inequality and unrest
Roberto Ezcurra and Beatriz Manotas, Globalization and civil war: An empirical analysis,
January 7, 2013, http://www.uibcongres.org/imgdb/archivo_dpo12678.pdf
Accordingly, the
degree of economic integration with the rest of the world influences on ethnic
inequality (i.e. inequality across ethnic groups), favouring some¶ ethnic groups over others (Olzak, 2011). The
implications of economic globalization¶ on ethnic inequality may be especially important in
lower income countries, where¶ the most benefited are generally those ethnic groups that
hold a political dominant¶ position, whereas other groups tend to be excluded and experience
few benefits from¶ the process of integration (Chua, 2003). In order to keep their privileged situation¶ and limit
the degree of mobilization of disadvantaged groups, the dominant ethnic¶ group usually adopts practices
including the deterioration of civil and political rights¶ of minority groups. This setting leads to
an intensification of social unrest based on¶ ethnic cleavages (stby, 2008; Wimmer et al., 2009), which is
consistent with the¶ increasing relevance of ethnic violent conflicts during the last decades (Chua, 2003).
Globalization generates internal pressure on repressive regimes
Roberto Ezcurra and Beatriz Manotas, Globalization and civil war: An empirical analysis,
January 7, 2013, http://www.uibcongres.org/imgdb/archivo_dpo12678.pdf
Social globalization
also generates greater international pressure on repressive¶ regimes, as a
result of the increasing information available via the Internet and other¶ global
communication media (Dreher et al., 2008). In this context, the existence of a¶ violent armed conflict
within a country affects negatively the probability of receiving¶ foreign investment and
international aid. Indeed, this effect is particularly important¶ in those countries highly dependent of tourism, as the
economic gains generated by¶ tourism are put at risk due to the negative publicity of internal violence. This argument
seems to suggest that this aspect of social globalization increases the opportunity ¶ cost of civil
war, thus reducing the risk of conflict. It should be recalled, however, that¶ additionally the advance of the new
technologies of information facilitates the capacity¶ of mobilization of insurgents, as can be
observed in the recent wave of demonstrations,¶ protest and civil wars that has shaken the
Arab world.
Globalization reduces cultural distance which can lead to armed conflict
Roberto Ezcurra and Beatriz Manotas, Globalization and civil war: An empirical analysis,
January 7, 2013, http://www.uibcongres.org/imgdb/archivo_dpo12678.pdf
The social dimension of globalization can also affect conflict. Thus, the flows of¶ information and
ideas that characterize social integration boost internal movements based on claims for selfdetermination and expanded minority rights (Soysal 1994;¶ Frank and McEneaney 1999; Schofer and FourcadeGourinchas 2001; Tsutsui 2004;¶ Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). Social globalization helps to reduce the cultural
distance¶ between countries, thus providing an ideological platform and an international
audience predisposed to support these claims (Olzak, 2011). In this setting, the minority¶ groups have
greater capacity to mobilize against repressive regimes that deny them¶ their rights, which in
turn raises the risks of armed violent conflict. Moreover, the¶ advances in this dimension of globalization
give rise to an increase of migratory flows¶ across national borders (Goldberg and Pavnick, 2007). These
migratory flows often¶ lead to a negative reaction of native citizens and the aggravation of
existing ethnic¶ tensions.
Trade Bad – Economy
Pushing globalization too fast wrecks domestic economic infrastructures
Hetes 10
Roxana Hetes, Lecturer Ph.D. West University of Timisoara, Faculty of Economy and Business
Administration. “STABILITY VERSUS INSTABILITY IN THE CONTEXT ¶ OF FINANCIAL
GLOBALIZATION.” 7/19/10. http://www.rebs.ro/articles/pdfs/35.pdf
Without denying that the difficult economic situation in countries affected by ¶ crisis, is living proof
of the fact that the international financial markets can have ¶ disastrous effects on national
economies, it cannot be ignored the fact that imprudent ¶ policies have played a role in the process
through which these economies have come ¶ to be very vulnerable to sudden changes in
financial flows. If big countries, with ¶ extensive resources and markets, can long resist the economic
forces, this happens ¶ very rarely in small countries, especially in those promoting imprudent
policies80¶ .¶ Inadequate management, a weak regulatory system, reduced cost of loans (financial
¶ openness has facilitated access to funds with interest rates lower) and the fixed ¶ exchange rates (foreign exchange
risk was lower priced) are the main internal ¶ factors that contributed to increasing risk. ¶ But taking into
account all the variables in the equation, I believe that the ¶ successive crises of the 90s (Turkey, Mexico, Southeast Asia,
Russia, Brazil) may ¶ be considered, rightly crisis of globalization. Even if all the affected economies
had ¶ weaknesses and were vulnerable to sudden changes in the economic situation, ¶
premature liberalization and massive inputs of funds, associated with globalization, ¶ have
exacerbated what could have proven to be a simple and limited financial crisis. ¶ The economic
instability incumbed by international financial crises along with the ¶ fact that they ultimately hit the population, prove, more than
ever, the need for ¶ appropriate measures of crisis management and, both at national and international ¶ level.
Trade Bad – Environment
Trade hurts the environment – consumption and competitive advantage prove
Jeffery L. Dunoff, visiting Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, Woodrow
Wilson School, Princeton¶ University; Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of
Law, 1999 [“The Death of the Trade Regime,” European Journal of International Law,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=c8262fbf-a5ae-48c1-92d1e25c223e9fb0%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=108] jmin
Trade and environment issues exploded onto the US political scene in the early 1990s with the
announcement of US plans to negotiate a trade agreement with Mexico and, shortly
thereafter, with the leaking of a GATT panel report concluding that a US ban on the
importation of Mexican tuna, caught using methods that killed large numbers of dolphins, was
GATT-inconsistent. While the links between trade and the environment are complex and multifaceted, for present purposes it is sufficient simply to identify the primary concerns that
environmentalists have raised in the context of trade liberalization efforts. First, they argue that
liberalized trade can cause environmental harm by promoting economic growth that results in
unsustainable consumption of natural resources and increased waste production. Second,
trade agreements contain market access provisions that can be used to override domestic
environmental regulations, as the Shrimp-Turtle, Reformulated Gas and Tuna-Dolphin cases
demonstrate. Third, nations with lax environmental regimes are thought to enjoy a
competitive advantage in a global marketplace, creating political pressure in nations with high
environmental standards to reduce their level of environmental protection.6 Finally,
environmentalists wish to use trade measures as leverage in global environmental protection
efforts, as in treaties designed to protect the ozone layer,7 manage hazardous waste trade,8
and preserve endangered species.9 From the trade perspective, the use of environmental trade
measures is often considered unwise if not counterproductive. First, according to neo-classical
econ- omic theory, the use of trade measures is never optimal environmental policy. In addition,
the trade community fears that protectionists may seek to achieve their goals by invoking the
politically attractive rhetoric of environmental protection. In particular, the trade community
objects to measures designed to adjust for differences in domestic environmental standards,
fearing that this will undo differences in comparative advantage. Finally, free traders fear that
the use of trade measures for environmental purposes may undermine the cooperation
necessary for the continued functioning of the trade regime.
Leads to warming- transportation
Venkat 3 (Kumar, works in Silicon Valley's high-tech industry and writes about the social and environmental impacts of
technology. December 11, “Global Trade = Global Warming” http://www.commondreams.org/views03/1211-02.htm)
Recent news that Russia is unlikely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol -- which would deliver a deathblow to the world's first climate change
pact -- comes at a time when the need for a comprehensive international agreement on greenhouse-gas emissions has never been
greater. One
of the reasons is the link between expanding global trade and climate change.¶ Just
one early impact of increasing long-distance trade is the emerging issue of "food miles." The
fossil-fuel energy spent to transport food products often exceeds the energy contained in the foods themselves. To add insult to
injury, transportation is a major source of carbon-dioxide emissions.¶ Sustain, a U.K.-based food and
farming alliance, has shown that iceberg lettuce flown from Los Angeles to London requires 127 calories of fuel for every food
calorie. Sustain also reports that countries often end up swapping food instead of importing critical items that cannot be produced
locally. The U.K., for example, imported 126 million liters of milk and exported 270 million liters in 1997.¶ Researchers at Iowa State
University have found that fruits and vegetables travel an average of 1,500 miles within the U.S., a 22 percent increase since 1981.
When imported foods are added to the mix, the average distance from farm to the dinner table increases significantly. Studies show
that a basic diet with imported ingredients can easily consume four times the fossil-fuel energy and emit four times the carbon
dioxide compared to domestically produced ingredients.¶ Merchandise
trade currently accounts for only about
20 percent of global GDP, with agriculture representing just a small part of global trade. But
even at these relatively low levels of trade, the transportation sector consumes nearly 60
percent of the world's oil and produces a quarter of all energy-related carbon-dioxide
emissions . Oil use by transportation has almost doubled since 1973. Transportation-related emissions are
growing at about 2.5 percent annually -- faster than any other sector in the economy.¶ Any
dramatic increase in global trade could add substantially to the world's annual carbondioxide emissions. Particularly problematic is the growing use of trucks and airplanes at the expense
of slower and more efficient trains and ships. Technological breakthroughs for freight transport are not yet on the horizon.
Improvements in fuel efficiency are possible, but studies show that they would encourage more long-distance transport due to
lower operating costs and are unlikely to prevent emissions growth in the face of increasing demand.¶ Given the general scientific
consensus that carbon-dioxide emissions will have to drop below 1990 levels within a few decades in order to stabilize the climate at
the lower end of various warming scenarios, long-distance trade poses a serious challenge. If the world's future economic
development depends largely on global trade, then in the absence of radically new transportation technologies, we are likely to face
the ultimate conflict between the economy and the environment. If global trade in agricultural products is the only way out of
poverty for hundreds of millions of rural poor in developing countries, the conflict may well turn out to have an additional tragic
dimension.¶ The very essence of trade -- transporting goods from producers to consumers -- takes a toll on the environment. Free
trade may appear to be the solution to many economic problems when social and environmental "externalities" are ignored. Global
warming is only one such externality, but its sheer scale and complexity make it a litmus test for whether the emerging global
economy can be sustained in the long run.¶ Remarkably, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank -- the two premier
institutions that promote global trade -- are silent about the links between trade, transportation and climate. And there are no
policies or plans in place for the enormous task of replacing the world's freight transportation infrastructure with a cleaner, lowemissions version.¶ A missing link in today's globalizing economy is a way for the market to sense the environmental costs of trade.
An international agreement to cap and trade greenhouse-gas emissions -- going beyond the Kyoto Protocol to include emissions
from international freight transport -- would allow the market to respond by choosing optimal trading distances. Limits on emissions
would also spur the development of next-generation technologies for freight transport.¶ Without
timely and effective
environmental regulation at the international level, global trade may well fail the test of
sustainability -- and leave the world poorer instead of richer.
Trade Bad – Famine
Free trade massively decreases food security and increases famine – drives
farmers out of business and decreases income globally
Mittal, policy director at the Institute for Food and Development Policy and coordinator of the
US section of FIAN, 1997
(Anuradha, “The Politics of Hunger,” Earth Island Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 2, Spring)
Trade has a major bearing on access to food via its positive effect on economic growth, incomes
and employment.... Without trade, people and countries would have to rely exclusively on
their own production: Average income would be far lower, the choice of goods would be far
less and hunger would increase. A look at India proves otherwise. During the last five years of
trade liberalization, agricultural exports increased by more than 70 percent. At the same time,
domestic food prices increased by at least 63 percent. A survey by India's National Institute of
Nutrition shows that the average daily per capita consumption of cereals has dropped by 14
grams per person since the late 1980s. The Indian government is pushing exports, while
denying ration cards to poor people and cutting family food quotas. Large segments of India's
population are at the mercy of the open market's skyrocketing prices. Free trade has not led to
increased food security. Market Gains Trickle Away The FAO argues that increased trade raises
overall income, which "trickles down" to each household. In 1987, in India, 361 million people
lived in abject poverty. Today, the proportion of households below the poverty line has
increased in both rural and urban areas. In the 200 million-strong Indian middle class, lowerend incomes are dropping off, while upper-end incomes are increasing dramatically. If
anything, free trade has caused benefits to trickle up. Higher Income = Food Security? The
third FAO assumption -- that increasing household income will lead to greater food security -- is
made even as the FAO document acknowledges that the trickle-down approach may make
matters worse for farmers and peasants: Because small-scale producers often lack the
resources necessary to grow export-oriented crops... they may find that commercial
expansion has an inflationary effect on production costs and on land rent that may even make
their traditional production less feasible. Small producers may abandon their land or be
bought out by larger commercial interests... and export agriculture may worsen the position of
the poor majority. According to government estimates, some 2 million small and marginal
Indian farmers lose their subsidies or even their land each year. Putting India's food security in
the hands of a few giant agribusinesses -while the poor are landless and unemployed -- is a
sure recipe for famine. Land loss will become more common as new farm policies further relax
rural land-holding laws for businesses. For almost a decade, the goal of national and
international food and farm policies has been to lower consumer food prices by increasing food
imports. Trade liberalization has kept farm prices in most countries at below-cost-ofproduction levels, putting many farmers (both in major exporting countries and importing
countries) out of business. The US government currently plans to make more aggressive use of
trade negotiations to dismantle foreign import tariffs, import quotas, production subsidies and
other "trade barriers" to build food import demand abroad and fuel agricultural export growth.
US dumping of underpriced grain surpluses has destroyed poor farmers in many foodimporting countries. In 1965, the US unloaded grain in India in the name of "food aid," driving
down the price of domestic wheat and curtailing native production. Over the past few years, the
Mexican government put 1.8 million corn farmers out of business by choosing to import heavily
subsidized corn from the US. Rock-bottom world corn prices (set by the US) averaging about half
the cost of production have encouraged cattle farmers to concentrate on confined livestock
operations (where cattle eat grain that otherwise would be used for human consumption). Low
grain prices have made corn sweeteners so cheap that Pepsi and Coca-Cola have abandoned
cane and beet sugar in favor of corn syrup, driving world sugar prices to all-time lows and
cutting into the foreign exchange earnings of many Third World countries.
Trade Bad – Hegemony
Globalization kills hegemony
Erney 13 (Rosalyn, The Xavier Journal of Political Science official journal of the Xavier school of social science, We Won't, We
Won't Rock You: The Decline of U.S. Primacy and the Rise of the Rest,
http://www.xavier.edu/xjop/documents/XJOP2012VolIIINo1Erney.pdf)
Americans, Zakaria (2008) argues, are at a competitive disadvantage in a globalized and ¶
interconnected world economy. By relying on their superpower status, Americans have allowed ¶ other
states to learn their exclusive market practices and “they have not had to reciprocate by ¶
learning foreign languages, cultures, or markets (Zakaria 2008)”. Americans have never ¶ attempted to learn how
to access other markets or other cultures. Americans’ inability to learn ¶ from others has had drastic
effects on the United States. For example, the U.S. automobile ¶ manufacturing industry, which
has been centered in Michigan for more than a century after the ¶ invention of the
automobile in 1894, was moved to Canada in 2004. The reasons for this were ¶ not cheaper labor or reduced
corporate taxes, but rather health care costs. If manufacturers ¶ moved their plants from Michigan to Ontario, the medical
and insurance costs they were required ¶ to pay each worker dropped from $6,500 to $800 (Zakaria 2008). While this could
have been ¶ changed very easily with a few policy adjustments, the political system in America has
become so ¶ vitriolic and reactionary that any real change in policy is virtually impossible. Party politics and ¶ the factions
that they cause have led to the virtual stagnation of policy progression. The sense of ¶ American exceptionalism and the relative
inability of the political system to “fix its ailments”¶ (Zakaria 2008) is what will really lead to the decline of the American economy
through ¶ competitive disadvantage. ¶ Zakaria
argues that the economic and military decline of the United
States is accompanied by ¶ the simultaneous rise of the rest. In 2005, “twenty-four of the world's 25 largest
initial public ¶ offerings that year were held in countries other than the United States (Zakaria 2008).” While the ¶ U.S. has
historically held the lowest corporate tax rates in the world, these tax rates have been ¶
lowering across the globe, leaving the United States with the current highest global corporate
tax ¶ rate. New, emerging powers like China, India, Brazil and South Africa have economies that are ¶ growing at a rate much
faster than the U.S.’ modest 1.5% (Cia World Factbook 2012). In fact, by ¶ the year 2020, the purchasing power parity in China is
expected to surpass that of the United ¶ States (Ikenberry 2008).
