Adversary images and willingness to use force:
British public opinion concerning Iran
Graeme A. M. Davies
University of Leeds
And
Robert Johns
University of Essex
1
How do individuals make decisions about preventive military action when they have little
idea about international affairs? Research into cognitive-interaction indicates that the public need
a considerable amount of situational evidence, such as casualty figures or the aggressive
behaviour of the target in order to structure their attitudes towards military action (REFs).
However, in preventive conflict scenarios, the potential target has not revealed its preferences; in
essence the key situational evidence is low, which in turn means individuals use other
mechanisms to formulate an attitude towards military action. We propose a theoretical
framework that links national images or stereotypes to individual support for preventive military
action, and we test this theory on British public support for airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear
programme.
This paper engages with academic discussions in the social psychological literature on
stereotyping (Alexander et. al 1999; Caprariello et. al 2009; Cuddy et. al 2007; Cuddy et. al. 2009;
Fiske 2002; Fiske et. al 2002) and on the growing body of research on national images in the
international relations literature (Boulding 1959; Cottam and Cottam 2001; Jervis 1970;
Alexander et. al 2005a; Alexander et. al 2005b). The study also relates to current debates taking
place in both the media and in the academic literature about the utility of airstrikes in dealing
with Iran’s nuclear programme (Bolton 2012; Tomlinson and Coghlan 2011; Davies 2012;
Tarock 2006;Kroenig 2012). Specifically we test whether macro–theoretical models that have
been generally dominant in the international relations literature- the democratic peace, clash of
civilisations and realist balance of power calculations- have any micro-foundations in individual
images of Iran and whether these images affect support for preventive military action.
Previous Research
With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq there has been considerable discussion in the
academic literature about public support for war (Clements 2012; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler
2005; Grieco et. al. 2011; Perla 2011). The literature has moved on a substantial distance since
2
the “Almond-Lippman” consensus which viewed that the public essentially had non-attitudes
towards foreign affairs (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955; Converse 1964). Rather the public’s
attitudes were highly contingent to the different foreign policy contexts or situations (Aldrich et
al. 2006). The current literature has tended to focus on how pre-dispositional and situational
factors influence public support for military action. Pre-dispositional research has found a range
of value dimensions influencing support for war including, but not limited to, internationalism
versus isolationism, militarism versus accommodation, national chauvinism and general political
ideologies (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Wittkopf 1990; Alvarez and Brehem 2002, Holsti 2004;
Herrman, Isernia and Segatti 2009; Russett, Hartley, and Murray 1994). Pre-dispositions are only
part of the explanation as to why individuals support war; the public are also sensitive to context
such as the objectives of the military intervention (Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992) or domestic
elite consensus (Larson 1996; Zaller 1992). To take into account both pre-dispositional and
situational factors Hermann, Tetlock and Visser (1999) developed a cognitive-interactionist
framework that synthesises both sets of variables into a series of experiments, finding that the
way individuals respond to situations depends very much on their general attitudes.
However, in the context of preventive military action, we argue that situational factors
will have little influence on public support for military action. The actual preferences of the
Iranian regime have not been revealed (for example, there has been no nuclear test nor has Iran
invaded another country) so it is hard for respondents to make judgements about the context of
the dispute. Situational research has tended to focus on ongoing conflicts where the “enemy” has
revealed its preferences, either invading another country or engaging in widespread human rights
abuses (Jentleson 1992; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). However, for preventive strikes
respondents are being asked to make decisions about the future behaviour of the target state and
the need for military action. Without situational evidence to indicate how the target state is
behaving then respondents will have to infer future behaviour from perceived current
characteristics, and this is where we believe that image theory help us to understand why
3
individuals will be willing to support airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Images of Iran
will provide heuristics that can be used by respondents to make judgements about the need for
military action.
Research on the image can first be traced back to Kenneth Boulding (1956) who
identified the image of the other as being critically important to foreign policy decision-making.
The image was defined as:
“the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioural unit, or
its
internal view of itself and its universe” (Boulding 1956 pp. 120-121).
For Boulding (1956, 1959) the two key images in international relations relate to the
hostility/friendliness of other states and their perceived strength/weakness. These images appear
to be very much ‘of their time’, relating to Cold War politics and the dominance of realism in
international relations thinking. Boulding’s theory of images was firstly a theory of elite foreign
policy decision-making and secondly was directly linked to realist calculations about power
distributions and alliance formation(Waltz 1956, 1979; Walt 1990). We however, are using image
theory to understand why individuals are willing to support preventive military action against
potential nuclear proliferators. While recognising that friend/enemy distinctions and capability
images are crucial to individual perceptions of the other, we believe that there are several other
factors that are relevant to the perceived need for preventive military action, such as images of
trust and responsibility.
Image theory has had a strong effect on the international relations literature having been
used to explain elite behaviour between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold
War (Hermann 1985, 1986; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990; Silverstein 1989). The application of
image theory has gone beyond Cold War dynamics to explain interactions between Middle
Eastern States (Szalay and Mir-Djalali 1991), between the United States and Arab countries
(White 1991) and between the US and Turkey (Bilali 2010). Images provide a powerful tool to
4
help us understand how elites make decisions about out-groups and how populations view other
states and peoples in the international system. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi (1997)
developed a formal theoretical approach arguing that perceptions of structural relations between
states result in emotions that influence the images and perceptions of other actors’ behaviours.
Image theory has been tested using a variety of experimental approaches on student samples
relating to hypothetical conflict scenarios (Alexander, Brewer, and Herrmann 1999; Herrmann et
al., 1997; Bilali 2010). Hermann et. al (1997) examined four ideal typical images (enemy, ally,
colony and degenerate) but suggested that further research needs to be conducted examining
different images and different patterns, a suggestion we take up in our own research.
