Strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Circumvention on case
Border K
T-Domestic
CP
Cartel DA
Topicality
Interpretation
A. Domestic surveillance is surveillance of US persons
Small 8 MATTHEW L. SMALL. United States Air Force Academy 2008 Center for the Study of the
Presidency and Congress, Presidential Fellows Program paper "His Eyes are Watching You:
Domestic Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis"
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those
needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being
intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the
acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333
(3.4) (i)). With this definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept. This paper’s analysis,
in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance; specifically, wiretapping phone
lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f of the USA Patriot Act of 2001
defines electronic surveillance as:
Violation
B. Border Patrol surveillance occurs on non-US Persons
(CBP 15, CBP, US Border Patrol Official Website, "Border Patrol Overview," USCBP, acc.
7/24/15 http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview)
While the Border Patrol has changed dramatically since its inception in 1924, its primary mission
remains unchanged: to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.
Together with other law enforcement officers, the Border Patrol helps maintain borders that
work - facilitating the flow of legal immigration and goods while preventing the illegal trafficking
of people and contraband.
Undocumented persons are not US persons
(Jackson et al 9 Brian A. Jackson, Darcy Noricks, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, RAND
Corporation The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society RAND 2009 BRIAN A.
JACKSON, EDITOR
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf
3 Federal law and executive order define a U.S. person as “a citizen of the United States, an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association with a
substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or are aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S.” (NSA, undated). Although
this definition would therefore allow information to be gathered on U.S. persons located abroad, our
objective was to examine the creation of a domestic intelligence organization that would focus on—and
whose activities would center around—individuals and organizations located inside the United States .
Though such an agency might receive information about U.S. persons that was collected abroad by other
intelligence agencies, it would not collect that information itself.
C. The Aff interpretation is bad for debate – limits are necessary for negative
preparation and clash, and their interpretation makes the topic too big.
Immigration is a huge area, big enough to be a topic itself, and all the issues are
completely different.
D. T is a voter – the opportunity to prepare promotes better debating
Borders K
The 1ac’s focus on violence on the Tohono nation’s borders compartmentalizes
harm against immigrants into only that area – this obstructs the everyday
violence experienced by immigrants and strengthens local anti-immigrant
government agencies.
Coleman 9
[Mathew Coleman Department of Geography, The Ohio State University (2009) What Counts as the Politics and Practice of Security,
and Where? Devolution and Immigrant Insecurity after 9/11, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99:5, 904-913,
DOI: 10.1080/00045600903245888] //duff
Displacing and Consorting with Critical Geopolitics Heightened U.S.–Soviet tensions during the Reagan era prompted a group of
geographers to examine the intersection of geographical knowledge and geopolitical power in international politics. The project,
dubbed “critical geopolitics,” centered on the sociospatial structures of intelligibility underpinning foreign policy practice. As Dodds
and Sidaway (1994, 518) explained, critical geopolitics seeks “to deconstruct the representational practices of conservative foreign
policy elites, to reveal how they spatialize international politics.” Specific attention was paid to “formal geopolitics” (i.e., foreign
policy scholarship) and “practical geopolitics” (i.e., foreign policy conduct) as an ensemble of “socio-cultural resources and rules by
which geographies of international politics get written” (Toal and Agnew 1992, 193). The goal was to “challenge some aspect of
taken-for-granted geopolitical knowledge by looking at its social production, the parameters of its discursive economy” (Dalby and
Toal 1996, 452). Critical geopolitics’ emphasis on knowledges constitutive of geopolitical practice spurred an important rethinking of
security. Of particular interest were the ways in which security
was hitched by mainstream foreign policy elites
and experts to spatialized tropes of identity and difference. Campbell (1992), for example, unpacked
security as a boundary-drawing knowledge of performative rather than pragmatic
temperament—as literally a self- and other-citing act in space. Similarly, Dalby (1990) discussed the “geographs”—or spatialized discourses about self and other—that inhere in foreign policy and that
reduce complex global realities to simplistic, state-territorial maps about security and danger.
Dalby emphasized that the self–other formulation of state security in terms of spatial exclusion and rival territories was in fact a
primary constituent of human insecurity insofar as it transformed lived spaces into dehumanized blocs ready for military conquest.
This abbreviated account of critical geopolitics’ beginnings will be familiar for many. Nonetheless, it is important to recall because it
highlights critical geopolitics’ parasitical relationship with mainstream geopolitics. Toal (1994, 542; 1996) hinted at this early on in
the critical geopolitics experiment, noting that in displacing orthodox geopolitics “we are consorting with a philosophical tradition,
an historical code, a geographical map, an order of places.” Indeed, in response to the charge that critical geopolitics sometimes fails
to problematize its use of mainstream geopolitical concepts (Sharp 2000; Sparke 2000), Toal (2000, 387) conceded that “[i]n seeking
to engage certain discourses in order to displace them, one invariably is dependent to a certain degree upon the organizing terms of
these discourses.” Toal’s explanation of the cramped relationship between critical geopolitics and its mainstream interlocutors is in
terms of deconstruction and its perils; however, Foucault’s notion of archaeology is also relevant. In his early essays on discourse
and its transformations, for example, Foucault (1989, 41) challenged the “opposition between the liveliness of innovations and the
dead weight of tradition.” Instead of seeing the boundary breaking-ness of the new against the wrong-headedness of the old,
Foucault emphasized how “discoursing subjects” belong to a “discursive field”—not a monolithic plane in which authors remain
constants but one in which anonymous rules of expressibility, conservation, memory, reactivation, and appropriation are in play. Put
in the context of Toal’s comments, archaeology suggests that the new (i.e., critical geopolitics) does not break with the old (i.e.,
mainstream geopolitics) but is engaged in a play of dependencies with it. I want to expand on this problem with the goal of
interrogating what counts as the politics and practice of security in critical geopolitics. If, as earlier, critical geopolitics seeks to upend
the socio-spatial structures of intelligibility underpinning the practice and rationalization of statecraft, the paradox is that the field as
a whole tends to reactivate a mainstream account of what constitutes security in practice. Even as
critical geopolitics
approaches statecraft as a cultural performance of identity, and thus in essence collapses any
neat differentiation between domestic and foreign policy spaces, it still has much to say about what might
constitute the politics and practice of security beyond foreign policy. This is particularly the case in critical geopolitics scholarship
focused on theory building. Critical geopolitics’ conjoining of security to foreign policy has not gone unnoticed.