Trade Bad – Trafficking
Human trafficking in Mexico increases as trade increases- reject it, its modern
day slavery
Hilyard 11 (Ashley, writer at ANTH 5070: Culture of Development and Globalization, Globalization And Its Impact on Human
Trafficking In Mexico, http://ashleyhilyard.wordpress.com/2011/09/13/globalization-and-its-impact-on-human-trafficking-inmexico/)
In Henrietta L. Moore’s, “Global Anxieties: Concept-metaphors and pre-theoretical commitments in anthropology,” she defines
globalization or the global as “just such a concept-metaphor, a space of theoretical abstraction and processes, experiences and
connections in the world, important not only to social scientists but now part of most people’s imagined and experienced
worlds.”[1] The notion of the global is associated with aspects such as mass migration, mass media, flexible capital, global
consumerism, transnational communities, etc. In turn, globalization is associated with theoretical abstraction since it does not
involve direct face-to-face interactions and is also extended over space and time.[2] The above are all illustrations of how
globalization connects the world. Globalization, like most things can
be both beneficial and detrimental. Along with all
of the positive aspects of globalization, there are negative aspects such as the trafficking of persons and
drugs. Trafficking tends to distort national boundaries and borders, because it has no limit and has become one of the most
dangerous and lucrative crimes in the world. Although trafficking is not new to Mexico, it is a relatively recent phenomenon in
regards to the scholarly research being conducted on the subject. That is, the following segment will analyze scholarly research on
trafficking in Mexico and how it relates to the ambiguity of globalization.¶
It is internationally recognized that
trafficking in persons is modern-day slavery, and involves victims who are coerced into sexual
exploitation and/or labor. Human trafficking for the purpose of sex trafficking is defined by the Anti-Trafficking Training
Program as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex
act.”[3] UNICEF reports that over 1.2 million children are sexually exploited each year. Moreover, according to U.S. Department of
State approximately 800,000 individuals are trafficked across national borders, which fails to include those trafficked domestically
within their country of origin. The majority of transnational trafficking victims are females, and it is argued that approximately 50%
are minors.[4] Human trafficking is not only a global phenomenon, but is also a high volume and extremely lucrative crime. The
United Nations estimates that “the total market value of illicit human trafficking is $32 billion – about $10 billion is derived from the
initial ‘sale’ of individuals, with the remainder representing the estimated profits from the activities or goods produced by the
victims in this barbaric crime.”[5] That is, human trafficking is the second most lucrative crime in the world. The most lucrative crime
is drug trafficking.[6]¶ Human
trafficking along with drug trafficking are not only a global
phenomenon, but also a high volume domestic occurrence, in regards to trafficking in North America,
and specifically Mexico. In “Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation” Martti Lehti and Kauko Aromaa argue that approximately 60 – 80
percent of trafficking is domestic, and argue that current estimates of human trafficking underestimate exploitation of minors. The
article focuses on the vacillation of trafficking of persons in Western countries, including those in North America. North America
according to Lehti and Aromaa, is a major destination and transit area. Still, there is also large-scale internal trafficking with the main
destinations being the United States and Canada. The situation
in Mexico however is very different from the
other two countries. Although still a major destination area, Mexico is also a major source and
transit country. That is, the central trafficking routes from Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
Asia go through Mexico before they arrive at their destination in the United States.[7]¶ Although
there are not an abundant amount of scholarly articles and literature exclusively on human trafficking in Mexico (it seems as if the
issue is overshadowed by drug trafficking in many cases), there are of course many organizations and non-profit advocacy groups
such as iEmpathize that focus on spreading awareness. In addition, there are individuals that are dedicated to raising awareness
through not only activism, but also education and knowledge on the primacy of sexual exploitation in Mexico.¶ In “A Conceptual
Analysis of Women Trafficking and Its Origin Typology,” Arunkumar Acharya explains the relevance of migration in regards to
trafficking of women and constructs a typology considering migration patterns from the origin area to the destination area. Acharya
focuses on developing a conceptual definition of women trafficking, because although sex trafficking is becoming an imperative
global problem, “its lack of a conceptual definition makes it hard to distinguish between illegal migration and trafficking.”[8] By way
of explanation, even though Mexico has ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and its
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in People, Especially Women and Children, which states that Mexico is legally
bound to put its provisions into practice by applying them as part of its domestic law, “trafficking is not yet duly criminalized in
accordance with current international standards.”[9] Furthermore, because Mexico has not clearly defined sexual exploitation and
trafficking in the domestic law, there is thus a lack of uniformity in the criminalization of trafficking offenses at the state level.¶ In
“Research on Human Trafficking in North America: A Review of Literature,” Elzbieta Gozdziak explains that the lack of literature on
human trafficking in Mexico as opposed to that of the United States and Canada is because the Mexican government has supported
few efforts to limit and eventually eradicate human trafficking. Gozdziak provides information on non-governmental organizations
that have created projects to analyze and eliminate human trafficking in all three nations in North America. She explains “Mexico is
the largest source of undocumented migrants and a major transit point for third-country migration to the United States, but these
statistics usually refer to illegal and smuggled migrants without making any attempt to even hypothesize whether any of them might
be victims of trafficking.”[10] As a result, it is suggested that NGOs need to direct research to exploring policy shortcomings and the
emergence of organized trafficking, rather than relying on the legal frameworks already in existence. Namely Gozdziak proposes to
establish more systematic methods of data collection and evaluating the impact that human trafficking has on the lives of victims,
their families, and consequently their communities.[11]¶ Elzbieta Gozdziak proposes to develop new directions in the research of
human trafficking specifically in Mexico by constructing different systematic methods of data collection. In congruence with her
suggestions I feel as if it would be beneficial to at first combine human trafficking research with drug trafficking research in Mexico,
since drug trafficking is not only prevalent in Mexico, but also because the literature is already there, and the two are often linked to
one another. In “Sex Trafficking: The ‘Other’ Crisis in Mexico,” Amy Risley explains that while drug trafficking is a major problem, it is
not the only crisis situation in Mexico. Risley outlines “the nature of sex trafficking internationally,” summarizing that “this crime
against humanity, generally victimizing women and girls, continues to grow.”[12] She argues that there is an abundance of research
on drug-related violence and trafficking in Mexico, whereas research on sex trafficking in Mexico is only beginning to grow. She
focuses her argument specifically on Mexico because not only is it a destination country, but also is a
major origin and transit country. That is, although drug trafficking is a major problem in Mexico, so is human trafficking,
and Risley contends “deeply rooted gender inequality and weak laws, in addition to high monetary remuneration, are to blame.”[13]
For that reason, she suggests that more theoretically sound, empirically supported research is needed in order to develop political
and social change in regards to women’s rights in Mexico.¶ In regards to how drug trafficking has affected human trafficking, in
“Female Drug Smugglers on the U.S. – Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and Empowerment,” Howard Campbell explains the various
degrees of female drug trafficking and how those factors influence their lives. He explicates that economic and cultural factors such
as social class strongly influence female involvement in drug trafficking in Mexico. Campbell focuses on each social class and argues
that higher class females within drug trafficking receive not only greater economic benefits, but also may achieve power and a
relative independence from male dominance. This of course is not the case for “low-level mules” and those who rather than
smuggling drugs are just negatively impacted by the repercussions of drug trafficking.[14] That is, according to Campbell this
category of women who are associated with those in drug trafficking, but are not smugglers themselves are often victims of female
violence, including sexual violence and consequently human trafficking. Even more disturbing, often times high-level female
smugglers exploit other low-level mules and “fourth category women” into sex trafficking as a vehicle for power and ironically,
female empowerment.[15]¶ Human
trafficking is but one example of the harmful effects of
globalization. It involves mass migration of women and children for the purpose of sexual and
labor exploitation. Additionally, it involves global consumerism in that this is a global
phenomenon that is funded by consumerism and has no boundaries. Flexible capital is also relevant in
that in regards to a capital structure the cost of capital (victim in this case) is minimum, while the market price share (value
upon trafficking) is maximum. Furthermore, human trafficking impacts transnational
communities in that traffickers and trafficking organizations have grasped the opportunities
offered by advances in not only transportation but also communication technology. That is, this
global connectivity on transporting women from origin to transit to destination areas has a definite impact on politics, economics
and society as a whole. By way of explanation, it is disappointing that when researching the negative aspects of globalization it
seems as if trafficking [in regards to Mexico] is not a major issue, when in fact it is an extremely high volume and lucrative global
crime that is a direct correlation of globalization and the global.
Trade Bad – Women
Free trade and corporatism systematically place womyn in danger environment
and intentionally give lower pay
Kelson 2000 (Gregory A, Executive Director of the Institute for Women and Children's Policy, an international policymaking
think-tank in Chicag,. International Labor Policies and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Are Women Getting Their
Fair Share?. Journal of International Women's Studies, 1(2), 43-44.)
Since the NAALC was brought into force in 1994, there have been 22 complaints ¶ filed by the three
NAFTA Parties.125 The United States has filed 14 complaints,126¶ Mexico has filed five complaints,127 and Canada has filed
three.128 Of these 22 ¶ complaints, ten have gone to ministerial consultations.129 None of the complaints have ¶
gone further than ministerial consultations.¶ In the complaint by the Mexican NAO against the United States,
several issues ¶ were ignored. Although this was a complaint that was based on the issue of freedom of ¶ association, this is a
unique case because the employees were of one gender and ethnicity ¶ (i.e., Hispanic females). The
Mexican NAO’s final
report dealt with the major issues of ¶ the missed union vote and the sudden plant closing, but it missed other issues such
as ¶ unsafe working conditions and pay discrimination. Even though these were the issues ¶
that brought up the union vote to begin with, they were virtually ignored during ¶ ministerial
consultations and subsequent hearings.¶ In the U.S. complaint against Mexico, the Ministerial
Council let go of a golden ¶ opportunity to study the effects of sex discrimination in the
workplace. The Secretariat ¶ report on the Merida conference has not yet been made public, but it will probably be the last
action taken on this complaint.130 I really had hoped that an Evaluation Committee of ¶ Experts (ECE) would have been formed to
review this situation.131 There are obviously ¶ some interpretations within the Mexican Federal Labor Law that require clarification.
¶ And if it is proven that the companies are discriminating against women, then sanctions ¶ against the companies should be
imposed. But, at the very least, a plan of action to study ¶ the effects of sex discrimination in the workplace should be put in place. If
this step is ¶ taken, the study should conclude with policy recommendations for laws and enforcement ¶ of those laws in Mexico.¶
It is still too early to determine whether the NAALC will be an effective tool for ¶ improving
working conditions for women. Thus far, there has only been one complaint ¶ filed that specifically deals with the rights
of working women. The outcome of this case ¶ is still pending but it is safe to say that the more serious dispute
resolution steps in the ¶ NAALC will not be implemented. How this will affect issues such as affirmative
action, ¶ pay equity, sexual harassment, parental leave, day care, and other issues important to ¶ female workers remains to be
seen.¶ Bringing the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation into force has, for ¶ the most part, been an integral part of
fair trade among the three NAFTA Parties. ¶ However, the agreement should not be used as a political tool to dictate the labor
policies ¶ of one country to another. The agreement should be used to ensure that fair employment ¶ practices are put into place.
Are women getting their fare share under the NAFTA? I ¶ would give a qualified no to this.
While the Council has been looking out for the ¶ interests of workers, it especially needs to look out for the special needs of female
¶ workers. The NAALC is now six years old -- still a relatively new agreement. As time ¶ progresses and more countries are added to
the NAFTA, more opportunities will present ¶ itself to looking out for the world’s female workers.
And these corporations exploit cheap foreign labor and subject them to terrible
conditions
Kelson 2000 (Gregory A, Executive Director of the Institute for Women and Children's Policy, an international policymaking
think-tank in Chicag,. International Labor Policies and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Are Women Getting Their
Fair Share?. Journal of International Women's Studies, 1(2), 33-34.)
However, soon after acquiring LCF, Sprint discovered that the business
was not ¶ producing the profits that it
expected. After moving its operations from San Rafael, ¶ California, to San Francisco, to seek out a larger
workforce pool, Sprint discovered that ¶ most of LCF’s employees were undocumented aliens and sued to
rescind the purchase ¶ agreement. A settlement was reached with LCF in 1994 and Sprint retained LCF at a ¶ reduced purchase
price.47¶ During the lawsuit with LCF to rescind the purchase price, Sprint did not invest ¶ significant time or money into the
operations of LCF. An economic analysis from Sprint ¶ soon uncovered that LCF, which had been projected to make a profit of $8
million in ¶ 1994, would lose $4 million that year.48 LCF was actually losing more customers than it ¶ was gaining.49¶ About
the
same time, workers at LCF began a union organizing effort for better ¶ working conditions.50
Workers were paid $7.00 per hour, which was $5.00 less than their ¶ English-speaking
counterparts.51 Also key among the employee complaints were unpaid ¶ commissions and
bathroom breaks. One worker stated that “[n]o matter how many new ¶ customers [the LCF
workers] signed up, the workers never received sales ¶ commissions.”¶ 52 Rules were often changed
concerning the commissions.53 Concerning ¶ the bathroom breaks, the worker noted, “Sometimes we would ask to take a bathroom
¶ break, but we were told to wait until our regular break.”¶ 54 Another worker stated, “We ¶ were not allowed to go to the
bathroom until our break time. Although we were on the phone all day and our throats got dry and sore, they told us not to drink a
lot of water so
we wouldn’t need the bathroom breaks.”
WTO Bad – Environment
WTO destroys the environment – 5 reasons
Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Blobal trade watch division and a trade attorney and
Woodall, public interest researcher in Washington, D.C. and served as Research Director at
Global Trade Watch, 2004 (Lori and Patrick, Whose Trade Organization, 21-22)
Mindful of this disturbing pre-Uruguay track record, environmentalists urged Uruguay Round
negotiators to strengthen Article XX exceptions so that they might be used effectively to
safeguard environmental laws. They also sought to amend GATT provisions that had been, or
could be, the basis for attacks on environmental policies. Uruguay Round negotiators refused to
remedy the existing problems, instead adding a vast array of new antienvironment,
anticonservation provisions. These new rules subject a wider array of hard-won environmental
laws to scrutiny as so-called "nontariff barriers" to trade. ("Nontariff barrier" is trade jargon for
any law or policy that is not a tariff but affects trade. For instance, from the GATT/WTO
perspective, a law that prohibits import of a product because it contains a toxic or ozonedepleting substance is considered a nontariff barrier to trade and may only be maintained if it
meets WTO rules.) New market access terms for "tropical products" and other natural
resources also created incentives for more intensive exploitation. Some of the new problems
created by the WTO pacts include: • Incentives for Rip-and-Ship Exploitation of Natural Resources:
The Uruguay Round tariff schedules promote unsustainable rip-and-ship exploitation of
forests, fisheries and minerals. The tariff escalation built into these schedules creates an
incentive to ship unfinished materials. For example, rough tropical timber comes into the U.S.
duty free, but plywood veneered with tropical wood has a tariff of 8%, and almost all furniture
above a limiting quota receives a 40% tariff.' Constraints on Environmental Standards on Toxics,
Eco-labeling, and More: The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
explicitly restricts government actions relating to food and agriculture aimed at protecting the
environment, human, plant and animal health, and the food supply. The WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) requires that product standards be the least trade-restrictive
version and, with limited exceptions, be based on WTO-recognized international standards,'
many of which are set in industry-dominated fora, such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO). Moreover, both of these agreements and the underlying GATT rules they
amplify have been interpreted to forbid governments from creating or even maintaining
policies that distinguish between physically similar goods according to the environmental or
conservation conditions of their production or harvest. Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Undermined: Countries seeking to implement their obligations under environmental treaties
are facing increasing threats of WTO challenges against such actions. Consideration of
Environmental Factors in Government Purchasing Forbidden: The WTO Agreement on
Government Procurement (AGP) requires that governments' technical specifications for goods
and services cannot have the effect of creating "unnecessary obstacles" to trade and that
conditions regarding qualification of suppliers be limited to those essential to ensure a firm's
capability to fulfill the contract, meaning requirements for recycled content or preferences for
sustainably harvested timber or for "green" companies are exposed to challenge. Biodiversity
Threatened: The increased volume of trade spurred by the WTO is contributing to an
intensified spread of invasive species as plants, animals and insects are deposited on foreign
shores in packing materials, bilge waters and forestry, fishery and agricultural goods. Invasive
species are a leading cause of biodiversity loss. The WTO's SPS agreement has been interpreted
to strictly limit government actions to counter invasive species infestations, as described in
Chapter 2. As well, the WTO agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs) promotes biopiracy with large pharmaceutical and agribusiness firms collecting and
patenting plant varieties and the processes for medicinal and other uses of wild flora and
fauna in a manner that removes them from the public commons and designates them to be
private property, as described in Chapter 7. In addition to the WTO's many new rules, its
enforcement power sets it apart from GATT. Under pre—Uruguay Round rules an enforcement
ruling had to be adopted by consensus. (Requiring consensus for action is a typical sovereignty
protection found in many international agreements.) Thus, a country whose domestic
regulations were under fire could essentially block the enforcement of a ruling (although, in
order to avoid undermining GATT when tables turned, countries rarely exercised this option).
WTO Bad – Poverty
Empirically the WTO leads to increased poverty
Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Blobal trade watch division and a trade attorney and
Woodall, public interest researcher in Washington, D.C. and served as Research Director at
Global Trade Watch, 2004 (Lori and Patrick, Whose Trade Organization, 8-10)
We must await full implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements before we can fully
assess their long-term economic impacts. But the economic trends that have emerged so far
indicate serious problems. These trends would have to abruptly reverse course to merely
return the developing world to better, pre–Uruguay Round conditions, much less to fulfill many
of the outlandish predictions of broad benefits served up by Uruguay Round boosters.
Unbelievably, WTO boosters still argue that the answer to this grinding poverty is more of the
same, faster—including a new proposed WTO expansion—and that poverty is being caused by
governments not adhering quickly or completely enough to the WTO formula. Thankfully, the
ironclad consensus among economists and policy elites around the world in favor of the model
promoted by the WTO rules has loosened dramatically. For some, theory and ideology have
been overcome by the facts: the number of people living on less than $1 a day (the World
Bank's definition of extreme poverty) has risen since the WTO went into effect and, in many
parts of the world, the percentage of people living is such that extreme poverty also has risen.
What we also know today and what has contributed greatly to the shift among elites is that the
world has been buffeted by unprecedented financial instability as more countries have adopted
the package of policies in the WTO. Economic growth in the developing world has slowed.
Income inequality is rising rapidly between and within countries. A report by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) found that, "In almost all developing countries that have undertaken rapid trade liberalization, wage inequality has increased, most
often in the context of declining industrial employment of unskilled workers and large
absolute falls in their real wages, on the order of 20-30% in Latin American countries." Despite
productivity gains, wages in many countries have failed to rise. Commodity prices are at all-time lows,
causing the standard of living for many people to slide, particularly in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Indeed, in most
countries the period under the Uruguay Round has brought dramatic reversals in fortune—and not for the better.
Latin America is foundering, mired in its deepest economic slump since the debt crisis of the 1980s. The corporate
economic globalization model with its hallmark of "free" trade, export-oriented development, privatization, and
investment liberalization was imposed on Argentina by multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and
the WTO. Argentina reorganized its entire political and economic structure to comply with this model, and it was
highlighted as a "poster child" for the new global economy—until it imploded with desperate and violent
consequences. East Asia lost decades of economic progress in a crisis caused in part by the very investment and
financial service-sector deregulation that WTO rules intensify and spread to other nations. When the U.S. media
announced that the crisis was over in 1999, people living in Asia knew better. For instance, in
Korea the crisis had quadrupled unemployment and precipitated a 200% increase in absolute
poverty. Global economic indicators generally paint a tragic picture: The median income of the
tenth of the world's people living in the richest countries was 77 times greater than the tenth in
the poorest in 1980, but by 1999, the richest earned 122 times the poorest countries. Entire
regions of the developing world are falling alarmingly behind the wealthiest countries that
compose the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Sub-Saharan
Africa's per capita income was one sixth of OECD countries in 1975, but fell to one fourteenth of
OECD per capita income in 2000. Over the same period, Latin America and the Caribbean per
capita income fell from less than half that of OECD countries to less than a third, and Arab
countries' per capita income fell from one quarter of that of OECD countries to one fifth. In the
U.S., the trade deficit is at an all-time high, $435 billion in 2002 and climbing, having
ballooned—not declined as promised—from $98 billion before WTO in 1994. The median family
income has not risen by $1,700 per year during any of the past nine years as promised, despite
the fact that the U.S. had a period of unprecedented economic growth. Since the WTO went
into effect, the U.S. has seen its industrial base hollowed out with the loss of 2 million
manufacturing jobs. Now the service sector and high-tech jobs that we were told by the WTO's supporters would
be our employment future are beginning to follow the manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries, with more than 3
million U.S. jobs expected to be shifted to China and other nations by 2015, according to Forrester Research.
Meanwhile, analysis of promised future gains of greater trade liberalization shows that net losses—not gains—would
result for most people from further liberalization. While the economic data demonstrate the absolute
failure of the WTO model, they are but one part of the story. Of equal importance, but less
well known, is the WTO's consistent record of eroding public-interest policies designed to
safeguard the environment, our families' health and safety, human rights, and democracy.
WTO Bad – Water
WTO causes extinction through water privatization
Reilly, Dean of the Nathan Weiss Graduate College, 2002
(Kristie, “Not a drop to drink,” October 11,
http://www.inthesetimes.org/issue/26/25/culture1.shtml)
Privatization is the future, if the World Trade Organization has its way. Three trade
agreements—NAFTA, GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)—define
water as a tradable good, service or investment, and these international trade agreements are
the most alarming, least-publicized aspect of the wars brewing over water today. When water
is defined as a good or service, all global trade rules apply. These trade agreements are hostile
to most government regulation as “non-tariff” barriers to trade, and as such they effectively
discourage governments from shaping their own domestic water policies. NAFTA prohibits its
three members, Mexico, Canada and the United States, from banning the bulk export of any
resource, including water. GATS is actually designed to promote trade liberalization for water
and other services. The proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, now being negotiated,
promises to be even worse. Under the WTO, member countries can bring suit on behalf of
corporations who say they’ve been discriminated against in regulatory measures; NAFTA
allows corporations to sue countries directly. In a 1998 case that is still under consideration, a
California company sued the Canadian government because British Columbia had banned the
export of bulk water just after the company signed a contract to export water from Canada to
California. The company, Sun Belt Water, is suing for $10 billion in lost profits. Perhaps most
disconcerting of all is GATS. This agreement went into effect at the end of the Uruguay round
of GATT negotiations in 1994, and is intended to inaugurate a new era in international trade.
What are services? Virtually anything that cannot be considered a good. “Many services are
highly regulated to protect both consumers and the domestic economy,” a publication from the
European Union pitched toward business explains, “and some are public monopolies.” There are
160 service sectors defined in the GATS agreement; they span finance, law, education, health
care, energy provision, even social services. And, of course, water. GATS negotiations between
WTO members are scheduled to occur over the next few years and to conclude in 2005. The
agreement’s architects hope the next several years will involve progressively greater
liberalization in services around the world. But perhaps not if the public finds out. In April of this
year, the European Union’s liberalization requests to 29 developed and middle-income
countries—prepared for the first deadline of GATS negotiations—were leaked to the press. The
European Union had asked each of them to open up markets in water across the board. It also
requested the lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership in countries from Malaysia to Mexico,
and the opening up of markets in electricity, finance, banking and telecommunications. The
disclosure caused a firestorm. Advocacy groups accused the European Union of trying to
privatize the Third World on behalf of corporations. (Europe is home to the largest water
companies in the world, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux; Vivendi Environnement, a division of the
media conglomerate Vivendi Universal; and Thames Water, a subsidiary of the huge German
utility RWE). The European Union denied the charges in a barrage of statements. GATS poses no
threat to water systems, officials said: Governments can simply refuse to accept our requests.
It remains to be seen how the world’s governments will respond next March, when they must
indicate which markets they are willing to open to international trade. The United States
submitted its requests this summer; those too, according to a statement from U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick, make numerous requests of other countries in “environmental
services,” finance, telecommunications and other sectors. Global trade in services—and the
potential opening up of water markets worldwide—has officially begun. In the United States,
privatization has already gained a significant foothold, with some 15 percent of the market.
