Brian Fitzsimmons
Digital MDST Exam 1
1.
It is easy to say that new technologies change society. Just like in a biological habitat,
when you introduce some new element, of course the processes of life there will be disrupted.
Media are slightly different, however, for they form their own environment (McLuhan, 1964). As
Ian Bogost put it, media can be approached in terms of “microecology,” with each medium
representing a microhabitat whose idiosyncrasies impact broader society like ripples in a pond
(Bogost, 2011, pg. 6). According to McLuhan, these “ripples” change the scale or pace of
society, and inevitably alter our consciousnesses – hence, “the medium is the message”
(McLuhan, 1964). Many scholars have expanded upon this, such as Neil Postman, who
concluded that TV has made us illiterate entertainers with short attention spans (Postman, 1985),
and Illich and Sanders, who revealed that the transition from print to oral culture altered human
memory (Illich and Sanders, 1988). However, one has yet to apply this to digital media and
applications such as the World Wide Web, videogames, cell phones, and, of course, social
networking sites. Most importantly, we have to ask what is doing the changing.
There are three main paradigms for this question. Technological determinism, for which
McLuhan was a deity, believes that technology changes society and behavior (Baym, 2010).
When the TV entered the living room, all other furniture turned to face it – the TV did not adapt,
but forced society to adapt to it. Next, social constructivists think that people cause the change,
based on the context they live in. In other words, technology arises from social processes (Baym,
39). And last, social shaping lies somewhere in between: people and technology influence each
other (Baym, 45). Yet, no matter which paradigm you follow, it seems that digital media
technology is now “domesticated,” as Baym put it, to the point that it is fully embedded in our
social lives (Digital Nation). This confounds the division between online and offline, as we will
see later with authors such as Dana Boyd, Zadie Smith, Ito et al, and Nancy Baym. As for Mr.
Zuckerberg, by his letter to potential investors, we can see that he leans towards technological
determinism, saying that technology leads “to a complete transformation of many important parts
of society” (Zuckerberg, Letter to Investors). Is this true? Has technology led to more “efficient”
communication? Has it “brought us closer together?” Or are social processes responsible?
This essay asserts that technological innovations cannot change society without the input
of those who use them – as Tim O’Reilly said, “users add value” (O’Reilly, Web 2.0) – but that
media can influence that input as well as the context it is made in. In other words, this essay
takes a social shaping stance to these questions.
In order to show this, we must clearly define what Zuckerberg meant by “efficient
communication.” In the transmission model of communication, quickness and accuracy of a
message would determine efficiency. But in Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model, it would be
efficient if there were any meaningful discourse at all (Hall, 1973)! With digital media now
domesticated, we have to look at this in terms of “mediated publics,” where “people can gather
publicly through mediating technology” (boyd, 2007, pg 2). Because digital media are
ubiquitous, mediated publics are practically equivalent to non-mediated publics, if not more
populated. Here, the technology allows information to travel “faster than thought” (Abelson et
al’s “Koan #7,” 2008, pg 12); people can create perfect copies of data (Abelson et al, 2008), find
anyone instantly (boyd, 2007), and reach a whole swath of audiences from a single source
(Baym, 2010). This certainly seems efficient, but what of the social processes involved? For
something as complex as digital media, the transmission model is too limited. The internet is a
“mixed modality,” (Baym, 63) or a medium incorporating different types of communication into
it (textual, visual, and auditory) that allows for “remediation,” or the blending or writing and
conversation styles with conventions of popular media (Baym, 66). Such communication cannot
be represented merely by “sender – medium – receiver.” Thus, when we look at the users’ input,
efficiency takes on new meaning. For example, digital media are “lean” compared to face-to-face
interaction, because they limit social cues, or the physical markers we display that communicate
non-verbally (Baym, 2010). In addition, as John Lanier pointed out, people “reduce” themselves
online, effacing many tidbits that make them who they are (Smith, 2010, pg 7); and what they
say online is not necessarily what they would say offline (boyd, 2007). Baym complements this
with her study of online identity, which demonstrated the multiplicity digital media allow for
profiles, or “disembodied identities” (Baym, 105). Therefore, even if we do follow the
transmission model, digital communication would be inefficient because the “message” of who a
person is would be severely limited. Furthermore, the “perfect reproductions” and “reach” of
data has created problems for industries combating piracy (Abelson et al; Baym), as well as for
public figures who must constantly watch what they say lest the “persistence” of online data
(boyd, 2), which never goes away, come back and bite. And, thanks to the ease of “searchability”
(boyd, 2), it is possible to find quotes without having to read the context, and thus misinterpret
them. Therefore, efficiency can go both ways – the technology shapes society by allowing
thought to transcend space and time, but we shape the technology by integrating it into our social
interactions.