Images are an important way for individuals to sort multifaceted material that would
become overly complex and unstructured without cognitive shortcuts (Tetlock 1983). Images
have both the potential to simplify decision-making but also distort it, potentially exacerbating
conflict (Stoessinger 1993; Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1983) or leading to groupthink (Janis and Mann
1977).
Cottam (1977) highlights that certain worldviews or “perceptual milieu” will predispose
different individuals towards alternative foreign policy options. For Cottam (1977), there are four
key images relating to threat, opportunity, culture and capability. Cottam, in reality blends these
four images into three as threat and opportunity are treated as opposites on the scale. We follow
Cottam (1977) and Hermann (1985) by including images of friend/enemy, cultural similarity and
capabilities, but we also take on board Martha Cottam’s (1986) aggression image which we
believe is directly relevant to decisions about pre-emption. Typically, image theory has tended to
focus on goal compatibility, relative power distributions and cultural status (Alexander et. al
2005). These images are then thought to influence perceptions of state behaviour and most
importantly influence enemy/friend distinctions (Beck 2002). While recognising that these
images are important, the international relations literature has provided us with several
theoretical cues that might influence the individual perceptions of other states in the
international system, most importantly the Democratic Peace and the Clash of Civilisations. We
5
therefore engage with the growing literature examining the micro-foundations of both the
Democratic Peace and the Clash of Civilisations (Tomz and Weeks 2012; Johns and Davies
2012; Lacina and Lee 2012).However, this paper examines a current foreign policy situation, the
standoff with Iran where we can examine actual images which wouldn’t be possible for
hypothetical scenarios that previous studies have investigated.
Images of Iran and Preventive Self-Defence
We divide images of Iran into two categories, the first set relate to perceptions of Iranian
attributes, specifically perceptions of cultural similarity, the level of Iranian democracy and
respondents’ estimates of Iranian national “power”. We are interested in assessing whether the
key macro variables that have been identified in international relations literature have microfoundational sources in individual attitudes. This paper examines whether the democratic peace,
the clash of civilisations, and/or power distributions influence public calculations about Iranian
behaviours, such as being trustworthy, responsible and/or aggressive and whether to support
preventive military strikes. The last national image we are interested in relates to friend/enemy
distinctions, specifically, what attributes or behaviours influence public perceptions of Iran being
a friend and whether it directly affects public support for military action?
Looking at figure 1 we see a theoretical model of the interaction between attribute
images, behavioural images and their effect on friend/enemy images. We anticipate that
individuals who perceive Iran to be similar, or to be democratic, or to be militarily capable will be
less willing to support military action against Iran. These attributes will have a direct effect on
support for military action, but will also influence public perceptions of how Iran will behave on
the international stage. It is theorised that institutional and cultural similarity will increase
perceptions that Iran is responsible and trustworthy, we also anticipate that institutional and
cultural similarity will reduce the perception that Iran is aggressive. Those respondents’ who
believe that Iran is powerful will be deterred from supporting military action, following standard
6
realist balance of power theory. However, we are also interested in examining indirect effects of
Iranian power, assessing whether perceptions of strength result in a belief that Iran is an
aggressive state, which in turn increases support for preventive military action. Therefore we
expect images to cascade from attributes, to behaviours, to friend/enemy distinction, which
finally influence public support for airstrikes.
Attribute Images
Cultural Similarity
Huntington's Clash of Civilisations (1996) has been both a controversial and highly
influential theory of state interactions in the post Cold War environment (Russett, Oneal and
Cox, 2000; Henderson and Tucker 2002; Lacina and Lee 2012; Johns and Davies 2012;
Schulman 2012). Huntington (1996) argues that the main fracture lines in current international
relations relate to conflicts between civilisations.
For Huntingdon “the most pervasive,
important and dangerous conflicts…are along the line separating people of Western Christianity,
on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox people on the other” (1996, 28). Does this macro
theoretical relationship between states hold for individual perceptions of Iran, a pre-dominantly
Muslim country, and its influence on British public support for military action? Certainly after
the 9/11 attacks there were numerous references to the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ in the media and
by elites, with President Bush referring to the ‘war on terror’ as a ‘crusade’ (White House 2001).
Likewise the day after the attacks on the Twin Towers, The Times of London ran a story entitled
“The 'end of history' replaced by a 'clash of civilisations'” (The Times, 2001).The British public’s
perception of the “other” will have a huge impact on the way the public react to Iran’s nuclear
program. Perceptions of cultural distance should undermine public confidence in both Iran’s
trustworthiness and the likelihood that they will behave responsibly. The greater the cultural
distance the more likely that the public will view Iran in a stereotypical fashion which will make
them seem less reasonable to the British public, potentially make them seem more aggressive and
7
open to infrahumanization reducing the value of Iranian civilians, essentially increasing support
for military action(Park and Judd, 1990; Ostrom and Sedikides, 1992; Judd and Park, 1993; Ryan
and Bogart, 1997; Kurzban and Leary 2001; Read and Urda 2003; Frieddrich and Dood 2009).
We also look to the social psychological literature to build the theoretical argument that
cultural distance reduces trust (Foddy et. al. 2009; Kramer 1999; Maddux and Brewer 2005 ).
Trust is a key social lubricant that makes exchanges possible in social settings. Individuals tend
not to trust blindly rather they look for cues that inform them about trustworthiness of a
stranger (Foddy et. al 2009; Kiyonari 2002). If the stranger shares these characteristics then they
are more likely to be trusted, leading to what is called group-based trust (Foddy et. al 2009). There
are two possible bases for individuals trusting in-group strangers more than out-group strangers,
firstly, people tend to have more positive evaluations of in-group members, viewing them as
more trustworthy and fair (Boldizar and Messick 1988; McAllister, 1995). Trust of in-group
strangers is simply based around a belief that members of the in-group have more positive
qualities and therefore can be relied upon. Secondly, trust of in-group strangers is based on
more strategic calculations independent of positive evaluations of in-group members. Members
of the same in-group have common interests and will therefore behave in a fair and reciprocal
fashion simply to further each other’s interests (Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi et. al 1999; Yamgishi
and Kiyonari 2000). Both reasons indicate that membership of the in-group should increase
perceptions of trust. Group-based trust seems particularly salient to the ongoing nuclear crisis
with Iran being perceived as a member of the out-group.