One early
critique was Dodds’s (1994; cf. 2001) plea that critical geopolitics move beyond representational
analyses of foreign policy and deal with “domestic” geopolitics. More recent commentators point
to critical geopolitics’ prioritization of interstate military conflict at the expense of more
“regional” research (Power 1999; Agnew 2001; Mamadouh and Dijkink 2006). Others, without noting the field’s foreign policy
centrism, focus on conflict in contexts frequently read as more political geographic than geopolitical per se (Herbert 1997). Likewise,
Mamadouh (1999) reminds critical geopolitics scholars—mostly in the United States and United Kingdom—of non-Anglo-American
“critical geopolitical” thought (i.e., Lacoste and Herodote ´ ) that attempted explicitly to delink geopolitics from international
relations and draw attention to the warring aspects of public policy geographies.
There is also research on the
urbanization of war that suggests that the politics and practice of security are not just about
foreign policy in a narrow sense (Falah and Flint 2004; Graham 2006). Reading this literature alongside the
most cited critical geopolitics texts suggests the latter’s reluctance to engage with statecraft’s
more prosaic coordinates (Painter 2006; Katz 2007; Pain and Smith 2008). Feminist political geographers in particular
have remarked on critical geopolitics’ dismissal of the everyday. As Staeheli (2001) summarizes, critical
geopolitics fetishizes the state and statecraft, both theoretically and empirically, such that localities and
lived experiences feature infrequently in the research. The result, as Sharp notes (2000, 363), is that critical
geopolitics relies on a private–public mapping of “political effectual and non-political-ineffectual spheres” with geopolitics
apparently only relevant in terms of the former. Indeed, feminist scholars note that what counts
as security in critical
geopolitics for the most part does not stray far from “big P” politics (i.e., warfare), whereas the
question of where security occurs is frequently about abstracted macro-spaces such as the
“battlefield” (Kofman 1996; Dowler and Sharp 2001; Secor 2001; Smith 2001). In this spirit, Hyndman (2004, 319) asks
geographers to shift “scales to include the security of the state but in relation to the security
and wellbeing of people who live in and across its borders.” Indeed, Hyndman (2001) argues a need to
foreground a politics of (in)security at a finer and more embodied scale and broaden what counts as the politics and practice of
security to include everyday violent relationships. In short, what the feminist geopolitics literature argues is that security should be
approached as something that abides by no particular practices and no particular spaces. In an attempt to contribute to rethinking
geographies of security as suggested by feminist geographers, without losing critical geopolitics’ problematization of security, I next
explore post-9/11 immigration policing in the U.S. context. I am interested in how, in the name of national security, the
localization of immigration enforcement targets immigrants’ every day. Immigration Enforcement and
Devolution after 9/11 One long-standing consequence of critical geopolitics’ foreign policy centrism
has been muted attention to how public policy spaces and politics are geopolitical or to how
public policy and foreign policy implicate increasingly indistinct practices and spaces. More recently,
despite attention across the social sciences to homeland defense and how post-9/11 immigration policy in particular blurs
the lines between public and foreign policy (Tirman 2004), critical geopolitics has been surprisingly
quiet about how everyday spaces of immigrant regulation and incorporation (Mountz 2004), or peopled
mobility more generally (Hyndman 2000; Dahlman and Toal 2005), are relevant to the politics and practice of
security. This lack stands at odds with the ubiquitous motif of migrants (and their purported impact on welfare, crime, language,
cultural practices, etc.) as a national security problem in mainstream geopolitics. Recent research on the spatial convergence and
rescaling of internal and external security practices in the European Union, around precisely immigration enforcement, offers some
important signposts (Bigo 2002; Samers 2004; Walters 2006). This literature is striking insofar as state security practice is understood
not as a foreign policy problematic but as a multitude of quotidian techniques for governing immigrants across a variety of public
and private sites and through means not typically thought of as geopolitical (Huysmans 2006). Although there is not much likeminded research in the North American context,
the emphasis on homeland security in the United States has
brought about a comparable reorganization of internal and external security. The post-9/11
devolutionary trend in immigration enforcement is a prime example. Although states and localities played an
early role in admitting and expelling noncitizens, a stand-alone (i.e., plenary) federal power over immigration was
the norm for much of the twentieth century, when immigration control was conceived as a specifically national security power and
as such preemptively the preserve of federal representatives and agencies (Lee 2005). Moreover, by virtue of its focus on territorial
entry itself as a security risk, the plenary doctrine meant that immigration control was administered primarily at U.S. borders
(Shachar 2007). This federally preemptive and outward-looking scheme has been fundamentally disrupted by the post-9/11
devolutionary trend. In making immigration enforcement a localized as well as inward-looking national security practice, devolution
constitutes a significant challenge to who regulates immigration and to what practices security comprises. I limit my following
discussion of devolution to the expansion of interior enforcement via state and local authorities. I look first at 287(g) and second at
inherent authority.