That figure probably includes older, existing contracts—Boston, for example, has arranged water
shipments with private companies since 1796—but much of it is undeniably new as well. The
global water giants—Suez, Vivendi and Thames Water—dominate here, too: Together, the three
companies own the four largest private water companies in the country, and they are behind
every major privatization project of the last few years. Atlanta, Milwaukee and Indianapolis have
privatized their municipal water systems; New Orleans will decide whether to privatize its own,
as well as its sanitation system, in October, and numerous towns and communities have
privatized as well. Of course, along with privatization comes the ineptitude and sheer disregard
for health and safety associated with such projects. This summer, Atlanta Mayor Shirley
Franklin sent a formal letter of warning to Suez, which runs the city’s water system. Water in
many parts of the city ran the color of iced tea for weeks, and four times over the course of
the summer Atlanta residents were told to boil their water before drinking. “We cannot
survive as a species if greed is privileged and protected and the economics of the greedy set
the rules for how we live and die,” Shiva writes. Residents of water-privatized cities all over
the world agree—privatization seems to strike a visceral nerve, especially where it is
accompanied by unreliable or unsafe service and high rates. The communities it strikes are
fighting back. Cochabamba, Bolivia, is perhaps the best-known of such protests: In 2000, tens of
thousands of residents protested and then rioted after the U.S.-based Bechtel took over the
water system, raising rates as much as 300 percent. The protests eventually forced Bolivia to
cancel the contract, and company executives fled the city. The Alliance of Small Island States is a
group of island nations whose very existence is threatened by the rising tides and violent storms
associated with global warming. An ambassador from the group says, “The strongest human
instinct is not greed. … It is survival.” Welcome to the 21st century. Let’s hope Shiva, Barlow
and Clarke are wrong.
Increased water scarcity causes extinction
Gleik, president and co-founder of the Pacific Institute, Barlow, national chairperson of The
Council of Canadians and co-founder of the Blue Planet Project, McCully, Director of the
Berkely based International Rivers Network and Marks, 2008
(Peter H., Maude, Patrick and William E., “The corporate threat to water and the water justice
movement’s fight to protect it,” Interview conducted by Amy Goodman, March 2,
http://www.ecoearth.info/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=93918&keybold=air%20pollutio
n%20cleanup)
PETER H. GLEICK: The Nile River doesn't reach its end. The Colorado River, the Yellow River in
China, they, for the most part, don't flow anymore to the sea. MAUDE BARLOW: So this notion
that somehow these problems are far away, get rid of that. You know, take it out of your head.
You know, delete that. PATRICK McCULLY: We're treating the water resources of the planet
with contempt, which is just so stupid, because we depend on them. We need water to live.
We will only survive for a day or two if we don't have water. WILLIAM E. MARKS: Scientists,
through decades of study and millions and millions of pieces of data, now recognize the fact that
we're on the brink of the sixth great mass extinction ever to be experienced on the face of the
earth. The fifth mass extinction was the dinosaur age. MAUDE BARLOW: You know those
movies where there's the comet coming at the earth, and all of a sudden the governments of
the world say, "Gee, we're not -- our differences aren't so big anymore, because we're about to
all die"? That's really where we are. There is a comet coming at us. It's called water shortage.
AT: Trade Solves War
Trade doesn’t prevent war – their “data” is unsubstantiated
Philippe Martin et. al, Thierry Mayer, Mathias Thoenig, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
School of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Paris 1 Pantheon, Paris
school fo Economics CEP11 and Centre for Economic Policy Research, University of Geneva and
Paris School of Economics, First version April 06, final version November 07, published 2008
[Make Trade Not War?, The Review of Economic Studies Limited, <http://econ.sciencespo.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/MMT.pdf>] jmin
Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science¶ argues
that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy¶ should limit the
incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can¶ partly be traced
back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of
the European trade integration process was to prevent the¶ killing and destruction of the two
World Wars from ever happening again.¶ 1¶ Figure 1suggests¶ 2¶ however, that during the 1870–
2001 period, the correlation between trade openness¶ and military conflicts is not a clear cut
one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th¶ century, was a period of rising trade
openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with¶ World War I. Then, the interwar
period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world¶ trade and conflicts. After World
War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the
risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear¶ evidence that the 1990s, during
which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower¶ prevalence of military
conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign¶ states.
US trade dominance not key to peace
Christopher Preble, VP for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato Institute, Ph. D in history
from Temple University, 8/3/10 [U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?, National
Journal’s National Security Experts, CATO, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-powerpreeminence-for-what-purpose/>] jmin
Goure and the Hadley-Perry commissioners who produced the alternate QDR argue that the
purpose of American military power is to provide global public goods, to defend other countries
so that they don’t have to defend themselves, and otherwise shape the international order to
suit our ends. In other words, the same justifications offered for American military dominance
since the end of the Cold War.¶ Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is,
and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the
logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today.
They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need
not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and
resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects
should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are
scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with
thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama
bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and
Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars
between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would
erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power,
and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of
their respective regions.
Peace through Trade Theory wrong- it assumes symmetrical trade
Delahunty 11
Robert J. Delahunty. “Trade, War, and Terror: A Reply to Bhala.” University of St. Thomas Law
Journal. 2011.
in his National Power and the Structure of Foreign¶ Trade (1945).34 Hirschman noted that trade
between two states may be¶ asymmetrical. In other words, one trading partner (usually, the
one with the¶ smaller economy) may be far more dependent on maintaining the trading
relationship than the other partner (the larger economy).35 Hirschman¶ thought that Nazi
Germany sought to use foreign trade to make the smaller¶ economies of Central Europe
increasingly dependent on access to the German market and hence more submissive to the
Nazis’ foreign policy¶ goals.36 In light of Hirschman’s analysis, some critics of the “peace
through¶ trade” thesis contend that while symmetrical trade ties may promote peace,¶
“asymmetrical dependence creates tensions that may manifest themselves in¶ conflict.”37 On
that approach, liberal theorists may be right about symmetrical trade but are mistaken about
asymmetrical trade.38
Free trade does not prevent war
Richard M. Ebeling, Ludwig von Mises Institute, March 18, 2002, http://mises.org/daily/915
Free trade was unable to prevent war in the twentieth century because by 1914, very few people believed
any longer in the idea of liberty. The spirit of economic freedom reached its zenith in the 1860s and
1870s. From then on a counterrevolution began against freedom. Germany was a major
catalyst for the change in ideological and policy direction with its return to protectionism and
implementation of many of programs of the modern welfare state. But France also started to move in this
direction with regulations and pressures that gave the government increasing influence and, in fact, control over the patterns of
French foreign investment in other countries to reinforce its political foreign policy objectives, as well as restrictions on foreign
investments made inside France. And even in Great Britain, which retained the closest approximation to free trade principles for the
longest time--until the opening shots of the First World War--the London investment houses would informally make sure that their
foreign loans and investments did not conflict with the wider policy goals of the British government. The
First World War
was the culmination of this process, with nation and state completely becoming one as
belligerent powers made all aspects of social and economic life subservient to the ends of
war.
AT: Resource Wars
No resource wars – no resource dependency, difficult of acquiring resources
through conquest, and the age of sustainability
Daniel, Richard Anthony Deudney and Matthew, Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Johns Hopkins, winner of American Political Science Association’s Follett Prize; Assistant
Professor in School of Social Ecology and the Department of Political Science, and Director of
Global Environmental Change and Human Security Research Program, 1999 [Contested
Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, SUNY Series in International
Economic Environmental Policies,
<http://books.google.com/books?id=XWpPRayWy_gC&pg=PA205&lpg=PA205&dq=%22The+hyp
othesis+that+states+will+begin+fighting+each+other+as+natural+%C2%B6+resources%22&sourc
e=bl&ots=55G6qBR5Wz&sig=FEe5kWSc4XHYbSEi6hoPyjsJaFE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NlBqUDrE9asBva
6A2Ao&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22The%20hypothesis%20that%20states%20will%
20begin%20fighting%20each%20other%20as%20natural%20%C2%B6%20resources%22&f=false
>] jmin
The hypothesis that states will begin fighting each other as natural ¶ resources are depleted and
degraded seems intuitively accurate. The ¶ popular metaphor of a lifeboat adrift at sea with
declining supplies of ¶ clean water and rations suggests there will be fewer opportunities ¶ for
positive-sum gains between actors as resource scarcity grows. ¶ Many fears of resource war are
derived from the cataclysmic world ¶ wars of the first half of the twentieth century. Influenced
by geopolitical theories that emphasized the importance of land and resources ¶ for great power
status, Adolf Hitler fashioned Nazi German war aims ¶ to achieve resource autonomy.40 The
aggression of Japan was directly ¶ related to resource goals: lacking indigenous fuel and
minerals, and ¶ faced with a slowly tightening embargo by the Western colonial powers in Asia,
the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia for oil, tin, and rubber41 Although the United States had a
richer resource endowment ¶ than the Axis powers, fears of shortages and industrial
strangulation ¶ played a central role in the strategic thinking of American elites ¶ about world
strategy.42 During the Cold War, the presence of natural ¶ resources in the Third World helped
turn this vast area into an arena ¶ for East-West conflict.* Given this record, the scenario of
conflicts ¶ over resources playing a powerful role in shaping international order ¶ should be taken
seriously. ¶ However, there are three strong reasons for concluding that the ¶ familiar scenarios
of resource war are of diminishing plausibility for ¶ the foreseeable future. First, the robust
character of the world trade ¶ system means that states no longer experience resource
dependency ¶ as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy. ¶ During the
1930s, the collapse of the world trading system drove ¶ states to pursue economic autarky [selfsufficiency], but the resource needs of contemporary states are routinely met without
territorial control of the resource. As Roie Lipschutz has argued, this means that resource
constraints are much less likely to generate interstate ¶ violence than in the past44 ¶ Second,
the prospects for resource wars are diminished by the ¶ growing difficulty that states face in
obtaining resources through territorial conquest. Although the invention of nuclear explosives
has ¶ made it easy and cheap to annihilate humans and infrastructure in ¶ extensive areas, the
spread of conventional weaponry and national ¶ consciousness has made it very costly for an
invader, even one ¶ equipped with advanced technology, to subdue a resisting population, as
France discovered in Indochina and Algeria, the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan. 45 At the lower levels of violence capability that matter most for conquering and
subduing territory, the great powers have lost effective military superiority and are unlikely
soon to regain it. Third, nonrenewable resources are, contrary to intuitive logic, becoming less
economically scarce. There is strong evidence that the world is entering what H. E. Goeller and
Alvin M. Weinberg have labeled the "age of substitutability," in which industrial technology is
increasingly capable of fashioning ubiquitous and plentiful earth materials such as iron,
aluminum, silicon, and hydrocarbons into virtually everything needed by modern societies.46
The most striking manifestation of this trend is that prices for virtually every raw material have
been stagnant or falling for the last two decades despite the continued growth in world
economic output. In contrast to the expectations widely held during the 1970s that resource
scarcity would drive up commodity prices to the benefit of Third World raw material suppliers,
prices have fallen.47
US Trade Leadership
Leadership Good – Economy
US trade influence solves the global economy and promotes democracy and
equality
Zoellick 02 – the 13th US Trade Representative (Robert B., 10/1/2002, “Globalization, Trade, and
Economic Security,”
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/USTR_Speeches/2002/asset_upload_fil
e910_4237.pdf)
Looking ahead, America’s Trade Agenda will drive a ten-point plan for harnessing the ¶ power of
openness to grow America’s economy, safeguard security, and promote ¶ development and
democracy. ¶ We will…¶ First, open new markets and commercial opportunities, for example by
completing free 10¶ trade agreements with Chile and Singapore this year.¶ Second, promote
security and new business networks, for example by pursuing free trade ¶ agreements with
important partners, such as Morocco and possibly Australia.¶ Third, encourage development
and democracy through economic-business partnerships ¶ by pursuing free trade agreements
with the Southern African Customs Union, the Central ¶ American countries, and then others.¶
Fourth, bolster hemispheric prosperity and economic security by creating the world’s ¶ largest
free trade zone—a Free Trade Area of the Americas—by 2005. At the same time ¶ we pursue the
FTAA in hemispheric negotiations, we will grant statutory trade ¶ preferences and negotiate
agreements with sub-regions and individual countries, to move ¶ step-by-step toward free
trade from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.¶ Fifth, open world markets for U.S. farmers and
ranchers by advancing new, fairer rules ¶ that lower agricultural market barriers, eliminate
export subsidies, and drastically reduce ¶ subsidies that distort production and prices.¶ Sixth,
build better jobs for American workers, including a push for the reduction or ¶ elimination of
trade barriers on manufactured goods, of which the United States is the ¶ world’s leading
producer.¶ Seventh, revolutionize a freer global trade in services, opening minds to the great ¶
possibilities of this newer area of negotiations and creating opportunities for the 80 ¶ percent
of Americans holding service jobs.¶ Eighth, stimulate American and global innovation and
creativity by upgrading intellectual ¶ property rules to match technological innovation,
insisting on enforcement, and assisting ¶ developing countries with special needs.¶ Ninth,
aggressively enforce U.S., global, and special trade rules so as to keep our ¶ commitment to
America’s workers and businesses for fair treatment.¶ Tenth, reform and expand the
membership of the WTO by increasing transparency and ¶ outside involvement; building
capacity for full participation by developing countries; and ¶ by adding new nations—
especially Russia, without which the “World” in WTO is ¶ incomplete.¶ Conclusion¶ President
Bush understands the need for U.S. trade leadership—and he will use that ¶ leadership to
expand economic freedom at home and abroad. The White House report on ¶ “The National
Security Strategy of the United States,” released just last week, sketches 11¶ the
interconnection between “a world that trades in freedom” and America’s interests in ¶
promoting a strong world economy, lifting societies out of poverty, and reinforcing the ¶ habits
of liberty.¶ The history of this era will of course be written about how we overcame the dangers
of ¶ terrorism and tyrants in the Persian Gulf, and how we challenged the United Nations to ¶ live
up to its founding purpose. ¶ Yet our history will also record how we turned to a page of
opportunity for trade, growth, ¶ development, and economic security; how we composed a
new chapter for poorer ¶ families around the globe who could become full participants in the
gains of a global ¶ economy; how we drew on the links between trade and political liberty;
and how we ¶ helped the World Trade Organization live up to its founding aims.
Leadership Good – Global Trade
US trade leadership is key to multilateral trade—that solves all impacts
Panitchpakdi 04 – Secretary-General of the UN Conference on Trade and Development; Former DirectorGeneral of the World Trade Organization (Supachai, 2/26/2004, American Leadership and the World
Trade Organization: What is the Alternative?,”
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp22_e.htm)
I can sum up my message today in three sentences: The United States, more than any single
country, created the world trading system. The US has never had more riding on the strength of
that system. And US leadership — especially in the current Doha trade talks — is indispensable
to the system's success. It is true that as the WTO's importance to the world economy
increases, so too does the challenge of making it work: there are more countries, more issues,
trade is in the spot light as never before. But the fiction that there is an alternative to the WTO
— or to US leadership — is both naïve and dangerous. Naïve because it fails to recognize that
multilateralism has become more — not less — important to advancing US interests.
Dangerous because it risks undermining the very objectives the US seeks — freer trade,
stronger rules, a more open and secure world economy.¶ The Doha Round is a crucial test. The
core issues — services, agriculture, and industrial tariffs — are obviously directly relevant to the
US. America is highly competitive in services — the fastest growing sector of the world
economy, and where the scope for liberalization is greatest. In agriculture too the US is
competitive across many commodities — but sky-high global barriers and subsidies impede and
distort agricultural trade. Industrial tariffs also offer scope for further liberalization — especially
in certain markets and sectors. But what is at stake in these talks is more than the economic
benefits that would flow from a successful deal. The real issue is the relevance of the
multilateral trading system. Its expanded rules, broader membership, and binding dispute
mechanism means that the new WTO — created less than ten years ago — is pivotal to
international economic relations. But this means that the costs of failure are also higher —
with ramifications that can be felt more widely. Advancing the Doha agenda would confirm the
WTO as the focal point for global trade negotiations, and as the key forum for international
economic cooperation. The credibility of the institution would be greatly enhanced. But if the
Doha negotiations stumble, doubts may grow, not just about the WTO's effectiveness, but about
the future of multilateralism in trade. ¶ This should be a major concern to the US for two
reasons: First, the US is now integrated with the world economy as never before. A quarter of
US GDP is tied to international trade, up from 10 per cent in 1970 — the largest such increase of
any developed economy over this period. A third of US growth since 1990 has been generated
by trade. And America's trade is increasingly global in scope — 37 per cent with Canada and
Mexico, 23 per cent with Europe, 27 per cent with Asia. Last year alone, exports to China rose by
almost 30 per cent. The US has also grown more reliant on the rules of the multilateral system
to keep world markets open. Not only has it initiated more WTO dispute proceedings than any
other country — some 75 since 1995 — according to USTR it has also won or successfully settled
most of the cases it has brought. The point is this: even the US cannot achieve prosperity on its
own; it is increasingly dependent on international trade, and the rules-based economic order
that underpins it. As the biggest economy, largest trader and one of the most open markets in
the world, it is axiomatic that the US has the greatest interest in widening and deepening the
multilateral system. Furthermore, expanding international trade through the WTO generates
increased global prosperity, in turn creating yet more opportunities for the US economy.¶ The
second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider
global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China
and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or
another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic
concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading
system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its
prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it
weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre
of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore.¶ These priorities must continue to
guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main
driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU
— was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent
initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them
towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the
multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that
the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The
reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system
drifts.¶
Leadership Good – Hegemony
US trade leadership is the basis of hard and soft power, solves all impacts
Zoellick 01 – the 13th US Trade Representative (Robert B., 9/20/2011, “Countering Terror with
Trade,”
http://asr2.myweb.uga.edu/Fall%202004/Readings/Countering%20Terror%20With%20Trade.do
c)
Our nation has drawn together in shock, mourning and defiance. Now we must thrust forward
the values that define us against our adversary: openness, peaceful exchange, democracy, the
rule of law, compassion and tolerance. ¶ Economic strength -- at home and abroad -- is the
foundation of America's hard and soft power. Earlier enemies learned that America is the
arsenal of democracy; today's enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for
freedom, opportunity and development. To that end, U.S. leadership in promoting the
international economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about more than economic
efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle. ¶ Prior Americans
recognized the role of economic ideas in overcoming international adversity. Congress granted
Franklin D. Roosevelt the authority to employ free trade as a cure for the protectionism of the
Great Depression and then to help Harry Truman revive a devastated world. Throughout the
Cold War, Congress empowered presidents with trade negotiating authority to open markets,
promote private enterprise and spur liberty around the world -- complementing U.S. alliances
and strengthening our nation.¶ Congress now needs to send an unmistakable signal to the
world that the United States is committed to global leadership of openness and understands
that the staying power of our new coalition depends on economic growth and hope. In
particular, Congress needs to complete action on the U.S. free trade agreement with Jordan, our
first such commitment in the Arab world. It needs to put the finishing touches on our trade
accord with Vietnam, a former foe that is recognizing that its future depends on markets, not
Marxism. Congress also should reauthorize critical trade preference legislation for Andean
democracies struggling against internal threats and for other developing nations relying on open
markets to counter those who can destroy but not build. And most important, Congress needs
to enact U.S. trade promotion authority so America can negotiate agreements that advance
the causes of openness, development and growth. It is a sad irony that just as the old world of
bipolar blocs faded into history and the new world of globalization fast-forwarded, the United
States let its trade promotion authority lapse. ¶ President Bush has been reestablishing
American trade leadership by moving on multiple fronts: globally, regionally and with individual
countries. In the wake of last week's attack, we affirmed our commitment. The United States is
working to launch new negotiations to open markets at the World Trade Organization meeting
in November. In the past few days, we acted to bring China and Taiwan into the WTO this year.
Yesterday, President Bush met President Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia to emphasize our
support for the success of democracy in the largest Muslim country. Next week, I will go to
Moscow to work on Russia's accession to the WTO. Before long, I will meet with African trade
ministers to build new networks through the African Growth and Opportunity Act. We are
pressing ahead with negotiations on a free trade area for all 34 democracies of the Americas.
