Irrational Belief Persistence
Justin Landy
Judgments and Decisions
October 12, 2011
The Question of “Rationality”
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There ARE beliefs that we would all agree are
irrational.
Irrational persistence of belief.
We often do not adjust our beliefs in
normatively correct ways in response to new
information.
Search and Inference

The Search-Inference Framework: Where do
we misuse information?
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Search:
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Order effects
Selective Exposure
Inference:
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Biased Assimilation
Belief Overkill
Normative Rules for
Using New Information
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The Order Principle
Primacy Effects
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How much would you like this person? (Asch,
1946)
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Intelligent, industrious, impulsive, critical, stubborn,
envious
Envious, stubborn, critical, impulsive, industrious,
intelligent
Is this irrational?
Primacy Effects

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Two urns (Peterson & DuCharme, 1967):
Strong primacy effect in estimates of probability
that experimenter was drawing from first urn.
A Special Case of
Primacy Effects?
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“Total discrediting” (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross,
1980):
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Participants given information, then told it was
completely fabricated
Yet, information still affects subsequent beliefs
BUT, also sometimes occurs when participants are
warned ahead of time that information is fabricated
(Wegner, Coulton, & Wenzlaff, 1985)
Myside Bias in Search:
Selective Exposure
Selective Exposure
in the Lab

During 1964 presidential election, participants
read sample of brochures for each candidate,
and can order copies of the brochures for free
(Lowin, 1967)
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When arguments were strong and hard to refute,
ordered more brochures supporting own candidate
When arguments were weak and easy to refute,
ordered more brochures supporting other candidate
Normative Rules for
Using New Information

The Order Principle

The Neutral-Evidence Principle
Interpreting Neutral
Evidence


Which bingo basket? (Pitz, 1969):
Consecutive balls of different colors shouldn't
change strength of beliefs.
A More RealWorld Example
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Beliefs about the deterrence effects of the death
penalty (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979):
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Kroner and Phillips (1977) compared murder rates
for the year before and the year after adoption of
capital punishment in 14 states. In 11 of the 14
states, murder rates were lower after adoption of
the death penalty. This research supports the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.
Palmer and Crandall (1977) compared murder rates
in 10 pairs of neighboring states with different
capital punishment laws. In 8 of the 10 pairs,
murder rates were higher in the state with capital
punishment. This research opposes the deterrent
effect of the death penalty.
A More RealWorld Example

Beliefs about the deterrence effects of the death
penalty (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979):
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Biased Assimilation:
A More RealWorld Example

Beliefs about the deterrence effects of the death
penalty (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979):
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Attitude Polarization:
A More RealWorld Example

Beliefs about the deterrence effects of the death
penalty (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979):
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“Our subjects' main inferential shortcoming ... did
not lie in their inclination to process evidence in a
biased manner ... Rather, their sin lay in their
readiness to use evidence already processed in a
biased manner to bolster the very theory or belief
that initially 'justified' the processing bias.”
Other Routes to
Violations of Neutral
Evidence Principle
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Illusory Correlations
Can even occur when ONLY receive opposing
evidence (Batson, 1975)
More Myside Bias in
Inference: Belief Overkill
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Many controversial issues have good
arguments on both sides
Making a rational decision would involve
balancing these arguments (tradeoffs)
We often avoid this by convincing ourselves
that all of the good arguments are on one side.
Examples of
Belief Overkill

Nuclear Testing (Jervis, 1976):
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“People who favored a nuclear test-ban believed
that testing created a serious medical danger,
would not lead to major weapons improvements,
and was a source of international tension. Those
who opposed the treaty usually took the opposite
position on all three issues.”
Examples of
Belief Overkill
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Capital Punishment, again (Ellsworth and Ross,
1983):
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66% of proponents would still favor capital
punishment if it was no better than life in prison.
48% if it didn't deter at all.
3% of opponents would favor if it were a deterrent.
Search and Inference

The Search-Inference Framework: Where do
we misuse information?

