The Future of Forced Regime Change and Democracy
Scott Walker
University of Canterbury
Department of Political Science
scott.walker@canterbury.ac.nz
[Draft Version]
Paper to be presented at the Annual Meeting of the Australian Political Studies Association.
Sydney, 28 October-1 November, 2014. Draft Version.
1. Introduction.
A. What is the FD Strategy?
The Forced Democratization (FD) strategy reflects a desire on the part of powerful Western
liberal democracies to create governments in their own political images. A potentially powerful
motive for the appeal of the FD strategy is the post-World War II experiences of Germany,
Japan, and Italy, three highly illiberal regimes that were transformed into liberal democracies
after military defeat by the Allied powers. Because each of these three “successful” cases could
serve as a dramatic example of democratic transformation, American leaders have
subsequently been tempted to recreate these transformations in “hard to crack” cases of
autocracy.
The first decade after the end of the Cold War was marked by a great deal of curiosity about
the prospects of forcing democracy from the outside. This new angle on the process of
democratization came along during a series of movements that political science was taking at
the time. The early-to-mid 1990s was a time of optimism. In addition to Fukuyama’s thesis
discussed above, Samuel Huntington (1991) famously chronicled the rise of the “Third Wave” of
democratization in the 1970s through early 1990s. Huntington’s analysis included much
discussion about the role of external forces in democracy. Specifically, Huntington considers
whether democratization in one country can set off a democratic chain reaction in culturally
similar countries, and whether the gravitational pull of a major democracy such as the United
States can increase the likelihood that a country within its realm of influence will democratize.
One must understand the context of this optimism. Of course, the Cold War was over,
which in itself was seen as a victory of liberal, democratizing forces over their illiberal
counterparts. In the early 1990s, it did not seem inappropriate to talk of the mission of the
United States and its allies as a democratizing one. Would America “fulfill its destiny” by
promoting democracy, as Joshua Muravchik argued (1992).
B. A Very Brief Review of the Record of FD Interventions
Following the early finding of Meernik (1996) that countries could expect a slight liberal
movement after a hostile US intervention, Mark Peceny (1999a) argued that, if one controlled
for the previous level of democracies, target countries were more likely to become democratic
if intervention was accompanied by certain democracy promotion measures that encouraged
free and fair elections. This analysis introduces an important wrinkle into the forced
democratization argument because it posits that forced democratization may be successful
under certain conditions. As we will see, certain empirical works would later challenge Peceny’s
thesis.
As the post-Cold War era progressed, and that sense of the “unipolar moment” receded,
research on the topic of forced democratization became more skeptical of the benefits of
forced democratization. As the new millennium arrived, democracy appeared to have entered
what Larry Diamond refers to as a “democracy recession” as the tide of the Third Wave crested
(2008, 88). Democratic interveners such as the United States and its NATO allies were under
pressure to show that their interventions in Iran and Afghanistan were legitimate. At the same
time, alternative forms of governance arose to challenge the American version of liberal
democracy. East Asian states such as China and Singapore have placed economic growth and
national progress ahead of individual liberties, temporally at least. The new millennium also
saw the rise of the “illiberal democracy”. For instance, Russia’s leaders were able to garner
legitimacy among large segments of their domestic population through a combination of an oildriven economic boom and a more assertive foreign policy that was perceived to increase the
country’s prestige abroad.1
Reflecting an awareness of the declining fortunes of democracy around the world, and
conscious of the difficulties of aggressive democracy promotion, scholars became more
skeptical of forced democratization as the post-Cold War period progressed. Research was
driven by a consensus that the record of success for FD was somewhat poor, all things being
equal (see Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006), Gleditsch et al. (2007), and naturally moved
toward identifying the reasons why the track record of these interventions was less-thanstellar.
Moreover, some of the earlier, more promising findings related to the FD strategy were
challenged. In particular, some researchers argued that earlier findings by Meernik (1996) and
Hermann and Kegley (1998) that the typical American intervention led to short-term
democratization did not hold up under close scrutiny. Williams and Masters (2011) point out
that the democracy measures used in these studies do not effectively identify a weakening of
autocracy after intervention, but of the state itself. In addition, more detailed investigations of
the role of American intervention by Gleditsch el al. (2007) and Walker and Pearson (2007) find
that the long-term effects of intervention identified by Peceny (1998) were not nearly as robust
as Peceny suggests.
1
See Levitsky and Way (2010) for the rise of semi democratic challenges to liberal democracy.
[Insert Table 1 Here.}
My list of countries targeted for democratizing interventions since the end of World War
II was compiled from two sources. The first (Type 1) includes countries that were targets of
hostile US military intervention in which measures to promote “free and fair elections” (such as
election assistance) were undertaken by occupying US forces. The second group of countries
(Type 2) have also been targets of such interventions, but their defining feature is that the
country has experienced at least a short-term period of democracy according to the Polity IV
data set immediately after intervention. 2 Seven countries experienced both types of
intervention.
What patterns emerge from examining these 16 countries? Can we say anything about
the long-term prospects of hostile US interventions into non-democratic states?
It appears to be fairly obvious that the number of target countries that have become
stable democracies in the wake of FD interventions is not very high. Consistent with what
earlier research has already pointed out, the only four targets of US intervention since World
War II that currently are democratic on both indexes are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Haiti, and Panama. All four have been at that high level for many years. Beyond this, the other
Latin American cases and the Philippines reach a medium level of political rights according to
Freedom House, while the four remaining Asian countries, along with the two Middle Eastern
cases and Somalia, all have low levels. This small set of existing cases since the end of World
War II suggests that, outside of its own region, the United States should not expect good long-
2
Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, “Against All Odds? The History of Imposed Democracy and the Future of
Iraq and Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008): 323; and Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, “Forging
Democracy at Gunpoint,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2006): 539-559
term democratic outcomes from interventions. A note of caution: Numbers might vary slightly
due to the fact that I am only looking at one year. For instance, Nicaragua was in the “Partly
Free” category of democracy for several years before 2011, when it shifted to “Not Free”
according to Freedom House. Likewise, Cambodia has just returned to “Autocracy” on the polity
scale in 2013.