We are driving to complete free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. New U.S. activism
on trade has been drawing others toward us so we can pursue free trade in a way that fosters a
new type of alliance for openness and fairness. ¶ America is inextricably linked to the global
economy. Trade and earnings on international investments now amount to one-third of our
nation's output. Exports account for 25 percent of gross cash sales for America's farmers and
ranchers -- a projected total of $57 billion for next year. The jobs of one out of every five U.S.
manufacturing workers rely on exports. And the annual gains from our last major trade
agreements -- the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round -- amount to
between $1,300 and $2,000 for the average American family of four. ¶ America cannot lead
effectively if it slips in international markets. Yet the United States is a party to only two of the
more than 130 free trade agreements in the world; the United States belongs to only one of the
30 free trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere. When multiplied across products and
countries, the cost to America's strength -- and to workers, farmers and families -- of falling
behind on trade soars exponentially.¶ America's trade leadership can build a coalition of
countries that cherish liberty in all its aspects. Open markets are vital for developing nations,
many of them fragile democracies that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty
and create opportunity; we need answers for those who ask for economic hope to counter
internal threats to our common values. To address the relationship between trade agreements
and other international objectives, the president has proposed that we build on openness and
growth in developing countries with a toolbox of cooperative policies. There is no "one size fits
all" formula that can deal with environment, labor, health and other challenges.
Leadership Bad – Hegemony
US trade unipolarity threatens hegemonic decline
Foreign Policy Initiative 10 (October 2010, “In Order to Maintain its Primacy In the 21st
Century, the US Must Begin Debate on its Strategy says FPI Director Eric Edelman,”
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/node/25296)
In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued
that “the international system — as constructed following the Second World War — will be
almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a
historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing
influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one
with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing
countries” [emphasis in original].” This conclusion represented a striking departure from the
NIC’s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was
likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system. ¶ Between the two reports
America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the
counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States
global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging
economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global
economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of
a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the
unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the
pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations
that followed the end of the Cold War.
Trade leadership doesn’t determine economic or military hegemony –many
factors
Preble 10 – VP for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato, PhD in history (Christopher,
8/3/2010, “US Military Power: Preeminence For What Purpose?,” http://www.cato-atliberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/)
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s
indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability
theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments
diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a
single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply
disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne
by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly
comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of
nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and
his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao.
Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nationstates; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United
States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other
countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective
regions.
Cuba
U: Trade High (Non-US)
Cuba has already made a free trade zone and megaport-the only country they
don’t trade with is the US
Tarbuck 13
Emly Tarbuck. “Cuba: Government Confirms First Free Trade Zone.” Argentina Independent,
4/4/13, http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromlatinamerica/cubagovernment-confirms-first-free-trade-zone/
The Cuban government confirmed today that it is to introduce the country’s first free trade
zone. The policy will see a new customs regime for the importation, production, and sale of
goods in both the domestic and international market.¶ The government confirmed that the first
free trade industrial region will be established at Puerto de Mariel in Cuba’s Artemisa province.
The customs regime will see companies operating in the area exempt from import taxes,
meaning goods can then be re-exported with higher added value, as well as alterations in the
current customs procedures for production, importation, and sale of goods.¶ Puerta Mariel,
located in the northwest of Cuba, will assume all national maritime commerce that until now
had been centred in Havana. The plan is for the zone to become a “mega-port”, the first of its
kind in Cuba, and an industrial platform for trade with both domestic and international
markets.¶ The free trade zone initiative cost US$900 million, with US$640 million contributed by
Brazil and the remainder by Cuba. The Brazilian investment company Odebrecht has already
built several industrial plants in the zone.¶ The minister of foreign trade and investment,
Rodrigo Malmierca, said that the opening of the free trade zone is part of the policy of
President Raúl Castro “to increase exports and effective import substitution”, and represents
“an interesting opportunity for foreign capital.”¶ The expansion of the Puerto de Mariel, and the
construction of the “mega-port” is stated to begin in April.
Cuba already has tourism, trade, and interaction
Bukzpan 10
Daniel Bukzpan, “Who's Doing Business with Cuba, Despite Embargo,” CNBC, 5/25/10,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/37256542
Many of the provisions of the embargo are bypassed with the help of countries that do
business with Cuba, despite their own close ties to the United States. The Netherlands and
Canada are Cuba’s primary trading partners, and Canadian and European tourists have been
regular visitors since the late 1990s.¶ The Cuban government has been only too happy to help
this situation along by allowing direct acceptance of the euro in tourist areas and by waiving
conversion surcharges against British pounds and Canadian dollars. As a result, tourism has
boomed and America’s allies have helped it thrive.¶ The Cuban-American community also plays
a role in the embargo’s lackluster results. Despite almost uniform anti-Castro sentiment, many
Cuban-Americans still send money to family members back home, a practice that has
persisted for years.
Trade Good – Farming (US)
Trade with Cuba will save the US farming industry
Williams III, 02
Williams III, Alexander. “MORE ASSISTANCE PLEASE: LIFTING THE CUBAN
EMBARGO MAY HELP REVIVE AMERICAN FARMS.” Drake Journal of Agricultural Law.2002.
http://students.law.drake.edu/aglawjournal/docs/agVol07No2-Williams.pdf
Not only has the Cuban embargo affected Cuba, it has done its share of ¶ damage to several United
States farmers’ businesses.56 From 1960 to 1987, the ¶ Cuban embargo cost Cuba $11.5 billion,
but during that same time, it cost the ¶ United States $30 billion.57 Moreover, “[i]t is
estimated that between 1965 and ¶ 1986, the embargo cost the United States nearly $2 billion
in lost export sales of ¶ corn, cotton, potatoes, rice, wheat, flour, dry milk, and poultry.
Trade with Cuba is a shot in the arm for the farming industry
Williams III, 02
Williams III, Alexander. “MORE ASSISTANCE PLEASE: LIFTING THE CUBAN
EMBARGO MAY HELP REVIVE AMERICAN FARMS.” Drake Journal of Agricultural Law.2002.
http://students.law.drake.edu/aglawjournal/docs/agVol07No2-Williams.pdf
Recently, there has been widespread support for lifting the Cuban food and medicine embargo
by American farmers and Congressmen because it is estimated that Cuba buys a little less than
one billion dollars of food annually from countries such as Canada, Europe, and Latin
America.110 Any well-trained businessman knows that a billion-dollar market is a gold mine
in the world of economics.111 And, any well-trained businessman knows that “opening
additional export markets,” a billion dollar one at that, is vital to any “industry that is in a
severe economic crisis.”112 Therefore, many American farmers and certain Congressman have taken steps to open the
Cuban market to American Farmers.113¶ For example, Representative Nick Lampson of Texas, along with several ¶ rice farmers,
traveled to Cuba in search of new export markets, in turn, they ¶ asked United States lawmakers to lift the restrictions on food and
medicine sales ¶ to Cuba.114 Representative Lampson believes that “the
objectives for which [the embargo] was
created no longer makes any sense in either political or economic terms.”115 Furthermore,
Representative Lampson believes that the economic sanctions specifically hurt two groups of people,
“the Cuban people who need ¶ our food, and United States farmers who can produce it in
abundance.”
Trade Good – US key
Free trade will alleviate the rich-poor gap in Cuba but only the elites can benefit
in the squo
Stokes 3
Stokes, Bruce. “Cuba Samples Globalization.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 18, 2003.
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/cuba-samples-globalization/p5467
La Guarida's setting is a depressing reminder of Cuba's long-lost affluence. Yet its culinary and
business success is a tantalizing hint of what Cuba might become if it had a market economy.
And the restaurant's very existence symbolizes Cuba's emerging two-track society, in which a
few people have successfully entered the broader global economy while a far larger number
remain isolated and fall further behind their countrymen, in a nation that has believed in,
fought for, and largely achieved a rough egalitarianism.¶ Cuba is rapidly being globalized. But its
leaders are struggling to define the nation's niche in that world marketplace. "Globalization is
a fact," observed Ricardo Alarcon, the president of Cuba's National Assembly. "You can't be
against the movement of history."¶ Like leaders everywhere, Alarcon and others in Havana hope
to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of that globalization. Cuba's prospects,
however, are clouded by its sclerotic planned economy and its authoritarian Communist
political system, neither of which has the flexibility demanded by the global marketplace.
Moreover, people on Cuba's streets are wary of swimming in the broader capitalist sea without
the benefit of their life vest-the economic safety net that socialism has long afforded them.
Their personal initiative is also questionable after 44 years of dependence on the state for their
livelihoods. And many people still fervently adhere to the strict egalitarian values of the
revolution.¶ Cuba's most important global competitive advantage-its proximity to the U.S.
market-is constrained by the U.S. trade and investment embargo imposed in the 1960s in a
futile effort to topple the Communist regime of Fidel Castro. Moreover, the isl. and's
geographical blessing is also a curse. The sun and sea tempt the new Cuba to become a typical
Caribbean economy, sustaining itself through tourism rather than more-productive activitiesmanufacturing, services, and specialty agriculture. Finally, time is working against Cuba, in two
ways. Its well-educated workforce is not renewing itself-the population is not increasing. And
the uncertainty about what may follow Castro's inevitable passing-he is 76-has created a waitand-see attitude about needed reforms, a dawdling that is incompatible with the rapid pace of
globalization.
Trade Bad – Public Services
Developing countries prove globalizing Cuba will create an elite and cripple the
poor
Huish 13
Huish, Robert. Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉUM), L'Université de Montréal, Canada.
“Cuba vs. Globalization: Chronicle of Anti-imperialism, Solidarity and Co-operation.” Global
Autonomy. Last modified 7/17/13.
http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/dialogueItem.jsp?index=SN08_Huish.xml
While Cuba was forced out of globalization, many countries in the South that were "invited
in" have fared poorly, and the poor of those countries have fared miserably. Case by case, country by
country, the story of globalization from the point of view of the destitute has seen intentional deinvestment in public services in order to repay foreign debts. Restructuring economies and
restructuring lives so the South exports soybeans, flowers, and peanuts but imports milk,
medicine, tourists, and TV shows at extortionist prices. Although the United States is the world's most
indebted country no one seems rushed to demand payments from Washington. Yet, at the turn of the millennium the
Global South was repaying its foreign debt at the rate of US $250,000 per minute (Galeano
2000). In India the economy sees children stitch soccer balls rather than go to school. In
Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua the export-oriented economy sees many of tomorrow's
scholars go as far as grade six before setting out on a long-life of banana picking, because from the
point of view of financial directors bananas are more important than public schools. In places like Haiti medical clinics are
few and trained doctors fewer, loan repayments limit the imagination of financial directors to seldom invest in clinics
and rarely train doctors. Within this economic climate, the 800 million souls suffering from chronic
hunger are doomed to the fate of the empty plate until the free market decides to lower food
prices.
Trade Bad – AT: Key To Economy
Globalization and trade not key to stability
Huish 13
Huish, Robert. Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRÉUM), L'Université de Montréal, Canada.
“Cuba vs. Globalization: Chronicle of Anti-imperialism, Solidarity and Co-operation.” Global
Autonomy. Last modified 7/17/13.
http://globalautonomy.ca/global1/dialogueItem.jsp?index=SN08_Huish.xml
There is an episode of "The Simpsons" where Homer is sent to hell, and, held captive in the
ironic-punishment division, he is fed an endless quantity of donuts. But in the end, he enjoys his punishment
and the devil eventually scratches his head and gives up. The ironic punishment dealt to Cuba
by the Western world was exclusion from globalization with barring it from the World Trade
Organization, embargoes against multi-national corporations, and forbidding "assistance" from
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Now at "the end of globalism" as John
Ralston Saul (2005) put it, it is Cuba, in relation to other clients of the Bank and the IMF, which
has made out well from the ironic punishment. While Homer enjoyed his gluttony from his punishment, Cuba
weathered its castigation by stabilizing its economy, improving education and health
indicators, expanding its global outreach to other countries, and bolstering trade. Cuba has
also taken the helm of the non-aligned movement, is a principle architect of two United
Nations human rights commissions, and is innovating new trade and solidarity movements
with other so-called "developing countries."
Mexico
Trade Good – Economy
Lack of foreign investment in Mexico bad – no competition and jeopardizes
foreign debt services
Aldo Musacchio, working paper for the Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, 2012
[“Mexico’s Financial Crisis of 1994-1995,” Harvard Business School,
http://www.obela.org/system/files/Musacchio,%20A.%20(2012).%20Mexico%C2%B4s%20finan
cial%20crisis%20of%201994-1995.pdf] jmin
Since the Great Depression, the Mexican government followed a strategy of import ¶
substitution industrialization (ISI). Under ISI the Mexican government instituted a series of ¶
policies and regulations to protect domestic industries from international competition. This ¶
approach installed not only high import tariffs, but also non-tariff barriers on the importation
of ¶ foreign goods, and provided subsidies to aid Mexican industries. Under this model, the ¶
country’s producers had no incentive to export manufactures because they enjoyed a captive
¶ domestic market with little or no competition. The Mexican model of development, based on
¶ ISI, continually ran into trouble in the 1970s and 1980s. Except for auto manufacturers and ¶
maquiladoras, companies operating under the ISI model did not export much and it was hard ¶
for them to get enough foreign exchange to pay for imported capital equipment and ¶
intermediate goods. Moreover, severe shortages of foreign exchange also could jeopardize the
¶ foreign debt service of the Mexican government, generating damaging exchange rate crisis.
In ¶ fact, the country had balance of payments crises, i.e., had to devalue its currency, in 1954,
1976, ¶ and 1982
Mexican economic liberalization boosted the economy – 1993 reforms prove
Aldo Musacchio, working paper for the Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, 2012
[“Mexico’s Financial Crisis of 1994-1995,” Harvard Business School,
http://www.obela.org/system/files/Musacchio,%20A.%20(2012).%20Mexico%C2%B4s%20finan
cial%20crisis%20of%201994-1995.pdf] jmin
In 1989 the Mexican government finalized the renegotiation of Mexico’s public and ¶ foreign
debt with a group of international creditors, an event that allowed Mexican companies ¶ and
banks to start borrowing again in financial markets abroad. Almost simultaneously the ¶
government changed the Foreign Investment Act to allow greater freedom for foreigners to ¶
invest in the Mexican stock exchange. (It created options to purchase B shares, with no ¶
controlling rights, or ownership in mutual funds that held A shares of Mexican companies.) ¶
After 1993 the capital account of Mexico was further liberalized and the government allowed ¶
the local stock market to trade foreign securities.1¶ The effects of these reforms can be gauged
by looking at Mexico’s balance of payments ¶ in Table 1. For instance, after 1991 net foreign
direct investment went from over $2 billion dollars per year to over $4 billion dollars per year.
Portfolio inflows increased considerably after ¶ 1989, going from practically zero (due to
controls) to $3.4 billion in 1990, $12.7 billion in 1991, ¶ and $18 billion in 1992. Debt flows also
increased dramatically as Mexican companies started to ¶ finance expansion through foreigncurrency loans. “Other investment liabilities,” in the ¶ balance-of-payments accounts, which
include debt flows among other things, show a dramatic ¶ increase in 1990 and 1991 as well. ¶
[Table 1. Mexico’s Balance of Payments around here] ¶ The Mexican peg¶ One important
component of the Mexican reform strategy was to fix the value of the ¶ Mexican peso to the U.S.
dollar. This policy served at least three purposes. First, it provided ¶ foreign investors with
assurance that their investments would not lose value under normal ¶ circumstances. This
confidence also bolstered the booming import-export business in Mexico. ¶ Second, a fixed
exchange rate allowed Mexican firms to borrow money in international markets ¶ to finance
expansion in preparation for the opening of free trade with the United States in ¶ January 1995.
Finally, a fixed exchange rate helped the Mexican authorities fight domestic ¶ inflation by
forcing monetary policy to fluctuate according to balance of payments ¶ considerations, not
political whims. Moreover, in an open economy with a fixed exchange rate, ¶ prices of imports
were stable and Mexican products competing with imports had be priced to ¶ meet
international competition.
Free trade improves Mexico’s economy- their claims are over-exaggerated
Brown 12
(Robert Brown, President of online Newspaper "El Paso Art Alive" which he is trying to turn into
a non-profit and affiliated with University of Texas El Paso, “NAFTA links 450 million persons in a
$17-trillion market”, http://borderzine.com/2012/02/nafta-links-450-million-persons-in-a-17trillion-market/)
EL PASO – The North American Free Trade Agreement, (NAFTA) created 18 years ago spawned
millions of jobs in Mexico, sending $160 billion in business south of the border. “Never did we
expect during the negotiations the success that NAFTA has had,” said Dr. Herminio Blanco,
founder of Soluciones Estratégicas and former Minister of Trade and Industry for Mexico. Speaking to students
and faculty at the The University of Texas at El Paso February 7, Blanco said, “Mexico has been able to attract $160
billion. Never would we have thought that possible.” The number of jobs created in Mexico by NAFTA is
difficult to establish, he said, “…but definitely we’re speaking about at least 2 million families that have jobs
directly created by investments that came to Mexico because of NAFTA.” NAFTA now links
450 million people producing $17 trillion worth of goods and services. The other NAFTA countries
(Canada and Mexico) were the top two purchasers of U.S. exports in 2010. Proponents and opponents of the agreement that
created the world’s largest free trade market are still debating the merits of the pact. NAFTA went into effect January 1st, 1994 and
according to the Office of the United States Trade Representative’s website the United States has also benefitted from NAFTA. U.S.
goods exports to NAFTA in 2010 were $411.5 billion, up 23.4% ($78 billion) from 2009, and 149% from and up 190% from 1993 (the
year prior to NAFTA). U.S. exports to NAFTA accounted for 32.2% of overall U.S. exports in 2010. Although the United States has
seen benefits associated with NAFTA not
all businesses have profited from the treaty. According to Ricky
Jimenez Carrasco a local photographer who handles advertising/marketing for his, Xicali Imports in El Paso, Texas, NAFTA has
had a negative effect on the business. “The way the traffic was running through downtown
[before NAFTA] was very profitable, I mean it boomed,” said Carrasco. “Somewhere around the
time of NAFTA that slowed down to a trickle, that did not kill us but it did hurt us immensely.”
Although some businesses have been affected adversely with the implementation of NAFTA,
other businesses such as the El Paso Saddleblanket have been able to benefit from it. “We’ve been in the
import/export business for over 42 years, since 1970 and we’ve always had a wonderful relationship with Mexico,” said Luke Henson
Wells, General Manager for the El Paso Saddleblanket Company, “What NAFTA
has done is just really to
streamline the process and made it a lot more accessible.” With the creation of the world’s largest free trade
area via NAFTA, importers and exporters from the three participating countries, The United States, Canada, and Mexico, must
ensure that certain requirements for their goods to qualify under the NAFTA terms are met. “We
trade all over the world
and countries that have trade agreements, like the United States and Mexico have NAFTA,” said
Wells, “it just really facilitates the trade of arts and crafts and merchandise in a way it just
doesn’t happen when those types of agreements aren’t in place.” Although businesses in all three of the
participatory countries involved in NAFTA are seeing and enjoying the benefits of NAFTA there are those who are opposed to the
pact. One of the arguments that opposers to NAFTA put forth is the loss of jobs from one country to another, especially between
The United States and Mexico, yet according to its NAFTA – Myth vs. Fact PDF file created in March of 2008, The Office of The United
States Trade Representative states U.S. employment rose from 110.8 million people in 1993 to 137.6 million in 2007, an increase of
24 percent. The average unemployment rate was 5.1 percent in the period 1994-2007, compared to 7.1 percent during the period
1980-1993. Although not all individuals and businesses within the United States, Canada, and Mexico are willing or able to enjoy the
benefits associated with NAFTA,
the one thing that is for certain is that after 18 years it is apparent
that NAFTA and the various benefits that it has offered to some individuals and businesses is
here for the long haul.
