Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
1
Background/Reference ............................................................................................................................. 3
Okinawa Background ............................................................................................................................ 4
Pro ........................................................................................................................................................... 10
Contention I -- Alliance ....................................................................................................................... 11
Contention II – Cyber War .................................................................................................................. 16
Contention IV -- Kick Out .................................................................................................................... 21
Contention V -- Deterrence................................................................................................................. 28
Contention VI – Rotational Presence/China ....................................................................................... 34
Contention VII– Democracy Credibility............................................................................................... 43
Contention VIII – China Encirclement ................................................................................................. 46
Contention IX – Okinawa-Japan Relations .......................................................................................... 54
Contention X – Allied Assurances ....................................................................................................... 55
A2: They Should Stay in Okinawa and Go Elsewhere.......................................................................... 58
A2: Withdrawal Undermines Allied Assurances ................................................................................. 63
Pencil Pushers ..................................................................................................................................... 69
Okinawa Bases Can Go Elsewhere ...................................................................................................... 70
A2: Withdrawal Causes Japan to Go Nuclear...................................................................................... 72
A2: Withdrawal Causes Conventional Rearmament ........................................................................... 75
A2: Proposal Politically Unpopular...................................................................................................... 76
Con .............................................................................................................................................................. 79
Con Contentions ..................................................................................................................................... 81
Contention I – Asian Credibility.......................................................................................................... 82
Contention II – China .......................................................................................................................... 83
Contention III -- Taiwan....................................................................................................................... 86
Contention IV --Korea ......................................................................................................................... 87
Contention V – Disaster Response HADR........................................................................................... 91
Contention VI—Alliance ...................................................................................................................... 95
Contention VII—Gradualism ............................................................................................................... 96
Con China Extensions .............................................................................................................................. 98
Access Link Wall (China)...................................................................................................................... 99
Con General Deterrence Extensions ..................................................................................................... 101
Capability & Will Wall ....................................................................................................................... 102
AT: Navy / Air .................................................................................................................................... 103
AT: Guam........................................................................................................................................... 104
AT: Kadena ........................................................................................................................................ 105
Uniqueness........................................................................................................................................ 106
AT: force Dispersal ............................................................................................................................ 107
AT: Kickout Now ................................................................................................................................ 108
AT: 35000 Protest ............................................................................................................................. 110
AT: Japan China War ......................................................................................................................... 111
AT: Deterrence Fails .......................................................................................................................... 113
Con Korea Extensions............................................................................................................................ 119
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
2
Yes Korea Collapse ............................................................................................................................ 120
Impact ............................................................................................................................................... 122
Con General Deterrence Extensions ..................................................................................................... 125
Links .................................................................................................................................................. 126
A2: Response Time Link Turn ............................................................................................................ 129
A2: Marines Left Behind.................................................................................................................... 132
A2: We don’t Know the Exact Number of Marines We Need ........................................................... 135
A2: Other Bases in Asia ..................................................................................................................... 136
Answers to Pro Advantages .................................................................................................................. 137
A2: Dugongs/Environment ................................................................................................................ 138
A2: Bases Benefit the Okinawa Economy ......................................................................................... 139
A2: Other Ways to Deter................................................................................................................... 141
A2: Not Enough Troops in Okinawa to Deter .................................................................................... 143
A2: Can Move Bases to Mainland Japan ........................................................................................... 146
Asia War Impacts .................................................................................................................................. 148
Asia Arms Race Impats .......................................................................................................................... 154
China Threat .......................................................................................................................................... 158
Japan-US Alliance Impacts .................................................................................................................... 159
Japan Nuclearization ............................................................................................................................. 170
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Background/Reference
3
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
4
Okinawa Background
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16
Uchina, as Okinawa is called in its native tongue, was the largest island of the archipelagic
Kingdom of Ryukyu in the East China Sea. An independent country from the fifteenth to the
seventeenth century, it played an important role in the maritime trade of East and Southeast
Asia. Although it became a tributary state, first to China and then to Japan, it remained largely
autonomous and prospered, providing a crucial channel between two kingdoms that otherwise
had no formal relationship. Ryukyuans were not considered Japanese; in fact, Japan forbade
them from adopting Japanese customs, clothing, or names.
This changed in 1879, when Japan’s Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and
incorporated it as Okinawa Prefecture. Thus followed a period of subjugation and forced
assimilation under imperial Japan, particularly during World War II. About a quarter of
Okinawa’s civilian population lost their lives during the Battle of Okinawa, a series of skirmishes
from April to June 1945 that resulted in Allied victory. Not all the deaths were a result of Allied
action. The Japanese military ordered many Okinawans to kill family members and commit
suicide rather than risk the shame of capture; Okinawans, indoctrinated to be loyal to the
Japanese emperor and to “be more Japanese,” complied.
After the war, Okinawa effectively became a U.S. military colony, and the United States
updated and expanded military installations around the island. Although the United States
purchased much of the land from locals, it also reportedly resorted to coercion and deception
in order to buy it, evicting unwilling residents by bulldozer and bayonet. The Okinawans under
U.S. occupation had neither political authority nor legal redress for the seizure of property or
for crimes committed by service members.
If Okinawans hoped that the reversion to Japanese governance in 1972 would decrease the U.S.
presence on their lands, hopes were dashed by geopolitical considerations. With fleet anchorage, troop
staging, and airfields at a close distance to Seoul, Shanghai, and Taipei, the island is key to the United
States’ security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Although Okinawa constitutes less than one percent of
Japan’s total land area, it bears the burden of 74 percent of the U.S. military’s overall footprint in the
country, including facilities, equipment, and roughly half of the 53,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan.
Associated Press, December 25, 2015, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/okinawa-suesjapan-government-in-bid-to-stop-u-s-military-base-relocation-1451040155 DOA: 2-2-16
TOKYO—Local authorities on Okinawa filed a lawsuit against the central government Friday in a bid to
stop the relocation of a U.S. air base on the southern Japanese island, deepening their decadeslong
dispute over the heavy U.S. troop presence there.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
5
The Okinawa government said the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism illegally suspended the prefectural governor’s
cancellation of approval for reclamation work needed to relocate U.S.
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a less-populated part of the island
called Henoko.
“We will do whatever it takes to stop the new Henoko base,” Okinawa
Gov. Takeshi Onaga told a news conference in the prefectural capital of
Naha. “Okinawa’s argument is legitimate, and I believe that it will be
certainly understood.”
The central government filed its own lawsuit against Mr. Onaga last
month, after he rejected an order from the Land Ministry to reinstate
approval, issued by his predecessor, for the land reclamation. The
ministry went ahead with the reclamation work.
“We’ll proceed with the construction to achieve the planned relocation as soon as possible,” Defense
Minister Gen Nakatani said in Tokyo.
Half of US trrops are in Okinawa
Associated Press, December 25, 2015, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/okinawa-suesjapan-government-in-bid-to-stop-u-s-military-base-relocation-1451040155 DOA: 2-2-16
he legal battle is the latest chapter in a long-running dispute between the
central government and Okinawa, formerly a tiny kingdom that was
annexed by Japan in the 16th century.
Many residents want the U.S. base moved out of Okinawa entirely. They
have been long frustrated by heavy U.S. troop presence on the tiny
island and have complained about noise, pollution and crime associated
with the foreign bases.
Under a Japan-U. S. security treaty, about 50,000 U.S. troops are
stationed in Japan, more than half of them on Okinawa.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
6
Okinawa hosts 7% of US military installations in Japan
Arata Yamamoto, October 29, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/okinawa-relocation-u-smilitary-base-triggers-protests-n453486 DOA: 2-2-16
The Japanese government resumed controversial construction work to
relocate a key U.S. airbase in Okinawa on Thursday, with elderly
protesters who tried to stop the project being dragged away by police.
Some residents oppose the plan to move the U.S. Marines' Futenma base
to another location on the island. The government earlier this month
overruled local Governor Takeshi Onaga's decision to rescind
permission to build on the new site that had been approved by his
predecessor.
Outside the gates of the construction site and on a flotilla, more than 200
protesters gathered to condemn the move. They say it will damage the
environment. Okinawa was also site of bloody battles near the end of
World War Two which left almost 100,000 civilians dead, and many
locals resent hosting the U.S. military at all.
Despite the war scars, the island currently hosts 75 percent of all U.S.
military installations in Japan.
"The fact that they forcibly executed this construction, there is nothing
but anger," Takashi Kishimoto from the Okinawa Peace Movement
Center who spoke to NBC News via cellphone from a protest boat. "We
are outraged at these political tactics which ignore will of the people."
The area already returned area is very small
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
7
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
The United States and Japan on Friday announced the upcoming return of two parcels of land from
military bases in Okinawa to civilian use. The thin strips, currently part of U.S. bases, are to help widen
roads and ease traffic jams.
The news came at a rare joint announcement by U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy and Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo.
The total size of the land is a tiny fraction of the massive territory occupied by U.S. bases, which
together take up as much as 18.2 percent of Okinawa Island.
The transfer is not imminent, and will be complete by the end of March 2018.
Still, Kennedy and Suga played up its significance, in an apparent effort to ease growing anti-military
sentiment among Okinawans, many of whom seek a reduction in the U.S. military presence.
New Okinawa governor blocking the construction of the Futenma replacement facility
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Outlook for Construction of Offshore Runways at the Henoko Site
Construction of the new facility will involve challenges for both law enforcement officials and engineers
working on the project. Reportedly, the offshore runways will require 21 million cubic meters of soil to
create 395 acres of reclaimed land.2 The bulk of this soil will be delivered by ship from other areas of
Japan ((In an attempt to prevent or delay the construction of the FRF, the Okinawa prefectural
legislature passed an ordinance that requires imported soil to undergo special screening and allows the
governor to cancel the import of soil). Japanese and U.S. officials have said that construction of the FRF
would be finished in April 2022 at the earliest. A slightly larger offshore runway project at the Iwakuni
Marine Corps base in mainland Japan took 13 years to complete,3 but the Henoko land reclamation
project could proceed faster than the Iwakuni project if Tokyo commits more administrative attention
and resources to it. Abe Administration officials have repeatedly declared their intent to return MCAS
Futenma to local control as soon as possible, and the most plausible means of achieving that goal under
the existing agreement would be to accelerate construction of the Henoko FRF.
Construction of the new base will also be a law enforcement challenge for Japan. The ability and will of
the Okinawan Prefectural Police to thwart determined anti-base protesters and enable smooth
construction could be severely tested. The Japanese Coast Guard has been called into service to prevent
sea-going protestors in kayaks from interfering with the land reclamation operation. The mayor of the
local municipality (Nago City) has declared that he will not cooperate whatsoever in construction of the
Henoko FRF ((see section “Nato City Political Dynamics”), which could bring additional inconveniences
and logistical delays.
New governor blocking base relocation on the island
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
8
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
In the last days of 2013, the United States and Japan cleared an important political hurdle in their longdelayed plan to relocate the Futenma base when Hirokazu Nakaima, then-Governor of Okinawa,
approved construction of an offshore landfill necessary to build the replacement facility. Nakaima lost
his reelection bid in late 2014, however, and his successor as Governor of Okinawa has used a variety of
administrative, legal, and political tactics to prevent or delay construction of the Futenma replacement
facility. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated that the new base at Henoko would
be completed no earlier than 2022.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
9
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
10
Pro
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
11
Contention I -- Alliance
Advantage one is Alliance
The US agreed to relocate the Futenma base 20 years ago but still hasn’t followed
through - this is the biggest vulnerability in the alliance – only the plan makes relations
sustainable
Tatsumi, Senior Associate of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, 6-24-15
(Yuki, “Abe’s Okinawa Problem,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/abes-okinawa-problem/)
The reason of Abe’s frustration with Onaga is clear. Onaga, formerly a member of ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who used to support
Futenma’s relocation to Henoko when he was the mayor of Naha City, has not softened his stance against the existing plan to relocate Futenma
Air Station. Onaga even visited Hawaii and Washington D.C. between May 27 and June 5, accompanied by a delegation of Diet and
prefectural assembly members from Okinawa, to voice the prefecture’s opposition to the current government plan to U.S. lawmakers and
government officials. If anything, the
cool treatment he received in the United States — he could not get any official
whom he met during his trip to sympathize with his position — seems to have hardened his opposition
to the current plan. To be fair, the problem associated with the relocation of Futenma Air Station is not of Abe’s making. In 2009, Yukio
Hatoyama, then the prime minister and head of the Democratic Party of Japan, promised that his government would look for an alternative to
the current relocation plan that is “at minimum outside Okinawa.” With that
promise, a sense of hope quickly emerged
and spread in Okinawa that the Futenma relocation issue could be resolved under the new political
leadership. When Hatoyama admitted nine months into his premiership that he had come to realize that the existing plan was indeed the
best option available for Okinawa, disenchanted political leaders in Okinawa (who lost whatever little confidence they may have had in Japan’s
central government) came together behind the banner of “no new construction in Henoko.” In other words, five years after Hatoyama left
office, the Abe government still struggles to recover from the situation aggravated during the Hatoyama administration. Still, the reality
remains that the
relocation of Futenma Air Station has not been achieved almost 20 years after the U.S. and
Japanese governments first agreed on it in 1996. The local government holds a great deal of authority in issuing various
permits required for the construction of the replacement facility to proceed. Therefore, even if Onaga cannot stop the
construction in Henoko, he can still make the process as difficult as possible for the Japanese
government. Theoretically, Abe can counter these moves by trying to enact a Special Measures Law that would
allow the central government in Tokyo to proceed with the relocation without having to subject the process to the approval by the governor
and/or mayor, essentially overriding their authority. There is precedent for this — in 1996, the Japanese government revised the Special
Measures Law to practically allow the Japanese government to continue to rent the land for U.S. military bases and other facilities from private
landowners regardless of the owners’ request for the land to be returned. However,
doing so prematurely would damage
the Abe government as it has the risk of triggering anti-U.S. base sentiment across Japan. The approval rating
for Abe’s cabinet is on the decline since the government hit a major speed bump in its deliberation of national security legislation after three
constitutional scholars unanimously argued that the proposed legislation is “unconstitutional.” Under the circumstances, Abe will not want to
force the issue. The
current situation, where Futenma Air Station’s ultimate fate remains in limbo, is
unsustainable. As Tokyo’s relationship with Okinawa remains deadlocked with no real prospect of a breakthrough, Futenma
remains, as it was 20 years ago, one of the most tangible vulnerabilities for the political sustainability of a
U.S. military presence in Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance writ large.
Marine presence is eroding the alliance - reducing the burden on Okinawa is key to the
effectiveness of relations
Mochizuki, Associate Professor @ George Washington University, 13
(Mike, “Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific,”
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/chian/naha_port/documents/h24reporten-1.pdf)
As the United States and Japan look to a new phase in their relationship, with President Barack Obama beginning a second
term and change likely in Japanese political leadership soon, they have some serious work to do. What the late great Ambassador
Mike Mansfield called the greatest bilateral alliance in the world, bar none, a generation ago remains great. It
features two of the world’s three largest economies, that are also two of the world’s best in the hightechnology sectors; it bridges enormous cultural and geographic expanses because for all their differences, the Japanese and American
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
12
peoples share common values and a desire for peace;
it affords America irreplaceable basing and staging options while
protecting Japan in one of the world’s most dynamic and turbulent regions. Yet it is underperforming. For more than a decade,
the biggest issue within this alliance of giants has been what to do about 18,000 Marines, a relatively small
force, on the very small island of Okinawa, and what to do about one particular Marine Corps airfield there. Japanese domestic politics are
the immediate cause of the impasse in solving the problem, but much larger strategic and diplomatic stakes are at play as well. As long as
the alliance stays bogged down over this matter, it will gradually and ineluctably atrophy, and it will be
increasingly hard to describe it as the world’s greatest or most important. What to do? The bases in Japan are all
highly useful, but only some are crucially important in a strategic sense in our judgment. A number of capabilities presently located in
Japan out of convenience could be downsized without harm to the alliance’s posture, largely because
alternatives exist that are militarily comparable or superior. A good analogy might be with the Obama administration’s
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe, whereby a technologically superior new approach also partially mitigated a diplomatic
problem with Russia. Here the situation is different of course, but there
do appear to be ways to reduce the Marine Corps
footprint on Okinawa even further than now contemplated—and bring some of the Marines back to main
American bases rather than Guam, as a cost-saving measure—while actually improving net military responsiveness for
Asian contingencies. We develop these ideas below, while also addressing a number of other nettlesome matters
within the alliance.
Japan is the cornerstone of norm creation – the alliance is key to cooperation and
preventing conflict
Walker, Transatlantic Fellow @ German Marshall Fund, 15
(Joshua, “Japan's Global Re-Emergence: How Japan's Active Diplomacy Strengthens the Foundations of
the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-w-walker/japans-globalreemergence_b_7013506.html)
Japan has reappeared on the world stage. After 20 years of economic stagnation and a decade of political malaise, Shinzo Abe, in his
second incarnation as prime minister, has won two major elections and is attempting to use his political capital to reform the sluggish Japanese economy. At the
same time, he is placing a renewed emphasis on global affairs. Central to this has been the Abe's government effort to diversify Tokyo's international partnerships.
Japan is forging closer relations across the Indo-Pacific and increasing dialogue with ASEAN. Farther abroad, Japan
is deepening cooperation
with Europe and reinforcing its security anchor, the U.S.-Japan alliance. Just when global rules and
norms are being tested, Tokyo's proactive diplomatic outreach, aimed at strengthening the international
system, is a welcome development for Washington. Japan has benefited tremendously from the U.S.-led international rules based order
established after World War II and now seeks to stand-up to the threats that are challenging this order by strengthening its connectivity with other countries -especially other democracies. Japan is seizing the opportunity to be not only a contributor to regional peace and stability, but an active player on the global stage.
Japan's determination to be a global actor is underscored by recent contributions to international peace
and prosperity efforts in combating the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Japan
joined the United States and Europe in implementing sanctions against Russia. This position ran contrary to the prior
Japanese goal of settling its longstanding territorial dispute with Moscow and securing much-needed energy resources from Russia. Sadly, Japan's increased global
profile has not come without controversy or tragedy, witnessed most starkly by the recent public killing of two Japanese hostages by ISIS. The Abe government has
sought to diversify Japan's traditional partnerships and policy instruments by pursuing a grand strategy of connectivity among democracies, while balancing its
pragmatic and opportunistic relations with other states. This strategy begins with Japan's newly established National Security Council, and employs the use of a
variety of levers including foreign aid, defense commerce, and multilateral diplomacy. Ultimately, Abe's success in this endeavor will hinge on his much-vaunted
"Abenomics" -- economic policy aimed at resuscitating the sluggish Japanese economy. The success of this daunting task will likely determine whether Abe will have
the political capital to sustain Japanese leadership abroad. There is little public appetite for Japan's international leadership role if direct interests are not at stake.
Thus it is vital for Abe's government to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership as soon as possible, and clarify the benefits of various new trilateral partnerships
involving Australia, India, and Southeast Asia. If Abe can succeed, a
revitalized Japan, empowered to undertake important trade negotiations and
reinterpret the traditional definitions of collective self-defense, is a welcome global development. Japan's proactive diplomacy is not a threat to
the U.S.-Japan alliance; rather it is a tribute to it. By the same token, strategic diplomacy with partners in the region or elsewhere who share common interests but
not values should be viewed as complementary to U.S. and European interests. Tokyo's
diversification of its partnerships with likeminded powers in the Indo-Pacific and Europe along with the deepening of relations in Southeast Asia
works to ensure a prosperous and strong Japan, which in turn guarantees regional stability. Rather than being
a zero-sum game for the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is a force multiplier for both parties. The United States remains the indispensable link
between the Atlantic and Pacific. In turn, Japan has a key role to play not just as an important ally of the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
13
United States in Asia, but also as the world's fourth largest economy, the biggest donor of international
aid, and home to many of the world's most respected multinational businesses, assets that Tokyo can
bring to bear in international affairs to reinforce global norms and the existing international order. Success
in tackling its own domestic and economic challenges will ultimately determine the longevity of Tokyo's global renaissance. Japan's global emergence should be
welcomed and encouraged by its partners to weather the challenges in the 21st century.
Norms solve existential great power wars
Sachs 14—Jeffrey, D. is a Professor of Sustainable Development, Professor of Health Policy and
Management, and Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is also Special Adviser to the
United Nations Secretary-General on the Millennium Development Goals “Ukraine and the Crisis of
International Law,” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jeffrey-d--sachs-sees-in-russia-sannexation-of-crimea-the-return--with-us-complicity--of-great-power-politics
International law itself is at a crossroads. The US, Russia, the EU, and NATO cite it when it is to their
advantage and disregard it when they deem it a nuisance. Again, this is not to justify Russia’s unacceptable actions;
rather, it is to add them to the sequence of actions contrary to international law. The same problems may soon spill over into
Asia. Until recently, China, Japan, and others in Asia have staunchly defended the requirement that the
Security Council approve any outside military intervention in sovereign states. Recently, however, several
countries in East Asia have become locked in a spiral of claims and counterclaims regarding borders, shipping lanes,
and territorial rights. So far, these disputes have remained basically peaceful, but tensions are rising. We must hope that
the countries of the region continue to see the great value of international law as a bulwark of sovereignty,
and act accordingly. There have long been skeptics of international law – those who believe that it can never
prevail over the national interests of major powers, and that maintaining a balance of power among
competitors is all that really can be done to keep the peace. From this perspective, Russia’s actions in the Crimea are
simply the actions of a great power asserting its prerogatives. Yet such a world is profoundly and unnecessarily
dangerous. We have learned time and again that there is no such thing as a true “balance of power.” There are
always imbalances and destabilizing power shifts. Without some scaffolding of law, open conflict is all too
likely. This is especially true today, as countries jostle for oil and other vital resources. It is no coincidence that
most of the deadly wars of recent years have taken place in regions rich in valuable and contested
natural resources. As we look back in this centennial year toward the outbreak of WWI, we see again and again that the
only possible route to safety is international law, upheld by the United Nations and respected on all sides. Yes, it
sounds naive, but no one has to look back to see the naiveté of the belief that great-power politics will
preserve peace and ensure humanity’s survival.
Renewed focus is key to counter every transnational threat – including climate change
and pandemics – the US and Japan need each other for successful climate talks in Paris
this December
Elgin-Cossart, Senior Fellow at American Progress, 15
(Molly, “Mindful of Both Past and Present Challenges, Japan and the United States Must Work Together
to Achieve a Progressive Future,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2015/04/27/111819/mindful-of-both-pastand-present-challenges-japan-and-the-united-states-must-work-together-to-achieve-a-progressivefuture/)
Another major objective for Prime Minster Abe will be to focus public attention on Japan’s global citizenship since World War II and to cast a forward-looking
agenda for bilateral cooperation. While the focus for Prime Minster Abe and President Obama will likely be acute challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, they also
should use this moment to think about how the
United States and Japan can collaborate to promote inclusive prosperity and
environmental stability not just in Asia but also globally. Given the two nations’ shared values and a commitment to human
rights, human security, democracy, economic opportunity, and confronting climate change, this should be natural. With both
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
14
nations wielding substantial clout in the United Nations, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the G-7, the G-20, and
other critical elements of the global order, it is also practical. Elevating collaboration in these forums as a
top pillar in bilateral relations should be a priority for both sides. Investing in people and prosperity The United States and
Japan have contributed substantially to economic development worldwide, as well as to the global good. The United States was pivotal in establishing international
institutions such as the United Nations, and it is the world’s largest contributor of official development assistance globally. Following World War II, Japan was a
major recipient of international assistance but became a donor nation within a decade. Today, Japan is the world’s fifth-largest bilateral aid donor, the largest
contributor to the Asian Development Bank, and a generous funder of multilateral initiatives such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Fund and the U.N. Action Against Sexual
Violence in Conflict initiative. These efforts are vital to preserving the security, rights, and freedom of people worldwide. Japan
and the United
States have been leaders in not only the quantity of assistance but also the quality. Their commitment to
ending poverty and promoting health, food security, and other essential needs has been vital to global growth and
progress. However, a new approach is needed: 21st century challenges—including ending extreme poverty, more broadly sharing
the benefits of globalization, and combating climate change—demand 21st century solutions. Despite great progress, significant
challenges remain, and business as usual will not offer solutions. The challenge for global development is threefold: Ensure the rights and
dignity of each and every person. Help economies move from poverty to prosperity. Work together to prevent and mitigate the effects
of catastrophes—which know no borders—from pandemics to violent extremism to the effects of climate change and other
environmental crises. Shared values—including individual rights, building inclusive and prosperous economies and societies, and providing for the global good—
unite the United States and Japan and provide the foundation to tackle these challenges together. From Southeast Asia to Africa, the potential for joint investment
is great. Crucially, the United States and Japan also realize that there is work to do at home too. Japan has unveiled ambitious plans to increase the number of
women in its workforce, and the United States has taken significant steps toward universal health care and reducing carbon emissions. These domestic initiatives
are integral to a new approach to development that sees development less as charity and more as sustainable global progress. Investing in the planet In the past
decade, natural
disasters have been on the rise in the Asia-Pacific region, which presages the impacts of climate
change and other environmental problems, such as deforestation, in the coming decades. Agricultural productivity is at risk; rising sea
levels threaten to displace more and more people; and food and water scarcity coupled with pandemic exposure have the
potential to create a global public health crisis. If the United States and Japan are serious about fostering another 70 years of growth and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, climate change mitigation and resilience, as well as sustainable natural resource management, must
be at the heart of bilateral cooperation. In terms of cutting emissions, the United States has already unveiled
its international commitment and has reduced the carbon intensity of its energy consumption by 8 percent since 2005. Japan
is expected to pledge a target 20 percent emission reduction by 2030 based on 2005 levels during the June G-7 summit. While dramatically reduced nuclear energy
use in Japan makes aggressively reducing domestic emissions extremely challenging, the
$4.5 billion that the United States and Japan have
pledged to the Green Climate Fund will help developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change and
further reduce carbon pollution. Technology, research, and technical assistance are other areas where the United
States and Japan can make a great difference. Delivering advanced low- and zero-carbon energy
technology from sources such as wind, solar, and nuclear power for future generations has great
potential as an area of cooperation for globally shared prosperity and environmental security. Conclusion
The United States and Japan cannot tackle the global challenges of the 21st century alone. Both have extensive
partnerships and influence in regional and international bodies—from the United Nations to the G-20 and G-7, the Arctic
Council, and the multilateral development banks. In the near term, Japan will lead the G-7 in 2016, an opportunity that offers tremendous
potential. Working through these forums, the United States and Japan can collaborate with other nations to
take action to build inclusive prosperity and tackle climate change. 2015 presents a particularly
important opportunity to marry progress on climate, environment, and development with progress on both the
U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris climate Conference of the Parties.
Alliance key to norm setting in cyber – prevents conflicts deters aggression
Petretti, counsel in Morgan Lewis's Global Outsourcing, Technology, and Commercial
Transactions Practice, 15
(Vito, “United States and Japan Form Cybersecurity Alliance in Hopes of Building International Norms,”
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/united-states-and-japan-form-cybersecurity-alliance-hopesbuilding-international-nor)
On April 28, the United States and Japan reached an agreement to form a cybersecurity alliance between the
countries. Faced with the growth of hacking threats from countries like China and North Korea and nonstate actors, the White House hopes to
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
15
leverage the alliance along with other efforts to encourage the growth of international cyber norms. As Cory Bennett describes in The Hill
article White House Unveils Cyber Part with Japan, “U.S. officials have publicly acknowledged that several countries — including Asian power
China — are sitting on the United States’ critical networks, collecting data and possibly waiting to attack.” As
part of the new alliance,
Japan and the United States have agreed to share cybersecurity data such as threat data regarding hackers and
assistance in strengthening cybersecurity infrastructure. The alliance also allows Japan to engage in some international
cybersecurity initiatives. Bennett’s article describes the alliance as a step toward establishing broader
international cybersecurity norms, noting that the countries agreed to develop “peacetime cyber norms”
and to coordinate efforts with international organizations like the United Nations. The White House hopes that building international
consensus behind some cyber norms will give the United States more authority to prosecute bad actors. Although
the United States has expressed grave concern about the growth of hacking threats, particularly from state actors like China, it has been
hesitant to retaliate. The Obama administration indicted five Chinese military servicemen last year on hacking charges, but this has
been viewed as “a largely symbolic measure.” The new US-Japan cybersecurity alliance may be a model for future
cooperation among other nations that may lead to new cyber norms and new policing of international cyber threats.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
16
Contention II – Cyber War
Removing the Futenma base is critical to cybersecurity cooperation – frees up
diplomatic bandwidth
Segal 13 (Adam, Mansfield Fellow based in Tokyo, “Rob Sheldon: Advancing U.S.-Japan Collective
Cyber Capabilities (Part III: Cooperation)”, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2013/10/25/rob-sheldon-advancingu-s-japan-collective-cyber-capabilities-part-iii-cooperation/)
Most importantly, both sides need to commit to the principle of progress. Oddly, the person with arguably the greatest
potential to slow cooperation in cyberspace is not in Washington or Tokyo, Moscow or Beijing. It is the
Governor of Okinawa, who perhaps as early as this December will decide whether to approve plans for the
realignment of forces in Okinawa. This is the greatest foreseeable determinant of the trajectory of
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in 2014. If the result is another delay, Futenma is likely to remain the
most pressing issue on the agenda. One need only compare the joint statement of the 2011 Security
Consultative Committee (“2+2”), which included promising language on cyber, to the 2012 version, where cyber
was never mentioned, to understand just how all-consuming Futenma can be for the alliance. But
regardless of the outcome of force realignment issues—and for that matter, broader collective defense debates—Washington and
Tokyo must commit to preserve bandwidth so that cyber cooperation can proceed.
Cyber war is likely – states have the means and motive – escalates to accidental war
Brake, international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 15
(Benjamin, “Strategic Risks of Ambiguity in Cyberspace,” http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/strategicrisks-ambiguity-cyberspace/p36541)
As major powers increasingly rely on digital networks for critical services, the number of plausible network attacks, accidents, or failures
that could trigger or exacerbate an international crisis will increase. The likelihood and severity of such a destabilizing event will
also grow as long as norms of appropriate behavior in cyberspace are underdeveloped, timely and convincing attribution of attacks remains
difficult, and the number of cyber-capable actors increases. Preparing for or responding to such a crisis is complicated by ambiguity in cyberspace, primarily
regarding responsibility and intent. Ambiguity about who is responsible for a cyberattack exacerbates the risk that countries amid a geopolitical crisis will
misattribute an attack, unduly retaliate or expand a crisis, or be unable to attribute an attack at all, thereby preventing or delaying a response and weakening their
deterrence and credibility. Ambiguity of what is intended complicates a country’s ability to distinguish between espionage operations and activity conducted in
preparation for a cyberattack. The United States has strategic interests in preventing and mitigating these risks, given its commitment to global security and
overwhelming dependence on networked systems for national security missions, commerce, health care, and critical infrastructure. The
longer it takes
to implement preventive and mitigating steps, the greater the likelihood of unnecessary military
conflict in and outside of the cyber domain. Cyberattacks are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact, including their capacity for
physical destruction. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia have demonstrated an ability to conduct destabilizing
cyber activity. Such actions—whether for destructive purposes, intelligence collection, or economic espionage—are designed to evade network defenses
and can involve various means of deception to thwart attribution. Recent incidents have shown that U.S. adversaries can no longer assume they will be able to
conceal their identities in cyberspace, but cybersecurity experts still lack agreed-upon standards for attribution; evidence for a credible and convincing attribution
can take a long time to compile; and malicious actors continue to develop new means of obscuring responsibility. Moreover, unlike many cyber operations designed
to exfiltrate large amounts of data, destructive
cyberattacks can be made to operate with limited communication
between the malware and controller, offering fewer forensic details to establish responsibility. Even when an attacker can be identified, public
attribution will remain as much a political challenge as a technical one, given that competing allegations of responsibility will likely follow any public accusation.
Without corroborating signals or human intelligence—which, if it exists, officials may be reluctant or slow to disclose—computer forensic data may be incomplete or
too ambiguous to convince a skeptical public. Should a major cyberattack occur over the next twelve to eighteen months, or even beyond that period if sufficient
preventive and mitigating steps are not taken, public pressure to respond could outpace the time needed to credibly attribute responsibility and, if desired, build an
effective coalition to support a response. Over the same time period, ambiguity regarding the intent of cyber operations will also remain a challenge, leaving
policymakers uncertain about whether malware discovered on a sensitive system is designed for espionage or as a beachhead for a future attack. The
United
States could face several plausible crises over the next twelve to eighteen months that would be
complicated by the risks of ambiguity in cyberspace. These include destructive insider threats, remote cyber operations that threaten
trust in financial institutions, and cyberattacks by foreign nations or nonstate groups against critical infrastructure systems that cause widespread panic and loss of
life, or similar attacks against a U.S. ally. National Security Agency (NSA) Director Admiral Michael Rogers warned in late 2014 that he expects U.S. critical
infrastructure—assets essential to the function of a society and economy, such as water supply systems, electric grids, and transportation systems—to be attacked,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
17
noting that multiple foreign nations and groups already possess the ability to shut down a U.S. power grid and several others are investing in the capability.
Attacks like the publicly unattributed January 2015 cyberattack that severely damaged a German steel
mill suggest the ability to bring about physical destruction through cyber means may be proliferating
quickly. Of particular concern would be the proliferation of these capabilities among terrorist groups, which currently possess limited technical skills but
destructive intent. As the number of cyber-capable adversaries grows, so too does the number of critical targets, especially as industrial control systems move to
web-based interfaces and more common operating systems and networking protocols. The
implications of any crisis will depend on the
current geopolitical context; the type of networks that fail; and the extent of economic damage, physical
destruction, or human costs that result directly from network failure or its cascading effects on public
health, communication and financial networks, and the economy. A successful cyberattack against one or more critical
infrastructure systems could endanger thousands of lives, halt essential services, and cripple the U.S. economy for years. Two plausible factors
that could exacerbate such a crisis are intentional and inadvertent ambiguity. Over the past two years, Iran and North Korea have appeared most willing to conduct
destructive and disruptive cyberattacks against U.S. and foreign targets while attempting to conceal responsibility. Tactics
have included data
wipes, destruction of computer hardware, and denial-of-service attacks. Russia and China have exhibited
some of the most advanced capabilities, and actors in both countries have been linked to disruptive
attacks during regional tensions. Actors in South Asia and the Middle East have also conducted operations
in regional conflicts that could quickly entangle U.S. interests. During a crisis involving the United States or an ally, any one
of these countries could conduct cyber operations that risk further destabilization. As the rate of operations grows,
so too could the challenge of attribution, with each incident exposing tools and techniques that can be repurposed. Cyber activities that could not be promptly
attributed have already appeared in several conflicts. Though most have rarely elevated beyond nuisance, others have caused significant damage or threatened
escalation. In 2008, Russia-based actors launched a wave of attacks against Georgian targets, and similar malware appeared in operations against Ukraine in 2014.
Japanese networks are frequently targeted, including during heightened Sino-Japanese territorial tensions and sensitive anniversaries, with origins reportedly traced
to China. North Korean cyber actors are suspected of having conducted destructive operations that compromised South Korea’s national identification system—
damage that may cost more than $1 billion and over a decade to repair. In 2014, U.S. officials blamed North Korea for destructive attacks against Sony Pictures
Entertainment, an American subsidiary of the Japanese company Sony. North Korean officials deny the country’s role in these attacks and will likely seek to similarly
obscure their hand in attacks during future crises to deter or delay a potential American or South Korean response. U.S. officials suspect Iran’s involvement in a
2012 cyberattack against two energy firms, one in Saudi Arabia and another in Qatar, that destroyed data and crippled thirty thousand computers, possibly in
retaliation for alleged U.S. cyber operations, and to demonstrate an ability to conduct similar attacks against U.S. targets. U.S. financial firms subsequently suffered
tens of millions of dollars in losses resulting from Iranian denial-of-service attacks launched in retaliation for economic sanctions. In 2014, Iran became the first
country to carry out a destructive cyberattack on U.S. soil when it damaged the network of Las Vegas Sands after its chairman advocated a nuclear strike against the
country. Due to the difficulty of determining whether certain activity is intended for espionage or preparation for an attack, cyber
operations run the
risk of triggering unintended escalation. Espionage malware that could be reprogrammed to gain control of networks, such as BlackEnergy,
which has been discovered on critical infrastructure networks, may be viewed by victims as one update away from becoming an attack tool capable of crippling
energy supplies, water-distribution and -filtration systems, or financial transactions. Security scans of networks intensified amid heightened geopolitical tensions
could reveal such malware and prompt fears of an imminent attack, even if the malware was implanted for espionage purposes long before the crisis began. The
difficulty of predicting a cyber operation’s effects and the interdependency of networked systems
increase the risks that an operation will inadvertently spill over onto sensitive systems or cause
unintended effects. One example of ambiguity and the risk of misperception is the 2010 discovery on Nasdaq servers of malware similar to a cyber tool
reportedly developed by Russia’s Federal Security Service. Initial assessments maintained that the malware was capable of wiping out the entire stock exchange.
Only later was it shown to be less destructive, according to media accounts. Such ambiguities during
periods of heightened
geopolitical tensions pose significant escalatory risks. Information security experts have raised similar
concerns about other Russia-linked activity and questioned whether aspects of the activity are intended to insert offensive capabilities into
critical infrastructure systems for future use. Ambiguity also arises in the case of “worms”—self-replicating malware that seeks out other computers to infect.
Worms can spread so pervasively that their origin and intent can be difficult to infer from known victims. One
worm, Conficker, spread to
millions of computers and disrupted military communications in several European countries. Its creator and
purpose remain unknown. Warning Indicators Indicators of activity with the potential to create or exacerbate an international political crisis include leadership
statements of an intent to conduct or permit computer network operations against foreign networks; evidence of that intent, including research and development,
budgetary allocations, or organizational changes, such as the creation of offensive cyber forces; the express or tacit acceptance of parastatal hackers; and a
demonstrated capability to conduct computer network operations, including cyber-espionage and cyber operations against domestic targets. Tactical warning
indicators resemble traditional conflicts, such as changes in the alert status of military units and an increase in crisis-related rhetoric. Indicators unique to cyber
operations include increased efforts to probe foreign networks and an uptick of activity in online hacker forums discussing foreign targets and tools, techniques, and
procedures appropriate for operations against them. Implications for U.S. Interests First, cyberattacks
will eventually be part of every
nation’s military strategy. The United States depends on information communications technologies for critical military and civilian services far more
than its strategic rivals or potential adversaries. U.S. officials have noted an increase in computer network operations targeting state, local, and privately operated
critical infrastructure--, some of which have the potential to cause considerable harm to operations, assets, and personnel. Second, ambiguity
in
cyberspace elevates the risk that a significant cyber event amid a geopolitical crisis will be misattributed
or misperceived, prompting a disproportionate response or unnecessary expansion of the conflict. Such an escalation
would impair the United States’ prominent role and interest in global security and its commitment to international law. Third, U.S.
officials’ ability to respond swiftly and effectively to cyberattacks is complicated by the difficulty of timely public attribution and ambiguity over what type of
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
18
cyberattack would trigger a right to self-defense or security commitments to strategic partners. A failure to confidently attribute an attack or determine whether
such activity constituted an attack could limit U.S. response options. Such confusion,
uncertainty, and delay could weaken
deterrence and the credibility of U.S. assurances, trigger a misperception of U.S. commitment, and
undermine a U.S.-led coalition.
Cyber attacks cause nuclear war – accidents
Gady 15 (Franz Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Article quotes: James Cartwright,
retired US Marine Corps General and eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York, and
Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?”, http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/couldcyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/)
Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the risk of accidental
nuclear war, according to Cartwright, while ”the sophistication of the cyberthreat [to nuclear weapons]
has increased exponentially.” “One-half of their [U.S. and Russian] strategic arsenals are continuously
maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a
moment’s notice,” a policy report compiled by a study group chaired by the retired U.S. general summarized. “At the brink
of conflict, nuclear command and warning networks around the world may be besieged by electronic
intruders whose onslaught degrades the coherence and rationality of nuclear decision-making,” the
report further points out. The War Games-like scenario could unfold in one of the following three ways: First,
sophisticated attackers from cyberspace could spoof U.S. or Russian early warning networks into
reporting that nuclear missiles have been launched, which would demand immediate retaliatory strikes
according to both nations’ nuclear warfare doctrines. Second, online hackers could manipulate communication
systems into issuing unauthorized launch orders to missile crews. Third and last, attackers could directly
hack into missile command and control systems launching the weapon or dismantling it on site ( a highly unlikely
scenario). To reduce the likelihood of such an scenario ever occurring, Cartwright proposes that Moscow and Washington should adjust their
nuclear war contingency plan timetables from calling for missiles to be launched within 3 to 5 minutes to 24 to 72 hours. Reducing the lead
time to prepare nuclear missiles for launch would not diminish the deterrent value of the weapons, Cartwright, who headed Strategic
Command from 2004 to 2007 and was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before retiring in 2011, emphasized. However, the
Obama
White House has so far rejected the idea, particularly due to the recent deterioration of U.S.-Russia
relations. Also, Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, testified in Congress this
month arguing “it did not make any great sense to de-alert forces” because nuclear missiles “needed to
be ready and effective and able to prosecute the mission at any point in time.” Cartwright’s credibility may have
also suffered among Washington policy circles ever since he has been under investigation for leaking information about the top secret Stuxnet
virus – a sophisticated cyber weapon allegedly jointly developed by Israel and the United States – to the New York Times. Nevertheless, a
co-authored paper, seen in draft by The Diplomat, argues that “cyber
weapons and strategies have brought us to a
situation of aggravated nuclear instability that needs to be more explicitly and more openly addressed in the diplomacy of
leading powers, both in private and in public.” The authors, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York (and a regular contributor to The
Diplomat) and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, have concluded that “Russia now sees U.S. plans to disrupt the command
and control of its nuclear weapons as the only actual (current) threat at the strategic level of warfare.” Laura Saalman of the Asia Pacific
Research Centre in Hawaii has also warned of the need to look at the impact of U.S. strategies and nuclear force posture on China in a 2014
paper titled “Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear”.
And lashout
Tilford 12 Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, "Cyber attackers could
shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast" 2012, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyberattackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa
To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S.
military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and
heart monitors also power "every military base in our country." "Although bases would be prepared to weather a
short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out", he said. Which means
military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
19
shut Down completely. "Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons
systems would be left without either fuel or electric power", said Senator Grassley. "So in a few short hours or days, the
mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions", he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials
confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, "preventing
a cyber attack and improving the nation~’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country" (source: Congressional Record). So
how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure (see video: Pentagon declares
war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_kVQrp_D0kY%26feature=relmfu ). A cyber attack today against the US
could very well be seen as an "Act of War" and could be met with a "full scale" US military response. That could include
the use of "nuclear weapons", if authorized by the President.
The plan creates a more equitable alliance which shores up effectiveness and
responsiveness – reducing presence is key to Japanese independence
Gross, senior associate of Pacific Forum CSIS, 13
(Donald, “The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War,” p.
ebook)
On another level, however, it was ill advised for current and former U.S. officials to effectively accuse
Japan of undermining the alliance because Tokyo exhibited sensitivity to domestic opinion over a
controversial deployment. The American accusation, coupled with implied and explicit threats to pull
back its forces now defending Japan, shows deep disrespect for that nation's democratic system. It also
ignores the views of Japan's ruling party and serious Japanese strategic thinkers who seek to advance
their country's security and prosperity at a time of profound historic change in the region. Japan's vision
of its future regional and global role is clearly built on the foundation of the ongoing U.S.-Japan alliance.
If the United States intends to preserve and revitalize this alliance, it should accept and implement
Japanese preferences rather than risk a schism based on narrowly conceived views of American
Interests.
In July 2010, following Hatoyama's resignation, Japan experts Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign
Relations and Yuki Tatsumi Of the Stimson Center in Washington Offered these observations on the
Okinawa controversy that remain true today: It is time to end the corrosive effect this haggling over
Futenma has had on our alliance. Fourteen years ago, (U.S. and Japanese leaders made a promise to the
people of Okinawa to close Futenma; ten prime ministers and three presidents later, that promise
remains unfulfilled. Our publics are increasingly frustrated with a lack of resolution, and until Futenma is
closed, the alliance risks being held hostage to the inequality of concentrating so many U.S. military
bases on Okinawa. (Shelia Smith) [Futenma] keeps the [Japanese and American] governments from
discussing a broader range of common security concerns…[T]he world needs an economically and
politically strong Japan to work with the United States to address a wide range of global challenges …
(Yuki Tatsumi)47
A Better U.S. approach
The United States should support Japan’s evolving foreign policy under the DPJ government for two
reasons – it is good for Japan and it is good for America. As Japan’s longstanding and closest partner, the
U.S. should be enlightened enough to accept the greater autonomy and independence of Japan, both
regionally and globally.
There are some Americans, of course, who feel uncomfortable unless Japan acquiesces to the decisions
of its more powerful partner. They tend to believe that a Japan which does America’s bidding is the
essence of the U.S.-Japan alliance. A far better view is that the U.S. should appreciate a more
independent Japanese foreign policy as the sign of a mature ally that understands its identity, takes
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
20
pride in its national values and strives to make major contributions to peace and prosperity, both
regionally and globally.
There is another, more self-interested reason to support Japan's foreign policy — a more autonomous,
independent Japan that pursues a middle power strategy built on the U.S.-Japan alliance will
strengthen and revitalize its relationship with the United States. But greater U.S.-Japan cooperation
can only proceed apace if the U.S. relieves some burdens imposed by the security alliance.
Dr. George Packard has called for the U.S. to relieve these burdens as a means of shoring up the overall
relationship: The U.S. government should respect Japan's desire to reduce the U.S. military presence on
its territory, as it has respected the same desire on the part of Germany, South Korea, and the
Philippines. It should be willing to renegotiate the agreement that governs the presence of U.S. troops in
Japan, which to some is redolent of nineteenth-century assertions of extraterritoriality. It should be
aware that, at the end of the day, Japanese voters will determine the future course of the alliance.
Above all, U.S. negotiators should start with the premise that the security treaty with Japan, important
as it is, is only part of a larger partnership between two of the world's greatest democracies and
economies. Washington stands to gain far more by working with Tokyo on the environment, health
issues, human rights, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and counterterrorism.
Fully settling the dispute over the relocation of the U.S. Marines base to the satisfaction of Japan also
strengthens Japan's commitment to its military obligations under the alliance. An agreement of this
kind would demonstrate America's respect for Japanese public opinion and the citizens of Okinawa, who
daily bear the serious inconvenience of living next door to an active air base. It is shortsighted for the
U.S. to push hard for basing rights that run up against the Japanese government's policy of creating
greater equality in the alliance and more effectively asserting Japanese views.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
21
Contention IV -- Kick Out
Advantage two is Kick Out Marine presence is politically unsustainable - maintaining a large footprint sparks antibase movements throughout Japan – that causes strategically import bases like
Kadena to get kicked out – the impact is Sino-Japan war
Yukio, Research fellow @ MIT’s Center for International Studies, 8-4-15
(Okamoto, “The Okinawa Issue and East Asian Security,” http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a04502/)
The Japanese and US governments agreed in the 1990s on a plan to close down US Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma, a facility located in a heavily populated area on the main island of Okinawa, and move
its operations to a facility to be constructed in Henoko Bay on the Pacific coast of the island. The
agreement still stands, but it is unclear when, if ever, this move will be completed.
The new facility in Henoko is supposed to have a runway built on landfill covering just a third of the area
of the current air station at Futenma. The noise from the aircraft using it and the danger of accidents
would be shifted from a populous district to an area over the sea. Clearly this represents a major
improvement over the current situation. So I originally supported the planned move. But in 2011, when I
was invited to speak as a witness to the House of Representatives Budget Committee, I expressed the
view that the government should stop trying to force this plan through. And I repeated my call for
abandonment of the plan when I spoke before the House of Councillors Budget Committee in 2012. Why
did I change my mind?
Opinion in Okinawa was formerly split fairly evenly on this issue, with about a third of the people willing
to accept the planned move to Henoko, a third opposed to it, and another third with intermediate
views. But in 2009, when the Democratic Party of Japan came to power, Hatoyama Yukio, the new prime
minister, declared that the Futenma facility must be moved to a location “at least” outside of Okinawa
Prefecture. And after hearing this, almost everybody in Okinawa came to oppose the Henoko plan.
The DPJ administration’s handling of this matter was irresponsible. Finding a replacement site outside of
Okinawa is not practical. The reason is simple: Ospreys, the vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft
currently deployed at Futenma, serve as an essential means of transport for the US Marine Corps in
Okinawa. They cannot be moved to a distant location unless the entire Marine contingent goes too. This
would mean also moving the headquarters now located at Camp Foster and the training facilities at
Camp Hansen and Camp Schwab.
The DPJ administration looked at over 40 potential locations elsewhere in Japan, but in the end it was
unable to find a replacement site, and in April 2010 Prime Minister Hatoyama apologized to the people
of Okinawa, asking them to accept the relocation of the Futenma facility within the prefecture. But their
willingness to do so was gone. It was as if they had been about to have a meal at a restaurant, albeit
with some reluctance, when a DPJ big shot came barging in and cried, “The food here is lousy. There are
lots of good restaurants out there, so let’s go to one of them.” He led the diners out, but of course there
was no such restaurant to be found. The group ended up going back to the original place, but the food
was no longer fresh, and nobody felt like eating.
I have seen many activists from mainland Japan taking part in the campaign against the US military
bases in Okinawa. Their objective is not limited to the complete reversion of the Futenma facility. By
fomenting the local anti-base movement and promoting disruption, they seek to close down all the US
bases, particularly Kadena, the biggest US Air Force base in the Eastern Hemisphere. Meanwhile, the
deadlock between the national government in Tokyo and the prefectural government in Naha continues
to drag on. And if one of the Ospreys were to have a major accident, Okinawa could explode, much as
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
22
it did back in 1956, when an “island-wide struggle” broke out against the US military administration.
{Note 1}
Is there an alternative? When I expressed my opinions to the National Diet committees, I called for the
adoption of “Plan B.” Though I did not state the specific contents of this plan, the idea was to make the
move to a new facility at Henoko unnecessary by revising the deployment structure of the US Marine
Corps in Okinawa and elsewhere in the western Pacific and modifying the role of Japan’s Self-Defense
Forces.