A review of the available evidence suggests that, regardless of whether one focuses on
narrower democratic outcomes or on a broader set of governance outcomes, FD interventions
have not been successful in delivering positive, enduring levels of democracy. In this chapter I
argue that despite the rather dismal prospects for success, American leaders may nonetheless
be tempted to use the FD strategy in the future. There are two important reasons why I believe
this to be true. First, both normative and instrumental factors can increase the appeal of FD as
a means of promoting democracy in countries with recalcitrant autocratic regimes. Second,
each of the principal alternative strategies that the United States can resort to when attempting
to push for change in autocratic states has its own shortcomings. In other words, the lack of
availability of viable democracy promotion strategies may have the effect of making the FD
strategy relatively appealing one to American leaders.
I therefore believe that despite its patchy track record, it is possible that the FD option is
likely to continue to be a viable policy option for American decision makers at certain times. IN
the concluding section I offer some suggestions for when this policy may become particularly
attractive in the eyes of American leaders. While leaders are no doubt aware of the risky (and
often very costly) nature of intervening military to push for democratic change, they are likely
to nonetheless find it to be an attractive choice in certain situations.
2. Opportunity and Willingness
The concepts of opportunity and willingness, outlined by Benjamin Most and Harvey
Starr in their book Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics can be useful to help identify key
reasons why American leaders may consider employing the FD strategy in the future. The
authors argue that states will act when they possess the both the opportunity to do so but also
possess the will to carry out the action (1989, 19).
So what do opportunity and willingness mean in the context of the decision to conduct
an FD intervention? Most and Starr claim that opportunity is related to what they term the
“objective environment” in which a state exists (27). The international environment constrains
most from going to war with most other countries in the system because of “spatial and
geographical factors”, the most powerful of which is geographic proximity. As the possibility of
conflictual interaction between countries that are not close to one another, there are not many
“opportunities for interaction” between most dyads (pairs of countries) in the world system
(30). Technology can play a critical role in expanding a country’s capability for war, as it can
enable countries to “modify distance and other aspects of the physical opportunities presented
by geography” (ibid, 31). Unlike other countries, the United States possesses the technological
capacity to initiate a war virtually anywhere in the world on short notice. With global interests
and a military presence around the world, the United States could conceivably encounter
possibility of conflict almost anywhere. This obviously sets it apart from other countries in the
world system.
Most and Starr compare the ability to go to war to the ability to order food at a
restaurant. It is impossible for countries to order food if there is no restaurant, or if they are not
allowed in the door. Just as some people would not be able to order food at a restaurant, so
would many countries not be able to engage in a war. The United States would, by this logic,
almost always find itself in a setting that would allow it to order from a conflict menu (ibid, 32).
Willingness, the second concept discussed by Most and Starr. It is a cognitive concept
which signifies the degree to which a country is willing to engage in warfare. The level of
willingness depends upon the:
decision-maker’s image of the world, or definition of the situation. Willingness
is intimately related to a decision maker’s calculations of advantage and
disadvantage, of cost and benefit, that decision makers consider on both
conscious and unconscious levels. Hence, willingness is related to…the
idiosyncratic prism through which individuals process information about their
environments (Most and Starr, 34).
This decision making incorporates not only a country’s own set of beliefs and values, but also
how its leaders believe other actors will relate to the situation, and how they “see their own
behavior constrained within a broader environment (ibid, 34).” Most and Starr argue that
countries are more willing to engage in war when other alternatives are “severely limited” or
eliminated from the decision maker’s image of the situation or choice calculus (ibid, 34).
Willingness is thus more related to a leader’s perception of the situation as opposed to an
objective understanding of it.
In short, opportunity is the material, or objective, side of the equation, while willingness
is the perceptual side, involving processes such as “displacement, defensiveness, prejudice,
conformity, or obedience (ibid, 34).”
Suzanne Werner (1996) operationalizes opportunity as a situation in which the imposer
possesses enough power to defeat its rival in war. Opportunity alone is not sufficient for
imposition, however. The potential intervener must also possess sufficient willingness to act.
Although a state may have the opportunity to install a polity, it may not be willing to engage in
state-building. States are willing to impose a polity in a rival country when they feel that the
rival poses a great threat to its security, and the only way to neutralize the threat is polity
imposition. They may be less willing to do so where the threat from the rival is less potent (71).
Russett argues that it is a combination of environmental possibilism and interest that
leads powerful liberal states to intervene in world affairs on a regular basis:
One certain qualification is that major power democracies, by virtue of their
widespread interests and intervention capabilities, are more likely than smaller
ones to exhibit higher frequencies of international conflict. Moreover, if
democracies are more successful in war than autocracies, by better mobilization
of resources or soldierly initiative, then their success may prime them for further
efforts to exert their military power (2005, 397).
In the rest of this chapter I offer suggestions for why we may expect a continued
willingness on the part of American policy makers to engage in FD interventions at certain times
and under certain conditions. First, both normative and instrumental factors may make this an
attractive policy option. Second, the weakness of alternative policy options may make FD
appear to be a relatively attractive in the eyes of American policy makers.
3. Intrinsic Motivations for FD Interventions
Wolff and Wurm (2011) outline two primary motivations for democracy promotion.
First, instrumentalist or rationalist motivations center around the idea that:
Democracy is promoted as long as it is seen, by decision makers, as improving a
country’s geostrategic situation in the long term, without having immediate
negative effects on national security and the relative power position (83).
