International Politics of
Democracy Promotion PO229
Session 1: Framing the Module
and Basic Vocabulary
1
Framing the module
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United Nations Sec. General’s statement
The ‘when’ of democracy promotion.
The ‘who’ of democracy promotion.
The ‘where’ of democracy promotion.
A roller coaster ride.
Questions the module addresses.
Dispelling three myths.
Do you have any questions?
2
Vocabulary
• Democratisation
• Means movement towards/in the direction
of democracy. In practice that usually
means western style liberal democracy.
But we can challenge that reduction if we
think other forms of democracy may be
more appropriate
3
Democratisation
• Includes both transitional phase in the
installation of democracy, and subsequent
progress, for example from new, fragile,
unstable, defective or imperfect
democracy, towards more established,
stable, and ‘more democratic’ democracy.
Open question of how to assess
‘democraticness’ or a democracy’s quality.
4
Democratisation
• No end point: no country has reached the
ideal typical position; the ideal itself may
be dynamic, as for example new
technology makes new forms of mass
political participation possible.
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Democratisation
• Democratisation is analytically distinct
from the political liberalisation of
authoritarian regimes, which may not
produce democracy
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Democratisation
• Democratisation is analytically distinct
from authoritarian break down, which may
not lead to democracy. Locating the
borderline (the ‘tipping point’) between
authoritarian break-down and democratic
transition is somewhat arbitrary: the one
merges into the other. Of course we can
only know if the one merged into the other
with benefit of hindsight, i.e. after the
event.
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Democratisation Backwards
• Increase in attention paid to examples of
democratic decay and authoritarian
persistence and revival, and, even, the
diffusion of authoritarian and semiauthoritarian or illiberal rule. New
theoretical perspectives required.
8
Democracy Assistance
• Concessionary (i.e. grant-aided) and
largely consensual projects and
programmes. But can become politically
contentious – borderline with nonconsensual forms of democracy promotion
difficult to locate.
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Democracy Promotion
• All the different methods and approaches
to promoting democracy that range from
assistance and ‘soft power’ (e.g. influence)
through ‘pressure’ to ‘hard power (i.e.
coercion, including for example military
intervention)
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Democracy Support; Supporting
Democracy-Building
• Can cover assistance and also knowledgesharing about democracy/democratisation and
diplomatic engagement, but not coercion.
Sometimes preferred by non-governmental
practitioners.
• ‘Shared democracy-building’ (IDEA’s
preference) echoes the evolution from foreign
(economic) aid, thru’ development assistance, to
internat. development cooperation, and now
‘partnership for development’.
11
Regime Change
• The attempt to bring down a government (as distinct from
changing the type of political regime or political rule or
political system) by the use of military force. Born of the
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq by US and coalition
forces.
• Clausewitz famously said ‘war is a continuation of politics
by other means’. ‘Regime change’ might be thought of as
an endeavour that sometimes masquerades as democracy
promotion but employs ‘other means’ than assistance, most
notably physical violence, and in the first instance is driven
by other purposes and goals. It might or it might not lead to
democracy.
12
International Dimensions of
Democratisation
• Dwells on context or environment or ‘causes’ rather than
consequences of democratisation. Comprises both
active and passive international democracy promotion
• Active form comprises intentionality, i.e. deliberate
assistance and/or promotion, by whatever means.
• Passive sense refers to democracy being spread or
diffused (or the opposite) by international influences
(positive or negative) other than intentional democracy
promotion and democracy assistance. Example: effects
of living in a good, or conversely bad, neighbourhood;
effects of global economic trends.
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Towards a Borderless World?
• ‘International’ itself a contested dimension
• Impact of globalisation on the
national/international or foreign/domestic
distinctions: the transnational dimension (e.g.
global civil society) and the mutually constitutive
nature of the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’,
whereby each stimulates or provokes and
shapes the other and influences its effects.
Assigning causality in democracy promotion
even more difficult than identifying
democratisation’s causes.
14
IPDP
• Session 2: Evolution in the State of
Democratisation as Reality and as Subject of
inquiry
• Aim of Lecture: to introduce the apparent paradox that
democratisation and its international promotion
warrant close inspection even though, possibly, the
best is already behind us.
• The rise of democracy is ' the most important thing to
have happened in the twentieth century' (Amartya
Sen, 1999).
• Since then the optimism has dimmed, the romance
has faded away. Unclear whether the ‘Arab
awakening’ is coming to the rescue.
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Main points
• 1.The study of democratisation has been driven by events that were
not foreseen in advance.
• 'the likelihood of democratic development in Eastern Europe is
virtually nil' (Samuel P. Huntington, 1984). Five years later….
• 2.Although American political science tended to dominate the study
of democratisation, especially early on, the best way to understand
democratisation is to approach it in the spirit of politics as an open
discipline.
• 'the suggestion that the student of politics is an eclectic is very well
observed, for he draws on so many ways of analysis as seem to suit
his purpose' (W. H. Greenleaf, 1968).
• A multidisciplinary approach is especially well suited to increase our
knowledge & understanding of democratisation, if we conceive it to
be a multi-faceted & multidimensional process, i.e. about something
more than just refashioning the institutions of government.
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Main points
• 3.The fact that democratisation has had an
impact both on politics and on the study of
politics around the world means it should
be of special interest to political studies
and to students of international politics.
• 'where democracy is strong, political
science is strong; where democracy is
weak, political science is weak'
(Huntington, 1988).
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Main points
• 4. Establishing the trend: the flow and the ebb tide
of democratisation under the impact of :
• revisions to our understanding of democracy,
raising the bar
• prevalence of state fragility, collapse even, or at
minimum weak government
• authoritarian persistence & now resurgence
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Three provocative thoughts to
conclude with
• 1)‘It is not true that trends towards greater
freedom and democracy in the 1990s have since
been stalled, reversed or hollowed out. On the
contrary, what we see is a moving of the
goalposts: the actualité is being subjected to
ever more rigorous appraisal. It is as if we were
previously blinded by the impression of a glass
half full. In contrast, we now focus our analysis
more on the half empty portion of a glass that is
being redefined in ever more expansive terms’
(Anon). Discuss.
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Three provocations
• 2). ‘There are so many places now where
democratisation is, or should be, placed on hold, or
even dumped. The priorities must be building state
and/or building nation, that is to say creating political
and social order and the capacity for (better)
governance. Our analytical frameworks & explanatory
theories should take account of the implications of this
both for politics and for the study of politics. And there
are implications for international democracy promotion
too’. (Anon). Discuss.
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Three provocations
• 3).‘Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule are back.
Political science in general, and theories of
democratisation in particular, need to adjust their sights
and explain how this could have happened. And reflect
and what it means for the future of world politics’. (Anon)
Discuss.
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Summary conclusion
• On the ground: democratisation has evolved over recent
decades and now faces an uncertain future. Does the
‘Arab spring’ really make a difference?
• In the discourse: our knowledge & understanding of
democratisation have made progress, but continue to
reveal weaknesses, including a repeated failure to make
sound prediction.
• For practitioners: the policy implications of the above for
how to (whether to?) promote or support democracy
abroad are under major review.
22
IPDP
• Session 3: Distinguishing processes of
political change
• Aim of Lecture: to alert us to the
conceptual debate and its significance
through an analytical review of key
concepts in democratisation: political
liberalisation; democratic transition;
democratic consolidation; democratic
reversal.
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Political change: transforming the regime rather
than changing the state
• 1.Political transition or opening not same as democratic
transition/opening
• 2.The dichotomy of 'authoritarian' versus democratic
regime is oversimplified because it conceals the variety
of non-democratic regime types and their different claims
to political legitimacy, as well as different governance
properties. Examples.
• 3.Non-democratic not same as pre-democratic. Possible
significance: path-dependence.
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False dichotomy
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3.The dichotomy of authoritarian versus democratic regime is oversimplified because there
can be a variety of outcomes of political transition from the former, apart from the possibility
of reversion back to the same kind of regime.
a) transition to a different type of non-democratic regime
b) break-down of political order – regime collapse degrades the state (Saddam Hussein).
c) intermediate categories of regime from authoritarian to democratic (‘with adjectives’ such
as semi, limited, partial, etc; hybrids). Stable or unstable?
d) democracy a relativistic concept, e.g. electoral; liberal; participatory; deliberative. The
differences may be as profound as the difference from some non-democracies.
e) certain shared underlying features of non-democratic and democratic regimes may
colour how examples of both types operate in some similar ways, e.g. informal institutions.
f) The rule of law matters: but is not exclusive to democracy; and may be more a requisite
than an inevitable part of democracy. The sequencing debate links state and regime.
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Transition v consolidation
• 4.Distinguishing political liberalisation from democratic
transition (and from economic liberalisation).
• 5.Defining democratic consolidation.
• 6.Is the idea of post-consolidation meaningful?
Irreversibility? Beyond the political arena? Scaling up?
• 7.Democratisation as variable geometry: different ‘flight
trajectories’ offer an alternative view to linear progress
marked by agreed stages and tipping points.
• 8. Mirror image of forward and backwards movement
and their explanations (‘causes)?
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Different processes/different
causes
• Distinguishing and disaggregating the process is
important to identifying ‘causes’.
• Significant for the international promotion of democracy,
as well as for pro-democracy actors and opponents of
reform inside countries
• ‘Yet whereas an extensive literature has emerged
concerning the causes and consequences of
democratisation, emerging types of democracy and
issues of democratic consolidation, remarkably little
research has been undertaken on the emergence or
persistence of authoritarian regimes’ (Levitsky and Way,
Journal of Democracy, 13/2, 2002). This is beginning to
change, but there is still some to go, especially
regarding international influences.
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IPDP
• Session 4: Democracy’s critiques and alternatives
• Aim of Lecture: to identify normative critiques of the very idea of
democracy – and by implication of the idea of international
democracy promotion.
• This is more fundamental than criticising merely some particular
theoretical version or interpretation of democracy. More fundamental
than criticising just certain particular institutional models associated
with democracy (e.g. presidential, or alternatively parliamentary).
And it is more fundamental than criticising the democratic
performance of countries that call themselves democracies (i.e. do
not judge the idea of democracy by the so-called democracies,
which might be falling short).
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Critiquing the idea is also
• Not the same as critiquing the motives that are
attributed to international democracy promotion
generally and the West’s lead in promoting democracy
specifically (e.g. US imperialism). And not the same as
criticising the slow pace of democratisation in some
new democracies, or the unrealistic expectations that
people there and/or in the West have about the pace
of change in these countries.
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Also, critiquing the idea can
• Go beyond the claim that democracy does not solve all problems
and procure every good thing that we want (i.e. rejecting democracy
is more fundamental than moderating our expectations about what it
can achieve or deliver). And it goes beyond the claim that
democracy promotion is not a science but a very imperfect art (i.e.
the need to moderate expectations about that too).
• So far all these are different arguments or claims.
• The following reject democracy as a political solution either for some
or for all societies, or for some situations, or for some periods or
phases in a society’s development (note that these are all different
claims too).
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Alternative values in the world and over
time
• 1.Democracy’s values are not universal values (contrary to what
Sen claimed in 1999). Asian values, authoritarian capitalism, and
some versions of political Islam may all offer alternatives.
• In the past, patriarchal rule/the king equates to father of a
family/power to rule is inherited (e.g. Filmer,The Natural Power of
Kings,1680, critiqued in Locke’s First Treatise). Divine right of kings.
• In more recent times, theocratic rule/theocracy/Church overrides or
supplies the state (Iran; Vatican City State), still claiming legitimacy
based on divine source of authority. God is the ultimate sovereign,
and not the people.
• Democracy respects the people’s choice, so if the people prefer an
alternative to democracy, then the alternative is what they should
have.
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Who and what are the people?
• 2. Power should be the preserve of true members of the national
community. This may not mean everyone (i.e. non-inclusionary
enfranchisement based on ethno-nationalist and racial or racist
theories about blood line or colour, or gender and age discrimination
(e.g. apartheid South Africa).
• 3.The people are many, but only the few are wise. Democracy
empowers the ignorance, stupidity, and irrational passions of the
masses. Philosopher kings (Plato: The Republic) or the modern day
equivalent - technocrats – should rule.