This would have required careful bilateral deliberations with the United States over an extended period
of time, meaning a delay in reversion of the Futenma facility. But considering that almost two decades
had passed since the original US-Japan agreement on the matter, I felt that it was worth considering my
proposal. But the government ended up sticking with the existing plan, and in December 2013 the
governor of Okinawa gave his go-ahead for the landfill at Henoko, where work has now started. At this
point, pushing for an alternative approach will only confuse matters. So I have regretfully decided to put
my Plan B under wraps and return to supporting the move to Henoko as the best we can hope for under
the current circumstances.
Deterrent Power: The Importance of Perceptions
Though the move from Futenma to Henoko may need to be implemented as a stopgap, I would like to
consider the longer-term prospects. How can we achieve a major reduction in the US Marines’ presence
in Okinawa without decreasing Japan’s deterrent power?
Japan’s current deterrent is not based on the ability of the US Marines stationed in Okinawa to respond
immediately to an attack from North Korea or China. It is based on the Japan-US security arrangements
as a whole. A key element of the bilateral security setup is the US Seventh Fleet. The ships of this major
fleet, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, along with the aircraft they
carry, cost several trillion yen to build. The fact that this fleet is based in Yokosuka, a port near Tokyo,
sends a clear message to neighboring countries that the United States is truly committed to Japan’s
defense. It is this clear commitment that is the essence of the deterrent.
The deterrent is ultimately a matter of perceptions: It depends on the belief of neighboring countries
that the Japan-US security arrangements are certain to operate. Absent this belief, the Japan-US
Security Treaty becomes no more than a piece of paper. So the core of Japan’s deterrent power consists
of the ongoing maintenance of a close alliance with the United States that leaves no room for doubt in
the minds of other countries in the region.
If, however, a large-scale reduction of the US forces in Okinawa were to be conducted in the face of
local turmoil without a sound basis in military thinking, it would create a big hole in the fabric of the
deterrent. Neighboring countries would sense a power vacuum. Consider what has happened in the
South China Sea: After the United States pulled out of Vietnam, China grabbed the Paracels, and after
the Russians left, it pushed the Vietnamese off Johnson South Reef. And after the US forces left the
Philippines, China took over Mischief Reef from that country.
If the Chinese judged that the US military had been driven out of Okinawa, it would greatly increase the
likelihood of their grabbing the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from Japan by force. And once
they landed on these islands, it would become very difficult to dislodge them. Doing so would mean
undertaking a combat operation that could well result in the first deaths in action for Japanese armed
forces since World War II. Would Japan actually fight to get the Senkakus back? It is possible that the
Japanese government would instead declare its intention to “negotiate persistently,” a line it has often
used, and that the Senkakus would remain under China’s effective control indefinitely, just as Takeshima
has since South Korea took it over in the 1950s.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
23
This decks deterrence in East Asia even if bases aren’t totally withdrawn
Halperin, senior adviser to the Open Society Foundations, 15
(Morton, “OPINION: Ignoring opposition in Okinawa will imperil Japan-U.S. alliance,”
https://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2015/04/346639.html)
When constructing a military base in a democratic country, the popular will of local citizens who bear the burden of the
military presence should be carefully considered. Their voice is entitled to serious consideration and if it
is not heard, the base may not be able to have a stable future. When a military base is located on
foreign soil, it is even more important to take the opinion of local citizens into account. Without such effort, protests from the local
community could threaten the future of the presence of the base, which could eventually lead to a major diplomatic issue
between the two countries. Public opinion on the relocation of the Futenma air base to the Henoko area has been clear. Recent election results, including those
from the Nago mayoral election, Okinawa
gubernatorial election and general election, have indicated clear
opposition of the local citizens against the relocation. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the American and Japanese
government should abandon the effort to relocate the Futenma air base to the Henoko area. If opposition from Okinawa residents
further spreads, it would affect public opinion towards other U.S. bases in Okinawa, including the
Kadena air base. It would most certainly damage U.S.-Japan relations. Furthermore, U.S. military personnel stationed in the bases
in Okinawa will find it very difficult to operate surrounded by the public opinion hostile to the U.S.
military presence. I visited Okinawa and toured around the area where the base is to be built in September last year. I witnessed the Okinawans' desire
for peace, which is deeply rooted in their harrowing experience of the past: the Battle of Okinawa. On a boat in the sea off the Henoko area, I was truly impressed
by the beautiful ocean and the voices of the local residents. They are fighting to protect the environment and pass it on to next generations. The Japanese
government has simply ignored popular opinion and put concrete blocks into the beautiful ocean. If the democratic process -- of which Americans are so proud of -is boldly disparaged in this way, it would be far from the best decision for both the U.S. and Japan. In addition, current debate
over the relocation of
is proceeding without a new assessment on the need for the USMC (U.S. Marine Corps)
presence in Okinawa. The American military needs to seriously consider what the other options are for
basing the Marines in the region or on bases in the United States and assess the implications of alternative possibilities from the viewpoint of deterrence, as
well as conducting military operations. Okinawa may not be the only option for the U.S. Marine base. American and Japanese
the Futenma air base
governments assessing the issue need serious deliberation before starting any work on the new base construction, especially when many experts of both countries
propose alternative options.
And, controversy is heating up despite China’s rise – reducing the footprint is key –
relocation won’t placate the locals
Lind, associate professor of government @ Dartmouth, 4-2-15
(Jennifer, “Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/couldokinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3)
Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan
alliance. In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows
more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s
government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims
pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more
significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has
accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment. In fact, just a
few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the
headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that
would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to
create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban
location. But Okinawans didn’t want the facility moved to a different part of Okinawa—they wanted it
off the island completely, and elected Governor Onaga on that platform. On March 22 he issued a
deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit. Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand
as “very regrettable,” and suspending the governor’s work stoppage order. Onaga responded by vowing,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
24
“I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the will of the Okinawans.” What happens
next? “Once again,” wrote DC scribe Chris Nelson, “the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in
our face.” The Okinawans are, in Carol Fulp’s words, becoming visible. They’re shouting louder and
louder—and want to be onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was Reischauer and
Kennedy’s challenge. Averting another one is ours.
Marines are not necessary for deterrence – but the political backlash they cause leads
to the disruption of vital air and naval facilities that are actually key to prevent
hotspot escalation
Ennis, Japan Relations Analyst, 10
(Peter, served on two Council on Foreign Relations task forces regarding Japan, regularly participates in
the Pacific Forum’s annual conference on US-Japan defense relations, has spoken at numerous
universities, “Mike Green hit critics of Obama Futenma policy,”
http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2010/06/jeff-bader-mike-green-hit-critics-of-obama-futenmapolicy.html)
These two facilities are the absolute key to the US forward-deployed ability to project power in East Asia, along with the 8th Army and related air and sea units in South Korea, and the huge air, Marine, and naval buildup underway
Given this vast array of indispensable US power projection capabilities in the region, it was perfectly
reasonable to ask just why the Futenma replacement facility is so vital. The US is already redeploying 8,000 ground troops out of South Korea,
on Guam.
has moved many units further south to make them into a more flexible regional force, and has turned over to South Korea operational control of its own armed forces. Yet the current structure of the Marine presence on Okinawa
remained curiously beyond the realm of acceptable discussion, at the insistence of Obama administration officials. Throughout the entire discussion, the Administration has painfully been unable to answer a simple question: Just
The Marines are not indispensable
quelling any potential North Korean assault on the South. ROK ground forces alone number more than
the combined personnel of the US Army and US Marine Corps, worldwide. The main US role in a Korean
Peninsula contingency would be air and naval, largely based out of Kadena and Yokosuka. The job of
seizing North Korean ports to facilitate humanitarian relief operations in a crisis, or the job of locating
and securing North Korean nuclear materials, could all be conducted by Marines brought into Japan for
those purposes, utilizing prepositioned supplies and equipment located on bases agreed to by Tokyo. As it is, a good number of the US Marines nominally
based on Okinawa for deterrence in East Asia are often deployed elsewhere, including Afghanistan. Nor
are the Marines on Okinawa to somehow deter China, a job done most effectively, once again, by the US air and
naval forces based at Kadena and Yokosuka respectively. Are the US Marines vital to stability in East
Asia? Absolutely. But nowhere is it written in strategic stone that they have to be based on Okinawa. The
what indispensable contribution to deterrence in East Asia do the Marines on Okinawa make that they could not make if based elsewhere?
need for the Henoko project to replace Futenma largely boils down to one factor: The Marines want to introduce to Okinawa in the coming years the V-22 Osprey, a tiltrotor aircraft capable of both vertical and conventional
takeoffs and landings. Why is a new runway needed at Henoko, designated site for the Futenma replacement facility, if the Osprey has vertical capability? Because the aircraft is notoriously unreliable, and the Marines say they
need a runway in the event the shift from turboprop to helicopter capability fails. Ironically, the State Department’s Kurt Campbell, who fought so hard for the Futenma project in recent months, was strongly opposed to further
development of the Osprey while he worked at the Pentagon over a decade ago. Beyond the Osprey requirements, the Marines also defend their status on Okinawa because of the heavy funding provided by Japan as base support.
Okinawa is a highly advantageous location for the US Marines to be based. But all things are
not equal, given that 20% of the entirety of Okinawa island’s land mass is taken up by US military
facilities. The heavy concentration on Okinawa of US Forces in Japan is a political disaster just waiting
to happen. Anyone truly interested in the political sustainability of vital US air and naval bases in Japan
should be worried about the pent-up animosity all-too-evident on Okinawa.
All things being equal,
The US will be kicked out of Kadena – that will make deterring war with China/North
Korea impossible
Axe, defense analyst @ the Diplomat, 10
(David, “Why Allies Need US Base,” http://thediplomat.com/2010/06/why-allies-need-okinawabase/?allpages=yes)
An explosive political drama that reached its climax earlier this month underscored the importance of
Kadena and the surrounding bases. On June 2, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stepped down after weeks of tumbling public support
for his administration. The reason—the ongoing uncertainty over the future of US forces in Japan. During the general election campaign last year, Hatoyama had
vowed to reconsider a 2006 deal over the relocation of US Marines from the Futenma Air Station, a smaller base just south of Kadena. After strongly hinting that he
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
25
would abandon the 2006 deal, Hatoyama announced in late May his continued support for the existing agreement reached under the previous Liberal Democratic
Party administration. Under this agreement, the Marines would eventually relocate their airstrip to a less-populated part of the island prefecture. But many
Okinawans oppose any US military presence there at all. US bases—and Futenma, especially—have generally
been unpopular among the now largely pacifist Japanese public, particularly Okinawans. In 1995, three US
servicemen from Futenma abducted and raped a local schoolgirl, further stoking opposition to the base. And aircraft crashes are another safety concern, especially
as Kadena and Futenma have between them several hundred US military aircraft permanently based at facilities surrounded by densely populated residential
neighbourhoods. The decision to stick with the 2006 deal represented the belated recognition on Hatoyama’s part that ‘there was no other good option’ for the
strategically-vital Marine presence and for the US-Japanese alliance in general, according to Michael Auslin, an Asia expert with the American Enterprise Institute. In
that context, the prime minister’s vague election promise to Okinawan base-detractors was a ‘miscalculation.’ So, will the Futenma dispute also prove the undoing
of Hatoyama’s successor, Naoto Kan, who has so far stayed quiet on the base issue? If anything, the crisis over Futenma underscored the lasting, even growing,
importance of US military facilities in Okinawa—not only for the United States, but also for Japan and other US allies. As China’s economic and military rise
continues and tensions
mount over North Korea’s nuclear programme and its alleged sinking of a South Korean warship, the US
and its Asian allies need Okinawa more than ever. ‘The US, South Korea and Australia have been very vocal to
Japan, saying, “Hey, be careful what you’re doing,”’ Sheila Smith, an analyst with the Council on Foreign
Relations, says. ‘This isn’t a good moment to be taking large numbers of US forces out of Japan.’ Aside
from US forces in South Korea (which are exclusively focused on the North Korean land threat) there are just two significant concentrations of US troops in East
Asia: in Okinawa and on the Pacific island of Guam. Okinawa
lies just an hour’s flight time from both the Korean Peninsula
and Taiwan; Guam, by contrast, is 1000 miles from any potential theatre of war. ‘It may be easier for us to be there
[in Guam], as far as the diplomatic issue is concerned,’ says Air Force spokesman John Monroe. ‘But if we’re in Guam, we’re out of the fight’ due to the distance. For
combat forces to be capable of reacting quickly to the most likely crises, Okinawa is the only realistic option. Without
its 2 Okinawan air bases
and their 3 roughly 10,000-foot runways, the US military—and by extension, US allies—would depend
almost entirely on a handful of US aircraft carriers for bringing to bear aerial firepower in East Asia. That
might be a realistic option, except that China has lately deployed several new classes of anti-ship weaponry
specifically meant for sinking US carriers, including the widely-feared DF-21 ballistic missile and a
flotilla of stealthy fast-attack vessels. In recognition of Okinawa’s growing importance, the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past
decade modernizing forces and facilities on the island. The US Army deployed Patriot air-defence missiles capable of shooting down enemy aircraft as well as
ballistic missiles, a favourite weapon of both China and North Korea. Kadena
got extensive new storage bunkers for bombs,
missiles and spare parts, allowing the base to support potentially hundreds of aircraft flown in from the
United States during an emergency. In 2007, the US Air Force began stationing Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth
fighters at Kadena. The Raptors represent perhaps the greatest improvement. Indeed, in the minds of US planners, in many ways Okinawa’s most
important function is to support the F-22s. In a 2009 study examining a simulated air war pitting the
United States and Taiwan against China, the California-based think-tank RAND concluded that a wing of
F-22s could shoot down 27 Chinese fighters for every Raptor lost in the air. F-22s flying from Okinawa
could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in China or North Korea, according to
Lieutenant Colonel Wade Tolliver, commander of the 27th Fighter Squadron, an F-22 unit based in Virginia that routinely sends Raptors to
Kadena. ‘There are a lot of countries out there that have developed highly integrated air-defence systems,’ Tolliver says. ‘What we need to do is
take some of our assets that have special capabilities…and we need to roll back those integrated air
defence systems so we can bring in our joint forces.’ The base’s ability to host F-22s and follow-on
aircraft is ‘probably the most important thing about Kadena,’ Monroe says. ‘Because of our capability to
stage forces out of here—this is a huge runway—we do believe we have unmatched air power.’ All this
planning for air wars with China and North Korea doesn’t mean that planners in the United States, Japan or anywhere else believe such conflict is inevitable.
Pyongyang remains predictable only in its volatility, but Washington, Tokyo and Beijing are all working hard to forge peaceful and lasting ties. The strategic
uncertainty is in the margins. ‘There’s no question you want to engage China, but (we should) hedge against an uncertain future,’ Nicholas Szechenyi of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies says. It’s as a hedge that Okinawa remains indispensable to the US and its allies—so much so
that the shared international need for the island’s bases must trump any Japanese domestic political calculations. Hatoyama ignored that truth at the expense of his
job. The question now is will Kan?
North Korea war goes nuclear
Metz, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research
Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 2013 (Steven,
3/13/13, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,”
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war)
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
North Korea is
26
dangerous
Today,
the most
country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending
stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked
American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do
so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing
Pyongyang then threatened a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off
the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry
asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may
prove true. No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official
statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to
recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American
policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North
Korea could repeat this pattern. Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's
hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the
sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger,
United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know
whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war
The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes
instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security.
against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many
Early attacks might include nuclear weapons
decades.
, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing
North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are
backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean
forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread,
operations and insurgency could potentially last for years
protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla
following
the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and
developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. The second Korean War would
force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S.
military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the
a second Korean conflict
would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. Eventually,
United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover,
though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it
did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would
have to be America's strategic objective. China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North
Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second
Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies
China
would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States.
this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. Still,
One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River
the result could easily
be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic
connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian
from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly,
economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and
hostile at the same time that the two continued
Sino-Japan war goes nuclear – deterrence is key
Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, 14
(Robert, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,”
http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)
knowing the
resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly
against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was
unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the
context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least
some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7
Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of
an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to
face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first
China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
27
targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has
available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves,
China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR
systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and
damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early
resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile
capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is
become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific:
it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in
nuclear escalation
is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may
resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great
equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to
retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks
separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese)
conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to
retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a
the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that
last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based
nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
28
Contention V -- Deterrence
Withdrawal is critical to rotational presence and burden sharing – improves
deterrence
O’Hanlon, 12
(Michael, “Solving the Okinawa Problem,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/12/solving-the-okinawaproblem/)
In recent weeks the U.S. Marine Corps has begun to deploy the V-22 Osprey to Okinawa, Japan. The Osprey flies like a propeller plane but can take off and land like
a helicopter, providing more speed than the latter but more tactical flexibility than the former. It has also reignited the long-standing debate between Japan and the
United States over the future of the Marines’ presence on Okinawa. Critics have called the airplane unsafe and demanded its redeployment back to the United
States. While flight data do not confirm this specific allegation, policymakers in Tokyo and Washington do need
to realize they have an even bigger
problem — and search for a new, less intrusive way of basing Marines on this small island at the southern end of the Japanese
archipelago. The question of the Marines on Okinawa has been contentious for some two decades now. Numbering between 15,000 and 20,000 at a time there,
they have constituted more than a third of the U.S. military presence in Japan, on an overpopulated island that itself represents well under 1 percent of the
Japanese landmass. On top of those Marines, another 10,000 or so Air Force personnel continue to be based at the Kadena Air Base on Okinawa as well. The
Marines have been resented locally not only for their sheer numbers, but for Air Station Futenma, which is
surrounded by residential neighborhoods and schools in the city of Ginowan. The occasional accident there has put anxiety into the hearts of many who fear a
worse accident in the future; moreover, as Okinawa is one of Japan’s only prefectures actually growing in population, local officials want the land for other
purposes. There is a lot to say in defense of the Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. position, starting with the fact that these forces serve common alliance interests in
a stable Asia-Pacific region. Washington has tried to work with Tokyo to relocate the base, the most recent proposal being to build an airfield on the shore of
Henoko Bay farther north in a much less populated part of Okinawa. But Japanese national and local politics have repeatedly gotten in the way. In 2006, the United
States and Japan agreed to relocate almost half the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam in the coming years to relieve pressure on Okinawa. And regarding the Osprey
in particular, though it has suffered some famous accidents, as of August it had been statistically safer over its lifetime than the average Marine Corps aircraft.
According to Marine Corps headquarters at the Pentagon, it has had a 20 percent lower rate of serious accidents per flight hour than the typical Marine helicopter
or other aircraft — though admittedly its two recent crashes merit further public discussion to relieve understandable anxieties on Okinawa. All that said, the
current relocation scheme appears stuck in the morass of Okinawan politics. This June, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s
ruling coalition failed to win a majority in the prefectural assembly election. That fact puts him on the defensive. Given the public discontent about the Osprey
deployment, the governor has little choice but to push harder in resolving the Futenma issue — without, alas, approving the Henoko site — as well as opposing the
Osprey deployment. There is another problem with the Marine Corps’ plan for the region, concerning the airfield construction plan combined with the partial
relocation to Guam. None of this is the fault of the Marine Corps, which has sought in good faith to find a plan that works for all. Alas, in addition to the political
challenges the plan faces, it is also now associated with a price tag estimated by the Government Accountability Office to be up to $30 billion, split roughly equally
between Tokyo and Washington. This at a time when sequestration threatens to lop another 10 percent off future Pentagon budgets, on top of the nearly 10
percent cut already in effect from the 2011 Budget Control Act. There
is a cheaper, simpler, more promising way. It would bring
more Marines home to the United States, where downsizing in the years ahead will free up space at
stateside Marine Corps bases, and compensate by predeploying supplies in the broader Pacific region.
This latter step would cost some money, but nowhere near the $30 billion saved by jettisoning the
current plan, and it could be funded largely by Japan (since the United States would be helping the Japanese solve a local problem).
Futenma would ultimately be closed, but first provisions would be made for limited Marine Corps use of
other airfields on the main island of Okinawa and perhaps on smaller islands in the prefecture as well —
together with full access to such facilities in times of crisis or war. Specifically, we would suggest leaving
only 5,000 to 8,000 Marines on Okinawa and bringing the rest back to places like Camp Pendleton, California,
rather than building new facilities for them on Guam. The United States would then station prepositioning ships with weapons
and supplies for several thousand Marines in Japanese waters (to complement existing similar capabilities now already at ports in Guam) in order to allow the
Marines who had been relocated stateside to return rapidly to the Western Pacific in a crisis. In addition, Marines
based in the United States would
rotate regularly to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct exercises with friends and allies, including Japan.
Regarding airfields, we would counsel the following changes. Follow through promptly on the commitment to close Futenma
and return the land to local control. To replace some functions of Futenma, build a modest helipad inside
an existing Marine Corps base on the northern half of the island, where Okinawa-based Marines do most of their training now,
so the logistical implications may be minimal (or even net positive). In addition, by agreement with Tokyo and the Okinawan prefectural
government, the United States would seek authority to conduct some Marine Corps fixed-wing flights at the Kadena Air Base if necessary, provided the total
number of takeoff and landings at that base decreases. To ensure that Kadena does not become busier on a day-to-day basis, the United States should base some
Air Force planes now at Kadena elsewhere in peacetime — like Misawa in northern Japan, or even Guam. Finally, Japan could build a second runway at Naha
international airport, which would aid the island’s economy in peacetime and provide more capacity for U.S. and Japanese military use in crises or war.* This
plan is win-win-win. It saves money for both allies. It actually improves U.S. responsiveness to possible regional crises.
And it finally extracts the United States from the quagmire that the Japanese and alliance politics of this issue
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
29
have become. The United States and Japan have been bogged down by the Okinawa issue too long. The precious
time and talent of policymakers have gone toward trying to solve a problem that has become almost
insoluble. We need to look at this problem anew, address it, and finally move beyond it. The American defense budget
crunch may be just the final impetus needed to motivate policymakers to fresh thinking and decisive action.
Reducing presence in Okinawa is key to advance burden sharing and interoperability
Sugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13
(Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_1069
92.html)
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is surrounded by densely populated residential areas in the midst of
Okinawa Island. In December 1996, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed, as a part of the realignment of US bases in Okinawa, to return
it "within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilitates are completed and operational." Although Tokyo and Washington
later decided to build the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent
waters, the construction has long stagnated because successive Japanese administrations have failed to
persuade Okinawa Prefecture to approve the landfill. Hopes of the two governments now hinge on the approval in the next few
months of the landfill plan by the Okinawa government. Regardless of the decision by the Okinawa governor, however, the
fundamental question will remain. Why should we consume money and energy for unpopular,
expensive, and ineffective base-moving when the security environment and fiscal condition is so
severe? Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility.
Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining
approval for a landfill permit from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the
majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community would eventually weaken the basis
of the alliance. The financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General
Accounting Office reported that the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the landfill and construction of
the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the
Japanese government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present
US base realignment initiative fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the
rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately
9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened
from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft .
Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the
Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with
China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need
to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind. First
and foremost, Japan
and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the
Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel
betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the present situation where the MCAS Futenma has
potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa
other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as
the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose
immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese
government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also
be allocated to share the costs of rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the
Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment
depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the helicopters and
transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot remain on
Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
30
FRF in the prefecture. While
smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire
division needs to relocate. Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to Hawaii
and California rather than relying so much on Guam. Fourth, it is important that the departure of the majority of Marines based on
Okinawa not be read as a retreat or a sign of decline of the alliance. Japan and the United States can create a framework to substantially compensate for the losses
of deterrent capability. As a part of such efforts, US scholars Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon have suggested a new strategy to assure the swift and robust
projection of the Marine Corps across the Pacific at a significantly lower cost. We should also discuss steps to augment alliance capacity in other areas, particularly
the US air and naval presence based in other parts of Japan. The existing US base at Misawa in northern Honshu, home to an F-16-equipped fighter wing, could host
more advanced F-22 aircraft, for example. Expanded Military Role of Japan Equally important, the role and capability of Japan's own defense forces should be
expanded. Under the present US base realignment initiative, the government of Japan is expected to pay for relocation facilities, but not to play a larger military
role. This scheme contrasts with the realignment of US Forces Korea where the Republic of Korea agreed to bear more military burden. If Japan really demands a
smaller presence of US forces in the current security environment, it needs to step into the gap. Japan needs to invest more resources steadily in the defense of
southwest of Japan. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the SDF should establish its own naval infantry unit. Improvement in maritime and air power as
well as space and cyberspace security is more urgently required. More
effective coordination between the SDF and the US
troops would significantly improve the capability of the alliance. One of the most serious weaknesses in
the current operation of the Japan-US alliance is the ambiguity and complexity about what the SDF can
do in contingencies when "Japan is not under attack, but some kind of emergency takes place around
Japan." The SDF will provide logistical support to US troops in such events, but the domain of the SDF activity must be limited to the "non-combatant area" as
Article 9 of Japan's Constitution prohibits the use of force unless Japan is attacked. Although talk of amending the Constitution was not realistic for a long time, the
situation seems to have changed. The Abe administration is trying to change the interpretation of Article 9 to admit the exercise of the right to collective selfdefense, while others believe that such a substantial change should be made through a deliberative process of formal amendment. In either case, recognition of the
exercise of the right to collective self-defense, as well as relaxation of constitutional restraints on collective security, will clear the way for allied forces to coordinate
more closely, based on military rationales. The SDF will also be able to increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities to share various levels of
intelligence with the US military. It is therefore conceivable, for instance, that the Maritime SDF will assume a larger responsibility in the East China Sea and reduce
the burden for the US Navy. Expansion of Japan's military role, however, must be very carefully designed. Neighboring countries in East Asia will certainly take it as a
sign of Japan's resurgence as a military power. If they respond militarily, the region will face a new arms race and we will be less secure. To avoid such a clumsy
outcome, prudence is required for both Japan and the United States. For example, the larger roles and missions for the SDF may be emphasized in the realm of
logistical support to the US military and multilateral missions such as peacekeeping. At the same time, Japan needs to build confidence with its neighbors to
reassure them that Tokyo is not embarking on a dangerous course. The Japanese government should express more candid reflection on its responsibility for the war
in the Pacific, while China and South Korea could reciprocate with acceptance of genuine Japanese gestures of contrition. Japan should also construct a
comprehensive China strategy that emphasizes not only deterrence but also proactive engagement. Military to military cooperation between the SDF and People's
Liberation Army, including joint training or even coordinated activities in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, should be pursued as well. Faced with new
realities, Japan
and the US can no longer settle for a policy that merely clings to the existing plan. The
leaders of the two countries should take this opportunity to demonstrate the viability and resilience of
our precious alliance, yet again.
US-Japan alliance solves Senkaku deterrence
Bill Gertz 15, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon, 4/29/15, “Obama Says U.S. Will Defend
Japan’s Senkakus,” http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japanssenkakus/
President Obama on Tuesday invoked U.S. military defense guarantees for Japan’s disputed East China Sea islands
that have been the target of coordinated Chinese military provocations since 2012.
During a Rose Garden press conference with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Obama repeated a promise to defend the Senkaku
Islands, a statement that is likely to anger China, which claims the uninhabited islands as its own, calling them the Diaoyu Islands.
“I want to reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s
administration, including Senkaku Islands,” Obama said in a carefully crafted statement.
Additionally, Obama noted growing concern over China’s South China Sea assertiveness. Beijing has claimed some 90 percent of the sea as its
maritime domain, putting it in conflict with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other regional states.
“We share a concern about China’s land reclamation and construction activities in the South China Sea, and the United States and Japan are
united in our commitment to freedom of navigation, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion,”
he said.
The presidential statement of support comes as Japan works to adopt a new interpretation of its pacifist
constitution that will permit the use of weapons and military forces for collective self-defense and for socalled “gray areas,” such as remote island disputes. Legislation to codify the new legal interpretation is pending before Japan’s legislature.
The announcement also comes amid revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines that analysts say are designed
to counter China’s regional aggression.
The treaty article mentioned by the president is part of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It states that an armed attack on either country
would prompt action “to meet the common danger.” Other lower-level U.S. officials have made the commitment in the past. But it
was the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
31
second time in two years that Obama mentioned the military commitment, giving it more political
weight.
Chinese Embassy spokesman Zhu Haiquan said the Diaoyu island and its affiliated islands “are China’s inherent territory.”
“No matter what others say or do, the fact that the Diaoyu islands belong to China cannot be changed, and the determination and will of the
Chinese government and people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not be shaken,” he said.
Zhu said the U.S.-Japan alliance was forged during the Cold War. “We are firmly opposed to making use of this alliance against the interests of a
third party including China,” he said. “We urge the U.S. side to be discreet with what it says and does, honor its commitment of not taking sides
on issues concerning territorial sovereignty, and do more to promote regional peace and stability, instead of the other way around.”
The president’s statement follows a similar commitment he made a year ago during his visit to Japan and further signals to the
Chinese that the United States, while stating it is neutral in territorial disputes, affirmed that U.S. defenses could be used
to assist Japan in any Chinese attempt to seize the islands by force.
John Tkacik, a former China specialist with the State Department, said Obama’s statement was significant. The Senkakus have been a central
concern of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the islands were handed over to Japan by the United States in 1972, he said.
“Tokyo rightly considers the islands a touchstone of the alliance’s durability,” Tkacik said.
“The tenor of President Obama’s reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the alliance, and specifically the Senkakus, was at least as firm as past
presidents, and actually may even be more explicit than any other president personally has given,” he added.
“It’s an indication that President Obama appreciates the gravity of the strain China’s aggressiveness in the Okinawa area has placed on the
alliance.”
The strong statement is “a signal to friend and foe alike in Asia that the alliance is psychologically prepared
for even new regional pressures—particularly from China,” Tkacik said.
The plan causes a shift to rotational presence – that is a win-win-win for deterrence
O’Hanlon, 12
(Michael, “Solving the Okinawa Problem,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/12/solving-the-okinawaproblem/)
In recent weeks the U.S. Marine Corps has begun to deploy the V-22 Osprey to Okinawa, Japan. The Osprey flies like a propeller plane but can take off and land like
a helicopter, providing more speed than the latter but more tactical flexibility than the former. It has also reignited the long-standing debate between Japan and the
United States over the future of the Marines’ presence on Okinawa. Critics have called the airplane unsafe and demanded its redeployment back to the United
States. While flight data do not confirm this specific allegation, policymakers in Tokyo and Washington do need
to realize they have an even bigger
problem — and search for a new, less intrusive way of basing Marines on this small island at the southern end of the Japanese
archipelago. The question of the Marines on Okinawa has been contentious for some two decades now. Numbering between 15,000 and 20,000 at a time there,
they have constituted more than a third of the U.S. military presence in Japan, on an overpopulated island that itself represents well under 1 percent of the
Japanese landmass. On top of those Marines, another 10,000 or so Air Force personnel continue to be based at the Kadena Air Base on Okinawa as well. The
Marines have been resented locally not only for their sheer numbers, but for Air Station Futenma, which is
surrounded by residential neighborhoods and schools in the city of Ginowan. The occasional accident there has put anxiety into the hearts of many who fear a
worse accident in the future; moreover, as Okinawa is one of Japan’s only prefectures actually growing in population, local officials want the land for other
purposes. There is a lot to say in defense of the Marine Corps, as well as the U.S. position, starting with the fact that these forces serve common alliance interests in
a stable Asia-Pacific region. Washington has tried to work with Tokyo to relocate the base, the most recent proposal being to build an airfield on the shore of
Henoko Bay farther north in a much less populated part of Okinawa. But Japanese national and local politics have repeatedly gotten in the way. In 2006, the United
States and Japan agreed to relocate almost half the Okinawa-based Marines to Guam in the coming years to relieve pressure on Okinawa. And regarding the Osprey
in particular, though it has suffered some famous accidents, as of August it had been statistically safer over its lifetime than the average Marine Corps aircraft.
According to Marine Corps headquarters at the Pentagon, it has had a 20 percent lower rate of serious accidents per flight hour than the typical Marine helicopter
or other aircraft — though admittedly its two recent crashes merit further public discussion to relieve understandable anxieties on Okinawa. All that said, the
current relocation scheme appears stuck in the morass of Okinawan politics. This June, Governor Hirokazu Nakaima’s
ruling coalition failed to win a majority in the prefectural assembly election. That fact puts him on the defensive. Given the public discontent about the Osprey
deployment, the governor has little choice but to push harder in resolving the Futenma issue — without, alas, approving the Henoko site — as well as opposing the
Osprey deployment. There is another problem with the Marine Corps’ plan for the region, concerning the airfield construction plan combined with the partial
relocation to Guam. None of this is the fault of the Marine Corps, which has sought in good faith to find a plan that works for all. Alas, in addition to the political
challenges the plan faces, it is also now associated with a price tag estimated by the Government Accountability Office to be up to $30 billion, split roughly equally
between Tokyo and Washington. This at a time when sequestration threatens to lop another 10 percent off future Pentagon budgets, on top of the nearly 10
percent cut already in effect from the 2011 Budget Control Act. There
is a cheaper, simpler, more promising way. It would bring
more Marines home to the United States, where downsizing in the years ahead will free up space at
stateside Marine Corps bases, and compensate by predeploying supplies in the broader Pacific region.
This latter step would cost some money, but nowhere near the $30 billion saved by jettisoning the
current plan, and it could be funded largely by Japan (since the United States would be helping the Japanese solve a local problem).
Futenma would ultimately be closed, but first provisions would be made for limited Marine Corps use of
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
32
other airfields on the main island of Okinawa and perhaps on smaller islands in the prefecture as well —
together with full access to such facilities in times of crisis or war. Specifically, we would suggest leaving
only 5,000 to 8,000 Marines on Okinawa and bringing the rest back to places like Camp Pendleton, California,
rather than building new facilities for them on Guam. The United States would then station prepositioning ships with weapons
and supplies for several thousand Marines in Japanese waters (to complement existing similar capabilities now already at ports in Guam) in order to allow the
Marines who had been relocated stateside to return rapidly to the Western Pacific in a crisis. In addition, Marines
based in the United States would
rotate regularly to the Asia-Pacific region to conduct exercises with friends and allies, including Japan.
Regarding airfields, we would counsel the following changes. Follow through promptly on the commitment to close Futenma
and return the land to local control. To replace some functions of Futenma, build a modest helipad inside
an existing Marine Corps base on the northern half of the island, where Okinawa-based Marines do most of their training now,
so the logistical implications may be minimal (or even net positive). In addition, by agreement with Tokyo and the Okinawan prefectural
government, the United States would seek authority to conduct some Marine Corps fixed-wing flights at the Kadena Air Base if necessary, provided the total
number of takeoff and landings at that base decreases. To ensure that Kadena does not become busier on a day-to-day basis, the United States should base some
Air Force planes now at Kadena elsewhere in peacetime — like Misawa in northern Japan, or even Guam. Finally, Japan could build a second runway at Naha
international airport, which would aid the island’s economy in peacetime and provide more capacity for U.S. and Japanese military use in crises or war.* This
plan is win-win-win. It saves money for both allies. It actually improves U.S. responsiveness to possible regional crises.
And it finally extracts the United States from the quagmire that the Japanese and alliance politics of this issue
have become. The United States and Japan have been bogged down by the Okinawa issue too long. The precious
time and talent of policymakers have gone toward trying to solve a problem that has become almost
insoluble. We need to look at this problem anew, address it, and finally move beyond it. The American defense budget
crunch may be just the final impetus needed to motivate policymakers to fresh thinking and decisive action.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
33
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
34
Contention VI – Rotational Presence/China
China can beat the US in a war now – that emboldens aggression risking war
Talent, senior fellow @ AEI, 6-24-15
(Jim, and director of the National Security Project 2020 at AEI’s Marilyn Ware Center for Security
Studies,
The Obama administration’s “rebalance” to the Pacific is manifestly failing to prevent Chinese expansionism. The reason
is that China’s rapid military buildup is shifting the regional balance of power in their direction. Until the United States and its
partners reinforce their own position in the region, China will continue its coercive tactics in the East and South China Seas,
increasing the risk of armed conflict, and undermining both the rights of neighboring countries and the
vital interests of the United States. The entire world has now heard of China’s actions across seven islets and reefs in the South China Sea and its ongoing
conversion of those features into military installations. But that is just the latest in a series of aggressive Chinese actions over the last several years. In 2012, Chinese forces
blocked off the Scarborough Shoal, eventually taking control of it from the Philippines. They are trying the same tactic now with
the Second Thomas Shoal. Last summer China stationed an oil rig in waters also claimed by Vietnam. The Chinese
are flooding the Senkaku Islands, which Japan administers, with paramilitary vessels, supported by China’s naval presence just over the horizon. They have
declared an “Air Defense Identification Zone” over much of the East China Sea and likely will do the same soon in
the South China Sea. All of these are hostile acts, and the Chinese consistently accompany them with
uncompromising rhetoric: loud claims of absolute sovereignty, repudiation of negotiated solutions, and
threats against other countries which fly aircraft or sail vessels within international waters or airspace that the Chinese claim as their own. Looming in the background
is the vast military which China has built over the last twenty years. China has nearly 300 vessels in its increasingly modern Navy, several
thousand fighter aircraft, updated intelligence and reconnaissance systems, growing anti-satellite capabilities, highly sophisticated and
lethal cyber capability, and an enormous and growing inventory of increasingly longer-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles. Virtually all of this
power can be concentrated on targets in the East and South China Seas. Twenty years ago the PLA Navy could put to sea little more
than a coastal defense fleet. But since then China has been increasing its defense spending by double digits every year,
incorporating the most sophisticated technology, much of it stolen from the United States, into its ships.
They are now in serial production of entire classes of modern corvettes, frigates and destroyers, all heavily armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. Given their vast
shipbuilding base, they could increase production quickly whenever they want.
Withdrawl key to rotational presence – that shores up speed, flexibility,
interoperability, and reduces US base vulnerability to Chinese first strikes
Haddick 12
(Robert, Independent Contractor, U.S. Special Operations Command, APRIL 27, 2012, "This Week at
War: NIMBYs in the South China Sea", FP, foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/27/this-week-at-war-nimbys-inthe-south-china-sea/
Planners now agree that the Marine presence on Okinawa will shrink. The 2006 version of the plan would have
transferred 8,600 Marines and 9,000 dependents about 1,500 miles southeast to Guam, a move that would have required $21.1 billion in
construction costs to complete. The
Marine Corps presence on Okinawa has become too politically toxic for the
Japanese government. In addition, some military analysts fear that in a shooting war with China, missile
strikes could close U.S. air bases and ports on the island, preventing the Marine infantrymen there
from getting to where they might be needed. Meanwhile, the bill for the huge buildup on Guam came
in much too high and would have concentrated too many assets on one spot. Last year, Senators Carl Levin, John
McCain, and James Webb objected to the Guam plan and demanded a rewrite. The latest plan scales back the Guam move to 4,700 Marines
with 2,700 more moving to existing bases in Hawaii. That will reduce the Pentagon’s Guam construction bill. However, Levin, McCain, and
Webb still want to know how the latest basing proposal, "relates to the broader strategic concept of operations in the region." Providing a
forward presence in places like the South China Sea and reacting to military and humanitarian crises will be the major missions for the Marine
Corps in the Pacific. How best to position Marine units to accomplish these tasks remains unsettled. Aquino seems to welcome a stepped-up
U.S. military profile in his neighborhood. But that doesn’t mean he wants a return to the large and politically overbearing bases the United
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
35
States operated in the Philippines until 1992, when a political consensus in the country threw the U.S. forces out. It is likely that a majority on
Okinawa would follow suit, if they had the authority to do so. The
political path of least resistance will be to relocate
overseas units back to bases in the United States (something almost all congressmen will welcome) and then fly or
sail these units back out on relatively short-term deployments and training exercises in partner
countries. Darwin, Australia, is already preparing to eventually host up to 2,500 Marines on six-month rotational deployments. The
Philippines may soon roll out a similar welcome mat. Other countries in the region may follow. In addition to reducing the
corrosiveness of large foreign bases such as those in Okinawa and formerly in the Philippines, the
rotational deployment method has other benefits. It will condition U.S. military forces and planners to
an expeditionary mind-set. Logisticians will further improve their already formidable skills at moving
military units around the world, skills that will always be handy during crises. Military units will learn
to become more nimble, adaptable, and flexible, increasing their usefulness during crises. With
deployments as the standard model, U.S. military personnel will become acquainted with a wider variety
of foreign partners than they would under a static basing scheme. And when units are not deployed,
they will be back at bases in the United States, which will have better training facilities and better
family accommodations than those overseas. The deployment approach has its risks. U.S. naval and air forces
face increasing challenges from long-range, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles. The ability of some adversaries to use these
missiles to impose "anti-access, area denial" measures against the movement of U.S. reinforcements
into crisis areas would be especially troubling for the deployment model. From a diplomatic perspective, some will
question whether a U.S. strategy that relies more on distant deployments and less on a permanent forward troop presence will be sufficiently
reassuring to partners who might be under stress from a strong nearby neighbor like China. Under
a growing missile threat, field
commanders will likely prefer the flexibility afforded by an expeditionary approach compared to the
vulnerability of fixed bases — such as Okinawa — located within easy range of Chinese missiles. The new
slimmed-down relocation plan to Guam will still cost an estimated $8.6 billion, spent on elaborate barracks, family housing, and training ranges.
Instead of building up another increasing vulnerable fixed base, the Pentagon should consider using
that money to acquire additional Marine amphibious ships and anti-missile destroyers to protect
them. That would boost forward presence and flexibility, which should be reassuring to both alliance
partners and U.S. commanders in the region.
Reducing presence increases interoperability and Japanese defenses
Sugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13
(Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_1069
92.html)
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma is surrounded by densely populated residential areas in the midst of
Okinawa Island. In December 1996, the governments of Japan and the United States agreed, as a part of the realignment of US bases in Okinawa, to return
it "within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilitates are completed and operational." Although Tokyo and Washington
later decided to build the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent
waters, the construction has long stagnated because successive Japanese administrations have failed to
persuade Okinawa Prefecture to approve the landfill. Hopes of the two governments now hinge on the approval in the next few
months of the landfill plan by the Okinawa government. Regardless of the decision by the Okinawa governor, however, the
fundamental question will remain. Why should we consume money and energy for unpopular,
expensive, and ineffective base-moving when the security environment and fiscal condition is so
severe? Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility.
Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining
approval for a landfill permit from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the
majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community would eventually weaken the basis
of the alliance. The financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General
Accounting Office reported that the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the landfill and construction of
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
36
the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the
Japanese government will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present
US base realignment initiative fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the
rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately
9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened
from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to 1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft .
Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are likely to undermine the ability of the
Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with
China's maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need
to reset the current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind. First
and foremost, Japan
and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the
Okinawan people. Withdrawing the promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel
betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the present situation where the MCAS Futenma has
potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa
other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of attention, even bigger projects such as
the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike Futenma, however, these bases do not pose
immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese
government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also
be allocated to share the costs of rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the
Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment
depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the helicopters and
transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot remain on
Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to accept any other site for the
FRF in the prefecture. While
smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire
division needs to relocate. Due to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to Hawaii
and California rather than relying so much on Guam. Fourth, it is important that the departure of the majority of Marines based on
Okinawa not be read as a retreat or a sign of decline of the alliance. Japan and the United States can create a framework to substantially compensate for the losses
of deterrent capability. As a part of such efforts, US scholars Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon have suggested a new strategy to assure the swift and robust
projection of the Marine Corps across the Pacific at a significantly lower cost. We should also discuss steps to augment alliance capacity in other areas, particularly
the US air and naval presence based in other parts of Japan. The existing US base at Misawa in northern Honshu, home to an F-16-equipped fighter wing, could host
more advanced F-22 aircraft, for example. Expanded Military Role of Japan Equally important, the role and capability of Japan's own defense forces should be
expanded. Under the present US base realignment initiative, the government of Japan is expected to pay for relocation facilities, but not to play a larger military
role. This scheme contrasts with the realignment of US Forces Korea where the Republic of Korea agreed to bear more military burden. If Japan really demands a
smaller presence of US forces in the current security environment, it needs to step into the gap. Japan needs to invest more resources steadily in the defense of
southwest of Japan. It does not necessarily mean, however, that the SDF should establish its own naval infantry unit. Improvement in maritime and air power as
well as space and cyberspace security is more urgently required. More
effective coordination between the SDF and the US
troops would significantly improve the capability of the alliance. One of the most serious weaknesses in
the current operation of the Japan-US alliance is the ambiguity and complexity about what the SDF can
do in contingencies when "Japan is not under attack, but some kind of emergency takes place around
Japan." The SDF will provide logistical support to US troops in such events, but the domain of the SDF activity must be limited to the "non-combatant area" as
Article 9 of Japan's Constitution prohibits the use of force unless Japan is attacked. Although talk of amending the Constitution was not realistic for a long time, the
situation seems to have changed. The Abe administration is trying to change the interpretation of Article 9 to admit the exercise of the right to collective selfdefense, while others believe that such a substantial change should be made through a deliberative process of formal amendment. In either case, recognition of the
exercise of the right to collective self-defense, as well as relaxation of constitutional restraints on collective security, will clear the way for allied forces to coordinate
more closely, based on military rationales. The SDF will also be able to increase Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance activities to share various levels of
intelligence with the US military. It is therefore conceivable, for instance, that the Maritime SDF will assume a larger responsibility in the East China Sea and reduce
the burden for the US Navy. Expansion of Japan's military role, however, must be very carefully designed. Neighboring countries in East Asia will certainly take it as a
sign of Japan's resurgence as a military power. If they respond militarily, the region will face a new arms race and we will be less secure. To avoid such a clumsy
outcome, prudence is required for both Japan and the United States. For example, the larger roles and missions for the SDF may be emphasized in the realm of
logistical support to the US military and multilateral missions such as peacekeeping. At the same time, Japan needs to build confidence with its neighbors to
reassure them that Tokyo is not embarking on a dangerous course. The Japanese government should express more candid reflection on its responsibility for the war
in the Pacific, while China and South Korea could reciprocate with acceptance of genuine Japanese gestures of contrition. Japan should also construct a
comprehensive China strategy that emphasizes not only deterrence but also proactive engagement. Military to military cooperation between the SDF and People's
Liberation Army, including joint training or even coordinated activities in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, should be pursued as well. Faced with new
realities, Japan
and the US can no longer settle for a policy that merely clings to the existing plan. The
leaders of the two countries should take this opportunity to demonstrate the viability and resilience of
our precious alliance, yet again.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
37
Japanese Leadership—Japan would solidfy a network of regional allies which prevents
them from bandwagoning with China
Paul J. Leaf, worked for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is an Associate in the Labor &
Employment and Commercial Litigation Departments of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Sept 4 2014, "Promise and
Potential Peril: Japan’s Military Normalization", The Diplomat, thediplomat.com/2014/09/promise-andpotential-peril-japans-military-normalization/
However, the security environment has deteriorated in recent years due to growing threats and at least
the perception of eroding U.S. defense commitments. Since 2006, North Korea has tested three nuclear
weapons, potentially developed nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking Japan, and has killed South Korean troops and civilians.