The second type of explanation for democracy promotion is normative or reflective. According
to Wolff and Wurm, the normative argument proposes that “democratic governments and
societies have a ‘natural’ normative affinity to democratic (opposition) forces and movements
in other countries – a moral impetus that suggests supporting them against oppressive
governments. (ibid, 81)”
The authors also propose that ‘hybrid’ models of foreign policy behavior that combine
the instrumental and normative approaches can also hold some explanatory power about
democracy promotion decisions.
A. Normative Concerns
Normative rationales for foreign policy behavior assume that “actors and structures in
international politics cannot be properly understood independent from social context and that,
consequently, aims and corresponding preferences are socially constructed (Harnisch 2003,
329).” Wolff and Wurm argue that states develop “national role conceptions” conceptualization
of decision making fits “an actor centered constructivism that emphasizes national self-images,
roles and identities, and foreign policy cultures. The norms that emerge can be driven by both
the “domestic cultural setting” as well as the “international normative order” (2011, 82).
A fundamental motivating factor for American democracy promotion arises, the
normative perspective suggests, because the national role perception of the United States
suggests that its mission is to fulfill a mission to aid the global spread of democracy. Such a
vision is closely tied to the liberal values that are at the heart of American political culture:
Obviously, established democracies should be interested in enlarging the
community of democratic states. On the other hand, democracy promotion is
about spreading universally conceived values. Democracy promotion is then
embedded in the democratic culture as the morally right thing to do, a liberal
mission… In addition, this implies that democratic governments and societies
have a ‘natural’ normative affinity to democratic (opposition) forces and
movements in other countries – a moral impetus that suggests supporting them
against oppressive governments (Wolff and Wurm 2011, 81).
This faith in the pacific nature of democracy is deeply ingrained in the American
imagination. There are two primary grounds for this belief. The first is grounded in the idea of
the democratic peace; that is, countries that are democratic do not fight one another:
Trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and
democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. Thanks in part to
globalization, almost two thirds of the world’s countries today are democracies—
a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democracies are
less likely to fight wars. While it’s true that democracies rarely if ever war with
each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies to engage in wars
with non-democracies. We can still hope that has more countries turn to
democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war by non-democracies
(Griswold 2007).
The second belief is that along with the establishment of democracy comes a series of
beneficial effects, not the least among them economic prosperity, and that all of these effects
support one another:
Liberals see democratization in a mutually reinforcing relationship with other
liberal values, such as economic interdependence and international law and
organization. All of these, independently and together, strength international
and domestic peace, in the liberal view (Gleditsch, et al., 2007, 8).
Such norms are by no means limited to American foreign policy. Gleditsch, et al. point to
the fact that in the post-Cold War period, United Nations spokespeople often speak of
democracy when before they merely spoke of ‘good governance’. The European Union and
NATO both have expressed greater commitment to democracy as well. And powerful NGOs
such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch also are actively pushing for democratic governance
(2007, 15).
Wolff and Wurm (2011) argue that international norms are mediated by the domestic
context:
Even if democracy and democracy promotion are generally established as regional or global
norms, the precise meaning of democracy is always contested and the question what, in a given
situation, might promote, protect, hinder, or undermine democracy is at times difficult to
answer. Thus, ample margins remain for the usual ‘national interests’ and particular national
values and norms to shape foreign policy decisions (85).
In the American context, Peceny argues, liberalism has an established place in
international politics. A strand of thought within the American congress is particularly
dedicated to addressing democracy and human rights goals abroad:
First, some actors in the policy process are motivated by their commitment to
liberal ideals. These "liberal internationalists" have supported interventions that
successfully promoted democracy and human rights. They have also launched
principled challenges to U.S. military interventions when they believed these
interventions undermined democracy, both at home and abroad (Peceny 1995,
383).
While expanding the community of democracies is generally seen as desirable in
mainstream American (and western) thought, it is also true that an inherent desire to promote
liberal values can express itself in both aggressive and non-aggressive ways. Doyle (1986)
suggests that member of the “family” of liberalism is liberal pacifism, as outlined by
Schumpeter. According to Doyle, Schumpeter’s argument is predicted on the idea that the
confluence of capitalism and democracy leads to an opposition to “war, expansion, [and]
cabinet diplomacy”. Thus, by the logic of liberal pacifism, modern liberal democracies have
developed strong anti-imperialistic tendencies (1153).
Doyle contrasts liberal pacifism with liberal imperialism, a very different strain of
liberalism that is based on the arguments of Machiavelli. Liberal imperialism is based on the
Machiavelli’s idea that:
Strength, and then imperial expansion, results from the way liberty encourages
increased population and property, which grows when the citizens know their
lives and goods are secure from arbitrary seizure. Free citizens equip large armies
and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the common good because
they are, in fact their own (Machiavelli 1950, 287-90 in
Doyle 1986, 1155).
Doyle also suggests the possibility that at least some democratic republics may currently
possess liberal imperialist characteristics. He argues that the balance between the
Machiavellian and Schumpeterian view of liberalism may depend on the degree to which
democratic publics can restrain the aggressive or reckless aggressive tendencies of elites (ibid,
1155).
According to Russett, the aggressive tendencies of democracies periodically manifest
themselves in American leaders. He argues that the script for such leaders is written as “fight
them, beat them, make them democratic”, and that idea of forcing democracy by military
intervention was certainly a guiding idea behind the American decision to initiate the Iraq War,
for instance (2005, 396).
Gleditsch, et al. note that the irony of forcing countries to become democratic against
their own will is not lost on many liberal thinkers:
Democratic interventionism is, understandably, a deeply troubling ideology for
many liberals. There is something inherently contradictory about forcing people to
be free and fighting war to end war (Gleditsch et al. 40).
