***Canada CP Aff
Modermatt, Kevin P. , Grace P. , Aron B ., and Jarrod A.
Index
***Canada CP Aff ....................................................................................................................................... 1
Can’t Solve Generic .................................................................................................................................... 2
Can’t Solve Cuba ....................................................................................................................................... 11
Can’t Solve Mexico ................................................................................................................................... 12
Can’t Solve Venezuela .............................................................................................................................. 15
Perms ......................................................................................................................................................... 17
AT: Soft power .......................................................................................................................................... 23
AT: Conflict Resoulation ......................................................................................................................... 26
AT: diversification .................................................................................................................................... 27
Overstretch DA ......................................................................................................................................... 28
Impact D .................................................................................................................................................... 29
China japan ........................................................................................................................................... 30
Korea ...................................................................................................................................................... 32
Asia war ................................................................................................................................................. 33
Latin America ....................................................................................................................................... 35
Climate ................................................................................................................................................... 37
Bmd turn ................................................................................................................................................... 40
Can’t Solve Generic
Resource nationalism takes out the cp.
Jordan 12 – Mining Journalist at the Globe and Mail, (Pav, “In Latin America, nationalism stumps Canadian mining companies,” Jul. 11 2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/international-business/latin-american-business/in-latin-america-nationalism-stumpscanadian-mining-companies/article4405034/)//A-Berg
Bolivian President Evo Morales has revoked the mining rights of Vancouver-based South American Silver Corp., the
latest blow to foreign
miners operating in Latin America amid a growing wave of resource nationalism. The decision to
expropriate the Canadian company’s Malku Khota silver mine was the second for Bolivia in a month, highlighting the increasing risks to
developing mining and energy assets in the mineral-rich region. From expropriations in
Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina to violent opposition in traditionally mining-friendly jurisdictions such
as Peru and Chile, the rising political tensions pose a risk to a decade-long bonanza mining companies have enjoyed.
“Resource nationalism is not just about expropriation,” said Alan Hutchison, an expert in mining and energy securities
and corporate law at Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP who specializes in Latin American matters. “ It is the role and the stake that the
government is going to take in any resource project and I think you are seeing that on the rise
with the continued high commodity prices.”
Uncertainty prevents solvency.
Brickman, ’08 – Barry, President, North West International Ltd., “WESTERN CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA EXISTING AND
POTENTIAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS,” August 1, 2008, http://www.wd.gc.ca/images/cont/11103-eng.pdf)//A-Berg
Venezuela is a country of vast economic potential but there are challenges. The business climate is turbulent and
uncertain, particularly for private capital and foreign direct investment. Oil and gas agreements have
required renegotiation including higher royalties and a requirement for joint venture relationships
with the state-owned oil and gas company. The government is unlikely to move towards full state control of the economy, but the
potential for further nationalisation in strategic sectors may curb private investment. EDC sees
opportunities in all sectors but most particularly in oil and gas, agriculture/food, and health, as well as in information and communication technologies
(particularly rural). Canada and Venezuela have signed a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA) and a double taxation
agreement. The government will continue to use the state’s wealth of energy resources as leverage to deepen diplomatic and commercial relations with
countries it considers friendly within and outside the region. Connections with Cuba are strong. Venezuela helped Argentina during its financial travails
and now holds 70% of Argentina's debt. Venezuela is making sophisticated foreign investments, for example in the pharmaceuticals area.42
Enviornment
Canadian mining operations are destructive to the environment
Whalen 11 – COHA Research Associate (Daniel, Hidden Hegemony: Canadian Mining in Latin America, July 25, 2011,
http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latin-america/)//A-Berg
The Negative Effects of Canadian Mining Around the World Canadian industries operating abroad have always benefitted from
positive perceptions of the nation’s practices resulting from the aforementioned “halo effect.”[xvii] However, in truth, Canadian mining often has
drastic consequences for local environments and communities; thus, recent activities, in reality, stand to dampen
this image. Across the globe, Canadian mining companies destroy landscapes, contaminate the
environment, and disturb the lives of locals. Meanwhile, the Canadian government does little, if anything, to hold
these companies accountable for their exploits. In effect, environmental groups recognize that Canadian mining firms are
“just as bad as the most ruthless of American companies.”[xviii] To illustrate, one Canadian gold mining company, Goldcorp, maintains mines in the
following Latin America nations: Mexico, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Goldcorp represents just one of