Meanwhile, Beijing’s declared military budget grew fourfold over the last decade (now at nearly $132 billion),
whereas Tokyo’s military funding declined almost every year over that period (now approaching $49 billion). China
spends more on its military than Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam combined. Having developed stronger offensive military capabilities,
China is aggressively asserting control of (among other areas) the East China Sea, where islands administered by Tokyo are
subject to competing Japanese and Chinese claims and where rich fishing grounds, potential oil and gas
deposits, and important trade routes lie. Take the following examples. In January 2013, Chinese warships in those waters locked
their weapons-targeting radar on a Japanese helicopter and naval destroyer. In November 2013, Beijing enlarged its air defense identification
zone to cover a broad portion of the East China Sea claimed by Tokyo. China demands that aircraft entering the zone identify themselves and
divulge flight data, or face “defensive emergency measures.” In the year ending in March 2014, Japan scrambled fighter jets 415 times (a high
that is up 36 percent from the previous year) to intercept Chinese aircraft encroaching its claimed airspace. In May and June 2014, Chinese
fighter jets intercepted Japanese surveillance planes in contested skies, nearly causing collisions. And throughout this period, China conducted
military exercises that the U.S. Navy calls preparation for a “short, sharp war” to seize disputed islands from Japan. As
Japan’s
neighborhood has become less safe, its doubts about U.S. security guarantees have grown. Tokyo has
studied America’s shrinking military budget, war-weary voters, and expanding list of crises in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East that reduce resources the U.S. can devote to Asia. Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad
survived U.S. President Barack Obama’s threat that he must “step aside” and then crossed Obama’s “red line” against gassing his people, Russia
annexed Crimea and its proxies shot down a civilian plane, and China is forcibly expanding, including by expelling (with civilian vessels) the
Philippines from the contested Scarborough Shoal and sinking (with a fishing vessel) a Vietnamese boat in its bid to find oil in Hanoi’s exclusive
economic zone. But the U.S. has responded with little more than routine verbal condemnations and incremental, pinprick sanctions. Japan
sees a detached American president loathe to meet serious threats with serious responses, so it
questions whether the U.S. will meaningfully back it in a confrontation with China. Given these
dynamics, calls for Japan to field a more flexible military and to forge stronger alliances have
increased. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is normalizing Japan’s military. First, in 2013, Japan
increased its military budget for the first time in eleven years. Second, in December 2013, Japan created a
National Security Council and issued its first strategy paper, which focuses on countering China and
beefing up Japan’s military. Third, in April 2014, Tokyo ended its ban on weapons exports and announced
that it would jointly develop weapons with other countries in addition to the U.S. Fourth, in July 2014, Japan’s cabinet
reinterpreted Article 9 of the country’s constitution to allow it to engage in collective self-defense. The
move lays the groundwork for the Self-Defense Forces to use force abroad to defend it allies even if
Japan has not been attacked. This military normalization can help to check China’s increasingly hostile
rise. First, Japan’s military growth may offer new methods to oppose Chinese adventurism. China
incrementally presses its territorial claims generally through low-level civilian provocations (such as using its
civilian ships to patrol, blockade or expel). Last year, to support this strategy, China placed its civilian maritime forces, including its coast guard,
fishing, and surveillance elements, under the control of a single, more powerful non-military agency. To
prevent a serious U.S.
response, China avoids high-intensity conflicts (like invading a country) and mostly keeps its military forces intimidatingly close
but not directly involved in its low-level provocations. The U.S. and its partners are scrambling to meet this strategy as
fear of escalation makes the U.S. unwilling to respond forcefully to such moves and the targets of
China’s aggression are usually too weak to resist its incursions. Indeed, China’s battlefield, which includes
nearly 1.9 million square miles of ocean and airspace encompassing the East and South China Seas,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
38
necessitates the wide dispersal of those countries’ limited military resources. But when Beijing picks a
fight, it usually overwhelms its targets through sheer numbers. Japan’s military maturation may be the
answer because it can enhance individual and collective military capacities such that America’s regional
partners handle China’s low-level provocations without U.S. involvement while the U.S. focuses on
China’s high-level threats. According to Zachary Keck, countering Beijing’s low-level provocations requires
countries skirmishing with China to acquire “greater quantities of lower-end platforms” to “maintain a
larger presence throughout the massive waters of the South and East China Seas. These capabilities don’t need to
be especially high-end since China relies heavily on Coast Guard and other civilian vessels . . . . But they do need to be in the areas that China is
contesting, preferably beforehand to deter Beijing from trying to contest them in the first place.” As Keck points out, limited
defense
budgets will bar some of China’s competitors from procuring a sufficient number of even lower-end
platforms. Thus, other force multipliers, such as Washington and Tokyo donating decommissioned military equipment to and coordinated
defense efforts among Beijing’s adversaries, are needed. To realize this strategy, Japan’s military must be given wider
operating parameters and field stronger aerial, amphibious, maritime, and surveillance capabilities to
defend (and perhaps recapture) its islands and assist its neighbors. Even so, Japan must not procure too many bigticket weapons that overstretch its military budget given its contracting economy or that leave it vulnerable to asymmetric, dispersed or
sizeable attacks. To those ends, Japan
expects to acquire by 2019 six more submarines, three reconnaissance
drones, seventeen Osprey aircraft, fifty-two amphibious landing vehicles, four more refueling tankers,
seven additional naval destroyers, four more maritime patrol aircraft, and twenty-eight F-35 jet fighters,
and it is repositioning its military resources further south to be closer to areas contested by China. Also,
Tokyo must train Beijing’s rivals and provide them with military and maritime law enforcement
hardware, including patrol and surveillance equipment. Japan should not arm its neighbors with only military vessels,
because if those units are used for maritime law enforcement purposes (because of a shortage of civilian coast guard vessels), they undermine
the narrative of unilateral Chinese aggression and give Beijing an excuse to “defensively escalate” by calling in its own warships. To make its
technology more affordable, Japan should centralize its weapons development, procurement, and exports systems into a single agency and
expand its arms sales to spread costs. Second, Japan’s
military normalization portends the creation of a new
alliance system in Asia. Peace in that region has been secured primarily through bilateral relationships
between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other. The U.S. could rely on these
narrow alliances instead of cultivating multilateral relationships because it has been significantly more
powerful than China. But if Beijing nears surpassing Washington in Asia, the weaker countries
surrounding China will be tempted to acquiesce to its hegemonic ambitions. Still, these countries may
oppose Chinese ascendancy if a waning U.S. has sufficient support, such as a stronger and more
flexible Japan anchoring multilateral alliances in Asia. Washington and many of Tokyo’s neighbors,
including Australia, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, support Japan’s military normalization.
Indeed, high-ranking government officials from nearly all of these countries have openly praised
Japan’s actions. And during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s push to reinterpret Article 9, military
cooperation between Japan and each of these countries has increased, including military training and
aid, joint weapons development, and arms sales. Even Taiwan, which shares China’s territorial claims and was occupied
by Japan, appears receptive. Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui stated that Japan exercising collective self-defense will make the
region safer. And Taipei appears to have not publicly protested Tokyo’s construction of a radar station and forthcoming deployment of troops
on Yonaguni Island, which is 67 miles from Taiwan and 93 miles from islands claimed by Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei. If
Japan fails to live
up to its grand announcements about assuming a larger military role, however, it is unlikely to inspire
a following. It is thus troubling that since stating last year that it would supply Vietnam with used
coast guard boats, Japan has delayed the transfer because its substantial patrol duties leave it with
insufficient spare vessels and it is debating whether it is legally barred from sharing those boats with
Vietnam.
US China war goes nuclear
Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies @ Victoria University, 14
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
39
(Robert, “Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia,”
http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/COG%20%2318%20Web.pdf)
knowing the
resources that Japan’s ally could bring to bear, China could in fact face incentives to escalate very quickly
against Japan before America made that fateful decision. And if for some reason Beijing believed that the United States was
unlikely to come good on its confirmation that the Mutual Security Treaty applies to Japan in the
context of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the deterrence of Chinese escalation could in fact be weakened. There is at least
some speculation that China might exploit an emerging crisis with Japan in an attempt to force the United States to blink.7
Beijing could well be uncertain about what Washington would do. But in the pressure and confusion of
an already serious crisis, China’s leaders only need to think that American involvement is a possibility to
face some additional escalatory pressures. The PLA would be operating in the knowledge that its vulnerable C4SIR systems would be among the very first
China would need to think twice about escalating a bilateral conflict with Japan because of the distinct possibility of direct US military involvement. But
targets of American military action to defend its alliance partner. China would therefore face at least two types of escalatory pressures. The first one is more general: to use what forces it has
available over which it may lose effective command should its control systems be disabled. In this way the possibility of American involvement may, through China’s preemptive moves,
become an absolute certainty. The second pressure is more specific:
China would find it too tempting not to target American C4SIR
systems including America’s satellite capabilities. In this sequence, the move from a small and even accidental use of force involving China and Japan to a much more serious and
damaging triangular conflict with United States participation suddenly seems plausible. By no means is it too much to imagine China’s early
resort to anti-satellite attacks, its exploitation of asymmetric advantages with its growing missile
capabilities to target America’s aircraft carriers, and an acceleration in Chinese cyber-attacks for military purposes. Nor in response, or in anticipation, is
it implausible to envision devastating American and Japanese attacks against China’s C4SIR and missile systems. All three parties would very likely be aiming to keep this escalating exchange in
nuclear escalation
is less unlikely than some might wish to presume. An outwardly confident but inwardly vulnerable China may
resort to nuclear threats against Japan as a form of intimidation. That would immediately require America’s closest attention. Nuclear weapons remain for China the great
equaliser. But this also means that as prized assets, China may want to use its nuclear weapons early if it feels that its ability to
retain the capacity to do so is at risk. Two material issues surface here to make this hugely destabilising situation possible. The first is that China lacks
separate tactical and strategic C4SIR systems. This raises the prospect that American (and Japanese)
conventional attacks designed to degrade China’s control of its conventional forces may also reduce Beijing’s confidence in its ability to
retain a nuclear deterrence capability. China may face a horrible dilemma such that if it wants to retain a nuclear option, it has to use it early rather than as a
the conventional domain (and only two of them have nuclear weapons that might be used). But there are strategic and material factors which suggest that
last resort. The second is that, because of basing arrangements, China may assume that an American conventional attack will also remove some of its land based nuclear missiles and sea based
nuclear systems. This is also a perverse incentive to nuclear escalation.
The SCS is key to global econ and trade
Terri Moon Cronk, Reporter for DOD News, July 24, 2015, "Pacom Chief: China’s Land Reclamation Has
Broad Consequences", www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/612689/pacom-chief-chinas-landreclamation-has-broad-consequences
China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea could have far-reaching U.S. security and economic
consequences by disrupting international rules and norms that have supported the global community
for decades, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command said today. In a security forum panel discussion in Aspen, Colorado, Navy Adm.
Harry B. Harris Jr. said China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is an issue the American public must know about and the United
States must address. “While Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan have also conducted land
reclamation in the South China Sea, their total -- approximately 100 acres over 45 years -- is dwarfed by
the size, scope and scale of China’s massive buildup,” Harris said. “In only 18 months, China has reclaimed
almost 3,000 acres.” Each year, he noted, more than $5.3 trillion in global sea-based trade relies on
unimpeded sea lanes through the South China Sea, adding that the Strait of Malacca alone sees more than
25 percent of oil shipments and 50 percent of all natural gas transits each day. This is made possible
through the regional countries’ adherence to longstanding customary international law, which protects
freedom of navigation, he added. Fundamental to Global Economy International recognition and protection of
freedom of navigation are fundamental to the global economy and the U.S. way of life, Harris said, and unilateral
attempts by any nation to disrupt freedom of navigation place the international system and global
economy at risk. “The South China Sea is front and center in the tug-of-war between the majority of
regional nations that want to maintain the status quo and China that wants to change it to suit its
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
40
narrow self-interest,” he said. “This is why Deputy Secretary of State Blinken recently compared the
aggressive actions of China in the South China Sea to Russia’s actions in Crimea. They both demonstrate
desire by individual actors to change the status quo.”
Economic disruptions have a high propensity to spillover and escalate
James, Princeton history professor, 2014
(Harold, “Debate: Is 2014, like 1914, a prelude to world war?”, 7-2,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/read-and-vote-is-2014-like-1914-a-prelude-to-worldwar/article19325504/)
Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world are now re-emerging. Then an economically
declining power, Britain, wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing
competitors, Germany and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China – according to some
calculations, set to become the world’s largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, financial institutions
appear both as dangerous weapons of mass destruction, but also as potential instruments for the application of national power. In managing the
2008 crisis, the dependence of foreign banks on U.S. dollar funding constituted a major weakness, and required the provision of large swap lines by the Federal Reserve. The United States
provided that support to some countries, but not others, on the basis of an explicitly political logic, as Eswar Prasad demonstrates in his new book on the “Dollar Trap.”
Geo-politics
is intruding into banking practice elsewhere. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russian banks were trying to acquire assets in Central and Eastern Europe. European
and U.S. banks are playing a much reduced role in Asian trade finance. Chinese banks are being pushed to expand their role in global commerce. After the financial crisis, China started to build
up the renminbi as a major international currency. Russia and China have just proposed to create a new credit rating agency to avoid what they regard as the political bias of the existing
The next stage in this logic is to think about how financial power can be directed to
national advantage in the case of a diplomatic tussle. Sanctions are a routine (and not terribly successful) part of the pressure applied to rogue
(American-based) agencies.
states such as Iran and North Korea. But financial pressure can be much more powerfully applied to countries that are deeply embedded in the world economy. The test is in the Western
imposition of sanctions after the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Vladimir Putin’s calculation in response is that the European Union and the United States cannot possibly be serious
The threat
of systemic disruption generates a new sort of uncertainty, one that mirrors the decisive feature of
the crisis of the summer of 1914. At that time, no one could really know whether clashes would escalate
or not. That feature contrasts remarkably with almost the entirety of the Cold War, especially since the 1960s, when the strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction left no doubt
that any superpower conflict would inevitably escalate. The idea of network disruption relies on the ability to achieve advantage
by surprise, and to win at no or low cost. But it is inevitably a gamble, and raises prospect that others
might, but also might not be able to, mount the same sort of operation. Just as in 1914, there is an
enhanced temptation to roll the dice, even though the game may be fatal.
about the financial war. It would turn into a boomerang: Russia would be less affected than the more developed and complex financial markets of Europe and America.
Goes global
Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11
[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman
of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI
president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the
Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include
transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on
nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article
Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April
2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB)
View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 –
130]
Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The
first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into
an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving
the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be
triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just
experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy
similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
41
and rejection of outside interference would likely be
amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of
multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran
or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might
become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be
sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.
Risk of war high – miscalc likely, interdependence doesn’t check, small scale conflicts
escalate
Jackson, Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program @ Georgetown
University, 15
(Van, “Will Asia's Peace Last?,” http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/will-asias-peace-last/, theo cut this
card)
Will Asia’s peace endure? The answer depends on how policymakers cope with growing structural
pressures that increasingly encourage miscalculations, arms races, and reckless foreign policies. A number of wellknown yet largely overlooked regional trends make conflict more likely than in the past: mistrust; uncertainty; and widespread military modernization. The greater risk of conflict over time
comes from the convergence of these trends with Asia’s longstanding flashpoints. Now more than ever, Asian states express twin uncertainties about the intentions of a rising and increasingly
Apart from great power
uncertainties, Asian states are wary about each other’s long-term capabilities and intentions as well —
especially as much of the region undergoes a transition to larger and diverse militaries with more advanced capabilities. All of these insecurities become
compounded by the limited ability of Asian states to forge deep security cooperation because of
enduring mistrust of one another. Binding agreements are incompatible with the prevailing regional
norm of consensus-based cooperation, yet even non-binding but transparent and predictable patterns
of behavior are also largely absent from the regional security landscape. These trends feed security dilemma dynamics among
states purely interested in stability and the status quo, but they also risk impeding cooperation in the face of aggression. Bonding together over a common
threat is much harder when rules and norms of cooperation are fragmented, mistrust pervasive, and
uncertainty about the look and feel of the future regional order rampant. This is a principal danger of a more multipolar Asia, and is
arguably what we see today with multiple South China Sea claimants facing growing Chinese assertiveness — the structural conditions of the security
environment, exacerbated by domestic political antagonisms toward regional neighbors, create barriers
to regional coalescence against a more aggressive party. From Korea to the East and South China Seas, Asia is home to many familiar
flashpoints that have somehow avoided triggering war for decades. It may be tempting to conclude that since these disputes have not
yet destabilized the region, they are unlikely to do so in the future. For some, there are plenty of
reasons for optimism. Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, believes that the region is headed for a “golden age” because Asian policy elites
assertive China on the one hand, and the willingness of the United States to maintain its stabilizing role in the region on the other.
share a consensus that economic development and modernization are more important than conflict. David Kang of Dartmouth College has argued that a China-centered regional order has
historically been peaceful, which helps bolster his claim that Asian states are not balancing China (circa 2007). And Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard University argues that, contra Washington’s
Asia’s national economies, moreover, are becoming
increasingly interdependent; the costs of conflict would surely outweigh any conceivable benefits. But
even putting aside the accuracy of these characterizations of contemporary Asia, which are themselves
highly debatable, there are a number of reasons why such rosy outlooks offer little cause for optimism.
First, economic development is valuable to Asian policy elites because it strengthens domestic legitimacy,
but channeling nationalist passions still remains key to the legitimacy of most Asian governments. Under
the wrong conditions, whipping up nationalist sentiment against neighbors can trump economic development . Second,
militaries across Asia are building their capacity to not only provide for internal security, but to project
power outside their borders while denying other militaries the ability to do the same. Many small-scale
disputes have erupted between low-capacity Asian militaries in the past 30 years of relative peace. It is
conceivable that as military capacities increase so too will the likelihood of small-scale conflicts
becoming larger scale ones. Third, economic interdependence increases the stakes of conflict but does not
necessarily prevent it, or even increase the cost of it. Many middle powers operate their economic and political policies on separate tracks —
claims, China’s behavior in its many territorial disputes is not particularly new or assertive.
Japan’s Shinzo Abe has been explicit about this in Japan’s policy toward China and ASEAN nations have deliberately done this as part of a complex strategy to navigate the great powers
peacefully. Finally, and most importantly, none of the optimistic characterizations of Asia engage with the realities of current trends — mistrust, multiple types of uncertainty, and military
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
42
If all is well, why is the region militarizing? Why aren’t stronger norms of cooperation in
place? Any explanation of why Asia will remain peaceful must account for the prevalence — and potentially perverse effects — of these attributes of the Asian security environment, but
modernization.
none do.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
43
Contention VII– Democracy Credibility
Presence undermines US democracy credibility
Motoyama et al., Kyoto professor emeritus, 2015
(Yoshihiko, “Does Okinawa Need Another US Military Base?”, April,
http://www.okinawaiken.org/washingtonpost2015/)
After two decades of resisting the Henoko plan, and what in any genuine democracy would be regarded as decisive elections held in
2014, the people of Okinawa made their views clear to Washington and Tokyo. In January, Mayor Susumu
Inamine, a forthright opponent of the Henoko plan, won re-election by a wide margin in Nago. In the
gubernatorial race in November, Okinawans overwhelmingly elected former Naha City Mayor and base
opponent Takeshi Onaga over incumbent Hirokazu Nakaima, who had succumbed to pressure from the Tokyo government to accept
the project. The election amounted to an Okinawa-wide referendum over the Henoko-Futenma issue, in
which even the long-suffering residents of Ginowan voted in largest numbers for Onaga. Finally, in December, all four Okinawan
constituencies elected anti-base construction candidates to the Lower House of the Japanese Diet, while various polls
show that between 65-80% of Okinawans are opposed to any new base. Despite these election results,
the Government of Japan continues to steamroll the relocation project over the will of the Okinawan
people. Engineers started drilling surveys on the sea floor off Henoko in the summer of 2014. In response, citizens opposed to the
reclamation began sit-ins in front of the gate of the adjoining military base at Camp Schwab and
launched protest activities at sea. Nevertheless, in spite of this overwhelming opposition, the Abe
administration insists it can go ahead with the full-scale destruction of Oura Bay it plans for this summer.
On April 29, Prime Minister Abe, in an address to a joint meeting of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, is expected to tell President
Obama and the American people that base construction in Okinawa is going according to plan, and even that the project will strengthen
U.S.Japanese bilateral relations. Pragmatists as well as idealists within the U.S. administration would do well to question this version of events.
Some 60
years ago, during another period of unrest in Okinawa known as the Island Wide Struggle, U.S.
troops forcibly removed Okinawans from their land using bulldozers and bayonets. At the time, senior U.S.
diplomats warned of Okinawa becoming ungovernable, and the most heavy-handed tactics of the period were abandoned in favor of
negotiation. Attempting
to impose a new base on Okinawa by force, which appears to be the only option currently being
repeat the mistakes of that period, at the same time
undermining Washington and Tokyo’s credibility as agents of democracy, freedom and human rights.
considered by U.S. and Japanese officials, threatens to
Backsliding guarantees great power war
Azar Gat 11, the Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, 2011, “The
Changing Character of War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers,
p. 30-32
Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have concentrated the minds of all concerned
wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist
world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always
sufficiently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist
economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been
War now seems
to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the world’s ‘zone of war’, where countries
that have so far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be
engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries.¶ While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near disappearance
of armed conflict within the developed world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the
collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a fleeting one. The probability of major
wars within the developed world remains low—because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and
interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more
radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy;
transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a ‘zone of peace’.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
This notion, however, is fast eroding with
the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent from the international
system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents
the greatest change in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist
liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character.¶ Authoritarian capitalism may be
more viable than people tend to assume. 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies,
because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half of
the twentieth century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efficient economically as, and if anything
more successful militarily than, their democratic counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and
ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new
non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the largest player in the
international system in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth that within a
generation or two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower.¶ Although the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers
does not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony since the Soviet Union’s
collapse could be short-lived and that a universal ‘democratic peace’ may still be far off. The new capitalist
and that in an affluent and democratic world, major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for.
authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus,
it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into
imperial protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In
time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes.¶ With the possible exception of the sore
Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be
as China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, flex its muscles, and
behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may
coexist more or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called ‘security dilemma’, and
against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated ideological
rivalry, potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions.
more problematic. However,
Although great power relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they may vary
less than seemed likely only a short while ago.
44
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
45
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
46
Contention VIII – China Encirclement
Forward bases in North East Asia make interstate conflict and military adventurism
likely
Vine 15, associate professor of anthropology @ American University, 9-13-15 (David, “How U.S.
Military Bases Abroad Undermine National Security and Harm Us All,” Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-vine/us-military-bases-abroad_b_8131402.html)
It is also not at all clear that bases enhance national security and global peace in any way. In the absence of a superpower
enemy, the argument that bases many thousands of miles from U.S. shores are necessary to defend the United States -- or even its
allies -- is a hard argument to make. On the contrary, the global collection of bases has generally enabled the
launching of military interventions, drone strikes, and wars of choice that have resulted in repeated
disasters, costing millions of lives and untold destruction from Vietnam to Iraq. By making it easier to wage foreign
wars, bases overseas have ensured that military action is an ever more attractive option -- often the only
imaginable option -- for U.S. policymakers. As the anthropologist Catherine Lutz has said, when all you have in your
foreign policy toolbox is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. Ultimately, bases abroad have
frequently made war more likely rather than less. Proponents of the long-outdated forward strategy will
reply that overseas bases “deter” enemies and help keep the global peace. As supporters of the status quo, they have been
proclaiming such security benefits as self-evident truths for decades. Few have provided anything of
substance to support their claims. While there is some evidence that military forces can indeed deter imminent threats, little if any
research suggests that overseas bases are an effective form of long-term deterrence. Studies by both the
Bush administration and the RAND Corporation -- not exactly left-wing peaceniks -- indicate that advances in transportation
technology have largely erased the advantage of stationing troops abroad. In the case of a legitimate defensive war or
peacekeeping operation, the military could generally deploy troops just as quickly from domestic bases as from most bases abroad. Rapid sealift and airlift
capabilities coupled with agreements allowing the use of bases in allied nations and, potentially, pre-positioned supplies are a dramatically less expensive and less
inflammatory alternative to maintaining permanent bases overseas. It is also questionable whether such bases actually increase the security of host nations. The
presence of U.S. bases can turn a country into an explicit target for foreign powers or militants -- just as U.S.
installations have endangered Americans overseas. Similarly, rather than stabilizing dangerous regions, foreign bases
frequently heighten military tensions and discourage diplomatic solutions to conflicts. Placing U.S.
bases near the borders of countries like China, Russia, and Iran, for example, increases threats to their security and
encourages them to respond by boosting their own military spending and activity. Imagine how U.S. leaders would respond
if China were to build even a single small base in Mexico, Canada, or the Caribbean. Notably, the most dangerous moment during the Cold War -- the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis -- revolved around the construction of Soviet nuclear missile facilities in Cuba, roughly 90 miles from the U.S. border. The
creation and
maintenance of so many U.S. bases overseas likewise encourages other nations to build their own
foreign bases in what could rapidly become an escalating “base race.” Bases near the borders of China
and Russia, in particular, threaten to fuel new cold wars. U.S. officials may insist that building yet more bases in
East Asia is a defensive act meant to ensure peace in the Pacific, but tell that to the Chinese. That country’s
leaders are undoubtedly not “reassured” by the creation of yet more bases encircling their borders. Contrary to the
claim that such installations increase global security, they tend to ratchet up regional tensions, increasing the risk of future
military confrontation. In this way, just as the war on terror has become a global conflict that only seems to spread terror, the creation of new U.S.
bases to protect against imagined future Chinese or Russian threats runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. These bases may ultimately help create the
very threat they are supposedly designed to protect against. In other words, far
from making the world a safer place, U.S. bases can
actually make war more likely and the country less secure. Behind the Wire In his farewell address to the nation upon leaving the
White House in 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned the nation about the insidious economic, political, and even spiritual effects of what he
dubbed “the military-industrial-congressional complex,” the vast interlocking national security state born out of World War II. As Chalmers Johnson’s work
reminded us in this new century, our 70-year-old collection of bases is evidence of how, despite Ike’s warning, the United States has entered a permanent state of
war with an economy, a government, and a global system of power enmeshed in preparations for future conflicts. America’s overseas bases offer a window onto
our military’s impact in the world and in our own daily lives. The
history of these hulking “Little Americas” of concrete, fast
food, and weaponry provides a living chronicle of the United States in the post-World War II era. In a certain
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
47
sense, in these last seven decades, whether we realize it or not, we’ve all come to live “behind the wire,” as military personnel like to say. We
may think
such bases have made us safer. In reality, they’ve helped lock us inside a permanently militarized
society that has made all of us -- everyone on this planet -- less secure, damaging lives at home and abroad.
Plan establishes stable relations with China that make cooperation on warming and
stability effective
Browne 15 Andrew Browne is a Senior Correspondent and Columnist, WSJ, June 12, 2015, “Can China
Be Contained?”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-china-be-contained-1434118534
For its part, China is utterly convinced that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of containment. Kevin Rudd,
the former Australian prime minister (and himself a China expert), summarized Beijing’s perception of
U.S. goals in five bullet points in a recent Harvard study: to isolate China, contain it, diminish it,
internally divide it and sabotage its political leadership. To be sure, the new tension in U.S.-China
relations is not anything like the Cold War stare-down that preoccupied Europe for decades, when NATO
and Warsaw Pact tanks faced each other across lines that neither side dared to cross. But in one
important respect, history is repeating itself: Both China and the U.S. have started to view each other
not as partners, competitors or rivals but as adversaries. China’s missile and naval buildup, as well as
its development of new cyber- and space-warfare capabilities, are aimed squarely at deterring the U.S.
military from intervening in any conflict in Asia. Meanwhile, many of the Pentagon’s pet projects—Star
Wars technologies such as lasers and advanced weapons systems such as a long-range bomber—are
being developed with China in mind. So what, specifically, should America do? In one of the most hawkish of the recent think-tank reports, Robert D. Blackwill, a
former U.S. deputy national security adviser and ambassador to India under President George W. Bush, and Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace who also served on the National Security Council staff under President Bush, write that engagement with China has served to strengthen a competitor. It is time, they declare, for a new
grand strategy: less engagement and more “balancing” to ensure the “central objective” of continued U.S. global primacy. Among other things, America should beef up its military in Asia,
choke off China’s access to military technology, accelerate missile-defense deployments and increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. For Michael D. Swaine, also of the Carnegie Endowment,
this is a certain recipe for another Cold War, or worse. He outlines a sweeping settlement under which America would concede its primacy in East Asia, turning much of the region into a buffer
zone policed by a balance of forces, including those from a strengthened Japan. All foreign forces would withdraw from Korea. And China would offer assurances that it wouldn’t launch
hostilities against Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province. Such arrangements, even if possible, would take decades to sort out. Meanwhile, warns David M. Lampton, a professor at
the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, U.S.-China ties have reached a tipping point. “Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any
time since normalization,” he said in a recent speech. The West has been in this position before. Optimism about the prospects of transforming an ancient civilization through engagement,
followed by deep disillusion, has been the pattern ever since early Jesuit missionaries sought to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Those envoys adopted the gowns of the Mandarin class,
grew long beards and even couched their gospel message in Confucian terms to make it more palatable. The 17th-century German priest Adam Schall got as far as becoming the chief
The disappointment in the U.S. today is heightened by
the fact that engagement with China has promised so much and progressed so far. Trade and
technology have transformed China beyond anything that Nixon could have imaged, and the two
countries are each other’s second-largest trading partners. China is America’s biggest creditor. More
than a quarter million Chinese students study at U.S. universities. But the ideological gap hasn’t narrowed at all—and now Mr. Xi has
astronomer of the Qing dynasty. But he fell from favor, and the Jesuits were later expelled.
taken a sharp anti-Western turn. Mao Zedong made the bold decision to cut a deal with Nixon, confident enough to embrace American capitalists even while pressing the radical agenda of his
Cultural Revolution. Later, Deng Xiaoping struck a pragmatic balance between the opportunities of economic engagement with the West and the dangers posed by an influx of Western ideas.
“When you open the window, flies and mosquitoes come in,” he shrugged. Today, Mr. Xi is furiously zapping the bugs. A newly proposed law would put the entire foreign nonprofit sector
under police administration, effectively treating such groups as potential enemies of the state. State newspapers rail against “hostile foreign forces” and their local sympathizers. The Chinese
Communist Party’s “Document No. 9” prohibits discussion of Western democracy on college campuses. And as Mr. Xi champions traditional Chinese culture, authorities in Wenzhou, a heavily
The backlash against the West
extends well beyond China’s borders. For decades, China accepted America’s role as a regional
policeman to maintain the peace and keep sea lanes open. But in Shanghai last year, Mr. Xi declared
that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the
security of Asia.” Washington feels a certain sense of betrayal. America’s open markets, after all, smoothed China’s export-led rise to become the world’s second-largest
Christian coastal city dubbed China’s “New Jerusalem,” tear down crosses atop churches as unwanted symbols of Western influence.
economy, and the two economies are now thoroughly enmeshed. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that mutual dependence will necessarily prevent conflict. Pre-World War I Europe was
also closely entwined through trade and investment. Even the U.S. business community, once Beijing’s staunchest advocate in Washington, has lost some of its enthusiasm for engagement.
James McGregor, a former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and now the China chairman of APCO Worldwide, a business consultancy, recalls helping to persuade U.S.
trade associations to lobby for China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, which happened in 2001. That unity of purpose, he says “has been splintering ever since.” Today, “they all
China’s fears notwithstanding, the Obama administration remains very much in
favor of engagement. Last year’s high-profile deal on climate change showed that cooperation is still
possible. Ahead of a planned summit in the U.S. in September, the two countries are hammering out an
ambitious bilateral trade agreement. And it is often pointed out that not a single problem in the world,
from piracy to pollution, can be solved without their joint efforts. In an increasingly awkward dance,
believe that China is out to screw them.”
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
48
however, the Obama administration is trying to sustain this policy of engagement while also ramping
up its military options in Asia. China is playing a similar game. And it is not clear how long both sides will
be able to continue before there is a clash, by accident or design. Mr. Obama himself sometimes strikes
adversarial postures on China. In trying to push a massive Asia-Pacific free-trade zone through a
resistant Congress, he has been invoking a China threat. “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the
rules out in that region,” he told The Wall Street Journal in April. He also has pursued a campaign—
ultimately futile—to prevent allies such as Britain and Australia from signing on to a Chinese regional
development bank. Although the bank will help deliver much-needed infrastructure, the White House
interpreted it as part of a bid to undermine America’s leadership in global finance. For its part, China
believes that the U.S. will never accept the legitimacy of a communist government. Mr. Xi has proposed
a “new model of great-power relations,” designed to break a pattern of wars through the ages that
occur when a rising power challenges the incumbent one. But America has turned him down, unwilling
to accept a formula that not only assumes that the two countries are peers but seems to place them on
the same moral plane.
Only plan makes cooperation effective
Swaine 15 Michael Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
and has a PhD in Government from Harvard, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 20,
2015, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance
of Power”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-westernpacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi
First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept the unambiguously superior level of American
predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is required to ensure long-term
regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. “freedom of action” and a clear “ability
to prevail” militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to China’s
mainland borders. The United States would never tolerate such predominance by any power along its
borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given China’s expanding interests and
capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along
Beijing’s maritime periphery will virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and economically
draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at present, and
reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to work together to address a growing
array of common global challenges.
U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably
reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that
prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained
domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s
maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders. Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military predominance in the Asia-Pacific region can be sustained on a consistent basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China
could establish its own predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the long-term security environment in Asia, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region,2 concluded that, while the United States will remain the
strongest military power on a global level indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly confront increasingly severe, economically induced defense spending limitations that will constrain efforts to decisively keep well ahead of a growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within
approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline, that is, the area covered by the so-called first and second island chains. This will occur despite Washington’s repeated assertion that the rebalance to Asia will sustain America’s predominant position in the region. Moreover,
such largely economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the Asia-Pacific.
Of course, a continuing U.S. capacity to shift military assets from other parts of the globe to Asia in a crisis or conflict could conceivably correct America’s relative military decline in the Western Pacific. But such a surge-based “solution” would require considerable time to implement,
while any future threatening Chinese military action, for example, with regard to Taiwan or maritime disputes near its border, would almost certainly involve a very rapid strike aimed at establishing a fait accompli that could prove extremely difficult and costly to undo. Equally important ,
a growing day-to-day Chinese capability and presence along the Asian littoral and a perceived relative U.S. military decline in daily presence would inevitably affect the security calculations of other Asian states, especially American allies and friends, regardless of the overall ramp-up
capacity of the U.S. military in any confrontation. In the current, increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship, a clear relative shift in day-to-day regional power toward China would likely cause such states to hedge more deliberately against a U.S. failure to prevail in a crisis or conflict
by developing stronger, more independent, and potentially destabilizing military capabilities and/or by accommodating Chinese interests, possibly at the expense of the United States, for example, by spurning past or future security arrangements with Washington. The limits on U.S.
maritime predominance do not mean that China will eventually grow into the position of Asia’s next military hegemon, however. The above-mentioned Carnegie reports also concluded that American military power in Asia will remain very strong under all but the most unlikely, worst-case
scenarios involving a U.S. withdrawal from the region. While China’s regional military capabilities will continue to grow significantly in key areas such as submarines and surface warships, ballistic and cruise missiles, offensive aircraft, air defense, and joint warfare, they will not provide an
unambiguous level of superiority over U.S. forces in the Western Pacific, and certainly not in any other region. Therefore, any eventual Chinese attempt to establish predominance in Asia would almost inevitably fail, and not only because of U.S. capabilities and resolve, but also because
such an effort would drive regional states much closer to the United States. The result would be either a cold or a hot war in Asia, with intensifying polarization, arms races, and an increased likelihood of crises and conflicts. The Chinese leaders understand this and hence might only seek
some form of predominance (as opposed to acting opportunistically and in a more limited manner) if American words and actions were to convince them that even the minimal level of security they seek were to require it. Such a belief could emerge if Washington insists on maintaining
its own historical level of military superiority in Asia by attempting to neutralize entirely Chinese military capabilities right up to China’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters and airspace or to develop a force capable of blockading China from a distance. Variants of operational concepts
currently under consideration in U.S. policy circles, such as Air-Sea Battle or Offshore Control (the former designed to defeat Beijing through preemptive, precision strikes deep into Chinese territory, and the latter to throttle China via a blockade along the first island chain bordering the
eastern and southern Chinese mainland), contain such features. Indeed, any effort to sustain U.S. predominance in the face of a growing relative decline in U.S. capabilities alongside steady increases in Chinese power and influence will almost certainly intensify the U.S.-China security
Fortunately, this zero-sum dynamic has yet to emerge, but
growing suspicions and beliefs in both capitals—founded on the above clashing assumptions held by
each side regarding the necessary conditions for long-term order and prosperity in Asia—are certainly
moving events in this direction. Of course, a fundamental shift in the Asian power balance and its likely
consequences will become moot if China’s economy collapses or declines to such a level that it is unable
to meaningfully challenge American maritime predominance. Indeed, for some analysts of the Asian
competition, deepen tensions between the two powers, and greatly unsettle U.S. allies and friends.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
49
security scene, such a possibility is real enough to justify a rejection of any consideration of alternatives
to such predominance. But the above-mentioned reports, China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in
2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, found that such an adverse outcome for
China is highly unlikely in any foreseeable time frame. Equally important, a major delay in adjusting to
current and likely future realities due to a misplaced belief in China’s ultimate decline will make it far
more difficult to undertake adjustments years hence, given both the long lead time required to
implement them and the likelihood that mutual suspicions will have by then deepened to the point
where neither side is willing to make the required accommodations. The Need to Transition to a Stable
Balance of Power Thus, for both the United States and China, the primary future strategic challenge is to
develop a mutually beneficial means of transitioning away from U.S. maritime predominance toward a
stable, genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific in which neither nation has the clear capacity
to prevail in an armed conflict. This will be difficult to achieve and potentially dangerous, but
nonetheless necessary, given the existing and future trends shaping the region.
In general, true balance-of-power environments can at least
potentially increase both risk taking and miscalculation, especially if one or both sides conclude that they must confirm or consolidate a perceived increase—or compensate for a perceived decline—in leverage by acting more aggressively to test the resolve of the other side, advance
specific interests, or manage a serious political-military crisis. Avoiding or effectively controlling such situations will require not only a variety of crisis management mec hanisms and confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) beyond what have been developed thus far in Asia, but also high
levels of mutual strategic reassurance and restraint, involving substantive and verifiable limits on each side’s freedom of action or ability to prevail militarily along China’s sensitive maritime periphery, as well as the maintenance of deterrent and shaping capabilities in those areas that
count most. Many knowledgeable observers have offered a variety of recommendations designed to reduce mistrust and enhance cooperation between Washington and Beijing, involving everything from caps on U.S. and Chinese defense spending to mutual, limited concessions or
understandings regarding Taiwan and maritime disputes, and clearer, more calibrated bottom-line statements on alliance commitments and core interests.3 While many of these initiatives make eminent sense, they generally fail to address both the underlying problem of clashing
assumptions and beliefs about the requirements for continued order and prosperity in Asia and the basic threat perceptions generated by inaccurate historical analogies about China’s past and domestic nationalist views and pressures. Moreover, almost no observers offer
In
order to minimize the potential instabilities inherent in a roughly equal balance-of-power environment,
specific actions must be taken to reduce the volatility of the most likely sources of future U.S.-China
crises and the propensity to test each side’s resolve, and to enhance the opportunities for meaningful
cooperation over the long term. In particular, Washington and Beijing will need to reach reliable
understandings regarding the future long-term status of the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, the management
of maritime territorial disputes, and the scope and function of U.S. (and other foreign) military activities
within the first island chain—or at the very least within both China’s and Japan’s exclusive economic
zones (EEZs). Such understandings should almost certainly involve some credible form of neutralization
of these areas as locations from which to project U.S. or Chinese power, or the creation of a stable U.S.China balance of power within them, thereby creating a de facto buffer zone along China’s maritime
periphery. In the case of Korea, this implies the emergence of a unified, nonaligned (or loosely aligned)
peninsula free from foreign military forces. This would require prior credible security assurances by
both the United States and China that a unified Korea would remain free from coercion and always open
to close economic and political relations with both countries. Such assurances might involve a
continuation in some form of a greatly reduced security relationship with Washington, at least in the
short to medium term. This process might also require Japan to provide security assurances to a unified
Korea, at least to the extent of agreeing to not acquire nuclear weapons or some types of conventional
weapons that Korea might find threatening, such as precision ballistic and cruise missile strike
capabilities. Of course, none of this could happen as long as the Korean Peninsula remains divided, with
South Korea under threat of attack from North Korea. Thus, ideally, the development of a stable balance
of power in the Western Pacific will require Korean unification sooner rather than later. Failing that, a
clear, credible understanding must be reached as soon as possible among the powers concerned
regarding the eventual disposition of the Korea problem.
recommendations designed to significantly alter the power structure in volatile areas along China’s maritime periphery, such as on the Korean Peninsula and in and around Taiwan, in ways that could significantly defuse those areas as sources of conflict over the long term.
In the case of Taiwan, any credible neutralization of the cross-strait issue as a threat to either side’s interests would require, as a
first step, a U.S.-China understanding regarding restrictions on U.S. arms sales in return for certain types of verifiable limits on Chinese military production and deployments relevant to the island, such as ballistic missiles and strike aircraft. Beijing would also likely need to provide credible
assurances that it would not use force against Taiwan in any conceivable contingency short of an outright Taiwanese declaration of de jure independence or the U.S. placement of forces on the island. In the past, Beijing has resisted providing assurances regarding any non-use of force
toward the island, viewing such an assurance as a limit on Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. However, as in the case of Korea, Beijing would likely view such a conditional limitation on its right to employ force as acceptable if viewed as a requirement for the creation of an overall stable
balance of power in the Western Pacific; Chinese leaders might also regard it as a step toward the eventual unification of the island with the mainland. In addition, Beijing would also likely need to accept: a) explicitly that such unification could only occur on the basis of a peaceful process
involving the willing consent of the people of Taiwan, and b) tacitly that eventual unification would likely not occur, if at all, for many decades. For its part, the United States would likely need to provide assurances to China that it would neither place forces on the island nor provide any
new level of defense assistance to Taipei, as long as Beijing abides by its own assurances. And both countries would need to consult closely with Taiwan and Japan at each step of t his process and provide clear and credible assurances regarding the understanding reached between them.
Regarding territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the United States needs to make clear that it has little if any direct interest in the interactions occurring between the disputants, beyond clear security threats leveled against the two U.S. allies involved: Japan and
the Philippines. While supporting, in an even-handed manner, a binding code of conduct and established legal procedures for resolving clashes and arbitrating claims, Washington should avoid staking its credibility on ensuring that a noncoercive process is followed in every instance. That
said, it should also make clear that it will oppose, forcefully if necessary, any attempt to establish an exclusion zone or de facto territorial waters beyond accepted 12-nautical-mile limits. For its part, Beijing must clearly affirm, through its words and actions, that there is no military
solution to these disputes and that it will never seek to dislodge rivals forcefully from occupied areas. It must also credibly and convincingly state, privately if not publicly, that those waters in the South China Sea located within its so-called nine-dashed line and outside the territorial
In the larger
conventional military realm, U.S. military primacy within at least the first island chain will need to be
replaced by a genuinely balanced force posture and accompanying military doctrine. This should likely
be centered on what is termed a “mutual denial” operational concept in which both China and the
United States along with its allies possess sufficient levels of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)–type
waters and EEZs of specified land features constitute open ocean. Although doubtless difficult to achieve, such understandings will likely become more possible in the larger context of a neutralized first island chain as U.S.-China suspicions abate.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
50
air, naval, missile, and space capabilities to make the risks and dangers of attempting to achieve a
sustained advantage through military means over potentially volatile areas or zones clearly prohibitive.
In such an environment, neither side would have the clear capacity to prevail in a conflict, but both sides
would possess adequate defensive capacities to deter or severely complicate an attack, for example, on
Taiwan, on the Chinese mainland, and against U.S./allied territory, or any effort to close or control key
strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific. This will likely require agreed-upon
restraints on the production and/or deployment of certain types of weapon systems operating in the
Western Pacific, such as deep-strike stealth aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and deployed surface
and subsurface warships.
That cooperation is necessary and sufficient to solve global warming
Gao 14 Gao Hairan, Deputy Director and Assistant Professor, National Center for Climate Change
Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), focuses on China-U.S. relations on climate change and
South-South cooperation on climate change, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, March 17, 2014,
“How China and the United States Can Work Together to Tackle Global Climate Change”,
http://www.fletcherforum.org/2014/03/17/hairan/
Climate change is one of the most severe environmental and socioeconomic challenges faced by
human beings today. It is also a key issue of sustainable development and closely related to
biodiversity, poverty alleviation, and the transformation to a low-carbon development path. As the
world’s largest economies and emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, China and the United States must
work together more cooperatively and with other countries to combat climate change and to help the
globe build a low-carbon future. Anthropogenic GHGs emissions have had a huge impact on global
warming since the Industrial Revolution. As such, curbing global climate change requires coordinated
and coherent global action, as well as an overarching system that includes all major greenhouse gas
emitters (GHGs) in the world. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and its Kyoto Protocol have been the cornerstone of international cooperation on tackling climate
change since the 1990s. Still, major political differences remain between developed and developing
countries. Developed countries believe that the current international climate framework should evolve
over time and be dynamic enough to reflect economic and geopolitical changes. Developing countries,
on the other hand, insist that developed countries should continue to take the lead in GHGs emission
reduction beyond 2020, and developing countries should make efforts to cut their GHGs emissions
according to their capabilities. Furthermore, from the developing countries’ perspective, abandoning the
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol and redefining the principle of common but different responsibilities
(CBDR) is not acceptable. The current international political dilemma on combating climate change is
twofold: first, how should we allocate valuable and limited GHGs emission space to various countries?
And second, is this burden-sharing best accomplished through a top-down or a bottom-up approach?
The former might accomplish this through an international, legally-binding agreement such as the
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, and the latter through nationally determined, voluntary actions that
may be related but not limited to countries’ QELROs, renewable energy development targets, poverty
alleviation, and energy intensity. Therefore, finding a common denominator is crucial to mobilizing
global consensus and action to curb climate change. As negotiations continue, one possibility in 2015
would be a general agreement that combines both the top-down and bottom-up approaches. This could
be facilitated through a robust international measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) system with
common accounting rules to ensure transparency and real emissions reductions by countries involved
without undermining their long-term socioeconomic development or infringing upon national
sovereignty. In addition, enhancing financial, technological, and capacity building support will also be
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
51
key elements of any agreement, as they are of significant importance to help developing countries
address climate change. As the two top GHGs emitters, economies, and energy users in the world, the
actions taken by China and the United States are crucial to the realization of the ultimate objective of
the UNFCCC and sustainable development on a global scale. In 2013, the total fossil CO2 emissions of
China and the United States accounted for more than forty percent of world fossil CO2 emissions.
Therefore, any successful effort to tackle climate change will need these two countries to work
towards a solution either through the UNFCCC process or on a bilateral basis. Meanwhile, it also must
be noted that China is different from the United States in various aspects, and should thus bear different
responsibilities in tackling climate change. Recognizing the differences between the two countries
politically will be helpful for effectively managing those differences, building a constructive partnership,
and finding mutually acceptable approaches to cooperation without undermining their respective core
national climate-related interests. Cooperation between China and the United States under the UNFCCC
could ensure a successful 2015 global pact on climate change and further solidify bilateral cooperation
under the current China-U.S. Climate Change Working Group (CCWG). As for the UNFCCC process, both
countries should demonstrate their political willingness and commitment to it for the protection of
climate as a global public good. In terms of bilateral cooperation, issues of common interest may include
short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), shale gas, HFCs, nuclear technology, and the five thematic areas
under the CCWG. The two countries must recognize that combating climate change, either through a
UN-led multilateral process or on a bilateral basis, is of mutual interest to them, both economically and
strategically. By working together, China and the United States may also find new domestic
opportunities, such as economic restructuring and rebalancing investment, finance, and trade between
them. This could also help ensure energy security and economic prosperity while moving towards a lowcarbon development path. China-U.S. cooperation on climate may also contribute to building new
models of major power relations between them and mobilizing global political momentum. In this
connection, regular, open, and targeted exchange, dialogue and negotiation mechanisms on climate and
energy should be further explored and utilized to improve mutual understanding.
Northeast Asian solutions spill over and solve globally
Brettell, ‘7 – program officer for East Asia with primary responsibility for China at the National
Endowment for Democracy
(Anna, Security, Energy, and the Environment: the Atmospheric Link, appears in: The Environmental
Dimension of Asian Security: Conflict and Cooperation Over Energy, Resources, and Pollution, edited by:
In-tʻaek Hyŏn, Miranda Alice Schreurs, US Institute of Peace Press, Google Books, pg 109)
Regional cooperation on climate change and energy security should lead to a decrease in the region's
overall C02 emissions, which has global significance. Moreover, shared environmental problems can
lead to ¶ regional collective action or cooperation, which could increase interde- ¶ pendence, confidence,
and trust among nations in the region.81 Coop-erative activities initiated by climate change institutions
in the region can contribute to global efforts to combat change and promote greater national
participation in global environmental forums than would exist in the absence of these institutions.
Already these forums have contrib- ¶ uted to the advancement Of global climate change models,
assisted ¶ countries in Asia and the Pacific in preparing for the impacts Of climate ¶ Change, helped raise
awareness Of climate change among citizens, and ¶ helped put pressure on nations to take action to
reduce emissions that ¶ result in climate change. ¶ CONCLUSION ¶ Nations in the region of Northeast Asia
face some of the most challenging and complicated atmospheric pollution problems in the world, ¶
including acid rain, dust storms, and high levels of greenhouse gas ¶ emissions. The negative externalities
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
52
of these problems affect states in the region and the world. Moreover, none of these problems has
reached ¶ its peak.
Warming is real, human caused, and causes extinction—acting now is key to avoid
catastrophic collapse
Dr. David McCoy et al., MD, Centre for International Health and Development, University College
London, “Climate Change and Human Survival,” BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL v. 348, 4—2—14, doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2510, accessed 8-31-14.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has just published its report on the impacts of
global warming. Building on its recent update of the physical science of global warming [1], the IPCC’s
new report should leave the world in no doubt about the scale and immediacy of the threat to human
survival , health, and well-being. The IPCC has already concluded that it is “ virtually certain that human
influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “ extremely likely that more than half of the
observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic [1]. Its new
report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water;
extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass
human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over
80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice:
“the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.” [2] Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the
Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.”
[3] The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have
resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on
how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide
would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in
less than eight years. [4] “ Business as usual ” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current
level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm
by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is
now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.” [5]. The
IPCC warns of “ tipping points ” in the Earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of
interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt,
unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the
globe.” [2] And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme
weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in
global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.” [6]
The impacts of climate change are racist and are falling disproportionately on the global
south—they are happening now
Butler 09 (Simon, maintains an Australian-based ecosocialist blog devoted to the struggle for a safe
climate and an inhabitable planet, 12/4/09, “The racism of climate change” Climate change Social
Change) http://climatechangesocialchange.wordpress.com/2009/12/04/the-racism-of-climate-change/
The impacts of climate change are also racist. Or more precisely, dangerous climate change will impact first on
those who have done least to cause the problem. That rising sea-levels will soon make many island nations in
the Pacific Ocean uninhabitable is just one example of this gross climate injustice. But throughout the global
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
53
South, the prevailing poverty and underdevelopment will inflame the effects of climate change. A critical issue
will be food-security. About 1 billion people are already starving worldwide — almost all in the South. But the
United Nation predicts changing weather patterns and water losses caused by global warming could cause a
25% drop world food production by 2050. Many of the business-as-usual solutions to climate change are
racist. Carbon offsets are based on the idea that corporations in the rich countries can pay carbon
projects in poor countries to make emissions cuts instead. In effect, offsets allow the biggest polluters to
export responsibility for cutting greenhouse gases. Critics have decried the system as a new “carbon
colonialism”. The fast-growing market in offsets, which makes the carbon stored in forests a valuable
commodity, has already led to evictions of tribal peoples from their forests in some countries. A
November 23 report by Survival International said the Ogiek hunter-gatherers of Kenya “are being
forced from the forests they have lived in for hundreds of years to ‘reverse the ravages’ of global
warming”. The biofuels industry is another example of a “response” to climate change that compounds
problems for the world’s poorest. Because it uses food to feed cars instead of people, its expansion will worsen
climate change-induced food shortages Racism is an ideology that justifies inequality and oppression. It’s not
just about hate crimes, vilification and discrimination — although these are very real consequences of
racism too. In particular, racism works to make ordinary people in places like Australia to become
desensitised to poverty and injustice elsewhere. No one will escape the impacts of global warming. But the
rich nations are far better placed to adapt and secure scarce resources for themselves — at least in the
short-term. Meanwhile, Oxfam predicts up to 200 million people in the South will be climate refugees by
mid-century unless radical action is taken to curb emissions. The governments of the first world will be able
to get away with business-as-usual on climate change as long as racist ideas, even subtle ones, prevail.