However, the authors do not think that this apparent contradiction will dispel democratic
actors for pushing for democracy through military means:
Apart from its other virtues, the continued spread of democracy is likely
to reduce violence within and between nations. If a careful use of
targeted violence against autocratic regimes could reduce genocide and
politicide, decrease the risk of civil war, and promote international
peace, it might be justified as a form of just war (ibid, p. 40).
In recent years, a debate has emerged over to what degree the emerging liberal
consensus suggests a more central role for the international community in enforcing human
rights norms when states do not fulfill their obligations of good governance (49). Kegley and
Herrmann argue that many in the human rights community as well and the international legal
community are increasingly issuing “demands for humanitarian intervention” (1997, 361).
In short, as Wolff and Wurm argue, not only democracy and human rights, but their
external promotion has become an international norm (2011, 85).
Research suggests that changes in what constitutes a legitimate intervention may affect
how a leader views initiating regime change in an autocratic state. Peceny (1995) argues that
since the Clinton administration, the push for “democratic enlargement” has increased (398).
He argues that “US policy makers adopt pro-liberalization policies because they are compelled
to do so by a universally shared cultural bias in favour of democracy.”
Talentino suggests that international norms are defined by a combination of
“collectively shared expectations”, as well as moral missions “embedded in a foreign policy
culture” of a democratic state, can contribute to what she terms a “logic of appropriateness”.
She further argues that norms surrounding the promotion of democracy have become so
embedded over time that they are almost seen as binding expectations on the part of the
international community.
While normative factors play a role in determining the predisposition of policy makers’
attitudes about democracy, it is unlikely that such factors alone will sway American leaders to
intervene in an attempt to force democracy. But neither is there any inherent incompatibility
between liberalism and military action under certain conditions. While much of what ultimately
happens depends upon geopolitical or domestic political realities unrelated to a concern for
democracy, there is a strong underlying sense of a democratizing mission that runs strongly in
American politics and at times may leave them favourably predisposed toward action. I now
turn to the other set of factors that may contribute to a willingness to force democracy-instrumental or utilitarian factors.
B. Instrumental Factors
FD interventions may also be driven by realist or geopolitical concerns. Bueno de
Mesquita and Downs use the term “instrumental” to describe this set of motivations (2006,
631), while Wolff and Wurm refer to them as “utilitarian”, based on a desire to support “either
security/power interests…or economic benefits” (2011, 79). In an instrumental framework,
leaders are rational and only wish to be re-elected, and are thus likely to calculate a political
decision to intervene almost exclusively only on tangible benefits and costs (Bueno de Mesquita
1999; Ray 1995).
At the heart of an instrumental perspective of foreign policy is security. A number of
scholars have focused on the link between democracy promotion and security. Meernik (1996),
for instance, asserts the United States involvement in democratic promotion stems from
security interests. Similarly, Williams and Masters identify democracy promotion as a central
security interest for the U.S (2011, 21). Clearly, the United States is more likely to impose a
polity in another state if the target regime poses a security threat for the United States.
Owen argues that rational self-interest is at what motivates a country to militarily
intervene in another with the goal of regime change. During times of tension, the need for
leaders to expand their state’s power interacts with their desire to keep or put ideological allies
in power in the target state. Once a state decides to impose a polity, Owen argues they are
likely to impose institutions similar to their own in the target state. Installing similar institutions
to those of the imposer may be more attractive since the imposer has extensive, first-hand
knowledge of such institutions (2013, 396).
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs suggest a similar process, but infer that it is the
domestic political factors that determine which foreign policy goals are desirable. Democracy
will be a desirable outcome when it provides sufficient benefits to the domestic political
“winning coalition”. The authors suggest that in the case of a democratic intervener, these
benefits usually involve public goods such as “security, trade, and access to resources.” Even
though the intervening country is itself democratic, the resulting government will take a
democratic form only when this form is likely to aid the survival of the intervening country’s
leader (2007, 630).
Similarly, Enterline and Greig suggest that countries attempting to impose their
institutions onto others results in a lower need for self-maintenance. The intervening country
may choose to impose institutions that are compatible with their desired outcomes,
eliminating the necessity of repeated interventions to maintain the newly imposed regime). If
the state is able to create a polity that will deliver consistent and desired outcomes, the costs
of intervention may be surpassed by the benefits of dealing with a regime with similar
interests (2008, 884).
C. A Mixture of Both Types of Factors
The other possibility is that both normative and instrumental factors can play an important role
in the decision to push for democracy promotion. Wolff and Wurm describe democracy
promotion as being guided by both sets of factors.
The normative explanation, on the one hand, simply reinforces the utilitarian
argument in favor of democracy promotion: Obviously, established democracies
should be interested in enlarging the community of democratic states. On the
other hand, democracy promotion is about spreading universally conceived
values. Democracy promotion is then embedded in the democratic culture as the
morally right thing to do, a liberal mission. In addition, this implies that
democratic governments and societies have a ‘natural’ normative affinity to
democratic (opposition) forces and movements in other countries – a moral
impetus that suggests supporting them against oppressive governments (2011,
81).
The reality is that it will never be possible to precisely distinguish where the United States has
been motivated by normative concerns such as democracy, and when it has on the other hand
responded to utilitarian concerns. Gleditsch et al. (2007) argue:
In any intervention carried out by a major power, it is difficult to distinguish
between universalistic motivations like ‘promote democracy’ and self-interested
motivations like saving US citizens, protecting United Fruit, or ensuring
continued oil supplies. To some extent, the democratic peace blurs this
distinction between universalism and self-interest. A leader of a democratic
nation may argue that an autocratic state presents a danger, whereas a
democracy would be able to live peacefully with other democratic states. Thus,
the successful imposition of democracy is beneficial to national security (15).