Cultural similarity will also influence perceptions of friendship, with a promising avenue of
research into perceptions of friendship can be found in the social psychological literature on
homophily, which is defined as “liking others who are perceived to be similar to oneself” (Olk and
Gibbons 2010). Research into homophily argues friendship often results from shared gender,
ethnicity or socially constructed attributes that individuals identify with (McPherson, Smith-
8
Lovin and Cook 2001). Applying homophily research to national images we anticipate that images
of cultural similarity should increase individual perceptions of Iran being a friend and
dissimilarity should increase perceptions of Iran being an enemy. We therefore anticipate a direct
and indirect links between cultural similarity and support for airstrikes leading to the following
hypotheses.
H1a: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be culturally different to the UK, will have negative perceptions of Iranian
behaviour.
H1b: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be culturally different to the UK, will be less likely to believe that Iran is a
friend.
H1c: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be culturally different to the UK, will be more likely to support airstrikes
against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Joint Democracy
The next attribute image relates to the democratic peace proposition which argues that
two democracies have never gone to war, and is the closest thing we have to a law in
international relations (Mintz and Geva 1993; Rousseau et. al 1996; Mor 1997; Ray 1998; Gartzke
1998). While there are some questions about definitions of democracy (Oren 1995; Shiller 2012)
and some examples that could potentially refute the ‘law-like’ status of the democratic peace
(Elman 1997), there is still a strong empirical basis to suggest that democracies are very unlikely
to fight one another. As such we are interested in examining whether an image of Iran as a
democracy will inhibit public support for military action.
The causal mechanism behind the effect of the democracy image on support for
airstrikes is unclear as to whether the institutions of democracy in themselves provide a sufficient
heuristic to reduce support for airstrikes or whether the micro-foundations of the democratic
peace are driven by behavioural images that in turn reduce individual inclinations for military
9
action. The direct effect of democracy will stem from the structural approach to the democratic
peace which argues that democratic institutions constrain leaders from initiating military action
and therefore reduce the need to initiate military action to gain a first strike advantage (Bueno de
Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993). As such democracy in itself should reduce
support for military action as the public perceive that the Iranian elite’s are constrained in their
capacity to launch military strikes. Behavioural images are therefore relatively unimportant; being
perceived as a democracy provides enough information to reduce support for military action.
However, if we follow a normative model of the democratic peace we expect images of
behaviours to matter more, as the public perceive that a democratic state will behave in a more
acceptable fashion. It is not about the constraints placed on the elites, rather the public view
democratic nations as being “nicer” in that they externalise norms that characterise their
domestic political processes (Maoz and Russett 1993). The normative model suggests that
individuals who believe that Iran is democratic will be more likely to have positive images of
Iranian behaviours which in turn reduce their support for military action against Iran’s nuclear
facilities.
Positive images of Iran are again clearly driven by in-group/out-group dynamics that
underpin the impact of perceptions of Iranian democracy on support for airstrikes. Being
perceived as a member of the democratic in-group will tend to increase positive perceptions of
Iran whereas being a member of the out-group will increase the likelihood of negative
stereotypes (Cuddy et. al 2007; Cuddy et. al. 2009). The British public will be more aware of
democratic states as they make up the United Kingdom’s regional neighbourhood, they are
more likely to have travelled to democratic states and will have seen the UK work closely on
security issues with the democratic club that form NATO. Positive stereotypes of democracy will
increase the belief that democracies are trustworthy, which is supported by the literature on
alliance commitments (Gaubatz 1996; Leeds 1999), likewise they will also appear to be
responsible and because of their similar interest structures (Mansfield et. al 2002 ). Homophilli
10
research (see earlier) would suggest that countries with similar institutional structures would be
more likely to be viewed as friends. Democracy will therefore have both direct and indirect
effects on support for military action leading to the following hypotheses.
H2a: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be less democratic than the UK, will have negative perceptions of Iranian
behaviour.
H2b: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be less democratic than the UK, will be less likely to believe that
Iran
is a friend.
H2c: Individuals, who perceive Iran to be less democratic than the UK, will be more likely to support airstrikes
against Iranian nuclear facilities.
Capability
The first two attributes relate to images of Iran’s cultural and institutional similarity to
the United Kingdom. They are unit levels features of Iran and they are examined because they
provide heuristics about the behaviours and motivations that influence British public calculations
about the need for military action. However, capabilities are examined because they tell us
something about how the public include realist power calculations into their decisions about war
and peace. Does an image of a powerful Iran deter military action or does it increase the urgency
for military strikes? Following standard Balance of Power and deterrence approach we anticipate
that the more powerful the public perceive Iran to be on the international stage they will be less
inclined to support military action for fear of the consequences as Iranian capabilities are
perceived to balance against Western capabilities (Claude, 1962; Wright 1964; Morgenthau 1967;
Gochman 1990 ). A militarily strong Iran will reduce the chances that the airstrikes will be
11
successful, they will also increase the capacity of Iran to inflict significant costs on the UK or the
oil producing Middle East by closing the Straits of Hormuz (Talmadge 2008).
However, Power Preponderance theory argues that the public who view Iran as weak will
be less inclined to support military action because they don’t believe Iran is a threat; they are
puny and can therefore be dominated by the Western powers without the need to resort to
military action (Blainey 1973; Geller 1993; Craig 2009). It is only when they get stronger that we
need to use military force to deal with their nuclear programme because they now have the
capacity to threaten British national security interests, as well as the security of the wider Middle
East.