Ending the threat of climate change requires ending the right of the vested interests, primarily the
world’s big corporate polluters, from continuing to pollute the planet for profit. Most of all, it’s a
struggle to keep all remaining fossil fuels in the ground. This requires a movement of global solidarity.
Informed and determined people in each country have to force this change. Racism is one of the biggest
barriers to building this kind of movement.
Combining radical critique with concrete action to address climate change in the short-term is
key to achieve societal transformation
Christian Parenti, Professor, Sustainable Development, School for International Training, Graduate
Institute, “Climate Change: What Role for Reform?” MONTHLY REVIEW v. 65 n. 11, 4—14,
http://monthlyreview.org/2014/04/01/climate-change-role-reform, accessed 4-24-14.
These measures could be realistic and effective in the short term. They are not my preferred version of
social change, nor do they solve all problems. And achieving even these modest emissions reducing reforms
will require robust grassroots pressure. If capitalism can transition off fossil fuels over the next several
decades, that will merely buy time to continue struggling on all other fronts; most importantly, on all other
fronts of the environmental crisis. The left needs to have credible proposals for dealing with the short-term
aspects of the climate crisis as well as having a systematic critique and vision of long-term change. Both
should be advocated simultaneously , not pitted against each other. We are compelled by circumstances to
operate with multiple timeframes and at multiple scales . Reforms and reformism is an important part of that.
Given the state of the left globally, which outside of Latin America is largely in disarray, achieving
socialism will take a very long time indeed. Thus, the struggle for climate mitigation and adaptation cannot
wait for revolution.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
54
Contention IX – Okinawa-Japan Relations
Presence creates tension between Okinawa and the mainland
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Although Washington-Tokyo relations play a role, the controversy over bases is seen by many as largely
a mainland Japan versus Okinawa issue. Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the islands’ key
strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the continuing U.S. military presence.
According to the Okinawan government, about 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan are located
in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area,20 and roughly half of all U.S.
military personnel are stationed in Okinawa. Many observers assert that Tokyo has failed to
communicate effectively to Okinawans the necessity and benefits of the alliance. Some Okinawans see
the decision to host the bulk of U.S. forces on Okinawa as a form of discrimination by mainland
Japanese, who also do not want U.S. bases in their backyards. The Abe Administration at times has not
received envoys from Okinawa and at other times has engaged in talks about the U.S. military presence,
although neither Tokyo nor Okinawa appeared to change its position on the issue.
_
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
55
Contention X – Allied Assurances
Withdrawal sends a signal of abandonment to allies—crushes deterrence – that’s key
to check conflict
Auslin 10, Resident Scholar at AEI, Michael, U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments,
https://www.aei.org/publication/u-s-japan-relations-enduring-ties-recent-developments/
Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the
keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in
democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad. Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have
Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S.
forces, our forward-based posture is untenable, particularly in a period of growing Chinese military
power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S.
forces over time. There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while three-quarters of our military facilities are in
worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after.
Okinawa. Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific. Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the
U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan’s $4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a
continuing feature of bilateral discussions. The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult
It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military
forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American
commitment to the region. From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key
enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm. And today, for all its dynamism, the AsiaPacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective
multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts. Our friends and allies in the area
are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was
reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our longstanding commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of
negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either.
what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective,
taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.
regional credibility solves nuclear war
Goh 8 [Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at
the Univ of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the
United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database]
The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This
certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of
regional stability in East
Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about
the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S.
assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional
hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in
the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still
dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller
legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that
subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked
next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of
recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to
Three of the key potential global challengers to US
unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US
dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership.
explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War.
Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the Unite d States has bee n able to neutralize the potential threats to its position fr om Japa n via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying a nd pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircli ng and deterring it with allied and frie ndly states that support Ameri can pr eponderance. Se condly, recog nizing US hi erarchi cal prep onderance further explai ns cont e mporary under -balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against
incumbe nt America n pow er. I have argued that one de fining chara cteristic of a hierarchical syste m is voluntary subordi nation of les ser states to the domi nant state, and that this g oes bey ond rationalistic ba ndwagoning be cause it is manifested in a s ocial contra ct that comprises t he related proces ses of hierarchical a ssurance and hierarchical defere nce. Critically, succes sful and s ustainable hierarchi cal ass urance and defere nce helps to e xplai n why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has e xperie nce d signifi cant impetus t o revise and e xpa nd the re mit of its se curity for ces i n the last 15 years. Yet, t hese pre ssures continue to be ins ufficient to prompt a whole sale revision of its constitution and its re militarization. The rea son is that the United States e xtends its security umbrella over Japa n throug h their alliance, w hich has led T okyo not only to perceive no threat from US domi nance, but has in fa ct helped to forge a se curity co mmunity betwee n the m (Na u, 200 3). Adj ustments in burde n sharing in thi s alliance si nce the 1990 s have arisen not from greater indepen dent Japanese strategic activis m, but rather from periods of strategic
uncertainty and crises for Japa n when it appeared that Ameri can hierar chi cal assura nce, along with US' positi on at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. T hus, t he Japanes e priority in taking on more responsi bility for regional s ecurity has been to i mprove its a bility to facilitate the US' centra l position, rather tha n to challenge it.13 In t he fa ce of the se curity threats from N orth Korea a nd China, Tokyo's continue d reliance on the s ecurity pact with the United States is rational. While there re mains debate about Japan's re -militarization a nd the growi ng clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in T okyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘ nor malization’ process ca nnot take place out side of the restraining framework of the United States–Japa n alliance (Samuels, 20 07; Pyle, 20 07). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscie nce choice not only to re move itsel f from the U S -led hierarchy, but als o to challe nge the U nited States domina nce dire ctly. The U nited States–ROK alliance may be understood in a si milar way, although Sout h Korea face s different s ets of constraints be caus e of its strategic priorities related to
North Kor ea. As J.J. Suh argues, in s pite of dimi nishing North K orean ca pabilities, whi ch ren der the US se curity umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because o f mutual identi fication – in South Korea, the i mage of the US as ‘the only conceivable prote ctor against aggression fr om the North,’ a nd in t he United States, an i mage of itself as protect or of a n allied nation now vulnera ble to an ‘evil’ state suspe cted o f transferring weapons of ma ss de struction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2 004 ). Kang, in contrast, emphasize s how South K orea has become les s enthusiastic a bout its ties with the U nited States – as indicated by domestic protests a nd the reje ction of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not ar ming against a potential land invasion fr om China but rather maritime threats (Ka ng, 200 3, pp. 79–80 ). These observations are valid, but they can be e xplaine d by hierarchical de fere nce towar d the Unite d States, rather than China . The ROK's military orientation re flects its ide ntification with and depe nde nce on the U nited States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. I n spite of its primary concern with the North K orean threat, Seoul's formal strategic
orientation is toward maritime threats, i n line with Was hington' s regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean D efe nse W hite Paper s habitually cited a re militarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of copi ng with such a threat would be continued reliance on t he US se curity umbrella and on Washi ngton's ability to restrain Japane se remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007 ). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its dura bility is based on South Korea's fundame ntal acceptance of the Unite d States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defe nd a nd keep regional order. It also doe s not rule out S eoul and other US allies conducting busine ss and e ngaging dipl omati cally with China. I ndia has i ncreasi ngly adopte d a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in re cent years. Give n its history of territorial and political dispute s with Chi na and its conte mporary economi c r esurge nce , India is s een as the key potential power balancer to a growi ng Chi na. Yet, India has sought to neg otiate settl ements a bout border di spute s with Chi na, and ha s moved signi fica ntly toward developi ng closer strategic relations
with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation i n the form of military excha nge progra ms and joint e xercis es, the key breakthrough was the agree ment sig ned in July 200 5 which fa cilitates renewed bilateral civilian nucl ear cooperation (Mohan, 2 007 ). Once again, thi s is a key regional power that could have bala nce d more directly and i nde pendently against Chi na, but ha s ra ther chose n to align itself or bandwag on with the pri mary power, the United States, partly be cause of sig nifica nt bilateral gains, but funda mentally in order to s upport the latter's regional order-managing functi on. Re cog nizing a regional hierarchy and seei ng that the lower layers of thi s hierarchy have be come more active since the mid-1970 s also allows us to understand why there ha s bee n no outright balancing of Chi na by regional states si nce the 1990 s. On t he one hand, the US position at the top of the hie rarchy has be en revived since the mid -1990 s, mea ning that deterre nce against potential Chinese aggre ssion i s reliable and i n place. 14 On the other hand, t he aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusi on in the regi onal hierar chy
at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recog nize that they ca nnot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chine se growth. But they hope to socialize China by en me shing it in pea ce ful regional norms and e conomic and se curity institutions . T hey also know that they ca n also help to en sure that the ca pabilities gap between China and the U nited States remains wide en ough to deter a power transition. Be cause this strategy requires persua ding China about the ap propriaten ess of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitima cy of the US pos ition, all East Asian states engage signi fi ca ntly with China, with the s mall Southeast Asian states refusing ope nly to ‘choose si des’ between the United States and China . Yet, hierarchical de feren ce continues to e xplain w hy regional institutions such as t he ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and Ea st Asian Summit have ma de limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the e nd of the Cold War, its hi erarchi cal prep onderance also constitutes t he regional or der to the e xtent that it cannot
comfortably be excluded fr om a ny substantive strategic developme nts. On the part of some less er states (parti cularly Japan and Singa pore ), hierarchical de fere nce is mani fested i n incl usionary i mpul ses (or at least impulses not to exclude the Unite d States or US proxies ) in regional institutions, s uch as t he East Asia Summit in December 2005. Di sagreement on thi s issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymie d pote ntial progress i n these regional institutions (Malik, 200 6). Finally, conceiving of a US -led Ea st Asian hierarchy ampli fies our understandi ng of how and why the U nited States–China relations hip is now the key to regional ord er. The vital nature of the Sino -Ameri can relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As dis cus sed earlier, China is the pri mary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. H owever, as Chinese power grows a nd Chines e activism s preads beyond Asia, the United States is les s and les s able to se e Chi na as merely a regional power – witnes s the growing concerns about Chinese invest ment and aid in certain Africa n countries. T his ca uses a disj uncture betwee n US global intere sts and
US regional interests. Regional atte mpts to engage a nd s ocialize China are ai med at mediating its intentions. Thi s process, however, ca nn ot stem Chines e growth, whi ch forms the material ba sis of US threat perce ptions. Appre hensi ons a bout the growt h of China's power culmi nates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to Chi na, echoing Cold War concer ns that transcri bed regional de feats into syste mic s etbacks. 15 On the other hand, t he US se curity strategy post-Cold War a nd post-9 /11 have regional ma nife stations that disa dvantage Chi na. The stre ngtheni ng of US alliances with Japan a nd Australi a; and the de ploy ment of US troops to Ce ntral, Sout h, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a cons olidation of US global hege mony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional conte xt and the n stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determi nants of the East Asian s ecurity order relate to two core questions: (i ) Can the US be per suade d that Chi na can a ct as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ t hat will help to buttress regi onal stability and US global security aims;1 6 and (ii) ca n Chi na be convinced that the United States has
the East Asian
regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely
disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese
remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward
neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to e ncircl e Chi na, but will help to promote Chinese developme nt and stability as part of its global se curity strategy? (Wang, 20 05). But, thes e que stions cannot be aske d in the abstract, outsi de the conte xt of negotiation about their relative positions in t he regional and global hierar chies. One urgent question for further investig ation is how the process of ass urance and defere nce operate at the topmost levels of a hi erarchy? W hen we have two great powers of une qual strengt h but contesting claims and a cl osing capabilities gap i n the sa me regional hi erarchy, how much s cope for negotiation is there, be fore a reversion to balancing dyna mi cs? This is the main structural dile mma: as long a s the Unite d States does not give up its pri mary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, Chi na is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide co mforting answers to the two questions. Yet,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
56
Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5.
Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that
the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of
equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US
position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with
greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical
assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the
United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires
conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and
constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the
hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional
level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or
defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the
region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of
change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge
thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of
benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be
much worse.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
57
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
58
A2: They Should Stay in Okinawa and Go Elsewhere
Katsuren solution fails—takes 20 years, and is universally opposed by Okinawans
Gavan McCormack 10, Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University, an expert of modern
East Asian, especially Japanese politics, June 2010, "Ampo at 50 The Faltering U.S.-Japan Relationship",
Center for Asian Studies, www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions30gavanmccormack.pdf
Kengai Kokugai (Outside Okinawa, Outside Japan)? DPJ’s Tergiversations on Futenma From December 2009, numerous sites were
considered: Kadena (merging some Marine functions from Futenma with those of the USAF base there), other Okinawan islands such as
Shimoji (where there was a civil airport with a 3,000 meter runway currently used for pilot training) or Ie, (a smaller airfield used by Marines),
or islands relatively near but outside Okinawan prefectural boundaries such as Tokunoshima (with a little used 2,000 metre runway airport) or
Mageshima, in Kagoshima prefecture.68 Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell protested, not unreasonably, that “Almost every day
someone comes up with a statement or a proposal.”69 By
March 2010, the Hatoyama government narrowed the
selection process to several main options:70 (a) “Schwab”: building either a 500-meter-square helipad at U.S. Marine
Corps Camp Schwab (at Henoko), or a 1,500 meters runway also within the Camp but further inland, needing more time, and involving more
substantial earthworks. (b)
“White Beach”: building a 1,800 metre runway in a 200 hectare reclaimed area off-shore from a US Navy
facility at White Beach, in the shallow seas off the coast of Katsuren Peninsula, in the vicinity of Tsuken Island or, in a longer term
variant, reclaiming a larger (1,021 hectares) ocean area between Ukibaru and Miyagi Islands and building an artificial island that would be
shared by US Marine Corps, US military port facility (relocating from Naha Port) and Japan’s Air Self Defense Forces (relocating from Naha
Airport). Either of these options would be accompanied by relocation of some of the training drills currently conducted at Futenma to Tokuno
(or Mage) Island, both technically in Kagoshima Prefecture though historically part of the premodern Ryukyu kingdom and culture zone.
Hatoyama at this point had accepted the Pentagon logic that the Marines were a necessary deterrent force and it would be inappropriate to
relocate them far from Okinawa.71 His bottom line seemed to be that the US demands would be met, preferably by a formula that would allow
transfer of some Marine functions to points just beyond the Okinawan prefectural boundaries, but, if not, and if it meant alienating Okinawans,
they would be offered “compensation”.72 In broad outline, both
the Schwab and White Beach ideas had been
considered and ruled out in the negotiations leading to the realignment agreement of 2006. Both were based on a “within
Okinawa” design that was rejected by all sides in the prefecture, and to adopt either would require a
fresh Environmental Impact study – a process which normally requires several years and, if done
properly, would be open to a possible negative outcome or, in the event of a positive outcome, would
be followed by up to 10 years for construction. The scale of the White Beach reclamation project was
staggering: with three runways (2 of 3,600 and one of 3,000 metres) it would exceed by six times the Henoko “V”
option. The Governor declared it would take “20 years” to build,73 and both it and the Schwab plan
would be “extremely difficult” (read: impossible).74 The Ryukyu shimpo said that it “would be hard to
imagine anything worse” than this plan, with its combination of two “worst” choices.75 Uruma City and the
Kagoshima prefecture towns and villages that had been mentioned all insisted they would not tolerate
any such project and, in a bizarre final revelation, although Hatoyama’s government suggested the White Beach
site would be more environmentally acceptable than Henoko because its coral was ‘mostly dead’, when
divers from the two Okinawan newspapers investigated the site, they found thriving colonies of coral, a
veritable “sea of fertility” as the Ryukyu shimpo put it.76 Neither the Schwab nor the White Beach designs
satisfied Washington. It continued to press Tokyo to maintain (“honour”) the Guam accord.77 Furthermore, in a surprising
demonstration of sensitivity, the Pentagon let it be known that there was nothing to negotiate with Japan unless and until its Government
could show it had secured the consent of residents in the newly chosen sites.78 By this, the Pentagon was surely asking the impossible of
Tokyo. As Hatoyama’s government struggled to find a formula acceptable to both Washington and Okinawa, the
Okinawan people
united to oppose any formula involving base construction in the prefecture. In February, the Okinawan
parliament (the Prefectural Assembly), adopted an extraordinary resolution unanimously demanding that
Futenma be closed (moved “overseas or elsewhere in Japan”).79 In March, all of Okinawa’s 41 local town mayors
declared themselves of the same view, and in April the Association of City Mayors, made up of the mayors of the 11 Okinawan
cities, unanimously adopted a similar resolution.80 Also in April, Tokunoshima was the scene of the largest gathering
of people in its history, with three in five of the island’s inhabitants joining in sending Tokyo a message
of defiance and resistance to any plan for the building of a base on that island.81 Weeks later, 90,000
Okinawans gathered at Yomitan Village on the main Okinawa island to demonstrate mass support for
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
59
the position already established through all their formal institutions of local government. Everybody
from the Governor down, and representatives of all political parties from Communist to LiberalDemocratic participated, presenting a united front of opposition to any new base construction and
demanding the unconditional closure and return of Futenma.
Doesn’t solve kickout—90% of Okinawa supports the anti-base movement—they’ll
oppose any new construction
Gavan McCormack 10, Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University, an expert of modern
East Asian, especially Japanese politics, May 31, 2010, "Ampo's Troubled 50th: Hatoyama's Abortive
Rebellion, Okinawa's Mounting Resistance and the US-Japan Relationship - Part 3", The Asia-Pacific
Journal: Japan Focus, www.japanfocus.org/site/make_pdf/3367
The phenomenon of foreign military bases being hosted for any period of time in the territory of a
sovereign state is extremely unusual and the likelihood of them being closed following a change of
government (as in the Philippines, Ecuador) is high since they are, as Kent Calder puts it, “castles built on sand.” 45 The
Okinawan sand is now crumbling. It is a paradox for the Japan whose constitution outlaws “the threat
or use of force as means of settling international disputes” to be allied to the one country above all
others for whom war and the threat of war are key instruments of policy, supporting its wars in every possible way
short of actually sending troops into combat, offering it more extensive military facilities, on more generous terms,
than any other country, and paying far greater subsidies than any country in the world to support the US
armed forces. Official 50 th anniversary commemorations celebrating the US military as the source of the “oxygen” that guaranteed peace
and security to Japan and East Asia are not inclined to pay attention to the fact that the same oxygen is elsewhere a poison, visiting catastrophe
on country after country, notably Korea (1950s and since), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1960s to 70s), Chile (1973), the Persian Gulf
(1991), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-), and that it now threatens Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and (again) Iran and North Korea. Millions
die or are driven into exile, and countries are devastated as the US military spreads its “oxygen” by unjust illegal interventions. The degree to
which allied countries share criminal responsibility has been the subject of major public review in Holland (which found that the Iraq War was
indeed illegal and aggressive) and in the UK (where the Chilcot Inquiry continues). In Japan, the Nagoya High Court in 2008 found that the
Koizumi and Abe governments had acted in breach of the constitution in consenting to US demands to "show the flag" and put Japanese "boots
on the ground" in Iraq, and that therefore the Japanese troop presence in Iraq was both unconstitutional and illegal. In response, the Prime
Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Self Defense Forces all dismissed the judgement, saying
with varying measures of scorn that it would have no effect whatever on troop deployment. In Japan, as in Holland and the UK, questions of
responsibility have sooner or later to be asked. There
is no precedent in modern Japanese history for an entire
prefecture to unite, as does Okinawa today, in saying “No” to the central state authorities, just as there
is no precedent throughout the post-1945 decades for the confrontation that has occurred between the
US and Japan in 2009-10. Transcending conventional political divisions, the polls say the Okinawan
struggle is now supported by 90 per cent of its people. The Okinawa Times expressed the hope that the 50 th anniversary
might offer a “chance to reconsider the Japan-US Security treaty that from Okinawa can only be seen as a relationship of dependence.” 46 The
Ryukyu Shimpo said that it
was not just the fate of Henoko that was at issue but the question of whether the
Japanese constitution’s guarantees of popular sovereignty, basic human rights, and peace applied to
Okinawa. 47 Ginowan mayor Iha was in 2010 preparing to launch a suit against the national government for neglect of its duty to protect
the constitutional rights of Okinawan citizens to livelihood and safety. 48 The breadth and depth of such Okinawan sentiment was hard to
detect in mainland discourse. Okinawan
sentiments are especially aroused as the contest over the base issue
coincided with revelations of lies and deception practised by LDP governments over the past half-century, and with
exposure of the readiness of successive Japanese (LDP) governments to pay almost any price to retain US
forces in Okinawa. Disappointment with Hatoyama was so much the greater because the hopes of change raised by the DPJ before it
took office had been high, only to be slowly let down since then, till it “seemed to be adopting an even weaker position towards the US than its
LDP predecessor.” 49 In Hatoyama’s Japan, all parties save the Communist were committed to continuing and “deepening” the Security Treaty,
none to fundamentally revising the relationship. In Hatoyama’s Okinawa, all
parties and almost all the people were united in
demanding that the burden of foreign military presence on the prefecture and its people be lightened.
The Okinawa Times noted ominously that if the government tries to impose a new base on Okinawa it would invite
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
60
“unpredictable” consequences. 50 The reason it had taken 13 years to determine the Guam Treaty
formula for Futenma replacement had nothing to do with inherent complexity or difficulty of
construction and everything to with the fierce, uncompromising, non-violent and popularly-supported
resistance to further base construction on Okinawa. The “old regime” (to 2009) contemplated using force, and in 2007 sent
the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s frigate, Bungo, to intimidate the sea-floor civic defenders of the sea and its creatures at Henoko, but held
back in fear of the political consequences of mass arrests and imposition of martial law. Whether Hatoyama will be able to muster a greater
resolve than his LDP predecessors seems doubtful, meaning that the
fifteen year struggle to block construction of a new
base at Henoko will continue. In Washington, managers of the alliance could feel satisfied that their uncompromising stance had
forced the Prime Minister of Japan to surrender. They could also note with pleasure that Tokyo was increasingly committed to the principle of
military facilities being shared between US and Japanese forces. Already, JGSDF (Japan’s “Army”) command has moved to the US Army’s Zama,
outside Tokyo (which handles much of US military planing for the Pacific), where it is merged (under the 2006 Agreement) with US Army 1
Corps command. 51 Already, the JASDF (Japan’s “Air Force”) command has merged with that of the US 5 th Air Force at Yokota. As for the
JMSDF (Japan’s “Navy”), it is already a subsidiary and support organization under the Yokosuka home-based US 7 th Fleet (with the aircraft
carrier George Washington), regularly engaged in joint war games and exercises under US direction). It is far-fetched to suggest that, under
such circumstances, Japan retains autonomy of “defense” planning and policy or that its SDF serves exclusively to defend; more likely it is
furthering its “Client State” agenda by subordinating its 240,000-strong military to Pentagon direction with the result that the scope of its
operations extends throughout the Asia-Pacific and beyond. So, while the 2009 Hatoyama rhetoric of a close and “equal” relationship had
worried Washington, and led to the flood of abuse, intimidation, and derision without parallel in the US relationship with any country, seven
months of unremitting pressure wore him down till he and his ministers looked like nothing so much as clones of their LDP predecessors. The
alliance in its first fifty years was characterized by subterfuge and by the persistent abuse of Okinawa. Is
it possible that it can now substitute a “mature” alliance relationship with the US for the “Client State”
relationship cultivated by the former (George W. Bush) administration and its LDP partners in successive
Tokyo governments? If it is to do so, also it will have to face up to the secret diplomacy, lies, deception and manipulation of the last 50
years, and reflect upon, apologize, and offer redress for the wrongs that have for so long been visited upon the people of Okinawa as a result.
It is surely time to extend to the Japanese and Okinawan people the constitutional guarantees of
pacifism, human rights, and local autonomy guaranteed by its constitution. Instead, at the end of May 2010 and
in the teeth of unprecedented American intimidation, Hatoyama vacillated and retreated, and the deeply rooted structures
of dependency pushed Japan on the 50 th towards a deepening and widening of clientelism and outright
clash with Okinawa.
Removal from Okinawa is key to the alliance—otherwise a vicious cycle will undo the
foundation of the US-Japan relationship
Envall, ANU IR research fellow, 2012
(HDP, “Japan’s Okinawa dilemma”, 11-7, http://insidestory.org.au/japans-okinawa-dilemma/)
Accordingly, Japan continues to stick with the first option. Indeed, the alliance remains popular and America’s security guarantee is still
welcomed. The
central bargain that has so successfully underpinned the alliance – that Japan hosts the
United States in return for America’s security guarantee – still has great appeal for both sides. Japan, for
instance, is happy that the United States considers that the Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of the security treaty. The dilemma is
that this option contains the seeds of its own undoing in Okinawa. So long as Japan prefers the alliance
option, but continues to be seen in Okinawa as unwilling or unable to spread the associated base burden
more widely through the country, the alliance will suffer ongoing reputational damage. Accidents and
crimes in the prefecture fuel Okinawan discontent over the US military presence and the central
government’s negligence, perceived or otherwise. Robert D. Eldridge, a historian and civilian official for the
Marine Corps in Okinawa, talks of a “vicious cycle” in the domestic politics of the basing issue, whereby
discussion gradually becomes more contentious and emotional, with little place for compromise. If such
a cycle were allowed to persist, it could conceivably weaken the United States–Japan relationship to a
point where the viability of this central bargain might be questioned. Under such a scenario, Japan would
consider itself unable to support such an ill-behaved sponsor, while America would no longer be willing
to defend such a fractious client. The breakdown in this bargain would in turn weaken America’s position in the region while
pushing Japan towards the kind of rapid security “normalisation” that could produce the very tensions in the Asia-Pacific that the two allies are
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
61
hoping to avoid. A fourth option would be to maintain
the US presence but spread the base burden more evenly
across the country. The policy of realigning the US military presence in Japan, including relocating the functions of bases in Okinawa to
mainland Japan or Guam, has been an important step in this direction. There are significant obstacles to this process,
however. A greater emphasis on the East China Sea region in US and Japanese strategies – illustrated by America’s
“pivot” to Asia and Japan’s new “dynamic defence” doctrine – arguably increases Okinawa’s strategic importance.
Meanwhile, “nimbyism” in Japan makes it extremely difficult to move key US bases out of Okinawa to other
places around the country. This was well illustrated by the criticism Hatoyama received in 2010 when he
considered transferring parts of Futenma elsewhere in Japan.
Negotiation causes delay—profit seekers and military mission creep means relocation
get bogged down
Brooks, John Hopkins japan studies professor, 2010
(William, “The Politics Of The Futenma Base Issue In Okinawa”,
http://www.reischauercenter.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/The-Politics-of-the-Futenma-BaseIssue-in-Okinawa.pdf)
But the erosion may have started long before the DPJ came into power. As my research shows, the long delay in returning a
dangerous base to Japan that should have been closed at least a decade ago can be traced to a tangled
web of competing political and commercial motives at national and local levels. An examination of the some 15
years of negotiations and renegotiations reveals a number of recurring themes: (1) the dangers of lack of initial clarity
(in the original SACO statement) that led to ambiguous resolutions, relocation plans that proved to be unfeasible; 2) political and interest-group
distortion of strategic concepts, turning the issue of alliance versus local interests into a zero-sum game;
(2) tradeoffs between operational optimality and alliance stability resulted in a replacement facility that
little resembled the original function and purpose of the base to be reverted; (3); the incentives of the
Okinawans to keep the issue perpetually in play, never solving it and quite willing to change the goal
post whenever it suited their political fancy; and (4) the need for decisive leadership and U.S.-Japan
national-level cooperation. This final factor may be critical in order to transcend the morass of narrow
interests vying to profit as much as possible, either politically by those wishing to deny the Futenma
replacement facility from being constructed or commercially by those who maneuvered behind the
scenes to profit from construction of a new facility as large in scale and as costly as possible. The U.S.
side was not always helpful, for there also was at times a tendency on the part of the U.S. forces in
Japan toward “mission creep” – seizing the opportunity to build not a simple heliport as originally
planned but a full-fledged second runway in Okinawa with heavy-lift capabilities. Changing the game
plan in such ways not only complicated the picture, making implementation problematical, it also
created competing forces in Okinawa scrambling to take advantage of the perceived commercial
opportunities.
All relocation plans will fail
Michael J. Green et al 12, the Japan Chair and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, as well as an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown
University, June 27, 2012, "U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent
Assessment", Center for Strategic and International Studies,
archive.guampdn.com/assets/pdf/M019284483.PDF
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
62
A number of alternatives have been suggested to the current plan for the FRF at Camp Schwab, but none are
without significant shortcomings. (Note: Section Three of this report provides an analysis of these alternatives.) Offshore
islands in the vicinity of Okinawa such as Iejima, Shimojijima, and Ishigaki are notionally attractive but
present challenges such as infrastructure, vulnerability to natural disasters, and local opposition.
Integrating Marine functions at Futenma into operations at Kadena Air Base (AB) also faces stiff and
almost uniform local and national opposition due to concerns about noise and safety. Modifying the
Henoko plan to build the runway further up the peninsula than the current shorefront location would
have significant overflight impact on local communities. The Northern Training Area is rough terrain and contains local
reservoirs. Building the FRF at Camp Hansen, a major training facility already facing significant limitations,
would have an adverse impact on Marine readiness. The major risk with shifting to an alternative to the
Henoko plan is that the alternative would have to be fully accepted and executable if alliance
managers are to avoid another dead end that would weaken the credibility of the alliance and
embolden opponents of bases within Okinawa. None of the alternatives to Henoko assessed by the
project team fit that condition. It is clear that the Henoko plan also faces challenges, most recently from prefectural election results
in early June 2012 that created more headwinds against the plan. However, the April 2012 SCC agreement puts the burden largely on the
government of Japan for FRF implementation. While progress is unlikely this year given Japanese political turbulence, future implementation
should not be entirely ruled out.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
63
A2: Withdrawal Undermines Allied Assurances
Extended deterrence failing now – small incursions outweigh large symbols
Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15
(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My
Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclearumbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)
But while U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea are the ultimate promise, it is
a promise for the least-likely situation. And meanwhile, whether because of political expediency or the low stakes involved, the United States
has played a marginal role in dealing with the smaller threats these two countries face: for Japan, Chinese harassment in waters around
contested islands in the East China Sea; and for South Korea, conventional attacks by North Korea. The result? By failing to adequately tackle small-scale challenges with or on behalf of Tokyo
the United States has cast doubt about its nuclear umbrella for those two countries. This in turn
reflects an unstated paradox: the strongest form of U.S. commitment doesn’t address the much weaker
quotidian challenges actually facing its allies. Consequently, Seoul and Tokyo look to Washington and see its credibility
eroding. Frank Sinatra once sang that if he could make it in New York, he “could make it anywhere.” This logic, dubbed the “Sinatra test,” suggests that those who can survive a hard test
can survive an easy one. But when it comes U.S. extended deterrence, allies see the opposite: if the United States can’t handle the small threats,
then how can it handle the big ones, like nuclear attacks? Consider what happened in 2010, when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean
and Seoul,
frigate Cheonan, killing 46 seamen, and then followed up that provocation in November of the same year by shelling the Yeonpyeong Islands, killing four South Koreans and injuring 19 others.
Officials in Washington urged restraint, and prevented South Korean retaliation. The response was telling: Politicians in Seoul, in a move that signaled their doubt over the reliability of U.S.
commitments, called for the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Korean soil (all U.S. nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea in 1991). And because the United States is
not planning to redeploy its nuclear weapons, several senior South Korean politicians have called for the country to develop their own bomb — concluding that if the U.S. nuclear umbrella
couldn’t protect their country, they would have to rely on their own nuclear capability. Consider also what’s happened over the last five years to Japan, a top U.S. ally. China has repeatedly
confronted Japan over the Diaoyu islands Tokyo claims (and calls the Senkaku). Beijing has asserted its claims with novel and aggressive moves that fall just under the threshold for retaliation
consider, for example,
Japan’s response to the unarmed Chinese reconnaissance drones Beijing has frequently dispatched into contested airspace over the last few years. In
each case, Japan alone has scrambled fighter aircraft or sent maritime vessels in response. The more Japan does alone, the more it doubts the
strength of the partnership. The U.S. commitment to protect Japan against existential threats risks being
eroded by its irrelevance in protecting Japan from the primary — though relatively small — danger it
faces today. As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe bolsters Japan’s military, Japan’s departure from a long history of buck-passing its security burden to the United States only makes sense
as a response to feeling more threatened and lacking confidence in U.S. reliability. Of course, in these cases Japan and South Korea (not to mention much of the
rest of the world) would have been discomfited if the United States threatened nuclear retaliation — and that illustrates
the problem. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for
others, like deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for others, like
— using water cannons, fishing vessels, reconnaissance drones, and military ships nominally designated as Coast Guard vessels to harass Japanese vessels. And
deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict.
Withdraw from kickout is worse because its larger and unplanned
Turn – plan increases resolve AND our ability to respond to Korea/China crisis
Mochizuki, Associate Professor @ George Washington University, 13
(Mike, “Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific,”
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/chian/naha_port/documents/h24reporten-1.pdf)
Some would worry about the signals that could be sent to China and North Korea and possibly other
parties by any reduction in U.S. forces in the western Pacific. We would offer several responses. First,
the ongoing buildup of American capabilities in Guam, Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere is well
designed and sensible. It has achieved many of its desired effects. If anything, it is now on the verge of
going slightly too far in the signals it sends. Firming up commitment to allies is appropriate but it must
be balanced against the need to avoid stoking up the rivalry with China. Second, and even more to the
point, while leading to a modest U.S. numerical force drawdown in the western Pacific, our plan would
actually increase rather than reduce American responsiveness for more plausible scenarios in the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
64
western Pacific—and also scenarios that would require a major U.S. role, such as another North Korean
attack on South Korea.
The plan is helping Japan out of a political bind—they won’t turn around and prolif-if
they cared that much about Marines—Iraq/Afghanitan deployment should have
triggered the link.
Solves the DA – reassures better than extended deterrence
Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15
(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My
Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclearumbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)
Rather than drawing greater attention to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the United States should devise
long-term policies that help South Korea and Japan deal with North Korean provocations and Chinese
coercion respectively — small-scale but significant problems. The United States should launch strategic
consultations with South Korea and Japan to compare notes on global and regional trends (which
includes small-scale coercion), and how they affect national threat perceptions, mission priorities, and
military weapons investments. Though far less sexy than nukes, elevating cooperation with South Korea
and Japan to strategy and policy planning consultations might go a long way toward shoring up their
confidence.
Assurance and Deterrence low – thanks Obama
Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15
(Bruce, “Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?,” Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot
__107662.html)
The Asia Pivot Is Not Working America’s Allies Are Not Reassured. During his 2014 Asia trip, President Obama claimed that “our alliances in the Asia
Pacific have never been stronger. Our relationship with ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia has never been stronger. I don’t think that’s subject to dispute.” But for
all the emphasis on the Asia Pivot, there is little to show in actual, tangible results. Allies are nervous,
and opponents are emboldened. Indeed, a prevalent theme of President Obama’s foreign policy and his 2014 Asia trip was built around the need
to reassure U.S. friends and allies in the region. Allies of the United States around the world—not just those in Asia— have expressed grave misgivings about
Washington’s capability and resolve to help them defend against escalating security threats. First up were the Europeans, who expressed concern that the Asia Pivot
meant a reduced American commitment to their defense. The withdrawal of two U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) from the continent, cutting in half the
BCTs that the U.S. maintained in Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, heightened their trepidation. Asian
allies, initially heartened by the
renewed U.S. focus on the region, continue to express concern about China’s unrelenting assertiveness in pushing
extralegal sovereignty claims on their territories. The weak U.S. response to Beijing’s bullying led the Philippines, one of just a handful of
American treaty allies, effectively to cede its claims to the Scarborough Shoals. Consequently, an increasingly nervous Tokyo has called repeatedly for stronger U.S.
support to deter similar Chinese intimidation against the Japanesecontrolled Senkaku Islands. South Korea and Japan watched with growing dismay as Washington
first cut $480 billion from the long-term military budget only to warn then of the catastrophic consequences that sequestration would have for U.S. armed forces.
Yet when the sequester hit, slicing an additional $500 billion, Washington claimed that it could still fulfill American security commitments, though admittedly with
“additional but acceptable risk.” Seoul
and Tokyo were flummoxed when Syrian President Assad crossed the U.S. redline
against using chemical weapons against civilians and President Obama refused to implement the
pledged military response. These allies have privately expressed fears that Washington might similarly
abandon its defense commitments to them if North Korea or China attacked. In early 2013, North Korea
ratcheted up tensions by threatening nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea, abrogating the
armistice ending the Korean WaChr and nullifying all inter-Korean nonaggression pacts. Initially, the United States
demonstrated resolve, augmenting forces committed to an annual bilateral military exercise with South Korea. However, Secretary of State Kerry soon revealed that
as the crisis continued, the Obama Administration had elected to change course in the face of North Korean threats. Kerry stated during a press conference in Seoul
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
65
Rather than standing
up to blatant belligerence, the United States stepped back, citing the potential for conflict escalation on
the Korean peninsula as its primary concern. Secretary Kerry explained, “Let’s face it. Everyone here knows this, we’ve got enough
that “President Obama [had] ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken. We have lowered our rhetoric significantly.”
problems to deal with around the world.” One can only imagine the glee in Pyongyang and the trepidation in Seoul at the U.S.’s prioritizing other regions over
defending our Korean ally, in addition to the pall cast over the initial optimism accompanying announcement of the United States’ return to Pacific affairs. Finally,
Russia’s military incursion into Crimea and subsequent U.S. affirmation of support to European NATO
nations triggered yet more concerns of a “reverse Asia Pivot.” U.S. officials were dispatched to provide reassurance once again
to both European and Asian allies. But the ease with which Putin annexed Crimea and the U.S. inability to prevent it
from happening heightened anxiety that China could be emboldened to try a similar seizure in the
Pacific. Opponents Have Not Moderated Behavior. Despite an uptick in meetings in Asia—a case of substituting
wingtip shoes for soldiers’ boots—the United States has failed to temper Chinese and North Korean belligerence. In
recent years, Beijing has used military and economic threats, bombastic language, and military bullying to
extend its extralegal claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In November 2013, China declared an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, and threatened to use its military to enforce it. Washington condemned
the declaration as a provocative act that exacerbated tensions in the region and increased the risks of a military clash. However, U.S.
protests and those
of other countries in the region have had marginal effect as China continues to maintain the ADIZ. Beijing
attempts to divert attention from its own actions by mischaracterizing Japan as a threat to regional security. China’s bellicose actions have
fueled regional concern and have triggered a greater Japanese willingness to confront Chinese
expansionism and strengthen the Japanese military. Japan’s willingness to defend its territory has been mischaracterized by China as a
resurgence of 1930s imperial Japanese militarism when, in fact, it is a logical response to increased Chinese provocations. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has
maintained his regime’s threatening behavior and has continued its quest to augment its nuclear and missile-delivery capabilities. North Korea credits Jong-un with
being the mastermind behind the regime’s two attacks on South Korea in 2010, which resulted in 50 South Korean deaths. Clearly, the
Administration’s
current approach to North Korea is insufficient as the Communist nation continues to menace U.S.
allies.
Frees up other resources that make our response to crisis better—small footprint is
enough to deter aggression and win battles
Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 15
(ANDREW F., JR., “How to Deter China,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-0216/how-deter-china)
If China invaded a U.S. ally or partner, even a small number of U.S. ground troops could help local forces
mount a determined resistance. Modern conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East have
demonstrated what a modest irregular ground force can achieve with the help of modern weapons and
capable advisers. Thanks to U.S. advisers and airpower, an overmatched South Vietnamese army was able to withstand a full-scale assault by North
Vietnamese forces in 1972. Nearly three decades later, in 2001, a small contingent of U.S. Special Forces, backed by strike aircraft, helped Afghanistan’s Northern
Alliance defeat the Taliban. And in 2006, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon, with the assistance of Iranian advisers, fought the Israeli Defense Forces to a standstill for a
month. A
similar effort by U.S. ground forces in the Pacific could make seizing and occupying territory an
extremely costly proposition for China, especially if local forces also had advanced training and
equipment. Access to short-range, precision-guided mortars, rockets, and shoulder-fired antiaircraft
missiles, for example, would maximize the lethality of small guerrilla resistance units. By shouldering greater
responsibility for denying the PLA the air and sea control it needs to mount offensive operations, ground forces could liberate U.S. and
allied air and naval forces to perform the missions only they can accomplish, such as long-range surveillance
and air strikes. Should deterrence fail, these air and naval assets would prove critical to defending the
first island chain and offsetting PLA advantages. For example, the PLA can concentrate forces at any point along the first island chain far
more rapidly than can the United States and its allies, whose militaries are more widely distributed. And it doesn’t have to reconcile conflicting national interests. (In
the wake of a Chinese offensive against a single island, countries along the chain would likely want to keep their forces in place to defend their homelands.) By
reducing the demands on U.S. air and naval forces for such missions as air and sea denial, ground forces
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
66
would enable these air and naval forces to stand in reserve, ready to move quickly to defend a
threatened link in the chain.
Marines aren’t key to deterrence – no symbol cuz not there most the time, no real war
we would use them, aren’t just gunna D-Day china, ok? – Ennis their ev is all from
think tanks!
--containment backfires
--other presence checks
--marines don’t stay in Okinawa
--they can’t deploy quickly/independently
Vine-prof anthropology, American-15
Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World p.272-3
Gradually, a growing number of military analysts have started to question the U.S. base presence in
Okinawa—not on political or social grounds, but on purely military ones. .58 More profoundly, analysts across the political spectrum are
increas- ingly beginning to question the underlying justifications and rationale for the bases. As long as the United States has had bases in
Okinawa and Japan, the primary justification tor their existence has been that they ensure security for the United States, Japan, and the region.
Initially, it was said that the bases helped contain and deter Soviet expansionist ; desires. Since the end
of the Cold War, many have simply substituted China and North Korea for the USSR in the
containment/deterrence framework. But North Korea is a small, impoverished nation, possibly on the
verge of collapse. And while China's military power has grown in recent years, it doesn't approach that of the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. What's more, placing bases and troops on another country's door- step can
be seen as an aggression in its own right, triggering exactly the kind of military response the strategy is
supposedly designed to prevent. Even within the context of containment and deterrence, the U.S.
presence in Okinawa hardly looks like an optimal setup. Many now agree, for example, that the Marines'
presence in Okinawa—including the controversial Futenma base and its debated replacement—likely has little deterrent
effect. Barry Posen, who was a Pentagon official in the Bush administration, has said that with the large
Air Force and Navy forces at Okinawa's Kadena Air Base and on mainland Japan, the
withdrawal of the
marines would see "no change in deterrence." Posen added that he "cannot see what
role the Marine Corps might play in military actions" that conceivably might take place in the region.39
Former Democratic House representative Barney Frank agreed, saying, "15,000 Marines aren't going to land on the
Chinese mainland and confront mil- lions of Chinese soldiers. We don't need Marines in Okinawa. "They're
a hangover from a war that ended 65 years ago "60 And there often haven't even been fifteen thousand marines in
Okinawa, the number frequently cited by proponents of the status quo. During the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, thousands of them deployed from Okinawa, decreasing troop levels by one quarter to one third from pre- war
averages.61 If Okinawa-based Marines are so critical to deterrence, how could the military afford to let
them leave? Marines in Okinawa also don't have the transportation necessary to get involved in
significant numbers during an emergency. To deploy, marines rely on Navy transportation vessels
harbored in Sasebo, Japan. During a 2013 drill simulating a response to China's seizing contested territory, such as the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, marines relied on a vessel based in San Diego to transport troops and weaponry.62 The
Marines' controversial Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft doesn't have the range to trans- port troops to the
Senkaku/Diaoyus without in-air refueling; and with just twenty-four Ospreys in Okinawa, the Marines
can send fewer than six hundred troops at most in a single deployment.63 If the Marines can't operate
independently and speedily from Okinawa, what land of regional deterrent force are they?
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
67
They keep saying base – there is more than one base with marines on it – their links
are about the MEU which we don’t remove – solves the link args
Ennis 13, Dispatch Japan founder
(Peter, “RAND study questions heavy US Marine presence on Okinawa”, 5-31,
http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2013/05/rand-study-questions-heavy-us-marine-presence-onokinawa.html)
THE RAND PLAN: Ironically, just a few days before the Kessler testimony, the influential RAND Corp. think tank issued a voluminous study on the costs and strategic
benefits of basing US military forces overseas. The
study, commissioned by Congress as part of the 2012 Defense
Authorization Act, concluded that most of the US Marines now based on Okinawa could be relocated to
California without any appreciable decline in response time to a crisis. Specifically, the report suggested that
only the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a highly-trained, “special operations capable” group,
remain on Okinawa. The 31st MEU is the only one of the Marine Corps’ seven MEUs to be based overseas.
It consists of some 2,500 Marines, with a dedicated “Amphibious Ready Group” of naval vessels based at Sasebo. The 31st MEU is virtually selfsufficient, capable of deploying at moment’s notice, fully equipped, for upwards of one month. By
contrast, the readiness of the rest of the Marines based on Okinawa depends on them “marrying up”
with supply ships that are prepositioned in Guam. Moreover, the deployment of the majority of the III
MEF Marines in response to an emergency would require several hundred airlift sorties by transport
aircraft not based on Okinawa. In short, the RAND study suggests, the response time of the III MEF
would not suffer if the force were deployed to a crisis zone from California rather than from Okinawa.
Its bad in the region – capabilities are cut to the bone
Klinger, Senior Fellow @ Heritage, 15
(Bruce, “Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot?,” Real Clear Defense, 2-25-15,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/02/25/rebalancing_to_the_pacific_asia_pivot_or_divot
__107662.html)
The Asia Pivot policy is sound only if the requisite military forces are deployed in the Pacific—a number that must be commensurate with a stated increase in the
region’s importance. Without such a deployment, the Pivot will fail to reassure allies or deter potential opponents. Claims
that U.S. forces in the Pacific will be immune from duties elsewhere or from budget cuts that will affect the U.S. Joint Force over the next several years simply do not
hold water. Though the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were increased by 100,000 troops to handle the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, U.S. soldiers and Marines were
also removed from Asia to serve in those wars. Even well
before sequestration-mandated budget cuts, it was obvious that the United
States was underfunding defense requirements essential to maintaining security commitments in Asia. In February 2012, Panetta testified
that the United States would rebalance its force posture to emphasize Asia, but he added that the defense budget maintained only the current bomber, aircraft
carrier, and big-deck amphibious fleets and restored Army and Marine Corps force structure in the Pacific to preIraq and pre-Afghanistan deployment levels. On
the surface, the Obama Administration’s 2015 budget projections appear to maintain current levels of defense
spending. As economist Robert Samuelson points out, defense spending in nominal dollars (unadjusted for inflation) remains static between 2013 and 2024: $626
billion in 2013 and $630 billion in 2024. However, a
closer review of these numbers reveals that, once adjusted for inflation, U.S. defense
spending drops by 25 percent.16 It is difficult to envision how the President’s Pivot can be executed successfully with such a decrease in defense
spending, a point underscored by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, who has stated that, with sequestration budget cuts, the military is in danger of
becoming “a hollow force, one that is not ready, one that is not capable of fulfilling assigned missions. In the longer term, after trimming the military
enough to restore readiness and modernization, the resulting force would be too small—too small to fully execute the president’s defense strategy.” Asia Pivot
Derailed by Defense Budget Cuts Although there have been no force reductions in the Pacific as there have been in other commands, the
cuts in the
overall defense procurement and training budgets have already negatively affected U.S. forces in the
Asia–Pacific region. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina G. McFarland admitted in March 2014 that as a result of defense
budget cuts, “Right now, the [Asia] pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen.” The ability
of the U.S. to fulfill its security obligations rests on two factors: the actual number of military forces
available and the quality of those forces. Having requisite forces in the long term requires sufficient ongoing funding for their procurement.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
68
The quality of those forces is determined in part by adequate training. Current U.S.
defense budgets for military forces in the Pacific
are insufficient to provide for numbers or quality, let alone both. Navy. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert has
told Congress that in order to meet the global needs of combatant commanders, the Navy would need a 450-ship fleet. Currently, the Navy has 289 ships and hopes
to achieve a 306-ship fleet by the end of the decade, but attaining 306 ships would require a shipbuilding budget of $18 billion per year over the next 20-plus years.