Search:



Inference:



Order effects
Selective Exposure
Biased Assimilation
Belief Overkill
So, WHY do we irrationally persist in beliefs?
Why do we use evidence improperly?
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence
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Beliefs about thinking
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Good thinkers are people who keep their minds
open, consider other opinions, and weigh opposing
evidence. They are open, rational, and deliberative.
Bad thinkers are people who keep their minds
closed, refuse to consider other options, and only
seek confirming evidence. They are closedminded, irrational, and stubborn.
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence
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Beliefs about thinking
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Good thinkers are people who stick to their beliefs,
defend them, and do not change their minds. They
are committed, principled, and strong-willed.
Bad thinkers are people who change their minds
too easily, let themselves be influenced by people
who are wrong, and are not committed to their
beliefs. They are weak, fickle, and unprincipled.
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Beliefs about thinking: Items for measuring
attitudes about Actively Open-Minded Thinking
(Stanovich & West, 1998)
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Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.
One should disregard evidence that conflicts with one's
established beliefs.
It is better to simply believe in a religion than to be confused
by doubts about it.
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Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character.
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Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
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It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when
evidence is brought to bear against them.
Etc.
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Beliefs about thinking
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People who endorsed Actively Open-Minded
Thinking tend to show less myside bias (Stanovich
& West, 1998) and more likely to spontaneously
consider both sides of an issue (Baron, 1989)
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Why do some people believe that one-sided
thinking is better?

The “fittest” institutions promote it?
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Equate of “good thinker” with “expert”
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Equate of “good thinker” with “advocate”
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence
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Beliefs about thinking
Wishful thinking and distortion of beliefs by
desires
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Wishful thinking and distortion of beliefs by
desires
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Self-deception
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The above-average effect
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Wishful thinking affects decisions, too: terminal
cancer patients who overestimate life expectancy
more likely to want aggressive treatment that is
unpleasant and unlikely to help them (Weeks, et al.,
1998)
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Wishful thinking and distortion of beliefs by
desires
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Denying evidence (Kunda, 1987):
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Article presents evidence that regular caffeine
consumption increases women's risk of fibrocystic
disease, which can lead to breast cancer
Infrequent and frequent consumers of caffeine, male and
female
“How convinced are you by the article?”
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence
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
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Beliefs about thinking
Wishful thinking and distortion of beliefs by
desires
Desire for consistency, dissonance reduction
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Desire for consistency, dissonance reduction:
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We devalue options not chosen, and (presumably)
reasons that support them (Festinger, 1962)
We change our beliefs to align with our actions
when we do not have a good reason for the actions
(Festinger, 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)
Demonstrate a desire to be “good” decisionmakers, and to have been “right” all along, as
opposed to a desire to be as right as possible
NOW.
Reasons for Irrational
Belief Persistence

Desire for consistency, dissonance reduction:



We devalue options not chosen, and (presumably)
reasons that support them (Festinger, 1962)
We change our beliefs to align with our actions
when we do not have a good reason for the actions
(Festinger, 1962; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959)
Demonstrate a desire to be “good” decisionmakers, and to have been “right” all along, as
opposed to a desire to be as right as possible
NOW.
Prescriptive Solutions?

Actively Open-Minded Thinking

Persistence of beliefs in total discrediting
experiments can be reduced by asking participants
if they could argue for the other side (Anderson,
1982)
Prescriptive Solutions?

Actively Open-Minded Thinking
Prescriptive Solutions?
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But, is it worth improving? Does Actively
Open-Minded Thinking improve the outcomes
of decisions?
In short, yes. Good decision-making correlates
with good outcomes.
But, correlation is not perfect, of course.
Better Thinking,
Better Outcomes

Decision-making in international crises (Herek,
Janis, & Huth, 1987):
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Studied historical records of presidents' decision
processes in 19 crises, 1947-1973. Experts in
international affairs evaluated decision process on:

Gross omissions in surveying alternatives.
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Gross omissions in surveying objectives.
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Failure to examine major costs and risks of the preferred choice.
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Poor information search.
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Selective bias in processing information at hand.
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Failure to reconsider originally rejected alternatives.
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Failure to work out detailed implementation, monitoring, and contingency
plans.
Better Thinking,
Better Outcomes

Decision-making in international crises (Herek,
Janis, & Huth, 1987):
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
Evaluated decisions from perspective of United
States' best interest, and the world's
Symptoms of poor decision-making correlated with
bad outcomes, and actively open-minded thinking
correlated with good outcomes (for the US and the
world)
Better Thinking,
Better Outcomes

Decision-making
in international
crises (Herek,
Janis, & Huth,
1987):
Concluding Remarks
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The origin of beliefs that we irrationally persist
in holding?
These biases are not universal. Not everyone
shows them all the time.
But, of course, everyone thinks they are one of
the ones that don't make mistakes. Back to our
desire to be good decision-makers who were
always right.