The alternative is to see like a border – positioning oneself in the borderlands
allows for an analysis of the structural conditions of those disposed by it. This is
a prerequisite to any positive political action.
Rumford 11
[“Seeing like a border”; Chris Rumford is a professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway,
University of London; Political Geography 30 (2011) p. 61-69;
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~reecej/Johnson%20et%20al%202011%20Political%20Geography.pdf] //duff
In a world of security alerts, enhanced personal mobility (for many, but not all), and transnational
flows of goods, finances, and services we encounter not a borderless world but a plethora of borders which
are not only found “at the border”. They “now occupy ‘a multiplicity of sites’ and ‘seep into the
city and the neighborhood’ in addition to existing at the edges of a polity” (Amoore, Marmura, & Salter,
2008). Ordinary spaces are saturated with “borders, walls, fences, thresholds, signposted areas,
security systems and checkpoints, virtual frontiers, specialized zones, protected areas, and areas
under control” (Multiplicity, 2005). Borders are no longer seen only as lines on a map but as spaces in their own
right (as in the idea of “borderlands”) and as processes; in short, there has been a shift from borders to bordering (or rebordering,
on some accounts). The argument advanced here is that the changes to borders are in fact more far-reaching than can be captured
by either the idea that “borders are everywhere” or a security-driven rebordering thesis. I
propose that to understand
borders fully scholars need to “see like a border”. Three key dimensions of borders/bordering are generating a
distinct research agenda and associated literature. First, borders can be “engines of connectivity”. Rather than curtailing mobility,
borders can actively facilitate it; many key
borders are at airports, maritime ports, and railway terminals.
Borders can connect as well as divide, not just proximate entities, but globally. This means that more
conventional views of interactions across borders (e.g. Minghi, 1991) are in need of revision. It also
means that border scholars must take issue with the idea, expressed by Häkli and Kaplan (2002, p. 7), that “cross-border interactions
are more likely to occur when the ‘other side’ is easily accessible, in contrast to when people live farther away from the border”. For
van Schendel (2005) borderlanders are able to “jump” scales (local, national, regional, global) and therefore do not experience the
national border only as an immediate limit. People can construct the scale of the border for themselves; as a “local” phenomenon, a
nation-state “edge”, or as a transnational staging post: the border can be reconfigured as a portal. Second,
bordering is not
always the business of the state. Ordinary people (citizens and also non-citizens) are increasingly
involved in the business of bordering, an activity I have previously termed “borderwork” (Rumford, 2008). Citizens,
entrepreneurs, and NGOs are active in constructing, shifting, or even erasing borders. The borders in question are not
necessarily those (at the edges) of the nation-state; they can be found at a range of sites throughout
society: in towns and cities, and in local neighborhoods. Examples (in the UK) include: the local currency
schemes in several English towns (Stroud, Lewes, Totnes) designed to prevent the leeching of money from the local economy;
securing Protected Designation of Origin status (from the EU) for local produce such as Melton Mowbray pork pies
and Stilton cheese (Cooper & Rumford, in press) which creates bounded regions for branded products. What is
distinctive about these activities is that they result from initiatives by entrepreneurs, citizens/ residents, and grass roots activists.
They
are not top-down, state-led processes of bordering. This activity does not necessarily result
in borders that enhance national security but it provides borderworkers with new political
and/or economic opportunities: the uses of borders are many and various. Third, borders provide
opportunities for claims-making. This has long been recognized to be the case in respect of the
nation-state, where national borders are not always imposed by the center. For example Sahlins’ (1989,
p. 9) work on the SpaineFrance border in the Pyrenees shows that “local society brought the nation into the village”. But borderwork
also has a post-national dimension and is consistent with what Is in and Nielsen (2008) term an “act of citizenship”: “they are part of
the process by which citizens are distinguished from others: strangers, outsiders, non-status people and the rest” (Nyers, 2008, p.