Trade key to Mexican economy- will control 70% of their GDP this year
Rathbone 12
(John Paul Rathbone is the Latin American editor for Financial times and previous editor of the
Lex Column, June 18 2012, “Free trade: Way ahead ‘is openness, not protectionism’”,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6e3a29c-b15e-11e1-9800-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zgVsxWx7)
International trade is under attack. Recession has tested many countries’ commitment to keep
their borders open, as politicians, beholden to domestic audiences, have succumbed to the
temptation of throwing up trade barriers for short-term economic gain. That is a fair enough
summary of the current state of global trade. But not in Mexico, one of the most stalwart
defenders of free trade in Latin America – or indeed the world. “We have to be very clear that the
way forward is not protectionism, but openness,” Felipe Calderón, Mexico’s outgoing president, told a gathering
of chief executives during April’s Summit of the Americas. “The way forward remains commerce, as it has been
for millennia.” It was a passionate and rare public statement by a leading international politician in favour of free trade. In
today’s economic climate, it is hard to think of any other G20 leader who would stick out his or her neck so far on the issue. It was
also a thinly veiled criticism of some of Mexico’s partners. These include the US, where there
are protectionist measures in Congress and, especially, two Latin American countries that
have large Atlantic coastlines and where nervousness about deindustrialisation has recently
triggered mercantilist instincts. In February, for example, Brazil moved to shield its car industry from Mexican
competition; the country’s vintners also want protection from Chilean imports. Argentina, a prodigious inventor of eccentric policies,
has meanwhile required importing businesses to sell something – anything – to foreigners worth as much as what they buy from
them. The contrast between these approaches and the attitude of big Latin American economies with a Pacific coastline –
Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile – is stark. All have strong free-trade instincts, perhaps because
they have a sharper sense that the world’s economic centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia
and the Pacific. Mexico, for example, is one of the most open of the world’s leading economies. In
2010, trade accounted for almost 60 per cent of its gross domestic product, compared with
China at 48 per cent, the US with 22 per cent and Brazil at 19. Look to the future, and the contrast is even
starker. HSBC reckons Mexican trade, which totalled $700bn last year, will rise to almost 70 per cent
of GDP this year and 85 per cent by 2017. In some ways, this makes Mexico a regional standard
bearer for open trade – although one could argue it has little choice. The country sits next to the world’s largest market, to
which it can supply goods within 48 hours. It is also less rich in commodities than, say, Brazil. Both factors point to
Mexico’s strategic need to become adept at manufacturing and facilitating trade. Thus, its
exporting vocation has been further boosted by a plethora of trade agreements, and by
fostering supplies of skilled and semi-skilled labour. Some 110,000 engineers graduated in engineering and
technology in 2010, more than double the number in 1999, according to Inegi, the national statistics agency. As a result, the
country has steadily diversified its trade partners and moved up the value chain, as Mexicobased manufacturers have become ever more efficient and skills-rich. The country now even
exports cars to China.
Free trade is key to the Mexican economy- allows for foreign investment
Green 12 (Ruth Green, Reporter at “The Lawyer” A world renowned law journal based in the
UK “tequila surprise” https://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/, lexus)
Mexico is on the rise after bearing the brunt of the US slump, and lawyers around the world are looking to get a taste of its
opportunities¶ Mexico bore much of the brunt of the slump in US consumer spending in 2008/09, but three years on the country is
experiencing an impressive turnaround, and investment
from abroad seems better than ever.¶ "Foreign
direct investment is definitely one of the main drivers of the Mexican economy, both in terms
of creating jobs and maintaining growth," highlights Yves Hayaux du Tilly, a partner at Nader Hayaux & Goebel.
"The trend started back in 1994 with NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement).
Then, in 1995 Mexico became the first Latin American member of the OECD and in 2000 it
entered into a Free Trade Agreement with the EU. These agreements have not only reduced
the tariffs to export and trade with Mexico and increased trade between those countries and
Mexico, but also increased the flows of foreign investment into the country ."¶ Carlos Valencia, a
partner at DLA Piper in Mexico City, also points to growth in certain areas of the local economy .¶ "Both direct
and indirect foreign investment into Mexico are growing," he says, "particularly in industrial and general services, infrastructure,
telecoms and, most recently, real estate."¶ Jorge de la Garza, a partner at White & Case in Monterrey, adds: "Now China is losing
emphasis, the Mexican workforce and the country's tourism sector are both attractive, and there are significant opportunities for
companies to invest in beaches and resort areas."¶ Valencia draws particular attention to Fibra UNO, which became the first real
estate investment trust (REIT) to be listed on Mexico's stock exchange in April last year. Fellow DLA Piper partner Guillermo Uribe
acted for Fibra Uno on the deal when he and Valencia were at their former firm Thompson & Knight, but Uribe has since retained
the REIT as a client and continued to represent it on offerings and acquisitions.¶ But away from tourism and real estate, why is there
a sudden surge of interest in Mexico?¶ "It's a good moment to invest in Mexico since the US crisis is starting to recede and the
Mexican economy is seeing perhaps its best numbers in history - the country's
macroeconomics are making it an attractive place to work," enthuses de la Garza. Mexico's potential as a
global car manufacturer, in particular, is huge, with Volkswagen, Nissan, Renault, Toyota and most recently Audi flocking to the
country to make the most of what Mexico has to offer.¶ "Several automobile companies are already in the process of or seriously
considering opening plants to build cars in Mexico as they have realised that it wasn't as efficient to manufacture them in other
jurisdictions as they thought," comments Julián Garza, a partner at Nader Hayaux Goebbels.¶ As Mexico continues to attract
attention from abroad, it's not surprising that international law firms are showing signs of finding a base there.¶ Mexico should be
core to any firm serious about making it in Latin America, according to De la Garza.¶ "If you want to be a player in Latin America you
must be in Mexico and Brazil, and you definitely need New York access," he stresses.¶ It was for this reason that between October
2011 and February 2012, Greenberg Traurig, Littler Mendelson and DLA Piper all set up shop in Mexico.¶ For Valencia, who was one
of four partners who left Thompson & Knight for DLA in February 2012, the decision to tap into the Mexican market was a logical
move for his new firm.¶ "In our opinion the Mexican market is attractive for international firms, but the decision to establish your
own office in Mexico requires in-depth analysis of the market," he says. "For DLA Piper, the decision was easy."¶ "There's definitely
interest from law firms and the reason behind that is no secret," stresses Garza. "The
financial condition of Mexico
and its strategic role in the emerging markets will bring a lot of opportunities for companies,
and many firms are looking into the possibility of opening an office as they have clients with businesses in Mexico that require legal
services. It's also an opportunity to serve new clients."¶ As Mexico prepares for the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party to
power in December, following July's elections it is hoped things will continue to improve.¶ "There's been a lot of speculation about
reform, particularly around labour, energy and tax," says de la Garza. "Although those topics have been on the legislative agenda for
many years nothing has happened. There are better expectations this time."¶ Hayaux du Tilly, who splits his time between Nader
Hayaux & Goebel's offices in Mexico City and London, also stresses the significant role the UK can play in ensuring Mexico's
economic wellbeing.¶ "A top priority for the coalition government in the UK is to double investment in Mexico," he says. "Our
countries' futures are very much aligned and Mexico wants to divest of its dependence on the US economy - the UK will be an
important aspect of this."¶
Trade Good – Environment
Free trade agreements like NAFTA ensure environmental protection – criticisms
are inaccurate
Kublicki 94
(Nicolas, Attorney, Beverly Hills, California. B.A. 1987 University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1992 Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M.
(environmental law) 1993 George Washington University National Law Center. Assistant to the Deputy Director, Office of Policy Development, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1992) (part-time); Assistant to the Senior Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. (1993) (part-time). Mr. Kublicki practices in the area of environmental law. 1994 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 59.
(1994 ): 30264 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/17.)
NAFTA expressly addresses the environment. n12 NAFTA is the first trade agreement in history
with provisions aimed at safeguarding the environment. The Agreement prohibits the erosion
of national environmental standards to encourage investment, provides for the supremacy of
key international environmental agreements, and encourages the harmonization of
environmental standards among the three signatory states. Mexico has reversed a long trend
of weak environmental regulation and enforcement. n13 Since the election of President Carlos
Salinas de Gortari in 1988, Mexico has undertaken an unprecedented program of economic
and environmental reform. The Mexican leadership abandoned its past philosophy which
viewed environmental protection as an obstacle to economic growth. In its place, President
Salinas has embraced the goal of "sustainable development," whereby environmental
protection complements economic growth. n14 In its five years of reforms, Mexico has largely
privatized its economy, reduced inflation, lowered taxes, revitalized environmental laws and
their enforcement, and drastically increased environmental expenditures. These reforms
demonstrate that the stereotype of Mexico as a willing Third World "environmental dumping
ground" is inaccurate.
Trade good- leads to better clean tech spinoffs and focus on cleaner industries
Cui 13 (Mengshan Cui, May 2013, from the university of Arts and Sciences at Brandeis university, NAFTA's Impact on the Mexico
Environment, https://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/25170/CuiThesis2013.pdf?sequence=5, pg. 10)
Better pollution abatement technologies decrease pollution ¶ per unit of output and tends to
drives down pollution levels. Copeland and Taylor(2004) first use these ¶ three effects to analyze the Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC), an inverse-U-shaped relationship ¶ between a country's per capita income and
its level of environmental quality. As a country's income ¶ level increases, its production in every industry tends to
expand, which lead to positive scale effect ¶ and higher pollution level. Yet, assuming environmental quality is a normal good,
demand for better ¶ environment would increase as country's income increases, which lead to
tends to shift to less ¶ pollution-intensive industries, and thus cause favorable composition effect on reducing
pollution ¶ level. This type of composition effect change is driven by a country's income level change.
motivates firms to apply better technology to reduce pollution intensity, which lead to a ¶
favorable technique effect on increasing environmental quality.¶ At low income level, the scale effect ¶
dominates the composition effect and technique effect due to production expansion and weak ¶ environmental regulation. This
would lead to increase in pollution level. As income increases, the ¶ technique and composition effect increase and dominate the
scale effect, which cause decrease in ¶ pollution level.
Trade with mexico solves the environmental problem, free trade empirically
reduces environmental issues and makes greener tech products
Cui 13 (Mengshan Cui, May 2013, from the university of Arts and Sciences at Brandeis university, NAFTA's Impact on the Mexico
Environment, https://bir.brandeis.edu/bitstream/handle/10192/25170/CuiThesis2013.pdf?sequence=5, pg.13)
Years after NAFTA was put into force, economists
started to review what happened and stud(y)ied ¶ the impact of
NAFTA. Ederington(2007) reviews the work done by Stern, Dominguez-Brown, and ¶ Barajas-Garcia. All of them
investigate the pollution performance of Mexico after NAFTA. Stern use ¶ aggregate emissions
data to study the overall environmental impact of NAFTA, while ¶ Dominguez-Brown and
Barajas-Garcia use firm-level environmental data to focus on technique ¶ effects and studies this
issue through foreign direct investment. All of these articles hold optimistic ¶ views towards the
environmental impact NAFTA, as none of them find statistically significant ¶ evidence of the pollution haven hypothesis.
¶ Stern (2007) investigates the aggregate environmental response to NAFTA by studying the ¶ impact of NAFTA on energy use and
emission of air pollutants. He studies whether or not NAFTA has ¶ led to a convergence in emissions and emissions-specific
technology in the U.S., Mexico and Canada. ¶ Stern
uses exploratory analysis of per capita emission of
carbon, sulfur, and NOx to show that per ¶ capita levels of pollution emissions are decreasing
in Mexico, and Mexico is the cleanest among these ¶ three countries in terms of per capita emission. From the convergence test
Stern concludes that there ¶ is strong evidence that emissions per capita of the three countries are converging, even though the ¶
strength of the convergence varies across different pollutants. In conclusion, Stern finds that none of ¶ the more extreme
predictions of the outcome of NAFTA has been realized. Instead, trends before ¶ NAFTA has continued and improved after NAFTA
but not in significant way. Schatan (2003) provides an overview of the Mexican manufacturing export post NAFTA. Her work is
inspired by concerns that trade liberalization associated with NAFTA would increase competitiveness and lead countries to relax
their environmental regulations to reduce production costs. Schatan investigates NAFTA's impact on pollution generated by Mexican
manufacturing ¶ exports and whether or not Mexico has comparative advantage in more pollution-intensive industries. ¶ By
studying change of the export pattern from Mexico to the United over the period 1987-2000, ¶
Schatan’s initial finding is that Mexican trade activity has changed dramatically from exporting
more ¶ traditional manufactured products to specializing in technologically sophisticated
products, which are ¶ comparatively less pollution-intensive. Hence, from this observation,
Mexico has not become the ¶ pollution haven.
Trade Good – Stability
International free trade threatens Mexican stability
Gonzalez, 11 – professor of torts, environmental law fundamental, international
environmental law, and international trade law at Seattle University School of Law (Carmen,
“Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental
Justice Lens,” Seattle University School of Law, 7/31/11,
http://seattleu.academia.edu/CarmenGonzalez/Papers/817244/Markets_Monocultures_and_M
alnutrition_Agricultural_Trade_Policy_through_an_Environmental_Justice_Lens)
On January 1, 1994, hundreds of indigenous Mexican peasants took part in the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, to
protest Mexico’s participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as well as the
Mexican government’s repeal of a constitutional provision safeguarding the right to land reform. In the eyes of the Zapatista rebels,
NAFTA was the codification of economic policies that marginalized and impoverished Mexico’s
indigenous peasantry by depriving them of cultivable land in order to promote large-scale
agro-export production. The rebels feared that cheap food imports from the United States and the
elimination of government-guaranteed agricultural prices would threaten the livelihoods of
Mexico’s small corn producers, undermine food security, and increase migration to the United States.
Subsequent studies documenting the adverse impact of trade liberalization on food security, on
the environment, and on the livelihoods of Mexican corn farmers have confirmed the validity of
these concerns. Trade liberalization under NAFTA has accelerated the trend toward large-scale,
export-oriented, chemical-intensive agricultural production at the expense of small-scale
subsistence farms. Mexican farmers have experienced a 70 percent decline in real corn prices since 1994 as a consequence of
the influx of cheap, subsidized corn from the United States. This catastrophic drop in corn prices has coincided
with the virtual disappearance of the Mexican government’s agricultural subsidies and price
supports. Finding that the cost of corn production exceeds the revenue gained by selling the corn, many Mexican farmers have hired
themselves out as laborers or have migrated to northern Mexico or to the United States in order to earn the cash necessary to
support their families. Ironically, the
drop in corn prices has not been passed on to Mexican consumers.
price of tortillas (a staple of the Mexican diet) increased three-fold in real terms
between1994 and 1999. The decline in corn prices depressed rural incomes, increased poverty and
unemployment, reduced food security, and produced higher levels of migration from rural areas.
Trade liberalization in the corn sector also accelerated environmental degradation, as wealthy
farmers increased the use of pesticides and fertilizers while poor farmers responded to depressed corn prices
On the contrary, the
by extending cultivation to more marginal lands. Finally, the NAFTA-induced decline in corn prices jeopardized the genetic diversity
of the Mexican corn sector by undermining the rural institutions upon which traditional maize growing is based. The
Zapatista
uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, is an example of fierce resistance by local and indigenous farming
communities to development strategies that threaten their lands, their livelihoods, and the health of local
ecosystems. Similar struggles have been waged in many other countries , including Indonesia, Malaysia,
Brazil, Madagascar, Argentina, and India. In Sarawak, Malaysia, for example, hunters and farmers organized blockades and
demonstrations to preserve their forests from commercial logging, which had already contaminate drivers, exposed soils to erosion,
and destroyed plants and animals used as sources of food. Similarly, in the Brazilian Amazon, rubber tappers joined forces with
indigenous communities to preserve millions of acres of forest from conversion to pastureland. These
grassroots struggles
in developing countries over the ecological necessities of life (land, water and food) have been
referred to as “the environmentalism of the poor,” or simply “environmental justice,” and have been studied
extensively by scholars working in the interdisciplinary field of political ecology. Like the environmental justice movement in the
United States, these
social movements in developing countries draw their activist base primarily
from those who are directly affected by environmental abuse and who view the
environmental conflict as part of a larger struggle against political and economic
marginalization. What these ecological movements in the developing world have in common is
an emphasis on the survival needs of the poor, defined in terms of adequate and equitable
access to food, water, and living space.
These economic struggles underlie all symptoms of Mexican instability
Shirk, 11 – Ph.D, professor at the Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego (Dr. A. Shirk, “
Transnational Crime, U.S. Border Security, and the War on Drugs in Mexico,” University of San
Diego Trans-Border Institute, 3/31/11,
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Shirk.pdf
Mexico’s security crisis is largely a reflection of the country’s economic struggles over the last few
decades. As a result of a series of economic crises starting in the 1970s, Mexico’s total underground
economy —including street vendors, pirate taxis, and a burgeoning market for ―secondhand‖
goods stolen from local sources (such as auto parts, electronics, etc.)— now accounts for as much as 40
percent of all economic activity. According to official estimates, illegal drug production and trafficking
provides employment opportunities for an estimated 450,000 people, and perhaps 3-4
percent of Mexico’s more than $1 trillion GDP. Today, the illicit drug sector involves large numbers of young men
aged 18-35 who have neither educational nor employment opportunities, known commonly in Mexico as ―ni-ni’s‖ (ni estudian, ni
trabajan). Where
other options have failed them, these young men have found substantial economic
opportunities in the illicit global economy for drugs.
Free trade helps increase international stability – specifically Mexican stability
Kublicki 94
(Nicolas, Attorney, Beverly Hills, California. B.A. 1987 University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1992 Pepperdine University School of Law; LL.M.
(environmental law) 1993 George Washington University National Law Center. Assistant to the Deputy Director, Office of Policy Development, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (1992) (part-time); Assistant to the Senior Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section, U.S. Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. (1993) (part-time). Mr. Kublicki practices in the area of environmental law. 1994 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 59.
(1994 ): 30264 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/17.)
Finally, the failure to ratify NAFTA would have caused the loss of an important opportunity to
increase regional stability and heighten the sense of international community present among
the three NAFTA partners. Such a sense of community is essential to any agreement on joint
environmental standards. It has been stated that nothing works for nationalism like intercourse
within a nation. n238 In a broader context, nothing works for international stability like free
trade. NAFTA's free-trade provisions bolster stability and likely will decrease the political and
cultural tensions between the United States and Mexico.
Trade Bad – Democracy
Free trade undermines democracy, social & political stability, and cultural
independence
Africa News 5
"Zimbabwe; Free Trade Improves Global Standard of Living." Africa News. (October 13, 2005
Thursday ): 2125 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/19.
A key argument against free trade is that it forces developing countries to get "locked in" to
serving the needs of the world market in raw materials, and therefore not develop
industrially.
Free trade also undermines social stability, political stability, cultural independence, and
national security. As free trade increases, the balance of power shifts in favour of companies
and away from governments. This is widely accepted, and considered to pose a threat to
democratic self-determination.
Further, the competitive pressures as a result of free trade often undermines democracy by
creating external pressures to lower wage demands, and legal protections like environmental
and safety standards (race to the bottom). Free trade thus benefits wealthy people more than
poor people within countries.
Free trade undercuts democracy and leads us in a race to the bottom
Johnson 12
"Dave Johnson: Democracy Improves Lives in China -- and Here, Too." Political Machine. (June 1,
2012 Friday 1:34 AM EST ): 1543 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/19.
But for decades the democracy experiment has run the other way. Our "free" trade agreements
have undercut our democracy. We allowed goods made by exploited workers to come in and
undercut the good wages that we were receiving because we had a say. The exploited workers
elsewhere were used as a hammer over our heads: "Accept lower wages and cuts in benefits or
we will move your job out of the country." From Democracy V. Plutocracy, Unions Vs.
Servitude,¶ Workers in countries like China where people have no say have low wages, terrible
working conditions, long hours, and are told to shut up and take it or they won[t have any job at
all. They are given no choice.¶ Increasingly workers here have their wages, hours, benefits,
dignity cut and are told to shut up and take it or their jobs will be moved to China. Because we
are pitted against exploited workers in countries where people have no say, we have no
choice.¶ And the result was that our share of the pie got smaller and smaller. The concentrated
wealth has been used to undermine our democracy, and we are in a downward spiral -- a
"race to the bottom."¶ Decades of "Free" Trade Has Made Us Poor¶ Corporate conservatives like
Speaker Boehner like to say "We're broke":¶ House Speaker John Boehner isn't going to step in
to stop proposed cuts for a low-income heating program.¶ Asked specifically about why now is
time to be cutting LIHEAP and other key programs to help poorer Americans, the Ohio
Republican said, "Everything is on the table. We're broke. Let's be honest with ourselves."¶ If, as
they claim, "we're broke," then how did we get that way? By undercutting our democracy with
"free trade" agreements, that led to terrible trade deficits. The Trade Deficit Keeps Draining
Money From Our Economy:¶ Another month and another terrible trade deficit report. Why is it
that DC elites who profess to care so much about deficits say so little about our worst deficit?