The more powerful Iran is perceived to be by the public, the less willing they will be to
support military action because they are deterred by Iran’s strength. Secondly, the Power
Preponderance School argues that the stronger Iran is perceived to be the more likely the public
will be to support military action to deal with a growing threat, when Iran is weak then military
action is thought not to be needed. We are agnostic about the direction of that relationship, but
it is anticipated that perceptions of power will have a direct influence on support for military
action.
H3a: Images of Iran’s capabilities will have an effect on British public support for military action.
Due to the competing expectations of the Power-Preponderance and Balance of Power
Schools we also test whether there is a non-linear relationship between capability and support for
preventive military action. Combining the insights of Balance of Power and PowerPreponderance theories it is possible to suggest that there is an inverted U relationship between
perceptions of Iranian strength and support for airstrikes (Davies 2002). Perceptions of
weakness will reduce the necessity for military action, rather Iran is not believed to be a threat
and therefore the need for preventive military action has been reduced, as argued by powerpreponderance theorists (Blainey 1973). Whereas, if Iran is perceived as being strong then the
12
public may be deterred from initiating military action for fear of repercussions, as argued by
Balance of Power theory (Gochman 1990). It is where Iran is perceived as being relatively
strong, that the public may see Iran as being potentially threatening but not so militarily capable
as to deter airstrikes, it is at this point public support for preventive action may be at its highest.
H3b: There is a non-linear relationship between public perceptions of Iranian strength and support for preventive
military strikes.
Beyond the direct effects of capability perceptions on support for airstrikes, it is expected
that perceptions of capability will indirectly affect support for airstrikes by influencing
perceptions of Iranian aggression. Weak countries are less likely to be perceived as aggressive as
they lack the capabilities to make threats or act imperiously on international stage. Perceptions of
strength are a necessary but not an absolute condition for believing a nation as aggressive.
Likewise, security dilemma thinking suggests that the public will perceive increases in national
capability as not defensive rather power is acquired to support aggressive and potentially
expansionist behaviours (Mearsheimer 2001; Booth and Wheeler 2007). If the analysis
demonstrates that perceptions of Iranian strength increases perceptions of aggression we have
strong evidence that the public view the Iranians as power maximisers who are acquiring new
nuclear capabilities to use for offensive purposes.
H3c: Images of Iranian strength will increase the likelihood that Iran will be viewed as aggressive.
Perceptions of strength should have little influence on perceptions of trustworthiness
and responsibility. While democracy and cultural similarity may influence perceived incentive
structures and lead to negative stereotypes there is little reason to believe that strong countries
are perceived to behave in either a trustworthy or responsible manner. Capability in itself
13
provides no heuristic about either the capacity of Iran to act either responsibly or in a
trustworthy fashion.
The relationship between joint democracy, cultural similarity and peace is more nuanced
than a simple direct link between perceptions of democracy or cultural similarity and support for
airstrikes, it is hypothesised that the relationship is in fact moderated through a series of
behavioural images such as aggression, responsibility and trustworthiness, which are of direct
relevance to nuclear proliferation.
Behavioural Images of Iran
Images of Iranian behaviour are clearly going to be important in relation to decisions
about preventive military strikes, if the target state is perceived to be peaceful the public will be
less inclined to support preventive military action. However, if the target is perceived to be
aggressive with inclinations to use nuclear weapons in support of an expansionist foreign policy
then the public will favour the use of airstrikes. Similarly, if the target is perceived to behave
responsibly on the international stage and is therefore capable of handling nuclear weapons in a
conscientious fashion then again the public will be less likely to support an attack. Finally, if we
trust the target when it says that it is only developing peaceful nuclear energy and not a weapons
programme, then the need for military action is redundant.
Images of Aggression, Responsibility and Trust
Images of aggression and responsibility directly relate to public perceptions about how Iran
would use nuclear weapons if it managed to develop them, whereas trust is about the case for
military action. Gauging the intentions of the potential target are hugely important when making
decisions about preventive militarily action, which relates to Security Dilemma thinking (REFS).
Developing a nuclear weapon in itself is not necessarily a concern for the British Public, for
example the UK’s nearest neighbour France has a large nuclear arsenal but there is little fear
14
about it amongst the UK population, as French intentions are perceived to be benign. However,
the more aggressive a potential proliferator is perceived to be, the greater the concern that these
weapons are being developed for offensive rather than defensive purposes. Intentions are
therefore the key, if the state developing nuclear weapons was perceived as being aggressive then
the public should be more inclined to support the use of force to prevent it from gaining a
WMD capability. Support for airstrikes should therefore be strongly and directly linked to
perceptions of aggression, in this case the more aggressive Iran is believed to be the more likely
the public will support preventive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. If Iran is viewed as
being peaceful and is simply developing nuclear weapons for defensive purposes then the public
will be less willing to support military action. Perceptions of Iranian aggression will also influence
friend/enemy distinctions, with an aggressive Iran being conceived as being an enemy of the
UK, whereas a peaceful Iran will be perceived as a friend.
H5: Images of Iranian aggression will increase public support for military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities
and reduce perceptions of friendship.
Images of responsibility however, relate to public perceptions of rationality and Iranian
use of nuclear weapons. Are the Iranian’s capable of dealing with a nuclear device and are they
likely to be deterred from using it? If the Iranian’s are perceived as wild, perhaps barbaric,
individuals who are unable to behave responsibly then the public would be concerned about
Iran’s capacity to ‘handle’ nuclear weapons. Could the Iranian’s be deterred from using nuclear
weapons or are they so irresponsible that rational deterrence calculations do not apply to them?