• Contemporary examples include Smith and Shearman on responses
to global warming, and recent debates in some European countries
over handing power to experts to determine policy responses to
sovereign debt crises.
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Security an overriding value
• 4. Democracy may be a nice idea, but personal
safety, or security meaning both at home/internal
(‘law and order’) and external/from foreign
aggression must come first (Thomas Hobbes’
argument for absolute, unlimited and indivisible
power off the sovereign, in Leviathan). By
dividing or distributing power widely in society
and placing limits on what even a government
with clear majority support is allowed to do, the
ability of government to guarantee security – the
individual’s basic right to life – would be
compromised, and could be fatally undermined –
especially in an age of terror(ism).
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Democracy requires unrealistic
commitment
• 5.Attaining and maintaining democracy require qualities of selfconfidence, energy and vigilance that human nature might not
possess, even if people are clever.
• Soft version: sustainable democracy requires sustained commitent
by the people (J.S.Mill, ‘A few words on non-intervention’, 1859 ); at
best might succumb to the appeal of populist leaders, who are
insincere democrats.
• Hard (scary) version: ‘fear of freedom’/ ‘freedom an unbearable
burden’ (Eric Fromm, 1941), provides the conditions for messianic
rule that promises a holy grail. Rise of ‘totalitarian dictatorship’, e.g.
fascism in the 1930s.
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Too expensive
• 6.Democracy costs too much, for poor countries
anyway: just think of the opportunity cost in
terms of the basic (material) needs foregone.
Similar arguments used recently against
changing the voting system and electing the
second chamber in the UK.
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Historical obsolescence
• 7. In today’s increasingly globalised world the sites of
power and leading institutions of governance are
moving offshore, and now straddle territorial
boundaries between countries. But democracy was
designed for - and remains trapped inside - the
obsolete shell of the national state. So it can no longer
deliver what it claims – rule by (and for) the people
(discussed further in summer term – see module
programme, week 21).
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Radical views from the left
• 8. Marxist view of ‘bourgeois democracy’ – an historically transient
part of the superstructure. Of no great value in itself (it is the
economic base and social relations make history). And it is
pernicious in as much as it is fashioned to serve/prolong class
domination/exploitation/alienation.
• And it is destined to be superseded by communism (alternatively, C.
B. Macpherson on democratic socialism of Soviet-style rule).
• 9. Anarchist rejection of the state (Tolstoy; Proudhon; etc).
Democracy presupposes a state, and the state is the enemy of
freedom. The end of politics means no place for democracy as we
know it.
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Fatal links, or just remediable flaws?
• 10.(Electoral) democracy means tyranny by the majority. Is liberal
democracy the solution, if it protects the rights of individuals and
minorities (e.g. Bills of Rights)?
• 11.Democracy threatens property rights (Federalist Paper No. 10,
debated in US in 1787). Seems overstated. But highlights
importance of rule of law to encouraging wealth-creation).
• 12.Democracy perpetuates male domination (feminist critiques).
Yes, but remediable – (only?) by social/economic change.
• 13.Representative democracy means enslavement between
elections(Rousseau in The Social Contract, Book 3, chapter 15,
1762). E-democracy now offers a solution?
• 14. Contradicts traditional communal rule (e.g., African style, such
as Botswana’s kgotla). ‘Town hall democracy’ and deliberative
democracy as solutions?
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And democracy promotion?
• Irrespective of whether the idea of democracy is good or
bad, and regardless of what methods are used to
promote democracy, the international promotion of
democracy may be a bad idea because:
• 1.All national communities have a right to determine their
own future free of external influence. Sovereignty limits
democracy support to a request basis only. A matter of
principle.
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And democracy promotion?
• 2.It is only the people of a society who can really know what
that society wants, what it needs, what will work best, when
and how to get it. External influence at best gets in the way,
even when it is welcomed and is well-intentioned. A matter of
prudence more than principle.
• 2a.Variant on above: international democracy promotion is
bound to be ethno-centric, i.e. promote models that reflect
their country of origin, which may be unsuited (e.g.at the time
of the French Revolution in 1790s Burke saw republicanism
as anathema to English traditions of liberty that cherish the
‘wisdom of the ages’, so even if it was right for France –which
Burke denied – this would mean it could not be right for
England).
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And democracy promotion?
• 3.Governments, especially democratically elected ones,
are obliged to place their own countries’ interests first.
So beware of foreigners (democracy promoters) ‘bearing
gifts’: (Rousseau’s ‘Legislator’ argument inverted). Policy
motives elaborated later in module).
• 4.If societies in the established democracies do not wish
to support international democracy promotion then their
elected governments should not use taxpayers’ money in
that way (similar to arguments about spending on
international development aid).
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Homo sapiens’ destiny is to challenge, and the role of the
academy to preserve the critical spirit
• 5.We should keep alive the idea that faith in democracy
could be misplaced, which means that the idea of
democracy promotion should be challenged too.
• Uncritical support for democracy and/or for democracy
promotion leads to complacency and susceptibility to
error. If they are not challenged, then even the meaning
as well as the vitality of attachment and jealous
protection of democracy will be more easily lost – in the
established democracies (Socratic method; J.S. Mill in
On Liberty, 1859).
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Forthcoming attractions
• In the weeks ahead:
• Critiques of particular motives or policy drivers
attributed to the democracy promoters (e.g.
week 9).
• Criticisms of specific strategies, approaches,
techniques or methods used to promote
democracy, claiming they are ineffective or may
even be counter-productive (see weeks 11
onwards).
43
IPDP
• Session 5: Explaining the growth of
democracy promotion
• Aim of lecture: to explain how the
'international community' came to be more
enthusiastic about promoting democracy
by the late 1980s and took off in the 1990s
but did not happen earlier.
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Historical Origins
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1. Post-1945 international order: states are sovereign; non-intervention; national selfdetermination (decolonisation); UN Security Council hamstrung by ‘first world’ v’ second
world’ rivalry.
2.Foreign aid in the cold war era: providers’ (US, USSR, China, OPEC, Japan, UK, France,
Germany; WBankl policy rationales not democracy promotion.
3.The turning point: impact of events in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev became leader
(1985) and end of ‘Brezhnev doctrine’. Affects North-South relations as well as East-West
relations: window of opportunity for West to apply pressure for political change in
developing countries without consequences for East-West balance of power
4. ‘Third world’ countries became more vulnerable as lose ‘second world’ financial,
economic and political support; also, fear aid diversion of Western aid to transition
countries in former second world; collapsing appeal of alternative ideology(communism) .
5. Do not underestimate domestic pressures for political change inside the developing
world, provides a demand-pull complement to the supply side push in political
development support. Gives legitimacy. But were domestic demands for change primarily
aimed at political reform or at economic improvement?
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From Foreign (Economic) Aid to Political Development Support
• 4.Supply side aid institutions’ opportunistic response to growing 'aid
fatigue' at home.
• Origins of 'aid fatigue' in the US (disappearance of cold war
rationale); and everywhere a growing frustration at aid's weak
developmental performance notwithstanding introduction of
economic conditionality, and sensitivity to domestic public concern
about aiding corrupt and/or incompetent governments, while having
to impose fiscal austerity at home.
• 5. Early precursors of democracy promotion: President Carter’s
human rights policy in late 1970s did not last.
• 6.Political (development aid) rejuvenates aid’s moral purpose – a
good sell at home – and costs less than economic development aid!
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New Thinking about International Relations
• 5.Evolving thinking about an international regime of rights - rights
belong to people, not governments - and about international
obligations – the former state-based notions of national sovereignty
are put on the defensive against the role of the ‘international
community’ in protecting and/or furthering the rights of peoples
(even against their own government ignores or represses the
people’s rights). Democracy an entitlement?
• Modelling a new norm of international democracy protection and/or
promotion on the evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention
(which may even justify use of force and ignoring the objections of
the government).
• Is it a right – or an obligation – of the international community to do
this? And who/what is the international community – same as the
UN; other organisations?
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Conclusions
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•
•
Conclusion: the collapse of the USSR and relaxation of former
constraints on international ‘diplomacy’, the need for a new rationale for
aid given the background of development failures, and the 'pull factor'
from peoples seeking political change from their governments all
combined to create a favourable environment for international
promotion of democracy to take off in the 1990s.
Advances in ‘humanitarian intervention’ begin to look conducive to the
evolution – ultimately - of a new doctrine of democracy intervention.
In reality this never got off the drawing board and eventually became
‘dead in the water’ after the US response to 9/11. The idea that the
international community has a ‘responsibility 2protect’ is what remains,
but restricted to circumstances of specific human rights abuses
(genocide; war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity),
does not have status of international law, and its application is
frustrated by the power politics that divide influential states.
48
IPDP
• Session 6: the developmental case for democracy promotion
• Aim of Lecture: to examine the intellectual rationales/case for
promoting democracy, focusing today on the developmental case.
• Note: this is not the same question as the historical origins – how
DP came about (see previous lecture),
• And note the same question as why certain actors embraced DP
and try to do it - the actual policy motives (see later lecture).
49
The Way We Used to Think
•
•
•
•
The 'cruel choice' theory (1960s) – pursue either development, or
democracy, but not both. Investment requires abstinence from
consumption, which is politically unpopular.
The performance of East Asia’s dragons/tigers provides evidence that nondemocracies can and do deliver development.
Modernisation school of development proposes that political development
will follow economic change; the ‘wealth theory of democracy’ (Lipset) then
kicks in. So everything can work out fine in the long run.
Bias towards strong executive government as a means to implement the
'Washington consensus' that requires structural (economic ) adjustment,
embodied in conditional programme lending (1980s). ‘No pain, no gain’ a
hard sell, politically. So democracy/democratisation unwelcome distractions,
or worse, present political obstructions to rational (economic) imperatives.
50
The Thinking Changes
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•
•
•
By 1990 the dominant thinking undergoing change in three respects:
1.Our understanding of the relationship between economics and politics:
rejection of economic determinism; political institutions make a difference.
2. Our understanding of the specific connection between economic
development and political development: political change might be necessary
for economic progress, not an obstacle.
3. Our understanding of the comparative merits of authoritarianism and
democracy as political agents of economic liberalisation: the legitimacy
gained from being democratically elected can help governments take the
tough decisions that weak autocracies see as too risky to their political
tenure.
51
Explaining the changed thinking
• Realisation that development needs investment in human capital &
social capital, as well as physical capital. They are not ‘luxuries’ that
must be denied to people in poor societies. So development strategy
may not require or benefit from (politically unpopular) austerity.
• Conditional lending seen to be a failure because of lack of
government ‘ownership’ and non-enforceability, which pose political
challenges (NB. an alternative explanation would be that the
‘Washington consensus’ advice is inappropriate and the root cause
of a country’s’ economic problems lies in the international economic
and financial system, but this explanation is not acceptable to
donors/the West).
• Lessons of experience that non-democratic governments that are
not accountable to society often do not feel obliged to prioritise the
well-being of the people, either in the short or the long term. Africa –
land of dictators – was not developing.
52
If politics is the (source of) the problem of weak development,
then the solution must be political too
•
•
•
•
Different political solutions: democracy/responsive government (bilateral
donors); good governance/competent and honest government (World
Bank).
Reasons why democracy might be good for development: accountable to
the people, who demand material improvement; policy feedback improves
policy; ‘command and control’ might suit first generation economic
conditionalities (e.g. devaluation), but second generation economic
conditionalities benefit from a more consensual politics (e.g. wage deindexation).
Removal of doubts that democracy could harm development: evidence that
democracy does not destroy property/incentive to create wealth; political
parties gain politically from a reputation for economic competence.
Reasons why democratically elected governments will/can pursue economic
liberalisation: rely on the experts for policy advice, while political legitimacy
buys (grudging) acceptance from the people; international financial support
sugar coats the pill, if properly distributed (and not trapped by government
elite) .
53
Democracy/democratisation even good for fighting world poverty
• Reducing poverty becomes main goal of foreign development aid,
after end of cold war.
• Poor people are the most vulnerable to bad governance (corruption).