Since the current FY 2013–FY 2019 plan is for only $13 billion per year, “the largest fleet of current ship designs that the Navy would be able to afford is 30% smaller
than the goal—or about 220 ships.” Representative Randy Forbes (R–VA), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, has expressed concern that “in 2007 we met 90-percent [sic] of the combatant commander’s requirements. This year we will only meet 43
percent.”20 In addition, the
current defense budget does not include funding to refuel and overhaul the USS
George Washington, which could lead the Navy to have to decommission the aircraft carrier. Doing so
would reduce the carrier fleet from 11 to 10, despite then-Secretary of Defense Panetta’s pledge that “the President
of the United States and all of us have decided that it is important for us to maintain our carrier
presence at full strength. And that means we’ll be keeping 11 carriers in our force.” Given that the Navy historically dedicates from one-third to onequarter of its deployed fleet to operations in the Pacific, such a dramatic decrease in fleet size can only have a negative
impact on the United States’ naval capabilities in the region. Marine Corps. Naval and amphibious operations are the backbone of
U.S. military deterrence and defense capabilities in the Pacific. Yet Admiral Samuel Locklear, III, PACOM commander, testified that due to
a lack of large amphibious ships, landing craft, and other amphibious vehicles, the Navy and Marine
Corps do not have enough assets to carry out contested amphibious operations in the Pacific if a crisis
were to arise. Locklear added that there is a “continuing demand” for PACOM to provide other deployed and ready forces to the other regional combatant
commanders, creating “periods in PACOM where we lack adequate intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as key response forces, ultimately degrading
our deterrence posture and our ability to respond.” The Marine Corps has stated that it would need 54 amphibious assault ships to fulfill the validated requirements
of all the combatant commanders. That would be the number needed to deploy three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), since each MEB requires at least 17
ships for a force of 17,500 Marines and all their gear. But the
Navy’s shipbuilding budget— a critical factor for U.S. forces in
the Pacific—has not been sufficient to meet combatant commander requirements for years, so the
Marine Corps and Navy have had to settle for the ability to transport and deploy less than two full
MEBs—nearly half of required capabilities. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) again validated the requirement for 38
amphibious warships to move two MEBs, but current fiscal pressures led to a decline from 33 to 28 warships, meaning that the Corps’ actual ability to conduct a
large-scale amphibious operation will amount to a mere 1.5 MEBs, or roughly a half-dozen battalions of Marines with their supporting aviation—presuming that all
amphibs from around the world were brought together for a single operation. The latest Navy plans do not envision a force of 33 amphibious warships until at least
the mid-2020s, which would still meet only two-thirds of the total requirement. Then-Marine
Commandant General James Amos
warned that defense cuts could “translate into increased loss of personnel and materiel, and ultimately
[place] mission accomplishment at risk.” Twenty retired Marine Corps generals wrote Congress in March 2014 to warn that the shortage of
amphibious ships—and the reduced maintenance of the existing fleet—had “degraded our current national security capabilities and will have negative effects long
into the 21st century.” Beyond this, Marine
Corps fighter squadrons used to have 12–14 aircraft available. Now they
usually have 12, but in 2015 that may decrease to eight deployable aircraft per squadron. U.S. Air Force. The
U.S. Air Force has grounded 13 combat squadrons (250 planes), nearly one-third of its active-duty fighter and bomber squadrons. Air Force officials said they have
implemented a “tiered readiness” approach for active-duty air combat units and warned that there may not be sufficient combat air power to respond immediately
to contingencies. Moreover, for every month a squadron does not fly, it takes an equal number of months to retrain the pilots. Recently, the Air
Force had
to cancel a two-week flying exercise in which units from the Asia–Pacific region and allied air forces
would have trained together. The 374th Airlift Wing in Japan had to cut its flying program by 25 percent
and cancel its participation in a combined drill in Thailand called Cope Tiger. U.S. Army. The Army has had to cut training
above squad and platoon levels, including all but one of the Combat Training Center rotations scheduled for brigades this fiscal year. Depot maintenance was also
halted, and the Army cut flying hours from aviation training, creating a shortfall of pilots. General Raymond T. Odierno, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that
“should a contingency arise, there may not be enough time to avoid sending forces into harm’s way unprepared.” General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of U.N.
and U.S. forces in Korea, testified that he has doubts about America’s ability to counter a largescale North Korean attack effectively due to the low readiness of
forces stationed outside of Korea. He warned that “[a]ny delay in the arrival or reduction in readiness of these forces would lengthen the time required to
accomplish key missions in crisis or war, likely resulting in higher civilian and military casualties.” In other words, cuts
in the defense budget affect
the ability of the U.S. military to prepare for and engage in operations in general, but especially the
Pivot to Asia.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
69
Pencil Pushers
Marines don’t have combat roles – other forces fill in better
Spitzer, defense correspondent, based in Tokyo, 12
(Kirk, “Marines on Okinawa: Time to Leave?,” http://nation.time.com/2012/01/13/marines-on-okinawatime-to-leave/)
Although 18,000 Marines are nominally based on Okinawa, the number has been closer to 12,000 to 14,000
in recent years because of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to training restrictions on Okinawa, most of those
troops were sent to California for final pre-deployment training. More than a thousand Marines on
Okinawa – the exact number is unclear — are assigned to headquarters units that have few if any combat units
specifically assigned to them. III MEB, 3rd Marine Division and III MEF each have full headquarters element, including a commanding general and his staff, but exist
largely to build up to brigade, division or multi-division size units, respectively, in case of a large land war or contingency in Asia. Whether those headquarters
elements could be located elsewhere and still get the job done – or whether the job is still required – is likely to get a close look. The Marines are currently planning
to cut about 12,000 troops from their current strength of 200,000. Even the Marines’ core combat element on Okinawa, the 31st MEU, is likely to get a close review.
The 31st MEU is one of seven amphibious groups that patrol various parts of the globe for up to six months at a time. Three are based at Camp Lejeune, S.C., and
three at Camp Pendleton, Calif. Although Okinawa saves a week or more sailing time, it’s unclear whether the sailing time saved from the West Coast. Each unit is
limited to about 2,200 Marines, including support and logistics troops. Obama announced last year that 2,500 Marines would be stationed in Darwin, Australia, but
whether they would serve as a replacement for the 31st MEU is also unclear. Hornung
says that until recently he was a strong
supporter of keeping Marines in Okinawa, but he’s now convinced other forces in the region could do
the job. “What are the Marines on Okinawa for? If you say they are there for deterrence, then you have to ask,
deterrence from what? If you are talking about China, then that would be the 7th Fleet. If you are
talking about North Korea, then I would say it’s the troops who are (based) in Korea,” Hornung says. “If you pull the
Marines out, is that going to hurt Japanese national security or US national security? I don’t think so.”
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
70
Okinawa Bases Can Go Elsewhere
US can protect Asian security by redistributing Okinawa assets elsewhere in the
region
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio
Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.
If the United States and Japan wish to maintain the moral high ground in Okinawa, they will have to
make some sacrifices. Tokyo should acknowledge Okinawa’s suffering to ease local discontent.
Washington should similarly recognize that, in the case of Okinawa, Americans were aggressors as well
as oppressive occupiers. U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy’s recent decision to return some land to
Okinawa by March 2018 is a gesture of goodwill, but it does not go far enough. She has continued to
support Futenma’s relocation to Henoko, defending the move as “the best of any other plan that was
considered.” Such rhetoric will not result in reconciliation, and although the statement may have been
true at the time the agreement was originally signed, there have been some notable developments
since. In fact, although the Japanese government may not have had Okinawa in mind, the new security
bills, coupled with the growing Chinese presence in the East and South China Seas, has opened up other
avenues for both Tokyo and Washington to explore. They can protect places including the Philippines,
South Korea, and Taiwan by redistributing U.S. military assets throughout the region, away from
Okinawa.
US can put the bases elsewhere in Japan
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio
Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.
Japan’s new defense policy and the revised U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation guidelines seek to make
the alliance better at responding to potential crises in the region. Although it remains to be seen how
Japan will implement this more robust, outward-looking strategy, it may consider building more jointuse bases on the main islands. In the south, Kyushu Island is closer than Okinawa to the Korean
peninsula (and the Chinese mainland). In the north, Japan and the United States could explore placing
bases in the Tohoku region, where pro-U.S. sentiment is high after Washington’s post-tsunami
assistance.
US could move forces to the Phillipines
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio
Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
71
To reduce the burden on Okinawa, the United States should also look beyond Japan. The Philippines, for
example, has recently welcomed the return of U.S. forces to Subic Bay amid fears over Chinese land
reclamation in the South China Sea. Subic Bay is also close to Taiwan, making it arguably a more
strategic location than Okinawa. Although it may not be a simple case of reshuffling troops from one
base to another, U.S. policymakers would be remiss not to reexamine all alternatives to Okinawa.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
72
A2: Withdrawal Causes Japan to Go Nuclear
Extended deterrence failing now – small incursions outweigh large symbols
Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15
(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My
Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclearumbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)
But while U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea are the ultimate promise, it is
a promise for the least-likely situation. And meanwhile, whether because of political expediency or the low stakes involved, the United States
has played a marginal role in dealing with the smaller threats these two countries face: for Japan, Chinese harassment in waters around
contested islands in the East China Sea; and for South Korea, conventional attacks by North Korea. The result? By failing to adequately tackle small-scale challenges with or on behalf of Tokyo
the United States has cast doubt about its nuclear umbrella for those two countries. This in turn
reflects an unstated paradox: the strongest form of U.S. commitment doesn’t address the much weaker
quotidian challenges actually facing its allies. Consequently, Seoul and Tokyo look to Washington and see its credibility
eroding. Frank Sinatra once sang that if he could make it in New York, he “could make it anywhere.” This logic, dubbed the “Sinatra test,” suggests that those who can survive a hard test
can survive an easy one. But when it comes U.S. extended deterrence, allies see the opposite: if the United States can’t handle the small threats,
then how can it handle the big ones, like nuclear attacks? Consider what happened in 2010, when North Korea torpedoed the South Korean
and Seoul,
frigate Cheonan, killing 46 seamen, and then followed up that provocation in November of the same year by shelling the Yeonpyeong Islands, killing four South Koreans and injuring 19 others.
Officials in Washington urged restraint, and prevented South Korean retaliation. The response was telling: Politicians in Seoul, in a move that signaled their doubt over the reliability of U.S.
commitments, called for the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Korean soil (all U.S. nuclear weapons had been removed from South Korea in 1991). And because the United States is
not planning to redeploy its nuclear weapons, several senior South Korean politicians have called for the country to develop their own bomb — concluding that if the U.S. nuclear umbrella
couldn’t protect their country, they would have to rely on their own nuclear capability. Consider also what’s happened over the last five years to Japan, a top U.S. ally. China has repeatedly
confronted Japan over the Diaoyu islands Tokyo claims (and calls the Senkaku). Beijing has asserted its claims with novel and aggressive moves that fall just under the threshold for retaliation
consider, for example,
Japan’s response to the unarmed Chinese reconnaissance drones Beijing has frequently dispatched into contested airspace over the last few years. In
each case, Japan alone has scrambled fighter aircraft or sent maritime vessels in response. The more Japan does alone, the more it doubts the
strength of the partnership. The U.S. commitment to protect Japan against existential threats risks being
eroded by its irrelevance in protecting Japan from the primary — though relatively small — danger it
faces today. As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe bolsters Japan’s military, Japan’s departure from a long history of buck-passing its security burden to the United States only makes sense
as a response to feeling more threatened and lacking confidence in U.S. reliability. Of course, in these cases Japan and South Korea (not to mention much of the
rest of the world) would have been discomfited if the United States threatened nuclear retaliation — and that illustrates
the problem. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for
others, like deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict. Extended deterrence is a blunt instrument: good for some things, like deterring nuclear attack, but not for others, like
— using water cannons, fishing vessels, reconnaissance drones, and military ships nominally designated as Coast Guard vessels to harass Japanese vessels. And
deterring provocations or low-intensity conflict.
Withdraw from kickout is worse because its larger and unplanned
Turn – plan increases resolve AND our ability to respond to Korea/China crisis
Mochizuki, Associate Professor @ George Washington University, 13
(Mike, “Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific,”
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/chian/naha_port/documents/h24reporten-1.pdf)
Some would worry about the signals that could be sent to China and North Korea and possibly other
parties by any reduction in U.S. forces in the western Pacific. We would offer several responses. First,
the ongoing buildup of American capabilities in Guam, Australia, Singapore, and elsewhere is well
designed and sensible. It has achieved many of its desired effects. If anything, it is now on the verge of
going slightly too far in the signals it sends. Firming up commitment to allies is appropriate but it must
be balanced against the need to avoid stoking up the rivalry with China. Second, and even more to the
point, while leading to a modest U.S. numerical force drawdown in the western Pacific, our plan would
actually increase rather than reduce American responsiveness for more plausible scenarios in the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
73
western Pacific—and also scenarios that would require a major U.S. role, such as another North Korean
attack on South Korea.
The plan is helping Japan out of a political bind—they won’t turn around and prolif-if
they cared that much about Marines—Iraq/Afghanitan deployment should have
triggered the link.
Solves the DA – reassures better than extended deterrence
Jackson, visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 5-18-15
(Van, is a and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. “Raindrops Keep Falling On My
Nuclear Umbrella,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/raindrops-keep-falling-on-my-nuclearumbrella-us-japan-south-north-korea/)
Rather than drawing greater attention to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the United States should devise
long-term policies that help South Korea and Japan deal with North Korean provocations and Chinese
coercion respectively — small-scale but significant problems. The United States should launch strategic
consultations with South Korea and Japan to compare notes on global and regional trends (which
includes small-scale coercion), and how they affect national threat perceptions, mission priorities, and
military weapons investments. Though far less sexy than nukes, elevating cooperation with South Korea
and Japan to strategy and policy planning consultations might go a long way toward shoring up their
confidence.
No link – other presence defuses allied prolif
No prolif – technical and political hurdles
Holmes, former US Navy surface warfare officer, 12
(James, “Japan: Joining the Nuclear Weapons Club? It Could.,” http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japanjoining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-could/)
Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long experience operating nuclear power plants, it
would take Tokyo far longer than a year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years.
As J. C. Wylie defines it, strategy is a plan for using available resources and assets to accomplish some goal. Strategy goes no farther than those implements can
carry it — and strategists cannot simply conjure them into being. Toshi and I see a variety of impediments to a Japanese breakout. Let's catalogue just a few.
Consider the politics. It is certainly true that nuclear weapons are no longer the third rail of Japanese
politics — a topic officials and pundits dare not touch lest it strike them (politically) dead. But Japan's
painful past experience as a target of atomic warfare, its ardent sponsorship of nonproliferation
accords, and the fury with which pacifist-leaning citizens and Japan's Asian neighbors would greet
evidence of a bombmaking program add up to a forbidding political barrier. That barrier is hardly unbreachable, but it
would demand quite a feat of political persuasion on Tokyo's part. As the learned strategist Mike Tyson points out, "everyone has a strategy 'til they get punched in
the mouth." Memo to nuclear-weapons advocates: duck! Nor are the strategic, operational, and technical challenges less daunting. A nuclear triad — land- and seabased missiles combined with weapons delivered by manned bombers — holds little promise in light of Japan's lack of geographic depth and the vulnerability of
surface ships and aircraft to enemy action. That means fielding an undersea deterrent would be Tokyo's best nuclear option. But doing so would be far from easy.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force operates an impressive fleet of diesel submarines but has no experience with naval nuclear propulsion. And that leaves aside
the difficulty of developing sea-launched ballistic missiles and their nuclear payloads. Such engineering challenges are far from insoluble for Japan's scientifictechnical complex but cannot be conquered overnight. A force of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs, or SSBNs, thus looks like a remote prospect for Japan. As an
interim solution, the JMSDF might construct cruise missiles resembling the U.S. Navy's old TLAM-Ns, or nuclear-tipped Tomahawks. JMSDF boats could fire such
missiles through torpedo tubes, the easiest method. Or, shipyards could backfit Japanese subs with vertical launchers — much as the U.S. Navy installed Tomahawk
launchers in its fast attack boats starting in the late Cold War. The problem of constructing nuclear weapons small enough to fit on a missile would remain — but
nuclear-armed diesel boats would represent a viable course of action should Japan decide to join the nuclear-weapons club. Years
down the road, then
overnight — a modest Japanese nuclear deterrent might put out to sea. Will Tokyo proceed down
that road? I doubt It. But the prospect no longer appears unthinkable.
— not
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
74
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
75
A2: Withdrawal Causes Conventional Rearmament
Japan’s offensive militarization has already begun
JOHN HAYWARD, Writer for Breitbart News, Sept 1 2015, "CHINESE EXPANSION PUSHES JAPAN TO
SEEK RECORD MILITARY BUDGET", Breitbart, www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/09/01/chineseexpansion-pushes-japan-to-seek-record-military-budget/
The Japanese Defense Ministry has requested its largest budget ever, with a 2.2 percent raise following
three years of steady increases that are powered by fear of U.S. passivity as China invades other countries’ territory in the South
China Sea. The UK Guardian cites China’s island-building in the South China Sea — near the Philippines and Vietnam — and its claims on the
Japanese-held Senkaku Islands as the primary reason for Japan’s military buildup. The U.S. has only feebly protested China’s expansion, partly
because President Barack Obama is cutting U.S. defense spending while he tries to expand progressives’ power and influence over the lives of
U.S. citizens. While Japan’s military reform is supported by the United States, it has met strong resistance from isolationist members of the
Japanese public who wish their country to remain pacifist, after its disastrous decision to invade China and to attack the U.K., France, Holland
and the United States during World War II. A demonstration against Abe’s military reforms drew some 120,000 protesters over the weekend.
The international disgust over jihadi expansion, such as the Islamic State, is also a factor in the Japanese policy. That disgust lets Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe push for greater deployment of Japanese troops. Abe has cited the murder of two Japanese hostages by ISIS as a reason for
changing the rules governing Japanese military deployments. Abe has long maintained that Japan must shift its military posture to deal with
new threats in a changing world, and to put its World War II imperial past behind it. From the 1930s until the U.S. dropped two nuclear
weapons on Japan, Japan’s long imperial war in China killed roughly 20 million Chinese. China, well aware that many on the Pacific Rim are
worried by any discussion of Japanese troops fighting on foreign soil again, poured salt in those wounds by announcing a blanket amnesty for
elderly criminals who also fought in what the state-run Xinhua news agency describes as World War II “the War of Resistance Against Japanese
Aggression.” “The mercy shown to [criminal] veterans is an apt recognition of their contributions in the wars, and it shows China’s attitude to
history and commitment to peace,” said the Chinese government’s news agency. “While China remembers the fallen, jailed allies can not be
forgotten despite their post-war missteps.” China plans to hammer home its message about Japanese militarism by holding huge parades to
commemorate the 70th anniversary of Japanese surrender on September 3, and drawing renewed attention to a ruined Japanese prison camp
described as “China’s Auschwitz.” In a similar vein, China expects everyone to view its construction of artificial islands festooned with artillery
emplacements and military airfields as a commitment to “peace” in the South China Sea. Much
of Japan’s increased defense
spending is earmarked for defensive radar systems, drones, and surveillance aircraft designed to keep
an eye on what China does in the waters between Japan and Taiwan. The Japanese are also interested
in putting more long-range weapons within reach of disputed islands, and beefing up a flexible, fastresponse amphibious assault force. Presumably much of this buildup is meant to signals to the Chinese that
Japan is serious about protecting its interests in the region. Japan hardly needs any new equipment to
watch Chinese naval vessels putter around the nearby Senkaku Islands – as the Guardian notes, the Chinese did that
for the 23rd time this year over the weekend, and the Japanese had no difficulty watching the show with their existing surveillance systems.
But better detection systems and a rapid amphibious response force could project Japan’s sphere of
concern farther out to sea.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
76
A2: Proposal Politically Unpopular
Winners Win on foreign policy – the plan allows Obama to use a divide and conquer
strategy
Morey and Trantham 2015 Daniel Morey – professor of political science at the University of
Kentucky, Austin Trantham – Polisci PhD candidate at UK (go cats), Talking But Not Doing: Congressional
Opposition Cohesion and Presidential Foreign Policy Involvement, Paper presented at the 2015 Meeting
of the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, NV
http://www.austintrantham.com/uploads/5/9/9/2/5992747/talking_not_doing__morey_and_trantham_-_wpsa_2015.pdf
This paper seeks to expand our understanding of the role of domestic politics in determining the level of
presidential foreign policy involvement. However, unlike past studies we do not see foreign policy as a
safe harbor for a president who is weak at home. Instead, we see foreign policy as a tool presidents can
use to divide domestic opponents. Wielded skillfully, foreign policy could increase a president’s
domestic power. Almost every president, sooner or later, faces strong domestic opposition. Periods of
unified party control still appear but they are the exception more than the rule. Facing divided
government and a strong and vocal opposition past theory would indicate that a president would retreat
to foreign affairs and ride out the rest of their time in office. This past work assumes that the opposition
is a unified body that will stand against the president on most issues. This, often unstated, assumption is
the core of most theories of domestic politics and foreign affairs. Here we take the stand that the
opposition is not a single unified bloc and the internal differences within the opposition party create
room for the president to create wedges that can divide the opposition. In line with past research we
see the opposition party mainly united against a president’s domestic agenda. Domestic politics
continues to dominate voting decisions and the party out of power uses discontent among the general
public on domestic issues to build electoral support. What is missing in most studies is the level of
cohesion regarding foreign affairs. While the opposition rallies around certain domestic issues, foreign
affairs is more open. Pulled by different constituent considerations the opposition party usually does not
form a united foreign policy, especially not to the degree seen on domestic issues. This process can be
seen today within the Republican Party. There is strong cohesion against most of President Obama’s
domestic policies, especially regarding health care and taxes. This same unity does not exist in foreign
affairs. Republicans have been divided on issues such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and immigration. It is this lack
of foreign policy cohesion that we think is important. Facing an opposition party united both on
domestic and foreign policy there is little a president can do. In the face of strong opposition on all
issues gridlock sets in and the president loses the power to implement anything but modest changes.
However, if the president faces an opposition that is diverse in the area of foreign affairs it creates an
opportunity for the president to take action. A skillful president can use the opposition’s internal
divisions on foreign affairs to regain the ability to meaningfully direct policy. In the end, the president
may be able to use foreign affairs as an avenue to gain increased domestic power Seeing that the
opposition is divided on foreign affairs allows the president to achieve major policy successes. The
president can introduce issues to the agenda that play into the internal divisions of the opposition and
allow the president to successfully implement their favored policy. This can allow the president to have
major foreign policy victories and fits past work arguing that presidents use foreign affairs to build their
historical legacy. Beyond victories in foreign affairs, a president might even be able to use foreign policy
as a wedge to break cohesion on domestic opposition. Carefully selecting foreign issues could allow the
president to exploit divisions within the opposition and weaken the ability of members of the opposition
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
77
to work together. Making the opposition appear divided, disorganized, and weak could also benefit a
president in later elections.
A fight is coming over moving Marines to Guam-the plan resolves this.
Fuentes, Military Times, 9-5-15
(Gidget, “Navy signs off on plan to move 5,000 Marines to Guam”,
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/05/navy-signs-off-plan-move-5000marines-guam/71657614/)
The Navy Department released its Record of Decision Aug. 29 for relocating the Marines and their family
members to the U.S. territory in the western Pacific. It's a smaller force than what the Marine Corps first
proposed in 2009 when it wanted to send 8,600 Marines, 9,000 dependents and 1,900 government workers to Guam by 2020. That would have put a full brigade-size force
on the island. That idea prompted public outcry in Guam and congressional criticism over the cost for new
bases and infrastructure on the modestly populated island. In 2010, Rep. Hank Johnson, D-Ga., even went so far as to ask the head of U.S.
Pacific Command at the time whether adding that many troops to the small territory would cause the island to tip over. After additional studies and reviews, the plans were scaled back and
Japan's government pledged to shoulder part of the cost. The moves are part of a larger rebalancing of forces in the Western Pacific that will bolster air defenses and aviation capacity and add
a wharf for visiting Navy aircraft carriers on Guam. The Marine Corps plans to base infantry headquarters, aviation squadrons and logistics support units on Guam. Marines train there routinely
now, and the move will reduce the military presence on Okinawa, which some Japanese view as burdensome. “The Marine Corps has a historic friendship with the people of Guam,” Lt. Gen.
Ronald Bailey, the Corps' deputy commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, said in an Aug. 29 announcement. “We look forward to continuing that partnership.” What you need to know
about the future force in Guam. Who's going and when. Of the 5,000 Marines to live and train in Guam, only one-third of them will be there on permanent orders. That will mostly consist of
three-year, family-accompanied tours starting in 2020. The other 3,300 or so Marines who head to Guam each year will arrive on six-month unit deployment rotations and use equipment and
vehicles already in Guam. Those units will stagger so they don't all show up at the same time, similar to the way Marines currently rotate through Japan on the unit deployment program. The
number of Marines and dependents based in Guam will increase each year through 2026, when the Corps reaches its goal of basing 5,000 Marines and 1,300 family members there. The
biggest spike will occur between 2019 and 2020, when the total number of Marines based in Guam will jump from 387 to 2,990. Over the next several years, the Corps will boost the number of
Marines based there by 300 to 900 annually. Slowed growth. That 13-year buildup is far slower than the original call to move thousands of Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam in
just five years. The Navy's new plan also curbs plans for more land acquisition and construction projects. Now Marines will live and train on land already controlled by the military. "This
decision adopts all of the mitigation measures that were identified ... to avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts," the Navy decision states. Housing. Marine families will be able to
live in housing at Andersen Air Force Base, where about 510 acres will be set aside for construction of as many as 553 housing units. Other construction will include housing for bachelors and
other facilities in the nearby planned cantonment area covering 1,751 acres at the Naval Computer and Telecommunications site in the Finegayan area on the north side of Guam. Overall, the
Marine Corps will have a smaller footprint than the 2,500-acre base first envisioned for the island. Training grounds. Marines will access the 338-acre live-fire training range complex that will
be built at Andersen's Northwest Field. They'll also have access to a hand-grenade range planned for Andersen South.
Additional studies will sort out access to
historic sites within the range complex, which will include 3,701 acres for surface danger zones. Another 5,324 acres of federal land in the north will be
protected for wildlife habitat. Next steps. Defense Department officials will now draft construction plans for military
facilities and to expand road networks and local infrastructure. But not much will happen without
Congress coughing up money, something members have been hesitant to do without more concrete
plans.
Plan saves money—Guam/FRF is expensive
Sugawa, special researcher at the Office of Prime Minister, 13
(Kiyoshi, “What to Do About U.S. Marines in Japan,” Real Clear Defense, 12-6-13, DOA: 7-23-15,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/12/06/what_to_do_about_us_marines_in_japan_1069
92.html)
Drawbacks of the Current Plan The current FRF plan has serious flaws. The most obvious problem is political feasibility.
Okinawans' opposition to a new base is stronger than ever. Even if Prime Minister Abe Shinzo succeeds in gaining approval for a landfill permit
from the Okinawa governor, the FRF will still not win the support of the majority of Okinawans. Lack of support from the local community
would eventually weaken the basis of the alliance. The
financial costs of the realignment plan for the US bases in
Japan also weigh heavily on Japan and the United States. The General Accounting Office reported that
the costs for military construction in Guam will be more than $23.9 billion. The estimated price for the
landfill and construction of the FRF is almost $4 billion, although the real figure would be easily doubled
as is often the case for this kind of public works project. In addition to the FRF, the Japanese government
will have to pay another $20 billion or so in total. From a strategic point of view, the present US base realignment initiative
fails to meet today's most important security challenge in East Asia - the rise of China. The shift of Marines from Okinawa would presumably
weaken the deterrent capability of the alliance. Under current plans, approximately 9,000 III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) personnel are
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
78
to deploy to Guam and other places. The new airfield at Henoko, which is to be shortened from the current 2,740 meters at MCAS Futenma to
1,800 meters, will not be able to accommodate the same range of aircraft. Ironically, the costs of the FRF and other replacement facilities are
likely to undermine the ability of the Japanese government to fund much more vital defense spending, including new forces to deal with China's
maritime buildup in the region. Basic Principles of a New Initiative To overcome these drawbacks, Japan and the United States need to reset the
current plan and work on a new initiative that is acceptable, affordable, and strategically effective. Four basic principles should be kept in mind.
First and foremost, Japan and the United States must fulfill their promise to return MCAS Futenma to the Okinawan people. Withdrawing the
promise or postponing the return indefinitely will make them feel betrayed and their confidence in the alliance will be lost. Furthermore, the
present situation where the MCAS Futenma has potentially endangered the lives of Okinawans can never be justified. Second, the present
realignment plan for US bases in Okinawa other than MCAS Futenma should be downsized. Although the FRF has attracted a great deal of
attention, even bigger projects such as the relocation of Naha military port remain to be carried out under the current agreement. Unlike
Futenma, however, these bases do not pose immediate danger to the residents of Okinawa. The less ambitious plan will enable the Japanese
government to use the saved money for the modernization of SDF weaponry. Additional funds could also be allocated to share the costs of
rotational training by the US Marine Corps on Okinawa. Third, most of the Marines need to be relocated outside Japan, not just Okinawa. The
viability of the large-scale Marine infantry deployment depends on access to air fields, along with vast training space, to accommodate the
helicopters and transport aircraft they need to fulfill their missions. Without a replacement for Futenma, large numbers of Marines cannot
remain on Okinawa. And the reality is no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public refuses to
accept any other site for the FRF in the prefecture. While smaller crisis response elements of the III MEF can remain on the island, the entire
division needs to relocate. Due
to financial difficulties, the US government may want to bring them back to
Hawaii and California rather than relying so much on Guam.
Congress defers to the military on strategy
Nunez, Active Duty & Veterans Services fellow, 2013
(Emily, “Closing the Civil-Military Disconnection Gap”, November,
http://www.classyawards.org/exchange/closing-the-civil-military-disconnection-gap/)
In many cases, civilian leaders lack detailed knowledge of how the military operates, of military strategy,
or of the higher plane of grand strategy. As a result, government officials often defer to military
personnel resulting in problems of disconnection in budget discrepancies and a lack of military knowledge. The military budget is affected
as presidents and Congress defer to those who wish to increase it. For example, although President
Obama sought to reduce forces in Afghanistan, he ultimately decided to increase forces, beginning a reduction
only in the summer of 2011. The President’s decision to send 30,000 troops granted the military, “almost everything it wanted.” Lacking expertise
about this military operation, civilian leaders wound up making concessions on strategy and policy.
Whether one agrees with the troop increase or not, more knowledge of the military would allow the White House to make more informed decisions in such
situations.
No backlash to foreign base closure
Dodge, Heritage senior policy analyst, 2013
(Michaela, “Beyond BRAC: Global Defense Infrastructure for the 21st Century”, 5-3,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/05/beyond-brac-global-defense-infrastructure-for-the21st-century)
There is no review commission and no significant domestic constituency. As a result, closing military
installations abroad is politically easier than closing them at home. The Pentagon has been taking advantage of these
factors in the recent years. In Europe, the U.S. Army has downsized from 245 installations to 145 installations
between 2003 and 2010. By 2015, it plans on retaining 98 locations total.[11] It has reduced its end strength and force structure by over 45
percent.[12] The Air Force has reduced aircraft and forces stationed in Europe by 75 percent since 1990.[13] The Navy limited its presence in Europe and is further
examining options for downsizing.[14] In March 2013, the Army sent its 22 remaining battle tanks in Germany back to the U.S.—the first time in 69 years that there
is no U.S. tank stationed on German soil.[15] As
Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute notes, it is
important to keep these ongoing initiatives in mind because “many members of Congress want to
divest excess overseas capacity before shrinking domestic bases” without being aware of reductions
under way.[16]
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
79
Con
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
80
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
81
Con Contentions
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
82
Contention I – Asian Credibility
US forward presence in Okinawa is the cornerstone of the US-Japan alliance. It’s also
critical to deter China’s aggression and maintain US deterrence
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16
Growing discontent in Okinawa has the potential to reverberate beyond Japan’s borders. With a wary
eye to the increasing Chinese military activity in the South and East China Seas, the United States and its
allies are not keen to reduce the forward operating capabilities of U.S. forces in the region. Due to
Okinawa’s proximity to potential flashpoints, U.S. forces stationed there form the cornerstone of the
U.S.-Japanese alliance and are considered essential to U.S. policy in the Western Pacific. A strong U.S.
presence acts as both sword and shield, not just for Japan but also for the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, and all the other countries that rely on it for security.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
83
Contention II – China
The status quo solves their impact---the level of Chinese provocation is qualitatively
lower than in the past---US presence is the reason
Shaohan Lin 15, MA student in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, Graduate Research
Assistant at Calian, “After the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Now what?” Journal of Military and Strategic
Studies, VOLUME 16, ISSUE 2, 2015, http://w.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/597/577
Soft military procedures did not prevent China from retaliating in its own ways. When the US navy increased its presence in the Asia-Pacific and took sides in the South China Sea disputes, China responded with a rapprochement
with North Korea. Not only did China abandon all efforts in persuading North Korea to denuclearize, it also improved aid and trade relations with it. 58 China stymied US denuclearization efforts on another occasion; in 2012, just as
the US and other states sanctioned Iran for its illicit nuclear program, China reached an arrangement with Iran to purchase oil.59 Both the North Korea and Iran cases are definite responses to the pivot as China worked alongside
the US before the latter’s increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific. Syria is yet another additional area of contention where China challenged the US. In spring 2014, China, along with Russia, vetoed a resolution backed by more
than sixty-five countries to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for its numerous instances of human rights violations. This veto was in fact the fourth time China foiled Western resolutions regarding Syria.60 Admittedly, it
China avoids directly compromising
the security of the Asia-Pacific. It has not answered the US military presence by increasing its own
military presence, at least not in a fashion that menaces the US. Granted, China did voice its
discontentment towards American territorial “infringement” in the South China Sea, but contrarily media and some scholarly claims, China
has not escalated tensions because of the pivot; it may have very well done so without American
interference in the region. As claimants challenge a rising China, it should be expected for the latter to make full use of its leverages, especially without the scrutinizing gaze of the Americans. It
is not folly to believe that security conditions would be worse without displays of US commitment and
force that serve as a check to Chinese aggression. The harassments of Vietnamese and Philippine survey
vessels by Chinese patrol boats in 2011, 2012 and 2014 are often cited as proof of Chinese behaviour
aggravated by US showboating. But in 2005, when US presence in the Asia-Pacific was minimal, Chinese
ships fired at Vietnamese boats, killing nine people.61 Assuming that the US Navy has an impact on Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea, then it would be
beneficial as cable-cutting and collisions, the primary mechanisms of violence today, are considerably
milder than firing with the intent to kill. Thus far, the deterrence element of the pivot has succeeded in
restraining real Chinese aggression and has not shifted the status quo in the region.
is unsure whether these sabotages were done out of spite or quite independently of the US pivot. What these examples of reprisals show is that
Reduction to presence in Okinawa collapses US Access to the region – this is vital to
deterring China War.
Hyon 14 (Hyon Joo Yoo, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Trinity University East Asia Institute (EAI) fellow on Peace, Governance,
and Development in East Asia, a Korea Foundation fellow, and a visiting fellow at the East West Center, Washington, D.C.“When Domestic
Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa” The Korean Journal of International Studies 12-2 (December 2014), 403-23 Published
online December 31, 2014)
These changes
in the US-Japan alliance shed light on the geopolitical importance of Okinawa. Okinawa
holds two thirds of the US service members in Japan and is in close proximity to possible regional and
global contingencies (Nikkei Weekly 2006). The American forces in Okinawa have extended from their
traditional tasks to defend Japan and surrounding areas to the deployment to East Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa. Futenma, the US Marine Corps air station, is regarded as essential for sustaining the US capability
to respond to regional and global crises. One aircraft in the Futenma Marine Base can carry “fully
equipped combat-ready military units to any point in the world on short notice and then provide field
support required to help sustain the fighting force” (Japan Times 2009). The Futenma base is also a backup of
the air force in Kadena in Okinawa, the hub of the US force in the Asia Pacific. The Third Marine Expeditionary
Force (III MEF) in Okinawa is in high readiness and has “the ability to prevent war, swift and lethal” (Kirk 2013, 49).
Marines participated in fifteen operations in the past decade including humanitarian crises such as Operation
Tomodachi in the wake of the tsunami near Tokyo in 2011. Recently, 45 marines and sailors in Okinawa were dispatched to the Philippines for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in November 2013 after the typhoon Haiyan. As US Lt. General Gregson mentioned,
“Okinawa’s
geographical importance makes it absolutely essential as a permanent base for US
Marines in the Pacific” (Japan Times 2002).
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
84
The Japanese government understands the strategic importance of US
forces in Okinawa to maintain deterrence against
regional conflicts, such as contingencies in Taiwan and the Korean peninsula (See Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart
2014, 4). As Shigeru Ishiba, former defense minister of Japan, clearly noted, the relocation of the US Marines in Futenma
outside Okinawa means that the force cannot play a deterrent role (Japan Times 2009).
Access is key – china’s growing A2/AD makes the ability to use japan as a hub for
operations is crucial.
Przystup 15 (James J. Przystup Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, March 2015, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic
Perspectives, No. 18)
Defense of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, should address China’s growing A2/ AD challenge that
could put at risk the U.S. ability to “access” Japan and extend deterrence. The Roles, Missions, and Capabilities
discussion, including joint training, should focus on this challenge. Development of a “Joint Assured Access Plan,” with cyber,
space, ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance components, would serve both to strengthen the defense of Japan and enhance the
deterrence posture of the alliance.
Today, emerging threats from cyber and space domains and advancing A2/AD capabilities suggest that the present understanding of SIASJ—
“surrounding areas” and “rear area support”—is both operationally constraining and unrealistic and should be considered to encompass
greater depth and breadth. Collectively, the
security challenges of the 21st century speak to the need for a
conceptual review of the current understanding and relevance of the concept with regard to both the
defense of Japan and emerging security challenges. A main objective of the guidelines review process
should be to determine how roles and missions can be apportioned to provide “assured access” for
U.S. forces deploying from the Eastern Pacific to defend Japan against aggression.
China A2/AD Strategy causes extinction
Ayson & Bell 14 (Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and Adjunct Professor at the
Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre & Desmond Ball Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University,
where he was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from 1984 to 1991., “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?”, Survival | vol.
56 no. 6 | December 2014–January 2015 | pp. 135–166)
The role of nuclear weapons is one of the most important aspects of the escalation question in North Asia, as
China has a nuclear
arsenal and Japan relies on US extended deterrence. If Beijing and Tokyo engage in conventional
military conflict, the prospects of direct Sino-American nuclear escalation come into play more clearly.
One of the main concerns about the possibility of such escalation revolves around America’s superiority to
China in terms of conventional fighting power.41 While China is closing that gap, some American conventional
systems allow Washington to threaten China with accurate, destructive strikes that Beijing cannot hope
to replicate. Should Sino-American hostilities seem likely to intensify, China could be tempted to utilise
its nuclear forces. In such a conflict, however, Beijing should be aware that any attempted nuclear attack on the
US would be almost guaranteed to generate a swift and probably disproportionate nuclear response.
Mutual fear of surprise attacks and inadvertent nuclear war could not be ruled out, but nuclear deterrence might well operate effectively.42
In the early stages of a conflict involving only China and Japan, the nuclear question takes on a different perspective. Beijing would still face the
prospect of relative conventional-military weakness, especially when it considered the possibility of American support to Tokyo. But if
China
decided to escalate by threatening Japan with nuclear bombardment, it would have to weigh the
credibility of American extended deterrence, some portion of which would almost certainly swing into
action. At the very least, China would have to deal with the costs of a strong conventional response by the
US.
One might expect that nuclear threats, implicit or otherwise, would remain in the background. Washington could regard the threat of a nuclear
response as effective leverage, discouraging China from escalating a conventional conflict with Japan without the need for heavy US
involvement in a conventional military contest. Similarly, China might remind Japan about the existence of its nuclear forces, so as to highlight
the potential costs of conventional escalation. Testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during early hostilities – rather like the 2014
Russian test, apparently longscheduled, during the Ukraine crisis – could be such a signalling mechanism.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
85
If China suffers, or merely fears, a significant attack on its command and control systems, there are other
material reasons why nuclear escalation could become more likely. Unlike the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold
War, China lacks separate, redundant theatre and strategic networks for C4ISR. This increases the
likelihood that what Japan and especially the US view as an escalating conflict in the conventional
domain could have quite a different appearance to Chinese decision-makers. Conventional escalation
could easily cause the US to take measures that imperilled China’s control of its nuclear systems. Aware
of its general C4ISR vulnerability, Beijing would already have experienced considerable pressure to use its antisatellite
systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles (including the DF21-D) and other anti-carrier weapons, and to accelerate its
cyber attacks.43 The US would likely respond to the use of these capabilities by destroying all remaining Chinese force elements in any
way connected to them, which would have further C4ISR implications for China. America could be expected to forgo attacks on Chinese urban–
industrial centres and many other force elements. Washington
would seek to convey restraint and selectivity in its
response, but would already have provided Beijing with a perverse incentive to use nuclear weapons
pre-emptively, out of fear that its capacity to maintain command and control of these systems was
being destroyed in the conventional conflict.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
86
Contention III -- Taiwan
US presence in Okinawa is necessary to the defense of Taiwan – Taiwan takeover
collapses overall deterrence and the global economy
Twinning 13 (Daniel, senior fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He previously served as a member of the
secretary of state’s Policy Planning Staff and as Senator John McCain’s foreign policy advisor. “The Taiwan Linchpin”,
http://www.hoover.org/research/taiwan-linchpin)
A related component of the
strategic geography of Japan-Taiwan relations is the role relations play in
facilitating regional access for the United States, which remains the primary security provider in East Asia
and the Pacific. American ability to project power in East and Southeast Asia, as currently constituted, is dependent
on allied control of Japan and Taiwan. The largest American forward-deployed troop concentration, on
Okinawa, is as close to Taiwan as to the Japanese home islands. The United States’ responsibility for the
defense of Japan invests the southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands with considerable
strategic importance; similarly, U.S. ability to project power to defend Taiwan is dependent on the
American military’s ability to operate from Okinawa. In short, U.S. bases in Japan reinforce the continued
credibility of America’s military commitment to Taiwan’s defense, while a friendly Taiwan helps secure the
southeastern approaches to the Japanese home islands — the most likely route of any airborne or naval assault on
America’s closest Asian ally.
U.S. plans for the defense of Taiwan require access to bases, logistics, rear-area support, intelligence,
communication, and supply hubs in Japan. It is therefore unlikely that a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan
would relieve Japan of the imperative to actively support, defend, and perhaps even fight with American
forces. It was this realization, following the exposure of a lack of clarity in Japan over its role in supporting the United States during the
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, that led Washington and Tokyo to more clearly define the defense of Taiwan as a core area of alliance
cooperation.7
Chinese control of Taiwan would, among other things, sever the sea lanes than connect Japan and its ally, the United States.
Hostile control of Taiwan which enabled projection of naval and air power from its territory would dramatically erode the United States’ ability to defend Japan.
American bases on Okinawa would become less defensible and more vulnerable to embargo or attack. The ability of the United States Navy to secure the sea lanes
around Japan would be called into question. This would raise doubts not only about the defense of Japan, but the security of the maritime routes connecting Japan
to the economies of Southeast Asia, India, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia.
Okinawa serves not only as the frontline defense of Japan, but as the hub of American power projection
into Southeast Asia. Hostile control of Taiwan would geographically sever the primary base of U.S. expeditionary forces in Asia from
strategic regions like the South China Sea and the Indo-Malaysian archipelago. Asian states that have sought closer security
ties with the United States, including Indonesia and Vietnam, might reconsider their strategic choices
should Taiwan move from being a facilitator to an obstacle to U.S. power projection in maritime
Southeast Asia.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
87
Contention IV --Korea
Korea collapse inevitable—containing escalation is key.
Gobry 8-21—Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center [Pascal-Emmanuel, “Why North Korea's
collapse is inevitable,” The Week, 8-21-2015, http://theweek.com/articles/572913/why-north-koreascollapse-inevitable, accessed 9-28-2015]
The conflict is largely seen in terms of geopolitics, but it would really make more sense to look at it from
the perspective of North Korea's domestic politics. Totalitarian regimes are mostly driven either by
ideology or internal politics, not realpolitik as much. Nazi ideology was a better predictor of Germany's
actions under the Third Reich than realpolitik considerations (which was the great mistake that both
Neville Chamberlain and Joseph Stalin made in their dealings with Hitler).
In this case, North Korea's reigning ideology — Juche, a combination of communism, mercantilism, and
racism — doesn't tell us much. What we do know is that Kim Jong Un is probably a weak leader, and is
acting to shore up his support.
Even on its best days, the regime teeters on the brink of collapse, simply because most of its people are
starving and unhappy. It would take only a tiny push for the straightjacket of terror that keeps the
regime together to fall apart, for enough people to become more hungry than scared, and for enough
regime thugs and mid-level officers to say, "No, not this time, we won't pull the trigger."
The regime's attempt to black out all outside information has been showing cracks. Cell phones and
DVDs (and probably Bibles) are streaming in from the Chinese border, where guards are easily bribed.
This contraband is showing an increasing number of North Koreans that another way of life is possible.
Various market-driven "reforms," while improving the lot of a few ordinary North Koreans, also highlight
the regime's dons for what they are: corrupt kleptocrats, businessmen with guns.
It's against this backdrop that we need to look at the regime's recent actions. Everything suggests that
Kim Jong Un feels himself to be in a position of weakness. He was allowed to succeed his father basically
because the alternative was civil war and regime collapse. He needs a power base, and that means the
military, and especially the more hardcore elements in the military. Hence the purging of Hyon Yong
Chol, the grown-up in charge who probably thought the young Kim would be his puppet. Hyon was a
military man's military man — formerly in charge of the regime's all-important nuclear program — but
he was also close to the Chinese and (as far as we can tell given the murkiness of the regime) an
advocate of mostly letting sleeping dogs lie.
Stirring up trouble abroad to shore up the base at home is the oldest trick in the tyrant's book, and there
seems to be little alternative explanation to the artillery strikes. North Korea feeds itself two ways:
Chinese aid, and nuclear blackmail against the West and South Korea. Purging Hyon alienated the
Chinese, so now it's back to Plan B, a replay of Kim Jong Il's breakneck nuclear program in the 1990s that
irked the Chinese. He played the Clinton administration for suckers, extorting food aid in exchange for
nuclear promises never kept. (You would think a Democratic administration would learn the lesson of
listening to a tyrannical regime's nuclear promises — but that's a subject for another day.)
So as we look at what is happening in the Korean Peninsula, the main question shouldn't be about
balance of power, but about what we do when the North Korean regime collapses. Because it's
certainly not a matter of if, but when.
To say that it will be a humanitarian disaster is an understatement — virtually all of North Korea's
inhabitants are malnourished. But it will also be a security disaster, as countless weapons go
unaccounted for, and the society devolves into anarchy. And of course, there's the question of nuclear
weapons.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
88
China will want to preserve its interests and keep a buffer between its borders and the American
presence in South Korea. It will be reluctant to let international aid (an effort that will, by necessity, be
led by the U.S.) into the country. At the same time, it will also be extremely reluctant, if not unable, to
take on that duty itself.
Withdrawal of presence means that US forces can’t pacify unification—AND presence
is key to ensure Japanese support for economic support post-unification
Klingner 9/28/15 (Bruce, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia, distinguished graduate of the National War College, where he
received a master's degree in national security strategy in 2002. He also holds a master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Defense
Intelligence College and a bachelor's degree in political science from Middlebury College in Vermont “Allies Should Include Japan in Korean
Unification Plans”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09/allies-should-include-japan-in-korean-unification-plans)
South Korea should play the predominant role in determining the course and pace of Korean unification. The United States would
continue to serve as South Korea’s protector, ensuring Seoul’s security and national interests. Tokyo would
play a secondary and reactive role in Korean unification. However, Japan’s importance should not be underestimated since
its participation would be critical both in the military operations likely to precede Korean unification
and in potentially providing extensive economic support after Korean unification.
Japan provides a critical base of support for U.S. forces defending South Korea during a conflict with
Pyongyang. Seven U.S. bases in Japan are designated as part of the United Nations Command Rear, which maintains the status of
forces agreement for U.N. forces in Japan during peacetime and would serve as a staging area during a Korean crisis.
U.S. military forces would need access to additional Japanese bases for strike and logistics operations. U.S.
Marine Corps units on Okinawa are essential to allied security plans for responding to full-scale invasion
by North Korean forces as well as to other military contingencies.
Japanese Self-Defense Forces could participate in important combat support roles, such as minesweeping to maintain sea lines of
communication with the United States and the Korean Peninsula. Quite simply, the United States cannot
defend South Korea
without Japan, a point seemingly lost on the South Korean government and populace.
North Korea understands the importance of Japanese participation in military contingency plans and has sought to
prevent it. In March 2013, the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command threatened, “The US should not forget that Anderson
AFB in Guam [and] naval bases in Japan and Okinawa are within striking range of the DPRK’s precision strike
means.”[10] On October 10, 2012, the North Korean National Defense Commission warned that its strategic rocket forces could hit the
mainland U.S. and U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam.[11]
Failure of deterrence is the biggest threat – North Korea would target Japan first to
take out the south’s defense absent US presence – that causes extinction & Collapses
US security guarantees worldwide.,
Roberts 13 (Brad Roberts visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013.
From 2009 to early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy. Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 9th August 2013 )
The renewed
interest in extended deterrence in Northeast Asia follows from the emergence of a nucleararmed North Korea with long-range missiles. Although the precise time when such capabilities will be
operational is a matter of uncertainty and debate, sooner or later North Korea will have the ability to
strike targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States with both conventional and nuclear warheads
and perhaps also chemical and biological warheads.2
There is also uncertainty and debate about the strategic intentions of North Korea’s leader. On the one hand, he may intend to utilize these
capabilities to deter military action by the U.S.-RoK alliance and to advance negotiations with the United States on a peace treaty that secures
the North Korean state and regime for the long term. The following statement by Kim Jong Un, for example, seems to align with such
intentions: “the time has gone forever when enemies threatened and intimidated us with atomic bombs.”3 On the other hand, North
Korea has also stated that “Japan is always in the cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan
makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first.”4 This hints at an aggressive purpose—to
employ nuclear threats to coerce its neighbors, to cover provocations at the conventional level, and
perhaps even attack its enemies.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
89
These North Korean capabilities and intentions pose three kinds of risks for Japan. First, North Korea may
conduct further provocations by non-nuclear means, including perhaps against Japan. Second, there may
be unwanted escalation on and off the Korean peninsula if and as North Korea’s leaders miscalculate
and generate reactions from those attacked that potentially lead to war. Third, there may be outright
aggression by the North. After all, its national strategy remains guided by the ultimate goal of reunifying
the peninsula under its control. With nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Un may believe he now has the
ingredients of success: an ability to take Seoul hostage with conventional and perhaps chemical weapons, to threaten
attacks on Japan if it allows the United States access to bases and, if that fails and the regime’s survival comes into question, to threaten attacks
on the American homeland if the United States does not settle for peace on Kim Jong Un’s terms.5 These are new kinds of risks
that the U.S.-Japan alliance has not so far had to address. North Korea’s ability to strike at Japan with No Dong missiles
presents a qualitatively different problem from the cold war problem presented by Soviet missiles
such as the SS-20 pointed at Japan.
The possibility of outright aggression by North Korea cannot lightly be dismissed. Leadership in
Pyongyang appears firmly committed to its reunification agenda. As one authoritative study has noted, failures of
deterrence are not uncommon and typically occur when one or more of the following three factors is present: when the weaker state
is highly motivated, when it misperceives some facet of the situation, and when the stronger state has
some element of vulnerability.6 Given the mix of capability, motivation, and misperception evident in
Pyongyang today, it is important that the deterrence posture of the United States and Japan be credible for
this possibility. As argued above, a failure of deterrence here could have wide-ranging repercussions for
other challengers to regional order and also to the credibility of U.S. security guarantees more
generally.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
90
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
91
Contention V – Disaster Response
HADR
Marines are key to disaster response—withdrawal kills assurance
Harkins 9/25/15 (Gina, Staff Writer, “More than 80,000 Marines are focused on the Pacific”,
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/09/22/marine-corps-moving-15-percent-its-force-pacific/72395670/)
Responding to crises
The Marine Corps has been the first to respond or lead the effort for the last six major humanitarian
crises in the Asia-Pacific region that required foreign assistance, Toolan said.
