AFDC Workshop on Developing Asian Bond Markets: Facilitating the pricing mechanism for Asian bonds May 29- June2, Shanghai Bond Market Development:The Case of South Korea Gyutaeg Oh Korea Fixed Income Research Institute Chung Ang University Overview 1 Development of Korean Bond Market: History 2 Development of Korean Government Bond Market 3 Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market 4 Special Topics: New Asset Backed Securities 1 Development of Korean Bond Market: History Development of Korean Bond Market: History USD Billion 800 IMF Crisis 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1980 1990 Money Market Source: Bank of Korea 1995 2000 2003.10 Bond Market 2005 Stock Market Development of Korean Bond Market: History Amounts Outstanding USD Billion 250 200 150 100 50 0 1990 Gov. Source: Bank of Korea 1995 Bank 2000 Y ear MSB 2003 Agency 2005 Corp. Development of Korean Bond Market: History Source: Asia Bond Monitor 2005 2 Development of Korean Government Bond Market Before & After the Crisis Before the currency crisis: small and under-developed Markets for government bonds and government-guaranteed bonds were not well-developed (conservative fiscal policy) As a result, the 3-yr corporate bond emerged as the benchmark bond After the currency crisis: Dazzling Development – Government bond Market: To finance public fund for financial restructuring and boost depressed economy by fiscal pump priming (Government-led Development) – The government dramatically increased the size of KTB issuance from around W7 trillion ($billion) in 1997 to W56 trillion ($billion) in 2004. – In terms of outstanding balance, the total amount of KTBs has increased from W25 trillions as of the end of 1996 to more than W123 trillion as of end 2004. Government Bond Market -Institution Building Reforms in Korea 1998.8 Announcement of ‘Government Bond Market Stimulus Plan’ 1999.3 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM) 1999.3~1999.6 Test period of Primary Dealer system 1999.7 Enactment of Primary Dealer system 1999.9 Introduction of government bond futures 1999.11 Introduction of DVP system 2000.2 Introduction of Inter-Dealer Brokers (IDB) 2000.3 Securities financing facilities for primary dealers 2000.5 Introduction of reopening system 2000.8 Switch from multiple price auction to Dutch auction 2002.10 Mandatory Exchange trading requirement for benchmark issues 2003.1 Strengthening obligations of primary dealers Unifying interest payment dates in preparation for introducing STRIPS 2005 Introduce STRIPS 2006 Issue 20 year bonds Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds Design products for retail investors Effect of Reopening System The Fungible Issue System (Reopening System) • • Bonds have identical maturities and coupon rates. Reopening System expands the size of bond issuances of the same maturities. The turnover rates of GB is 6 times larger than that of CB. Turnover Rates 1.4 1.2 N on-fungible 2000.10월 2001 2002 2003 국채회전률 회사채회전률 2003-03 2003-01 2002-11 2002-09 0 2002-07 1 2002-05 0 2002-03 2 2002-01 0.2 2001-11 3 Corporate bonds 2001-09 0.4 2001-07 greater 2001-05 4 2001-03 0.6 2001-01 3.5 times 2000-11 5 2000-09 0.8 2000-07 6 Treasury bonds 2000-05 1 2000-03 7 2000-01 vo lum e (trillio n w o n) Volum e of B enchm ark Issues Volume of Benchmark Issues History of PD System • 1999.3 • 1999.7 Establishment of Inter-Dealer market (IDM) Introduction of Primary Dealer system - 24 institutions designated as primary dealers - 2% Minimum requirement: Acquisition & Trading • 2000.2 • 2000.3 Introduction of Inter-dealer brokers (IDB) Providing financing facilities for primary dealers - Line of credit provided (at cheaper rate) Privileges Obligations - Exclusive participation in government bond auctions - 5% minimum underwriting & trading (every 6 months) - Access to securities financing facilities for secondary market trading - Provide bid/ask quotes (min vol and max spread constraint) - Regular consulting partners for the treasury department at the Ministry of Finance and Economy - 40% Mandatory exchange trading - Reporting requirement of position and trading information of the government bonds (To Treasury) Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement • Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) & OTC Market VS. • New Policy measures for activating KSE market 2002.10 Mandatory exchange (KSE) trading requirement - 20% of Benchmark Issues 2003.01 Obligations of primary dealers strengthened - Exchange trading requirement increased from 20% to 40% - Minimum trading amount increased from 2% to 5% Primary dealers should trade benchmark issues of the Government Bonds in KSE. Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement Exchange Trading Proportions (%) (Benchmark vs. Non-Benchmark) 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 Benchmark May-04 Mar-04 Jan-04 Nov-03 Sep-03 Jul-03 May-03 Mar-03 Jan-03 Nov-02 Sep-02 Jul-02 May-02 Mar-02 Jan-02 0.0 Non-benchmark The proportion of benchmark issue trading within the exchange has significantly increased since Oct. 2002. Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement Gov Bond Trading Volume (KSE vs. OTC) 600,000 Total(D+E) Exchange OTC market 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement For benchmark issues Strengthening obligations of primary dealers - Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Oct-02 Jan-03 The Trading volume in the OTC market has not been decreased. Mandatory Exchange Trading Requirement Bid-Ask Spreads of Benchmark Issues 25 20 6.7bp 15 18.1bp 10 5 0 Jan-02 Apr-02 Jul-02 Oct-02 Jan-03 Bid-ask spreads of the benchmark issues decreased sharply after the new policy in 2002. Liquid Gov. Bond Futures Market 3-Year KTB Futures – Global Status <Top 10 Gov Bond Futures Contracts> (in 1,000 contract) Rank Contract(Maturity) Volume Exchange 1 Euro Bund(10) 129,320 Eurex 2 Euro Bobl(5) 78,297 Eurex 3 T-Note(10) 66,531 CBOT 4 Euro Schatz(2) 59,605 Eurex 5 T-Note(5) 33,204 CBOT 6 T-Bond(30) 30,452 CBOT 7 T-Bonds(3) 9,190 SFE 8 KTB(3) 5,452 KOFEX 9 Long Gilt(10) 4,883 Euronext-Liffe 10 JGB(10) 4,501 TSE (Source: FIA, January~June 2003) Recent Trends in Government Bond Market Institution Building Reforms in Korea Before 2005, reform focused on measures to reduce issuing cost by improving liquidity of the benchmark issues After 2005, reform focuses on measures to reduce issuing cost by meeting diverse investors’ need 2006 2005 • Introduce STRIPS • Issue 20 year Bonds • Issue Inflation-Indexed Bonds • Design products for retail investors 3 Development of Korean Corporate Bond Market Development of Corporate Bond Market Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000) Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs) MTM accounting for ITCs Establish Bond Pricing Agency Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve Credit Rating Issuance of P- SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit card CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt debt roll-over problems Rapid Pick-Up of Realizing the ABS Markets need for systemic risk monitoring system Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau Plunge of ABS markets Korea’s ABS system: Introduction The introduction of ABS Act in 1998 In September 1998, the Asset Backed Securitization Act (the “ABS Act”) was passed. - The ABS Act provides a means to engage in securitization transactions with legal certainty. - Tax benefits are conferred on transactions under the ABS Act. - Processes such as perfection of security interests against third parties are streamlined. The ABS Act was originally intended to facilitate the disposal of nonperforming loans. Securitization Process under the ABS Act Establishment of a securitization vehicle - Onshore ABS SPC- Trust company - Offshore ABS SPC Registration of a securitization plan with the FSC Acquisition of securitization assets by the securitization vehicle Appointment of servicer and transaction administrator Issuance of asset-backed securities Troubled Loan Disposed (billion won) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total KAMCO (A) 8,345.3 22,253.9 7,761.1 1,040.7 3,816.3 43,217.3 Banks (B) - 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 38,192.2 108,130.3 Total (C) 8,345.3 38,264.1 25,798 36,931.7 42,008.5 151,347.6 (B) / (C) 0% 42% 70% 97% 91% By Banks 71.4% (billion won, %) 1998 1997 2000 2001 Total Collected 5,491.7 5,048.2 8,357.9 9,969.7 28,867.5 (25.8) Write off 265.2 5,170.7 10,779 11,600 30,514.9 (27.3) 802.1 4,433.7 10,894.1 16,129.9 (14.4) 3,937.9 1,831.1 5,769 (8.6) 693.9 1,504.6 1,077.7 3,276.2 (2.9) 6,322 6,877.9 2,722.9 23,476.1 (21) 96.7 96.7 (0.1) 38,192.2 108,130.3 ABS Direct Sale Debt – Equity Swap Other 7,553.3 Sales to CRV Total 16,010.2 18,036.9 35,891 Corporate Bonds in Bank Restructuring Contribution: “Spare-Tire theory” * Corporations mitigated credit crunch problems by issuing massive amount of corp. bonds. Capital market as a parallel circuit to bank financing * Market interest rates were stabilized since corp. credit crunch problems were mitigated & thereby it contributed to high growth in 1999. Amount of bond Issuance (Net) unit: 10 billion won 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1997 1/4 -500 1998 1/4 1999 1/4 2000 1/4 2001 1/4 -1000 -1500 government bank financial Inst. corporation 2002 1/4 Credit Shocks: Daewoo Default and Maturity Concentration No Free Lunch!!!!!!! ITCs assumed credit risk with little discipline. Unviable firms could extend their lives. Easy financing reduced