Democratic accountability should force governments to improve
governance.
• Democracy/democratisation will make poverty-reduction a higher
political priority, because poor people – who may be in the majority will use their vote to demand attention.
• (Liberal) democracy more permissive of non-governmental
organisations and civil society groups, who will put the needs of the
poor on the political agenda even if political parties do not.
• Evidence: no famines in democracies with free media (Sen).
54
Conclusion
•
•
•
•
Growing belief that democracy (and hence democratisation) can be good for
development - development that reduces world poverty.
Political reform of some sort – especially in governance - may even be a
necessary (pre)condition for development, in many places; and in time
democracy should bring better governance.
Therefore supporting the spread of democracy (democracy promotion) and
helping to improve governance (governance aid) should be good for
development. And the world development aid industry also should help
support democratisation.
Criticism: in reality, democratisation can be bad for development, if it proves
very destabilising; democratisation in practice not always empower the
poor, and conflicts exist between economic liberalisation and poverty
reduction; development aid industry remains more sceptical of democracy
than good governance.
55
IPDP
• Session 7: Arguments suggesting that
democracy can be promoted
• Aim of the lecture: to examine intellectual
justifications for promoting democracy by
focusing on the influences on
democratisation that may be open to
manipulation or control
56
Development not a necessary condition or a
sufficient condition for democratization
•
•
Rise of the belief that democracy and democratisation are
possible even where the economic/socio-economic
circumstances are not especially favourable. India and
other examples of sustained democracy 'against the
odds‘/‘deviant democracies’. Hence the possibility that
international democracy support could 'make a difference'
even in these situations, and not only where
economic/socio-economic (pre)‘conditions‘/(pre)’requisites'
are already in place.
Anyway, economic development not a sufficient condition
for liberal democracy. So there must be other factors that
need to be addressed, where maybe international support
could help too.
57
Additional Independent Variables
•
•
We become aware of some other significant factors
that can affect the chances of success or failure of
democratisation, and the possibility that these
influences might be amenable to external influence
of some sort, e.g. technical advice, training, material
or financial assistance, diplomatic persuasion,
pressure, etc.
At least three candidates: political institutions; civil
society; political culture.
58
Political Institutions
•
•
The 'new institutionalism' generally (1980s on); political
decisions (and non-decisions) on choice of political
institutions matter, can make a difference to political
outcomes. Choices are possible, within reason (constrained
by previous choices and by more objective factors). Agency
and structure interact.
Institutional design and engineering (division of powers;
checks and balances; centralisation v devolution; electoral
system etc). Path dependence/stickiness suggests getting
the choices right is important (birth defect theory). But
constitutional processes may allow for change.
59
•
•
Do international actors have the right
knowledge/expertise to advise on appropriate
institutional engineering? Rousseau’s legislator
How can they influence choices when these must be
acceptable to society and the dominant political
actors? Possibilities: in occupied countries; broken
societies; where there is respect for tried and tested
experience of foreign models (maybe lawyers and
politicians educated abroad); conditionality for
accession to regional organisation, e.g.EU.
60
Formal and informal institutions
•
•
•
Informal institutions harder to change, and less amenable to external influence, than are
formal institutions. Examples: patron-clientelism; corruption.
Reform of the formal institutions might change the informal institutions in long run, by
altering the incentive structures to behave in particular ways. For example a majoritarian
electoral system design might encourage different ethnic groups to cooperate in a
broad-based political party, where a PR system might entrench ethnic political
representation.
But in the short-medium term, informal institutions can undermine or hollow out formal
institutional reforms – e.g. persistence of clientelism in new democracies prevents
democratically elected governments aiming for the general public good. And can cause
backtrack on the institutional reforms (i.e. no path dependence), e.g. Putin undoes
Medvedev’s modest reforms.
61
Political Culture
• Culture comprises attitudes, beliefs, values, feelings/sentiments.
Political culture a sub-set – orientations towards politics. Almond
and Verba (1960s) on the civic culture. Third wave resurrects
interest in the significance of political culture to the political
system/regime.
• But what makes up a specifically 'civic culture'? And its relationship
to religious creed, level of education and prosperity, historical
experience?
• Can we measure it? How? Growth in attitude surveys (‘barometers’)
organised/funded from established democracies. Could be used to
inform decisions on democracy support programmes/projects For
example if people fear the authorities, then help improve the rule of
law (e.g. strengthen mechanisms of accountability, like judicial
independence).
62
Condition or Consequence?
• Is civic culture a prerequisite for successful democratization? Whose
culture matters most - elite (leaders) or mass – and when? Mass
civic culture not necessary for transition, but essential to
consolidation?
• Can mass civic culture be a product of democratic transformation,
e.g. brought about by the new institutions of democracy ?
International help, directly (e.g. support civic education); indirectly
(through advice on/support for institutional reform, e.g. human rights
legislation.
63
Civil society
• Civil society not a new idea. Exists between state and household,
based on voluntary principle, seeking some public purpose. But
discourse mainly in political and social theory (Smith, Hegel,
Gramsci).
• Reawakening to its importance against a background of growth in
organised demands for political reform from outside the ruling party,
in Latin America and Central & Eastern Europe, e.g. Solidarity in
Poland. Another example of how real events force us to think afresh.
• But civil society is a contested concept; there are disagreements
over its function in politics and disagreements especially over
whether its role pre and post democratic transition should differ.
64
Contested Ideas about Civil Society
• Composition: all inclusive, or alternatively excludes civic groups
hostile to liberal democratic values (i.e. a civic culture), in other
words is there uncivil society too?
• Function: to challenge the state?, to countervail/check the state?; to
help the state be more effective?; a school/training ground for
democracy’s leaders?
• Modern and traditional variants (ethnic, tribal, extended familial
groups). Democracy support often accused of favouring the first.
• Pro-market (e.g. include business groups) v suspicious of
market/economic liberalisation (organised labour; anti-globalisation
protesters). An ideological division over this.
• Boundaries with social movements (different aim or purpose?
Different social base? Different methods? More transient?).
65
International Support for Civil Society
• Notwithstanding the academic arguments over civil society,
international democracy support for it in both new and prospective
new democracies became a major growth industry in 1990s – civil
society ‘capacity-building’ one of the highest categories of spending.
• Reasons: it offers an access point; external support may essential;
may be the main actor demanding/driving reform; cheap and
relatively easy to do; politically safer than backing political parties (if
there are pro-reform parties); responding to demand from civil
society.
• However the lessons of experience from two decades of support
now tell us it can be problematic – for both sides (as week 16 in the
spring term will explore in detail).
66
Conclusions
•
•
•
Irrespective of how developed/non developed, or wealthy/poor the country
is, democratisation might still be possible
And international actors might be able to make a constructive contribution to
this, by seeking to influence the institutions, the political culture, the civil
society.
Economic progress later would then help to consolidate the democratic
gains. Indeed, democratic transition might unlock the potential for economic
progress, which then helps consolidate democracy, in a virtuous circle.
67
Caveats
• Institutional design is an imperfect art and models do not always
travel well – ‘iron law of unintended consequences’. Informal
institutions and political culture may be resistant to change. A
seeming flourishing of civil society is not irreversible – recedes, or
becomes diverted into pursuing narrow group interests after the
democratic ‘revolution’ .
• In the meantime, protracted economic weakness and failure to
improve social welfare/well-being can undermine popular support for
a new democracy and lead to a stalled transition or even democratic
reverse
68
IPDP
• Session 8: Policy motivations for promoting democracy
• Aim of the lecture: to introduce different perspectives on what
motivates international democracy promotion (‘policy drivers’, policy
goals, policy ends).
• The why they do, rather than why they should, or the intellectual
justifications (see previous weeks) .
• Put differently, what are the incentives.
• Disentangling means and ends (objectives v goals).
• Disentangling surface rationalisations & ‘real’ or underlying reasons.
69
Plurality of types of actor with non-identical
missions and agendas
•
•
•
•
•
Foreign policy analysis gaining more respectability in social science.
Cross-over with foreign affairs think-tanks, foreign policy institutes/foundations.
But establishing motives not synonymous with foreign policy analysis of states:
inter-governmental organisations & non-governmental organisations. And states
are not monoliths (inter-departmental rivalries).
Two approaches to foreign policy analysis of states: from the inside out
(endogenous source); from the outside in (exogenous source).
If the real world is more interactive, tracing the internal mechanisms of the ‘push
me pull me’ process is the way forward to understanding policy, especially the
evolution of policy. In principle it should be able to capture whether (and how)
policy changes over time as a result of learning the lessons of experience about
its effects (effectiveness), i.e. feedback loop.
70
Some Candidates
•
•
1.Advancing democratic values and/or human rights for their own sake , i.e.
idealism. But possibly also bound up with own identity (and sense of mission to
lead). In the US ideas of ‘manifest destiny’ as the first free nation go back to
early 19th century . EU has equivalent sense of mission to show how countries
can overcome a history of conflict by adopting the right political solution.
Decline in popular support in US for democracy promotion. Should states have a
moral purpose in their international relations, anyway?
2.A strategic calculation to make the world a safer place (for self included):
democratic peace thesis – influential notwithstanding academic critiques ( the
reasons why there is a coincidence more revealing than the coincidence: e.g. it
all depends on how we define the terms; is a function of cold war; is a function
of shared prosperity; and democratization is destabilising and can even spawn
belligerence). Democracies initiate war on non-democracies, which is still a
breach of international peace).
71
More recent candidates
•
•
•
•
3.To enhance national security against new security threats, especially combating international
terrorism after 9/11.
Cannot explain democracy promotion before 9/11.
And is terrorism really due to lack of democracy? Alternative origins: social grievance;
nationalism; specific roots in Middle East politics). Increase in democratic freedoms can account
for increase in terrorism (at home).
Other new security ‘threats’: illegal migrants (but do democracies manage their economies
better?) and asylum seekers (democracies respect human rights); global environmental bads (but
are democracies really more responsible in global environmental terms? We revisit the topic of
climate change later in the module); health (would there be fewer pandemics in a world made up
entirely of democracies?); global financial instability (democracies the source of recent
instabilities!); energy security (no logical connection with type of regime, other than the evidence
that national abundance in traded fossil fuels helps sustain regimes that are not (liberal)
democratic, e.g. Gulf states, Saudi, Iran, Russia.
72
Less Reputable Candidates
• 4. Life a relentless struggle for power after power (Hobbes’
Leviathan) means the pursuit of power or hegemony, world
domination even, either for its own sake or to secure own selfpreservation in a world where others pursue it for its own sake.
Sought through cultural imperialism, the export of (political) values –
i.e. American values, or western values born of the European
Enlightenment, and not really the universal values they are claimed
to be). Old ways of exercising imperialism - military conquest and
occupation of territory; or economic domination or financial power
(e.g. world’s reserve currency) are more costly and less feasible
now than in the ages of pax Britannica and pax Amerciana.
‘Colonising minds’ just a new phase of neo-colonialism.
73
•
•
•
•
5. A public relations exercise: deflect critical domestic or international
attention from doing 'business as usual' with tacky regimes that have
political, economic or other assets. But in practice has opposite effect:
accusations of double standards and hypocrisy.
6.As a corollary of the 'Washington policy consensus' : democratisation
(‘democratic governance’) for the sake of structural economic adjustment
and economic liberalisation. And reinforces a state’s obligation to repay
debts to the IFIs (unlike ‘odious debt’).
7. Above merges into a grander claim that democracy promotion is about
making the whole world safe for capital - capitalism as an entire system of
political economy which is the end, where economic liberalisation is just a
means to help realise that end. Robinson on transnational corporations’
interest in pre-empting real democratic revolutions. But does capitalism and
the pursuit of profit really need democracy/democratisation – in China,
Vietnam? US no longer has monopoly on TNCs.
Critical theorists critique the promotion of economically liberal democracy
but disagree over whether promotion of other ideas of democracy (social
democracy; participatory democracy, etc ) is acceptable - and feasible.