That makes Marines' presence in the region vital for an area susceptible to devastating natural
disasters like typhoons or tsunamis. Marine air assets, including heavy-lift helicopters and MV-22B
Ospreys, have allowed the Corps to deliver supplies to those in need and evacuate people trapped
without food or water after a natural disaster.
Marines' ability to respond quickly to such events, like the April earthquake in Nepal that killed about 9,000 people or the
typhoon that struck Saipan in August, demonstrates the U.S. commitment to partners and allies in the region,
Toolan said.
Marines can expect to continue training for those types of contingencies in the region alongside troops from
countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Fiji and Malaysia, he said.
Key to prevent south Asian terrorism
Kolmannskog 8 – Norwegian Refugee Council (Vikram Odedra, April. “Future Floods of Refugees.”
http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/resource_guides/Migration_and_Climate_Change/Future_fl
oods_of_refugees.pdf
Sudden disasters and conflict
As a rule, sudden disasters tend to heighten dissatisfaction with the ruling government.37 Weak and/or
unsatisfactory state structures are exposed during and after disasters. When a devastating typhoon hit Bangladesh in
1970, the country was part of Pakistan and dominated politically and militarily by (West-)Pakistan. The trifling aid and apparent
indifference of central political leaders strengthened the Bangladeshi separatist movement. Pakistani
oppression of the movement eventually lead to civil war and independence for Bangladesh in 1971.38 Hurricane Katharina (in the USA in 2006)
illustrated that not only what we normally think of as developing countries, have their weaknesses and injustices revealed by climate change
impacts. Where a conflict between two clearly defined parties has already entered a phase of reduced tension, natural disasters can represent
opportunities to overcome entrenched differences.39 This may have manifested itself in for example the peace agreement between the Free
Aceh Movement and Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami and agreements on relief efforts between India and Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake
in Kashmir. (Related to earthquakes, neither of these natural disasters were influenced by climate.) According to the German Advisory Council
on Global Change (WBGU), the sudden disaster conflicts are likely to occur more frequently in future: Firstly, regions
at risk, particularly
Central America, generally have weak economic and political capacities, making adaptation and crisis
management very difficult. Secondly, storm and flood disasters along the densely populated coasts of the
Indian subcontinent and China can cause major damage and trigger or intensify migration processes
which in turn could trigger conflict.40 Parallel with the growing risk of sudden disasters, Bangladesh is furthermore
plagued by political violence and a growing trend toward Islamist extremism Drought and conflict Water
scarcity may trigger distributional conflicts. Water scarcity by itself does not necessarily lead to conflict and violence, though.
There is an interaction with other socio-economic and political factors: The potential for conflict often relates to social discrimination in terms
of access to safe and clean water. The risk can therefore be reduced by ensuring just distribution so that people in
disadvantaged areas also have access to the safe and clean water. As already pointed out, a main problem today (and probably for the near
future) is still the so-called economic water scarcity, and good water management can prevent conflict. Within states, groups have often
defended or challenged traditional rights of water use: In semi-arid regions such as the Sahel there have been tensions between farmers and
nomadic herders. According to The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change, 41 the droughts in the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s may
have been caused partly by climate change and contributed to increased competition for scarce resources between these groups. The Tuareg
rebellion in Mali in the beginning of the 1990s, is also mentioned as an example of a climate change-related conflict. Many of the droughtstruck nomads sought refuge in the cities or left the country. The lack of social networks for the returnees, the continuing drought, competition
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
92
for land with the settled farmers and dissatisfaction with the authorities, were factors that fuelled the armed rebellion. In the past there have
been few examples of “water wars” between states. In fact there are several cases of cooperation (for example between Palestine and Israel),
but these have generally concerned benefit-sharing, not burden-sharing. According to Fred Pearce, the defining crises of the 21st century will
involve water.42 He sees the Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and its neighbours as the first modern “water war”, specifically over the River
Jordan. Most of the world’s major rivers cross international boundaries, but are not covered by treaties. According to Pearce, this is a recipe for
conflict and for upstream users to hold downstream users to ransom. This could be helped by internationally brokered deals for sharing such
rivers. Soil degradation can also trigger food crises and further undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby
leading to destabilisation, the collapse of social systems, and violent conflicts. Yet it is migration, rather than violence, that has been the typical
response to the famines that have affected the most people.43 Migration influencing environmental conflict In research into environmental
conflicts, the environmental change–migration-conflict linkage is one of the most frequently mentioned scenarios and topics for case studies,
and several climate and security reports consider migration to be one of the most worrisome aspects of climate change.44 There is some
empirical evidence that migration may trigger or exacerbate existing conflicts. Politicisation of ethnicity, the financial role of
a diaspora and export of existing conflicts are possible connections between migration and conflict. Much focus has been on how forced
migration can create environmental problems, and the UNHCR has operated programmes such as planting trees around camps. Their 1996
Environmental Guidelines recognised that “the negative environmental impacts associated with refugee situations must be better understood
and dealt with.” Much of the forced migration related to climate change, is likely to be internal, regional and short-term or temporary. In transit
or the place of destination, (particularly mass) migration may (be perceived to and/or) contribute to competition for already scarce resources
such as land and water. During a drought people may move to a less affected region, resulting in rising demand there. A competitive situation is
more likely where population growth is strong. Climate change may also lead to further increases in rural-urban migration because of the
degradation of land and people searching for better livelihoods. This may result in growing slums and an increased competition for resources in
cities. There may also be competition and potential for conflict when migrants return to areas of origin and issues arise such as ownership or
rights of use. The conflict potential of migration depends to a significant degree on how the government and people in the place of transit,
destination or return respond. Governance, the degree of political stability, the economy and whether there is a history of violence are
generally important factors. • Sudden
disasters such as storms and floods often highlight weaknesses of the government in
power, thereby triggering or exacerbating existing intrastate conflict which in turn can trigger forced migration. • The
degradation of freshwater resources can trigger intrastate conflict which in turn can trigger forced migration. Migration has been more likely
than violent conflict as a response to famines. • The forced migrants can contribute
to a competition for already scarce
resources such as land and water, but several other factors, including governance, are important in determining conflict potential.
Full-scale nuclear war
Asghar 15 – Poli Sci Doctoral student @ University of New Mexico w/ research focus on nuclear security and disarmament [Rizwan
Asghar, “Nuclear fears,” The News, July 27, 2015, pg. http://tinyurl.com/nv4fvzn]
Armed with more than a hundred nuclear
weapons, India is overlooking a threat that could wipe out more than 1.5
billion people within the time span of a few days. The Modi government seems to be unaware of the fact that prosecuting
sub-conventional conflicts in the form of state-supported terrorism could potentially escalate into a full-scale nuclear
war. The current approach of the Indian military establishment aimed at asserting its regional leadership is likely to drive to trigger a mad
arms race in the region.
Against this backdrop, the destabilising effects of the presence of nuclear weapons become more observable in that nuclear capabilities have
enabled both countries to engage in sub-conventional conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of violence. And these sub-conventional
conflicts will continue to persist in the years to come because conventional conflicts remain risky.
It is quite reasonable to assume that the region will continue to experience a high degree of
unconventional and proxy wars in the years to come. These sub-conventional conflicts do not involve use of
regular military force but their propensity to escalate to limited wars can entail unpredictably high levels
of political violence. The goals in such conflicts could include disrupting enemy command and control centres or particular sites of
strategic importance.
Many nuclear experts are of the view that Pakistan and India could become engaged in a limited war,
entailing the use of nuclear weapons. The concept of limited nuclear war originated during the cold-war period when there were
only a small number of countries with nuclear arsenals. At that point, the nuclear conflict scenarios involved only threats of confrontation
between the US and the Soviet Union. Today’s global security environment includes the nine declared nuclear-weapons states and there
are
deep concerns about South Asia as a flashpoint for nuclear wars.
New Delhi remains a dominant player in conventional warfare against Pakistan but the Indian military establishment is still in a paranoid state,
seeking to promote violence at the level of insurgency and terrorism. Indian officials maintain that their country would not be the first to use
nuclear weapons in a conflict but recent moves by the Indian military are raising uncertainty levels for Pakistan.
Nuclear South Asia is not like cold-war Europe because of the many differences between the Indo-Pak
nuclear calculus and the dynamics of nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR. The bitter
animosity between India and Pakistan has profound impacts on the decision-making approach of the leaders of
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
93
both countries.
Pakistan and India do have the capability to pursue wars of limited aims but what makes these conflicts
dangerous is the fear of operational failures and there is no surety to the fact that the war would be
terminated once the initial goals are achieved. In addition, once initiated, the war might not remain limited
in aims and consequences throughout the course of the campaign. So it is almost inevitable that, with limited nuclear war,
there will be large uncertainties about the scope of conflict.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
94
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
95
Contention VI—Alliance
US forward-deployed presence is necessary to project power in east asia – prevents a
backlash and preserves the alliance.
Przystup 15 (James J. Przystup Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, March 2015, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic
Perspectives, No. 18)
For over six decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. forward-deployed presence in Japan have
served as the foundation for stability, prosperity, and security in the AsiaPacific region and beyond. For
the United States, the ability to project power and meet security commitments to Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and allies across the region and to assure partners of its continuing presence in the region
remains directly dependent on the alliance structure. For the United States, the alliance with Japan is the
foundation of its regional and global security strategies. The ability to project power nearly halfway
around the world from Japan was critical to the allies’ success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War—the USS
Independence was then home-ported in Yokosuka, Japan—and the deployment of the Kitty Hawk from Japan to the Persian Gulf to support
Operations Southern Watch and Iraqi Freedom again underscored the global significance of the U.S. presence in Japan
and the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Today, the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region are engaged in updating and strengthening
the alliances to address the security challenges of the 21st century. It is in this context that the United
States and Japan in 2014 are now engaged in reviewing the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The
present review takes place against the background of previous efforts to enhance alliance-based
security cooperation—namely, the defense guidelines of 1978 and 1997.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
96
Contention VII—Gradualism
Military presence prevents Article 9 from being an excuse for rapid modernization and
Japanese re-arm
Singh 15 (Bhubhindar Singh, Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme at the S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, in Singapore.“The Development of Japanese Security Policy: A Long-Term
Defensive Strategy” asia policy, number 19 (january 2015), 49–64
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/ap19/AsiaPolicy19_Singh_January2015.pdf)
The continued resilience of the U.S.-Japan military alliance is a third reason to support the conclusion that
the expansion of Japanese security policy would be a source of stability. The United States has served as a
key source of regional stability and provider of security guarantees for Japan through the 1951 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the two states (revised in 1960). Buttressed by strong domestic support in Japan, this
alliance became a pillar of Japanese security policy throughout the Cold War, and this continues to be the case today
(especially outside Okinawa). A key aspect of the treaty was the stationing of U.S. troops in a network of military
bases in Japan in exchange for the United States’ security guarantee. This arrangement has anchored the U.S.
military presence in the region and provided a critical source of regional stability by reassuring allies, deterring
adversaries, facilitating the United States’ ability to project force abroad when called on to do so, and
guaranteeing the freedom of the global commons.27 Apart from their role in guaranteeing the security of Japan and the
region, the U.S. military presence in Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance also serve as an important check
against any expansion in Japanese security policy that could destabilize the region. This is especially
important for reassuring Japan’s neighbors, who harbor a strong sense of suspicion and mistrust of
Japan stemming from their colonial history. The United States is cognizant of this dynamic. Thus, even though Washington
supports Japan implementing a more activist security policy, it is also in the U.S. interest to ensure that this
development contributes positively to regional and global security.
Fear of abandonment is the key driver in Japanese nationalism and belligerence – US
forces are key to interoperability as strategy instead of pre-emption in greyzone
conflcits.
Lee 15 (Sheryn Lee Associate Lecturer in Security Studies at the Department of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie
University, and a PhD Candidate at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University. “Crowded waters Naval
competition in the Asia–Pacific”, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/crowded-waters-naval-competition-in-theasiapacific/SR80_crowded_waters.pdf)
In July 2014, reflecting
the belief that Japan’s current defence policy constrains its ability to protect
fundamental interests, the cabinet of Prime Minster Shinzo Abe announced a ‘reinterpretation’ of Article 9 the
country’s Constitution to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to exercise the right of collective selfdefence under certain conditions.9 In April 2015, the US and Japan agreed on revised Guidelines for Japan–US Defense
Cooperation, which could lead to an enhanced operational role for the JSDF.10
Fear of US abandonment and China’s rapid military modernisation are also key drivers of Japan’s military
modernisation. Its Defense White Paper 2014 identifies China’s increased military reach as a principle factor influencing Japan’s defence
planners. Sovereign territorial claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and fears of China’s increased
power projection, have led to action–reaction dynamics between the JSDF’s and PLA’s modernisation
programs. Japan is also concerned about the protection of its sea lines of communication due to its high
dependence on seaborne supplies of natural resources, energy and food.11
Although the Obama administration has underscored the US rebalance to the region, the Defense White Paper recognises that
there are concerns about America’s ability to commit amid fiscal constraints and deepening defence sequestration. This is
worrying for the future of the JSDF force structure, particularly in the naval space, as the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF) serves as an adjunct to the US Navy. A key reason for investing in sophisticated
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
equipment—such as ship-based SM-3 missiles, 42 F-35A Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) and Aegis combat systems—was to signal to
Washington that Tokyo is willing to invest more in compatible and interoperable equipment.
97
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Con China Extensions
98
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
99
Access Link Wall (China)
Lillypad—China can launch missiles to anywhere in Japan – okinawa’s location in the
ECS allos the US forward presence to deny ACCESS to another lilypad
Yoshihara 15 (Toshi, John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Orbis Volume 59, Issue
1, 2015, Pages 62–75)
In the naval context, Chinese
ballistic and cruise missiles could be launched against fuel storage tanks,
ammunition depots, dry docks, and pier-side facilities located at major naval bases. Warships and
supply vessels fixed at their berths would be at risk. Civilian and military personnel, including shipyard
workers critical to the proper functioning of the bases, could suffer casualties in a missile raid. A concerted
Chinese missile campaign could thus deliver a major blow to the logistical foundations of Japanese
forces and of U.S. forward presence in Asia. By disrupting the supply system and degrading repair
capabilities, Beijing aims to choke off the allied capacity to conduct combat operations.
While successful attacks on bases in Japan would by no means constitute a war winner for Beijing, they
almost certainly would complicate U.S. war planning while magnifying the tyranny of distance
inherent to fleet operations in the vast Pacific. At the very least, crippling the region's basing infrastructure
could help the PLA slow down or hold at bay U.S. and allied forces operating along the approaches to
the Chinese mainland.
Conversely, this potential vulnerability underscores the centrality of Japanese bases to the U.S. strategy in
Asia. Take Yokosuka, for example. It is the only facility west of Hawaii that possesses the wherewithal to handle major carrier repairs. This base is also an
indispensable forward logistical hub without which U.S. naval units would be forced to rely on a far
more time-consuming supply chain located in Guam, Hawaii, San Diego, and Singapore. Yokosuka's
strategic location, physical infrastructure, world-class facilities, and highly-skilled local work force are
virtually impossible to replicate anywhere else in Asia.
US marine presence in Okinawa is key to the quality and strength of the deterrence
balance in East Asia – withdrawal as a result of anti-base issues collapses the alliance.
Yukio 8/4/15 (Okamato, Foreign policy commentator and president of Okamoto Associates Inc. Graduated from the Faculty of
Economics at Hitotsubashi University. Served as a career diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1968 to 1991, including a term as
director of the First North America Division. Special advisor to the prime minister, 1996–98 and 2003–4. Research fellow at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies since 2012., “The Okinawa Issue and East Asian Security”,
http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a04502/)
The deterrent is ultimately a matter of perceptions: It depends on the belief of neighboring countries
that the Japan-US security arrangements are certain to operate. Absent this belief, the Japan-US
Security Treaty becomes no more than a piece of paper. So the core of Japan’s deterrent power
consists of the ongoing maintenance of a close alliance with the United States that leaves no room for
doubt in the minds of other countries in the region.
If, however, a large-scale reduction of the US forces in Okinawa were to be conducted in the face of local
turmoil without a sound basis in military thinking, it would create a big hole in the fabric of the
deterrent. Neighboring countries would sense a power vacuum. Consider what has happened in the
South China Sea: After the United States pulled out of Vietnam, China grabbed the Paracels, and after the
Russians left, it pushed the Vietnamese off Johnson South Reef. And after the US forces left the Philippines, China took
over Mischief Reef from that country.
If the Chinese judged that the US military had been driven out of Okinawa, it would greatly increase the
likelihood of their grabbing the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea from Japan by force. And once they
landed on these islands, it would become very difficult to dislodge them. Doing so would mean undertaking a
combat operation that could well result in the first deaths in action for Japanese armed forces since World War II. Would Japan actually fight to
get the Senkakus back? It is possible that the Japanese government would instead declare its intention to “negotiate persistently,” a line it has
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
100
often used, and that the Senkakus would remain under China’s effective control indefinitely, just as Takeshima has since South Korea took it
over in the 1950s.
Second is the tripwire—absent joint basing we lose tripwire
Japan Times 12/25/14 (Citing Joseph Nye – phD from Harvard, “Nye suggests rotating U.S. forces in Japan around SDF bases”,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/25/national/nye-suggests-rotating-u-s-forces-in-japan-around-sdf-bases/#.VbkQHfmqqko)
As one reason for his proposal, Nye noted “the vulnerability” of fixed military bases to ballistic missile
attacks from other countries, such as China.
He also underscored the importance of “making sure that there are Americans on Japanese bases, so
that if a Japanese base is attacked, Americans are killed, which means that the Americans are
immediately drawn into the defense of Japan.”
Nye also questioned whether the U.S. Marine Corps should continue to play its present role 10 years from now, and called for discussions on
whether these forces are optimally deployed in Japan.
But even
if Washington and Tokyo were to introduce a rotational system, it would be better to maintain
U.S. naval bases as they are, including in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, he said.
Asked about the possible impact on the deterrence provided by the U.S. military presence in Japan, Nye said his proposal would still
ensure a U.S. military presence in Japan, if the naval bases are kept intact.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
101
Con General Deterrence Extensions
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
102
Capability & Will Wall
Deterrence depends on the combination of capability and will—plan collapses the
perception of Japanese will of the US to get involved into grey zone conflicts.
Santoro & Warden 15 (Santoro, David, and John K. Warden HOOCH DEBATE. senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS & WSDHanda fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age." The Washington Quarterly 38.1 (2015):
147-165.)
Effective deterrence requires a combination of capability and will. China and North Korea are both
pursuing conventional and nuclear capabilities that, over the long run, could increase their relative power
and allow them to more freely challenge their neighbors and the United States. But at present, Japan
retains local air and naval superiority over China, South Korea enjoys a conventional military edge over
North Korea, and the United States has conventional and nuclear dominance over both North Korea and China. The problem for
both extended deterrence and assurance in the short-term is resolve. Georgetown professor Oriana Mastro argues
that “[t]he belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the
foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it.”41 The exact
same sentence could have been written about North Korea in 2010.
To overcome the perceived resolve deficit and thus strengthen both extended deterrence and assurance without unduly
increasing the risk of war, the United States should demonstrate that it is willing to let allies accept slightly more
risk in the gray zone. If Washington makes it clear, both publicly and privately, that it will back its allies even if
they carry out certain limited escalations in response to gray-zone provocations, it will reverse the
perception that the United States seeks to deescalate crises at all costs. For example, Washington could tell
Tokyo that, should it deem it appropriate, the United States would not object to Japan using Maritime Self-Defense
Force assets to respond to territorial incursions in the East China Sea. It could also give Seoul more latitude in defining
the appropriate retaliatory targets in North Korea following a future provocation. Such steps would help reverse the
perception that China and North Korea have a resolve advantage and cause Beijing and Pyongyang to
question whether they can salami slice with impunity. They would also increase confidence in Tokyo
////MARKED AT///
and Seoul that Japan and South Korea can defend their interests with U.S. backing.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
103
AT: Navy / Air
Navy and Air forces are insufficient – only ground forces can deter aggression.
Stadler 10 (Keith J. Stadler, Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, “Marine General Stalder Speaks at Tokyo American
Center” http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20100217-71.html)
There are some in Japan who say that the Navy that is based here is enough of a deterrent force. As
someone who has served deployments on aircraft carriers, let me say that the technology at the disposal of the U.S. Navy is both sophisticated
and devastating to adversaries.
Our outstanding sailors and naval aviators are a key component of deterrence in this region, but they are limited by what they can accomplish
from the sea and using their aircraft.
And then there is the Air Force. Some of you know, I'm a fighter pilot. I flew F-4s and F-18s for most of my career, and I still take a
helicopter up once in a while. The capabilities of our aircraft are stunning. The combat power of the U.S. Air Force, particularly when it
combines efforts with the Japan Air Self Defense Force, is breathtaking.
And yet, if we have learned nothing else over the last 50 years, it is that air power and sea power alone
are inadequate to fight wars, and are inadequate as deterrents.
In the days immediately following the attack on the World Trade Center, operations in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban were of necessity conducted exclusively with air power. Air power was able to destroy all Taliban
and Al Qaeda targets, but it had no effect on the willingness of the enemy to discontinue fighting. U.S.
ground forces were required to defeat the Taliban government.
And regardless of what you may think about the Iraq conflict, and I realize there are different opinions in this room, certainly a lesson from Iraq
is the limits of air and sea power. Only
ground forces were able to defeat Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq.
Ladies and gentlemen, in the Asia Pacific, U.S. ground forces are Marines. The U.S. army maintains soldiers in
the Republic of Korea, but those soldiers are not expeditionary for the purpose of responding to
emergencies elsewhere.
They are largely dedicated to remaining on the Korean Peninsula in support of the combined defense. This means
the only deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines on Okinawa.
Those are the ground forces assigned to defend Japan and to maintain security in East Asia. The notion
that "we like the Alliance but we don't need or want ground forces" won't work.
It is impossible to deter, defend and defeat without the ability to deploy ground forces rapidly in
times of crisis. The U.S. cannot meet its Alliance obligation to defend Japan and maintain regional peace
and security without ground forces equipped with the appropriate capabilities and training. Without
expeditionary ground forces, the deterrent power of our Alliance would be greatly weakened.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
104
AT: Guam
Guam Fails—you should be highly skeptical. About this
1) Infrastructure DA – collapses readiness
Kan 14 (Shirley Kan - Specialist In Asian Security Congressional Research Service Expert On China Arms Deals Congressional Research
Service Proliferation Expert Congressional Research Service Specialist In Asian Security Affairs, November 26, 2014 , “Guam: U.S. Defense
Deployments”, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf)
Infrastructure. As
U.S. forces relocate to Guam, the state of its civilian infrastructure has been of concern to
some policy makers. Also, Guam’s political leaders have expressed concerns about the impact of
additional deployments on its civilian infrastructure, including utilities, roads, and water supplies. Guam’s
location in the Western Pacific also requires construction of protection for U.S. forces and assets against
typhoons. In addition, Guam’s size, remoteness, and conditions raised more questions about hosting and
educating military dependents; training on Guam and with other units in Asia, Hawaii, or the west coast; and
greater costs and time for extended logistical support, shipment of supplies, and long-distance travel.
Addressing another concern, a former commander of Marine Forces Pacific urged in 2007 that Guam’s buildup include more than
infrastructure to develop also human capital, communities, and the environment.19 The Defense Department
requested $106.4 million in FY2014 for water and wastewater projects and requested an additional $80.6 million in FY2015 for the water and
wastewater infrastructure.20
2) Vulnerability DA – easy strategic target in conflict over territory
Kan 14 (Shirley Kan - Specialist In Asian Security Congressional Research Service Expert On China Arms Deals Congressional Research
Service Proliferation Expert Congressional Research Service Specialist In Asian Security Affairs, November 26, 2014 , “Guam: U.S. Defense
Deployments”, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf)
Strategic Target. A concern is that Guam’s
higher military profile could increase its potential as a strategic target
for terrorists and adversaries during a conflict. For example, potential PRC and DPRK missile attacks could
raise Guam’s need for missile defense and hardening of facilities. Some officials say that hardening could
depend on the use of hangars, with less need of hardening for marines who deploy for training and
more need of hardening for the Air Force’s aircraft based at Andersen for power projection. A third option
is selective hardening of some facilities.21
China is believed to have deployed missiles that could target forces on or near Guam, considered by China as
part of the “Second Island Chain” from which it needs to break out of perceived U.S.-led “encirclement.” China’s
missiles that could target Guam include the DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)
launched from upgraded, longer-range H-6K bombers. China also has deployed DH-10 LACMs and DF- 21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) to
target aircraft carriers and other ships. While the DF- 21D’s initial range could be 1,500-2,000 km (930-1,240 mi), a more advanced variant could
extend the range to about 3,000 km (1,860 mi) and reach Guam. The PLA
reportedly has the world’s largest force of
ground-launched LACMs, with about 100 LACMs entering the operational force each year and up to 500 LACMs by 2014. Moreover,
the PRC reportedly has developed DF-25 and DF-26C intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with a range of 3,200-4,000 km. In 2012, the
PLA Navy started to conduct military activities, perhaps suspected surveillance, in the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) around Guam.22
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
105
AT: Kadena
Kadena is irrelevant – Chinese capabilities make japan air bases perceptually useless
Matsumura 14 - Professor of International Politics at St. Andrew’s University [Masahiro Matsumura,
“The Limits and Implications of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Japanese Perspective”, JMSs, VOLUME 15,
ISSUE 3, 2014, http://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25566/uploads]
Given the flying ranges of aircraft, the US military has to rely on air power projection from the Andersen
AB in Guam because China’s A2/AD measures can reach afield up to 1,500 km of the mainland, which
only makes Guam relatively safe. That is, all the US bases in Japan are not safe, including Kadena,
Futenma, Iwakuni, and Misawa. The Misawa AB is the only base that is fully hardened, but it is only
1,000km from China and 2,700 km from Taiwan.
The Andersen-only scenario is highly likely because US aircraft carriers cannot make up for the Taiwan’s
air force (Republic of China Air Force: ROCAF) capability. They face a growing threat from China’s
increasingly accurate land-based anti-ship missiles. Shlapak also estimates that, even without
considering attrition, the ROCAF can produce at most 650 sorties per day from its 317 fighters. Should
ROCAF capability of generating 100 sorties per day survive China’s initial salvoes of missiles, and should
50 fighters on each carrier be assumed to replace lost ROCAF sorties on a one-to-one basis, the US only
could make up 550 sorties by all of the eleven carriers it possesses. Even calculating by a factor of two,
the US still would have to send five carriers. These options are practically infeasible.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
106
Uniqueness
Bolsters deterrence --- that makes China/Japan relations more stable and conflict less
likely.
The Yomiuri Shimbun, 9/16/2015. “Security-related legislation could help improve relations with China,” http://thejapan-news.com/news/article/0002427493.
Nearly all points of contention over security-related legislation have been addressed in the Diet. The environment seems
favorable for a vote on the legislation.
The House of Councillors special committee on the national security bills held a public hearing, a procedure requisite for a vote
on them.
In his capacity as a speaker recommended for the public hearing by the ruling parties, Prof. Kazuya Sakamoto of Osaka
University expressed a favorable opinion about the bills. “[The legislation] will serve to strengthen our
nation’s deterrence remarkably, and increase [the country’s] ability to better contribute to world
peace,” he told the committee.
In stating the reason for his argument, Sakamoto said the legislation would make it possible for the nation to
conduct such activities as the defense of U.S. warships and other vessels by exercising its right of
collective self-defense to a limited degree.
He also said, “Shoring up the Japan-U.S. alliance will not only help reduce [the possibility of] a military
conflict with China, but also build reciprocal relations.” The perception is reasonable that an
improvement in the deterrence of Japan and the United States will do much to hinder China’s selfjustified conduct while also promoting better ties between Japan and China.
China’s deterred now—sees the relationship as too strong—but will act to undermine
any alliance it sees as susceptible
Glaser, 15 – senior adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security
policy. She is concomitantly a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S.
government on East Asia (Bonnie S., 5/12. “Yet another attempt to contain China, or a sincere
partnership?” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/through-beijings-eyes-how-china-sees-the-us-japanalliance-12864)
In the wake of Abe’s visit to the United States, the Chinese will likely assess the U.S.-Japan alliance as
robust and therefore not vulnerable to Chinese pressure, at least through the end of Abe’s term in
office. Despite this assessment, however, Beijing will probably not give up on efforts to abolish U.S.
regional alliances. Rather, China will focus its attention on undermining U.S. alliances in Asia it deems
more susceptible to Chinese influence. Such attempts are already visible in Chinese pressure on South
Korea to forego deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to defend against the
growing threat from North Korean ballistic missiles.
Beijing may also seek to use economic incentives in its relations with Australia to weaken the bonds of
friendship between Washington and Canberra. Once Philippine president Benigno Aquino leaves office,
the Chinese are hoping that a new leader will see the folly of challenging China in the South China Sea
and instead take advantage of Beijing’s economic largesse. The Chinese are pragmatic and patient; they
know China cannot supplant U.S. alliances with a new security architecture that is more favorable to
Chinese interests in a span of a few years. China will not give up easily, however. Xi Jinping hopes to
make as much headway as possible toward this goal during his term in office.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
107
AT: force Dispersal
Okinawa and futenma are key to deterrence – They’re necessary for a tripwire effect
Japan Times 12/25/14 (Citing Joseph Nye – phD from Harvard, “Nye suggests rotating U.S. forces in Japan around SDF bases”,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/25/national/nye-suggests-rotating-u-s-forces-in-japan-around-sdf-bases/#.VbkQHfmqqko)
WASHINGTON – U.S.
military units should rotate around and jointly use Self-Defense Forces bases across
Japan to reduce the conventional emphasis on multiple fixed American bases across the country, says
Joseph Nye, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense.
“We should place less emphasis on having fixed bases and more emphasis on having rotation” among Japanese military bases, Nye, who holds
the post of distinguished service professor at Harvard University, said in a recent interview from Washington.
Such rotations, which would involve joint use of SDF facilities, are “a useful area for U.S. and Japanese
strategic planners to start working together to think about,” Nye said, adding that the U.S. Air Force would particularly
benefit.
As one reason for his proposal, Nye noted “the vulnerability” of fixed military bases to ballistic missile
attacks from other countries, such as China.
He also underscored the importance of “making sure that there are Americans on Japanese bases, so
that if a Japanese base is attacked, Americans are killed, which means that the Americans are
immediately drawn into the defense of Japan.”
Nye also questioned whether the U.S. Marine Corps should continue to play its present role 10 years from now, and called for discussions on
whether these forces are optimally deployed in Japan.
But even
if Washington and Tokyo were to introduce a rotational system, it would be better to maintain
U.S. naval bases as they are, including in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, he said.
Asked about the possible impact on the deterrence provided by the U.S. military presence in Japan, Nye said his proposal would still
ensure a U.S. military presence in Japan, if the naval bases are kept intact.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
108
AT: Kickout Now
This is incoherent—no reasons that the US japan military alliance or the US would
withdraw its bases as a result of base backlash—the magnitude is sully and mostly
about other shit.
Japan is not Okinawa – I dare you to find a single card from the Japanese government
that says that they will FORCE the futenma base outwide.
No withdrawal from unpopularity & opinion polls are useless
Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart 14 (Emma Chanlett-Avery held positions in the State Department in the Office of Policy Planning
and on the Korea Desk, as well as at the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Bangkok, Thailand. Professional and academic fellowships include
the Amherst-Doshisha Fellowship, the Harold Rosenthal Fellowship in International Relations, the Foreign Language and Area Studies
Fellowship in advanced Japanese, the American Assembly Next Generation Fellowship, and a U.S. Speaker and Specialist Grant from the U.S.
Department of State, Ian E. Rinehart Analyst in Asian Affairs M.A., Security Policy Studies, International Relations and Affairs from George
Washington University, CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa
and the Futenma Base Controversy”, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf)
The views of Okinawans are far from monolithic. Many residents of base-hosting communities
appreciate the economic benefits, whether as employees on the bases, as local business owners who
serve American customers, or as landowners of base property. Some locals resent the actions of outsiders who focus on
environmental issues at the expense of economic development. Prorelocation authorities point to the village of Henoko (in Nago City
municipality) as an example of local citizens who are more in favor of additional U.S. facilities than the broader population, though this may
have to do with the reported monetary compensation that Tokyo provides to specific host communities. There
is also a “generation
gap” between older Okinawans with personal memories of past incidents and younger residents who
may not be as involved in the anti-base activist movement. There appear to be no reliable opinion
polls that might illuminate the extent of the opposition to U.S. presence across demographic
categories.
More ev
Hough 14 (Ricky freelance writer and consultant in Tokyo, 12/5/14, “The Okinawa Reality Geopolitical realities suggest that the recent
election of an anti-base candidate is unlikely to change much.”)
Geography is at least partly to blame. Okinawa
has been prized not because of its material or natural resources
because of its geostrategic location in the middle of two powerful
states – China and Japan – that have competing visions for the Asia-Pacific. Located in the middle of vital shipping
lanes that crisscross the East China Sea, Okinawa is prime military real estate. With its relatively calm seas and
abundance of natural ports, the prefecture provides an excellent staging ground for naval forces used to patrol
and defend sea lands of communication. Moreover, whoever controls Okinawa is able to block maritime
access to the greater Pacific Ocean and southwards toward the South China Sea.
(there are virtually none to speak of), but
They’re screwed – US presence is inevitable
Hough 14 (Ricky freelance writer and consultant in Tokyo, 12/5/14, “The Okinawa Reality Geopolitical realities suggest that the recent
election of an anti-base candidate is unlikely to change much.”)
Conceivably, Onaga could
prove to be a political disturbance potent enough to force Tokyo to abandon its plans. More likely, Tokyo
will call his bluff and clamp down politically and economically. Regardless of the rhetoric from antibase Okinawan politicians, not a lot has been accomplished in terms of large-scale base reductions. In
reality, besides generally being a nuisance, there is not much Onaga can do to halt the construction of the Futenma
replacement facility already underway at Camp Schwab. As recent history has shown, Okinawan leaders simply do not have the
leverage to force Tokyo’s hand, leaving anti-base politicians quite able to make promises, but quite
unable to keep them.
One thing Onaga’s victory and anti-base tough talk has done is rejuvenate calls in Okinawa for equal representation and self-determination.
Indeed, much of the hyperbole surrounding the Okinawa base issue focuses on failings of democracy and perceived injustices. Unfortunately for
Okinawans, these legitimate concerns
are trumped by international politics, and particularly by the realist
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
109
imperative for states to survive in an anarchic international system. In other words, local concerns must
confront Japanese and U.S. national security needs.
That leaves the fate of Japan’s southernmost prefecture determined by geopolitical factors over which
its people have no control. Okinawa’s future, like its past, will be decided by powerful states that possess
the material resources to coerce a much weaker and resource-poor community to bend to their will.
Such is international politics.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
110
AT: 35000 Protest
Lol nah
Eldridge 5/31/15 (Ph.D., former tenured associate professor of U.S.-Japan relations and Okinawan history at Osaka University,
currently works for the U.S. Marine Corps Bases Japan deputy director for government and external affairs for Marine Corps Installations
Command-Pacific, in Okinawa, from 2009 to 2015.“The other side to the Okinawa story The ‘All Okinawa’ opposition to U.S. military presence is
a leftist ruse” http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/31/robert-eldridge-the-other-side-to-the-okinawa-stor/)
A rally was held on May 17 in a new baseball stadium built in Naha (80 percent of the construction costs covered by the
central government), with 35,000 reportedly attending, to protest the construction at Camp Schwab. In fact, not only was
this number low by previous standards, but the actual numbers were approximately half that. Photos
comparing the rally with a Major League Baseball all-star game held there show that the baseball game,
with 17,900 spectators, had many more in attendance. Rally participants were double- and triplecounted because they belong to multiple organizations that were present. Indeed, many of the
participants were from outside the prefecture — professional agitators and mobilized union members.
They were forbidden from flying their organizations’ banners, as their actual hometowns would have become known.
This is certainly not an “all Okinawa” movement by any means. When all the rhetoric is stripped aside, Mr. Onaga
really has nothing left to say. Many Okinawans already know this and are angry with him and his delegation for
even taking the U.S. trip at taxpayer expense.
There is more than meets the eye regarding Okinawa. Washington, especially those in the media and think tank world, mustn’t be fooled any
longer. Okinawa is too important geostrategically for the United States, Japan and the entire Asia-Pacific region to become, as Mr. Onaga urges,
“a peaceful buffer zone with no bases.”
Americans shouldn’t be afraid to challenge his factually incorrect and sometimes emotional rhetoric, and to be more proactive and positive in
their public affairs and community relations outreach. In the absence of such a public diplomacy vacuum — a sad trend over the past couple of
years — only the haters (and China) can win. As an honorary citizen since 2005 of Naha’s sister city in China, Fuzhou, Mr. Onaga
has been
groomed for a long time by Chinese leaders — the same ones who declared earlier this week that war
with the United States is “inevitable.”
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
111
AT: Japan China War
The status quo puts a cap on their scenario – the only chance of outside intervention is
the lack of US presence
Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American
Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Ph.D. from Harvard and former Harvard Professor, Strategic Vision America and the Crisis of Global Power)
Because control over
the strategic commons is based on material advantages, as other nations grow their
military capacities they will necessarily challenge the omnipresent position of the United States, in hopes to
replace the United States as regional power broker. This competition could easily lead to miscalculation, less effective
management, or a nationalistic territorial interstate rivalry in the strategic commons. China, for example, sees
its surrounding waters as an extension of its territory. It considers most of the disputed islands there to be its own, and
China has focused on developing naval capabilities aimed at denying America access to the South and
East China Seas in order to protect those claims and solidify its regional position. Moreover, China has
recently escalated disagreements over the limits of its territorial waters and over the ownership of the
Senkaku, Paracel, and Spratly Islands into international disputes. Russia has also recently decided to
make the navy its highest military priority, heavily increasing the funding for its Pacific Fleet. India too
continues to expand its naval capabilities in the IndianOcean.
The key to future stability in the strategic commons is to gradually develop a global consensus for an
equitable and peaceful allocation of responsibilities while America’s power is extant. For example, a
peaceful maritime system is essential to the success of a globalized economy and all nations have an interest in seeing the air
and seas managed in a responsible fashion because of their impact on international trade. Thus, a fair system for allocating
management responsibilities is highly likely, even in the evolving landscape of regional power. However, in
the short term, when such a system is only just emerging, one nation might well miscalculate its own
power vis-à-vis its neighbor or seek to take an advantage at the expense of the greater community. This
could result in significant conflicts, especially as nations press for greater access to energy resources
beneath disputed waters.
America’s decline would have dangerous implications for this strategic common since currently the
world relies de facto on the United States to manage and deter maritime conflicts. While it is unlikely that an American
decline would severally inhibit its naval capacity—since it is central severally inhibit its naval capacity—since it is central to America’s core
interests—a
receding United States might be unable or simply reluctant to deter the escalation of maritime
disputes in the Pacific or IndianOceans, two areas of particular concern.
This answers any “alliance turns” arguments—its dependent on security arrangements
– that means ONLY the squo/ DA solvesChina modernization will cause a war if they
can’t understand Japanese intentionality – US forces are key
Roberts 13 (Brad Roberts visiting fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan in spring 2013.
From 2009 to early 2013 Dr. Roberts served in the Obama administration as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile
Defense Policy. Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia NIDS Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No.1, 9th August 2013 )
But China
is also re-making its nuclear posture. It is modernizing its force, which has also brought a diversification of
delivery systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons, especially of those weapons capable of reaching the
United States. This modernization occurs in the context of a broader military modernization effort that
gives China its own capacity for power projection into neighboring waters and in the new domains of
cyber and space, with significant negative implications for a U.S. military strategy that depends on
forward presence and maritime preeminence. China’s leaders and experts make the case that these new military capabilities
are defensive in nature and, in particular, that its modernization of its nuclear force is aimed at maintaining a “lean and effective” deterrent
under the no-first-use doctrine that remains credible in the context of improving U.S. conventional strike capabilities and missile defenses.8
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
112
The United States is concerned that China’s nuclear modernization will result in a much more effective
force that is far less lean and thus is more threatening to the United States and its allies. It is concerned that China may
further build up its nuclear force to achieve a position of relative parity with the United States (and Russia) as one more
signal of the shift toward a more multipolar world. The United States is concerned that China may abandon its
no-first-use nuclear doctrine and the practice of minimum nuclear deterrence; this concern was reinforced by
the absence of any explicit reference to no-first-use in the spring 2013 update to China’s defense white paper.9 It is concerned also with the
lack of transparency about the current and future size and main elements of China’s nuclear forces. It is also concerned with the lack of
transparency about potential changes to the mission(s) of the Second Artillery as the People’s Liberation Army modernizes and changes. It is
further concerned with the possibility that new
forms of competition in the cyber and space domains may result in
significant miscalculations and misperceptions of interest.
China’s experts consider many of these concerns to be un-founded. They point out that China’s tradition of nuclear minimalism is deeply
engrained and clearly reflected in a small force, a non-provocative doctrine, and a reluctance to give a prominent place to nuclear capabilities in
the strategic relationship with the United States. They note China’s refusal to be drawn into an arms race.
From the perspective of the U.S.-Japan alliance, China’s military modernization raises concerns about both
de-coupling and the stability-instability paradox. On de-coupling, the growth in China’s long-range nuclear strike forces
may be seen as increasing the risk for the United States of coming to Japan’s defense in a confrontation with China.
On the stability-instability paradox, China’s growing confidence in a modernized deterrent that can credibly
withstand a preemptive strike by the United States may encourage China’s “creeping expansionism” and
greater assertiveness in advancing its claims in the maritime environment (and elsewhere).
It is important to note that China has its own analysis of the stability-instability paradox. In the thinking of China’s expert community, the
modernizing strategic posture of the United States (specifically the introduction of conventional strike capabilities and ballistic missile defense)
has increased U.S. confidence in conducting preemptive strikes on China and has encouraged a new boldness among U.S. allies in the region
and greater assertiveness in advancing their claims in the maritime environment (and elsewhere), compelling a defensive response from China.
These two developments in the security environment have resulted in what one study has called a “security deficit” for
Japan: “In the 21st century, Japan’s security surplus is slowly shifting toward a deficit…The United States and Japan could lose
their nearly exclusive dominance over the conflict escalation ladder in the region.”10 To ensure that
deterrence remains effective in a changed and changing security environment, the United States and its
allies must address a number of specific new challenges spanning the spectrum of potential
deterrence contingencies. First, to meet the deterrence challenges of the highest-end nuclear contingencies, the strong
continued coupling of the United States to its allies in Northeast Asia must be ensured. Second, to meet the
particular deterrence requirements of an escalating regional crisis when an adversary attempts to test the resolve of the United States and
its allies just at or below the nuclear threshold, credible means are needed to signal their combined and collective
resolve to stand together in defense of their interests. Third, to meet the particular deterrence requirements at the lower
end of the escalation ladder, the United States and its allies must become more effective at deterring conventional
provocations, where nuclear threats may not be seen as credible or helpful. Fourth, the United States and its allies must
strengthen deterrence of North Korea while maintaining maintain a stable balance of conventional
power with China but without slipping into a more competitive cycle of military modernization (that is, an arms race) with China that sets
back the political relationship and increases the prospect of armed confrontation. Fifth and finally, the progress of the United States and its
allies in meeting these challenges must be clearly and widely recognized within the region.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
113
AT: Deterrence Fails
Deterrence is real---our evidence is based on an empirical analysis of states that have
the potential to go to war---deterrence accounts for the decision not to go to war,
which validates the entire disad
Stephen L. Quackenbush 10, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Missouri, January 2010, “International Interactions General Deterrence and International Conflict:
Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,” International Interactions, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 60-85
[Numbers changed to words: 384,865 to “three hundred eighty-four thousand”]
Case selection has been the biggest obstacle to the empirical analysis of general deterrence (Huth
1999). The only previous quantitative study focusing on direct general deterrence is by Huth and Russett
(1993:63, emphasis added), who argue that “the population of enduring rivalries in the international
system includes all dyadic relations in which a dispute created the possibility of one or both parties
resorting to overt military force to achieve a gain or redress a grievance.” According to this line of
reasoning, then, enduring rivalries are the proper cases for the study of general deterrence. Similarly,
Diehl and Goertz focus attention on rivalries, whether or not they become enduring, and argue that “the
rivalry approach provides a solution” (Diehl and Goertz 2000:91) to problems with deterrence case
selection.
According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), a dyad is in a rivalry if they engage in a militarized interstate
dispute. Thus, selecting all rivalries as cases of general deterrence would capture (by definition) all
failures of general deterrence.4 However, deterrence in dyads that have not fought would be
ignored, which is particularly problematic because those are the dyads where deterrence has
always worked. Furthermore, identification of the length of a rivalry, and thus the span of general
deterrence, requires the assumption that the rivalry begins either with the first dispute (and thus
deterrence failed when it was attempted for the first time), or at some arbitrary length of time before
the first dispute and after the last.5
Therefore, the rivalry approach is limited as a path to general deterrence case selection. However, one
can safely assume that every state wishes to deter attacks against itself—this is the basic rationale for
the maintenance of armed forces (Morgan 1983). This assumption is equivalent to the alliance portfolio
literature’s assumption that every state has a defense pact with itself (Bueno de Mesquita 1975;
Signorino and Ritter 1999).6 Hence, the difficult part of general deterrence case selection is not
determining who makes deterrent threats (everyone does), but rather what states the threats are
directed against. General deterrent threats are directed against any state that might consider an attack;
these are states that have the opportunity for conflict.
Thus, the key to selecting cases of general deterrence is identifying opportunity for conflict.7 To
identify cases where opportunity exists, I use the recently developed concept of politically active dyads
(Quackenbush 2006a). A dyad is politically active “if at least one of the following characteristics applies:
the members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through a colony, one of the dyad members
is a global power, one of the dyad members is a regional power in the region of the other, one of the
dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a
global power that is in a dispute with the other, or one of the dyad members is allied to a regional
power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other” (Quackenbush 2006a:43).
Quackenbush (2006a) finds that politically active dyads are able to identify opportunity as a necessary
condition for international conflict, while previous measures of opportunity such as politically relevant
dyads and regional dyads are unable to do so. Thus, we can have confidence that all politically active
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
114
dyads could fight if they had the willingness to do so. The goal of deterrence is to dissuade other states
from attacking the deterring state. In other words, states seek to ensure that other states—those with
the opportunity to attack—do not gain the willingness to attack, and they do this through deterrence.
While other empirically verified causes of war certainly impact deterrence outcomes, opportunity is the
key to general deterrence case selection.
Some readers might be concerned that there is no attempt to determine whether the challenger
actually intends to attack, and thus, whether the lack of an attack can meaningfully be considered
general deterrence success. This issue does not actually pose a problem for the analysis here. The
predictions being tested, from Table 1, are about particular game outcomes, not a dichotomous
measure of deterrence “success” and “failure.” Furthermore, these predictions explicitly cover the case
where the challenger has absolutely no interest in attacking. While the three non-status quo outcomes
are essentially different categories of general deterrence failure, the status quo outcome is not
necessarily the result of successful deterrence. For example, if Challenger prefers Status Quo to
Defender Concedes, the only rational outcome is Status Quo. Although Challenger’s decision to not
challenge the status quo in this case is not really “successful deterrence,” it is predicted by perfect
deterrence theory.
For the cases that are selected (because they are politically active), I employ a directed-dyad-year unit of
analysis. Within a directed dyad, the direction of interaction is important; for example, United
States→Japan is one directed dyad and Japan→United States is another. The Unilateral Deterrence
Game theoretically differentiates between the roles played by each state in a dyad, so employing
directed-dyads enables empirical differentiation between the states in a dyad as well. Furthermore,
since each state in a politically active dyad has the opportunity for conflict with the other, each state has
an opportunity to challenge the status quo. Therefore, each state is considered to be a potential
challenger. For example, in the United States→Japan directed dyad, the United States is Challenger and
Japan is Defender, while in the Japan→United States directed dyad, Japan is Challenger and the United
States is Defender.
Because most international relations data are based on annual observations, the year is the time period
used for the cross-sectional time series data analysis conducted here. Therefore, each politically active
directed-dyad-year constitutes an observation. Since general deterrence deals with the outbreak, rather
than the continuation, of international conflict, I eliminate dyad-years marked by a conflict continuing
from the previous year as well as ‘joiner’ dyads. Furthermore, I drop the directed dyad B→A in years
with a continuing conflict in the directed dyad A→B.8 This results in a total of 384,865 [three
hundred eighty-four thousand] politically active directed-dyad-years for the time period 1816–
2000.9
Case analysis validates the entire disad
Stephen L. Quackenbush 10, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Missouri, January 2010, “International Interactions General Deterrence and International Conflict:
Testing Perfect Deterrence Theory,” International Interactions, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 60-85
[Numbers changed to words: 384,865 to “three hundred eighty-four thousand”]
Case selection has been the biggest obstacle to the empirical analysis of general deterrence (Huth
1999). The only previous quantitative study focusing on direct general deterrence is by Huth and Russett
(1993:63, emphasis added), who argue that “the population of enduring rivalries in the international
system includes all dyadic relations in which a dispute created the possibility of one or both parties
resorting to overt military force to achieve a gain or redress a grievance.” According to this line of
reasoning, then, enduring rivalries are the proper cases for the study of general deterrence. Similarly,
Diehl and Goertz focus attention on rivalries, whether or not they become enduring, and argue that “the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
115
rivalry approach provides a solution” (Diehl and Goertz 2000:91) to problems with deterrence case
selection.