Wolff and Wurm (2011) argue that while utilitarian needs are not likely to be subverted by
normative concerns, as long as there is not a direct clash:
The fact that the positive impact on national security is long-term only implies
that in particular situations where the goal of democracy promotion clashes with
directly tangible security interests, the latter prevail. If democracy promotion is
conceived of as an instrument, such ‘opportunistic’ behavior is perfectly in line
with a modified realist perspective on democracy promotion. Democracy is
promoted as long as it is seen, by decision makers, as improving a country’s
geostrategic situation in the long term, without having immediate negative
effects on national security and the relative power position (83).
In the case of the United States, Peceny argues, the domestic political institutional
arrangement distributes the liberal (normative) and realist (instrumental) elements of
American political thought in different branches of government. Decisions such as whether
and how to intervene are not made by a monolithic force. Rather, it is largely dependent
upon which branch gets the upper hand. Presidents favor realist approaches to politics, while
Congress is often more likely to prefer policies that are based in liberal values. In times when
Congress is more influential, such as when divided government exists, more idealistic policies
may be put into place. At such times, presidents may need to appeal to the adoption of proliberalization policies in order to gain Congress’ support for the intervention (1995, 387).
Thus, while decisions to intervene may have an underlying rationale related to security, it
is very possible that in certain cases the goal of democracy promotion will be a prominent
goal as well.
4. The Lack of Strong Viable Alternatives
Beyond internal and external motivating factors, I believe that the FD strategy may survive
well into the future as a potential policy option is the fact that other policy tools aimed at
changing regimes (or improving the behavior of existing ones) are inherently problematic,
particularly when it comes to recalcitrant or entrenched autocratic regimes. Most and Starr
argue that actors choose actions based upon their perceptions of the world and constraints, but
also based on the available set of alternatives.
There is little question that the FD strategy is not only drastic, but seen as a more coercive
option that is not only costly, but also puts American prestige on the line. Downes (2013)
concludes that, in light of the fact that FD attempts are usually not successful, “Democracies
may be better off employing non-military means—such as foreign aid, development assistance,
and attempts to build civil society—to bring about a more democratic world.” Without going
into detail, Downes argues that FD attempts will fail in places where desirable “preconditions”
are not present (131). While Downes may be correct, he is ignoring one fact: that each of the
alternatives to FD interventions has its own weaknesses.
In this section I present three primary strategies—sanctions, foreign aid, and democracy
assistance— that the United States and similarly-minded countries have historically used to
promote democracy when diplomacy fails, and why the FTBF strategy may under certain
conditions represent an appealing alternative.
A. Sanctions
Sanctions would appear to be a logical place to start when thinking of how to push a
country toward democracy. They are a traditional form of diplomacy that is well established
under international law. They can send a clear message to the intended target state. While
some ostensible cases can be pointed to (South Africa) in which these interventions worked,
they suffer from myriad problems and (may be subject to a number of unintended side effects.
Moreover, Levitsky and Way argue that “relative control over cost of ‘getting in and getting out’
and costs of military actions.
Although it cannot be said that there is a strong consensus on the track record of
sanctions, much recent research suggests that they frequently do not have the desired effect.
In 2009, 2010, and 2011, Peksen and Drury published their research the effects of economic
sanctions. They analyze the effects of economic sanctions on democratic outcomes, and find
that “economic coercion has a significant and relatively strong negative impact on democracy.”
The authors find that extensive sanctions are even more likely to result in lower democratic
scores than limited ones, and that it persists for the duration of the sanctions (2010, 254).
Peksen and Drury use time series data of sanctions and political outcomes in the 1980 to
2000 period, and that economic sanctions often increase the coercive power of the state.
Controlling for endogeneity and a number of demographic and economic variables, their
research suggests not only can states that are targets of sanctions be expected to become less
democratic, but personal integrity rights actually are likely to decline. For instance, the
imposition of partial economic sanctions leads to a 50% increase in “disappearances”, while full
sanctions lead to a 115% increase. The equivalent numbers for extrajudicial killings are 29% and
64%, respectively (2009, 69).
Peksen and Drury argue that sanctions create perverse incentives for leaders. In fact,
they do not decrease the coercive capacity of the regime while generating “new incentives” for
the state to restrict democratic freedoms. 2 unintended consequences First, economic
sanctions make states more likely to intervene in the economy in ways that will “redirect
wealth toward its ruling coalition and away from its opponents to minimize the cost of
sanctions on its capacity to rule. This strengthens the dependency of its political allies and
weakens resource-deprived opposition groups (2010, 244).
Second, sanctions increase the costs of the regime to “concede to the sender’s
demands, because it would see acquiescence as leading to a decrease in legitimacy and
domestic support (ibid, 246). In addition, democratic freedoms are likely to be limited due to
the fact that the regime will sense that the sanctions are a message in support of opposition
groups. The authors use the example of Noriega in Panama. As sanctions intensified, Noriega
cracked down on opposition groups with paramilitary battalions that “spied on, repressed, and
intimidated the population through fear and physical coercion (ibid, 247).
One problem is that the coercive nature of economic sanctions coercive, which may
galvanize support in the targeted country for the leader. Hendrickson (1995) argues that
economic sanctions are wrong as part of homogenizing coercive democratizing projects. Since
sanctions are modeled on m the first step to war:
The principal forerunner of today’s trade embargo is the naval blockade. In
strategic thought, economic sanctions exemplify the strategy of attrition, that is,
the attempt to wear down the enemy by striking down at the whole of its
economic life, which is ultimately the basis of its military power (22)”
Hendrickson argues that sanctions are wrong-headed considering the diversity we have
always seen in governments. The fact that United Nations and (it goes without saying) the
United States don’t have authority in UN charter to do this aside, sanctions lead to “unintended
consequences” and “innocent bystanders”: they kill those factions most likely to deal with the
sanctioning country, and are perceived as being warlike whether they actually are or not.