74
• 8. The ‘defensive turn’ now : the rising power of autocracies
competing for influence in the world means democracy promotion
has to moderate its ambitions, however we choose to explain it
before. It is no longer the pursuit of absolute power, but about
slowing the decline in the West’s relative power. And it is not about
seeking the triumph of certain ideas or ideology - neither democracy
nor capitalism. Ideas and values revert to being just instruments in
a new round of struggles between nations and states over regional
and global balances of power, and will be either used or discarded
as best serves the interests of the West in its power struggles. This
new realist take on a ‘new cold war’ (see Kagan: ‘The Return of
History and the End of Dreams) consistent with recent criticisms of
EU for declining commitment to international democracy promotion
and of foreign policy adjustments early on in Obama presidency.
75
• Concluding Reflections
• Different answers or varying combinations of answer could explain
pursuit of different objects such as human rights, democracy, and
'good governance'.
• Different explanations or varying combinations could apply to
different categories of democracy-promoting organisation (states;
international orgs., non-governmental actors); to different states
(US; Sweden, etc., variations among different EU member states)
and successive governments within the same state; and even within
the same state structure (e.g. in UK between FCO & DFID & WFD;
in US between State Dept. and USAID let alone NED) and between
factions within individual organisations, e.g. idealists v career
bureaucrats).
76
• The leading explanations/policy motors could change over time, e.g.
from ‘doing development’ in 1990s, through fighting terrorism after
9/11, to countering the growing international power of rival national
states now.
• And motives can sometimes be confused or unclear, or persist due
to inertia but cease to mean very much.
• So whatever explanation(s) you are attracted to, do what Popper
says makes for a sound scientific method of inquiry – look for
evidence that would refute the claim, not just evidence that will offer
support for (i.e. confirm) it. Apply the test that asks ‘in principle can
the claim be empirically falsified? , if you ever feel the need to avoid
the temptations of conspiracy theory.
77
And Whatever Explanation(s) You Settle on
• At time the goals can be delusionary.
• Because policy implementation can deviate from the policy aims
and/or motivations.
• Because policy outcomes can be unpredictable; even perverse. The
backlash against democracy promotion in the twenty first century
suggests this.
• Put differently, motives may not be a very reliable guide to what is
attempted, and an even less reliable indicator of what is achieved.
So do not extrapolate results from intentions! Even if you believe the
US aspires to global domination through exporting its version of
democracy, success could be along way off – in fact, receding as we
speak!
• In theory, over time a policy-making feedback loop should help
correct this. But our examination of the performance of democracy
assistance in the spring term tells us not to count on it. That is to
say, an experience of policy failures or policy mistakes does not
always lead on to better or more successful policy.
78
International Politics of
Democracy Promotion PO229
• Session 9: Strategies for promoting
democracy: alternatives or
complementary?
79
Aim of Lecture
• to introduce the variety of patterns of
interaction between democratisation and
external actors in the international system,
and to draw attention to significant
differences among approaches to –
‘strategies’ for - promoting democracy
abroad.
80
Preliminaries
• 'More than one way to skin a cat‘.
• Not all cats are the same: fitting the choice of strategy to the political
situation and current direction of political travel in a country. For
example: one approach or set of approaches for toppling dictators,
another for protecting a new democracy from internal subversion,
and yet another for consolidating a democracy or helping it to
become more democratic.
• Could different approaches be mutually reinforcing, e.g. if used in
the right sequence over time?
• Important to distinguish between the nature of the relationship and
the identity of the external actor (‘horses for courses’).
81
Some analytical devices
• ‘Leverage’ v ‘linkage’ to the West (Levitsky and Way). Linkage
creates vulnerability to leverage, but is argued to be more effective
at securing the sustained democratic transformation of a regime.
• ‘Soft power’ (of attraction) v ‘hard power’ (military might & economic
incentives).
• ‘Power’ continuum – from assistance (consensual and nonviolent)
and persuasion (reasoned argument); through influence (social
learning & acculturation; conditionality; to coercion - both military
and non-military.
• ‘Toolbox’ instruments: diplomatic skills; ‘political capital’; financial;
economic; technical; threat potential; military capability.
82
Analytical devices continued
•
•
•
•
Active (intentional) v passive (unintended). Balance of effects.
Active: direct impact on political variables; indirect impact on politics through
affecting economic or other variables.
On socialisation: norm adoption v norm adaptation & selection (filtering;
context matters).
More on socialisation: norm conversion (internalisation, i.e. become
democrats by conviction) v logic of consequences (change the incentive
structure so that people will now calculate their interests differently, e.g. by
making offers of rewards for compliance; sanctions & penalties for noncompliance. They become ‘democrats for convenience’ – or ‘democracy
without dmeocrats’. Promoting ‘democracy by applause’ one application;
offer of club membership.
83
Continued
•
•
•
•
a) By example, learning and imitation/emulation : can be passive
(unintended) but also a low-cost approach to active democracy promotion.
Moral: put own house in order first (both politically and economically?)
d) Helping pro-democracy forces to struggle: is this democracy assistance,
or democracy promotion? Does the answer depend on how it is done (the
kind of support offered) and how strongly the authorities object?
Struggle can run away from/become out of control – democracy support
mission creep..
c) ‘Second generation’ (i.e. political) conditionalities coercive? Under what
conditions could they be construed as such? Are political conditionalities the
same as (self-serving) political strings.
84
International influences are not everywhere or
always positive
•
•
•
•
a) Well-intentioned democracy interventions can backfire (examples of Trusteeships in
Kosovo and Bosnia-H.?) or are ineffective (reasons will be explored in second term).
Even (negative)political conditionalities perform poorly, just like ‘first generation’ (economic
conditionalities) which failed to secure policy ‘ownership’. But positive conditionalities
(inducements) now back in fashion in EU relations with near abroad.
b) Emergence of competition from autocracy promotion. Is this ‘new kid of the block’ about
supporting autocracy or about defending the sovereignty of autocracies?
c) Countervailing influence of other international forces, developments or events. For
example are so-called crises of capitalism more accurately a crisis of/for democracy (and
democracy promotion) as well? Is global climate change a serious threat to democracy and
democratization (see week 22).
85
Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•
a) Different strategies to promote democracy abroad are conceivable; all
have been tried. Judging the right combination, at the right time, for the right
case is very difficult. Trying to supporting democracy abroad is an art not a
science.
b)The spread of democracy has not occurred solely because of 'imposition'
by the West. External/internal interactions matter.
c) Has to be both opportunistic in responding quickly appropriately to
(unforeseen) internal events and prepared to commit for the long haul.
d) Do not assume that political conditionality is effective. Even economic
sanctions only rarely deliver the desired a result.
e) Technical assistance may not always be an exercise in political power,
but it can become very political.
86
Conclusions continued
• f)The effectiveness of international democracy promotion should be
contextualised within a larger set of more diverse international
influences on the prospects for democracy.
• g) The global pathways to authoritarian/semi-authoritarian resilience
(and resurgence?) and their spread merit more attention now than in
the 1990s – and receive too little attention even now.
• h) Democracy promotion not just a transfer from North to South. Do
not forget the regional dimension, which could be positive or
negative, e.g. effects of living in a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ neighbourhood;
intra-regional spill-overs (‘democracy racing’ v destabilisation of
democratic initiatives by subversion by a nearby nondemocratic
regime that feels threatened).
87
Finally, true or false?
• The real contrast between democracy promotion and autocracy
promotion is not that democracies will use only methods that fall
short of coercion, whereas autocracies will happily use force.
Instead, the real contrast is that democrats actually believe in the
universal value of democracy, even when promoting democracy for
self-regarding or instrumental reasons, whereas autocracies will
support likeminded regimes only when and where they anticipate
some benefit to themselves. Supporters of democracy and
autocracy all dip into the same toolbox. It is just the ends that are
different.
88
IPDP
• Session 10: Three agendas or one? Democracy, human rights
and ‘good governance’
• Aim of the Lecture: to examine the relationships between the 3
agendas of democratic political reform, human rights and 'good
governance'.
• Do these provide the basis for a coherent strategy of international
'intervention' - a mutually reinforcing set of goals? Or are there
tensions - conflicts even - among the different elements, which
raises questions about what to give priority to and what are the right
sequences to pursue.
89
1. The Democratic Political Reform Agenda
•
•
•
(Western style) liberal democracy has had a monopoly on democracy promotion,
drawing on ideas of civil liberties as well as political rights, and consonant with a
market approach to economic organisation (i..e economic liberalism).
More emphasis on freedom from the state (negative liberty) than freedom to become
a full citizen (positive liberty),i.e. more like Locke than Rousseau. Formal equality of
political opportunities not actual political equality. Common possession of rights
based in law not necessarily amount to ‘empowerment’ of the people.
But there are other – less elitist - democratic models to compare ,e.g. social, radical,
participatory, deliberative, as well as other approaches (conceptions?) like green and
feminist approaches. Unresolved debates: how far compatible with liberal
democracy, or illiberal, or not fully democratic, or anti democratic? And if any of
these, should international democracy support actually offer support? If yes, does it
have the ability, or could it acquire the ability, to offer constructive help, where the
ideas of democracy are largely unfamiliar or untested or disowned in established
democracies.
90
2.Human Rights Agenda(s)
• Inalienable moral entitlements ascribed to (all) human beings by
virtue of being human beings.
• Universalism versus relativism and cultural specificity: Asian values;
Islamic values.
• Several generations: first (e.g freedom from torture), second
(universal adult suffrage) and third (e.g. socio-economic rights).
Descending order of general acceptance. And even a fourth – e.g.
right to peace, to own culture, to humanitarian assistance, to
development aid. Who has corresponding obligation (no world
government)?
• Rights of individuals v rights of particularistic collectivities
(communal rights): which count most?
91
The Reality
• In law governments can be held to account internationally to
international human rights conventions they have signed and
ratified.
• But not all sign and/or ratify all conventions, and international
enforcement is unreliable unless governments cooperate
(e.g.international criminal tribunals; international court of justice).
• International enforcement challenges state sovereignty by virtue of
putting the citizens rights first. Non-democratic governments least
likely to accept this, but even democratically elected governments
draw red lines (grounds of national security; nationalism).
92
3.'Good Governance' Agenda
•
•
The terms governance (‘the exercise of political, economic and
administrative power in the management of public affairs, says the World
Bank) and even ‘good governance’ are both so broad and employed in so
many different ways as to suggest we must be cautious in how we use
them. But in the policy world good governance is believed to be crucial to
development, measurability is aspired to, and performance indicators are
used in allocating development aid (second generation aid conditionality).
And now much international assistance is directed at strengthening
governance (i.e. strengthening the state) and improving governance, where
needed, contrary to former impression that western aid aimed to shrink the
state (first generation aid conditionalities of Washington consensus).
93
• Good governance includes openness and
transparency as well as efficiency and ability to secure
the rule of law (equality of all before the law). A strong
focus in governance interventions is on combating
corruption, which is thought to produce resource
misallocation, distort economic policy/management,
and harm the poor, as well as being detrimental to
democracy. Decentralisation another spin off, but note
this not same as devolution (of power).
• Growing interest among development aid donors in
supporting financial oversight by legislatures and civil
society, for sake of developmental ends
94
4. Conflicts Between Democracy, Human Rights and Governance
Support?
•
•
•
•
Are the different agendas logically interrelated, i.e. compatible simply
because of how they are defined (democracy is defined in terms of human
rights like freedom of speech & association), or just functionally
interdependent such that advancing one will help advance another (e.g. a
governance capacity to manage elections enhances the democratic
process, improves chances of high voter turnout and the victor can claim
legitimacy)? Or neither of these?
Historically different discourses and different advocates; inconsistent
labelling (but mislabelling can sometimes be useful when selling
intervention in internal affairs).
Human rights support serving as a soft option that conceals back-pedalling
on democracy support.
Can (representative) democracy truly respect everyone’s fundamental rights
equally? Libertarians fear (majority) tyranny at expense of minorities even in
consociational democracies (e.g. see the progressive redistribution of
wealth as an assault on the right to property); minority tyranny when there
are low electoral turnouts, especially in first-past-the-post electoral systems.