According to Diehl and Goertz (2000), a dyad is in a rivalry if they engage in a militarized interstate
dispute. Thus, selecting all rivalries as cases of general deterrence would capture (by definition) all
failures of general deterrence.4 However, deterrence in dyads that have not fought would be
ignored, which is particularly problematic because those are the dyads where deterrence has
always worked. Furthermore, identification of the length of a rivalry, and thus the span of general
deterrence, requires the assumption that the rivalry begins either with the first dispute (and thus
deterrence failed when it was attempted for the first time), or at some arbitrary length of time before
the first dispute and after the last.5
Therefore, the rivalry approach is limited as a path to general deterrence case selection. However, one
can safely assume that every state wishes to deter attacks against itself—this is the basic rationale for
the maintenance of armed forces (Morgan 1983). This assumption is equivalent to the alliance portfolio
literature’s assumption that every state has a defense pact with itself (Bueno de Mesquita 1975;
Signorino and Ritter 1999).6 Hence, the difficult part of general deterrence case selection is not
determining who makes deterrent threats (everyone does), but rather what states the threats are
directed against. General deterrent threats are directed against any state that might consider an attack;
these are states that have the opportunity for conflict.
Thus, the key to selecting cases of general deterrence is identifying opportunity for conflict.7 To
identify cases where opportunity exists, I use the recently developed concept of politically active dyads
(Quackenbush 2006a). A dyad is politically active “if at least one of the following characteristics applies:
the members of the dyad are contiguous, either directly or through a colony, one of the dyad members
is a global power, one of the dyad members is a regional power in the region of the other, one of the
dyad members is allied to a state that is contiguous to the other, one of the dyad members is allied to a
global power that is in a dispute with the other, or one of the dyad members is allied to a regional
power (in the region of the other) that is in a dispute with the other” (Quackenbush 2006a:43).
Quackenbush (2006a) finds that politically active dyads are able to identify opportunity as a necessary
condition for international conflict, while previous measures of opportunity such as politically relevant
dyads and regional dyads are unable to do so. Thus, we can have confidence that all politically active
dyads could fight if they had the willingness to do so. The goal of deterrence is to dissuade other states
from attacking the deterring state. In other words, states seek to ensure that other states—those with
the opportunity to attack—do not gain the willingness to attack, and they do this through deterrence.
While other empirically verified causes of war certainly impact deterrence outcomes, opportunity is the
key to general deterrence case selection.
Some readers might be concerned that there is no attempt to determine whether the challenger
actually intends to attack, and thus, whether the lack of an attack can meaningfully be considered
general deterrence success. This issue does not actually pose a problem for the analysis here. The
predictions being tested, from Table 1, are about particular game outcomes, not a dichotomous
measure of deterrence “success” and “failure.” Furthermore, these predictions explicitly cover the case
where the challenger has absolutely no interest in attacking. While the three non-status quo outcomes
are essentially different categories of general deterrence failure, the status quo outcome is not
necessarily the result of successful deterrence. For example, if Challenger prefers Status Quo to
Defender Concedes, the only rational outcome is Status Quo. Although Challenger’s decision to not
challenge the status quo in this case is not really “successful deterrence,” it is predicted by perfect
deterrence theory.
For the cases that are selected (because they are politically active), I employ a directed-dyad-year unit of
analysis. Within a directed dyad, the direction of interaction is important; for example, United
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
116
States→Japan is one directed dyad and Japan→United States is another. The Unilateral Deterrence
Game theoretically differentiates between the roles played by each state in a dyad, so employing
directed-dyads enables empirical differentiation between the states in a dyad as well. Furthermore,
since each state in a politically active dyad has the opportunity for conflict with the other, each state has
an opportunity to challenge the status quo. Therefore, each state is considered to be a potential
challenger. For example, in the United States→Japan directed dyad, the United States is Challenger and
Japan is Defender, while in the Japan→United States directed dyad, Japan is Challenger and the United
States is Defender.
Because most international relations data are based on annual observations, the year is the time period
used for the cross-sectional time series data analysis conducted here. Therefore, each politically active
directed-dyad-year constitutes an observation. Since general deterrence deals with the outbreak, rather
than the continuation, of international conflict, I eliminate dyad-years marked by a conflict continuing
from the previous year as well as ‘joiner’ dyads. Furthermore, I drop the directed dyad B→A in years
with a continuing conflict in the directed dyad A→B.8 This results in a total of 384,865 [three
hundred eighty-four thousand] politically active directed-dyad-years for the time period 1816–
2000.9
Predictions are good enough---they can be based on specific knowledge and empirical
data
Chernoff 9 Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations,
“Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1, Sage
For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion
that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt
have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction,
as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393).
More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’
defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction
sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social
relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple
examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable
social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a
spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive
past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the
UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the
power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–
UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist
China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not
enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited,
thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or
probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to
the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual
information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and
hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that
leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with
almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will
not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and
well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many
likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies:
they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with
the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in
China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
117
specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land
its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero).
The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military
decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to
rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action
against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example
distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the
critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true.
The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that,
under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK
will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also
argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while
physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’ , other natural sciences, such as seismology,
genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe
the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability,
for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17
am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the
former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-
point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of
action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are
most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what
political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often
attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus
commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any,
theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based
predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The
range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions.
From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered
accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive)
explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social
science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.
Maintaining deterrence does not lock in structural or gender violence--- it’s ethically
mandatory to maintain deterrent force against the threat of large-scale violence
Lucinda Joy Peach 4, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University,
2004, “A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Ethics and
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 442-443
Antiwar feminists highlight an important issue often lacking in discussions of the morality of deterrence by
emphasizing the unstated costs of the development, deployment, maintenance, and disposal of WMD, including the diversion of
funds that otherwise might be available for social welfare programs, the costs of disposing of hazardous wastes, exposure to radiation, and so
on. In addition, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as an inhibitor of armed aggression is dubious in the post-cold war era, dominated by
“internal” armed conflicts that do not directly involve one (nuclear) nation pitted against another, and the growing threat of terrorist tactics
such as those used by al-Qa’ida on September 11, 2001. Despite these
costs, pragmatic feminist strategy deals with
existing actualities, not utopian ideals. Deterrence has been “successful,” if success can be measured in
terms of the lack of the use of nuclear weapons for nearly fifty years.
Looking “pragmatically” at human history – and the scant possibility that nations that have already
developed weapons of mass destruction will voluntarily destroy them (all of them, that is) or be deterred from ever using
them in the absence of a credible threat that such use would be met by equal or greater force – the
possession of WMD for purposes of deterrence may be morally necessary, at least given current
geopolitical realities. As military philosopher Malham Wakin suggests:
When we ask whether nuclear deterrence is the only effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons
in a total war, we must be sure to do so in the context of the actual world situation we now find ourselves in, a
situation that includes a very large number of nuclear warheads in the possession of several nations and in least
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
118
one of those nations many of those nuclear weapons are aimed at the United States and its NATO allies. In
that realistic context is it
reasonable to suppose that a nuclear balance is better calculated to deter total war than a nuclear
imbalance?
Given the goal of pragmatist feminism to “end oppression,” including the domination and control of
some nations and peoples by others, and given that the possession and threatened use of WMD have
become one of the most effective means by which nations in the world today assert their power, deterrence
is morally necessary to help ensure against the oppression of some nations or peoples by others armed
with WMD.
However, since the goal of international peace and security can never be fully achieved while nuclear and other WMD exist, whether for
defensive, deterrent, or other purposes, pragmatist feminists allow for the interim use of deterrence only in the context of active efforts by
nuclear nations to bring about multilateral disarmament, such as that called for by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Pragmatist
feminists thus disagree with the antiwar feminist rejection of any use of nuclear weapons, even for
deterrence purposes, arguing for such use as a temporary, interim strategy through the process of mutual disarmament.
Therefore, while pragmatist feminists might agree with antiwar feminists that nuclear weapons never
should have been invented or, once invented, never should have been tested or deployed or used as the
basis for deterrence, that is not the reality we find ourselves in today. Yes, development and
deployment must be factored into the ethical status of deterrence, as antiwar feminists suggest. However, these
costs in and of themselves are not too high if viewed from the vantage point of the present, since much
of the cost has, in effect, already been spent. The antiwar feminist point about the costs of development and deployment is
highly relevant, however, to considering whether to build additional WMD for deterrence purposes.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Con Korea Extensions
119
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
120
Yes Korea Collapse
North Korea collapse most probable scenario
Kim 15—PhD in political Science from U of South Carolina with a specialization in IR and comparative
politics and an Assistant Professor at Bradley University [Jihyun, “Understanding the Hermit Kingdom As It
Is and As It Is Becoming: The Past, Present and Future of North Korea,” Journal of Contemporary Asia,
May 2015, p. 7-9, Emory Libraries]
Yet this regime stability and people’s loyalty are unlikely to last given the changes that have occurred in
North Korea, especially since the end of the Cold War. In its search for survival, the regime has reluctantly
allowed the country’s limited “opening” in the form of embracing foreign aid, endorsing economic
interactions with the South and not taking draconian measures to eradicate the country’s emerging
capitalist class and “cultural invasion” from the outside. Bradley Babson, in North Korea in Transition, sheds light on the
deep historical roots of North Korea’s continuing economic isolationism and sense of insecurity, which have
made Pyongyang extremely cautious about taking necessary measures to integrate itself into the global economy as doing so is
“inextricably linked with the political challenges of the transformation of North Korea’s domestic political
economy and its relations with its neighbors and with the international community at large” (153).
Nevertheless, the leadership is aware of the need to expand foreign trade and investment in order to achieve
the economic development, which is essential for its survival in the long term, irrespective of its handling of the
military and other security challenges. In fact, under the guise of “controlled capitalism,” Babson argues, the North Korean
regime has taken small yet notable measures to create institutions to facilitate its interactions with its
capitalist neighbours and to attract foreign capital without fully opening. This, in itself, is a major departure from North Korea’s
previous emphasis on complete isolation and autarky.
In the eyes of the North Korean
leadership, social and cultural changes in the country may seem to pose even
greater threats to the existing regime. North Korea’s famine in the 1990s has led its population to find
coping strategies in order to survive, leading to the rise of the new trading and entrepreneurial class that
has become the backbone of North Korea’s system of jungle capitalism.4 Relying on interviews with North
Korean refugees, Lankov, in his chapter in North Korea in Transition, illustrates the emergence of the “new rich” and
how they function as entrepreneurs, merchants and commercial operators in an environment where they
have access to unauthorised and uncensored information about the outside world. This new pattern defies
the assumption that the state is the only provider of jobs, income and information, thus “slowly eroding
the authority and control of the government” and implanting dangerous ideas (in the eyes of the leadership) to
North Koreans (191). In the same volume, Woo Young Lee and Jungmin Seo examine the effects of “cultural pollution” from
the South, caused by the spread of South Korean cultural products, ranging from music to soap operas
and films that are especially popular among the younger generation. Despite the illegality of such “subversive” products
in the North, South Korean cultural influences have expanded along with the illicit distribution of DVDs, CDs
and USBs. Lee and Seo anticipate that the potential of this cultural penetration could be substantial, especially if an
emerging counterculture would be used as a prism through which the North Korean people start to see
their enduring economic and political hardships.
Future Prospects
All the idiosyncrasies that revolve around North Korea pose enormous challenges in terms of understanding the country through the so-called
conventional wisdom. As illustrated by Scott Snyder and Kyung-Ae Park in North Korea in Transition, its
dynastic, familycentred,
military-first system still persists, notwithstanding the failure of its leaders to provide even the people’s
most basic needs, the country’s continuing reliance on outside sources for survival, and the new
challenges posed by social and cultural changes due to penetration of subversive information from the
outside. Yet, the verdict is still out on whether each of these factors would function as a catalyst for the North’s demise or dramatic system
transformation. There is no consensus reached even among the most renowned North Korea experts, including the contributors to the volumes,
reviewed in this article.
The chapter by Charles Armstrong in North Korea in Transition shows that the North Korean system, buttressed by the regime’s masterful
manipulation of ideology in support of the Kim dynasty, has proven to be remarkably resilient and quite malleable. Built on a similar view, Bruce
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
121
Cumings, in the same volume, squarely repudiates the widely assumed collapse scenario while emphasising the durability of the system that is
likely to endure in its current form of “monarchy” under the third-generation leadership. On the other hand, Victor Cha and Nicholas Anderson,
also in the same volume, use the lessons of the Arab Spring to analyse the prospects for North Korea. They argue that it “shows no potential to
have an Arab Spring” (103); nonetheless, something similar could occur if “the combination of tectonic, bottom-up societal shifts counteracted by
rigid, top-down repression efforts is creating a tension in the North,” generating a political earthquake in the country (112). Despite
the
seeming tranquillity in the Pyongyang regime, even after the death of Kim Jong Il, it cannot completely
shield itself from the forces unleashed by modern technology and information in the increasingly
interconnected world, which would make the North Korean leaders’ efforts to control their people even
more difficult. Thus, Cha and Anderson predict, the rigidity of North Korea’s ideology and political system would
ultimately lead to its demise, especially because of its inability to adapt itself to new realities and new
demands from its people and from the outside world.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
122
Impact
Only the status quo prevents provocations from escalating—kim perceives US forces
as controlling full on escalation because of the Marine’s unique ability to divert
Korean ground forces--that’s the main scenario for escalation
Chol 11 Kim Myong Chol is author of a number of books and papers in Korean, Japanese and English on North Korea, including Kim Jong-il's
Strategy for Reunification. He has a PhD from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Academy of Social Sciences "Dangerous games" Aug
20 www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MH20Dg01.html
The divided and heavily armed Korean Peninsula remains the most inflammable global flashpoint,
with any conflict sparked there likely to become a full-blown thermonuclear war involving the world's
fourth-most powerful nuclear weapons state and its most powerful. Any incident in Korea by design, accident, or
miscalculation could erupt into a devastating DPRK-US war, with the Metropolitan US serving as a
main war theater. Rodong Sinmun warned on August 16: "The Korean Peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever. An all-out war
can be triggered by any accident." Recent incidents illustrate the real danger of miscalculation leading to a
total shooting war, given the volatile situation on the Land of Morning Calm. 1. The most recent case
in point is the August 10 shelling of North Korea by the South. Frightened South Korea marines on
Yeonpyeong Island mistook three noises from a North Korean construction site across the narrow channel for artillery rounds,
taking an hour to respond with three to five artillery rounds. The episode serves as a potent reminder to the world
that the slightest incident can lead to war. A reportedly malfunctioning firefinder counter-artillery radar system seems to
partly account for the panicky South Korean reaction. South Korean conservative newspaper the Joong Ang Daily reported August 17: "A
military source said that radar installed to detect hostile fire did not work last week when North Korea fired five shots toward the Northern
Limit Line (NLL), the disputed maritime border, on Aug 10. "'We must confirm the location of the source of the firing through the ARTHUR
(Artillery Hunting Radar) and HALO (hostile artillery location) systems, but ARTHUR failed to operate, resulting in a failure to determine the
source of the fire,' said the source." BBC reported on November 25 last year the aggressive nature of troops on the South Korea-held five
islands in North Korean waters. "Seen in this sense, they (five islands including Yeonpyeong Island) could provide staging bases for flanking
amphibious attacks into North Korea if South Korea ever takes the offensive." 2. An
almost catastrophic incident took place
at dawn on June 17 near Inchon. South Korean marines stationed on Gyodong Island near Inchon Airport fired rifles at a civilian
South Korean jetliner Airbus A320 with 119 people aboard as it was descending to land, after mistaking it for a North Korean military
aircraft. The Asiana Airlines flight was carrying 119 people from the Chinese city of Chengdu. About 600 civilian aircraft fly near the island
every day, including those flying across the NLL, but they face a perennial risk of being misidentified as a hostile warplane. It is nothing
short of a miracle that the Airbus A320 was not hit and nobody harmed. 3. On March 26, 2010, the high-tech South Korean corvette Sokcho
fired 130 rounds at flocks of birds, mistaking them for a hostile flying object. The innocent birds looked like a North Korean warplane just at
a time when an alleged North Korean midget submarine had managed to escape with impunity after torpedoing the hapless Cheonan deep
inside security-tight South Korean waters. The South Korean military's habit of firing at the wrong target increases the risk of an incident
running out of control. CNN aired a story December 16, headlined: "General: South Korea Drill Could Cause Chain Reaction." F/A-18 pilotturned Marine Corp General James Cartwright told the press in the Pentagon, "What we worry about, obviously, is if that it [the drill] is
misunderstood or if it's taken advantage of as an opportunity. "If
North Korea were to react to that in a negative way
and fire back at those firing positions on the islands, that would start potentially a chain reaction of
firing and counter-firing. "What you don't want to have happen out of that is ... for us to lose control
of the escalation. That's the concern." Agence France-Presse on December 11 quoted former chief of US
intelligence retired admiral Dennis Blair as saying that South Korea "will be taking military action against North Korea". New
Korean war differs from other wars Obama and the Americans seem to be incapable of realizing that North
Korea is the wrong enemy, much less that a new Korean War would be fundamentally different from
all other wars including the two world wars. Two things will distinguish a likely American Conflict or
DPRK-US War from previous wars. The first essential difference is that the US mainland will become the main
theater of war for the first time since the US Civil War (1861-1865), giving the Americans an opportunity to know what it is like to have war fought on their own land, not on
faraway soil. The US previously prospered by waging aggressive wars on other countries. Thus far, the Americans could afford to feel safe and comfortable while watching TV footage of war scenes from Afghanistan, Iraq,
Pakistan and Libya as if they were fires raging across the river. The utmost collateral damage has been that some American veterans were killed or returned home as amputees, with post traumatic stress disorder, only to be
left unemployed and homeless. However, this will no longer be the case. At long last, it is Americans' turn to have see their homeland ravaged. An young North Korea in 1950-53 was unable to carry the war all the way across
the Pacific Ocean to strike back, but the present-day North Korea stands out as a fortress nuclear weapons state that can withstand massive American ICBM (Intercontinental ballistic missile) attacks and launch direct
The second essential difference is that the next war in Korea, that is, the
American Conflict or the DPRK-USA War would be the first actual full-fledged nuclear,
thermonuclear war that mankind has ever seen, in no way similar to the type of nuclear warfare
described in science fiction novels or films. North Korea is unique among the nuclear powers in two respects: One is that
retaliatory transpacific strikes on the Metropolitan USA.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
123
the Far Eastern country, founded by legendary peerless hero Kim Il-sung, is the first country to
engage and badly maul the world's only superpower in three years of modern warfare when it was
most powerful, after vanquishing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The other is that North Korea is fully
ready to go the length of fighting [hu]mankind's [the] first and last nuclear exchange with the US. The
DPRK led by two Kim Il-sungs - the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander Kim Jong-il and his heir designate Kim Jong-eun - is different from Russia under Nikita Khrushchev which backed down in the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis. Khrushchev and his company never fought the Americans in war. As a rule, most countries are afraid to engage the Americans. As the case is with them, North Korea is the last to favor war with the Americans.
However, it is no exaggeration to say that the two North Korean leaders are just one click away from
ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the US military forces in Guam, Hawaii and metropolitan
centers on the US mainland. On behalf of Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-eun will fire highly destructive weapons of like Americans have
never heard of or imagined to evaporate the US. The North Koreans are too proud of being descendents of the ancient civilizations of Koguryo 2,000 years ago
and Dankun Korea 5,000 years ago, to leave the Land of morning Calm divided forever with the southern half under the control of the trigger-happy, predatory
US. The North Koreans prefer to fight and die in honor rather than kowtow to the arrogant Americans. At
the expense of comforts of a
better life, North Koreans have devoted more than half a century to preparing for nuclear war with
the Americans. All available resources have been used to convert the whole country into a fortress,
including arming the entire population and indigenously turning out all types of nuclear thermonuclear weapons, and developing longrange delivery capabilities and digital warfare assets. An
apocalyptic Day After Tommorow-like scenario will unfold
throughout the US, with the skyscrapers of major cities consumed in a sea of thermonuclear conflagration. The nuclear
exchange will begin with retaliatory North Korean ICBMs detonating hydrogen bombs in outer space
far above the US mainland, leaving most of the country powerless. New York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and
major cities should be torched by ICBMs streaking from North Korea with scores of nuclear power
stations exploding, each spewing as much radioactive fallout as 150-180 H-bombs.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
124
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Con General Deterrence Extensions
125
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
126
Links
Our link outweighs any link turns – access to strategic locations makes it uniquely
necessary
Kapoor 10 (Dr. Rajesh Kapoor Ph. D, Japanese Studies/International Relations is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies,
New Delhi., “The Strategic Relevance of Okinawa”,
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheStrategicRelevanceofOkinawa_rkapoor_100610.html)
have been instrumental in ensuring peace and
stability within Japan as well as in East Asia. The geo-strategic location of Okinawa makes it the preferred site
for hosting US military bases both in terms of securing Japan as well as for US force projection in the
Far East. Okinawa’s distance from the rest of Japan and from other countries of East Asia makes it an ideal
location to host military bases and thus extend US military outreach considerably. In the case of an eventuality, it is
easier for the US marines, who act as first responders to exigencies, to take appropriate action well before the rest of
Japan is affected. In addition, Japan cannot ignore the potential threat it faces from its nuclear neighbours
including China, North Korea and Russia. The Russian and Chinese threats, as of now, can be ruled out. However, the North
Korean threat is very much real and Japan has been building up its Ballistic Missile Defence system in
In the post-Occupation period, US troops and military bases in Japan
collaboration with the US to cater for it.
Okinawa Prefecture includes a chain of hundreds of small islands. The midpoint of this chain is almost equidistance from
Taiwan and Japan’s Kyushu Island. During the Vietnam War, the USFJ military bases particularly in Okinawa were among the most
important strategic and logistic bases. In addition, strategists in Japan note that despite the country’s three non-nuclear principles, some bases
in Okinawa were used for stockpiling nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Even today, US nuclear-armed submarines and
destroyers operate in the vicinity of Japan, facilitated by a secret deal between the governments of the US and Japan. Moreover,
having military bases in Japan also helps the US to have easy access to the strategically important five seas –the
Bering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea.1
Japan deterrence continually tested
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Calculating the deterrent effect of bases and/or forces is always an imprecise
business. Perhaps the most important determinant is the degree of commitment
and willingness of one country to sacrifice for another. To date, the US-Japan
defense relationship and the maintaining of US bases on Okinawa for over 40 years
after Okinawa’s reversion to Japan has maintained peace and stability in Northeast
Asia. This has also had a calming effect in other parts of the region.
The Government of Japan obviously values the US bases on Okinawa or it
otherwise would have closed them down — as is quite doable under the US-Japan
Defense Treaty. However, the Japanese government must explain clearly and
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
127
forcefully to the Japanese public why these bases are necessary for Japan’s
national defense if it hopes to keep them. To date, no Japanese administration has
done what is necessary in this regard. Maybe someday one will — as the more
secure the US Okinawa presence, the greater the deterrent value.
Importantly, deterrence has never been tested quite like it is today. The US
military presence on Okinawa is, as noted, operationally important and also a
measure of the US-Japan political relationship. Our adversaries know this,
although in both the US and Japan many observers and commentators downplay
the deterrent effect of US bases on Okinawa.
Perhaps the ultimate test of the US Okinawa bases’ deterrent value is to remove the
US military presence or drastically reduce it. Do so, and we will soon discover
that they were a deterrent — and a good one indeed.
Forward presence in Asia enables the US to maintain strategic deterrence in Asia and
respond to humanitarian disasters
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Okinawa’s location has become more strategically important over the past few decades. (See Figure 2.)
In the post-World War II environment, Japan’s northern islands were seen as a bulwark to contain the
Soviet Union’s Pacific fleet. Post-Cold War security threats include the potential flashpoints of the
Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but more recent assertiveness by the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea and East China Sea has drawn growing attention
from Department of Defense (DOD) planners. The U.S. military presence in Japan, and particularly
Okinawa, allows it to fulfill its obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security to
not only defend Japan but to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific region. The forward-deployed
presence of the U.S. Air Force and Navy also allows for response to humanitarian disasters in the region,
as demonstrated by the rapid U.S. assistance after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in
northeastern Japan and after the November 2013 super-typhoon in the Philippines. The deployment of
MV-22 “Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft to Okinawa reportedly has enhanced the operational capability of the
Marines based there, because MV-22s have a greater range and faster cruising speed than the
helicopters they replaced
Okinawa presence needed to stabilize the East China Sea
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
The intensification of the territorial dispute between Japan and China over small islands in the East
China Sea has provided another rationale for the approximately 19,000 marines stationed on Okinawa.
The main island of Okinawa is only 270 nautical miles from the disputed islets, called Senkaku in Japan,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Diaoyu in China, and Diaoyutai in Taiwan. The potential role of U.S. Marines in defending and/or
retaking uninhabited islands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear, but the operational
capabilities of the Okinawa-based Marines are aligned with the needs of such a mission.
128
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
129
A2: Response Time Link Turn
Alternatives can’t match Okinawa—ensures conflict management fails
Jenny Lin, Sasakawa Peace Foundation resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS, February 2015, The US-Japan Alliance in Transformation: The
Management of the US Marine Corps Futenma Airfield Relocation Facility (FRF), http://csis.org/files/publication/issues_insightsvol15no3.pdf
The US Marine Corps Futenma airfield is one of the seven bases for the United Nations Command (UNC) in Japan. Those bases were
established in the 1950s to deter North Korea aggression, and to support South Korea by providing strategic and
military assistance. Futenma‟s strategic purposes include, first, rapid response to contingencies in the
region. Response time from Okinawa is a lot shorter than if the US military deploys from Honolulu or San
Diego, which takes approximately 5 or 8 hours, respectively. And second, facilities at Futenma meet the requirement of US
Marine Corps‟ doctrine on training and operation, namely the proximity of Marines to training and
support facilities. Third, as a UNC rear command airfield, it provides logistics for a wide range of military
activities, and accommodates reinforcement aircraft. Logistically, the airfield provides supplies,
transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, and communications. In an event of conflict, the
wait time for force and logistic reinforcement could be 1 to 8 hours, as they may be flying from Guam, Honolulu, or
San Diego; thus the Marines must fight with existing resources but will need support. Therefore, to supply
the Marines with proper reinforcements, it is essential that Futenma runways accommodate all type of
aircraft. Currently at Futenma, two runways are available, each of 2,743 meter (9,000 feet) in length, which allows both fixed and non-fixed
wing aircraft to land and take-off. The new security challenges: hybrid and volatile The 21st-century challenges are increasingly
complex and more diverse than during the Cold War, which make a “black-and-white distinction between
irregular war and conventional war.”149 At the end of the 20th century, Defense secretaries during the Clinton era150 supported
the principle of a “two regional war” strategy, and maintained the readiness of US forces accordingly.151 But this principle was deemphasized
in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR); the
new concept is to maintain readiness for a wider range of
challenges.152 The justification for deviating from traditional force planning is backed by lessons learned from previous wars and because
threats have evolved to hybrid challenges. The idea of “hybrid threats” was raised and supported by retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman and
former Defense Secretary Robert Gates. It means that US adversaries could use a combination of means to gain asymmetric advantage in
conflict.153 In a 2009 address at the Maxwell Air Force Base, Gates said: “War
in the future will often be a hybrid blend of
tactics where a nation state might deploy a mix of crude and advanced weapons to limit options, disrupt
freedom of action or deny access to key assets such as forward air bases.”154 To confront new
challenges, Gates emphasized the importance of adopting a mixture of weapon systems that is flexible
and versatile, to better meet a wide spectrum of conflicts while enhancing interoperability. Since Gates‟
departure, tensions have erupted in different regions. In the Asia-Pacific, the security situation is
becoming more volatile as tensions rise between China and its neighbors. At the May 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue,
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel criticized Beijing for destabilizing the South China Sea, and said that its actions threaten progress in the AsiaPacific region. Indeed, China‟s open disregard for the rule of law at sea,155 its unilateral action on announcing air defense identification zone,
and its dismissal of claims by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all drawn strong reactions. In early 2012, the PLAN began executing
Beijing‟s claim to almost the entire South China Sea by challenging the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal; in July that year, Beijing formally
created Sansha City, which oversees its claims to territories in dispute with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. In
November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared an ADIZ (air defense identification zone) over the East China Sea; and escalated its dispute with
Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In May 2014, Beijing put an oil rig in disputed waters that Vietnam claims as its exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). Beijing‟s assertiveness and disregard for the rule of law have resulted in strong reactions from its neighbors. In May 2014, Hanoi
confronted the PLAN at sea over Beijing‟s oil rig, and allowed protests against China‟s unilateral action.156 In June, Manila filed complaints in
international court against Beijing.157 And in July, Prime Minister Abe announced a reversal of restrictions posed by Japan‟s Article 9
Constitution – regarding the right to collective selfdefense.158 Amid
creeping advances in the Asia-Pacific, there is an
array of security issues that needs the attention of the US: terrorism, cyber intrusions, drug and human
trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and climate change. All of which underscores
former Defense Secretary Gates‟ point: the US must be ready to confront a combination of threats, and
the overall strategy must be supported by assets. Align strategy with assets: the role of the mega-float Given that future
challenges will be both hybrid and conventional, building an unconventional base can boost future force readiness. In the 2014 QDR, the DOD
addressed these challenges by recognizing the need to develop forces capable of responding to hybrid scenarios with a combination of highand low-level threats.159 More specifically, the Defense Department outlined three pillars in its new strategy: 1. To protect the homeland, to
deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters;
2. To build security globally, to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
130
common security challenges; 3. To project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In
the context of a possible conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, logistics in
the green water (i.e., nations‟ littoral zones; for example, the South China Sea to the first island chain) will be key to deter and
defeat aggressor(s). During peace-time, the mega-float can serve as part of the FRF; during conflict, it can function as an offensive
vehicle. To realize this concept, the design of the mega-float/FRF is crucial. First, the length of the FRF runways must be appropriate. The length
of the FRF runways should coincide with aircraft developments. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the length of the
runway is justified by the aircraft designs, and required longest runway lengths of aircraft that will be making regular use of the runway.160 The
current Henoko/FRF‟s two 1,600 meter-long V-shaped runways cannot accommodate all types of aircraft. Despite that the 2006 Roadmap
specified that the USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft at Henoko/FRF, the replacement airfield should still reflect the development
of all aircraft to be deployed by the US military. If
not, Futenma‟s original capability will be lost.
Ospreys solve
Envall 15 – Envall 8/26/2015 (H.D.P. (David) Envall is a Research Fellow at the Department of
International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University. Kerri
Ng is a PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific
Affairs, The Australian National University, Will regional tensions shift the deadlock on Okinawa’s
military bases?, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/08/26/will-regional-tensions-shift-the-deadlockon-okinawas-military-bases/)
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may be close to achieving one long-pursued goal, the relocation of the controversial Futenma airbase in Okinawa. This has been a perpetual sore in the
US‒Japan alliance. But recent international trends may be reshaping Okinawa’s base politics and pushing the two allies closer to carrying out the Futenma relocation. The Futenma controversy
was triggered in 1995, after widespread protests erupted in Okinawa following the rape of a 12-year-old girl by US military personnel. The US and Japanese governments subsequently reached
an agreement in 1996 to close Futenma following the construction of a replacement facility. Some Okinawans were willing to accept this relocation under certain conditions, but others viewed
the arrangement as a perpetuation of America’s excessive military presence in Okinawa. The two national governments were content to live with the status quo, especially in the face of other
more pressing issues, until change could be delivered on their terms. It was only in 2006 that they finally agreed on a clear plan for base realignment — including Futenma’s relocation
elsewhere in Okinawa (to Henoko) — as part of a broader restructuring of the alliance. But this plan was not well received by those Okinawans who remained committed to the relocation of
Futenma outside the prefecture. The resulting standoff was complicated further when the Democratic Party of Japan led by Yukio Hatoyama came to power in 2009–10. Hatoyama promised to
review the 2006 agreement and have Futenma moved outside Okinawa (and perhaps even outside Japan). But the US strongly opposed this and US pressure on Hatoyama forced him to
renege on his promise before resigning. When the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) returned to power in December 2012, the Japanese government moved to resolve the Futenma impasse. In
December 2013, Abe obtained the approval of Okinawan Governor Hirokazu Nakaima to begin landfill work at Henoko. But in November 2014, Nakaima lost the Okinawan gubernatorial
election to Takeshi Onaga, a former LDP member who opposes the Henoko relocation plan. Since then, the prefectural and national governments have been at loggerheads. In March 2015,
Onaga ordered that surveys on the new site be suspended on environmental grounds, only to be overruled by the national government. Then in July, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly voted
to restrict the transport of sand to Henoko in order to block the ongoing landfill work. In early August, Onaga announced that he would nullify Nakaima’s land reclamation approval. In
response, the Abe administration has suspended offshore preparatory work at Henoko until September to allow for further talks. The Futenma dispute has now persisted for so long that the
international environment has been dramatically transformed since the crisis of 1995. The rise of China has come to dominate debates about the region’s future. In particular, China has begun
Okinawa’s strategic importance. Okinawa’s
significance lies in its geography. It is an obvious location for a rapid deployment of forces in response to clashes
around the disputed islands. This is reflected in recent changes in US and Japanese strategic thinking. Japanese strategic doctrine, for example,
now highlights the need to be able to respond rapidly to ‘grey zone’, or low-level, disputes in the area. Okinawa, then, is firmly in the minds of strategic
thinkers. The deployment of the MV-22 Osprey vertical take-off and landing aircraft to Okinawa
improves response capabilities. Recent reports also suggest that plans are well underway for further, more substantial deployments of Japanese forces to
to contest the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands more vigorously. This shift has strongly reaffirmed
Okinawa.In the newly-released Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation, the US and Japan ‘reaffirmed’ that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are ‘within the scope’ of the security treaty. At
the two governments confirmed their ‘unwavering commitment’ to the
Henoko plan. This indicates that although Onaga has warned that Futenma’s relocation will be impossible without Okinawan consent, regional insecurity is actually making Japan and the
the same time, during Abe’s US trip in late April
US more willing to endure local protests:the political costs of creating further discontent in Okinawa are now outweighed by the consequences of failing to stand up to China. Abe may now
believe that, on the Futenma issue at least, he is close to success. That such an outcome will likely favour Abe’s security agenda is in no small part thanks to increasing regional tensions and
China’s growing assertiveness.
Not sourcing the lift requirements for moving the marines further away
Klingner 12 (Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow at heritage, “Don’t Strand the Marines on the
Beach,” 4/27/12) http://dailysignal.com//2012/04/27/dont-strand-the-marines-on-the-beach/
The United States and Japan released a revised deployment plan for U.S. Marine Corps forces in the
Pacific. It is an improvement over the 2006 Guam Agreement, but it still sacrifices alliance military
capabilities for political expediency. The new plan is more flexible and operationally focused, since it
maintains Marine Air Ground Task Forces rather than dividing Marine combat, command, and logistics
components. But moving Marine units further from potential conflict and humanitarian disaster zones
only makes them more vulnerable to the tyranny of distance endemic in the Pacific theater. The
Marines already face a shortage of critical lift and mobility assets to fulfill their missions and privately
grumble that the Navy shows no inclination to provide it. The Marines identified a need for 38 ships, the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
131
Navy provided 33, and the number has since dwindled to below 30. The Darwin Initiative—in which up
to 2,500 Marines will rotate through training areas in Australia—is an excellent strategic move
///MARKED AT////
to affirm U.S. commitment to defending allies and partners in Southeast Asia. But the Pentagon
continues to struggle in determining how it will “globally source” the manpower requirements. Without
sufficient mobility assets, the U.S. risks stranding the Marines down under, unable to get into the fight
over the horizon. A mobility shortfall in the Pacific is just one of the critical degradations of U.S. military
capabilities that are already taking place due to massive defense budget cuts. And the shortfalls are only
going to get exponentially worse under sequestration—a fiscal train wreck that the White House and
Congress are ignoring.
They have the shit right there!
Don Kirk 14, veteran correspondent and noted author on conflict and crisis from Southeast Asia to the
Middle East to Northeast Asia, Master's degree in International relations from the University of Chicago,
http://japanforum.nbr.org/scripts/wa.exe?A3=ind1401&L=LIST&E=quoted-printable&P=139597&B=--600603132-1990664861-1388667358%3D%3A27186&T=text%2Fhtml;%20charset=utf8&XSS=3&header=1
What would happen in the case of a missile or air attack on the Okinawa bases clearly DOES fall under the
rubric of deterrence value of the bases. That yarn about the pinpoint accuracy of a Chinese missile that purportedly
shot down a satellite makes for fun reading, but Chinese missiles, like the NKorean versions that once terrorized Israel without denting
Israeli military strength, would not be real effective against Okinawa bases. The bit about Futenma not having the
ammo storage space is incorrect. Of course it does. Marine pilots, in any case, may pick up ammo at Iwakuni,
not Kadena, since that's where they have most of their planes these days in view of anti-base protests around Futenma. The U.S. view is they
need two air bases on Okinawa in case of hostilities. (Some armchair strategists no doubt disagree.) Henoko, 10 mins or so flying
time from Kadena, would inevitably have storage facilities. Marine aircraft are not going to have to fly to
Kadena or Iwakuni every time they reload. Please. Talk of turning Kadena into a marine air station is an abstraction (distraction, actually).
By the way, it's easy to check on who's flying in and of Kadena from the fourth-story of the Up-Kitty restaurant bldg. beyond the main runway. That's where
Okinawa Defense Bureau logs all flights, keeping decibel count etc. while spectators, including tourists from China, come and go. I saw plenty of USAF planes, no
marine aircraft, when I was up there researching a book. I also got a sweeping view of Futenma air station from roof of admin bldg. of
university -- almost no take-offs and landings. Not many helicopters, the odd cargo plane, no fighters (though I'm told they do go in there from time to time). Oh
yes, storage
facilities were clearly visible too.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
132
A2: Marines Left Behind
Plan wrecks the Marines left behind---critical mass and combined training is key
Schoff 13 – James L. Schoff, Senior Associate in the Carnegie Asia Program Focusing on U.S.-Japanese
Relations and Regional Engagement, Japanese Politics and Security, and Private Sector's Role in
Japanese Policymaking, July 17, "Getting Serious About U.S. Marine Relocation in Japan",
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/17/getting-serious-about-u.s.-marine-relocation-in-japan
Nakaima faces a difficult political decision on the landfill permit with important implications. His main priority is to close Futenma
quickly and reduce the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa, and he criticizes the current Henoko plan as too slow. The majority of
Okinawans want the marines to move off the island entirely, and the governor’s office has promoted an expedited “dispersal” alternative that
would separate components of marines currently stationed at the Futenma Air Station and have them rotate around different
existing Japanese commercial and military facilities in the rest of country. The dispersal concept is vague, but it essentially breaks up
the marines in Japan into small units that would base and train temporarily at multiple locations outside
Okinawa. This alternative is unworkable operationally because the marines need a certain critical mass
and a reliable combined training regimen to maintain their capabilities and responsiveness. It also risks
opening up a whole new can of political worms and inciting multiple local protests in these new host cities. Pursuing this “quick” solution would
delay movement on the current plan and cause Futenma to stay where it is even longer than projected.
Multilat fails and is unsustainable.
Young et al 13 Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst,
David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director
of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government,
Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24, 2013, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation",
http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation
*We do not endorse the ableist language.
The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked,
despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it.
Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN
is [destroyed] paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each
of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a
perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common.
Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of
any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together.
Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems –
indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended
consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created
them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in
converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A
golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the
post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and
prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many
proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented
period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to
create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics.
While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose
rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented
speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to
this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37
intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of
International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of
international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal
intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials,
public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a
multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
133
with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic
of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and
countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking
the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the
dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in
transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to
thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three
and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller
1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing
interdependence has now
progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is,
economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order
are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global
cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for
international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized
multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales,
terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality,
biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now
increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature
of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is
needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity,
institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a
growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below.
Growing multipolarity.
The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most
basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that
“matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has
expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the
United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the
principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not
solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many
more countries, representing a
diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur.
Institutional inertia.
The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the
Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that
were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important
countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As
power shifts from West
to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt
with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some
countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally
bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would
organically adjust to fluctuations in national power.
Harder problems.
As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has
evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries,
and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era,
trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however,
negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property,
health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of
environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete
actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the
threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it
involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
134
developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low
carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).
Fragmentation.
The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today
occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both
multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of
global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently
uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the
proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public
goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define
the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented
institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing
four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although
different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now
faced by the multilateral
order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are
second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit
problem solving and reform at the global level.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
135
A2: We don’t Know the Exact Number of Marines We Need
We may not know the exact number, but we must maintain some marines
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Although most strategists agree on the importance of Okinawa’s location for U.S. security interests in
East Asia, there is less consensus on the particular number of marines necessary to maintain stability.
For example, two prominent analysts suggested a rethinking of U.S. military basing in light of cuts to the
U.S. defense budget and Okinawan obstacles; they argue that leaving a force of 5,000-10,000 marines
on Okinawa while also pre-positioning supply vessels in Japanese waters and bringing most of the
marines home to California would amply serve U.S. rapid response and deterrence needs.5 Defense
officials continue to assert the need for substantial numbers of U.S. marines to be positioned in Asia, but
have offered a degree of flexibility in their exact location; current plans would deploy marines on a
rotational basis through Guam and Australia. Congressional concerns, as discussed below, have focused
on cost and implementation, but have not argued that the Marine presence itself is unnecessary
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
136
A2: Other Bases in Asia
Japan is the most significant forward operating base in Asia
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2016, The US Military Presence in
Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf DOA: 2-3-16
Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is often labeled as “the cornerstone” of security in the Asia Pacific
region, local concerns about the U.S. military presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa have
challenged the management of the alliance for decades. The Japanese archipelago serves as the most
significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region; approximately 53,000 military
personnel (39,000 onshore and 14,000 afloat in nearby waters), 43,000 dependents, and 5,000
Department of Defense civilian employees live in Japan. With the United States rebalancing its defense
posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American
forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Answers to Pro Advantages
137
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
138
A2: Dugongs/Environment
There’s 10 left—presence isn’t key
Normile 14 (Dennis, Science Magazine, “New military base could seal fate of Okinawa dugong”,
http://news.sciencemag.org/asiapacific/2014/09/new-military-base-could-seal-fate-okinawa-dugong)
The Okinawa dugong's
days could be numbered. At most 10 of the marine mammals remain in Japan's
southernmost prefecture, according to the Nature Conservation Society of Japan (NACS-J). Now, land reclamation needed for a
new U.S. Marine Corps air base threatens two of the region's few remaining major beds of seagrass, which dugong
depend on, says NACS-J, which has petitioned U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy for permission to conduct a survey.
Dugong inhabit coastal zones in tropical and semitropical waters of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Populations have been
decimated by hunting, habitat loss due to coastal development, and fishing by-catching. The International Union for
Conservation of Nature lists the dugong as vulnerable to extinction worldwide. Japan's environment ministry considers the
Okinawa dugong, the northernmost population of the species, critically endangered.
The new base offshore of the Henoko district of Nago city in Oura Bay could be the death knell for the Okinawa dugong. One seagrass bed will be covered by the construction, and another will be dredged for sand. In mid-July, the Okinawa Defense Bureau, which is overseeing
construction, restricted access to the site to start a drilling survey needed to finalize reclamation plans. NACS-J had planned to have two foreign experts last month examine recently sighted feeding trails, the characteristic paths throug h seagrass beds dugong create as they uproot and eat
the vegetation. But the U.S. Marine Corps denied access to the construction zone, citing safety concerns. So last week NACS-J appealed to Kennedy, emphasizing the scientific nature of their intended survey and asking for her "special attention to an d reconsideration on this profound
problem."
NACS-J acknowledges that its aim is to stop construction of the base. "It will be very, very hard for the dugong to survive if this project goes on," says Mariko Abe, head of conservation for NACS-J.
The controversy over the new base is just the latest twist in a protracted dispute over the U.S. military presence on Okinawa. Responding to concerns about noise, air pollution, and safety, in 1996 the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to relocate the current U.S. Marine Corps air
base, called Futenma, to the Henoko–Oura Bay site in northern Okinawa. Environmental groups have long opposed the plan, as the construction would destroy a coral reef as well as the two major seagrass beds. Twice in the past month, thousands of demonstrators have marched to the
shore near the site demanding construction be halted, and sympathizers in Tokyo staged a protest rally this past Saturday. On 3 Sept ember, the Okinawa prefectural assembly adopted a resolution calling for an immediate halt to the drilling survey. The current governor was elected in
2010 on a platform calling for the base to be moved out of Okinawa Prefecture entirely. But late last year he changed his mind and gave the go-ahead for reclamation work. He now faces an antibase rival in a 16 November election.
The U.S. Marine Corps apparently feels that environmental concerns have already been dealt with. In a letter to NACS-J denying the request to enter the restricted waters, C. B. Snyder, deputy commander of the Marine Corps Installation Pacific, wrote: “Our understanding is that Japan
studied the potential impacts of the current construction activity under Japanese Environmental Impact Assessment law.” The U.S. embassy press office could not immediately confirm whether Kennedy had received the 16 September NACS-J letter. In the meantime, the Center for
Biological Diversity and other U.S. and Japanese environmental groups filed a lawsuit on 31 July in U.S. district court in San Francisco, California, seeking to force the U.S Department of Defense to halt construction.
Okinawa’s dugong may be doomed no matter what. Even if the seagrass beds are preserved, "it's hard
to imagine that a population this small is viable, as it is also isolated and at the extreme of its range," says Ellen Hines,
who specializes in marine and coastal conservation at San Francisco State
University. Nevertheless, she says, "it is against both U.S. and moral conventions for the U.S. military to degrade habitat for this critically
endangered species and accelerate its extirpation."
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
139
A2: Bases Benefit the Okinawa Economy
Okinawa bases do not benefit the Okinawa economy
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio
Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.
Since the 1980s, the percentage of base-related revenue has hovered around the 5 percent mark for
gross prefectural income; revenue from tourism is twice that amount. According to an expert panel
assembled by then Governor Hirokazu Nakaima in 2010, the productivity of an average land lot in
Okinawa was 1.6 billion yen per square kilometer, compared to only 900 million yen per square
kilometer on a military base.
Substantial opposition to the bases
Mio Yamada, January 20, 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Battle for Okinawa,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-01-20/battle-okinawa DOA: 2-2-16 Mio
Yamada was a Producer for NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation in Washington, DC.
Yet Okinawans have not benefited. Despite substantial subsidies from Tokyo to compensate for
the loss of land and other impositions, anti-base sentiment runs strong, as people complain
that the bases cause noise pollution and an influx in crime. According to the Okinawan
government, from 1972 to 2011 there were 5,747 criminal cases involving U.S. military
personnel. In 1995, the rape of a 12-year old girl by three U.S. servicemen incited outrage and
dredged up years of resentment, sparking a nationwide debate about the terms of the U.S.
occupation. Since
Okinawa trying to stop the relocation of the base to the southern part of the Island
Okinawa bases deter China
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
One should first ask what is being ‘deterred’? Put simply, US forces forward
deployed on Okinawa as elsewhere in Japan are intended to deter countries that
would attack other nations or seek to seize land territory or dominate seas and
airspace that are either international global ‘commons’ or owned by somebody
else.
For many years, the Okinawa bases were seen as playing a role in deterring a
North Korean attack on South Korea. However, in recent years the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) has strengthened the case for the US bases’ deterrent
value. The PRC’s rapid military build-up, increasing Chinese military activities
throughout the region, and claims to nearly all of the South China Sea have
unsettled China’s neighbors — nearly all of whom look (even if furtively) to the
United States to restrain China.
140
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
141
A2: Other Ways to Deter
Okinawa bases provide a critical advantage in terms of time and distance
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
The Okinawa bases alone do not deter China or anyone else. But they are an
important part of a larger network of American resources, power, and influence
that give the PRC pause. One first notes Okinawa’s location. It is near Taiwan,
close to contested areas in the East China Sea and the South China Seas, and not
far from the Korean Peninsula. Okinawa is a perfect place from which to deploy
and conduct a range of military operations to counter an aggressor or
someone seeking to upset long established rules regarding freedom of navigation
and flight, and even international boundaries.
Time and distance still matter in warfare. Being close to where one will operate
allows a more rapid and comprehensive response. Okinawa-based forces are able
to move just about anywhere in Asia in a matter of days or even hours. This
response time is much shorter than if based elsewhere in Japan — and weeks or
months faster than US-based forces, even if based in Hawaii. Also, being nearby
allows you to stay ‘on-scene’ longer. Try patrolling the South China Sea from
bases in Hokkaido or Hawaii. By the time forces arrive it is almost time to go
home.
An illustration that helps one understand the importance of time and distance (and
location) is to consider the effect of moving Tokyo Metropolitan Police
Headquarters to Gotemba — 60 miles west of Tokyo. Theoretically, TMPD might
send patrols into Tokyo for a few hours a day or as needed to respond to
emergencies — before driving back to Gotemba to refuel. This is obviously less
effective for maintaining law and order than actually being based in
Tokyo. Similarly, US bases on Okinawa are located near where trouble might
occur — and therefore better able to respond and to deter adversaries.
Time and distance have a deterrent impact on China
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
142
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Chinese behavior in the South China Sea shows it understands the role of
‘location’ as a part of deterrence. PLA forces operating out of Hainan Island can
operate throughout the South China Sea. However, China’s recent island-building
efforts much further south in the South China Sea demonstrate a clear
understanding of the importance of basing forces ‘forward’ in the area one wants to
control or influence.
This forward location facilitates military operations —
allowing a more rapid and constant presence — and it also ‘deters.’ Some critics
have pointed out that China’s new man-made islands are indefensible in the event
of war with a competent enemy. This is true enough, but it misses a larger
point. Once the island bases – even with small military detachments in place —
are established, they effectively ‘deter’ other countries from striking back — or
even applying pressure — out of fear of provoking or starting a war with
China. Thus, these small islands with military forces placed on them can restrain a
potential adversary’s behavior. This restraining effect is otherwise known as
‘deterrence.’
US bases on Okinawa from which US Air Force, US Navy, US Marine, and US
Army forces operate serve a similar function in bolstering American defense power
and the possibility of using it in the region — as Beijing would probably admit.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
143
A2: Not Enough Troops in Okinawa to Deter
Even a small presence deters
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Some commentators argue that there are not enough US forces on Okinawa to
deter an aggressor, much less make a difference in the event of a major conflict in
Asia. Besides the fact that even a small number of troops, ships, or aircraft rapidly
deployed can make a difference, this argument overlooks the fact that in the event
of a more serious contingency, Okinawa-based forces will be reinforced. They are
intended to be employed as part of a larger effort involving US forces from
overseas. Only a rash opponent would care to take on the full might of the United
States.