Levitsky and Way (2005) point out another problem: sanctions often fail to result in
democratic reform because they isolate regimes, and sanctions are most effective (they possess
the most “leverage”, in the authors’ terminology) when there are a great number of economic,
political, and cultural linkages. In other words, sanctions are limiting the very thing that makes
applying pressure on regimes successful. They bring up the examples of Cuba, North Korea,
Burma, and Zimbabwe, places where very little linkage and leverage existed due to isolation.
But what of diplomatic sanctions? Certainly they have the advantage of not appearing to
be as coercive. But even here, scholars find many potential problems. Tara Maller argues that
diplomatic sanctions have several “blowback” effects. First, they hamper in-country
intelligence. Second, they undermine communication between the two nations and are likely to
increase misperceptions between them. Finally, they reduce the influence of the country
imposing the sanctions, as embassies are meant to be a conduit for aid and assisting in bilateral
relations. As such, embassies might be able to influence matters on the ground. In short,
sanctions cut off constructive dialogue between the target country and the one imposing
sanctions (2010, 64).
Those who defend the use of sanctions focus less on their “record” but instead
emphasize that sanctions are designed to do more than deliver measurable results in the short
term. Oskarsson (2012) agrees that sanctions do not frequently lead to political change in the
target state. They are often used in order to contain regimes rather than to push for regime
change:
Sanctions have proven to be an effective means of coercion, proving critical in
containing both the Iraqi and Libyan regimes militarily. Weapons sales to Libya
virtually ended under the period of multilateral sanctions. In Iraq, the sanctions
prevented the rebuilding of the military after the first Gulf war and eroded Iraq’s
WMD program by blocking the import of necessary technologies. There have
been rumors of a similar situation’s occurring in Iran (99).
Ironically, according to Oskarsson, economic sanctions (or sanctions in general) are most
likely to work against already democratic states.
Diamond argues that sanctions may be better suited as a carrot than as a stick (i.e.,
lifting sanctions). While imposing them is not likely to lead to regime change in and of itself, the
value of sanctions may lie in their ability to change the behavior of the existing regime (2007,
24) .
In short, however, sanctions may more useful with regard to how they change existing
regime behavior than in whether they change actual regimes. While they are easy to implement
and do not have a great initial cost, and are certainly less drastic than war, sanctions are not
likely to result in a significant level of democratization in the short term. Moreover, sanctions
are ultimately costly both to the target country and to the sanctioning one. The difficult,
complex, and drawn out nature of sanctions would only serve to make a more direct approach
such as military intervention, more appealing—particularly where their leverage is smallest.
B. Foreign Aid
Encouraging countries to democratize through offering foreign aid is a second potential
way to encourage authoritarian countries to develop without direct interference. If autocratic
leaders desire foreign aid, the logic goes, receipt of continued aid can be conditional upon
improved behavior: “donors often condition grants or loans intended for general budget
support on performance in the areas of civil liberties, the conduct of elections, and respect for
the rule of law” (Knack 2004, 202). Knack argues that in addition to directly modifying behavior
of regimes, foreign aid may also aid democratization through the “modernizing” effects of
increasing education and per capita incomes, which may “increase the demand for democratic
government” (ibid, 202).
Much recent research on the topic points to positive, if not sizeable, increases in
democratic practices of countries due to foreign aid flows. Research by Bermeo (2011; 2013)
suggests that development assistance leads to modest levels of democratic change, at least in
the post-Cold War period for a slight but positive effect. Bermeo argues that conditional aid is
often useful because it is scarce. Thus, its positive effects may be restricted in oil producing
nations or others that are well endowed with natural resource (2011, 33). Likewise, Goldsmith
finds “small but real effects on economic and political liberalism. Aid is just that, aid—it gives a
bit of a lift” (2001, 44). He argues that there is indeed an “integral link” between aid and
democratic change, although it is important to avoid the electoral fallacy.
Another group of scholars suggests that foreign aid does not have any effect on the level
of democracy. Dietrich and Wright examine the effects of foreign aid on five governance
measures that relate to the consolidation of democracy (electoral turnover, etc.) during the
1991-2008 period. The authors do find that targeted democracy and governance aid does have
a positive effect (2008, 28).
Similarly, World Bank economic Stephen Knack argues that the data suggest that “little
if any” of the gains in democracy can be attributed to foreign aid. His study extends from the
years 1975 to 2000, and evaluates the effects of aid dependence on the level of both the
freedom house and Polity measures of democracy (2004, 262). As the article focuses on aid
dependence rather than changes in aid, this may not be particular significance, since levels of
aid tend to remain rather stable over time.
A recent study by economists Dutta et al. (2013) finds that while aid does have an effect,
it tends to stabilize whatever type of regime is in place, via what they term the “amplification
effect”:
Foreign aid neither causes democracies to become more dictatorial nor causes
dictatorships to become more democratic. it only amplifies recipients' existing
political-institutional orientations. Aid makes dictatorships more dictatorial and
democracies more democratic (66).
The failure of social scientists to find a conclusive role for the effect of foreign aid
on democratization is likely in part due to the fact that the relationship between the
recipient country and its donors is a complex one: Aid is a key component in a feedback
loop between donor and recipient countries. Bermeo argues that using scarce resources
as a method of encouraging countries may work, but that it is hard to determine telling if
the improvement happened because countries are likely to give more aid to recipients
that they believe are more likely to improve. Bermeo thus argues that the aid-democracy
relationship involves a complex process that not only has selection effects, but also
involves a feedback loop. Bermeo thinks that there is feedback loop action. She says that
states respond to positive incentives but is this partly due to the fact that donor states
anticipated that reaction (2010, 2029)?