Much of this social interaction is accomplished through our “voice,” as Zuckerberg puts
it. Voice can be thought of as the verbal articulations between thought and action we make in our
minds – we each have our own voice that makes us unique. Before the internet, only a select few
voices could be heard. But afterwards, anybody with a connection could present their
articulations. Consequently, does mass articulation equate to efficiency? Or would this result in
“filter failure” (Shirky, Lecture 1/26), where articulation of any quality can be heard? From the
hacker point of view, the more voices there are the better, since Web 2.0 is a “collective
intelligence” where “users add value” (O’Reilly, 13-15). It is all about sharing, which entails that
once a person’s knowledge goes online, it becomes everybody’s knowledge, (in fact, this is what
the Framers originally intended for copyright laws (Vaidhyanathan, Why Would TJ Love
Napster?)). The technology also creates “bonding capital” between voices, connecting originally
isolated ones across the globe (Baym, 82), and allowing suppressed voices refuge– gays and
other minorities, for example (Baym, 2010).
So the technology has built the bridges – do people actually cross them? Yes…and no.
For instance, because industrial society has so decentralized the individual, one voice is nothing
without followers. Just as Vaidhyanathan said in Me? Person of the Year? No Thanks, “you” is
nothing without “we.” (Vaidhyanathan, 2006). This connects to Bogost’s microecology, in that
each online voice is its own microhabitat within the internet environment. But now that there are
billions of them, the value of each has decreased. Furthermore, since we are social animals, we
have used these highways of articulation under John Lanier’s pack mentality (Smith, 8), not
wanting to distinguish ourselves, but our group. It should also be noted that while voice is
influenced by identity, according to Baym, identity is influenced by social interactions and their
contexts (Baym, 2010), which in turn can be affected by what the technology allows. Just as
what we say in public can be influenced by who we “hang out” with (Ito et al, 2008), so too can
our online comments be defined by the norms of the pack. The only difference is that the pack
follows the transcontinental bridges built by the technology. The effect: the globalization of
behavioral norms that no one foresaw the technology promoting.
Zuckerberg next makes a sweeping statement that digital technology “encourage[s]
progress.” This is certainly deterministic, but in truth, genuine progress cannot occur unless
people act appropriately with the tools given. And for this reason, it is useless to blame or extol
technology for altering the flow of social advancement. When critics like Karpinski disparage
media for making us stupid, claiming that Facebook harms grades (Wilson, 2009), and when
proponents like Steve Johnson and Jane McGonigal praise media, they do not give due credit to
the social processes involved. It is not the ripples of the microhabitat that distort the pond – it is
the fact that someone threw the pebble. Yet most of us miss this, which leads to “moral panics,”
as Abelson et al called it, such as the infamous privacy versus protection debates outlined in
Chapter 7 of Blown to Bits, and the flaws of intellectual property demonstrated by
Vaidhyanathan in Why Would TJ Love Napster? If we realized that we shape the technology just
as much as it shapes us, such alarm would be unfounded. The lines between real and virtual are
becoming blurred because we have chosen to domesticate the internet into our daily lives. It is
simply an extension of us (McLuhan, 1964). In any case, it is not society being transformed, but
our social norms (Ito et al, 2008). Dynamism is endemic to the very nature of Abelson’s koans
and Baym’s social cues. They are constantly evolving, embodying a true “perpetual beta”
(O’Reilly, 14), where the technology and social processes complement each other in new and
unpredictable ways. Just look at the history of the internet: it was intended to keep our
communication lines intact in the case of nuclear bombardment, but social cogs turned it into an
economic and communal melting pot of creativity!