168). Moreover, acts of citizenship and borderwork alike are not restricted to those who are already citizens; they are means by
which “non-status persons can constitute themselves as being political” (Nyers, 2008, p. 162). Borderwork can
also be
associated with a range of claims-making activity, not only claims to national belonging or
citizenship, but also demands for transnational mobility, assertions of human rights, and
demonstrations of political actorhood, all of which can comprise acts of citizenship. This leads to
the possibility of viewing bordering not only in terms of securitization but also in terms of
opportunities for humanitarian assistance targeted at those (refugees, migrants) who may coalesce at
the borders. Some common themes are evident in these three dimensions of bordering, most importantly bordering as a
societal phenomenon and the importance of individual experience in making/negotiating borders, pointing to a vernacularization or
cosmopolitanization of borders (Rumford, 2007). The resultant diversity and multiplication of border studies provokes a key
question: from what perspective should this multiplicity of borders be viewed? The
danger is that even when
acknowledged that borders can be diffused throughout society border scholars still choose to
look at borders from the perspective of the state, by considering for example the extent to
which the development of borderlands is compatible with conventional notions of securitized
borders. But what would happen if a different, non-state perspective were adopted? Rather than “seeing like a state” (Scott,
1998) what would it mean to “see like a border”? Seeing like a border shifts the emphasis in border studies in several important
ways. First, as borders can be found “wherever selective controls are to be found” (Balibar, 2002, pp. 84e85)
seeing like a
border does not equate to “being on the outside and looking in” (or looking out from the watchtower to the
wilderness beyond). Bordering processes permeate everyday life, well captured in Urry’s (2007) notion of
“frisk society” in which passing through public spaces is akin to the experience of airport
security. In aspiring to see like a border, the constitutive nature of borders in social and political life must be recognized. Second,
borders are not necessarily always working in the service of the state. When seeing like a state one is
committed to seeing borders as lines of securitized defense. Borders do not always conform to this model. In a desire to shore up
what may be perceived as the ineffectual borders of the nation-state borderworkers may engage in local bordering activity designed
to enhance status or regulate mobility;
gated communities, respect zones, “resilient” communities of CCTV
watching citizens. Third, seeing like a border does not necessarily mean identifying with the
subaltern, the dispossessed, the downtrodden, the marginal. The border, and the borderwork which has led to its construction,
may be the project of those seeking to gain further advantage in society: entrepreneurs or affluent citizens, for example. Why
remain passive in the face of other peoples’ borders when it is possible to obtain advantage by becoming a proactive borderer? If
borders are networked throughout society and more and more people can participate in borderwork, then the capacity to make or
undo borders becomes a major source of political capital. Seeing
like a border means taking into account
perspectives from those at, on, or shaping the border, and this constituency is increasing large
and diverse. Fourth, borders can be “invisible” (to some but not to all). This assertion runs counter to one of the
most established truths in border studies: that “a border that is not visible to all has failed its purpose” (van Schendel, 2005, p. 41).
But borders may be invisible, as
when they are designed not to look like borders, located in one place
but projected in another entirely. This is the case with the “juxtaposed” borders established by the UK along the
Eurostar routes, UK passport control being situated at the French terminus Gare du Nord in Paris, French controls at London’s St.
Pancras. There are many other examples of invisible borders: the UK’s “offshore borders” e established at points across the world
where people apply for visa to enter the UK e or the EU’s Frontex boat patrols along the coast of West Africa. Such bordering activity
is designed to constitute a formidable physical barrier to those beyond the EU’s border while not necessarily affecting those living on
the inside. Borders
can be highly selective and work so as to render them invisible to the majority
of the population. ‘Seeing like a border’ leads to the discovery that some borders are designed
not to be seen.
CP
Text: The United States Federal Government should cross-deputize the
Tohono O’odham Tribal Police Department with Arizona State Police
Forces, increasing cooperation with United States Border Patrol, give
exclusive jurisdiction of border crossings to the cross-deputized tribal law
officers, increase funding for tribal law enforcement, increase the
amount of crossing zones, and increase funding for the Border Patrol and
Tohono O’odham police forces.
The Counterplan solves the entirety of the affirmative and net-benefit plus
solves disputes, violence, drug and human trafficking, culture, and
terrorism
Cummings and Revel 14 (Janet, Emory University, Department of Health Policy and
Management, and Asa, Executive Assistant, National Native American Law Enforcement
Association, The American Indian Quarterly, Volume 38, Number 3, Summer 2014, Project
Muse)//rf
The onerous history of relations between tribal, federal, and state governments and the coinciding development and enforcement
of laws surrounding tribal entities have yielded the current complex and highly antagonistic environment that exists today. Until
greater attention is given to these issues and shifts in governmental policies occur, the negative
circumstances faced by the Tohono O’odham and Saint Regis Mohawk Nations, as well as several other American
Indian tribes in the United States, will continue to escalate.¶ Currently, limitations on tribal sovereignty serve
as one of the most substantial barriers in tribal law enforcement’s ability to carry out its duties
to protect tribal members and resources. An examination of the results of increased tribal sovereignty in the past
forty years provides reason to believe that further increases in sovereignty would improve the [End Page 311]
current conditions faced by these communities. Since the mid-1970s, shifts in federal policy toward increased
tribal self-determination have progressively manifested as improvements in tribal judicial, economic, and social systems. These
improvements may be attributed to the allocation
of responsibilities to tribal providers who are more
knowledgeable about tribal needs and more accountable to tribal communities than their
federal counterparts. Grant programs like STOP VAIW, which encourages tribally developed strategies to reduce crimes
against Indian women, have also shown substantial success, including increasing arrest rates and empowering tribal officials and
women.100 Additionally, because the federal government still possesses plenary power over Indian nations, there is significant
incentive for tribal nations to support activity that is fair to all Native and non-Native people.101
One specific example of how an increase in tribal sovereignty could address these challenges includes the
expansion of tribal law enforcement jurisdictional authority through the continued use of
policies such as cross-deputization agreements. Expanding the authority of tribal law
enforcement will work to reduce and possibly prevent non-Indian criminal activity on
reservations. This type of system is also typically less expensive than other options, such as security contracts in which tribal
