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Brooke Thompson
Dr. Lopez
ENGL 3080
9 December 2014
The Necessity of Plea Bargaining
One of the major controversial topics in the legal sphere, outside of today’s demanding
court cases, is the constitutionality of plea bargains and whether or not they are necessary in the
criminal justice system. The main argument or larger conversation surrounding this topic is the
fact that plea bargaining is essentially unfair, unjust, and primarily unconstitutional. In reality,
because plea bargaining is a choice given to defendants rather than a requirement, the plea
bargaining system remains constitutional, just as well as it is fair and just. Also, not only are plea
bargains constitutional, but they are necessary to the administration of the criminal justice
system, for pleas benefit all parties involved. We will discover just how the prosecution, the
judge, the defendant, and the court all benefit from the plea bargaining system and why this
system still remains in place today. More than 90 percent of criminal cases in America end in a
plea deal for a specific reason. Furthermore, we will identify the benefits that result from having
the plea system in place, and how the system substantially outweighs the negative prospective of
plea bargaining as a means of settling a case. Although the bargaining system may be
controversial because of the vast number of cons claimed to be associated with the process, we
will see just how it still proves constitutional and most necessary and proper for the balance it
provides to the criminal justice system as a whole.
Out of the various reasons for the negative outlook on plea bargaining, the two biggest
issues are the coercive nature behind accepted plea bargains, and the incompetency of those who
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accept the pleas. These two issues lead to a large percentage of innocent defendants who plea out
in fear and/or a misunderstanding of their rights. Because several innocent people are being
sentenced, it has caused a controversy in the legal system where parties have opted to request a
partial ban on pleas, or a request to eliminate the system altogether. Because getting rid of the
bargaining method will do more harm than good to the criminal justice system, banning plea
deals and suggesting the unconstitutionality of the act has failed significantly. Millions of cases
would be overturned if pleas were declared unconstitutional, and the already overcrowded
dockets of the American courts will cause a blockage on the availability of courtrooms and
judges needed to try each of these cases. Furthermore, the issue with coercion has resulted in
cases where the courts ruled on the requirement of counsel, those who can properly advise
indigents on the severity of a crime and help them outweigh the costs of a guilty plea, as
originally outlined in the Sixth Amendment of the right to counsel. However, because the
process of the bargain crucially affects the entire criminal justice system, it fails to be eliminated
simply because of negligence. Instead, defense attorneys have a duty to administer assistance to
defendants contemplating the acceptance of a guilty plea. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy of the
United States Supreme Court wrote in one of his opinions that, “‘The reality is that plea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel
have responsibilities [. . .] that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires’” (Veith). Because the assistance of counsel is available to
defendants, there should be no issue with incompetency, unless the defender has failed at his
duty of actively providing knowledgeable input on a defendant’s case—which can then be tried
in the court of law.
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As far as the coercive nature of the plea bargaining system and how it causes factually
innocent people to take a plea out of the fear of receiving a harsher sentence in court, has caused
several debates on the unjust nature of the plea bargaining system. The idea of a plea is to allow
defendants to receive a lesser sentence than they would if they went to trial: “A defendant might
plead guilty, not because he is guilty, but because the prosecutor offers some concession in
return. Even an innocent defendant may rationally prefer a specified lenient sentence to the risk
of a much harsher sentence resulting from a wrongful conviction at trial” (Gazal-Ayal). The
simple fact that they would prefer a specified lenient sentence means that they have a choice to
choose whether or not to accept a guilty plea in the first place. With a plea, there are three
options: guilty, not guilty, and nolo contender, meaning “no contest.” Because there are three
choices that can be made when taking a plea, one cannot argue a guilty plea being forced upon if
one has the ability to make such a decision of guilt for oneself: “Supporters of the plea
bargaining system claim that the above argument [of force] ignores the crux of the practice. Plea
agreements are not forced on defendants, supporters note—they are only an option” (GazalAyal). Because they are an option, they remain constitutional. So now not only are there
defenders who are designed and delegated to educate their defendants on the nature of a plea, the
defendant then has a choice on whether or not to take it. Furthermore, because these two
measures are in place, the negative outlook on pleas is justified because of the provisions
installed to make the process legal and beneficial—if properly executed.