95
Governance and Democracy
•
•
•
•
Does support for governance capacity-building undermine democratisation
if it empowers the executive vis-a-vis instruments of accountability, by
enhancing patronage powers and increasing the potential for winning
‘performance legitimacy’ in society’s eyes?
‘Good governance’ should correct market failure but its overall emphasis on
enabling market-led development can undermine democracy in two ways:
by being responsible for wide socio-economic inequalities/social injustice it
can infringe third generation rights and translate into political inequality ;
because openness to international economic/financial forces undermines
national democratic self-determination (external over internal accountability)
Democracy requires the rule of law (& good governance should secure the
rule of law) but is judicial autonomy (of politics) the mechanism to deliver it
(who will guard the guardians?).
Governance support leaves intact an underlying unequal distribution of
political power in society. Maybe social/socio-economic transformation and
maybe a cultural shift too are needed, if the distribution of political power is
to really change?
96
Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•
The right combination of objectives might close the gaps and compensate
for one another’s weaknesses.
But combinations create monolithic (‘all or nothing’) agendas. This can be
unwieldy and burdensome to coordinate; and resource-intensive. It leaves
‘recipient’ societies with few choices or room for manoeuvre: limits their
freedom to negotiate choices and opportunity to adapt support to what local
circumstances require (no one size can fit all).
Combining objectives still does not tell us how to achieve the individual
components
In practice, vested interests and institutional inertia as well as the genuine
advantages of specialisation/division of labour will maintain fragmentation,
only weak coordination, and competition within the overall industry of
democracy, human rights and governance support.
And over time the emphases between agendas and within agendas will
fluctuate as geo-political expediency and attention to results dictates.
97
IPDP
• Session 11: Election observation and
monitoring
• Aim of Lecture: to critically examine
different forms of electoral assistance,
most notably elections observation
98
Representative democracy and elections
• Representative democracy entails elections to public office.
• The 'fallacy of electoralism‘ in an age of elections. Necessary but not
a sufficient condition for democracy.
• Fraudulent elections can be tipping points in transition to
democracy, and in discrediting a democracy too.
• International v domestic observations: resources; apply
international standards and knowledge; credibility leads to
confidence- building in fairness of process, which may reduce
damaging boycotts including game playing by unpopular no-hopers.
• Managing v observation v monitoring. But blurring in practice, where
observation leads to recommendations for improvement during or
after the election.
99
The limits of elections observation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1.'Quick and dirty‘ ‘electoral tourism’ by ‘flying squads’. Establish a
presence well before the election day and, even, before the campaign.
2. To be aware of the significance of such issues such as:
Population census data and voter registration procedures.
Party registration.
Regulatory framework for party activities like rallies; lawful (tax fraud
charges) and illegal harassment.
Party finance including discriminatory distribution of public contracts.
Media access and coverage.
Independence and capacity of the national elections commission:
constituency boundaries, distribution of polling stations (UNZA example)
Who chooses the election date?
100
Limits continued
• 3.Exit polls can help pre-empt local fraud.
• 4. But central tabulation and declaration a weak a link.
Delayed publication of results; confusion.
• 5. Post-tabulation/declaration scenarios: disputed
outcome and protest. What are the dispute resolution
mechanisms: street action? legal process? Role for
conflict-mediation by international actors.
101
General issues
1.Not invited. In autocracies and ‘mature’ democracies.
2.Reject invitation to avoid legitimating fraudulent election.
3.Rivalry between different ‘missions’; weak coordination over timing
and content of verdicts can lead to confusing overall assessment
4. Assessments often not (cannot?) take form of either free or not free,
either fair or not fair, but something in between. So still open to
interpretation: is free but hardly fair better than fair but hardly free?
5. Political sub-text: influence of partisan international politics: funders
may be as interested in who wins as they are in the process.
102
‘Post-conflict elections’
1.International presence even more important in ‘post-conflict’ situation,
because of mistrust among local actors (social capital weak). And do
tend to attract UN and missions.
2.But the security situation and the timing may be difficult: premature
timing favours a few v drawbacks of delay (no legitimate
government; regress into violent conflict).
3.Political sub-text where elections could serve different purposes, e.g.
peace-building and political transition; to create a government; to
enable early international withdrawal (e.g. international peacekeepers).
4. More political sub-text: influence of partisan international politics:
funders may be as interested in who wins as they are in the process.
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Monitoring Democracy: when international election observation
works and why. Kelley’s findings.
• 1.Can assess elections accurately, but tends to be when the verdict
(positive or negative) is in no doubt anyway.
• 2.Can improve election quality, but mostly not done so. Main
influences on outcome are outside monitors’ control.
• 3.Monitors have competing objectives.
• 4. So, are sometimes biased and have contributed false legitimacy
to process and outcome.
• 5.More resources – bigger missions – not a solution.
104
Findings continued
• 6. Where capacity to stage elections is weak, concentrate support
on election capacity building, not election monitoring & assessment.
• 7.But can also mean repeating missions from one election to the
next. Long haul.
• 8.And one might add, help build the local capacity of civil society
and the political parties to observe elections on a durable long term
basis. This is more sustainable, & is concrete evidence of a society’s
commitment to building democracy: it is part of democratisation.
• 9.Which can also pay off in between elections.
105
Technical assistance: system design
•
•
•
•
A free and fair election can still lead to much discontent because of flawed
electoral system design.
But electoral systems designed by someone for some purpose. Partisan
aims. And legitimate trade-offs: stable & effective governance v highly
representative government. This may pose a choice of majoritarian (hence
first past the post) v consociational/consensus (hence proportional
representation).
Political history, socio-political cleavages, political culture all influence
electoral processes, outcomes of elections, and the effects of the electoral
system. So…
Avoid fallacy of international electoral assistance: not overestimate its ability
to make a difference, especially given that what happens in politics between
elections may well be the most important influence on the election
outcomes and on the condition of democracy (see Burnell article in
Representation 47/4 (2011), pages 383-97.
106
Finally
• In case you are still interested in becoming an
international electoral observer, visit web site of EIUC
(European Inter-University Centre on Human Rights
and Democratisation), formed from 41 universities and
offering ‘theoretical and practical training’, amid the
delightful surroundings of Venice.
107
IPDP
• Session 12: Building political parties
and party systems
•
• Aim of lecture: to critically examine the
international community's contribution to
addressing the challenge of building new
parties and stable, competitive party
systems in emerging democracies.
108
Order of lecture
• It does this after first outlining what parties – fundamental to
representative democracy – are said to do. Independent candidates
tend to be marginal. Party system is a composite of the number/size
of parties and other variables such as range of choice.
• Outlines three disturbing scenarios.
• What can international actors do?
• Introduces the specific challenge of political funding.
109
What parties do
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
They furnish candidates for high political office, unlike civil society.
They mobilise popular support for government, thereby enhancing its
legitimacy and improving its chances of providing effective government.
Opposition parties potentially offer checks against the abuse of power by
government
A medium for political communication between state and society, in both
directions.
They aggregate interests, which helps make the political demands on
government more coherent and manageable.
They can integrate diverse social groups.
They supply alternative policy options. A monopoly on policy initiatives by
the state bureaucracy translates isk-avoidance and inertia into policy
stagnation.
They articulate a vision of the good life. e.g. a free people, social justice,
green future, nationalistic ideas, etc.
110
Caveats
•
•
•
Not all parties in all polities perform every one of these functions. Parties do
not have a monopoly on all these functions. Not all parties perform the
functions well. In practice some of the functions may be better performed by
other institutions, e.g. CSOs.
In practice some parties may have dysfunctional effects, e.g. secretly have
anti-democratic agendas (radical Islamist parties?); incite illiberal and
divisive values, like inter-communal intolerance or hatred, which harms
democracy (some ethno-nationalist parties).
Some functions may be more vital than others. Which ones depends on
local political, social and cultural contexts, e.g. whether society is
harmonious or conversely conflict prone; whether good governance
improvements are vital or not; whether democratisation is actually
advancing or decaying instead.
111
continued
• Could be a difference between the roles actually
performed by the parties in the established
democracies (‘system maintenance’) and the functions
they must perform for democratisation (‘system
development) if democratisation is to move forward.
An example would be (re)building social capital (trust)
in the democracy-building challenge of ‘post-conflict’
societies.
112
Three disturbing scenarios seen in new democracies
•
•
1.Political hegemony of a dominant party/’one party dominant’ system’ (NB
not = one party state). African examples, e.g. ANC in South Africa. Could be
symptom/ harbinger of democratic erosion, e.g. excessive power to the
executive.
2.Excessive proliferation/’churning’ of parties and (hyper)factionalism. Often
found in the early days/months/years of democratic transition.. Bad for
stable coherent government, bad for accountability, but good for creating
voter confusion and fatigue. Tends to settle down later. Rapid demise or
fragmentation even of established parties always possible and may be
healthy. Example: Italy’s Christian Democratic party, dominant from 1944
on, disappeared in 1994.
113
continued
• 3.Personalist politics: party serves leader’s personal ambitions,
rather than the leader being servant of party/promotes a party
programme. Non ideological/non-programmatic parties. May mean
little meaningful choice for voters: reputation of politics and
democracy suffers. Succession problem for party becomes a crisis
for the polity (e.g. after Hugo Chavez, what?). Latin American
phenomenon especially but not exclusively.
114
What can international actors do?
• Work with the parties individually, e.g. offers of technical assistance
to develop campaigning and media skills, policy development.
• Choices: should be to all parties (USAID)?; only practicable to help
some but not all parties (WFD)?; can be bipartisan (Stiftungen)? Or
cross-party, especially in post conflict situations (NIMD).
• Choices: support a party in critical (transition)elections? Or help
parties’ longer term institutional development, the development of
structures for participation by youth & women especially.
• But party leaders have cooperate. Why would they?
• Risks: has to offer support to a ruling party that it mistrusts, in order
to be accepted; bipartisan support that is perceived to reflect foreign
powers’ own agendas can de-legitmise their local partners. Foreign
support backs a losers – should this matter? Foreign supporter finds
out too late that it helped fake democrats take power, i.e it is
implicated in a stalled transition to democracy or de-democratisation
(Zambia’s Frederick Chiluba, 1991-2001,a possible example).
115
alternatively
• Rather than support one or some parties individually, try to affect the
many determinants of the party system: legal/regulatory framework;
electoral system; elections management; executive-legislative
relations (parliamentary systems more conducive than presidential
systems to strong parties and party competition?); social and
economic cleavages/development; the political culture (e.g. extent of
female and youth participation).
• But government has to cooperate. Why would it?
• Risks: unable to affect some of these variables except indirectly and
in long run; and will have little impact when globalisation is
narrowing the space for policy differentiation (taken up in week 21).
116
Challenge of political funding
•
•
The cost of funding a party/its election campaigns is only a part of the overall resourcing costs of
democracy, but is politically controversial everywhere - even in long established democracies like
UK and US
Money is not everything – members/supporters volunteer - but increasingly important because
media exposure so crucial in elections. And in some countries voters expect a reward in advance
of voting.
117
Developing democracies as big spenders
•
•
An estimate of campaign spending on the Brazilian Presidential 2010
election of $15 dollars per eligible voter ($18 if include the assembly
elections) is significantly higher than the $8 dollars spent in the US 2012
Presidential race ($25 if include Congressional). Spending on the
presidential campaign in Brazil almost 6 times higher than in the US,
measured as a proportion of the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Other
high spenders include Mexico, Ukraine, probably Nigeria (but no reliable
data) - all relatively new democracies, as well as Japan and Israel. But
money does not always buy success.
In reality public (i.e. state support) is now more common than reliance
mainly on private funding, although both models do exist, e.g. private
funding in South Africa. Many but not all countries have legislated against
foreign funding, but bans can be hard to enforce, and financial contribution
by diasporas can be significant.
118
continued
• In reality public (i.e. state support) is now more common than
reliance mainly on private funding, although both models do exist,
e.g. private funding in South Africa. Many but not all countries have
legislated against foreign funding, but bans can be hard to enforce,
and financial contribution by diasporas can be significant.
119
Drawbacks of public funding
• How to devise rules for entitlement/distribution that will neither
'freeze' the existing party landscape nor create extreme pluralism?