governments contract with public or private entities to provide additional security on tribal land. In cross-deputization
agreements, all participants may undergo training that provides a comprehensive overview of
federal, state, and tribal laws. Additionally, these agreements enable tribal, state, and county
officials to utilize emergency equipment, such as firearms and vehicles, on and off reservation
land.102¶ Furthermore, because the responsibility of protecting our nation’s borders falls on the
shoulders of the US government and should not fall exclusively on two small Indian nations, it is
also important for the federal government to maintain a presence along the border. According to the
federal Indian trust responsibility, the United States “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust”
toward Indian tribes (Seminole Nation v. United States, 1942). This
doctrine is also a “legally enforceable fiduciary
obligation on the part of the United States to protect tribal treaty rights, lands, assets, and
resources, as well as a duty to carry out the mandates of federal law with respect to American
Indian and Alaska Native tribes and villages.”103¶ Given the federal government’s responsibility to protect our
nation’s [End Page 312] borders and tribal lands and resources, it is crucial that the federal government should
maintain a presence along the international borders within tribal land. This presence, however, should be
limited to a specified radius where the most violent crimes tend to occur.104 This would serve as a mechanism to
reduce the current animosity between the tribal communities and federal agents, enhance the
safety of tribal members on the Tohono O’odham and Saint Regis Mohawk reservations, and reduce
the impact of trafficking on vital resources.¶ Given that it is extremely important for tribal, local, state, and federal
governments to work together to improve the situation along the border, communication and cooperation are vital
to the successful achievement of goals. By increasing formal collaborations with tribal members concerning issues
related to the border, solutions can be developed that benefit all stakeholders. In this particular situation,
increased utilization of tribal knowledge and experience will enhance the effectiveness of law
enforcement efforts. Not only do tribal members know the land better than anyone, they also know the individuals involved
and methods utilized in carrying out this intricate system of trafficking. Maintaining an environment of respect is
crucial for the positive advancement of these interactions and may be achieved by
implementing a compulsory training on cultural sensitivity issues for federal and state law
enforcement agencies.¶ At the macrolevel, congressional involvement is also fundamental to inducing
change. Legislative initiatives may involve increasing funding for education and employment
opportunities on reservations, increasing sentences for drug traffickers who utilize Indian land (although this may
disproportionately affect Native people), and reallocating enforcement resources to treat the demand for drugs as a
public health problem.105 It is also important to develop a fair and easily accessible method for tribal members in the United States,
Mexico, and Canada to gain access to identification that is consistently accepted by all border enforcement agencies. One
method of achieving this would be to provide US citizenship to all Tohono O’odham and Saint Regis
Mohawk members regardless of what country they reside in and provide them with a realistic means
for obtaining US passports or identification cards. Furthermore, it is crucial that policymakers
eliminate the inequities in resource allocation between tribal, local, and state governments to
increase the effectiveness of the enforcement of borders. [End Page 313]¶ The crisis of drug and human trafficking
within the Saint Regis Mohawk and Tohono O’odham Nations is not a matter to be taken lightly. Not
only is it a threat to the security and culture of two unique populations, but it also poses a threat to the United
States’ homeland security. Each year tons of drugs and weapons are transported through these locations and distributed throughout
the United States. These sites also represent an easily accessible entry point for terrorist groups.
Allowing for the changes referenced above, tribal groups like the Tohono O’odham and Saint Regis Mohawk Nations can begin to
build innovative and effective systems that incorporate their traditional beliefs and may even serve as a model for the rest of the
nation. Achieving
a balance between federal presence on the reservation, increased tribal
authority over their land and activities, and equitable distribution of resources is fundamental to
resolving unrest along the border.
Cartel DA
http://azdailysun.com/news/local/border-violence-spikes-due-to-drug-cartelinfighting/article_612bbd60-31a1-55e5-ab75-cc668aa7ba1f.html
1. Drug trafficking from Mexico to the US through the Tohono O’odham
nation is high now – native population involved and the aff can’t solve
Cummings and Revel 14 (Janet, Emory University, Department of Health Policy and
Management, and Asa, Executive Assistant, National Native American Law Enforcement
Association, The American Indian Quarterly, Volume 38, Number 3, Summer 2014, Project
Muse)//rf
The distribution
and use of illegal narcotics has historically been a prevailing concern among the
US general public, with local laws related to the issue enacted as early as the 1840s. It was not until the initiation of the “War
on Drugs” by President Richard Nixon in 1971, however, that this topic became a central theme in political arenas. Since this era,
numerous laws have been enacted in an attempt to combat this problem. In spite of the implementation of more stringent laws and
regulations geared toward reducing the pervasiveness of drugs since the 1970s, the distribution
and use of illegal
narcotics continues to be widespread throughout the United States and, in some cases, has
shown significant increases.¶ This escalation is particularly evident on reservations such as those of
the Tohono O’odham and Saint Regis Mohawk Nations. According to a report released by the US Department of Justice, both
Mexican and Asian drug-trafficking organizations (dtos) frequently exploit reservations along the USMexico and US-Canada borders as arrival and/or transit zones for illegal drugs destined for markets
throughout the United States.1 Drugs are brought in via a variety of means, and Native American criminal groups are often recruited
to retrieve and transport the goods on the US side of the reservations.¶ In
2010, the Tohono O’odham Nation was
designated as a part of the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (hidta) by the US
Department of Justice. This region encompasses the western and southern [End Page 289] counties of Cochise, La Paz,
Maricopa, Mohave, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, and Yuma, including the entire US-Mexico border in Arizona. The area is
considered to be a major arrival zone for large quantities of marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin
entering the United States from Mexico. In 2009, 42 percent of all marijuana seizures occurring along the US-Mexico border took
place in this region, with the Tohono O’odham reservation serving as the primary entry point.2 Another report estimated that 5–10
percent of all marijuana produced in Mexico is transported through this reservation, which accounts for less than 4 percent of the
Increased border enforcement efforts along many parts of the US-Mexico border that
forced drug and human smugglers
to use more remote areas like the Tohono O’odham reservation.4 Five informal border crossings
have existed for decades along the Tohono O’odham Nation’s seventy-five-mile international border.