If Iran has nuclear weapons then the stakes during international crises will grow sizeably and the
consequences of any miscalculations will be enormous. If the public believe Iran to be
irresponsible and unpredictable they will be far more willing to support military action to prevent
the Iranians from developing a nuclear device. Responsibility is conceptually distinct from
aggression as the Iranian’s may be perceived as being aggressive but deterrable, if they are
15
irresponsible then deterrence may not work with them. There may also be chauvinistic
perceptions that the Iranian’s do not have the “capacity” to behave responsibly with the nuclear
devices under their control. They may not have the necessary safeguards that prevent accidents,
or the weapons may fall into the hands of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda because they lack
the capacity to protect these weapons in a responsible fashion. As such we expect that
responsibility (or rather the lack of it) increases the likelihood that the public will support
preventive military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We don’t anticpate that perceptions of
responsibility will influence friend/enemy distinction- the public will base friendship around
aggression and a capacity to trust Iran.
H6: Images of Iranian irresponsibility will increase public support for military action against Iran’s nuclear
facilities.
Alongside perceptions of responsibility and aggression the trust behavioural image is critical to
understading public attitudes towards preventive military action. There is a growing body of
research examining the concept and basis for trusting interactions in international relations
(Deutsch et. al 1957; Hardin 1993; Seligman 1997; Kydd, 1997, 2000)1. Are the public willing to
make themselves vulnerable to harm by trusting that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon
(Baier 1995)? In particular issues of trust have come to the forefront of the academic debate on
how to resolve the standoff with Iran over its nuclear programme (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010;
Wheeler 2009). Iran’s trustworthiness is enormously important when deciding how to deal with
their nuclear programme as the enrichment technology for developing peaceful nuclear energy is
also the same technology that can be used to enrich weapons grade Uranium (Chubin, 1995;
Fitzpatrick, 2006; Kroenig, 2009 Bowen and Brewer, 2011). Perceptions of trust are therefore a
key driver of support for preventive military action; there is no smoking gun, there has been no
1
For a detailed discussion on the concept of trust in international relations see Hoffman (2002)
16
nuclear test, rather we have to trust the Iranian regime. Trust will directly and indirectly influence
public support for military action. Directly, we anticipate that those respondents who perceive
Iran as being untrustworthy will be more inclined to support military action against Iran’s
weapons programme, whereas those who are more trusting of Iran will be willing to believe that
Iran is not developing a weapon and do not see the need for an airstrike. Indirectly we anticipate
that being able to trust another state is a critical factor influencing perceptions of friendship, it
seems inconceivable that those individuals who mistrust Iran can then perceive of Iran as friend.
Behavioural images will also have a strong influence on friend/enemy distinctions. Trust is
strongly correlated with friendship amongst individuals of all ages (Rotenberg 1986; Rotenberg
and Morgan 1995; Sharabany 1994; Parks and Floyd 1996). Again if we extend research from
individual relationships to our impressions of other states, then trust again becomes a key
dimension of the friend/enemy image. If the other state is perceived to be trustworthy, or
responsible we expect that the public will view these as desirable attributes making the state
appear friendlier, whereas if the state appears aggressive, it will be seen as being a potential
enemy. Behaviours should have the strongest effect on friend/enemy distinctions as we will
judge our friends on how we expect them to behave towards us.
H7: The more Iran is perceived as being trustworthy the more likely the public will perceive Iran as being a friend.
H8: The more Iran is perceived as being trustworthy the less likely the public will support airstrikes against Iran’s
nuclear facilities.
Enemy/Friend Distinctions
While enmity has been discussed in great detail in relation to research on rivalry and alliance
formation there has been relatively little research into friendship between states (Walt 1987;
Gowa 1999;Mearsheimer 1994; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Maoz et. al 2007).
Recently we have started to see the beginnings of a research programme that highlights the
importance of friendship for the study of international relations and politics (Devere and Smith
17
2010; Smith 2011). The friend/enemy distinction or binary has been most closely associated with
the work of Carl Schmitt who saw it as the essence of politics (REF) but it has also been found
in the philosophical work of Leo Strauss (Hirst 2011). Boulding (1956, 1959) highlights the
importance of the friend/enemy distinctions as being one of the key images that influence
calculations about other states. Needless to say, we anticipate that individuals who perceive Iran
as being a friend, will be less inclined to attack it, than those who perceive it as being an enemy.
H9: The more Iran is perceived as being a friend the less likely the public will support military action against
Iranian nuclear facilities.
Data and Operationalisations
The empirical basis for this study is a 2010 survey on a British sample. The British data are taken
from the second wave of a major three-wave panel study of foreign policy attitudes among the
British public (Wave 1: N = 1,276, response rate = 62.2%; Wave 2: N=1,065, retention rate =
83.4%). The panel design was to divide a long instrument into manageable chunks, and to field
these at very brief intervals so that the entire process of data collection took less than a month.
Since all of the measures used here are taken from the second wave of the survey, the ‘staggered’
approach to data collection has minimal implications for this article. The surveys were
administered over the internet by YouGov, whose approximately 300,000 panel members
formed the sampling frame. Most YouGov panelists are actively recruited (using targeted
campaigns via non-political websites) rather than volunteering for the panel. Similarly,
respondents are not able to choose in which surveys to take part: they are either sampled for a
given data collection or not. The company also has an impressive track record of sampling and
weighting to achieve representative samples of the British electorate – at least as measured by
their accuracy in predicting election results. All of the operational measures of images are based
on a seven-point semantic differential scale and approval of airstrikes is on a seven point scale.
Variables
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Dependent Variable:
In the world today there are various situations in which Britain might use force. Using the same
scale from 0 to 6, please say how much you approve of the use of force in each of these
situations.
Air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities
0 – Not at all approved
1
2
3
4
5
6 – Completely approved
Images of Iran
Now here are a number of pairs of opposites that can be used to describe a country. Thinking
first about Iran, please choose a point on each scale that you think best describes that country.