• Public funding can detach parties from the people: they have less
need to cultivate roots in society. Parties float above society; citizens
have no sense of ownership: become alienated.
• There are no free lunches: state funding can lead to (excessive)
state interference in the parties’ affairs, as a consequence of parties
being made accountable for how they spend the money.
• There are other claims on limited public funds that demand higher
priority, especially in poor countries.
• Discretionary public funding the worst outcome, i.e. the state
resources only the party of power, lawfully or otherwise. A common
practice.
120
Drawbacks with private funding
•
•
•
•
•
Too poor to sustain a plurality of parties.
Can encourage personalist parties formed/led by rich individuals,
e.g.Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, Italy’s Berlusconi, whose (ab)use of
high office subsequently attracts controversy.
Advantages parties formed by business that have a pro-business agenda
vis-à-vis representatives of other social groups, e.g. the unemployed,
meaning an unbalanced party sytem.
Questionable motives of some domestic and international sources: money
laundering by criminal organisations; foreign power diplomacy.
The state can try to regulate the amounts that parties may lawfully spend on
election campaigning (and what they may spend it on, e.g. ban the buying
of votes), so as to limit the power of big money and to level the playing field,
but US experience shows it is difficult to limit/police the ‘soft money’ spent
on causes and activities that indirectly favour a certain party.
121
International democracy assistance and party
funding
•
•
•
•
•
•
Best not to finance parties. Few will admit doing it, but does sometimes
does happen. The demand is there.
Advise parties on how to diversify revenue sources a better strategy for
building long term capacity/sustainability.
Offer technical assistance to development of regulatory framework for
funding and expenditure (International IDEA a good source of knowledge).
Help improve governance (‘good governance’) so as to reduce
opportunities for corruption, i.e. the use of public resources for private – in
this case (ruling) party – gain. Example: help build anti-corruption
commission; strengthen judicial autonomy; support media freedom
(investigative journalism).
Encourage/help civil society to take a constructive lead in their attitude/role
vis-a-vis parties, e.g. party tie-ups; volunteer poll watching .
Support development and modernisation generally.
122
Final words
• Even if parties really are the ‘weakest link’ (Carothers) in
democratisation,
• Success in helping a party win an election does not necessarily
mean a huge gain for democratisation
• Evidence from many cases suggests that party support can prove
ineffective, can be counterproductive, and may even bring lasting
regrets.
• Democracy assistance to parties and party system remains
politically very sensitive, which in part explains why fewer resources
are devoted to this than to other elements of democracy support.
123
IPDP
• Session 13: Civil society capacity-building
• Aim of lecture: to critically examine attempts by the
international community to further the development of
civil society in prospective, new and emerging
democracies. How politically safe is support for civil
society capacity-building?
124
Contested ideas about civil society
•
•
•
•
•
•
Idea not new to theory but events on the ground forced it to forefront of
attention. But what is it?
Who/what belongs in it (boundaries between CSO/civc associations and
NGDOs, the market, parties, social movements/real ‘people power’.
Are all associations, ‘traditional’ (e.g. religious groups) as well as ‘modern’
(think tanks; election observer groups) equally eligible?
Inclusive v exclusionary accounts: civil versus uncivil (illiberal) society.
A civil society is as the CSOs do.
But what should civil society do – and to what end: e.g. help make good
citizens with sense of civic duties; help social integration; help make the
revolution; help make government work better; help make government more
accountable (agents of vertical accountability).
125
Different roles depend on type of regime: bring down
autocracies v build up democracies
• For example challenge the state where the regime is autocratic:
stand up for human rights; subversion; organise (peaceful) civil
protest.
• But work with the state in a democracy: recruit elites into politics and
government, advise on public policy, cooperate with policy
implementation.
126
Problems of support by international actors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reasons why became a democracy assistance darling; where parties not
allowed; between elections; unpolitical.;
Different modalities of support: financial; training; equipment; core funding of
organisation v fund discrete projects & programmes..
How to select your partners? Beware OMOTs. Beware of GINGOs and
GONGOs, i.e. co-optation
How to prevent an excessive external orientation (DINGOs and DONGOs)
meaning they lack local authenticity & local support or are unrepresentative
(as happened in North Africa).
Can bring long-term dependency/unsustainability.
And be to the detriment of party development.
Donors can get sucked into (furthering) local rivalries among individual CSOs,
which divides and weakens civil society overall.
And risk exposing partners to increased repression in authoritarian regimes,
as happened in Russia.
127
What else can international democracy
actors do?
•
•
•
•
•
Press the authorities to provide an enabling environment for civic
associations, e.g. recognise freedom of association; lite-touch
regulation.
Insist that partners cultivate increasingly diversified and
indigenous funding sources, e.g. offer matching funds.
Encourage networking on a national, regional and international
basis, for mutual support and to advance global democracy
(countervail the institutions of regional and global governance).
Support economic and socio-economic development that is
conducive to CSOs – representing both business and labour .
Encourage liaisons short of union between CSOs and parties, e.g.
cooperate not compete (as in Zambia) over process for
constitutional reform.
128
Reminders
•
•
•
CSOs and virtue are not synonymous. Beware both state sponsorship
and CSOs linked to terrorists groups. Plurality of CSOs good but high
fragmentation can weaken civil society.
How inclusive? How representative? How internally democratic are the
CSOs?
Different ideas of democracy demand different approaches to civil
society: entrepreneurial models of CSO suit market democracy, but
social democracy needs more communal/solidaristic models to check
market excesses/abuse. And mass participatory democracy perhaps
needs social movements instead (e.g. anti-globalisation movement?).
129
Conclusion
•
•
•
Civil society’s role and international support could be
contingent on type of political regime and its political
dynamics.
International support to civil society is not a politicsfree zone.
Political parties are still (even more?) essential for
sound government, so long as made accountable to
voters at the ballot box.
130
IPDP
• Session 14 Promoting democracy in conflict-prone
and post-conflict societies
• Aim of lecture: interrogate the special demands
imposed by the challenge of constructing democracy
in conflict-prone societies and post-conflict situations;
investigate whether/how external actors can make a
constructive contribution
131
Shift from conflict between to conflict within
countries
•
•
•
•
•
•
1. Cold War not a time of peace. Surrogate wars between states involving
proxies in Horn of Africa, southern Africa, Central America, East Asia.
2.End of the Cold War should have meant more peace. But end of
superpower interest & withdrawal of support actually made weak states
more vulnerable to internal challenges. So the arrival of peace in East-West
relations brought increase in violent sub-state/domestic conflict, including
among new states in Eurasia (Caucasus) and Balkans.
3.More recently, states were weakened and exposed to violent internal
challenge following external military intervention, examples Iraq,
Afghanistan, Syria(?)
4. Violent conflict persists even within some new democracies, e.g. Mali
before the coup, Nigeria.
But for last two decades democratisation has been attempted in many socalled 'post-conflict' situations.
3.But throughout the period UN peace-building assumes state (re)building
132
&democracy building go hand in hand, e.g. DRC.
Democratisation and internal peace
•
•
•
•
•
But for last two decades democratisation has been attempted in many socalled 'post-conflict' situations, e.g. Mozambique, Nicaragua.
Throughout the period, UN peace-building assumes state (re)building
&democracy building go hand in hand and commits to both.
Reinforced by assumption that lack of democracy increases proneness to
violent internal conflict (i.e. democracy is a way of managing conflict
peacefully).
And the knowledge that sub-state/internal violence can have negative
externalities (spill-overs) that affect other countries (e.g. internationalisation
of terrorism) near and far, potentially undermining their political stability
and/or their democracy.
But before prescribing democracy/democratisation (and hence democracy
support) as universal solutions we need to distinguish between different
types of internal conflict and identify (all) the main causes. Can democracybuilding be a solution to them all? Could it even be part of the problem?
133
Typology of internal violence
•
•
•
•
•
•
There are many different kinds of sub-state and intra-state violence and each
might have more than just one cause.
Violence perpetrated by the state against society (repression) or between
different branches of the state (e.g. military coups; political assassinations).
War waged by society against the state with aim of changing the nature of the
regime, e.g. to substitute democracy for despotism.
Civil war or even war of secession based on ethno-nationalist or religious
cleavages.
Violent revolution originating in class conflict, rather than conflicts between
identities and conflicts over political ideals.
Absence of large scale violent conflict not necessarily mean a sustainable peace
if owes to state intimidation and threat of coercion (or other instruments of total
i.e. totalitarian, control such as propaganda).North Korea.
134
Typology of causes
•
•
•
•
•
Underlying (long-term) causes v catalysts (the sparks that set fire to the
tinder). Tunisia’s ‘Jasmine revolution’ (2010) began with a symbolic suicide
but the origins lay further back in time and in more wide-ranging grievance.
Economic failure: poverty.
Environmental scarcities, e.g. water (contested).
Distributive grievances: inequality.
Greed: ‘resource curse’ invites conflict over riches, e.g. Sierra Leone’s
‘conflict diamonds’.
135
Causes continued
•
•
•
•
•
Cultural diversity, i.e. failure of nation-building, e.g. Kenya.
Failure of state building (weak law enforcement; limited territorial reach),
e.g. Somalia.
Regime lacks political legitimacy (e.g. absence of democracy or
inappropriate institutional model of democracy such as majoritarian rule).
External intervention destabilises, e.g. Lebanon prey to intervention by
Israel, Syria, Iran.
Often there is a mix and interplay of several variables that feed off one
another, e.g. failed projects of nation building and state building and
democracy building in new states that are struggling to make economic
progress and are vulnerable to malign external intervention, e.g .DRC.
136
Democracy-building as universal cure?
•
•
•
•
•
•
One universal remedy for so many different problems?
Democratisation is not a way of bringing conflict to an end (i.e. conflictresolution). Peace must break out or be imposed first.
Democracy could still be a means to prevent conflict happening or
reoccuring if it is politically inclusive, ensures good governance, achieves
sound development and can secure the country against malign external
interference. A lot of ‘ifs’. Maybe a stable democracy can deliver most of
these, but only in the long term and with some good fortune.
Before the long term arrives, democratisation is vulnerable to failure to
address previous ‘causes’ of violent conflict and…
More specifically can make mistakes in respect of how to build democracy,
the kind of democratic architecture, and the sequencing of democracybuilding with state (re)building, any of which might prove fatal.
State (re)construction as a tool of peace-building and democratisation:
debate over whether these can be sequences/stages v parallel processes.
137
State (re)construction as a tool of peace-building and
democratisation
•
•
•
•
•
Pursued together, the two projects can overload the capacity of the system.
Moreover, democratisation (understood as power dispersion) can undermine statebuilding that requires a (re)concentration of power to overcome disorder and
lawlessness.
The sequence/staged approach that places democracy-building before the
establishment of order and stateness does not look viable and could threaten the
security of neighbouring states.
If sequencing places state (re)construction before democratisation, there is a
potential downside: the construction of any political order creates vested interests in
maintaining and perpetuating it (to their advantage). So path dependence may cause
the establishment of democracy to be delayed more or less indefinitely.
So society might have to to resort to violence (again) to change this, later.
138
Democratisation as agent of conflict
•
•
•
•
Political liberalisation/democratisation can accentuate divisions in society
especially if politicians compete for power (votes) by mobilising communal
support and stigmatising the 'other‘ (Mansfield & Snyder). Example of
Yugoslavia.
Shrinking of space for ideological competition in a globalising world where
one ideology of political economy dominates encourages identity-based
competition in societies that are heterogeneous.
The lesson for Mansfield and Snyder is that societies engaging in political
transformation should prioritise the establishment of the rule of law and the
development of a culture of human rights first, before they institutionalise
arrangements that enable mass political participation/competition (i.e. multiparty elections). This is controversial.
International actors including the UN want to see elections, and the sooner
the better, so as to install a government that has legitimacy and allow the
international community to withdraw any peace-keeping forces.
139
‘Post-conflict’ elections and international support
•
•
•
•
A typical ‘moment’ for international engagement. But getting the timing right
is very tricky.
Forms of support: financial, material, technical support to elections
management; build confidence in free and fair; assist parties and civil
society; even bribe former rebel leaders to abandon bullets for the ballot box
(Mozambique).