The trade deficit drains money from our economy, lowers our wages and forces us into an
ever-lower standard of living.¶ ...Here is the formula since Reagan:¶ 1) We open our borders to
imported goods made in places where people don't have a say, so they don't have good wages
or environmental protections. We send our factories over there and import "cheap goods" into
the country.¶ 2) This sends dollars over there, and they don't buy back from us (that would be
actual trade), so they accumulate the dollars as they drain our economy.¶ 3) Then we borrow
those dollars back to fund the tax cuts for the rich. Our rich get richer, the rest of us get poorer,
while they gain more and more power over us. The tax cuts force us to cut back and cut back
on schools and infrastructure and other things that make us competitive¶ 4) Meanwhile the
imports from over there are used to break the unions and drive wages and benefits down over
here.¶ 5) Bob's your uncle, here we are where we are today.¶ The economic result of decades of
these trade agreements demonstrates that when we let in products made where people don't
have a say it undercuts our own economy. We opened the borders and let the big companies
move the jobs, factories and industries over the border of our democracy, to places where
workers don't have a say, so they are exploited. And the result was the big corporations were
able to come back and cut our pay, and get rid of our pensions, and tell us, "take it, shut up, or
we will move your job, too." We allowed the 1%ers to make the benefits of democracy into a
competitive disadvantage! From Free Trade Or Democracy, Can't Have Both,¶ How often do you
come across arguments that "globalization" and "free trade" mean that America's workers have
to accept that the days of good-paying jobs and US-based manufacturing are over? We hear that
countries like China are more "competitive." We hear that "trade" means that because it's
cheaper to make things over there we all benefit from lower-cost goods that we import.¶ How
often do you hear that we need to cut wages and benefits, work longer hours, get rid of
overtime and sick pay? They say we should shed unions, get rid of environmental and safety
regulations, gut government services, and especially, especially, especially we should cut taxes.¶
What they are saying is that we need to shed our democracy, to be more competitive.
Free trade pacts undermine democracy by shifting power to corporate elites
Milchen 7
"Jeff Milchen. No 'Legitimacy' to the WTO." The Washington Post. (April 18, 2007 Wednesday ):
192 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/19.
U.S. citizens have not voted to abdicate their sovereignty. Americans were not asked if they
wanted local, state and federal laws to be preempted or repealed by unaccountable World
Trade Organization tribunals representing the interests of global corporations. The WTO and
trade pacts that Mr. Mallaby promotes under the guise of "free trade" have failed precisely
because they lack legitimacy and undermine our constitutional right to self-governance.
International trade under democratically enacted laws broadened our choices and helped build
wealth for centuries before the "free trade" hucksters came along. As 13 years of the North
American Free Trade Agreement have proved to U.S. and Latin American citizens, treaties that
subordinate democracy to the desires of corporate elites have undermined not only
democracy but decades of reliable economic improvement for average citizens.
Trade Bad – Disease
Opening up the border to increase free trade would increase the development
and passage of infectious diseases
Nuria and Antonio Homedes and Ugalde, Homedes – MD, Dr.PH; Ugalde -- PhD, December
2003 [“Globalization and Health at the United States–Mexico Border,” US Library of Medicine
National Institutes of Health – American Journal of Public Health,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448143/] jmin
An increasing number of researchers are examining the impact of globalization on
international public health and health policy formation.3–7 This article is an effort to contribute
to the discussion of the consequences of neoliberal globalization on international health
policymaking. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 1994, signaled the
beginning of an exponential increase of cross-border transactions of goods and services and of
international capital flows between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. We wanted to
assess the effects of the growing US–Mexican economic interdependence created by NAFTA on
binational health cooperation along the United States–Mexico border. To this aim, we studied
public health policymakers, people who influence policies, and health providers in Texas, New
Mexico, and the 4 bordering Mexican states (Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and Chihuahua).
As we discuss, during many decades the United States and Mexico attempted to coordinate—
with little success—health policies along their border in an attempt to resolve health problems
that do not recognize political boundaries. Our leading hypothesis was that if economic
interdependence were to have a positive effect on international policymaking, we would
observe improvements in binational health cooperation along the United States–Mexico
border.¶
Go to:
The Setting¶ Approximately 11.5 million people reside in the 42 US counties and 39 Mexican
municipalities located along the United States–Mexico border, and 86% of those people reside
in 14 pairs of sister cities. Sister cities are metropolitan areas divided by the international border.
On the US side, the population is predominantly of Spanish origin, young, and poor (35% live
under the officially defined poverty level), and it is estimated that the population grows 3 times
faster than in the rest of the country.8 Compared with the rest of Mexico, the Mexican border
population grows faster, is more affluent, and enjoys lower levels of unemployment. The border
population is expected to double by the year 2020.8¶
Border residents share similar resources and environmental problems. Air quality, water
quantity and quality, and animal control are issues of great concern for the border
communities.9–12 The American Medical Association has characterized the United States–
Mexico border as a fertile ground for the development of infectious diseases. Rates of
hepatitis A seropositivity on the US side are 3 times the national rates, while on the Mexican
side the rates are almost twice the national one.13 A recent study documented that the
prevalence of hepatitis A among women visiting prenatal clinics in El Paso and Ciudad Juarez
(the 2 largest sister municipalities) was 75.8% and 96.1%, respectively.14 Along the Mexican
border the incidence of salmonella is 26% above the rest of the country. In the United States, in
unincorporated poor neighborhoods known as colonias, which comprise around 250 000
households, the rates of salmonella and shigella infection are 4 times higher than in the rest of
the United States.15 Tuberculosis (TB) is endemic on both sides of the border, and cases of
dengue, leprosy, and rabies have been occasionally detected. Approximately 9% of the TB cases
in the border region involve strains resistant to at least 1 of the first-line treatments.16¶
The communities along the border are economically and socially interdependent. Residents
from both sides cross the border routinely to work, shop, visit friends and relatives, and
purchase health services. There are about 1.1 million legal northbound crossings a day.13
Valenzuela17 describes the border residents as a floating population to underline its mobility
and interdependence. The need for cooperation between the 2 nations for the purpose of
improvement of health and environmental conditions is well known and has led to many
collaborative initiatives between and within the public and the private sectors.13,18,19
Unfortunately, most of these efforts have had limited success, in spite of the creation of a field
office in 1942 by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)—the only one of its kind—in El
Paso, Texas, for the main purpose of facilitating binational interventions at the border. If
globalization is to bridge distances between nations, it could be anticipated that the United
States–Mexico border region, where there is intense contact and cultural closeness between the
populations on both sides, is a place where the benefits of globalization would easily bear fruit.
Communities on both sides of this border have seen a phenomenal growth in international
trade after NAFTA was signed.19,20 This agreement does not include a health chapter, but
many political leaders and economists consider it to be a model for the promotion of
globalization in other parts of the world. The question we address in this article is whether or
not globalization will facilitate the identification of solutions and the development of joint public
health interventions to overcome problems that for many years have been identified as being of
binational nature. In addition to public health problems that do not recognize borders, such as
those related to environmental pollution, communicable diseases, and vector control, as well as
the prevention of violence and motor vehicle accidents, there are other public health
dimensions that need cooperative action and could benefit from increasing integration of the
borders. Included in the last category are the design of binational disaster response plans, the
organization of emergency services, the development of shared information systems, and a
referral or information system to facilitate continuity of care when a patient initiates care in 1
country and receives additional care in a neighboring nation.
Free trade with Mexico will not improve public health – no cooperation
because of cultural and administrative barriers
Nuria and Antonio Homedes and Ugalde, Homedes – MD, Dr.PH; Ugalde -- PhD, December
2003 [“Globalization and Health at the United States–Mexico Border,” US Library of Medicine
National Institutes of Health – American Journal of Public Health,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1448143/] jmin
In spite of emerging linkages, we found very few truly binational cooperative programs along
the US–Mexico border. The leading assumption of our research was that NAFTA would facilitate
border binational cooperation and, as a result, would contribute to the improvement of the
health status of border residents. The barriers to collaboration that we uncovered in our
research suggest the opposite: US health officers and practitioners and their Mexican
counterparts face a variety of constraints that impede the design and implementation of
meaningful cooperative health programs. Among health professionals, globalization has had
little effect in bringing them together and in overcoming national jealousies, suspicions, or
tendencies to protect their professional turf.¶ Our study shows that globalization has not
helped to improve health cooperation between the 2 federal governments or between
neighboring states and municipalities. Border states and municipalities are not allowed to
carry out joint programs of mutual interest, and even the exchange of basic epidemiological
and health information continues to be problematic. Border public health experts indicated
that NAFTA brought additional bureaucratic hurdles that, in some instances, rendered
collaboration through informal exchanges more difficult.¶ Our findings cannot be extrapolated to
other settings. Nevertheless, they suggest that if globalization fails to resolve common health
problems along the United States–Mexico border, where residents interact greatly and share a
culture, it will not be likely to succeed in improving international health policymaking among
populations that are culturally, linguistically, and geographically more distant.¶ Technological
innovations and social changes have made global economic interdependence possible, and
reversal of this process is unlikely. It would be desirable that the benefits of economic
interdependence produce better standards of living and health for all. Unfortunately, a growing
body of literature confirms our findings and suggests that better standards are not the case. In
their study of the impact of globalization on health, Unwin et al.30 expressed this view:
Trade Bad – Economy
Globalization hurts financial systems – Mexico’s 1995 financial system proves
Manuela Tortora, PhD., Senior Consultant, Latin American Economic System (SELA), Spring
1999 [“The Free Trade Area of the Americas: A Latin American Perspective on Future Prospects¶
,” 5 NAFTA: Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 261 (1999),
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/lbramrca5&id=271]
jmin
We are learning that the crises stemming from globalization (the first such crisis was Mexico's,
in 1994-95) typically proceed along two stages. One stage is unexpected, swift and far
reaching, within and without the countries directly affected, and in a few days causes the
collapse of currencies and financial systems. The second stage is more extended in time and
develops while the devaluation brought on during the first stage produces the expected result
of increasing the competitiveness of exports from the countries that originated the crisis.
Free trade with Mexico hurts Mexican jobs and wages – NAFTA proves
Jean Monnet, Chair of University of Miami European Commission, 2005 [“NAFTA: Assessments
and Institutional Development,” The EU and Regional Integration,
http://aei.pitt.edu/32456/1/The_EU-Regiional-text%2Bcover-final.pdf] jmin
On the other hand, the connection between trade liberalization and¶ investment growth is
illustrated by three sectors where commercial ties have ¶ been relatively more extensive: the
automotive industry, textiles and clothing, ¶ and the electronic industry. “In these three sectors,
deeper integration is clearly ¶ evident between the three economies.”8¶ However, despite the
success indicated by the macroeconomic data, some ¶ criticisms emerge in the interpretation of
these numbers. For instance, “in the 12 ¶ years since NAFTA was ratified, the yearly U.S. trade
deficit with Mexico and ¶ Canada has grown from $9.1 billion to $110.8 billion.”9
In this vein, a study ¶ conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace shows
the¶ following findings: a) NAFTA has not helped the Mexican economy keep pace ¶ with the
growing demand for jobs (500,000 jobs were created in manufacturing ¶ from 1994 to 2002,
while the agricultural sector has lost 1.3 million jobs since ¶ 1994); b) real wages for most
Mexicans today are lower than when NAFTA took ¶ place (caused by the peso crisis); c) there
has been an increase in the number of ¶ migrants to the United States (although not
necessarily as a result of NAFTA).10¶ From the U.S. government’s perspective, officials have
admitted the¶ qualified success of NAFTA. As one U.S. official pointed out, “In fact, the result ¶ is
that NAFTA has been virtually job neutral. Given what most reputable¶ economist say about the
employment effects on NAFTA, that finding is not ¶ surprising.”1
Trade with US enhances Mexico’s agricultural trade deficit and thus, increases
unemployment
Sandra. Polaski, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment’s Trade, Equity, and
Development Project, 1999-2002 Special¶ Representative for International Labor Affairs at the
U.S. Department of State., 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶
FOR ¶ THE ¶ HEMISPHERE: Jobs, Wages, and Household Incomes,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
Agricultural Employment. As noted above, Mexico¶ has had a net trade deficit in agricultural
goods¶ with the United States every year since NAFTA¶ took effect, except the peso crisis year
of 1995,¶ when the huge devaluation of the peso made most¶ dollar-denominated products too
expensive for¶ Mexicans. The agricultural trade deficit existed¶ before NAFTA, but it grew after
enactment of ¶ the trade pact and was larger in 2002 than in any¶ previous year. Tariffs on the
most sensitive crops ¶ in both the United States and Mexico have yet to¶ be eliminated, and so
the nature of bilateral agricultural trade will continue to evolve. However, ¶ the pattern to date
challenges the conventional¶ wisdom that agricultural liberalization is good ¶ for the
developing country in a trade relationship¶ with a developed economy. The one bright spot ¶
for Mexico, an increase in exports of fruits and¶ vegetables, has not kept pace with imports of
U.S.¶ grains and oilseeds. This may be due in part to¶ greater efficiency among U.S. producers,
but it is¶ also partly due to U.S. subsidies. By one estimate,¶ U.S. corn was sold in Mexico from
1999 through 2001 at prices 30 percent or more below the cost ¶ of production.13¶ The
increasing trade deficit has translated into ¶ job losses in agriculture. Agricultural employment
¶ in Mexico actually increased somewhat in the late¶ 1980s and early 1990s, employing 8.1
million¶ Mexicans at the end of 1993, just before NAFTA¶ came into force. Employment in the
sector then¶ began a downward trend, with 6.8 million employed at the end of 2002, a loss of
1.3 million jobs.16¶ While not all of that reduction can be attributed ¶ to NAFTA, other forces that
affected trade, such as¶ the sharp devaluation of the peso during 1994-1995¶ pushed in the
opposite direction, toward greater¶ growth of Mexican exports over imports. In fact, ¶ 1995 was
the one post-NAFTA year in which¶ Mexico had a surplus in its agricultural trade with¶ the United
States, and agricultural employment ¶ did improve modestly for a short period thereafter.¶
However, once the peso stabilized, the agricultural¶ trade balance again turned against Mexico
and ¶ agricultural employment resumed its decline.¶ During this period, Mexico was also
liberalizing¶ trade with other partners, so the entire impact¶ cannot be ascribed to NAFTA. But
the WTO has¶ determined that Mexico reduced its agricultural¶ tariffs much more for the
United States than for¶ other trading partners.17Thus, agricultural trade¶ liberalization linked to
NAFTA is the single most¶ significant factor in the loss of agricultural jobs in¶ Mexico (see
Figure 4). The release of labor from the agricultural sector¶ largely offset the employment
gains in the export¶ manufacturing sector that occurred after NAFTA¶ took effect. As noted
earlier, it is impossible to¶ establish precisely what proportion of the 1.3 million¶ gain in export
manufacturing jobs (at the peak of¶ employment in 2000) and the 1.3 million loss in¶ agricultural
jobs between 1994 and 2002 was directly¶ attributable to NAFTA. However, it is clear that the¶
sum of the effects of the trade pact to date has not¶ been a strong net gain in overall
employment and¶ may have been a small net loss of jobs for Mexico.¶ Further, the long-term
effects are still uncertain, as¶ most manufacturing tariffs have now been eliminated, while the
most sensitive agricultural tariffs¶ have yet to come down.
Unprecedented trade growth causes job loss in Mexico’s agricultural sector and
wage decline – NAFTA proves
John J. Audley, Senior Associate and Director¶ Trade, Equity, and Development Project¶
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, trade policy coordinator at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶ FOR ¶ THE
¶ HEMISPHERE: Introduction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
NAFTA has not helped the Mexican economy¶ keep pace with the growing demand for jobs.¶
Unprecedented growth in trade, increasing ¶ productivity, and a surge in both portfolio and¶
foreign direct investment have led to an increase¶ of 500,000 jobs in manufacturing from 1994
to¶
. The agricultural sector, where almost a fifth¶ of Mexicans still work, has lost 1.3
million jobs¶ since 2000.¶ ■ Real wages for most Mexicans today are lower than¶ they were
when NAFTA took effect. However, this¶ setback in wages was caused by the peso crisis of¶ 19951995—not by NAFTA. That said, the productivity growth that has occurred over the last
decade¶ has not translated into growth in wages. Despite¶ predictions to the contrary, Mexican
wages have¶ not converged with U.S. wages.
Mexico is the net loser in agricultural trade with the US – kills employment and
the agriculture sector
Sandra. Polaski, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment’s Trade, Equity, and
Development Project, 1999-2002 Special¶ Representative for International Labor Affairs at the
U.S. Department of State., 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶
FOR ¶ THE ¶ HEMISPHERE: Jobs, Wages, and Household Incomes,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
■ NAFTA has produced a disappointingly small net gain in jobs in Mexico. Data limitations
preclude¶ an exact tally, but it is clear that jobs created in export manufacturing have barely
kept pace¶ with jobs lost in agriculture due to imports. There has also been a decline in
domestic manufacturing employment, related in part to import competition and perhaps also
to the substitution ¶ of foreign inputs in assembly operations. About 30 percent of the jobs that
were created in¶ maquiladoras (export assembly plants) in the 1990s have since disappeared.
Many of these ¶ operations were relocated to lower-wage countries in Asia, particularly China.¶ ■
Mexican agriculture has been a net loser in trade with the United States, and employment in¶
the sector has declined sharply. U.S. exports of subsidized crops, such as corn, have
depressed¶ agricultural prices in Mexico. The rural poor have borne the brunt of adjustment to
NAFTA and¶ have been forced to adapt without adequate government support.
US-Mexico trade causes a larger wage and regional income inequality
Sandra. Polaski, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment’s Trade, Equity, and
Development Project, 1999-2002 Special¶ Representative for International Labor Affairs at the
U.S. Department of State., 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶
FOR ¶ THE ¶ HEMISPHERE: Jobs, Wages, and Household Incomes,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
Income inequality has been on the rise in Mexico since NAFTA took effect, reversing a brief¶
declining trend in the early 1990s. Compared to the period before NAFTA, the top 10 percent
of¶ households have increased their share of national income, while the other 90 percent
have lost¶ income share or seen no change. Regional inequality within Mexico has also
increased,¶ reversing a long-term trend toward convergence in regional incomes.¶ ■ Income
inequality in the United States increased during the decade before NAFTA and has ¶ continued to
widen. The growing wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers is one¶ of the
causes, and to the extent that trade is a factor in the wage gap, it is also implicated in¶ growing
inequality.
US-Mexico trade massively increases income inequality – NAFTA proves
Sandra. Polaski, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment’s Trade, Equity, and
Development Project, 1999-2002 Special¶ Representative for International Labor Affairs at the
U.S. Department of State., 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶
FOR ¶ THE ¶ HEMISPHERE: Jobs, Wages, and Household Incomes,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
Gauging the effects of trade on real people requires¶ an assessment of trade’s impact on
inequality and¶ poverty, because the gains and losses from trade are¶ not distributed evenly.