Kersting suggests that countries are selected for aid because of their potential for
improvement in democratic performance. He argues that aid has a significant effect when
recipients expect future aid to be conditional. Collins agrees, stating that conditional aid is more
likely to work when donor credibility is strong (2013, 3).3
In conclusion, there is enough uncertainty that it even helps development at all. And even that
indirect route toward perhaps more social capital, etc. is a pretty sceptical way of doing things.
Nonetheless, some research suggests that aid can have at least some effect on
democratization, at least with regard to certain recipients, certain aid conditions and with
certain types of aid. Understanding the success rates of development assistance, however, is
complicated by the fact that aid is given for many reasons, and in some cases, the goal of
democratization is viewed as less important than the geopolitical significance of the recipient
country.
Economic aid may help to condition the behavior of autocrats to gradually move toward
democracy. However, foreign aid is also suited for long-term change, and appears to be highly
dependent upon the type of interaction that exists between the donor and recipient countries.
And there is little reason to expect that this form of assistance will change the political
landscape of a recipient country in the short or medium term.
C. Democracy Aid
Another alternative is democracy assistance. Many studies have shown that there is
indeed a clear effect of democracy assistance programs. Thomas Carothers argues that such
effects are “modest, negligible, and occasionally negative,” and can lead to reform:
The political approach has two principal strengths. It leads democracy promoters
to give direct attention to the domain of political competition—the institutional
framework for competition, the degree of actual political freedom in practice,
3
However, the power of conditionality may be undermined if the recipient country is also receiving significant
amounts of unconditional aid from autocratic countries or is of high geopolitical importance (2013, 16).
the capacities and actions of the key political actors involved, and so forth. This
domain is key to democratic progress in many settings. It is a domain from which
power holders may seek to deflect outside attention by offering up reforms in
other arenas, such as the social and economic. In addition, by encouraging
democracy promoters to look for and respond to key political junctures, the
political approach sometimes helps democracy-aid providers to find a catalytic
role, such as helping to support the organizational base for large-scale civic
resistance to the manipulation of an election (2009, 9).
Most studies find a positive effect for democracy assistance, but they also find that these
effects are not always straightforward. Finkel et al. (2009) conducted a detailed longitudinal
study of USAID democracy promotion funding in Latin America, concluding that while such
programs do have a significant impact, they also take a long time to work (436). This would
mean that while such aid is effective, a President would be unlikely to be able to reap the credit
for improvement during his or her term in office. Dutta, Leeson, and Williams (2013) find that
while democracy assistance may help to steer newly democratizing countries in the direction of
independence, it leads to no improvement in firmly established autocracies.
In addition, Scott et al. argue, there may be a powerful selection process in place:
"Allocations are strategic decisions informed by cues for donors about the prospects for the
impact of democracy aid, of which democracy itself may be among the most important" (2011,
52).
It is important to note that just because democracy assistance has a positive effect does
not mean that one would expect similar gains to scale if it were given in massive quantities. In
other words, it doesn’t appear that the relationship is as simple as “1) aid is given and 2) the
situation gets better”. Rather, the US and other donors seek prospects, and are much more
likely to give aid to those that they deem to be good prospects.
Of political assistance, it can be said that it is desirable as far as it goes—most people
argue that it is effective under certain conditions. Diamond argues that it is not only good value
for the money, but also serves an important function of keeping hope alive in cases where
authoritarianism seems to be firmly entrenched (2008, 125). However, political assistance
appears to be a strategy more designed for prodding recalcitrant regimes or for encouraging
newly democratizing countries to continue on the path toward consolidation more it is for
engineering short- or medium-term regime change. Schmidt argues:
Outsiders find it difficult to intervene directly in authoritarian societies where
there is no ongoing conflict or where the political leadership is strongly resistant
to change. In such cases, outsiders who wish to promote democracy have to
resort to more indirect methods. In the United States, the Agency for
International Development (AID), the State Department and the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) fund organizations, such as International
Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute (2008, 113).
Dinorah Azpuru suggests that despite its problems, democracy promotion does have a
great deal of potential. In reality, targeted democracy aid has only been pursued in Latin
America for a couple of decades. We have only genuinely been pursuing this for a couple of
decades. Likewise, Thomas Carothers (2007) suggests that during the short time that
democracy promotion has been around, there has been a great deal of learning, and the quality
of assistance has improved dramatically. However, the strength of democracy promotion as a
strategy is also its weakness. Small, targeted programmes can work, but it is hard to imagine
them working on a large scale. As Carothers says, democracy promotion works, but it is limited,
expensive, and not likely to be repeated on a larger scale.
Nonetheless, this strategy would have limited appeal, particularly in those “hard to
crack” places where democracy assistance is not likely to have a significant reach. Despite the
promise, recent scholarship doesn’t point toward the idea that this strategy is a short- or
medium-term substitute for regime change. The failure of these alternatives to result in
meaningful change means that, if anything, there is more of a rationale to intervene directly
rather than wait on less coercive, less forceful means.
4. Conclusion: Windows of Opportunity?
I have referred to the idea that FD interventions may be viewed as an attractive option
at certain times and under certain conditions. In this section, I suggest what some of those
favourable conditions might be. Two are related to domestic events, and two are more related
to the international environment.
A. “Wag the Dog”. A lot of hay has been made over the “diversionary theory of war.”
Reagan’s intervention into the tiny country of Grenada to restore democracy is seen by some as
an attempt by American leaders to deflect attention away from their own troubles in the
domestic political arena. Reagan’s intervention into the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada in
1983 could conceivably fit this category, for instance. Reagan’s popularity had begun to
rebound from their nearly historic lows from earlier in the year, but his popularity continued to
improve well into the sixties for some time to come in the year and a half after the
intervention.