entire US-Mexico border.3¶
began in the 1990s and intensified after the September 11 terrorist attacks have
Officially, only tribal members are permitted to pass through these entry points, and the biggest obstacle to crossing these locations
used to be steel
cattle guards and barbed-wire fencing. Due to a lack of enforcement and extensive
desert terrain along these areas, however, smugglers began using these points to gain easy access into
the United States via stolen vehicles. As a result, tribal officers were forced to close some of the entry
points.5 Additionally, the border has been enhanced with metal post and Normandy-style barriers (surface mountings constructed
with high-strength tubular and structural steel components) in an attempt to stop trucks carrying illegal drugs headed for urban
areas.6 Other means of transporting drugs across the border include backpackers, couriers on horseback, and airplanes.7¶ Because
of the reservation’s proximity to the border, wholesale quantities of drugs are often seized throughout the land of the Tohono
O’odham Nation, and these quantities have increased dramatically in the past decade. During fiscal year 2001, the Tohono O’odham
Police Department seized 45,000 pounds of illegal narcotics; this number increased to 65,000 pounds in 2002.8 This pattern of
escalation has shown no signs of deterioration. In 2008, a total of 201,000 pounds of marijuana alone were seized on the reservation
by law enforcement; in 2009, this amount increased further to 319,000 pounds of marijuana.9¶ Even more alarming than the
increase in the quantity of drugs seized [End Page 290] is the increase
in tribal member involvement with the
smuggling process. According to a statement made by Sgt. David Cray, a nineteen-year veteran of the Tohono O’odham
Police Department’s antidrug unit, the percentage of drug smugglers arrested on the reservation who are
tribal members has substantially increased in the last two decades. In the first half of 2009, twenty-nine of
the forty-five arrests related to drug smuggling made by tribal officers were of tribal members.10 One of the primary reasons tribal
members are recruited to assist with trafficking is because law enforcement officials must have a reasonable suspicion to stop tribal
members, whereas nontribal persons driving on the reservation’s restricted areas are not held to this standard. ¶ The Saint Regis
Mohawk Nation of New York is experiencing a similar predicament. According to reports, Asian dtos exploit the reservation and its
tribal members by smuggling marijuana, mdma, and cocaine across the Canadian border daily. The National Drug Threat Assessment
2010 estimates that as much as 20 percent of all high-potency marijuana grown in Canada each year is smuggled through the
reservation. Each week, multiple tons of illegal narcotics pass through the reservation, an area that accounts for less than 1 percent
of the US-Canada border.11 According to Saint Regis Mohawk Tribal Police Chief Andrew Thomas, incidents related to border
security occur daily, and a high percentage of these violations relate to illegal narcotics.12¶ Unless
significant strides are
made in the realm of policy, it is unlikely that the circumstances on the Tohono O’odham or
Saint Regis Mohawk reservations will improve. Until these changes occur, drug trafficking will
continue to place a significant financial and public health burden on tribal entities and threaten
the security of the United States.
2. Only expansion of current federal presence can solve - removing Border
Patrol destroys the only hope the Tohono have to combat drug trafficking
(Mizzi ’14, Shannon Mizzi, Friday, SEP 26, 2014, "A Forgotten Front in the Drug & Border
Fights: Tribal Reservations by Shannon Mizzi," The Wilson Quarterly,
http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/forgotten-front-in-drug-border-fights-tribal-reservations/,
language edited) //LS
Yet there are reasons to hope. Tribal revenues are up, which may allow for increased investment
in education (which could help to combat poverty and reduce the attractiveness of drug
trafficking). State, local, and federal officials are aiming to improve coordination with
reservation law enforcement, the Border Patrol has introduced cultural sensitivity training for
its officers, and new counter-trafficking measures grant O’odham officers access to advanced
technological tools. Revels and Cummings are optimistic about this upward trajectory,
advocating further expansion of the legal capabilities of Tohono O’odham law enforcement, and
a continued strong, but perhaps more respectful federal presence to reduce cross-border
trafficking and protect vulnerable O’odham.
3. Border Patrol loss increases crime – making a bad situation even worse
(Di Iorio ’07, “Mending Fences: The Fractured Relationship between Native American Tribes
and the Federal Government and Its Negative Impact on Border Security”, Syracuse Law Review,
Vol. 57, Issue 2 (2007), pp. 407-428, Di Iorio, William R.) //LS
The federal government can grant border tribes complete sovereignty, treating them like
foreign states as argued in Cherokee Nation. Such a change would give the border tribes sole
authority to patrol international borders. United States Border Patrol would then shift its
operations to controlling the borders between the Native American lands and the United States.