Not trustworthy – trustworthy
Undemocratic – democratic
Friend – enemy*
Responsible – irresponsible*
Aggressive – peaceful*
Powerful – weak*
19
Similar to Britain – different from Britain*2
Descriptive Statistics: What does the “Great” British public think of Iran?
Looking at figures 2 and 3 it is fair to say that the British public have a generally critical
image of both Iranian attributes and behaviours, with most of the variables being skewed
towards the more negative end of the semantic scale. Firstly, examining perceptions of Iranian
attributes we see that along the semantic difference scale there is a strong perception that Iran is
dissimilar to the UK, with 54 percent of respondents believing that Iran is strongly dissimilar and
only 4.2 percent of respondents believing Iran is strongly similar. Amongst the public there is a
belief that there are considerable cultural differences between the UK and Iran. This pattern is
also repeated for perceptions of Iranian democracy, with 40.8 percent believing Iran believing
Iran is completely undemocratic, whereas less than 1 percent Iran to be strongly democratic. If
the clash of civilisations and democratic peace macro-theoretical arguments are found at the
micro-level we can expect strong support for military action against Iran amongst the British
public.
The public tend not to have strong perceptions of Iranian power, most respondents
gravitating towards the middle point of the semantic scale (37.9 percent), only 4.5 percent of
respondents believing Iran to be very weak and 2.4 percent believing Iran to be very powerful.
Gravitating towards the midpoint is not particularly surprising, calculations about national power
are difficult to make (Organski and Kugler 1980), and a middle ranking nation appears to be a
reasonable calculation. Iran is clearly not the weakest state in the international system nor is it
capable of challenging China and the United States for Superpower status. So in terms of
national attributes, we see that the public perceive that the unit level attributes are dramatically
different to the UK and that Iran is perceived as being moderately powerful on the international
stage.
*Semantic
differential scales with this symbol were inverted after data collection to aid interpretation. For example
responsible is now six and irresponsible is now zero.
20
Next we see that the public tend to have negative perceptions about how Iran behaves
on the international stage, with 39.5 percent of the British public perceiving Iran as being
completely untrustworthy (as well as 30.8 percent one point lower down the semantic scale),
whereas less than 1 percent perceive Iran as being completely trustworthy. The public have a
slightly less negative perception of Iranian responsibility with only 24.2 percent believing Iran is
completely irresponsible compared to 6.2 percent believing that Iran is completely responsible.
Similarly, the British public have an image of an aggressive Iran, 25.7 percent of the public
perceiving Iran as aggressive compared to only 2 percent who believe Iran is peaceful. All of
these perceptions of Iranian difference culminate in 8.8 percent of the public perceiving Iran as
being a friend compared to 23.9 percent who believe Iran is an enemy (again the variable is
heavily skewed to perceptions of enmity rather than friendship). Overall, we see a picture of
mistrust, difference and enmity, which we hypothesise will have a strong effect on support for
military action against Iran.
Structural Equation Modelling Method.
Figure 4 presents a structural equation model (SEM) or map of British public images of
Iran and how their influence on support for military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. We
follow the theoretical model in figure 1 (see above) and place institutional, cultural and power
images at the base of the map feeding into the behavioural attributes, enemy/friend distinctions
and support for airstrikes. Above the attributes we place the images of Iranian behaviour
(responsibility, aggression, trustworthiness) and those behavioural images then feed into
enemy/friend distinction and support for military strikes. We also include two control variables
in the model estimating public approval of both British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq.
These two variables are included to test whether attitudes towards a conflict with Iran are a
function of national images or recent experiences of foreign adventures. The strength of a
structural equation modelling approach over a standard multivariate technique like regression is
21
that it allows us to simultaneously to model direct and indirect effects that were hypothesised in
the theoretical framework outlined above. The SEM approach therefore allows us to understand
how much of the Democratic Peace or Clash of Civilisations images directly affect support for
airstrikes, and how much is moderated through behavioural images of Iran. For ease of
comparison we produce standardised coeffecients.
Results
Examining table 1 we first move through the model discussing the effects of the attribute
images (democracy, cultural similarity and power) on the behavioural attribute images
(aggression, trustworthiness and responsibility) and then on enemy/friend distinction, finishing
with the direct effect of these images on support for airstrikes on Iran. Second, we then examine
how the behavioural images affect enemy/friend distinction and support for airstrikes. Third we
report the effects of enemy/friend distinctions on support for airstrikes and fourth we report
how estimates of how successful Iraq and Afghanistan have been on support for airstrikes. In
table two we then report the indirect effects of both the attribute and behavioural images on
support for airstrikes.
Moving from left to right on the figure one we report the results for images of cultural
similarity on perceptions of Iranian aggression, the Iranian responsibility and finally Iran
trustworthiness. In terms of Iranian aggression, the model indicates that the more Iran is
perceived to be culturally similar to the UK the less likely they will be perceived to be aggressive
(B= -.199 (p>0.01)), lending further support to the literature on homophili. In terms of Iranian
responsibility, images of cultural similarity have a positive and significant effect (B=.415
(p>0.01)). Individuals again appear to cognize the responsibility image through the homophili lens,
positive behaviours are assigned to nations that appear to be the similar to the respondents’
22
nation. Likewise, images of trust are again positively affected by cultural similarity images
(B=.104 (p>0.05)). Cultural similarity appears to have the strongest effect on images of Iranian
responsibility, if the public perceive Iran to be like “us” then they are considered to be more
capable of behaving in a responsible fashion, which presumably makes the public about whether
the Iranians are capable of handling nuclear weapons. In terms of all behaviour images appearing
culturally similar improves the image of Iran in respondents’ eyes.