However, while “wag the dog” may intuitively be an appealing scenario, there is little
evidence for the diversionary theory of war. Meernik (2001) argues that “elections, the
unemployment rate, the inflation rate and the stock market apparently are not important in
presidential decision-making to use force (899).” Selection effects appear to explain the link
between poor domestic performance and US interventions due to the fact that international
crises are much more likely to occur during these times, providing many more opportunities for
Presidents to make the decision to intervene militarily. Foster and Keller (2011) also argue that
it is quite difficult to ever directly discern when domestic forces actually led to diversionary
actions. However, they do suggest that leaders who lack “cognitive complexity”, i.e., those who
view crises simplistically and do not review a full range of options before acting, are more likely
to initiate them (205). Thus, while strong evidence doesn’t exist for this theory, neither can it
be ruled out as a potential reason for FD interventions.
In this case, the decision to use war as a diversionary tactic would have to be
accompanied by an attempt to push for democracy in the country that is the target of the
intervention. One can imagine cases beyond Grenada in which Presidents may have used their
intervention to increase popularity (George H.W. Bush in Panama in 1989, for instance), but
given the small number of cases and the complex set of domestic political factors at work, it
would be difficult to prove that FD interventions are in any way “caused” by the desire to divert
attention away from domestic affairs.
Given the small number of cases of intervention in the post-war period, we may want
to rely more on historical accounts, however, which Levy suggests provide plenty of evidence
that Presidents do indeed use force to divert from their domestic problems (1988, 673).
B. Power Shifts
A shift in political power between the President and Congress may be another reason
when may be another time when FD interventions are more likely. Peceny (1995) argues that
presidents have always taken relatively realist approaches to international politics, while
Congress often takes a more ideological position. During times when Congress has the upper
hand, it may be possible that “liberal attacks from the Congress… can compel presidents to shift
from non-liberalization to pro-liberalization policies during the course of an intervention (398).
This possibility of an intervention beginning as a geostrategic action but morphing into a more
humanitarian one can help to explain why interventions may be so focused on bringing about
democratic change despite the underlying security context.
C. Periods of Insecurity
Ideally, one should wait to establish democracy when conditions are ripe; for instance,
Fukuyama argues that a sense of “stateness” is necessary before an enduring political order can
be established (2005, 85). In reality, however, countries often act when the opportunity arises.
Werner (1996) and Meernik (2000) both argue that it is during times of uncertainty and crisis
that American leaders are likely to intervene. Owen argues that the most intensive period of
attempts to impose democracy coincide with times of high transnational ideological tension
and a high level international insecurity (2002, 376). It is during times of insecurity that
“windows of opportunity” emerge and interventions are more likely.
During such times of insecurity, American leaders may be more likely to choose the
option of suppressing a dangerous enemy. But how might this then explain why FD attempts
are more likely? One might argue that the combination of liberal and realist motivations may
apply here. Establishing a firm ally who is unlikely to challenge American interests is of course a
geopolitical goal. Installing democratic political institutions in the target state can be seen as a
way of establishing an ideologically similar regime that is unlikely to present itself as a threat.
Yet it is also the case that democracy can be seen as a good in and of itself. Domestic interests,
and liberal elements in Congress, may be more easily sold on the conflict if it involves an
attempt to not only pacify the target country, but to install democratic institutions.
Returning to Most and Starr’s concepts, American leaders can be viewed as rational
actors. So while the opportunity may always be there, willingness may be significantly more
likely during certain domestic and international situations. There are two factors to consider
here. First, the medium- and long-term costs of action may be high. However, if a president can
expect short-term benefits by being seen as interviewing for democracy’s sake, he may be more
likely to engage in action despite these costs. One must also remember that Presidents are
generally more focused on costs during their tenure than they are on the long-term impacts of
their actions, so they may be willing to discount long-term costs of an action. Leaders must
weigh potential benefits of action against the possibilities. Intervention is certainly costly, and
its benefits are uncertain. However, at times, the risks of inaction are seen as even more
unappealing than those of action. And it can offer the possibility of tangible results and the
credit that goes along with them.
I would argue that the conventional wisdom about the idea of forcing democracy (if
there is such a thing) in political science falls somewhere along the lines of “intervention
doesn’t lead to democracy under most conditions; the success rate is low; why not try other
measures (diplomatic pressure, foreign aid, economic coercion, etc.). The “ideal” strategy
would likely be one that engages the autocratic state while providing a constant stream of
carrots and sticks that slowly pushes the country in a democratic direction. Russett (2005), for
example, argues that democracy is “contagious”, and the best way to approach autocracies is to
rely on IGOs and civil society where they are strong, and to help build them where they are
weak (2005, 406). The problem is that American leaders do not always feel that they have the
luxury to wait for international institutions and NGOs to develop and lead countries gently
toward democracy. This can be seen at best as a strategy that at best will take longer than the
tenure of any president to succeed. Presidents feel internal and external pressures that make
waiting around for “ideal” strategies such as Russett’s seem unpalatable, especially during
times of uncertainty and crisis.
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Figure 1. Targets of “Democratizing” Interventions, Post-War Period
Country
Afghanistan
Cambodia
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iraq
Laos
Lebanon
Nicaragua
Panama
Philippines
Somalia
Vietnam
Intervention
Type
1
1
1 and 2
1
1 and 2
2
1 and 2
1 and 2
1
1
1
1 and 2
1 and 2
1 and 2
2
1
Freedom House
(2013)
Not Free
Not Free
Free
Free
Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Not Free
Partly Free
Partly Free
Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Not Free
Polity IV
(2014)
N/A*
Autocracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
N/A*
Democracy
Autocracy
Autocracy
Autocracy
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy
Not Free
Not Free
* States that are viewed as failing or occupied are not ranked by Polity IV.