Inequality in Mexico is high,¶ as it is in much of Latin America. This is a cause ¶ for concern
because it undermines social stability¶ and political cohesion. Furthermore, societies with¶ highly
unequal economies have been shown to¶ reduce poverty less effectively and at slower rates¶
than more equal societies.31 Some studies have also¶ shown that overall growth is reduced over
the long¶ term by highly unequal income distributions, thus¶ constraining the incomes of all.32¶
Income inequality had been declining in Mexico for¶ several decades up to the early 1980s,
but it reversed¶ course after the debt crisis of 1982 and the resulting¶ macroeconomic
contraction and structural reforms.¶ Inequality then increased for most of the following¶ decade,
but began to abate again in the early 1990s,¶ the years immediately before NAFTA. However,¶
since 1994 inequality has again been on the rise.¶ Compared to the period before NAFTA, the
top ¶ 10 percent of households have increased their share of national income, while the other
90 percent have¶ lost income share or seen no change.33
Trade Bad – Environment
Export-oriented policies in Mexico causes environmental degradation and
depletion of natural resources
Maria Cruz-Torrez, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside, Summer
2001 [“LOCAL-LEVEL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION IN NORTHWESTERN MEXICO,” Journal of Anthropological Research, JSTOR] jmin
James O'Connor (1998) has discussed the importance of recognizing the ¶ dynamic relationship
between economic development and natural resource ¶ degradation. Writing about the
interconnections of economic and environmental ¶ crises, he remarked that "there is a global
economy that is undergoing a process of ¶ 'accumulation through crisis' that is impoverishing
tens of millions of people, ¶ destroying communities, degrading hundreds of thousands of
bioregions, and ¶ exacerbating a global ecological crisis" (O'Connor 1998:267). For him,
economic ¶ crisis and environmental crisis are mutually interrelated. Case studies examining¶
the connection between national development policies, regional patterns of natural ¶ resource
access and distribution, and local poverty can shed light on the ¶ socioeconomic ramifications
of environmental degradation. This article on rural ¶ coastal Sinaloa in northwestern Mexico is
one such case. ¶ Since the 1960s, Mexico has undergone multiple economic crises, which have ¶
had profound long-term effects on the country's rural areas. Closely connected to ¶ these
economic crises is an environmental crisis. It is visible in the increasing ¶ deterioration of the
country's most valuable natural resources, and it is causing ¶ tremendous tension and distress
for the people of Mexico. Among the country's ¶ most persistent and pressing environmental
issues are soil erosion, deforestation, ¶ contamination of watersheds, desertification, loss of
biodiversity, and the ¶ destruction of coastal and marine habitats (Tello 1991; Carabias,
Provencio, and ¶ Toledo 1994; INEGI 1995; Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995; G6mez-Pompa and
¶ Kaus 1999). Eighty percent of the land is eroded, and thirty-one of the nation's ¶ most
important aquifers are contaminated (Carabias, Provencio, and Toledo 1994). ¶ Moreover,
Mexico has one of the highest deforestation rates in Latin America, with ¶ 500-800 ha of
rainforest lost every year (G6mez-Pompa and Kaus 1999).¶ Scholars have frequently cited
population growth during the last half of the ¶ twentieth century as a chief cause of the
environmental crisis (INEGI 1995). ¶ However, given the rates and forms of natural resource
degradation, population ¶ growth alone cannot be the cause. Recently, scholars have begun
to call attention ¶ to policies that encourage and support the export-oriented commercial
exploitation ¶ of natural resources (Carabias, Provencio, and Toledo 1994; G6mez-Pompa and ¶
Kaus 1999). In response to its need to service the country's growing foreign debt, ¶ the state
increased its reliance on income from natural resources during the 1980s, ¶ and in the early
1990s, the government implemented a neoliberal economic model. ¶ That new model reinforced
state policies favoring commercial exploitation of ¶ natural resources, while simultaneously
encouraging the implementation of ¶ policies for sustainable resource management
Meeting demands for Mexican agricultural and fishing commodities means
ecological degradation of coastal and marine habitats – Northwestern Mexico
proves
Maria Cruz-Torrez, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside, Summer
2001 [“LOCAL-LEVEL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION IN NORTHWESTERN MEXICO,” Journal of Anthropological Research, JSTOR] jmin
This study focuses on a region of northwestern Mexico that is undergoing ¶ radical
socioeconomic and environmental change in response to increased demand ¶ for agricultural
and fishing commodities. That demand is directly linked to state ¶ and regional economic
development policies supporting the use of natural ¶ resources for commercial export. The
resulting environmental and ecological ¶ pressures have particularly contributed to the
degradation of coastal and marine ¶ habitats. This degradation, in turn, has jeopardized the
livelihoods of people ¶ dependent on these resources. Mexico's rural coastal communities face
the ¶ contradiction of relying ever more heavily on a natural resource base that is ¶ diminishing
day by day. This situation raises the question of how rural households ¶ manage a condition of
decreasing natural resources and increasing poverty. As ¶ Feldman (1992:11) asked, "What
creative mechanisms do households and ¶ household members, especially women, employ to
ensure their daily survival?" ¶ This article seeks to answer this question by analyzing the manner
in which ¶ natural resource degradation has affected the livelihoods of rural people in southern ¶
Sinaloa. This research is organized around two main arguments, which are ¶ consistent with
those made by other scholars analyzing the effect of either ¶ economic crises or environmental
destruction on Latin American populations. ¶ First, to gain a true understanding of the dynamic
relationship between human ¶ populations and their environment, the analysis must include a
local-level ¶ perspective that includes that household. Second, in times of economic hardship, ¶
women bear a disproportionate burden. ¶ The first argument rests on two premises: (1)
households, in their quest for ¶ survival, engage in subsistence and cash-generating practices
that negatively affect ¶ the local environment (Dodds 1998; Painter and Durham 1995; Stonich
1993) and ¶ (2) in the absence of a collective or community effort, specific responses to ¶
environmental degradation and its resulting economic impoverishment will ¶ emerge at the
household level (Gonzdilez de la Rocha and Escobar Latapif 1991; ¶ Beneria 1992). As Sheridan
(1988) points out, the household is the basic unit of ¶ production, consumption, and resource
control in Mexican peasant communities. ¶ Thus, the household is central to this analysis. The
present study expands ¶ Sheridan's argument by treating the household as a social space where
people are ¶ in a continuous and active process of making choices, generating opportunities, ¶
and reorganizing existing resources to meet the household members' basic needs ¶ (Feldman
1992:10).
Degradation of Mexico’s natural resources means poverty for rural coastal
populations
Maria Cruz-Torrez, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Riverside, Summer
2001 [“LOCAL-LEVEL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION IN NORTHWESTERN MEXICO,” Journal of Anthropological Research, JSTOR] jmin
Beginning in the late 1980s, the economic restructuring of Mexico and ¶ implementation of state
policies favoring a neoliberal economy have led to an ¶ emphasis on globalization of the
agriculture and aquaculture industries. ¶ Production for export of agricultural and fishing
commodities, in turn, has ¶ contributed to the degradation of ecosystems along Mexico's
northwest coast. The ¶ creation of shrimp ponds has destroyed mangrove forests, while
overfishing by ¶ commercially oriented ventures has contributed to the depletion of the coastal
and ¶ marine resources. From the introduction of high levels of pesticides through the ¶
increase of waste from shrimp ponds, these policies have harmed fishing resources. ¶ This
degradation in combination with Mexico's economic crises has resulted in ¶ extreme poverty
for much of rural southern Sinaloa. ¶ My work in southern Sinaloa shows that there is a
relationship between ¶ environmental degradation and further economic impoverishment in
Mexico's ¶ rural areas. For the rural coastal population of southern Sinaloa, the decline in ¶
environmental quality has reduced their ability to secure a livelihood and a decent ¶ existence.
Free trade policies hurt Mexico’s forestry community – causing massive
biodiversity loss
Daniel S. Jaffee, Institute for Environmental Studies¶ University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996
[“Confronting Globalization in¶ the Community Forests of¶ Michoacán, Mexico:¶ Free Trade,
Neoliberal Reforms,¶ and Resource Degradation,” University of Wisconsin thesis dissertation,
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/jaffee.pdf] jmin
A great deal has been written speculating about the social and ecological¶ impacts of the GATT
and NAFTA free trade agreements, the freeing up of ejido¶ lands for privatization, and other
policies aimed at "modernizing" rural Mexico,¶ especially in terms of how they may affect the
viability of traditional agricultural¶ and social systems.1¶ Many observers express deep concern
over the effects that¶ importing cheap corn from the U.S. will have on rural communities in
Mexico.2¶ While the main focus of this work has been on agriculture, a number of authors¶
have suggested that free trade and neoliberal economic policies will also be¶ devastating for
Mexican forest communities and, by extension, for the temperate¶ and tropical forests they
manage.3¶ The Mexican market was recently opened to a¶ flood of imported wood products.
Yet there has been little data gathered so far to¶ document how these changes in economic
conditions have actually affected the way¶ that the owners of forests manage their resources, or
what trade liberalization¶ implies for forest sustainability, broadly defined.¶ This article examines
how a young but important social movement--the¶ Mexican community forestry movement--is being affected by liberalized trade,¶ economic and forest policies, and by the reduction of the
role of the state in¶ supporting and regulating forestry. It is based largely on research conducted¶
during 1995 in the Meseta Purepecha, a forested volcanic plateau in the Westerncentral state of
Michoacán. Its temperate oak and pine forests are home largely to¶ Purepecha indigenous
communities. Michoacán is experiencing severe¶ deforestation, and the Meseta is no exception.
About half of the native forests in the¶ area have been lost since 1963.4¶ Through interviews
with communal residents,¶ directors of communal forest businesses, foresters, researchers,
state and federal¶ officials and policy makers, the author studied the dynamics of forest use and¶
degradation in the region. The research focused closely on three indigenous¶ communities with
very different experiences in forest management and attempted¶ to gauge the impact of
neoliberal policies on the prospects for long-term¶ "sustainable" forest management in the
Meseta.5¶ This article also examines new¶ federal forest policy initiatives to promote sustainable
forestry, and the difficulties¶ of creating incentives for sustainability in the context of free trade
agreements.¶ Mexico is the world's fourth or fifth ranking nation in terms of biodiversity.6¶
Mexican temperate forests contain a very high number of pine species and the¶ largest number
of species of oaks. The percentage of forested land in protected¶ areas such as Biosphere
Reserves is small, and it is the peasant and indigenous¶ communities which live in and own
these forests, acting in relation to economic¶ pressures and forces, who primarily determine
their condition and how they are¶ used. Mexico has 25 million hectares of temperate forests and
24 million hectares of¶ tropical forests. They are home to about 14 million people (one-sixth of
the¶ population), and to the great majority of the nation's indigenous people. 7¶ So, even¶ though
the nation is small in terms of forested area and timber production in¶ comparison to its
northern neighbors (Figure 1), what happens to its temperate and¶ tropical forests has
significant implications for the protection of both cultural and¶ biological diversity.
Export-oriented Mexican commercial farming puts the ecosystem at risk –
nitrogen and other chemical fertilizers
John J. Audley, Senior Associate and Director¶ Trade, Equity, and Development Project¶
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, trade policy coordinator at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004 [“NAFTA’s Promise and Reality – LESSONS ¶ FROM ¶ MEXICO ¶ FOR ¶ THE
¶ HEMISPHERE: Introduction,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf] jmin
The fear of a “race to the bottom” in environmental regulation has proved unfounded. At this¶
point some elements of Mexico’s economy are¶ dirtier and some are cleaner. The Mexican
government estimates that annual pollution damages ¶ over the past decade exceeded US$36
billion per¶ year. This damage to the environment is greater¶ than the economic gains from
the growth of¶ trade and of the economy as a whole. More¶ specifically, enactment of NAFTA
accelerated¶ changes in commercial farming practices that¶ have put Mexico’s diverse
ecosystem at great risk¶ of contamination from concentrations of¶ nitrogen and other
chemicals commonly used ¶ in modern farming. Mexico’s evolution toward a modern,
exportoriented agricultural sector has also failed to¶ deliver the anticipated environmental
benefits of¶ reduced deforestation and tillage. Rural farmers¶ have replaced lost income
caused by the collapse¶ in commodity prices by farming more marginal¶ land, a practice that has
resulted in an average¶ deforestation rate of more than 630,000 hectares¶ per year since 1993 in
the biologically rich regions¶ of southern Mexico.
Free trade with Mexico harms the environment
Lopez 10
(Matthew L., 3 Phoenix L. Rev. 701. (Summer, 2010 ): 14674 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/17 Matthew Lopez is well respected within the legal community and collaborates on a
frequent basis with several other accomplished attorneys. As a member of the Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and Arizona Trial Lawyers Association, Matthew is consistently honing his legal knowledge and
skills, in an effort to provide clients with the best possible legal representation and trial advocacy. Matthew received his undergraduate degree from the prestigious W.P. Carey School of Business. After graduating
at the top of his class and being on the Dean’s List every semester – Matthew was heavily recruited to work for many Fortune 500 Companies. Matthew takes his clients’ legal issues seriously and is dedicated to
providing quality legal representation. He is passionate about practicing law and is committed to using his position as a lawyer to help others. Matthew values education and is honored to be a member of the
South Mountain Community College President’s Advisory Board.)
¶
¶
Environmentalists remain optimistic that foreign direct investment will expose developing countries to methods of environmental conservation. However, there are
industries that take advantage of developing countries' lax environmental regulations by using the
developing countries as hosts for their production plants. n40 This method of foreign direct investment provides manufacturers
from developing countries with the opportunity to increase their revenue by not having to comport with their home country's rigid and oftenexpensive environmental regulations. From this standpoint, opponents of globalization argue that free trade is a tool devised by
the world's richest countries as an effort to continue their economic prosperity at the expense
of less developed countries that have cheap labor and little or no environmental regulations .
n41 Renowned Yale University economist Dr. Thomas Palley supports this theory: "[G]lobal economic growth has actually slowed relative to the prior quarter-century. This
trade is at best only weakly associated with growth . . . ." n42 Palley further argues that developing countries
should consider abandoning free trade and [*710] primarily focus on preserving and growing their
domestic markets in hopes of having a better opportunity to prosper economically. n43 Industries from developed countries may relocate their manufacturing
plants to developing countries in order to take advantage of lax environmental policies. Some developing countries do not have the
expertise or resources needed to implement and enforce environmental policies. However, some
developing countries do have the necessary resources to devise and enforce environmental regulations, but simply choose not to enforce the
laws in an effort to attract foreign investment. This allows industries from developed countries to gain the cost
benefits of relocating to a country with lax environmental policies while still being able to
claim they are meeting a high level of environmental regulation. For example, in the mid-1990s Mexico made strong
suggests that
efforts to attract foreign direct investment with liberalized foreign investment rules, cheap labor, and initiating efforts aimed at reducing inflation of the Peso. n44 In response to
the industrial increase spawned by foreign direct investment, Mexico adopted the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection along with several other
environmental regulations. n45 Mexico established a complete environmental framework in approximately six years, while the United States spent decades establishing similar
NAFTA") requires its members to adopt certain environmental regulations. As a result of
NAFTA's environmental requirements, Mexico adopted environmental regulations comparable to that of the U nited S tates
Environmental Protection Agency. n47 Although Mexico may have a comprehensive environmental regulations scheme, its track record for regulatory
enforcement has been less than desirable. n48 The establishment of maquiladora programs in the early 1990s evidences Mexico's
lackluster attitude toward environmental regulation. n49 The program enticed American companies to
move their manufacturing plants to Mexican cities bordering the United States. n50 The maquiladora [*711]
programs were exceptionally beneficial for foreign countries because "foreigners were
permitted to set up 100% foreign owned and managed companies that could import, duty
free, all components and maintenance parts in order to eventually export them from Mexico
abroad." n51 Not surprisingly, a study conducted in 1994 revealed that only half of American companies participating in the
program were complying with Mexico's environmental regulations. n52
regulations. n46 Further, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("
Freer trade with Mexico inevitably leads to increased pollution and
environmental collapse
Grossman and Krueger 91
(Gene & Alan. Gene Grossman is currently the Jacob Viner Professor of International Economics at Princeton University. B.A. in
Economics from Yale. Ph.D. in Economics from MIT. Alan Krueger is a Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Affairs at
Princeton University and Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. On March 7, 2009, he was nominated by
President Barack Obama to be United States Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for economic policy. On August 29, 2011, he was
nominated by Obama to be chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. sNational Bureau Of Economic Research,
November 1991, “Environmental Impacts Of A North American Free Trade Agreement”)
With regard to NAFTA, the environmentalists have expressed a number of reasons for fearing
that freer trade and direct investment flows between the United States and Mexico may
aggravate pollution problems in Mexico and in the border region.2 At the least discerning
level, some have argued simply that any expansion of markets and economic activity inevitably
leads to more pollution and faster depletion of scarce natural resources. A more pointed
argument recognizes that pollution already is a severe problem in Mexico and that the country's
weak regulatory infrastructure is strained to the breaking point. Under these conditions, it is
feared that any further industrialization that results from the liberalization of trade and
investment will exacerbate an already grave situation.
Mexican trade liberalization kills the environment and kills any gains made
Gallagher 4 (Kevin P. Associate Professor of International Relations. BA, Northeastern University; MA, PhD, Tufts University
Economic Development, Trade and Investment Policy, International Environmental Policy, Latin America. “Free Trade and the
Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond,” http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/NAFTAEnviroKGAmerProgSep04.pdf )
First, since 1985 real incomes have grown at just 2.5%¶ per year, and less than one percent per capita. Second,¶ according to INEGI,
major environmental problems have¶ worsened since trade liberalization began in Mexico.¶
Despite the fact that Mexico reached levels of income¶ beyond the range of a predicted EKC turning point,¶ national levels of
soil erosion, municipal solid waste, and¶ urban air and water pollution all¶ worsened from
1985 to 1999.¶ Rural soil erosion grew by 89%,¶ municipal solid waste by 108%,¶ water
pollution by 29%, and¶ urban air pollution by 97%. The results have been costly to¶ Mexico’s
prospects for development. The INEGI studies estimate the financial costs of this¶ environmental
degradation at¶ 10% of GDP from 1988 to 1999, an average of $36 billion of damage each year
($47 billion for 1999). The¶ destruction overwhelms the value of economic growth,¶ which has
been just 2.5% annually, or $14 billion per¶ year
Trade Bad – Maquiladores
Free trade with Mexico leads to more maquiladora industries AND developing
markets don’t get much net growth from free trade
Lopez 10
(Matthew L., 3 Phoenix L. Rev. 701. (Summer, 2010 ): 14674 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/07/17 Matthew Lopez is well respected within the legal community and collaborates on a
frequent basis with several other accomplished attorneys. As a member of the Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and Arizona Trial Lawyers Association, Matthew is consistently honing his legal knowledge and
skills, in an effort to provide clients with the best possible legal representation and trial advocacy. Matthew received his undergraduate degree from the prestigious W.P. Carey School of Business. After graduating
at the top of his class and being on the Dean’s List every semester – Matthew was heavily recruited to work for many Fortune 500 Companies. Matthew takes his clients’ legal issues seriously and is dedicated to
providing quality legal representation. He is passionate about practicing law and is committed to using his position as a lawyer to help others. Matthew values education and is honored to be a member of the
South Mountain Community College President’s Advisory Board.)
¶
¶
Environmentalists remain optimistic that foreign direct investment will expose developing countries to methods of environmental conservation.
However, there are industries that take advantage of developing countries' lax environmental regulations by using the developing countries as hosts for
their production plants. n40 This method of foreign direct investment provides manufacturers from developing countries with the opportunity to
increase their revenue by not having to comport with their home country's rigid and often-expensive environmental regulations. From this standpoint,
opponents of globalization argue that free
trade is a tool devised by the world's richest countries as an effort
to continue their economic prosperity at the expense of less developed countries that have
cheap labor and little or no environmental regulations. n41 Renowned Yale University economist Dr. Thomas Palley supports this theory:
"[G]lobal economic growth has actually slowed relative to the prior quarter-century. This suggests that trade is at best only weakly
associated with growth . . . ." n42 Palley further argues that developing countries should consider
abandoning free trade and [*710] primarily focus on preserving and growing their domestic markets
in hopes of having a better opportunity to prosper economically. n43 Industries from developed countries may
relocate their manufacturing plants to developing countries in order to take advantage of lax environmental policies. Some developing countries do not
have the expertise or resources needed to implement and enforce environmental policies. However, some developing countries do have the necessary
resources to devise and enforce environmental regulations, but simply choose not to enforce the laws in an effort to attract foreign investment. This
allows industries from developed countries to gain the cost benefits of relocating to a country with lax environmental policies while still being able to
claim they are meeting a high level of environmental regulation. For example, in the mid-1990s Mexico made strong efforts to attract foreign direct
investment with liberalized foreign investment rules, cheap labor, and initiating efforts aimed at reducing inflation of the Peso. n44 In response to the
industrial increase spawned by foreign direct investment, Mexico adopted the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection along
with several other environmental regulations. n45 Mexico established a complete environmental framework in approximately six years, while the
United States spent decades establishing similar regulations. n46 Further, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") requires its members
to adopt certain environmental regulations. As a result of NAFTA's environmental requirements, Mexico adopted environmental regulations
comparable to that of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. n47 Although Mexico may have a comprehensive environmental regulations
scheme, its track record for regulatory enforcement has been less than desirable. n48 The establishment of maquiladora programs in the early 1990s
evidences Mexico's lackluster attitude toward environmental regulation. n49 The program enticed American
companies to move their
to Mexican cities bordering the United States. n50 The maquiladora [*711] programs were
exceptionally beneficial for foreign countries because "foreigners were permitted to set up
100% foreign owned and managed companies that could import, duty free, all components
and maintenance parts in order to eventually export them from Mexico abroad." n51 Not surprisingly, a
manufacturing plants
study conducted in 1994 revealed that only half of American companies participating in the program were complying with Mexico's environmental
regulations. n52
The unemployed in Mexico are forced to accept any available employment:
“maquiladoras” represent the most dismal sweat shops in the world and carnal
abuses of human rights: this is modern day slavery
Vigna 10
(Anna Vigna. The Juss Semper Global Alliance; TLWNSI is a long-term program developed to
contribute to social justice in the world by achieving fair labour endowments for the workers of
all the countries immersed in the global market system. “Mexico: Hell Is The Tijuana Assembly
Line”, September 2010. http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20Activity/mexicohellinmexico'smaquil.html)
Anne Vigna’s incisive account of the maquiladora sector –in-bond plants that import about 97%
of the parts, which are assembled to be then “exported” back to their contractors– exhibits the
dire and complete disenfranchisement of Mexican workers in the formal economy. Yet over
50% of workers toil at a living in the even worse underground economy.