If held too soon: unfavourable security situation interferes (so disarm and
demobilise first); it can advantage anti-democratic parties associated with
former regime or with the forces of violence that overthrew it. Moderates
take time to organise.
If delay the timing: there is no ‘legitimate’ government and popular
dissatisfaction might turn back to violence; international stakeholders
become targets and desperate for an exit strategy.
140
First elections and constitution-making
•
•
•
The right sequencing of elections to government and the process for
creating a new constitution can also be very tricky even in peaceful
transitions. But is even more tricky in political transformations borne out of
violence, where political trust is weak and the preceding struggle/loss of
lives has raised the stakes. Controversies over process as well as
substance of constitution-making in the Arab spring countries.
Should elections to government come first? The constitution-making can
then represent the will of the people as expressed through their elected
representatives?
Or should the new constitution be made first? The people will then know
what powers their elected representatives will have, both absolutely and
relative to one another (powers of parliamentary representatives v powers
of directly elected presidents; powers of central government v powers of
provincial and other lower level governments.?), when casting their votes.
141
Alternative criteria for assessing international support to post-conflict
elections
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Did election comply with international standards?
Did it established a government/restored governance.
Did it put an end to violence or at least stop it spreading further inside and
beyond national borders?
Did it help rebuild both political trust and social capital across the divisions?
Did it effect a transition to democracy?
Did it impose affordable costs on the international community?
Did it secure freedom from international interference?
142
Longer term democracy building: post-election support
• Elections usually do not cure all problem(s) that cause violent
conflict. And sustained democracy support also may not prevent a
return of the problems that produced conflict.
• Supporting the right choices of democratic institutions can help. But
what are the right choices?.
• Multiple forms of assistance might have to include support for
economic reconstruction and improving governance.
• The solution to violent conflict in the long run is when everyone is
persuaded that they have more to lose from (return to) violence than
from peace. This not does require that everyone must believe they
gain equally from committing to democracy and peace.
143
Finally, the democratic domestic peace thesis complements the
democratic peace thesis
•
•
•
•
Although some democracies may gain from and sometimes do encourage
internal conflict inside some non-democracies.
The challenge of building democracy after conflict is still worth trying
because:
The evidence suggests that once liberal democracy is consolidated it is
more likely than non-democracies to manage internal conflicts peacefully,
even including in cases where national unity is broken (UK heading for a
‘velvet divorce’?).
So if international support for building democracy in post-conflict situations
helps secure a durable peace within countries then it also serves peace
between countries: a mutually supportive double gain or win-win.
144
IPDP
•
•
•
•
•
Session 15: ‘Partnership’ and ‘ownership’ and evaluation: outstanding
issues in democracy support especially to civil society and parties.
Aim of lecture:
First, to explore the contested and problematic ideas of 'partnership' and
‘ownership’ as models for conducting the relationship between democracy
assistance providers and those they seek to support;
Second, to explore the challenging issue of whether and how to evaluate
democracy assistance;
Third, note connections between issues of ownership/partnership,
evaluation and democratisation.
145
Origins of discourse on ‘partnership' and ‘ownership
•
•
•
’
Familiar ideas in official development assistance from the West, enshrined
by Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), originating from two
streams of criticisms seeking to explain why development aid not very
effective.
Criticism of the inappropriate nature of donor-driven aid: ‘donor knows best’
mentality/’development aid tourism’. Holds donors responsible for failure.
Solution: devise arrangements that incorporate local wisdom more.
Criticism of the failures of ownership, i.e. dependency culture. Holds the aid
recipients responsible for failure. Solution: devise arrangements that instil
local responsibility for making aid-supported projects/programmes become
more successful, especially after donors withdraw.
146
Meaning of ownership and partnership
•
•
•
•
•
So ‘ownership’ means local partner will identify with the endeavour and commit
to it as a result of being treated as an equal partner.
‘Partnership’ = equals. Both the recipient and the donor have obligations (mutual
accountability). In theory each can hold the other to account for making aid
effective.
If these lessons should apply to international development aid/cooperation then
shouldn’t they apply at least equally to political aid?
Practice not yet caught up with theory in the development aid. Old habits especially donor practice of attaching policy conditionalities to aid - die hard.
And where aid recipients are truly being empowered this is not because
traditional donors are trying hard to put the idea of partnership into practice.
Instead it is of the rise of new donors especially China, which gives recipients
freedom to choose and reduces their vulnerability to the pressure from western
aid donors – including pressure to democratise, improve human rights and
better governance in exchange for aid.
147
Criticism of the failure of the Paris principles to take root in practice
should not surprise us because
•
•
•
•
•
Be realistic: he/she who pays the piper always calls the tune even if
unintentionally so and the piper tries to second guess, e.g. civil society aid.
The idea of equal partners does not go far enough anyway, if it still means B
endorsing A. But the alternative of ‘authorship’ (by B) is more demanding than
ownership, and can mean support is distributed very unevenly, e.g. civil society
aid again.
Too many actors have status of partner: governments, civil society
organisations, other development aid or democracy support providers. Cannot
all be equal partners. In fact improved donor coordination may help partners but
also reduces their scope to make choices.
‘Donors’ must still choose their 'partners' carefully, which means being selective
or discriminatory, and not just operate in response-mode which could mean
supporting incapable and/or politically disreputable ‘partners’.
In a democracy domestic relationships of accountability must always take
priority, i.e. account to parliament, taxpayers, voters for the way development
aid and democracy aid is spent and for whose benefit.
148
Evaluation: why?
•
•
•
•
If domestic democratic accountability for development aid and democracy
support are to be meaningful then the electorate/taxpayers need to know if
these activities deliver what it says on the tin, the rate of return achieved,
the value for money etc., as with any publicly funded good or service.
So political pressure is responsible for trying to evaluate democracy
support, especially strong in the US.
Other good reasons for evaluating democracy support include the chance to
improve it by learning lessons from success and failure, and putting the
lessons into practice.
For those democracy support organisations that have to compete for
business, favourable evaluations or even just a culture of evaluation may
help them to win commissions, consultancies, contracts.
149
Why evaluating democracy assistance is challenging
•
•
•
•
What sort of results/performance count? - effectiveness, efficiency
(value-for-money)? sustainable results? do no harm?
Democratisation as the dependent variable is vague, multi-dimensional
& and not easily quantified.
May be able to measure inputs (money spent), and even immediate
outputs (e.g. number of election observers trained), but what does this
mean for democracy and the impact on democratisation over time.
When should be the census date for collecting evidence? How can we
prove causal connectivity?
Emphasis on measure-ability can distort choices over democracy
support policy, i.e. what to do; how to do it, where to do it. But the
alternative of combining and integrating the best of both worlds quantitative & qualitative evaluations – is highly judgmental.
150
continued
•
•
•
•
Difficult to separate out the effects of a democracy support intervention from
all other influences on political outcomes
Shouldn’t ‘impact’ assessments also take account of 'collateral
damage‘/unintended negative consequences – not just for democratisation
but for other desirable goals like stability, governance, development too?
How identify and measure these?
How compare performance across different combinations of multiple
objectives, e.g. for democracy support in conflict-prone environments
where the aim is to build democracy and peace at the same time?
Should evaluations take account of degree of difficulty (like the high diving
competition in Olympic games)?
151
continued
•
•
•
•
Evaluation ethos can ruin ‘partnerships’ , by making partners feel they are
not trusted, i.e. evaluations seen a tool of managerial control.
Can be pointless too, because financially costly in relation to small sums
spent on democracy assistance; because analysis of the results too
burdensome;
and because democracy assistance must always remain flexible in order to
be able to react to events opportunistically, rather than tied up in evaluation
exercises that might reveal evidence of failures as well as some successes.
So just accept that democracy assistance is intrinsically risky rather than be
driven into becoming risk averse. Do not let the possibility of failure prevent
you doing it.
152
Evaluating democracy promotion even more challenging than
evaluating democracy assistance
•
•
•
•
Even more challenging to compare the performance of different
approaches, tools, instruments or methods of promoting democracy (e.g.
democracy assistance v diplomatic pressure v political conditionalities v via
assisting socio-economic development).
Because no common currency exists for comparing the inputs (e.g. ‘political
capital’ v money v technical expertise).
Because the expected ‘outputs’ of different approaches may not be
comparable (micro v macro; short v long-term effects).
Because it could mean comparing different types of actor, e.g. government
departments against autonomous foundations, where other ‘independent
variables’ might be responsible for variations that are detected in the results
of intervention.
153
Evaluating democracy promotion
• And do not assume that evaluations of effectiveness in promoting
democracy will necessarily influence policy, i.e. have (policy)
‘impact’ , if the policy drivers behind international democracy support
are not simply or solely about promoting democracy but are
influenced by other foreign policy goals instead.
• For example, even if evaluations ‘prove’ that democracy promotion
has been positive for democratisation, the commitment to promote
democracy might still decrease if policy-makers cease to believe
that democratisation helps secure the election of governments ‘they
can do business with’, will defeat international terrorism, serve to
promote global economic prosperity, etc.
154
Finally, democratising evaluation of assistance
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
But as the political demand to evaluate will not go away, especially in an era of
budget austerity,
It could at least be democratised, i.e. participant/participatory evaluation, which
means the local partners and not the providers do the evaluation.
This serves the cause of informed feed-back, learning and improvement.
It is also an opportunity for schooling in a technical exercise central to resultsoriented (good) governance.
It is a symbolic commitment to real partnership, and could mean the provider of
support is held to account by local partners.
Which in turn increases the legitimacy of assistance, which of itself makes local
cooperation and success more likely.
But would require the local partners to not just fill out an evaluation questionnaire at
the end of the project/programme, but also enjoy an opportunity to design the
questionnaire in the first place. What this means is the local partners determine the
goals and objectives of the assistance. The power to set democracy support agendas
must start there.
Are the democracy support organisations ready for this?
155
IPDP
Session 16: A future for democratisation and democracy
promotion? ‘Backlash’ , ‘pushback’ & ‘rollback’; autocracy
promotion
• Aim of Lecture: to assess the current state of democratisation and
the condition of democracy promotion, and to prompt reflection on
links between the two. There has been a general feeling that
• both got into in trouble and these two trends could feed on each
other – hence the talk about ‘backlash’ or ‘pushback’ and ‘rollback’.
• that autocracy export and autocracy promotion might be increasing
• However, then along came the Arab ‘spring’/’awakening’/’revolution’.
156
Two claims: democratisation is in trouble; democracy promotion
is in trouble? Are they valid?
Democratisation
What would count as indicators? Your call.
Where look for evidence?
Consult Freedom House and other surveys. Decide how to weigh the balance of
evidence: short v long term trends; less important cases v more important cases that are
either big countries or key countries for a region/ particular category of nondemocracy,
for example Russia, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, Egypt.
What does the evidence say?
Depending on how you interpret the question above, evidence somewhat mixed. But
according to FH the number of liberal democracies reached a plateau by 2000 and in last
few years freedoms across electoral democracies and nondemocracies in general have
been eroding, notwithstanding the recent events in North Africa.
157
Indicators and evidence of democracy promotion (the activity, not
its performance/effectiveness)
On the supply side
Political support, measured by size of budgets approved. Evidence: not declining, yet, although
there is talk of tough times ahead.
Popular support. Evidence: still seems strong in Europe but declined in US during second Bush
administration.
158
continued
•
Number of actors/organisations. Evidence: continued proliferation. Growing
engagement by some newer democracies like Poland, Czech Republic. But others
including Brazil and South Africa as well as India resist US and European
encouragement to become more involved. Reasons: sensitivity to sovereignty issues
in third countries; suspicion of western motives; own national interests lie in
cultivating strong economic ties and stable diplomatic links with China, etc. The
view that Turkey provides a role model for the Arab world is questionable:
Turkey’s progress towards democracy occurred under very different political &
economic conditions including the entrenchment of a secular state and economic
progress; and shortcomings in Turkey’s commitment to principles and values such
as inclusionary political representation (weighted against minorities, notably Kurds)
and poor record on freedom of expression/free media.