Chaebol’s incentive to restructure their businesses. - massive default and recurrent credit crunch - increased ultimate costs of restructuring! Maturity Concentration & credit crunch in 2001! Development of Corporate Bond Market Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000) Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs) ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs MTM accounting for ITCs Establish Bond Pricing Agency Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve credit rating Issuance of P- SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit card CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt debt roll-over problems Rapid Pick-Up of Realizing the ABS Markets need for systemic risk monitoring system Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau Plunge of ABS markets Bond Pricing Agencies for Mark-to-Market System in Korea - Nov. 1997: decided to introduce “Mark to Market” - Dec. 1999:KSDA provided Matrix Pricing BP - Jun. 2000:3 credit rating agencies launched 3 BPAs under government approval KIS PRICING Paid-in Capital KRW 3 billion Korea Bond Pricing Paid-In Capital KRW 4.75 billion Paid-In Capital KRW 5 billion The KSDA companies. monitors these -Oct. 2000: BPAs began pricing on MTM fund - 2002: MTM applied to Bank’s Trading book, Trust account , Insurance Co.’s special Trust account, securities Co.’s accounts - Oct. 2003: KDSA stops matrix pricing Improve Post Trade Transparency of Bond Markets KSDA requires dealers to report all bond transactions (including both corporate and government bonds) to KOSCOM CHECK Terminal within 30 minutes in 1999 (and 15 minutes since 2004) NASD begins full dissemination of transaction and price data on the entire universe of corporate bonds to retail investors using TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). Dealers must report corporate bond transactions to TRACE within 30 minutes, and that window will be reduced to 15 minutes in July 2005 Improve the Quality of Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) In 2006, Ministry of Finance and Economy of Korea plans to lower the barriers in entering the Korean credit rating industry in 2006, so that foreign agencies, such as S&P, Moody’s and Fitch may easily get into the Korean market. Korean CRA Market Foreign CRAs KOREA INFORMATION SERVICE Paid-in Capital: 23.8 billion won Paid-in Capital: 33.5 billion won 163 Employees Paid-in Capital: 24.3 billion won 183 Employees Seoul Credit Rating & Information Paid- in Capital: 13.7 billion won 227 Employees Development of Corporate Bond Market Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000) Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs) ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs MTM accounting for ITCs Establish Bond Pricing Agency Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve Credit Rating Issuance of P-CBOs to Refi Corp. Bond Debt Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit card debt roll-over problems Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau Plunge of ABS markets Maturity Concentration (Rollover) Problem Create a systemic risk (due to credit crunch problem) A temporary problem: Chaebols paid off debts (low interest rate, higher earning, less investment) 1 billion won 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 1998/1 1999/1 2000/1 Above A 2001/1 BBB 2002/1 BB-B 2003/1 below CCC 2004/1 2005/1 unrated 2006/1 Credit Crunch: Securitization & Credit Guarantee Credit Guarantee Services by KCGF 23 SMEs Credit guarantees for a pool of corporate bonds / loans Corp. bonds (72billion won) \ Small Business Corporation Combining mechanisms of ABS and credit guarantee Facilitated corporate financing in a short period of time Asset sales SPC Credit Enhancement By Korea Housing Bank (10 bil.) Senior bonds (2yr 8.5 bil., 3yr 36 bil.) Investor Junior bonds (27.5 bil.) Repurchased by Small Business Corporation Evolution of ABS Market in Korea Introduction Stage (’99~’00) Financial Restructuring & 35 KRW trillion 1 100% Securitization of NPLs 30 28.6 80% Developing Stage (‘00-’01) Financing tools for companies to overcome flight-to-quality (maturity concentration) problems 25 22.2 20.6 20 19.7 60% 56.6% 14.4 15 13.1 10.5 41.2% 10 40% 12.6 8.7 9.9 9.6 6.9 Maturing Stage (’02~’04) Deepening of ABS market Financing tools for SMEs, credit card companies mortgage, student loans, Future Cash Flow Securitization & others 5 4.6 3.2% 0.50.20.9 0.6 25.4% 4.6 4 2.5 8.3% 1.2 1 0.9 1.9 5.3 0.9 0.6 20% 3 3.5 13.4%0.8 0 0% 1999 Bonds Securities 2000 Accountable receivables 2001 2002 2003 2004 Card loans Lease, Auto loans Real-estate Ratio of Credit loans Lessons from Korean Experiences Securitization can be an effective policy tool for overcoming credit crunch