The federal and state governments would then have mutual responsibility for patrolling and
prosecuting illegal activity crossing into the United States from the Native American lands
without having to expend resources in monitoring the soft spots along Native American
international borders. Decades of federal assistance have created a strong reliance on the
federal government in tribal affairs. Because of federal oversight, Native American tribes have
never been completely self-sufficient. Abruptly cutting off this federal assistance would likely
leave the tribal lands in greater security disarray than at present. Native American tribes
currently lack the ability to combat crime in their territory. Therefore, without federal
assistance, their crime problems could significantly worsen. Native American violent crime rates
far exceed those of any other group.10 7
4. Devastates the Tohono people and turns their culture claims – drug abuse,
sexual violence, killings by rival drug cartels from smugglers and affiliates
(Mizzi ’14, Shannon Mizzi, Friday, SEP 26, 2014, "A Forgotten Front in the Drug & Border
Fights: Tribal Reservations by Shannon Mizzi," The Wilson Quarterly,
http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/forgotten-front-in-drug-border-fights-tribal-reservations/,
language edited) //LS
The increase in drug trafficking has spilled over into almost every other aspect of reservation
life. Where other racioethnic groups have seen a decrease in violent crime over the past several
decades, American Indian communities have suffered from rising incidences of violence over the
past 30 years. According to Revels and Cummings, "tribal law enforcement officials across the
[United States] consistently report that most violent, personal, and property crimes on
reservations relate to drug trafficking, drug abuse, and gang activity,” which “often lead to other
indirect consequences such as accidental death, injuries, suicide, domestic violence, and sexual
abuse." The increasingly militarized nature of border reservations like that of the Tohono
O’odham has fundamentally changed life in those communities: They are no longer peaceful or
safe places to live, and not a single resident is unaffected by the realities and spillover effects of
the drug trade. Homes are regularly broken into by smugglers and their affiliates. Residents are
routinely searched by law enforcement, their movements restricted on their own land. Those
who assist independent drug smugglers who are not attached to major cartels are at risk of
being attacked by members of dominant drug cartels who want to eliminate competition and
retain their near monopoly on the business. "The psychological burden this type of environment
places upon individuals," write Revels and Cummings, "coupled with the constant sense of fear,
is immeasurable."
The Advantage
Alt cause – division within the Tohono nation itself between the American and
Mexican side in the context of representation is causing the division in culture.
Kilpatrick, 14 (Kate. Reporter/Editor at Al Jazeera America. "U.S.-Mexico Border Wreaks
Havoc on Lives of an Indigenous Desert Tribe." Aljazeera America. N.p., 25 May 2014. Web. 15
July 2015.)
But for
Garcia, the issue facing O’odham in Mexico is not just access to resources but
representation. “There isn’t any representation in the [tribal] council that comes from Sonora,” he
said.¶ Even among those O’odham in Mexico who are officially enrolled in the Nation, very few are registered
to one of the 12 districts on the reservation. Most Sonoran O’odham IDs state N.D., no district, Garcia said. This means that
even though the tribe includes its Mexican members in the annual count that determines federal funds,
those funds get divvied up between the districts and don’t reach the O’odham in Mexico.¶ If the
tribe would allow it, he said, representation would give O’odham in Mexico a say in the tribal
government.¶ “They would have a voice in representing the housing needs, the road needs, the education, the health issue —
all those things would be voiced here on the Nation if we had representation.”¶ Garcia believes it’s vital to the
economic improvement of O’odham in Mexico as well as their ability to keep their culture and
identity intact.¶ “If the O’odham in Mexico don’t get organized, if they don’t get a unity going, they’re
always going to be in the same boat,” he said.¶ Facing extinction¶ David Ortega agrees. The self-described
warrior with long salt-and-pepper hair was born in the U.S. but moved to Mexico where he lives with his wife, Patty. “We have
lost that oneness,” he said. “We as native people have always supported each other. We’ve always lived together as one
throughout history and culture.”¶ “I feel we have to unify first, bring ourselves back from the dominant
culture’s way, relearn what we are as O’odham people.”
Border Patrol is stopping immigration but plan pullout reverses current
trends - crossings in this area cause negative environmental impacts,
break-ins, means Tohono O’odham can’t do cultural activities
(Filzen ’13, Andrea Filzen, 2-22-2013, "Clash on the Border of the Tohomo O’odham Nation,"
Pulitzer Center, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/clash-border-tohomo-o%E2%80%99odhamnation-migration-Mexico-Arizona-Native-Americans) //LS
Some migrants are poor parents who want to financially support their families by working in the
United States. They are not aggressive and they are not drug dealers. Some well- intentioned
migrants, out of desperation, steal food, water, and trucks, leave their trash on the land, and
use medical resources when passing through the O’odham nation. Employees like Gary Olson,
manager of waste maintenance for the O’odham government, reduce the negative effects of
migration by cleaning up litter. “Some of my employees have had their homes broken into.
Migrants raid their fridges because they’re starving after a long journey. Trashing homes and
leaving dirty clothes behind negatively impacts the environment,” Olson expresses. Yet
according to Olson, the amount of litter on the reservation decreased due to reduction in
border-crossing and help from larger environmental safety bodies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). “Immigration has significantly decreased because Border Patrol has
buckled down. It’s a cat and mouse game, and now there are more cats then mice. Another
factor is just the little job opportunities in the States now. With unemployment gone up there is
less of an appeal to come to the United States,” Olson explains. Views vary. Zepeda believes that
migration is on the rise. “A lot of times the migrants will want, especially in the summer time,
water or food. In the past it wasn’t a problem but let’s say in the last ten to fifteen years it has
gotten pretty dangerous, where there are more people crossing and they want more than water
and food—for example your truck or things on your lawn—and to that extent, Tohono O’odham
people are not open to helping because they don’t know who they’re helping and that might
cause further problems. Because of the influx of more movement across the O’odham nation
Border Patrol is very visible out there so there’s that conflict as well for jurisdiction and so on.”