In Vigna’s first hand
experience, right on the field during 2009, she talked to workers earning even lower wages. She
found workers –mostly women– earning $58 per week in the electronics sector. That is barely
more than a dollar an hour (about $1,16), for the typical work week of at least 48 to 50 hours.
In the apparel sector, the hourly pay could easily be below a dollar an hour. Such labour
endowments are, to be sure, what is now commonly regarded as modern-slave work wages.
Contrary to popular wisdom, slavery in the 21st century is not by any account a thing of the
past. It is a social phenomenon that has been growing in direct proportion to the grip that
today’s global Darwinian capitalism –the worst of its kind– is increasing on a world where
representative democracy has been supplanted by marketocracy, where the institutional
investors and their corporations dictate the pubic agendas.
Indeed, the most prominent
feature of the practice of modern-slave work in Mexico’s maquiladora sweatshops –a far more
accurate adjective to refer to this mode of production– is the complete, systematic and
customary violation of all international labour rights as well as many other human rights that
Mexico’s Congress ratified many years ago. This creates an ethos clearly reminiscent of the
worst kind of social Darwinism practiced in the factories of the English Industrial Revolution
that Charles Dickens so eloquently portrayed.
In the case of Mexico, Anne Vigna’s brief vividly
exposes the dire circumstance that millions of Mexicans working in the maquiladora sector
throughout Mexico endure daily in a gripping account of first hand experiences. Since NAFTA
took effect, millions of Mexicans have been displaced –completely disenfranchised– for they
lost their past livelihoods as part of the so-called “market externalities” of today’s global
economy. Many of them have sought to work in the sweatshop sector as a measure of last
recourse; many after trying unsuccessfully to migrate to the U.S. where many corporations
and millions of consumers benefit from the modern-slave work conditions model of Mexico’s
maquiladora industry.
Venezuela
Trade Good – Economy
Increased trade solves all internal issues dooming the Venezuelan economy
Fuentes 7/8 – part of the Venezuelanalysis.com editorial collective, resident researcher at
Fundación Centro Internacional Miranda (Federico, 7/8/2013, “Venezuela: War for oil fuels
economic crisis,” http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9820)
With Venezuela’s inflation rate for May soaring to 6.1%, first quarter growth stagnating at
0.7%, and shortages afflicting a number of basic goods, speculation has been rife regarding the
country’s economic future.¶ Critics from the right and left have argued these are all signs that
Chavismo (the name given to the radical project for change spearheaded by former president
Hugo Chavez) has reached its limits.¶ In most cases, economic woes are primarily attributed to
bad policies that have led to an excessively centralised economy presided over by a
bureaucratic state increasingly dependent on oil revenue.¶ However, placing the blame solely
on the government ignores the neo-colonial economy inherited by Chavismo. It also conceals
the ongoing economic war by Venezuela’s elites, who are seeking to regain control over the
country’s prize possession ― oil wealth.¶ This goal requires dismantling Chavismo, which
represents an attempt by Venezuela’s historically excluded poor majority to capture the state,
stem the flow of oil wealth out of the country and re-orientate it towards meeting their needs.¶
Oil impacts¶ The rise of oil production in the 1920s dramatically transformed Venezuela’s
economy. Agricultural production slumped as foreign oil companies poured into the country to
extract cheap oil and high profits.¶ Rather than develop local industries, Venezuela’s elites
preferred to take part of this oil wealth for themselves. They used some of it to import goods
from abroad to sell in the domestic market.¶ Venezuela’s oil-based economy took the form of
neo-colonial capitalism: formally an independent nation, Venezuela’s economy was dominated
by and dependent upon the economies of imperialist countries ― especially the United States,
the main destination for oil exports and origin of imported basic goods.¶ This economic set-up
also profoundly shaped the state and society in Venezuela.¶ As oil transnationals extracted the
oil, the state took on the role of making sure that, via taxes, royalties and regulations, some of
Venezuela’s oil wealth stayed in the country.¶ Local business elites, however, became
increasingly reliant on their connections to the state in order to secure some of this wealth. This
led to a fusion of power and wealth within the state. It spawned a parasitic capitalist class that
sought to accumulate capital largely through siphoning off the state’s oil-based revenue.¶ The
state also became a vehicle for creating a new middle class, whose position in society was tied
to the state bureaucracy.¶ Further down the ladder were marginalised popular classes, driven
from the countryside into the city in search of a livelihood and what they felt was their rightful
share of oil wealth. For many, the state was viewed as a means to lift them out of poverty.¶ This
led to a pervasive culture of “clientalism” (whereby access to jobs and services was tied to which
political group you supported) and corruption.¶ An extensive array of legal and illegal channels
were established to appropriate and and re-distribute the oil money that remained in the
country, with the lion’s share going to the elites.¶ Various bids to develop other sectors of the
economy did little to fundamentally alter this scenario.¶ Neocolonial economy¶ Instead,
“developmentalist” policies (whether aimed at import substitution or export promotion)
served to disguise the deepening of the rentier and neo-colonial nature of Venezuela’s
capitalist economy.¶ Policies such as market protection, overvalued currency, low taxes and
access to cheap foreign exchange, which were supposed to promote import substitution,
simply became vehicles to bolster the flow of oil rent to the local elites.¶ One form this took
was buying foreign exchange at the overvalued exchange rate and selling imports at inflated
prices.¶ But an overvalued currency made exports expensive, and the limited size of the local
economy meant industrial development was dependent on rent transfer.¶ In both cases,
connections to the state, rather than competitiveness, was decisive to economic success. This
helped the rise of a few powerful groups of conglomerates with close connections to the state,
rather than internal economic development.¶ The push towards export production fared no
better; instead they reflected shifts in the international market.¶ With some industries proving
too expensive to run elsewhere, such as the auto-industry, companies decided to shift
production to places such as Venezuela on the proviso that national protection barriers were
removed and cheap natural resources made available.¶ From the start, these new enterprises
were to be integrated into globalised production chains, orientated towards exporting goods
and profits back to the global North.¶ One important change that occurred was the state
gradually became an important economic agent in its own right. Its presence in the economy
grew with the oil nationalisation of 1974 and large investment in heavy industries such as steel
and aluminium. The aim was to expand the state bureaucracy’s economic base.¶ This led to
tensions with private capital (which generally appeared to be fights against corruption or for
greater state efficiency). It served to heighten conflicts within the state between different
fractions of capital over priorities (such as state investment in heavy industry versus subsidies
for consumer goods industries).¶ High oil prices helped dampen these conflicts, all the while
funding the steady reproduction of this model.¶ However, when oil prices tumbled down in the
late 1970s and '80s, the state became completely dependent on foreign loans.¶ This led to a
severe crisis of the state. Foreign capital used the state’s debt and deficit crisis to impose
harsh austerity measures against the poor, while squeezing more and more wealth out of the
country.¶ This, along with rising levels of protest and discontent among Venezuela’s
fragmented popular classes, was the backdrop to the rise of Chavismo.¶ Chavez’s platform
when first elected in 1998 was far from radical. In some areas, it represented a continuity with
the policies of previous neoliberal governments.
Trade Good – Relations
Expanded US-Venezuela trade key to relations—Maduro means now key
Farnsworth 3/10 – Vice President of the Council of the Americas (Eric, 3/10/2013, “What's
Next for Venezuela?,” http://www.as-coa.org/articles/what%E2%80%99s-next-venezuela)
The death of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez on March 5 is a watershed moment. For the
14 years of his reign, his work toward socialist revolution in Venezuela and across the
hemisphere sharply divided regional politics, polarized his own population, and drove a wedge
between Venezuela and the United States. In the end, Chávez was a figure larger than life, a
symbol to many of a leader unafraid to take on the established powers and give political voice to
those traditionally without it. To others, he was an autocrat who dismantled independent
democratic institutions, wrecked the Venezuelan economy, and dramatically complicated
hemispheric relations.¶ Already, with new elections required shortly, the fight is on to define the
Chávez legacy. Interim leader and Chávez’ designated successor Nicolas Maduro has claimed
the mantle of Chavismo but lacks the charisma and personal narrative of his mentor. At the
same time, Chávez bequeathed to him a deteriorating economy, exploding crime, and closer
international relations with global pariah nations such as Iran than with the United States, a
traditional ally and the largest market for Venezuelan crude. Rather than call for national
healing, improved international relations, or, less likely, a government of national unity to
address these serious issues, however, Maduro has already moved to undercut nascent moves
by Washington to improve relations while vilifying the political opposition at home.¶ No
question he is doing this to solidify his own role as the keeper of the Chávez flame and to
bolster his own legitimacy in the eyes of his political base. But the practical impact is to further
divide Venezuelan society while keeping the United States at a distance. We should all expect a
rocky road ahead.¶ Washington clearly wants a better relationship with Caracas, and has been
frustrated that Chávez was thoroughly disinterested in any relationship with the United States
beyond a foil for his political ambitions and a market for his oil. Maduro now seems content to
follow the same line. Prior to Chávez’ death, US government representatives had been in
contact with Venezuelan representatives including Maduro himself to seek confidence building
measures that could establish a path toward improved relations. That effort is now on hold, at
least until Maduro has actually won an election, given Maduro’s expulsion of two US embassy
employees and his laughable claim that the United States was responsible for Chávez’ cancer
and his demise.¶ From the U.S. perspective, the most appropriate effort at this point would be to
work with hemispheric partners including the Organization of American States to promote a free
and fair election which must be held, according to the Venezuelan constitution, within 30 days
from the death or incapacitation of the President. The full resources of the state are being
mobilized in support of the Chavista candidate, including the official press, national oil company
PDVSA, and the military, which has already pledged loyalty to Maduro, according to press
reports, thus violating its apolitical mandate. The playing field is manifestly uneven for the
opposition, and democracy in Venezuela must not be an afterthought. ¶ Nonetheless, the most
likely scenario is a victory for Maduro in upcoming elections, and a new mandate for Chavismo.
Would this provide an opening for improved relations with Washington? Only if Caracas wants
a relationship with the United States beyond the raw self-interest of trade in energy. In the
meantime, Maduro will be focused on solidifying his own position internally and finding ways to
patch Venezuela’s leaking economy. Hopefully, he will also choose to play a responsible role
encouraging the FARC leadership to accept peace with Colombia, and stanch the flow of illegal
narcotics transiting through Venezuela en route to North America via Mexico, Central America,
and the Caribbean Basin.¶ The bottom line is this: Chávez’ death concludes an era. It remains to
be seen whether his successor—whoever he is—will seek the same course in coming weeks and
months, or whether he will now look for a different approach. My hope is on the latter; my bet
is on the former.
Post-Chavez US-Venezuela ties vital to prevent Iran proliferation
Jones, 13 – (Steve Jones, US Foreign Policy on About News. “Does Chavez' Death Mean Better
Relations Between U.S. and Venezuela?”
http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Does-Chavez-Death-Mean-BetterRelations-Between-U-s-And-Venezuela.htm)
While the U.S. State Department isn't holding its collective breath, it would like to see better relations
between the two countries in the post-Chavez era. That would enable the U nited S tates to leverage
Venezuela against Iran as it continues attempts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear
weapons .¶ Venezuela and Iran became allies during the Chavez' tenure, and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela in 2012. The two countries signed various trade and financial agreements.¶ The U.S.
has deployed an array of sanctions against Iran. Venezuela's help could help strangle
resources that support Iran's nuclear program . According the the State Department, the United States
sanctioned Venezuela in 2011 for "delivering at least three cargoes of reformate, a blending
component for gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011."
Trade solves relations with Venezuela
Sullivan 4/9 – Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service
(Mark P., 4/9/2013, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)
Tensions that characterized U.S. relations with the Chávez government turned especially sour in
¶ the aftermath of President Chávez’s brief ouster from power in April 2002. Venezuela alleged ¶
U.S. involvement in the ouster, while U.S. officials repeatedly rejected charges that the United ¶
States was involved. After Chávez’s ouster, while most Latin American nations were
condemning ¶ his overthrow, the United States maintained that undemocratic actions
committed or encouraged ¶ by the Chávez administration had provoked the political crisis. This
set the stage for continued ¶ deterioration in U.S.-Venezuelan relations. Despite this
deterioration, Venezuela has remained an ¶ important supplier of foreign oil to the United
States. Currently, it is the fourth largest foreign ¶ supplier, providing about 10% of U.S. crude oil
imports. ¶ Over the years, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about human rights,
Venezuela’s military ¶ arms purchases, its relations with Iran, and its efforts to export its brand of
populism to other ¶ Latin American countries. Declining cooperation on anti-drug and antiterrorism efforts has been ¶ a major concern. The United States has imposed sanctions: on
several Venezuelan government ¶ and military officials for helping the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) with drug ¶ and weapons trafficking; on three Venezuelan companies
for providing support to Iran; and on ¶ several Venezuelan individuals for providing support to
Hezbollah. In late 2010, the Chávez ¶ government revoked an agreement for U.S. Ambassador-
designate Larry Palmer to be posted to Venezuela. The Obama Administration responded by
revoking the diplomatic visa of the ¶ Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States. ¶ Despite
tensions in relations, the Obama Administration maintains that it remains committed to ¶
seeking constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and ¶
counterterrorism efforts. In the aftermath of President Chávez’s reelection in October 2012, the
¶ White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez, congratulated the ¶
Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful election
process. ¶ Subsequently, in November 2012, the State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State
for Western ¶ Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, engaged in a conversation with Vice
President Maduro ¶ about improving bilateral relations, including greater cooperation on
counternarcotics issues. ¶ In early January 2013, the State Department reiterated that the
United States remained open to ¶ dialogue with Venezuela on a range of issues of mutual
interest. In light of the setback in ¶ President Chávez’s health, a State Department spokesman
maintained on January 9, 2013, that ¶ “regardless of what happens politically in Venezuela, if the
Venezuelan government and if the ¶ Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think
there is a path that’s possible.”11¶ In response to President Chávez’s death, President Obama
issued the following statement: ¶ At this challenging time of President Hugo Chávez’s passing,
the United States reaffirms its ¶ support for the Venezuelan people and its interest in developing
a constructive relationship ¶ with the Venezuelan government. As Venezuela begins a new
chapter in its history, the ¶ United States remains committed to policies that promote
democratic principles, the rule of ¶ law, and respect for human rights.12¶ While the President’s
statement did not offer traditional condolences, the State Department ¶ maintains that it
expressed U.S. sympathy to Chávez’s family and to the Venezuelan people.13¶ Many Latin
American and other foreign leaders have expressed their condolences to Venezuela on ¶
Chávez’s passing. The White House statement focused on the U.S. interest in getting
cooperative ¶ bilateral relations back on track while at the same time reiterating that the
United States is ¶ committed to promoting democratic practices and respect for human rights.
A number of other ¶ statements by Members of Congress also expressed hope for a new era in
U.S.-Venezuelan ¶ relations. ¶ While some observers contend that Chávez’s passing and the
beginning of a new political era in ¶ Venezuela could ultimately lessen tensions in U.S.Venezuelan relations, there is no expectation ¶ that this will happen quickly. In fact, State
Department officials have cautioned that the upcoming ¶ electoral campaign could delay any
forward movement in improving bilateral relations.14 Just ¶ hours before Chávez’s death on
March 5, Vice President Maduro announced that two U.S. ¶ military attachés were being
expelled from Venezuela for reportedly attempting to provoke ¶ dissent in the Venezuelan
military and even appeared to blame Chávez’s sickness on the United ¶ States. State Department
officials strongly denied the Venezuelan charges regarding the attachés, and ultimately
responded on March 11 by expelling two Venezuelan diplomats (a consular official ¶ in New York
and a second secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington).15¶ Hostility toward the
United States was often used by the Chávez government as a way to shore up ¶ support during
elections, and it appears that this is being employed by the PSUV once again in ¶ the current
presidential campaign. On March 20, 2013, Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said that ¶ Venezuelan
officials would no longer be talking about improving U.S.-Venezuelan relations with ¶ Assistant
Secretary of State Jacobson because of comments that Jacobson had made in a Spanish ¶
newspaper; Jacobson had said that “Venezuelans deserve open, fair and transparent elections.”
A ¶ senior U.S. official reportedly said that such bizarre accusations and behavior raises doubts
over ¶ whether bilateral relations will be able to be improved with a Maduro government.16
Another ¶ strange accusation by Maduro is that two former U.S. State Department officials were
plotting to ¶ kill Capriles and to blame it on the Maduro government; the State Department
strongly rejected ¶ the “allegations of U.S. government involvement to harm anyone in
Venezuela.”17 Looking ¶ ahead, some observers contend that anti-Americanism could also be a
means for PSUV leaders to ¶ mask internal problems within Chavismo, and even could be
utilized as a potential new PSUV ¶ government led by Maduro deals with a deteriorating
economy. ¶ In terms of Venezuela’s foreign policy, observers who believe that Maduro will win
the election ¶ maintain that there would be continuity with the policy under President Chávez,
especially since ¶ Maduro served as his Foreign Minister for more than six years. Many see
Venezuela’s strong ¶ support for Cuba continuing under a Maduro presidency, although some
analysts contend that a ¶ difficult economic situation in Venezuela could result in a diminishment
of that support. Some ¶ observers also contend that without Chávez at the helm, Venezuela’s
role as a regional power ¶ could begin to wane as well as its relations with Iran.18 Venezuela’s
strengthening of relations ¶ with Iran in recent years is viewed by many analysts as being driven
by the personal relationship ¶ between Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. ¶
Some observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with ¶
Maduro, contending that U.S. policy should focus on attempting to ensure that the upcoming ¶
election is free and fair. A Washington Post editorial from early March 2013 contended that ¶
“further wooing of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a ¶
free vote and demonstrates that he is more than a Castro puppet.”19¶ While it is likely that any
improvement in relations will remain on hold during the election ¶ process, some analysts
maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to remember that ¶ taking sides in
Venezuela’s internal politics can be counter-productive. According to Cynthia ¶ Arnson of the
Woodrow Wilson Center: “Supporting broad principles such as internal dialogue to ¶ overcome
polarization for the rule of law is not the same as promoting a particular political ¶ outcome, an
approach that is destined to only backfire.”20 Other analysts maintain that it is ¶ important for
U.S. policymakers to recognize the level of popular support in Venezuela for President Chávez.
While there was considerable controversy over past elections in which ¶ Chávez’s campaign
unfairly utilized state resources and broadcast media, the margins of his ¶ electoral victories in
four elections over the years left no doubt that he had won those elections. ¶ His death, at least
in the short to medium term, could deepen popular support for the PSUV. ¶ In the aftermath of
the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan ¶ relations to get
back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order ¶ to
augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶
democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. ¶ With
Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to ¶ maintain
its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug
trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.
Trade Bad – Economy
Modern forms of globalization hurt Latin America and many countries are
rejecting it
Global Exchange, November 5, 2011,
http://www.globalexchange.org/sites/default/files/VZneoliberalismALBA.pdf
During the last 25 years, many Latin American¶ governments have followed the Washington
Consensus¶ neoliberal economic model of corporate globalization,¶ which includes policies like
privatization of public¶ services, lowering tariffs, opening up to foreign¶ investment, and eroding worker’s rights, usually under¶
pressure from “structural adjustment” programs imposed¶ by the International Monetary Fund. During
this time,¶ exports
have increased, and yet Latin America has¶ experienced a spectacular failure of economic growth –¶
less than .5% per capita income growth average since¶ 1980. By way of contrast, the previous
twenty years saw¶ 80% economic growth or 4% per person per year.¶ A strikingly candid assessment by
the Wall Street¶ Journal last November acknowledged that the “rise of¶ Mr. Chavez, and of other more moderate leftist leaders¶ in
Latin America, reflects the disappointing results of the¶ so-called Washington Consensus, a set of marketoriented policies like trade
liberalization and¶ privatization that the region and parts of Asia embraced¶ during the 1990s.” Yet Bush and Condoleezza Rice still¶
talk in Latin America about the need to promote the¶ “twin pillars of democracy and free trade.”¶ Citizens
in the region,
however, are increasingly electing¶ democratic governments that prioritize economic growth¶ and development strategies,
turning away from the failed¶ neoliberal models of the recent decades. This has been¶ the case
in Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and to some¶ extent Brazil, and particularly in Venezuela.
Venezuela¶ has also worked hard to extend that model to the rest of¶ Latin America, through
programs of regional integration.