159
Indicators and evidence of democracy assistance specifically
On the demand side
• Increased obstruction by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states against
democracy and/or human rights support from outsiders, e.g. Russia, Iran, China (?).
• But some new territory where doors begin to open, e.g. Libya, Myanmar. MENA
governments vary but on the whole ambivalent (e.g. Egypt more hostile than
Morocco. Algeria still a no go).
• Across the world, organisations especially in civil society who receive democracy
support criticise past modalities and support for rivals they disapprove of and the
intentions they believe lie behind offers (and denials) of support. But they combine all
this with demands for more support for themselves, if done on basis of partnership.
• Exception of Islamist parties and CSOs who continue to oppose western support.
State of the market overall: there is still a demand for assistance and a supply of
democracy support. The democracy support industry would judge there is still a need for
support, even (especially) where governments resist. It has a vested interest in staying in
business. So democracy assistance is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
160
What would count as evidence of autocracy diffusion?
•
•
•
•
Are autocratic counterparts of democracy promotion, support and assistance
possible in principle? If yes, then look for evidence in practice, e.g. China’s soft
power offensive.
Does autocracy diffusion by emulation count, for instance if developing
countries aspire to learn from and apply China’s model of political economy and
development?
Direct attempts to transfer autocratic models & practices might be minimal, but
indirect support through China, Russia reinforcing global commitment to
absolute sovereignty of states may be more effective at underpinning/protecting
autocrats from international democracy support.
Do not forget non-state diffusion: socialisation/trans-border spread of values that
favour authoritarian political rule even where no foreign government is actively
encouraging this. Religious extremisms a possible example.
161
In sum
Autocracy diffusion is a nebulous concept.
There is ambiguity over what it refers to.
There is some evidence accumulating on a case by case basis.
But the bigger picture concerning how much of it there is and how
influential it is remain unclear.
Which means it is difficult to assess how strong is the competition it
now poses to democracy promotion. A relatively new research agenda.
162
If democratisation really is in trouble, then why? Is it for reasons
unconnected with democracy support?
•
•
•
•
•
Autocracy support, diffusion etc one possibility and not the main.
But do not underestimate the strength of (semi-)authoritarian regimes at
home: masters of coercion; intimidation; censorship etc .
Competing ideologies to democracy still exist, e.g. illiberal nationalism;
some varieties of political Islam. But are they merely local challenges, not
world-wide threats?
Democratisation has proven to be unfeasible where states are or become
weak or fragile, as in Iraq, Afghanistan.
The financial and economic troubles of democracies starting 2007 detract
from democracy’s economic appeal, compared to authoritarian/illiberal
capitalism which looks more successful. We hear this claim often. How
convincing is it? Even if there is universal admiration for the economic
achievements, does this mean popular demand to become more like
Russia, more like China?
163
If democracy promotion is in some trouble, might the reasons
include?
•
•
•
•
•
A realistic assessment that the easy victories are over and only hard(er)
cases are left, i.e. increasing degree of difficulty.
Could the long shadow of ‘regime change’ still be weakening its legitimacy.
Global shift in economic and political power away from the West weakens
the influence of the West generally (e.g. in WTO) and not just in respect of
promoting democracy.
‘United we would stand but divided we will remain weak’. But Obama’s
multilateral turn coincides with decline in EU’s ability to promote democracy
through EU enlargement... and then along comes the Eurozone crisis and
uncertainties over the future shape/composition of the EU too.
Other international public goods present competing foreign policy agendas,
e.g. international financial stability and an open trading system in the
presence of financial crises/structural imbalances; security and peace in the
presence of international terrorism and nuclear proliferation; energy security
and climate mitigation in the face of global warming.
164
So are the trends in democratisation and trends in democracy
support at all connected?
If they are connected, which one is cause and which one is effect?
Democracy support tends to follow democratic breakthroughs, which
makes it look more like an effect.
Yet democracy promoters obviously believe they can make a
difference, in other words, that they can have causal influence .
So interdependence might be a more accurate way to capture reality.
And then add in more specifc detail, e.g.(trends in) democracy support
as a product of authoritarian breakdowns/openings to democracy, but
then capable of influencing whether these moments will continue to
move forward.
Responses to the Arab spring could be a relevant case: might this do
more for international democracy support than such democracy support
ever did for bringing about an ‘Arab revolution’ ?
165
Assessing the consequences of developments in the MENA
region
On the plus side
1. Dispels claims of exceptionalism: democratic revolutions reconfirm
that freedom and democracy are global values/aspirations.
2. Dispels demo-pessimism: seemingly stable authoritarian regimes
really are vulnerable, so democracy promotion can be worthwhile.
3. Remarkable speed and extent of the regional diffusion effect.
4. Provides new/expanding frontiers for international democracy
support interventions, with renewed legitimacy - gained from being
a response on this occasion.
5. Potential to mobilise new supply side actors for democracy support:
Turkey in short term??; Egypt as regional hub later??.
166
However
•
•
•
•
•
•
Too soon to tell if the democratic breakthroughs will be sustained. Could be
slow, uneven, jagged processes of change (esp. Egypt); protracted
instability in Libya, Yemen, Syria.
Its the economy stupid! And prospects not look good.
Modest reforms by surviving regimes could prevent more substantial
democratic advance there, as the rulers intend (Morocco; Jordan).
Wake-up call to (semi-)authoritarian regimes elsewhere makes them more
repressive/more clever (Iran; Russia, China).
Too soon to know if international democracy support is capable of making
an appropriate response. Evidence is unclear.
West still beholden to other foreign policy interests: energy supplies;
stability (cooperation against international terrorism; migration control);
countering Iran; support for Israel; hostage to the ‘peace process’.
167
Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•
Now is the time to look/think beyond the discourse of backlash, pushback,
rollback, which came out of the war on terror.
The literature on autocracy promotion might be premature but we can’t be
certain.
The ‘Arab spring’ happened not because of but in spite of democracy
promotion (being largely absent in the region). Yet it potentially could rescue
democracy support.
But do not build too much on the shaky foundations of the ‘Arab spring’. It
could turn out to be a turning point for democratisation. But the signs right
now are not strongly positive.
Do not lose sight of the bigger picture of other trends, forces and issues in
world politics and global affairs more broadly. These may have more impact
on trends in democratisation than does the state of democracy support.
168
IPDP Session 17: Why the state of democracy in the West and
globalisation matter
Aim of Lecture
To consider what the defective nature of democracy in
the West and the phenomena known as globalisation
mean for democracy promotion and its goals: threat or
opportunities?
169
Premises
• Democratic shortcomings exist in the West when assessed against
liberal democratic yardsticks, even more so when judged against
more demanding notions of democracy.
• The image the West appears to want to project of itself abroad does
not seem to acknowledge the weaknesses even though the state of
democracy there has its critics at home.
• Globalisation comprises international (market) economic integration;
the rise of supranational governance; global information
network/cultural transmission. These three trends are
interconnected.
• Globalisation as defined presents both opportunities and challenges
for democracy and for democratisation.
170
Democratic deficits in the West
• What does this mean; what are the indicators? Levels of political
participation/engagement; security/insecurity of civil liberties;
political inequalities; scope for exercising meaningful choices;
degree of presidentialism (executive power); dumbing down; capture
by capital or corporate interests.
• What is the evidence? Mixed and variable depending on indicator,
country, time (see for example turnouts; rise of single issue groups;
devolution; investigative journalism. Critical v disaffected citizens?)
• Why does it matter? Obviously it should matter to the citizens in the
democracies (if it does not, then that fact suggests a shortcoming in
itself).
• Thinking the unthinkable means more likely to take preventative
action , i.e. avoid ‘tyranny of small decisions’/’death by a thousand
cuts’/’sleep-walking’ into tyranny.
171
And it matters to democracy promotion too
Although domestic imperative (obligation) is put own house in
order first (just like ‘charity begins at home’)
• Recognition of own mistakes and the lessons to draw from them is
essential to formulating sound advice to offer others.
• A self confident or self-assured democracy is more likely to want to
spread democracy abroad – whether out of idealism or as strategy
to protect own democracy from a hostile world.
• Credibility/reputation of the established democracies is the best form
of democracy promotion; conversely, human rights shortcomings
arm democracy’s abroad (calculate the impact of Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay; racism in Europe, etc ).
172
The dark side of globalisation
• Globalisation understood as global economic integration on neoliberal lines held responsible for consequences for poor people and
for inequality that harm democracy’s social requisites.
• Globalisation as increasingly powerful agencies of global & regional
governance reduce the scope for purely national (democratic) selfdetermination. They are not democratically accountable themselves;
some countries have more influence on them than others.
• Increasing penetration by external actors of the shrinking domestic
space for self-determination, e.g. influence of global corporations,
especially media groups.
• Globalisation understood as cultural diffusion and homogenisation
spreads (western capitalist) values of individualism and
consumerism that erode the sense of community and civic
responsibilities that some democratic ideals claim to stand for.
173
Second round effects
Awareness of the dark side of globalisation produces
responses that are no less benign for democracy and democratisation,
including:
• A growing sense of powerlessness, that fuels political apathy,
leading to a downwards spiral of political disengagement.
• Violent reaction (anti-globalisation protests), that in turn provokes
states into making an illiberal response, e.g. ban demonstrations.
• The argument that governments are increasingly constrained by
external institutions/forces like the IMF, credit ratings agencies etc
can be manipulated by governments to further insulate themselves
from society’s demands, so that they become even less accountable
to voters, e.g. a typical pretext for ditching election manifesto
promises, once in office.
174
But globalisation has a brighter side for democratisation too
• 1) Authoritarian hold-outs against globalisation look increasingly
desperate in comparative economic terms, and so must fall sooner
or later, e.g. North Korea.
• 2) Where globalisation delivers economic growth and (note) the
benefits are widely shared in society, this promotes the social
requisites of stable democracy (in Lipset’s argument).
• 3) Powerful states are not so much losing as being transformed by
globalisation and global governance.
• 4) Some international governance mechanisms like World Bank and
UN agencies seek to strengthen the capabilities and improve the
governance of weak and fragile states; this is requisite for
democracy-building and makes it more attainable.
• 5) Globalisation understood as a cultural phenomenon includes the
spread of ideas of democracy and human rights, making Sen’s
argument about democracy becoming a universal value more
plausible. The increased international mobility and communications
revolution offer vehicles for this to happen.
175
And then there is (global ) civil society
• The globalisation of civil society, transnational social networking and
emergence of a ‘new (supraterritorial) sense of demos’/’communities
of fate’ are creating instruments for holding global governance
institutions to account.
• However not there yet.
• And civil society’s own democratic properties should be questioned:
unelected; unrepresentative; only semi-independent.
• While not forgetting the parallel path of illiberal and parochial forms
of civil society that are not equipped for/interested in global
responsibilities.
176
Challenge of democratising globalisation goes on
• How to democratise the institutions of global/regional governance
and (note) global civil society.
• How to empower these institutions vis-à-vis other international
actors (transnational business, uncivil actors/international terrorists
etc) and vis-à-vis ‘forces’ like climate change that increasingly affect
peoples’ lives.
• Achieving these goals means both restoring power to the political
while bringing governance back and making the political more
democratic, at all levels, from local to global.
• These challenges require international democracy promotion to
adjust its sights and go to new levels. But there is no evidence that
the democracy promotion industry as currently configured is up for it
or up to it: has neither the resources nor the political vision and will.
177
IPDP Session 18: Complex relationships
connecting democracy/democratization and
climate change
• Climate change: global warming and severe
weather events
• Climate policy: mitigation; adaptation
• Why regime type matters: democracies more
environmentally responsible?
• Democracies & climate change: the evidence
• Can democratization get in the way?
• Governance matters too
178
Climate change matters for
democratization
• Climate change can affect politics as a
result of its effects on economy and
society
• Debates over climate change as source of
conflict and as an imperative for
authoritarian rule
179
Implications for democracy
promotion
• Potential to detract from democracy
promotion: cooperation on climate action
must come first?
• Better governance for better mitigation and
adaptation use of international transfers
• Moral standing of West to promote
democracy and human rights gains from
exerting stronger climate change
leadership
180