Plan funnels illegal immigration into the most dangerous areas of the desert –
increases violence, drug trade, migrant deaths
(Filzen ’13, Andrea Filzen, 2-22-2013, "Clash on the Border of the Tohomo O’odham Nation,"
Pulitzer Center, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/clash-border-tohomo-o%E2%80%99odhamnation-migration-Mexico-Arizona-Native-Americans) //LS
“A woman was driving her truck –and a lot of roads that come off of the main highway towards
the reservation, like dirt roads, was one that she was on –and she had to stop because she saw a
large tree laid across the road, which was unusual… so she couldn’t cross. So she stopped and
these people came out of the desert and they were all illegal immigrants and they didn’t hijack
her but they took her truck… and that was one way of making sure she stopped by putting the
tree there. So that made it in the local tribal paper and people are warned of things that are
unusual to come across. Trees in the road.”
Ofelia Zepeda, professor of linguistics at the University of Arizona, refers to an incident in which
migrants crossing into the United States from the border of Mexico disturb the lives of a Native
American group, the Tohono O’odham, who reside on the border. Currently migrants who
attempt to cross the United States border from Mexico and avoid Border Patrol are channeled
into a strip of the Tohono O’odham Nation’s hazardous desert land. Stricter national security
increasingly causes migrants to cross through the reservation, which attracts various actors onto
the nation’s land, consequentially altering O’odham way of life as well as O’odham attitudes
towards undocumented migrants. Eddie Brown, a professor of Arizona State University and a
member of the Tohono O’odham tribe, discusses some of the issues that Tohono O’odham tribal
members face because they live on the border of Mexico and Arizona. “You have O’odham living
in villages close to the border and many times their houses are robbed, their cars stolen, their
homes broken into. So many times you have O’odham that are afraid sometimes to go into town
to buy food, to leave their houses alone never knowing what is going to happen. And then of
course you have the drug trade and this is where it gets even more complicated: Illegals coming
across have dollars that pay people so you have O’odham that do not have jobs and are looking
for some way to earn a living; that becomes a very easy way as well.”
Solvency
Plan gets circumvented – Guadalupe proves the USFG just does whatever it
wants when it comes to border-crossing rights when convenient
(Di Iorio ’07, “Mending Fences: The Fractured Relationship between Native American Tribes
and the Federal Government and Its Negative Impact on Border Security”, Syracuse Law Review,
Vol. 57, Issue 2 (2007), pp. 407-428, Di Iorio, William R.) //LS
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed between the United States¶ and Mexico at the
conclusion of the Mexican-American War, brought several border tribes under the protection of
the federal government.47¶ While this treaty made no mention of border crossing akin to the Jay
Treaty, the Native American tribes routinely enjoyed free passage between¶ the United States
and Mexico for a significant period of time.48 This freedom continued, largely unchanged, until
the 1980s, when the problem of illegal Mexican immigration forced the United States
government to restrict all passage between the United States and Mexico border.4 9¶ While
federal actions after this treaty did not renege on promises guaranteed to Native Americans, the
actions reiterate the underlying nature of the federal government-Native American relationship
portrayed by the Marshall trilogy and the discussed treaties. Whatever rights may exist for
Native Americans cannot be considered fundamental in any way. They exist at the pleasure of
the federal government, to be granted or withheld at¶ the convenience of the government.¶ The
United Nations Draft Declaration, though not yet adopted by the United Nations or its members,
reflects generally recognized international norms with respect to the treatment of indigenous
populations, such as Native Americans. 50 In short, it would recognize the importance of Native
Americans' right to occupy and use traditional lands while requiring¶ 51¶ The International Labor
Organization Convention reflects the sovereign hopes of Native American tribes by recognizing
the "aspirations of indigenous peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of
life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and
religions, within the framework of States in which they live." 52 The Convention requires that its
signers take affirmative steps¶ to assist Native American tribes in preserving their culture and
protecting in case law and treaties. The historical record shows that the relationship between
the federal government and Native Americans is dictated not by words, but by actions. In that
vein, Native Americans should take little consolation from the statements and efforts of the
international community, as it is unlikely that the federal government will be swayed more by
the words of the international community than it has been by its own words. The historical
record reflects the tenuous nature of the relationship between the federal government and
Native Americans. Often depicted as less than human, Native Americans have never enjoyed
equal status. Moreover, the federal government has routinely failed to abide by its agreements
with Native Americans.
Arizona, where the Tohono live, won’t follow new border laws
Elizabeth Erwin 4/11 (“Arizona lawmakers want to ignore President Obama's executive
orders”, Mar 11, 2015 6:27 PM, http://www.abc15.com/news/state/arizona-lawmakers-wantto-ignore-president-obamas-executive-orders, Accessed 7/16/15,)
President Barack Obama has signed some big executive orders lately. They've impacted guns
and immigration, two issues Arizonans clearly care about. But the approach some lawmakers
are taking to keep us from enforcing those rules has some questioning if the plan is even legal!
"The legislature wants to prevent enforcement of executive orders and prevent enforcement
of federal agency policy directives," said attorney David Abner with Knapp & Roberts Law Firm.
House Bill 2368 says unless those orders have been voted on by Congress and signed into law,
Arizona wouldn't have to follow them. "It's political grandstanding. There's nothing of
substance to this. It's silly," Abner said. "Well, unfortunately, it's a waste of time, somewhat
ridiculous. In fact very ridiculous," said House Minority Leader Bruce Wheeler. Wheeler voted
against the bill. He said the priorities of what gets floor time doesn't match up with what
Arizonans really need. "We ought to be addressing education and jobs. Instead we're
addressing these extremist bills," Wheeler said. Abner said even if this bill is signed into law
there's no way it would stand up in court. "If our state officials ignore federal law they run the
risk of prosecution by federal authorities," Abner said. ABC15 reached out to the bill's sponsors
today for comment. We have not heard back yet.
6.