problems (or credit quality gap) Public sectors can facilitate securitization Securitization evolves as market need arises USA : Mortgage Lease/Cards Junk Bonds/CBOs Future Cash Flows Korea: NPLs CBOs Cards Future Cash Flows Development of Corporate Bond Market Maturity Concentration Crisis (2000) Financial Crisis (97.11) Daewoo Crisis (99.8) Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Credit shock Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Market Impact Massive Corp. Bond Issuance to Refi Bank Debts (From Banks to ITCs) ABS (Asset Backed Securities) development to handle NPLs MTM accounting for ITCs Establish Bond Pricing Agency Improve Post- Trade Transparency Improve Credit Rating Issuance of P- CBOs to Refi Corp Bond Debt Rapid Pick-Up of ABS Markets SKG & Credit Card Crisis (03.3) Credit card debt roll-over problems Realizing the need for systemic risk monitoring system Realizing the Importance of Credit Bureau Plunge of ABS markets Credit Card Industry in Korea ◇ Untapped new market of consumer finance 2002 104,807 4.6 2005.6 82,765 3.4 Growth of Consumer Finance 100.0% 80.0% 60.0% 40.0% 20.0% ◇ Credit card companies financed its lending by issuing corporate bonds and by securitizing credit card receivables. 04 03 20 02 20 01 20 00 Year 20 20 19 99 0.0% 19 ◇ Especially Credit card companies with less financial market experience which are subsidiary of business conglomerate used market share maximization strategy. 2.6 98 57,881 97 Average lending rate of bank: 6~7% per annum Cash advance fee: over 20% per annum Financing cost of credit card companies: 6~7% per annum 2000 19 1.6 96 ◇ In the beginning it was lucrative! 33,278 19 Every financial company in Korea began to enter consumer loan market 1995 95 • 0.6 19 After 1998, business entities stopped financing new investment 10,384 94 • 1990 19 Before 1998, individuals had a lower pecking order in the credit market Cards per economically active individual % out of total credit • Cards Issued (thousands) Beginning of Crisis in Credit Card Industry in Korea Market Situation ◇ SK Global event (February 2003) • Family owner was arrested as a suspect of accounting fraud • Investors of Money Market Fund which invested in debt instruments issued by SK Global suffered loss. ◇ Investors getting more sensitive about over-issued credit card companies’ bonds • Increasing concern about credit card companies’ loss ◇ Past due ratio (excluding rescheduled debt) increased End of 2001 End of 2002 End of 2003 2.0% 5.9% 13.6% ◇ Investors began to redeem investment trust funds in the fear of loss ◇ Investment trust companies had to sell or stop rolling over credit card bonds ◇ Other institutional investors were deeply concerned about their investment positions in credit card bonds Government Measures in 2003 • Initiatives by the Government in April 2003 Rolling over maturing debt securities issued by credit card companies Funding a pool to support refinancing credit card companies’ debt securities held by investment trust companies Large shareholders joining in new capital raising (8 credit card companies with their own plans to raise capital in the amount of U$ 80m~U$ 400m) Credit card companies reconstructing cost structure and asset management • Strengthening guidance on sound management • Reintroduction of loan service ratio In calculating past due ratio, liquidated asset should be included In calculating adjusted capital ratio, 20% of liquidated asset should be included in the denominator Starting Credit Counseling & Recovery Service (founded in 2003) 1 out of 10 economically active population is registered as insolvent and the number was increasing Increasing personal insolvency not only hurts financial institutions profitability but becomes the reason of social unrest Financial companies co-founded CCRS to reschedule personal debts and help finding jobs for troubled people Number of applications for debt rescheduled: 2003: 62,550 → 2004: 287,352 Credit Card Industry after Crisis • Credit card companies are recovering from crisis • Assets are still shrinking • Past due ratio (including rescheduled debt) has decreased to 11.9%(Sep 2005) from 28.3%(end of 2003) • Number of credit card companies has reduced - Three companies were merged into mother banks - Six credit companies left on business (billion U$, %) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005.9 Assets+ ABS 60 84 46 30 26 Liabilities+ Financing from ABS 52 75 45 28 23 Net income 2.1 0.2 -8.8 -1.1 0 ROA 5.8 0.4 -21.6 -3.9 0 Monitoring Systemic Risks Create indices to monitor systemic risks in bond markets • Concentration Index • Credit Spread Index • Market Sentiment Index Create indices to monitor individual credit risks • Strengthen credit bureau business • Create individual credit risk