Next we move onto examine the effect of images of Iranian power, we hypothesised
that power would increase the likelihood of Iran being seen as aggressive, which is what we find
(B=.212 (p>0.01)). The more powerful Iran is believed to be, the more inclined the public are to
believe that Iran will use that power offensively. It is not that Iran is perceived generally to be a
benign influence on international politics, rather if they are not viewed as being aggressive it can
be partly explained by that the public view them as too weak. We also find that images of Iranian
power influence perceptions of trust (B=-.037 (p>0.05)). This was not hypothesised but suggests
that Iran is essentially considered to be untrustworthy except when it is too weak to be able to
break its promises on the international stage, a point we come back to later in the paper.
Next we move onto examine how the democracy attribute image influences the
behavioural images. Democracy has a strong effect on images of aggression, the more
democratic Iran is perceived to be the less aggressive they are thought to be on the international
stage (B=-.316 (p>0.01)), again providing further evidence for a micro-foundational dimension
to the democratic peace. Similarly we find that images of Iranian democracy increase the chances
of Iran being perceived as being responsible (B=.066 (p>0.01))
and has by far the strongest
effect on public perceptions that Iran is trustworthy (B=.655 (p>0.01)). The democracy image
affects all behavioural images in the hypothesied direction. Summing up the comparative effect
of the attribute images on the behavioural images, we find that cultural similarity has the greatest
effect on the responsibility image, whereas the democracy image has the greatest effects on
images of aggression and trust, the greater the impression of democracy that the British public
23
have of Iran the more favourable impression they have of Iranian behaviours. Capability has
moderate effect on perceptions of aggression and a weak effect on responsibility.
Next we move onto examine the direct effects of the attribute image on enemy/friend
distinctions and then support for military action. Surprisingly we find no direct effect from the
behavioural images onto enemy/friend distinctions, although as we discuss shortly the effects of
attributes are strongly moderated through behavioural images. In terms of support for airstrikes
we find no evidence of a direct effect for democracy images on support for airstrikes, which
suggests that the structural argument for the democratic peace has no micro-foundations
amongst individual attitudes. The normative democratic peace is more strongly supported (see
below). In terms of cultural similarity we find that there is a significant but positive relationship
(B=.063 (p>0.05)). This completely unexpected result goes against our earlier hypothesis, at
most we would have anticipated that by taking into account perceptions of different behaviours
and enemy/friend distinction the direct effect of cultural similarity would be insignificant.
Firstly, we should not that the substantive effect is very small and secondly, if we look at table 2
we see that the heavy lifting for the cultural similarity for airstrikes are done by indirect
relationships and are in the hypothesised direction. We also find no evidence of either a linear or
non-linear relationship between images of capability and support for airstrikes, there is little
evidence of realist thinking being replicated amongst the British public in this case.
Moving up the structural map we now examine how the different behavioural images
influence enemy/friend distinctions and then support for preventive strikes against Iran. Firstly,
if we look at images of Iranian aggression we find that the more aggressive Iran is perceived to
be the less likely they will be viewed as a friend (B=-.04 (0>0.05)). However, the strongest effect
on friendship stems from the responsibility image (B=.622 (p>0.01)), supporting the idea that
images of responsibility provide a strong driver for perceptions of friendship, but as we shall see
shortly have no bearing on support for military action. The image that Iran has a capacity to
behave responsibly appears to be a significant driver of friendship. Trust surprisingly was
24
insignificant, which goes against a considerable amount of social psychological literature on
individual friendship. In terms of support for military action we see a considerable difference
from enemy/friend estimates. The single biggest driver behind support for airstrikes against Iran
are images of trust, the more Iran is trusted the less likely the public will be willing to support
military action (B=-.189 (p>0.01)) as supported by (h**). While trust seems to have little effect
on enemy/friend distinctions it is considered crucial to decisions about the need for military
action against a potential proliferator. Images of responsibility have no effect on support for
war- the public make different calculations about general impressions of friendship than they do
for military action. The aggression image has a moderate effect on support for military action
(B=.124 (p>0.01)). If Iran is perceived as being an aggressive and untrustworthy state then the
public will be more inclined to support military action, which brings us back to the democracy
attribute, that will be shortly discussed. The enemy/friend distinction has a fairly weak effect on
support for airstrikes (B= -.09 (p>0.01)); rather, behaviours appear to drive decisions about
airstrikes. Overall, we see that images of behaviours have the strongest direct effect on support
for military action, whereas friendship or attributes have little direct bearing.
Finally, looking at the two control variables; perceptions of success in Afghanistan and
Iraq we find that the have a strong effect on support for military action against Iran. Afghanistan
success has the strongest effect (B=.188 (p>0.01)), which is to be expected as British forces are
still in Afghanistan whereas the Iraq mission ended some years earlier (B=.156 (p>0.01)). So
perceptions about recent military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan have a direct spillover
effect onto support for military action against Iran. However, what is particularly interesting is
that these effects are not the strongest in the model and that they do not swamp British public
stereotypes about Iran, when making calculations about the need for preventive action.
25
Indirect Effects
In this section we want to highlight the variables that have the greatest impact on
support for airstrikes through both direct and indirect causal paths (see table 2). We then want to
examine how different attributes influence those behaviours that are thought to strongly
influence support for airstrikes. In terms of attribute images democracy has by far the greatest
substantive effect on support for airstrikes (B=-.129) whereas the coefficient for similarity is
smaller (-.048), the study demonstrates at least for support for military action against Iran that
the democratic peace has the strongest micro foundational effect on support for military action,
whereas culture appears to have a much smaller effect, the public clearly place significant stock in
democratic institutions and those institutions are thought to reduce the need for military action.
These democratic institutions also give us the image of a peaceful and trustworthy nation, but do
not necessarily affect friendship. Cultural similarity increases the likelihood of us seeing Iran as
responsible and a friend has much less impact on our estimates about war and peace. The
Iranian government by repressing the democratic green movement in 2009 are significantly
undermining their case in court of international public opinion (well at least in the UK).
Perceptions of power has little substantive total effect on support for military action (B=.013),
images of Iranian capability has very little effect (none of which is statistically significant) on
public support for airstrikes.