In connection with “communal havens,” Zuckerberg asserts that digital media bring us
closer together. Certainly, the internet has rendered distances moot for communication, but
people have shaped this capability in accordance with social conventions of exclusivity. No one
wants his pack to allow total admittance – they want it to be special. For example, The Social
Network revealed that even Facebook, the paragon of social inclusion, used this as its founding
principle. Therefore, does exclusivity within the internet’s inclusivity still bring us together?
Again, it depends on the social context involved – those who have lived their offline lives
isolated from much of the outside world, such as the Chinese or Middle Easterners, might not
recognize any distinction. But for the exclusive elites, like Americans, these digital communities
might be nothing more than opportunities to assert their selective culture. And indeed we see
this. For example, Ito et al showed that teens use the internet now as “youth places,” where they
can hang out away from the prying eyes of parents and teachers. And when that barrier is
breached, teens are more than annoyed (Ito et al, 2008) - that is why Dana boyd suggests a
hands-off approach to guiding teens through the internet (boyd, 5). So when Zuckerberg states
that digital media can bring the world together, in reality, the technology simply allows our
social nature to extend across time and space, but we choose who to extend it to.
In conclusion, whether technological innovations are truly the cause of transformations of
society depends on your approach. Here, we took social shaping because technology cannot do
anything without the human element, yet humans are now inextricably linked to technology, for
it is embedded in our daily lives. Sure, communication may be faster than ever now, but what
really matters is how people will use it. The technology has made it possible – the people will
make it social.
2.
Jane McGonigal’s theory that playing videogames for 21 billion hours a week will save
the world is eccentric, to say the least. Her idea is sound, but her attempt to sell the transition
from virtual to real-world problems falls short. The four characteristics of gamers – urgent
optimism, social ties, blissful productivity, and epic meaning (McGonigal, 2010) – can definitely
manifest themselves into a problem solving community, but McGonigal fails to illustrate the
importance of the growing connection between online and offline worlds. The skills garnered
from playing games most certainly can aid society on its epic quest to save the world, but to
convince the skeptics, proponents like McGonigal need to provide evidence for the real-world
application and embedding of gaming in modern, everyday life.
She could have easily done this with the help of Ian Bogost. Bogost showed that the new
media environment is full of gaming “microhabitats,” like individual processes within an
ecosystem that influence the entire chain of life (Bogost, 6). In turn, those processes are impacted
by the ecosystem itself. This theory then takes on the form of social shaping, or the idea that
technology and people shape the media environment (Baym, 44). By accepting the notion that
digital media are now completely immersed in human activity (Digital Nation), McGonigal
could have revealed the causal mechanism between the microhabitats of games and their impact
on human activity: these games influence an environment that is already inseparable from human
culture. Had she clearly demonstrated this, her argument could have been stronger.
In addition, her empirical evidence was lacking as well. True, she did mention a few
“performative games” (Bogost, 120) like World Without Oil, but she did not stress their real life
implications well enough. It would have been much more impressive had she handed out actual
statistics, not just say “these gamers are bringing the lessons learned back to real life.” That sort
of argumentation practically begs for skepticism. She needed to pull real-life examples that the
audience could relate to. For example, Bogost looked at dozens of games that were socially
shaped and had real-world impacts: “Exergames” like DDR and Wii Sports, “public policy
games” that teach gamers about politics versus politicking like Take Back Illinois, “Zen games”
like flOw, alternate reality games or performative such as McGonigal’s World Without Oil and
Cruel 2 B Kind, and more. In his short essays on these microhabitats, Bogost convinced the
reader that both the media environment and social/cultural environment have a reciprocal
relationship with these games. They shape us as we shape them. As for how they shape us, as
Professor James Gee said, “how we think is through running perceptual simulations in our heads
that prepare us for the actions we’re going to take. By modeling those simulations, video games
externalize how the mind works” (Johnson, 2005, pg. 5) In other words, videogames let us
practice our actions in reality simulations, thus preparing us for actual problems. In turn, we
shape videogames through “context and convention” (Bogost, 122). Revealing the symbiotic
nature of gaming and culture could have greatly enhanced McGonigal’s credibility.