index ABS related business guideline Market’s self-regulatory guideline for those engaged in ABS business (from ’05.5) • Clarify the role and responsibilities of ABS related party • Embody device for surveillance among ABS related parties • Strengthen ABS related disclosure Minimize instability in the ABS market and create an environment favorable to ABS investment 4 New Asset-Backed Securities: Student Loan Securitization Establishment of Korea Housing Finance Corporation • Korea Mortgage Corporation was established as a joint venture with IFC in 1999. • Establishment of State-run Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprise – – – – • • Korea Housing Finance Corporation Act enacted in Dec. 2003 KHFC officially established on Mar. 1, 2004 Korean government & Bank of Korea are sole contributors of the capital. Losses, in excess of reserves, to be covered by the government (KHFC Act) Major Lines of Business – – – – Purchases mortgages and issues MBS Purchases mortgages and Issues MBB (Mortgage-Backed Bond) Mortgage Portfolio Business (Issuance of MBS or MBB required) Provides credit lines to lenders to support the origination of mortgages Mortgage Securitization Business – As of Jan. 31, 2006 7.6 trillion won of mortgages originated (104,496 mortgages) Currently mortgages are originated by 22 Approved Lenders 9 Approved Lenders started to originate mortgages from Mar. 25, 2004 17 MBS Issuances completed (Total 7.3 trillion won) The first MBS issuance completed in June, 2004 The first SLBS Issuances completed in Oct. 2005 (517 billion won) Now preparing the 2nd and 3rd SLBS issuances scheduled to be completed in the coming Apr. and May MBS Issuance Structure FSC Registration of Securitization Plan, Transfer/Trust Sales of Mortgages Lenders (Seller/Servicer) Trust KHFC Issuance of MBS Trust (Trustee: KHFC) Guarantee Fee Trustee Fee Mortgages Monthly Servicing Fee Repayme nt of P&I Borrowers Investors MBS P&I Repayment Guarantee on MBS P&I payment Existing Subsidized Student Loan Major Problems of the old Student Loan Program - Government’s excessive burden for subsidization Annual subsidization increases as the outstanding balance of student loans increases Difficult to increase the government-sponsored student loans - Need to support the cost of living besides the tuition - Need to lengthen the Repayment Period Max. 7 years of Repayment Period needs to be lengthened. To mitigate the repayment burden - Mismatch in the bank’s Asset-Liability Management Short-term deposits vs. Long-term loans with fixed interest rate - Need to develop stable supply system of student loans Heavily depends on the banks’ discretion or business strategy New Government-Guaranteed Student Loan Student Loan Securitization – KHFC issues Student Loan-Backed Securities(“SLBS”) backed by Student Loans purchased from 15 designated Banks KHFC guarantees SLBS P&I payment – Student Loans are funded from the Bond Market – Banks will not hold Student Loans under their balance Sheets – Banks act as the Servicers once they sell Student Loans to KHFC Borrower repay P&I through the Banks (Originator/Servicer) Banks get Servicer Fee Income Banks are free from Credit Risk Student Loan Securitization Program Current Status – In the 2nd half of 2005, 15 Banks originated student loans and sold them to KHFC for securitization Origination period : Aug. 12 ~ Sep. 28, 2005 SLBS Issuance : Oct. 25, 2005 (517 billion won) – Currently 16 banks are originating student loans for securitization Origination period : Feb. 2 ~ Mar. 24, 2006 Targeted volume : 800 billion won (1st half of 2006 only) SLBS Issuance : Apr. & May, 2006 (400 billion won respectively) Student Loan Securitization(SLBS) SLBS Issuance Structure FSC Registration of Securitization Plan, Transfer/Trust Sales of Student Loans Banks Trust KHFC (Seller/Servicer) Issuance of SLBS Trust (Trustee: KHFC) Guarantee Fee Trustee Fee Student Loans Monthly Servicing Fee Repaymen t of P&I Guarantee Borrowers Student Loan Credit Guarantee Fund Guarantee Fee SLBS P&I Repayment Guarantee on SLBS P&I payment Investors Student Loan Credit Guarantee Fund • Specialized Fund for Credit Guarantee – Korean Government established「Student Loan Credit Guarantee Fund」 On July 18, 2005 To enhance the credit of student loans By providing 90% Partial Loss Coverage – Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development directs the Fund KHFC appointed as the Manager of the Fund Borrowers apply for the guarantee through 16 designated Banks which originate the student loans – Provided guarantee related to the origination of 522 billion won of student loans in the 2nd half of 2005 The Fund plans to provide guarantee to support 1.6 trillion won of student loans in 2006 Targeted Number of Student Loans : 500,000