Shifting away from the negative aspect of pleas, let’s focus on why the criminal system
needs plea bargaining to remain integrated in the courts. Although plea bargaining is seen as an
evil, it’s by far the most necessary evil in the justice system because of the balance it provides to
the system at large. The system, with the implementation of pleas, is already overcrowded with
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cases that need to go to trial. In reality, the justice system can only supply so many lawyers,
judges, courtrooms, and public defense attorneys until they have ran out of the integral elements
needed for a defendant to go to trial. For example, in the Supreme Court, “Approximately 10,000
petitions are filed with the Court in the course of a Term [or one year]. In addition, some 1,200
applications of various kinds are filed each year that can be acted upon by a single Justice”
(Supreme Court). On average, cases—depending on their severity—can take months for a
decision, which costs the courts money for trial materials and attorneys to represent the case. If
all 10,000 of these cases went to trial, the criminal justice system would not be able to afford the
cost and the man power needed to expedite all cases. Thus, plea bargains play a vital role in the
efficiency of the justice system. Out of these 10,000 petitions of writ, the lack of severity for
some issues can cause a loss of attention to those cases that need extended time to determine an
appropriate outcome. This problem has been prominent for years: “what most concerned
Congress, in 1996, was the crowding that it saw on the dockets of the federal courts, with
prisoners’ lawsuits piling up and taking longer to decide” (Denniston). Furthermore, in addition
to plea bargaining cutting down on time and resources, it cuts down on the number of individuals
occupying our already crowded prison cells: “America’s prisons now hold more than 2.3 million
inmates, and many of the facilities are overcrowded, with serious implications for both health
and safety” (Denniston). For example, “In California, the states’ 33 prisons are operating at
almost twice their design capacity — actually, 195 percent, meaning that two inmates have to
occupy the space designed for one” (Denniston). Because America’s prison cells are already at
maximum capacity from the small percentage of cases heard by the courts, there is no way
America will be able to accommodate the number of potential inmates that would result from the
lack of plea bargaining.
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Furthermore, plea bargaining benefits the criminal justice system by providing conviction
rates for prosecutors and allowing them to focus primarily on issues that are more severe: “it
enables them to secure high conviction rates while avoiding the expense, uncertainty, and
opportunity costs of trials. By obtaining guilty pleas, prosecutors can pursue more cases,
potentially resulting in greater aggregate deterrent or incapacitative effects with a finite amount
of resources” (Smith). In addition to helping prosecutors focus primarily on more severe cases,
plea bargains have the potential to help in the conviction of a co-defendant on trial, if the
individual involved in the plea is able to be a witness during trial. In some cases, defendants who
take a plea bargain are subject to being a witness as a part of their deal of a lesser sentence; not
all plea deals are strictly for lesser sentences alone. For example, over this past summer I worked
on a murder case that went to the Fulton County Superior Court where a group of five young,
black males—gang affiliated—were indicted on the robbery and murder of Jerrick Jackson,
brother of a prominent Atlanta pastor, Wiley Jackson. Out of the five co-defendants, one of the
defendants plead at the beginning of the case. Part of his deal was to testify against the other
males, detailing what happened during the crime and identifying which individual was
responsible for each action that took place during the night of the crime. One of the defendants
on trial, Demetrius Morgan, claimed he knew nothing about what the other four planned to do,
and plead not guilty. However, “Alejandro Pitts entered a guilty plea before Morgan's trial
started. He testified on Monday and said Morgan knew, along with everyone else in the car, what
they were about to do” (Harris). Because of Pitts’ testimony, the jury was able come to a proper
verdict on each individual involved, based on factual truth. In the instance that testimony is
relevant to the conclusion of a case, plea deals prove beneficial to the criminal justice system.
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In conclusion, plea bargaining, like every other controversial issue, has both pros and
cons that can be debated and misunderstood. Yes, plea bargaining may be seen as unjust, unfair,
and unconstitutional, but in reality, it’s quite the opposite. As we have outlined above, plea
bargaining has three possible outcomes—guilty, not guilty, and nolo contender—all of which are
voluntary decisions that can be made of the accused defendant. Because of the provisions of the
Sixth Amendment, giving individuals the right to counsel, the argument that plea deals are forced
on innocent and incompetent individuals fails because of the provision that has been set to
accommodate them. Yes, there are instances where the defendant is wrongfully advised, and if
proven, can be taken to court. But the majority of defendants are given an explanation and a
choice. Furthermore, plea bargaining is necessary to the criminal justice system as a whole
because it provides a balance in the administration of the courts and in America’s overcrowded
prison cells. If the 10,000 petitions of writ, discussed above, were to go to trial versus settled
with a plea deal, the criminal justice system would face a true problem, as they would not have
the means to address all 10,000 cases. Furthermore, the convenience of plea bargaining helps the
prosecution with conviction rates and settling cases properly, like the murder case of Jerrick
Jackson. Is plea bargaining an evil? Maybe, but unnecessary—by no means. As proven, plea
bargaining plays an integral role in the criminal justice system as a whole. Even though the
method of plea bargaining has its downfalls, it has the potential to be improved, as any other
evolving structure. However, it should never be partially banned or abolished because of its
constitutionality and necessity to our judicial system.
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Works Cited
“A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court.” Supreme Court of the United States. 9 Dec. 2014.
Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Denniston, Lyle. “Argument preview: Crowded prisons, inmates’ rights.” SCOTUSblog.
SCOTUSblog, 28 Nov. 2010. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Gazal-Ayal, Oren, “Partial Ban on Plea Bargains.”. Cardozo Law Review 27 (2006): 2295-2351.
SSRN. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Harris, Rodney. “Demetrius Morgan found not guilty on murder charge, guilty on others in
Jerrick Jackson trial.” CBS 46.com. WorldNow and WGCL-TV., 15 July 2014. Web. 9
Dec. 2014.
Smith, Douglas A. “Plea Bargaining Controversy, The.” Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 77.3 (1987): 949-968. Web. 9 Dec. 2014.
Veith, Gene. “The constitutional right to a plea bargain.” Patheos Hosting the Conversation On
Faith. Patheos, 23 March 2012. Web. 9 Dec. 2014