However, in terms of images of Iranian behaviour we see that trust has by far the
greatest total effect on support for airstrikes (B=-.217) if Iran can be trusted then the public will
be much less likely to support an attack. Images of Iranian aggression have the second greatest
impact on support for military action (B=.146) aggressive statements by the Supreme Leader or
President Ahmadinejad increase the risk that publics around the world will be more rather than
less inclined to support preventive military action. Finally we see that perceptions of
responsibility has the weakest total effect on support for military action (B=-.103). The key
drivers behind these behavioural images are perceptions of democracy which has the greatest
26
effect on images of both aggression and trustworthiness (see above) which is also reflected in the
largest total effect size of all attribute images.
Conclusions
Images of the “other” have a powerful effect on both how individual’s view the
friendliness of different states and whether they support military action. However, the effect of
these images vary depending on whether the public are formulating a general impression of a
state or whether they are being asked to support a potential military strike. In the case of Iran the
public generally perceive Iran in an unfavourable light, viewing it generally as an enemy, however
that is not enough for the public to support military action. Trust (or lack of it) and its
foundations are critical to public willingness to sanction future military action. Individuals who
perceive Iran as being more democratic will also tend to view it as more trustworthy and less
aggressive, which in turn reduces support for airstrikes. These results indicate that democracy is a
key variable for individuals who are trying to evaluate the peacefulness and trustworthiness of
other states in the international system and these factors appear to strongly influence support for
preventive military strikes. However, if we look at a the competing “clash” hypothesis we find
little evidence to suggesting that the public make decisions about preventive military strikes
based on cultural similarity. While statistically significant the total effects of cultural similarity are
substantively small. Institutions rather than culture provide the necessary cues for the public to
decide on military action. The public view democratic institutions as providing the necessary
checks on aggressive use of force and the transparency that increases trust.
Whereas, decisions about friendship are driven by different calculations relating to how
the “other” is viewed culturally. When Iran is perceived as being culturally similar and/or
responsible it is also perceived as being a friend. Aggression and trust appear to be largely
irrelevant to decisions about friendship, but they are crucial to decisions about war and peace.
Images of friendship appear to be more broadly based and appear to be based around two
27
cleavages. Is the other state culturally similar and do they behave responsibly? These cleavages
appear to have little impact on strategic calculations for military action. Responsibility has the
strongest direct effect on images of friendship whereas cultural similarity has a smaller direct
effect, but clearly feeds into images of responsibility, if a country is viewed as being similar it
tends to be viewed as being responsible (presumably like “us”) which then drives friendship
imagery. Democracy in the “other” state is crucial to public willingness to support military
strikes, but cultural similarity strongly affects how we view the view how responsible/rational the
“other” state is on international stage. Culturally dissimilar states make us uneasy and make us
view them as more of an enemy than a friend, but in itself is not sufficient for the public to
support military action, in fact cultural similarity appears largely irrelevant to decisions about
launching airstrikes against Iran, trust matters most and that stems from images of democracy.
28
Figure 1
Images and Support for Military Action
Support for Airstrikes
Friend/Enemy Distinction
Perceived Behaviours
Perceived Attributes
29
Figure 2
Attribute Images of Iran
Dissimilar/Similar
Undemocratic/Democratic
Weak/Powerful
54
41
38
33
27
25
17
7
6
2
16
5
8
1
1
2 0
8
4
1
5
Figure 3
Behavioural Images of Iran and Enemy/Friend Distinction
Aggressive/Peaceful
Untrustworthy/Trustworthy
Irresponsible/Responsible
Enemy/Friend
40
31
26
24 24
24
23 23
25
19 20 20
16
9
30
15 13
5
1
6 5
3 1
6 6
2 0
6
9
Figure 4
Structural Model Estimating the Effects of Images on Support for Military Action
31
Table 1
Estimated Effects of Variables in SEM
Coefficients
(std error)
Iran
Irresponsible/Responsible
Iran Dissimilar/Similar
.415
(.023)***
Iran Weak/Powerful
-.03
(.028)
Iran
.066
Undemocratic/Democratic
(.033)***
Iran Peaceful/Aggressive
Iran Dissimilar/Similar
-.199
(.018)***
Iran Weak/Powerful
.212
(.023)***
Iran
-.316
Undemocratic/Democratic
(.027)***
Iran Untrustworthy/Trustworthy
Iran Dissimilar/Similar
.104
32
(.012)***
Iran Weak/Powerful
-.037
(.014)**
Iran
.655
Undemocratic/Democratic
(.017)***
Iran Enemy/Friend
Iran Dissimilar/Similar
.138
(.022)***
Iran Weak/Powerful
.015
(.024)
Iran
-.002
Undemocratic/Democratic
(.038)
Iran
.622
Irresponsible/Responsible
(.018)***
Iran Peaceful/Aggressive
-.04
(.022)**
Iran
.009
Untrustworthy/Trustworthy
(.036)
Support for Airstrikes
Iran Dissimilar/Similar
.063
(.028)***
33
Iran Weak/Powerful
-.013
(.031)
Iran
.028
Undemocratic/Democratic
(.049)***
Iran
-.04
Irresponsible/Responsible
(.03)
Iran Aggressive/Peaceful
.124
(.029)***
Iran
-.189
Untrustworthy/Trustworthy
(.046)***
Iran Enemy/Friend
-.09
(.028)***
Iraq Success
.156
(.025)***
Afghanistan Success
.188
(.029)***
N
1877
CFI
.694
X2
1836.497***
d.f.
21
34
Table 2
Standardized Total Effects for War Support
Support for Airstrikes
Total Standardized Effects
-0.048
Cultural Similarity
Capability
0.013
Democracy
-0.129
Responsibility
-0.103
Trust
-0.217
Aggression
0.146
Enemy/Friend
-0.096
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