Next, McGonigal should have tackled the view that games just kill brain cells (as gamers
kill the brains of aliens or Russians). She had at her disposal many of the studies referenced in
Steve Johnson’s article that concluded that gaming develops “generalized skills that apply in
real-world situations” (Johnson, 3). For example, James Rosser found that laparoscopic surgeons
who played games made 37% fewer errors than their non-gamer counterparts (Johnson, 3). These
gamers “think well about systems; they’re going to be good at exploring; they’re going to be
good at re-conceptualizing their goals based on their experience; they’re not going to judge
people’s intelligence just by how fast and efficient they are; and they’re going to think
nonlaterally” (Johnson, 5). In connection, Steve Johnson’s other article, Dome Improvement,
purports that games might be responsible for the recent rise in IQ scores. He cites the “Flynn
Effect” for his argument, saying that any small genetic differences can be greatly enhanced by
the environment the subject is raised in. Today, of course, we live in a media environment
(McLuhan, 1964), so any relative alterations will be attuned to and by the technology at hand.
Videogames happen to be one of those technologies – hence the skills developed by games can
have an even greater impact in today’s digital world than any games Herodotus studied
thousands of years ago. As technology advances, virtual realities will take on more life-like
properties and simulations, and therefore the skills gamers develop will be more applicable to the
local environment. Had McGonigal underscored the significance this, her audience would have
been that much more convinced.
While it is hard to convince the public that any form of entertainment, especially one that
puts you in the environment of a super-soldier who chops up aliens (or Russians!) for leisure, can
in fact be educational, videogames nevertheless have the potential to develop strong problemsolving mindsets. They can be models for experience, offering new kinds of learning that can
influence our offline/online culture (Bogost, 2011). Furthermore, if we combine this with John
Lanier’s “pack mentality” mentioned in the previous essay (Smith, 8), we may start seeing
hordes of gamers coming together to solve the world’s issues. And before we know it, the change
we are hoping for may soon be upon us (Abelson et al, Koan #5, pg 9). This is what Jane
McGonigal was trying to illustrate – a perfectly possible if not probable idea. But she failed to
convince because she never emphasized the growing symbiosis between the digital and social
environments, and her arsenal of empirical evidence fell short despite having numerous studies
on hand. Had she applied these, she would have been much more persuasive.
3.
The idea of mediated publics, or “environments where people can gather publicly through
mediating technology” (boyd, 2007) has existed for centuries. The internet is simply the “latest
generation of mediated publics” (boyd, 2007). However, applications like social networking sites
do have characteristics that are unique to this digital medium: what you say never goes away,
you can always find what or who you are looking for, content is replicable, and your audience is
invisible (boyd, 2007). Other authors have supplemented this list of properties – Baym, for
example, acknowledges the replicability, portability, and storage of data, the medium’s far flung
reach, and its synchronous/asynchronous temporal structure (Baym, 6-12). In addition, Abelson
et al outlined “koans” that govern digital media, such as the fact that “nothing goes away”
(which connects to boyd’s “persistence”). These features set digitally mediated publics apart
from other electronic forms certainly, but with the growing domestication and embedding of
technology is modern society, it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate mediated and nonmediated publics. Indeed, some authors, such as Baym, think that you can no longer distinguish
offline versus online – the internet is now an essential tool that we use in daily life (Baym, 152).
Nevertheless, it is prudent to compare and contrast all we can in order to clearly understand what
constitutes mediated versus non-mediated publics.
The crux of the issue is the digital evolution of the community, for only when people
come together in the form of a community can public discourse occur. According to Baym, we
can compare and contrast communities based on space, shared practice, shared resources and
support, shared identities, and interpersonal relationships (Baym, 75). Space is the environment
in which users meet for discourse, such as a park or coffee shop. For online communities
however, we can interpret space as the websites or virtual realities that people meet in, such as
Second Life or Facebook’s “Wall.” Can we really say one space is more real than another?
Discourse occurs in both, does it not? The only difference is physicality, which society did away
with ever since the first telephone call was made. Indeed, Professor Vaidhyanathan objects to the
notion of a separate “cyberspace,” claiming that instead of creating another reality, digital media
simply connect the realities we have lived in for so long (Lecture, 1/23). This connects to boyd’s
“youth places” and Ito et al’s digital back alleys for “hanging out,” which teens now use to avoid
adults, just as they did before the internet came into being (boyd, 2007; Ito et al, 2008).