A similar dynamic applies on the Korean Peninsula. The relatively small number
of US Army troops in South Korea stationed near the DMZ have a limited
warfighting capability, but force the North to run the risk of bringing the full
weight of the United States in the event of an attack. This deterrent effect has
worked for many decades.
Also, one should remember that deploying US troops from a distance (i.e. the US
mainland or even Hawaii) is almost always a difficult domestic political
decision. With forward deployed troops, the decision has mostly already been
made — and if US troops are targeted or harmed, the certainty of a response is near
100 percent. This gives adversaries pause.
It is, of course, possible to reduce US forces (and bases) on Okinawa to a point
where they are operationally irrelevant or ineffective — and therefore of little
deterrent value from a purely military standpoint. Similarly, such a reduction in
forces and bases might easily be viewed by an adversary such as the PRC as a
weakened US commitment to defending Japan writ large.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
144
Okinawa bases create a political deterrent
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Ultimately, US bases on Okinawa — with all the challenges and costs they involve
— demonstrate a political commitment on the part of both governments — to
include America’s promise to defend Japan. This sort of commitment is closely
watched as an adversary decides how much to push. One recalls the classic
example of Saddam Hussein miscalculating the United States’ willingness to
defend Kuwait in 1990 that led to the First Gulf War.
One often detects a degree of puzzlement on the PRC’s part over the US’s
willingness to defend Japan –and particularly certain territory in the Ryukyus, such
as the Senkaku Islands. Solidly linked US and Japanese forces that are able to
operate effectively together – to include forces based on Okinawa — are ultimately
evidence of a strong political link between the two countries. This directly affects
deterrence.
The deterrent effect of American bases on Okinawa depends heavily on the state of
the US-Japan political relationship. The stronger the political relationship, the
more likely the US will use the bases (and its other military and non-military
resources) to defend Japan – and the more likely it is that the Japanese government
will make the necessary efforts to preserve the US bases. One tends to depend on
the other.
In this regard, the US and Japan should seriously consider integrating JSDF forces
as fully as possible onto US bases in Okinawa — to include bringing the bases
under Japanese control, such as at Atsugi and Misawa air bases. This would be
politically beneficial as well as operationally useful. The deterrent effect of US
and Japanese forces operating as ‘full’ allies and completely interoperable would
be immense. This combination of military and political linkage has a deterrent
value of its own and gives PRC strategic and operational planners considerable
headaches.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
145
Although not widely reported in the press, PRC political warfare efforts on
Okinawa to create opposition to US bases and other friction for the central
government demonstrate China’s awareness of political deterrence arising from a
strong US-Japan relationship. Such political warfare efforts are ongoing in Guam
and the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas (CNMI) as well — where additional
US bases are being built or planned. Importantly, the Guam/CNMI bases are
intended to augment US bases on Okinawa and provide strategic depth and
enhanced deterrence for US military capabilities in East Asia.
Political deterrence also extends to third countries. The presence of US forces in
Japan — and on Okinawa — is, as noted earlier, something many other regional
nations desire and find reassuring. This tends to bolster their willingness — both
individual and collective — to stand up to Chinese threats and/or blandishments —
thus, deterring Chinese behavior that would otherwise be even more aggressive
and assertive.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
146
A2: Can Move Bases to Mainland Japan
Moving them to mainland Japan lessens deterrence and undermines US-Japan
relations
Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic
Studies in Tokyo. He is a retired US Marine Officer and a former US Diplomat
and business executive with 20 years of experience in Japan, Asia Times, US
military bases in Okinawa – still an essential deterrent, October 30, 2015, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2015/10/us-military-bases-on-okinawa-still-an-essentialdeterrent/ DOA: 2-2-16
Of course they can, and the PRC would think this is a splendid idea. However, the
aforementioned ‘time and distance’ problems — and consequently weakened
deterrence — would apply. Moreover, such a move would suggest a weakened
US-Japan political relationship (and lessened deterrence) by virtue of Japan’s
central government being unwilling to make the political effort needed to maintain
US bases on Okinawa. Additionally, moving US bases to mainland Japan would
leave a vacuum. Vacuums get filled, and it is possible the PRC will fill this
vacuum. But it is almost unthinkable that a future Japanese administration would
allow this to happen as the result of a drastically reduced military presence on
Okinawa’s main island in light of the PRC threat. Thus, even if US forces leave
their Okinawa bases, JSDF forces will certainly replace them.
Importantly, in the absence of a US military presence on Okinawa, Chinese forces
would be facing off more or less directly with Japan Self Defense Force
units. Removing the deterrent effect on the PRC of the fear of harming US troops
would be dangerous given deep-seated Chinese resentment of Japan and an
increasing belief the PLA is a match for the JSDF. In the absence of ‘deterrent’
US forces on Okinawa, expect the PRC to push and ratchet up the pressure on
Japan — and in the Ryukyus and the East China Sea, to which China has stated it
is rightly entitled. This is dangerous.
Other ideas that have been considered for reducing US bases and force presence on
Okinawa while maintaining adequate operational and deterrent capability include a
‘virtual presence’ scheme and a scheme for ‘pre-positioning’ US equipment and
flying in troops when contingencies arise. These are both doubtful concepts in
terms of the ability to conduct effective military operations — and as importantly
— to deter unacceptable behavior by regional nations.
The ‘virtual presence’ solution calls for rotating forces, particularly US Marines,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
147
though it applies just as well to Air Force and US Navy units through the region
for training, without actually having any bases in the area. However, without a
single location serving as a ‘center of gravity’ from which military — and Marine
— power is seen to derive, there would always be something ephemeral about its
presence, and suggests the US is not really serious about its promise to defend
Japan and its own interests.
The ‘prepositioning’ school of thought claims US forces and Marines only need to
have supplies and equipment staged on Okinawa, with troops flying out in the
event of crisis. However, it is a truism that it is better to be located and to train in
the region where you operate — just like a baseball team does best when practicing
and playing at its home field. Also, pre-staged supplies and forward-based troops
are viewed differently by adversaries. One is a vague promise of intervention, the
other is a near certainty.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
148
Asia War Impacts
Asia war goes nuclear
Tan, Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences – University of New South Wales, ‘15
(Andrew T.H., “The prospects for conflict in East Asia”, Security and Conflict in East Asia, Routledge
International Handbooks)
High tensions in East Asia
The high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War, have led to fears of
open conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional powers, in particular the USA, By
early 2013, tensions between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea, the USA and Japan, on the
other, had deteriorated to their worst level since the end of the Korean War in 1953, sparking fears of
an accidental war due to North Korea’s brinkmanship and political miscalculation (ICG 2013a). Tensions
between the People’s Republic of China and Japan were also at their highest since the end of the Second
World War, due to their dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Hughes 2013). More seriously, China,
the USA and North Korea possess nuclear weapons, and Japan has always been regarded as a threshold
nuclear power, as it possesses plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile
capability and the technology to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons power should
it choose to do so (Rublee 2010: 62-63). South Korea could also be forced to develop its own nuclear
weapons if the threat from a hostile, aggressive and unpredictable North Korea continues to grow as it
develops its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and uses them to coerce South Korea
(New York Times 2013).
The impact of any regional conflict in East Asia will be significant and global. Any conflict in this region
would involve not only states in the region and US allies from further afield, but also quickly escalate
into a nuclear conflict, given the superiority that the USA enjoys in terms of conventional warfare
capabilities over North Korea, and to a diminishing degree, China, thus forcing them to resort to nonconventional means, such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict. Indeed, the US strategy of Air-Sea
Battle, which involves attacking China’s surveillance, intelligence and command systems, are likely to be
interpreted by China as attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability and could thus lead to a quick
arid unwanted escalation into a nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013).
Moreover, today the centre of the global economy no longer resides in Europe or North America but in
Asia, in particular, East Asia. Indeed, three of the key actors in the region, namely the USA, China and
Japan, are also the three largest economies in the world, with South Korea ranked 15th in global terms,
according to the World Bank. Any conflict in East Asia will therefore have a profound, global economic
impact. Furthermore, the fact that any conflict could escalate into a major war, including nuclear war,
means that conflict in East Asia will have global implications as well as uncertain consequences for the
international system.
Asian war escalates to nuclear use – MAD, diplomacy, and other checks fail
Zala 7 (Benjamin Zala, International Politics at the University of Leicester, PhD at the University of
Birmingham, former director of the Sustainable Security Programme at the Oxford Research Group,
February 2007, Security Challenges, “Asia-Pacific: The New Nuclear Fault Line?” vol. 3, no. 1,
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no1Zala.pdf)
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
149
Conclusion In any possible major conflict that may erupt in Asia-Pacific – whether on the Korean
peninsula, between Japan and China, in the Taiwan straight, or over Kashmir—a major instigating factor
may not be deliberate hostilities but miscalculation. Since the nuclear age in international relations
began in 1945, states have been deterred from using all military options available for pursuing strategic
objectives due to the threat of a nuclear exchange between two or more states. Yet nuclear deterrence
has not always been the constraining force that it ought to be. As Paul Monk has observed, the history
of the US-Sino confrontation over Taiwan gives some cause for concern in this regard. It was not the
intention of the Truman administration in 1948-50 to embroil itself in a war with China or to defend the
Republic of China on Taiwan, yet it found itself doing both. It was not the intention of Mao Zedong in the
late 1940s or the late 1950s to embroil himself in a war with the United States. Yet he ended up in a
brutal and costly conflict in Korea, in which hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers were killed
(including one of his own sons), and he very nearly brought on a cataclysmic U.S. nuclear strike against
China in 1958.17 If the Asia-Pacific region remains a theatre of Great Power competition as well as
retaining the geo-political flashpoints discussed above (as it appears likely to for some time), the threat
of miscalculation in military planning will only increase. If the nuclear weapons paths discussed above
are also followed (even if only by some), the threat of a nuclear exchange could well come to
characterise the strategic relations of states in Asia-Pacific just as it did for the members of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact in Europe during the Cold War. Early on in the Cold War, scholars and practitioners
turned their minds towards coming up with ways of facilitating rapprochement and some level of
cooperation amongst the nuclear powers, and in particular the two bipolar rivals. At the beginning of
the Twenty First Century, it does not appear that strategic thinking and diplomatic efforts are making
the equivalent gains in the Asia-Pacific region. Whether the region’s geopolitics over the coming
decades come to be characterised by being part of a larger multipolar order, an Asia-Pacific balance of
powers or the continuation of an uneasy dominance of the region by the American superpower
alongside a number of ‘great’ and ‘rising’ powers, is still unclear. Yet whatever the make up of the region
in terms of power relations, the Asia-Pacific appears to be set to dominate early-mid Twenty First
Century international relations. In the absence of robust regional arms control agreements18 or a
multilateral framework to discuss the strategic problems of the region,19 coupled with the rapidly
disintegrating consensus on nuclear weapons issues at the international level, the prospects of the AsiaPacific region becoming the new nuclear fault line seem set to significantly increase.
Most likely scenario for nuclear war
Nye et al., Former Deputy Secretary of State, 2K
[Joseph S. Nye, Professor @ The John F. Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard University, Former
Deputy Secretary of State, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard L. Armitage, Former Deputy
Secretary of State, Michael J. Green, Advisor & Japan Chair @ The Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Associate Professor @ The Walsh School of Foreign Service, Kurt M. Campbell, Fellow @ The
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frank Jannuzi, Minority Staff Member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Edward J. Lincoln, Fellow @ The Brookings Institution, “The United States
and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” The Institute for National Strategic Studies,
October 11th 2000, http://homepage2.nifty.com/moru/lib/nichibeianpo/pdf/INSS%20Special%20Report.pdf]
Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political,
security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world's population, 25
percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United
States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
150
appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the
consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a
generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the
world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable
states. Hostilities that could directly involve the U nited S tates in a major conflict could occur at a
moment notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major
flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in
Indonesia, the world fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is
tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region made facto security
architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral
relationship is more important than ever. With the world second-largest economy and a wellequipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S.
involvement in Asia. The U.S.- Japan alliance is central to America global security strategy. Japan, too, is
experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since
the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan
experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated
the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately
apparent, could be no less profound.
For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the
21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of
changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in
Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that
changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build
confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan's
participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various
defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations Regional Forum and the new plus Three grouping are further testimony to Tokyo's increasing
activism. Most significantly, Japan's alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for
regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a
bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. PostCold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together
to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia.
In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing
its focus and coherence- -notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once
freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored
the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well-intentioned efforts to find
substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no
clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security
have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security
ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been
drawn to the notion of Asianization and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral
institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded
the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period
of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some
Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade
tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay
over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine
and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until
the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula-- punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
151
incident--captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted
them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan
Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to
reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way
toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete
changes that updated defense ties in the ¶ form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement
to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood
alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon
returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.-Japan
relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers
had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan's prolonged
recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as
arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others'
economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived
the U.S. approach as a self serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful
of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been
obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal
focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China--a relationship
characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy
demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda
set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing's hostile reaction to
the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it
regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to
constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and-- to a lesser extent--Japan sought to
improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a
containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has
been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most
effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no
single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition
that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.Japan alliance. Both the U nited S tates and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a
time of political transition and important change in both countries--for the United States, a new
national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social
transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile
nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia--all
pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a pasting asset in irreversible decline, it
might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that
American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the
enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the
latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade,
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest
group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its
dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, wellconceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of
government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
152
a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a
government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of
economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the
international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart
the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle--the heretofore collusive relationships among
politicians, business, and the bureaucracies-- and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political
order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented
opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship--as well as test it further. The end of bipolar
ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security
affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches
to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to
assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan's parliamentary system make it
difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for long-term gain. The political
system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public at- large also recognize
that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan's future. Moreover, the Japanese
public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial
claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are
profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in
foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of
the private sector as the initiator of economic change--driven by technology and the empowerment of
the individual--are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as
Japan's risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation's economic transformation, the lack of
clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to
produce a well-conceived game plan for America's relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated
the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short,
the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium
on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership--that is to
say, excellence without arrogance--in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to
realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in
Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in
U.S.- Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and
fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come. Because the
stakes are so high in Asia , it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception
and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is
lowered dramatically by a visible and real U.S.- Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted
by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf.
Nuclear war
Cirincione 2000 (Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project – CEIP, Foreign Policy, 3-22, Lexis)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building
more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the
international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years
will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian
continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding
behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play
guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
153
Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race;
China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice
defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose
Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain
territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing
them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the
region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear
reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of
this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into
the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and
political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
154
Asia Arms Race Impats
Arms race in Asia causes global nuclear war --- strategic, cultural and political factors
make escalation likely.
Stephen Cimbala, March 2008. Professor of Political Science at Penn State University. “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis
Stability in Future Asia,” Comparative Strategy 27.2, p 113-132.
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard.
States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control
systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory
to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel
threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective
for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk
aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the
Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional
or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East
with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in
ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery
systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another's vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice
for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia,
North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and
China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of
contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the
defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing
over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges
posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia
may also have first strike-vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision
pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional
wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the
United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the
geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern
center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass
destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of
information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war
between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed
states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia
could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.
nuclear war
Adams 14 – Shar Adams, Reporter for the Epoch Times, Citing Desmond Ball, Professor in the Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, “Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in
North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror”, Epoch Times, 10-13,
http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1014683-asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-biggerthreat-than-war-on-terror/
The world may be focused on the “war on terror”, but the arms build up in North-East Asia poses a far greater threat to
global stability , says Professor Desmond Ball, a senior defence and security expert at the Australian National University (ANU). A former
head of ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Professor Ball is no lightweight when it comes to security concerns. It is Professor Ball’s
expertise in c ommand and c ontrol systems, particularly in relation to nuclear war, that underlies his concerns about
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
155
North-East Asia. “North-East
Asia has now become the most disturbing part of the globe ,” Prof Ball told Epoch
Times in an exclusive interview. China, Japan and South Korea – countries that are “ economic engines of the
global economy ” – are embroiled in an arms race of unprecedented proportions , punctuated by “very
dangerous military activities”, he says. Unlike the arms race seen during the Cold War, however, there are
no mechanisms in place to constrain the military escalation in Asia. “Indeed, the escalation dynamic
could move very rapidly and strongly to large scale conflict , including nuclear conflict ,” said Prof Ball. “It is
happening as we watch.” Arms Race Military spending in Asia has grown steadily over the last decade.
According to a 2013 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute report, China is now the world’s second largest military spender behind
the United States, spending an estimated $188 billion in 2013. Japan and South Korea are also among the world’s top 10 military spenders.
When North Korea and Taiwan are included, North-East
Asian countries constitute around 85 per cent of military
spending in Asia. But what is more disturbing, Prof Ball says, is the motivation for the acquisitions. “The primary reason now for
the acquisitions, whether they are air warfare destroyers, missiles or defense submarines, is simply to match what the other
[countries] are getting,” he said. While he believes it is likely that Japan would have embarked on military modernisation, he says it is
China’s military provocation of countries across Asia that is fuelling the build-up. Since China lay claim to all of the South China Sea, it has
escalated territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. What started with skirmishes between
locals and Chinese fishing boats or navy vessels has now become territorial grabs – island building on contested
rocky outcrops. In a sign of things to come, the South China Morning Post reported in June: “China is looking to expand its biggest installation in
the Spratly Islands into a fully formed artificial island, complete with airstrip and sea port, to better project its military strength in the South
China Sea.” According to Filipino media, the artificial island falls within the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Prof Ball says China’s
behaviour in the South China Sea is provocative, but “in the scale of what we are talking about, that is nothing” compared with conflicts in
North-East Asia, where China
and Japan are contesting claims over the Tokyo-controlled Senkaku Islands (claimed as
the Diaoyus by China). Of the Senkakus conflict, Prof Ball says: “We are talking about actual footsteps towards nuclear
war – submarines and missiles.” Chinese and Japanese activity in the Senkakus region has escalated to the point where sometimes there
are “at least 40 aircraft jostling” over the contested area, he said. Alarm bells were set off near the Senkakus in January
last year when a Chinese military vessel trained its fire-control radar on a Japanese naval destroyer. The incident spurred the Japanese Defense
Ministry to go public about that event and reveal another incident from a few days prior, when a Chinese frigate directed fire-control radar at a
Japanese military helicopter. Fire-control radars are not like surveillance or early warning radars – they have one purpose and that is to lock
onto a target in order to fire a missile. “Someone does that to us, we fire back,” Prof Ball said. Counter Measures Needed Prof Ball is recognised
for encouraging openness and transparency, and for his advocacy of multilateral institutions. He has been called one of the region’s “most
energetic and activist leaders in establishing forums for security dialogue and measures for building confidence”. In his experience visiting China
over the years, however, Prof Ball says gaining
open dialogue and transparency with Chinese military leaders is difficult .
He recounted a private meeting with a Chinese admiral shortly after the fire-control radar incident. Prof Ball had seen direct evidence of the
encounter – “tapes of the radar frequencies, the pulse rates and the pulse repetition frequencies” – and wanted to know what had happened
on the Chinese side and why it took place. “In a private meeting, I asked the admiral why … and he denied it to my face,” Prof Ball said. The
Chinese admiral would not even concede that an incident had happened. “I don’t see the point of this sort of dialogue,” he added. With
so
many players in the region and few barriers against conflict escalation , the North-East Asian nuclear
arms race is now far more complex and dangerous than the Cold War, he says. In the Cold War, there
were mechanisms at each level of potential confrontation, including a direct hotline between the US and Soviet
leaders. “Once things get serious here, [there is] nothing to slow things down . On the contrary, you have all
the incentives to go first ,” he said.
Goes nuclear
Cirincione 2k (Joseph, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Foreign Policy, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” 3/22/00, lexis)
The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more
quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms
control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
156
Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six
decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national
missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its
nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan
shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid
tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the
benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest
Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons;
the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can
trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an
interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the
frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments
could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global
economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.
Campbell et al 8 (Kurt M, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Campbell
served in several capacities in government, including as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia
and the Pacific, Director on theNational Security Council Staff, previously the Chief Executive Officer and
co-founder of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), served as Director of the Aspen Strategy
Group and the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly, and was the founder and
Principal of StratAsia, a strategic advisory company focused on Asia, rior to co-founding CNAS, he served
as Senior Vice President, Director of the International Security Program, and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair
in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, doctorate in
International Relation Theory from Oxford, former associate professor of public policy and international
relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and Assistant Director of the Center for Science
and International Affairs at Harvard University, member of Council on Foreign Relations
and International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Power of Balance: America in iAsia” June 2008,
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CampbellPatelSingh_iAsia_June08.pdf)
Asian investment is also at record levels. Asian countries lead the world with unprecedented infrastructure projects. With over $3 trillion in foreign currency reserves, Asian nations and businesses are
starting to shape global economic activity. Indian firms are purchasing industrial giants such as Arcelor
Steel, as well as iconic brands of its once-colonial ruler, such as Jaguar and Range Rover. China’s Lenovo
bought IBM’s personal computer
We call the transformations across the Asia-Pacific the emergence of “iAsia” to reflect the adoption by
countries across Asia of fundamentally new strategic approaches to their neighbors and the world. Asian
nations are pursuing their interests with real power in a period of both tremendous potential and great
uncertainty. iAsia is: Integrating: iAsia includes increasing economic interdependence and a flowering of
multinational forums to deal with trade, cultural exchange, and, to some degree, security. Innovating:
iAsia boasts the world’s most successful manufacturing and technology sectors and could start taking
the lead in everything from finance to nanotech to green tech. Investing: Asian nations are developing
infrastructure and human capital at unprecedented rates. But the continent remains plagued by:
Insecurity: Great-power rivalry is alive in Asia. Massive military investments along with historic
suspicions and contemporary territorial and other conflicts make war in Asia plausible. Instability: From
environmental degradation to violent extremism to trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons, Asian
nations have much to worry about. Inequality: Within nations and between them, inequality in Asia is
more stark than anywhere else in the world. Impoverished minorities in countries like India and China,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
157
and the gap in governance and capacity within countries, whether as backward as Burma or as advanced
as Singapore, present unique challenges. A traditional approach to Asia will not suffice if the United
States is to both protect American interests and help iAsia realize its potential and avoid pitfalls.
business and the Chinese government, along with other Asian financial players, injected billions in
capital to help steady U.S. investment banks such as Merrill Lynch as the American subprime mortgage
collapse unfolded. Chinese investment funds regional industrialization, which in turn creates new
markets for global products. Asia now accounts for over 40 percent of global consumption of steel 4 and
China is consuming almost half of world’s available concrete. 5 Natural resources from soy to copper to
oil are being used by China and India at astonishing rates, driving up commodity prices and setting off
alarm bells in Washington and other Western capitals. Yet Asia is not a theater at peace. On average,
between 15 and 50 people die every day from causes tied to conflict, and suspicions rooted in rivalry
and nationalism run deep. The continent harbors every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our
age: it is a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension; a source of terror and extremism; an accelerating
driver of the insatiable global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will suffer the
adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation; and the most likely
theater on Earth for a major conventional confrontation and even a nuclear conflict. Coexisting with the
optimism of iAsia are the ingredients for internal strife, non-traditional threats like terrorism, and
traditional interstate conflict, which are all magnified by the risk of miscalculation or poor decisionmaking.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
158
China Threat
The China threat is real – realism is inevitable and explains interstate conflict
Mearsheimer 15, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, US, China heading
toward face-off, says Mearsheimer, March, asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/InternationalRelations/US-China-heading-toward-face-off-says-Mearsheimer?page=2
A: China sends mixed signals when it talks -- it says very different things. China talks about rising peacefully and it tries to assure its neighbors,
countries like Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, that as it grows more powerful, those neighbors have nothing to worry about. However, at the same time the
Chinese have made it clear that: No. 1, they want the Senkaku Islands back or they want to make them part of China; No. 2, they
intend to make Taiwan part of China once again and, No. 3, they plan to turn the South China Sea into
a giant Chinese lake. What the Chinese are saying is that as we get more powerful we're going to try to change the status quo. This is going to
frighten all of China's neighbors, and it's sending the opposite message from the one that says China can rise peacefully and that
China is a benign power in the region. I think in the end ... that message -- that China is a benign power -- will be drowned out by
China's behavior, which will be much more oriented towards altering the status quo, and by military
force, if necessary. Q: It sounds like you are saying a conflict between the U.S. and China is unavoidable unless China changes its behavior. But are you also saying that China
will not change if its economy continues to grow? A: My argument is that it makes good sense for China, if it continues to grow economically in an
impressive way, to try to dominate Asia. It's not foolish for any country to want to dominate its area of the world. It
makes very good sense for China to be in a position where it is by far the most powerful state in Asia and the United States is no longer in Asia. That's the ideal
situation from China's point of view, just as from the American point of view, the ideal situation is to dominate the Western Hemisphere,
to have no other great powers in the neighborhood and no distant great powers from either Europe or Asia come into the Western Hemisphere. That's ideal from the American
it may be in China's interest to dominate Asia. But it is not in Japan's interest and it
America's interest to have a China that is what we call a "regional hegemon." Now, what will happen if China continues to grow is that you will
get an intense security competition between China on the one hand and countries like Japan and the United States on the other. Whether or not that
security competition leads to an actual war is difficult to say. It might not lead to a war, but there is at least a good chance that you'll
have a fight, an armed conflict over the Senkakus or Taiwan or the South China Sea
point of view. But to go back to Asia,
is not in
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
Japan-US Alliance Impacts
159
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
160
Expanding the alliance’s key to Japanese ISR capabilities—U.S. expertise guides
development while upholding burden sharing through concurrent Japanese expansion
Patrick Cronin 10, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center
for a New American Security, Paul Giarra, President of Global Strategies and Transformation, retired
Navy Commander, "Robotic Skies: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and the Strategic Defense
of Japan", Working Paper 2010, Center for a New American Security,
www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Robotic%20Skies_CroninGiarra.pdf
It is good news for Japan that the United States has been the global leader in ISR since the beginning of the
Cold War. The 1960 Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan has as its first mission the defense of Japan. As treaty partners
committed to the defense of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, the United States and Japan
should continue their collaboration on improving national and bilateral ISR capabilities to fill gaps in the
maritime, air, space and cyberspace coverage of Japan. Furthermore, America’s extensive experience with ISR
is a useful, if not exclusive, guide for Japanese ISR planning.
The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was published in February 201011 during what Aviation Week and Space Technology refers to as
an “airpower revolution in autonomous systems.” According to that publication “Automated, adaptive systems for processing, exploiting and
disseminating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data are a ‘real near-term need’ ... because of the increasing use of wide-area
airborne surveillance systems down- linking multiple video feeds.”12
The QDR, which prescribes a robust ISR force, carries Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ imprimatur on current and future U.S. defense
planning. Truly a wartime report and a key planning milestone, the QDR appeared after Secretary Gates’ stern insistence that the Department
of Defense follow through on fielding sufficient unmanned aerial vehicles to the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates felt
strongly enough about continuing resistance to his explicit direction to the Air Force regarding UAVs that the failure of the Air Force secretary
and chief of staff to follow his guidance in this regard was partly responsible for their abrupt dismissal. The QDR takes a highly deliberate
approach to ISR – both platforms and capabilities: Field more and better manned and unmanned ISR assets, and get them to Iraq and
Afghanistan where they will do the most good on the battlefield. The QDR’s emphasis on current battlefield (Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as a
future battlefield (air-sea battle) underscores the impor- tance of ISR in today’s Pentagon.
ISR is an important aspect of regional readiness, deterrence and response. In the Asia-Pacific, China’s
development of its anti-access and area-denial rhetoric, strategic doctrine, and military capabilities poses
considerable challenges to Japanese and American planners. With its emphasis on regional stability and allied
collaboration, the QDR should reassure Japanese decision makers. More specifically, the QDR chartered the development of a joint air-sea
battle concept, which has been a joint focus of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate
capabilities across all operational domains to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action. As it matures, the concept will also help
guide the development of capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. Although the QDR does not dictate the specific shape
of air-sea battle concepts being considered jointly by the U.S. Air Force and Navy (in Asia as in other regions), it is apparent that allies, alliances
and ISR will play a significant role.1 3 On the need to deter and defeat aggression in anti- access environments, the QDR states:
Chinese military modernization is a general concern in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization,
China is developing and fielding large numbers
of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with
advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and com- puter network attack capabilities,
advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its
military modernization programs, raising a number of legitimate questions regarding its long-term intentions ...
Accordingly, the Department of Defense is taking steps to ensure that future U.S. forces remain capable of protecting the nation and its allies in
the face of this dynamic threat environment. In addition to ongoing modernization efforts, this QDR has directed a range of enhancements to
U.S. forces and capabilities.14
Japan’s uncertain security situation makes an aerospace dialogue that defines future needs more
important than ever. This dialogue begins with
the United States and should include discussion of current
and future bilateral ISR capabilities. The dialogue would fit within the U.S.-Japan Capabilities Assessment dialogue, which is
conducted at the military-to-military level, with diplomatic and policy involvement in the familiar four-party “2+2” arrangement. As a point of
reference, the
issue of missile defense provides a useful example of how the United States and Japan have been
able to make good progress in a complex alliance planning dialogue.
EXPANDING JAPAN’S ISR CAPABILITIES
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
161
While Japan reviews how much cooperation can
be provided through closer collaboration with the
United States, it should also consider expansion of its own national ISR capabilities. The two processes
need to be coordinated within the context of the alliance. Indeed, a Japanese national ISR planning
dialogue that parallels alliance planning discussions could be part of a larger aerospace capabilities
planning process.
Japan’s national ISR capabilities can be envisioned in the context of a number of preliminary but realistic
operational scenarios that define Japan’s international security environment: the Sea of Japan, the East
China Sea, the South China Sea, the Ryukyu Islands and the Horn of Africa. It is in these areas where Japanese
interests intersect with North Korean and Chinese operations, and where enhanced Japanese airborne ISR capabilities would pay great
dividends, forming the basis for considering how to develop ISR acquisition and operational programs. A convenient way to visualize this
requirement is to consider Japan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, notionally illustrated below.
ISR command and control and analysis are crucial for Japan’s overall security infrastructure. It is not simply
the military that is integral to the system. Civilian organizations, akin to the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office, for instance, must control ISR
operations and provide the critical analysis that turns real-time information into strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
US-Japan ISR cooperation key to USAF effectiveness
Schanz 13--Marc V., senior editor of Air Force Magazine, January 2013, ISR After Afghanistan,
www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/.../0113ISR.pdf
Another area of interest is how to improve operations from standoff distances, such as from U-2s flying outside
the range of ground-based surface-to-air missiles and other threats.
Collaboration will play a huge role as the US draws down from Central Asia and redistributes its force
structure. The ability to leverage the ISR data that allies collect and share will prove valuable.
“Effective alliances and partnerships are a force multiplier in a region as vast as the Asia-Pacific region,”
Donley said, noting cooperation activities with Aus- tralia and Japan are vital to maintaining USAF global
vigilance.
Collapse of Air Force ISR kills deterrence and hegemony—unleashes global conflict
Thompson, March 2013--Loren B., PhD, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Lexington
Institute, www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/AirDominance-ISR.pdf
The United States has enjoyed global air dominance for many decades. No U.S. soldier on the ground has been killed by
hostile aircraft since the Korean War, and no U.S. pilot in the air has been killed by hostile aircraft since the Vietnam War.1 U.S. air dominance
has been preserved by pouring vast amounts of money into technology and training, far surpassing the efforts of other nations. The scale of this
funding was driven by an awareness of how crucial air dominance was to other facets of warfighting, plus the fear that a few mis-steps might
result in America losing its edge in the air.
However, since
the Cold War ended, modernization efforts in the Air Force and Navy -- the main providers of U.S. air
dominance -- have lagged. Plans to replace Air Force bombers, tankers and reconnaissance aircraft were canceled or delayed, while
programs to recapitalize tactical air fleets in both services were repeatedly restructured. In addition, efforts to develop next- generation
intelligence, navigation, communication, missile-warning and weather satellites have fallen far behind schedule. As a result, the joint inventory
of fixed-wing aircraft and orbital systems enabling air dominance has aged considerably. Unmanned aircraft are an exception to this trend, but
their utility in contested airspace is unproven.
While modernization of airborne and orbital assets was lagging, the global threat environment changed. China
emerged as the world's second-largest economy, pursuing regional security objectives with increasing vigor. Rogue states of varying
stripe developed weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Non-state actors with extreme
agendas were empowered by the proliferation of new military tools and techniques. And the focus of global security
shifted from technologies in which only a few countries could play, such as long-range ballistic missiles, to technologies in which many players
could develop deep expertise.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
162
If recent trends persist, the United States will gradually lose its claim to global air dominance. That claim is
already being challenged in the Western Pacific, where a scattered and aging U.S. air fleet is faced with growing Chinese investment in new
aircraft and air defenses. When
China's increasing military might is combined with its intrinsic geographical advantages in the
possibility arises that America may cease to be the dominant air power in what has become
the industrial heartland of the new global economy.2 Similar outcomes could occur in other regions,
because with recent advances in surface-to-air missiles, multi-spectral sensors, tactical networks and
other military systems, it is no longer necessary to match every aspect of U.S. air power in order to
defeat it.
region, the
With all that in mind, the Lexington Institute embarked on a year-long inquiry into the requirements for maintaining U.S. global air dominance.
The inquiry focused on the four core components of air dominance: intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance; air superiority; long- range
strike; and mobility. In each area, the inquiry sought to understand the current force structure and modernization programs being funded, and
then identify gaps in future capabilities that need to be addressed. It also examined alternative approaches to satisfying operational
requirements, and explored how those alternatives might be implemented in varying fiscal circumstances. A series of working groups and
studies were conducted in support of the final report, to be issued in Spring of 2013.
The present study is about intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance -- typically referred to among air-power
practitioners as "ISR." Timely, precise insights into enemy actions and intentions have always been
valuable in warfare, but with the coming of the information revolution they have assumed overriding
importance because there are now so many options for collecting, analyzing and exploiting relevant
data. Air power provides a unique perspective on modern warfare, because there are some features of military activity
that can only be captured from above. Airborne ISR also generates information essential to the deterrence of
aggression, the enforcement of arms-control treaties, and the prevention of nuclear proliferation. In a
world of rapidly changing technology and diverse threats, constant vigilance is a necessary cost of preserving the
peace, and providing that vigilance is an overarching mission of the nation's air forces.
Failure to shore up the alliance causes multiple scenarios for nuclear war
Armitage, 10-11-2K – former Deputy Secretary of State (Richard, “The United States and Japan:
Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at
National Defense University)
Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s
population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and
Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social
the prospects for conflict in
Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major
powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at
a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major
flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourthand economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but
largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this
, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s
second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S.
involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is
promising but also potentially dangerous setting
experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II.
Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The
effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji
the key to
sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that
anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia.
Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States,
As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and
build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early
1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further
testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the
U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western
alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared
victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from
the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find
substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of
international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in
both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path
similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral
tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
163
diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine
and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of
the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral
relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in
the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater
missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to
bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers
had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see
Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and
opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own selfcentered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the
bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo
followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security
partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional
diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment
strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty,
the time has arrived for renewed
attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face
an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national
and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that
leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature
of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible
decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to
underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s.
Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key
constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net
effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible
alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity
of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are
breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse.
The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test
it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials
provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global
stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But
the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by
giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a
force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and
the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s
economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for
America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic,
If the United States can exercise
leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to
realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive
and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs.
political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global
Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan
develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in
Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan
arenas in the years to come Security
allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should
be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic
approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more
efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security
policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner.
This
requires the
We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance.
arrangement
following elements: Reaffirming the
defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands.
Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services
with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles
and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist
each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping
and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to
Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility,
flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this
burden other peacekeeping nations.
process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of
We should strive to reduce the American
military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and
technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago.
rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense
technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to
facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both
countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American
policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary
to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security,
distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The
U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on
Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
164
the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an
obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense
operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready
for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better
elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But
neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by
American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete
implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement
should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access
from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so
that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United
States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.
across the region. But
The alliance is key to maintain and Pakistani stability
Campbell, 6-28-10 – Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Kurt M., Statement
before the House Armed Services Committee Washington, DC, “U.S.-Japan Relations for the 21st
Century)
Japan continues to be an increasingly active partner in global affairs, and our bilateral and multilateral
cooperation transcends the Asia-Pacific region. Our strong relationship with Japan is global in reach.
Japan is working with us and others on post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Chile, to eradicate disease
and develop environmentally friendly sources of energy. In addition to their work in Haiti, Japan is involved in UN
peace-keeping missions in Syria, Nepal, and Sudan, and has made contributions in kind to numerous UN
missions. In Iraq, our Japanese allies have pledged nearly $5 billion in aid to Iraq, focusing on rebuilding the industrial base and
energy, transportation, and irrigation infrastructure. By generating economic opportunities for the Iraqi people, these activities complement
to our shared goal of ensuring the country’s long-term stability. Japan is a vital
international supporter of reconstruction, reintegration, and development in Afghanistan. Japan has
assumed the lion’s share of the cost of salaries for the Afghan police force. With a $5 billion commitment over five
years, Japan is the second largest single donor, after the United States, to Afghanistan. Japan is providing
expertise as well as funding, and helping the Afghan government develop programs to hasten the
reintegration of former Taliban into normal society. In Pakistan, as well, Japan is contributing to the
country’s stability by providing over $2 billion of humanitarian and development assistance. Japan is
helping the international community ensure refugees and internally displaced Pakistanis receive the food,
shelter, and medical services they need. In a program that complements the American work Secretary Clinton announced in Islamabad
on July 19, Japan is extending the electricity grid to areas of the country that have not had it before and
developing the energy sector throughout the country.
our own and contribute
Solves Pakistan collapse and global nuclear war
Pitt, 5-8-09 – New York Times, internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What
Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (William, “Unstable
Pakistan Threatens the World,”
http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)
But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several
children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and
government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other
militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole
new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave
Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear
weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The
and growing threat to us all.
situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal
security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff
with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century.
The fact that Pakistan, and India,
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
165
and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or
escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently,
the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a
recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity
mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that,
hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and
opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled,
leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam
out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a
regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent
on spreading their rule. The
United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must
now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there.
Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant
gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described
the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in
the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working
with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its
historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence
conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States
is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is
believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is
threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears
over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. " As
the insurgency of the Taliban and
Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly
concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants
to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In
public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But
that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and
Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan
sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought
to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the
country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell
could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those
If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very
dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nucleararmed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured,
the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world
on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly
weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario.
so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious
about addressing the situation. So should we all.
The alliance solves the impact
Smith, 7-26-10 – Senior Fellow for Japan at the Council on Foreign Relations (Sheila, “Successful U.S.Japan agenda must meet public expectations,” The Nikkei Weekly)
In their first meeting on June 27, U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minis-ter Naoto Kan set a positive tone for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Coming off a dif-ficult
interlude in the bilateral relationship, there is reason for all of us to be reassured as to the commitment of our two countries' leaders to work to-gether. Yet if
we
are to recast the foundation upon which the alliance's future will be built, we should also guard against
making light of the work ahead. Adapting this relationship so that it can address contemporary and
future challenges is the goal, and it is easy to forget that it will take more than a good meeting to make this happen. To be sure, one of the most
difficult legacies of our recent bilateral disconnect is that relations at the highest level of government have become deeply strained. Thus, in the weeks and months
ahead, the
U.S. and Japanese governments must find a way to build trust between the new ruling party of Japan and
the Obama administration. But the more pressing need will be to build trust between the people of Japan
and their leaders on how to proceed with the task of adapting to change. So a second - and perhaps more difficult - task is to build a common agenda for
cooperation that can produce visible results. That agenda must have bipartisan (in the U.S.) and multiparty (in Japan) support if it is to be sustainable. As we have
learned over the past 10 months, political change can be a challenge to even the best of high-level intentions for the U.S.-Japan alliance. As much as he is criticized
now, former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama intended to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance. And from the earliest days of his presi-dency, Obama has advocated the
importance of the alliance. Yet, confusion has reigned between our two governments and fostered deep skepticism about the alli-ance's effectiveness. Democratic
societies change governments, and political transitions are the norm. Yet transitions in Tokyo have not been the norm, and old habits of alliance man-agement, it
seems, die hard. Our officials must be alert to how the alliance will be affected as Japan's governing practices shift. And alliance-management practices must adapt
to new political realities. The Democratic Party of Japan government is expected to be in power until the next lower house election, most likely to be held in 2013.
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
166
Before then, of course, elections in Okinawa and Tokyo as well as the U.S. midterm congressional elections this fall will test our two governments' ability to fulfill
whatever agenda might be devised. We should not forget that another presidential election in 2012 will make sig-nificant political challenges out of foreign policy
issues in the U.S. as well. Thus, the prime minister and president ought to be thinking of how to craft an agenda that can garner broad-based support among our
political elites as well as our citizenries. Of course, the
real key here is in the substance that will make up our bilateral
agenda. What is it that our two peoples expect of this relationship? And how can we ensure that it lives up to those expectations? The list of tasks we might undertake is long, as our shared interests and even our domestic priorities line up well. Globally, Japan and the U.S. share an interest in
contending with climate change and exploring mechanisms for energy conservation as well as developing alternative sources of
energy. Additionally, our two societies depend deeply on the development of stable global rules for
commerce and dispute-resolution mechanisms as an increasing number of economies become globally competitive. National economic growth
will depend on U.S.-Japan leadership in the international effort to stabilize the global economy and in our
respective efforts to restore fiscal responsibility in the years ahead. The true security challenges lie within northeast Asia, and it
is here that this alliance must prove its mettle in uncharted waters. Japan and the U.S. must contend head-on
with the potential for instability on the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Kan and President Obama must continue to work with
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to organize a global effort to condemn Pyongyang's use of force, and to forestall potential future
provocations that could lead to additional deaths in the region. Key here will be persuading Beijing that its interests in a stable northeast Asia - as well as in
broader Asia-Pacific maritime stability - make regional security cooperation imperative. A miscalculation by China here could have
devastating consequences for the future of this part of the world. Beyond diplomacy, the U.S. and Japan must focus clearly and with alacrity on the
"what ifs" associated with a breakdown of order in North Korea should the suc-cession process go awry. And our security agenda should build on the accrued experiences of our two militaries' efforts thus far to cope with managing the multiple crises already generated by North Korea's nuclear and missile tests. Our shared
interests are broad, and the means by which we can pool our resources abundant. Yet, when it comes right down to it, this relationship will garner public support in
Japan and the U.S. only if it demonstrates its value in tangible ways. Our two governments must be able to deliver on promises made - and this is why the issue
swirling around U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, a helicopter base in Okinawa Prefecture, is so fundamentally
important to the
success of the newly minted relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Kan. Fourteen years ago, their predecessors made a
promise to the people of Okinawa. Eight prime ministers and two presidents later, that promise remains unful-filled. Rhetoric must be put aside. Blame and
responsibility must be fully ac-cepted by both the U.S. and Japan. Our peoples are increasingly frustrated with the lack of resolution, and until
Futenma is
closed, the entire relationship is at risk of being held hostage to the inequity of concentrating so many U.S. military bases
on the tiny prefecture's main island. So the next several months will be crucial, not only to the relationship between our two leaders, but to the confidence of our
peoples in their leaders' ability. Capitalizing on the potential of the U.S.-Japan relationship does not rest solely on friendly relations between President Obama and
Prime Minister Kan. Rather, it depends on each one's ability to mobilize his government and society to fulfill an agenda of promise for Japan and the U.S. that will
carry us into the next generation.
The alliance is critical to preventing cyberterrorism
Denmark, 10 – Fellow at the Center for a New American Century (Abraham, “Cornerstone: A Future
Agenda for the U.S. – Japan Alliance,” CNAS Policy Brief)
In the years ahead, the alliance should contribute to the defense of the global commons – the maritime, air, space and cyber
domains that no country exclusively governs.⁵ The United States and Japan are highly dependent on the global
commons for security and prosperity. Their commerce and energy supplies traverse the world’s oceans, their militaries are
dependent on space-based sensors, and their societies are highly networked. Consequently, the United States and Japan have a
strong interest in countering threats to the global commons, preferably in tandem and working through the
alliance. As two of the world’s foremost maritime powers, the United States and Japan can play a pivotal role in combating piracy not only by
dispatching ships, which they already do, but also by bolstering the navies and coast guards of key littoral states. As global spacefaring nations,
they can credibly champion a treaty banning the first-use of anti-satellite weapons and advance other measures to prevent the ultimate high
ground from becoming a combat zone. And as
two of the world’s leading providers of information technologies, the
United States and Japan can pool resources to counter cyber espionage and foil debilitating cyber attacks.
Cyber warfare ensures accidental nuclear war – multiple warrants
Fritz ‘9
(Jason - former Captain of the U.S. Army, July, Hacking Nuclear Command and Control)
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two
authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and
control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman
missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding
officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a
nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
167
directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a
complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to
YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of
destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre
has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to
arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure
Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High
Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines
via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine
communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have
noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for
broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed
that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The
investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further
to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal
Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear
submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as
alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary
reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system
would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the
operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating
privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a
launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they
believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a
decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as
to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the
past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear
attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military
officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby groundlevel sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links
with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground
antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn
would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to
some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and
on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active,
cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into
believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes
it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be
done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a
project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to
be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair
2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted,
received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer
networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early
warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to
notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three
chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the
missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
168
nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning
systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be
gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are
transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet
may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If
access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators
believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the
decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist
groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an
attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the
number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier,
especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional
terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For
example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more
vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping
communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated
scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet.
Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to
protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and
the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For
example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands
within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back
together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be
used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ “In June 1998, a group of
international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic
Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a
nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements
like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no
significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point
towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit
letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant
2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations
between governments.
Alliance key to stop disease spread
Nye, 5-12-08 – Government Professor at Harvard & former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Joseph,
“Future of Japan-US Alliance,” Korea Times)
In general, transnational threats such as climate change or pandemics can cause damage on a scale equivalent
to military conflict. (In 1918, avian flu killed more people than died in World War I). Responding to such threats requires
cooperation, soft power, and non-military instruments, and this is an area in which Japan is a much more equal and
important ally. If anything, the new and growing dimension of transnational threats, when added to traditional
security concerns, makes the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance look more promising than ever.
Scenario One is Disease – It leads to extinction
GREGER 08 – M.D., is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States (Michael Greger, , Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching,
http://birdflubook.com/a.php?id=111)
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
169
diseases] were advance patrols of a great
army that is preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the
Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some
people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary
competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept
Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new
in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they
fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see,
pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep
So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but
the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the human race is losing the race.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We
it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the
up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct.
Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in
time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging
viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year
head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that
emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs
infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, “Considering that bacteria,
and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two
percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of
competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as
threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human
species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. “Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will
continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of
London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
170
Japan Nuclearization
The disad outweighs aff – withdrawal emboldens Japanese prolif – that sparks a
regional arms race – the impact is global nuclear war because of accidents, miscalc,
and preemption – draws in every major power. It turns the aff because the US will
inevitable be drawn back into the region – fiat doesn’t solve because the aff only
mandates withdrawal
The impact is quick
Brumfiel 4 (Geoff, Cites Paul Leventhal, Head of the Nuclear Control Institute, “Nuclear proliferation
special: We have the technology”, Nature 432, 432-437 (25 November 2004) | doi:10.1038/432432a;
Published online 24 November 2004,
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v432/n7016/full/432432a.html)
Paul Leventhal, head of the Nuclear Control Institute, a non-profit watchdog in Washington, says that
Iran is taking the path followed by one of the United States’ most steadfast allies: Japan. Since its first
nuclear-power plant became operational in 1966, Japan has developed a large civilian nuclear
programme that has produced several tonnes of plutonium-239, the other metal commonly used for
nuclear bombs. Leventhal says that many consider Japan to be little more than “a screwdriver away”
from a nuclear weapon. “Most think it could get a bomb in a matter of weeks to months, if not days,”
Leventhal says.
Pre-emptive wars in the interim
Friedberg 15 – PhD, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
(Aaron, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 57.3)
If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US security partners in
East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might improve their prospects
for balancing against Chinese power. But here again, there is likely to be a significant gap between
theory and reality. Assuming that Washington did not actively assist them, and that they could not
produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval during which its former allies lost the
protection of the American nuclear umbrella and the point at which they acquired their own would be
one in which they would be exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it
contains a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea, Japan
and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and Japan), a multipolar
nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to instability.48
Allied proliferation crushes U.S. influence
David Ochmanek, 2015 – senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, M.P.A., Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, "Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the AsiaPacific Region", www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE142/RAND_PE142.pdf
As a substitute for U.S. security commitments, proponents of disengagement assume that other states
will “balance against a potential hegemon” (Layne, 1997, p. 113; see also Logan, 2013, p. 15). Their
preferred strategy, obviously, would place fewer demands on the armed forces of the United States but,
equally obviously, would represent a huge gamble, both militarily and strategically. It is not clear that a
lower U.S. profile abroad would prompt allies and partners to do more for their own defense. And if it
did, there are limits on the extent to which these states (e.g., Taiwan) can compete with their more
powerful neighbors (e.g., China). Hence, it is difficult to see how withdrawing U.S. forces and security
Millennial Speech & Debate
Okinawa Withdrawal – March PF
171
commitments from Eurasia would not erode deterrence, even if regional states with the ability to do so
dramatically stepped up their investments in military capabilities. More profoundly, U.S. retrenchment
would tempt regional hegemons to use divide-and-conquer strategies to isolate less-powerful states in
their regions, compelling them to accept one-sided security arrangements that make them beholden to
the hegemon. In this world, the diminished, isolated United States that would emerge would lose the
ability to influence decisions and actions in key regions, with unavoidable consequences for the security
and well-being of Americans.