Facebook is a prime example of a “youth place.” Although millions of parents and teachers have
profiles as well, much of the teen gossip is exclusively among teens. Moreover, it can become
pretty awkward when an adult chimes in on an obviously teen-oriented post. POS!
Next, shared practices characterize both offline and online communities, but those of
online ones can become much more esoteric. Practices are the routinized behaviors and norms of
communities that all members partake in (Baym, 77). For example, gamers have very specific
language markers, as Nicholas Baker discovered (Baker, 2010) – you can always tell a Call of
Duty player from a Halo fan. Baym called this “speech community” (Baym, 77), and it connects
to Bogost’s microhabitats in that each one has its own idiosyncrasies that all members can
recognize. These idiosyncrasies then lead to behavioral norms that are ever-evolving, just like
Abelson et al’s koans and Baym’s 7 digital principles. This compares to many offline
communities, who also evolve their behavioral norms to fit modern contexts. The tendency for
gamers to warn SPOILERS, for example, is very similar to a book club’s warning against
reading a certain novel. In addition, when a member performs the current norm exceptionally
well, he can rise in status among the group (Baym, 80). As boyd said, “the Internet mirrors and
magnifies all aspects of social life” (body, 2007), and the goal of any social adventurer is to be
popular. Facebook users, for instance, post what will make them “cool” among their Friends
(Smith, 7). The same can be said for our book club metaphor: those who contribute the just want
to show off their knowledge half the time.
This connects with shared identities, or the roles people play within communities (Baym,
86), in that they too promote social norms. Once a position, such as the “expert,” is occupied,
there is resistance to others trying to fill it. We see this in both offline and online communities –
the main difference is that online communities house more roles and more openings for them.
Nevertheless, both can change depending on who fills which roles. For example, if the “constant
meme-spammer” on Facebook happens to like cat memes, then much of the discourse will
revolve around just that. This is similar to any public official, who often shapes the agenda of
meetings. Of course, know that, were the public meeting held online, anything said could be
easily searched for, copied, shared, and stored for future use. This is in fact one of the main
debates over Facebook: should law enforcers be able to use Facebook posts as evidence? No jury
has decided yet (boyd, 2007).
Next, shared resources and support include the sharing of social capital, like bridging
(meeting people you normally could not or would not meet) and bonding (maintaining strong
ties) (Baym, 82). In this area, online and offline communities differ the most, for digital media’s
transcendence of time and space allow much more bridging capital, which can then lead to
bonding capital. This connects to boyd’s “searchability,” which promotes bridging across the
globe. Offline, you are restricted by geography and physicality. This is one of the reasons why
SNS are so popular: because they allow easy maintenance of weak and strong ties (Baym, 134).
While any offline community member can do this, it is much harder when distance restrains you.
Last, interpersonal relationships are the core of offline versus online debates. Which one
is best for creating and maintaining intimate relations? The critics argue that nothing will ever
beat face to face communication because it provides the most social cues and cues unconsciously
given off (Baym, 2010), therefore representing the person more accurately. However, more and
more successful relationships are formed online every day. Although mediated publics may be
leaner than non-mediated ones, media multiplexity allows richer communication to occur as
relationships develop (Baym, 2010). They use more technologies that can accurately describe
themselves as their ties strengthen. This connects to Ito et al’s study of how youths find ways to
integrate new media into their “hanging out” processes (Ito et al, 2008). Facebook of course is a
huge relationship maintainer/creator. Relationship statuses are increasingly important to whether
a relationship is authentic or not – “Facebook official.” And due to latent ties (potential relations
with friends of Friends), many people first start flirting over Facebook (Baym, 101). This is now
engrained in youth culture, just as asking someone to a dance or dinner was the norm for teens
decades ago. Therefore, are mediated publics really different from non-mediated ones, or are
they just evolutions of modern social context?
Based on these criteria, we can say that the line between offline and online are becoming
increasingly blurred. They both use space, shared practices, identities, support, and both develop
lasting relationships. As Baym said, “the idea that these are separate realms does not hold up to
scrutiny” (Baym, 152). Despite boyd’s searchability, persistence, replicability, and Baym’s
portability, social cues, and reach, mediated publics can be considered merely the contextual
evolution of non-mediated publics.
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