the many Canadian
mining companies in Latin America, yet its mines have been associated with
numerous infractions, including the destruction of archaeological sites, acid mine drainage,
water resource depletion in drought-prone areas, polluting water resources with copper and
iron, high levels of arsenic and lead in local inhabitants, mercury poisoning, pipeline bursts, and
disregarding the pleas of locals.[xix] The Effects of Mining on the Environment Depletion of water resources and
contamination are the principal negative ramifications of mining, in addition to physical
destruction. Mining companies often forcibly monopolize water resources, as many mining techniques require large amounts of water. As a
result, local communities are left with a profound shortage or impaired quality of water . For example,
Goldcorp’s Marlin mine in Guatemala uses approximately 2,175,984,000 liters per year compared to the 153,300 used by an average North American
citizen or the average 13,505 liters used by an African citizen.[xx] The problem is exacerbated in areas that receive as little as 150 mm of rainfall per
year such as northwest Argentina, where the joint venture Alumbrera mine operated by Goldcorp, Xstrata and Northern Orion depletes the already
precarious water supply, leaving locals in desperation.[xxi] Water pollution has a more detrimental and long-lasting effect on the environment than
water depletion. Acid
Mine Drainage (AMD), the most common form of mining contamination, occurs when sulfides housed in the rock are
off into nearby streams and lakes, polluting the
surrounding watershed. The acid dissolves other heavy metals it encounters such as copper, lead, arsenic,
zinc, selenium and mercury, which further pollute the surface and ground water of the
region.[xxii] AMD can continue for thousands of years after the mine is closed, as illustrated by a 2,000-year-old mine in Great Britain that
exposed to air during excavation, forming sulfuric acid. This acid runs
continues to produce AMD today. Goldcorp mines have been associated with AMD in four Latin American countries: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala,
and Argentina.[xxiii] Cyanide, used to extract gold and silver from the surrounding rock, makes
large-scale processing
possible, but when released into the environment, it can have serious consequences. On average, 70 tons of waste is created in
the processing of 1 ounce of gold. At Goldcorp’s San Martín mine in Honduras, an average of .78 ounces of gold is extracted from every ton of ore, and
the water
supply can become contaminated with cyanide.[xxiv] Though mining companies report that cyanide is broken down by
sunlight and transformed into a nontoxic form, it frequently harms, or even kills, aquatic life.[xxv] At the La Coipa mine in Chile, a former
Goldcorp holding, mercury as well as cyanide was discovered in groundwater as a result of mine seepage. Blood samples taken from
the local community population near Goldcorp’s San Martín mine in Honduras registered high levels of mercury, lead
and arsenic.[xxvi] False Hope and Canadian Bill C-300 The Canadian mining industry’s operations in Latin
America have unquestionably harmed the surrounding environments and communities and
influenced the policies of the host nations.[xxvii] Despite this, the Canadian government refuses to enforce any
type of human rights regulations outside of Canadian territory; instead, the government supports the mining industry both
an enormous amount of rock must be moved. When chemically treated rock and ore, known as ‘mine tailings,’ spill during transport,
financially and politically regardless of its practices. Several enlightened segments of the Canadian government took a stand against the government’s
policy with respect to foreign mining practices, but to no avail. The parliamentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade
issued a report calling for reforms regarding mining in foreign countries. However, the government responded stating that no precedent for prosecuting
or regulating practices outside of the Canadian territory currently exists. The government established a round-table to address the issue, viewed by
many critics as an ineffective stalling tactic. [xxviii]
Canada destroys Latin America – fills it with corruption, violation of
human rights, and severe damage of the environment
Studnicki-Gizbert & Bazo 13, 3/11 - Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert: is Associate Professor at the Department of
History and Classical Studies at McGill University. His research focuses on the social and environmental history of natural resource
extrac-tion in Latin America. This includes the environmental history of colonial mining, early Iberian discourseson the
transformation of nature, and the historical geography of mining in Mexico. He coordinates theMcGill Research Collective for the
Investigation of Mining in Latin America (MICLA).Fabiola Bazo: is Adjunct Professor in the Latin American Studies Program at
Simon Fraser University. Her research interests include extractive industries and social conflict, the rise of punk music in Peru as a
political voice for disenchanted youth in the 1980s, and the role of social media as a catalyst for political change. She writes on
current affairs in Peru (Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert & Fabiola Bazo March 11, 2013, “The emergence of transnational “natural
commons” strategies in Canada and Latin America”
http://academia.edu/3235720/The_Emergence_of_Transnational_Natural_Commons_Strategies_in_Canada_and_Latin_Americ
a)//GP
After the Lost Decade in the 1980s, Latin America is back in business – or so we are told. The region is
currently experiencing sustained growth, attracting inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) since 2002, circumventing global trends when FDI worldwide shrunk by 15 per cent in 2008. Beside the
United States, Canada has become a leading pursuer of gold and other strategic
minerals in Latin America. During the 1991–1995 period, the number of properties owned by
Canadian companies increased dramatically. Properties in Mexico almost
quintupled (52 to 244), and in Peru and Argentina the numbers also skyrocketed (from 3 to 98 in Peru and from 0 to 97 in
Argentina) (Lemieux1995). Canadian mining corporations operated some 1,500 projects across the continent in 2007 (Mining
Association of Canada 2007, 22).3¶ High commodity prices and government policies favouring
deregulation, privatisation, free trade and investment, especially in mining and
hydrocarbons, have contributed to the investment frenzy. Policies aimed at
attracting foreign capital in extractive industries include new mining codes,
liberalised regulatory regimes and favourable institutional arrangements. The new
mining codes implemented in the 1990s lifted foreign capital restrictions and entitled individuals, irrespective of nationality, to
invest. They also provided subsidiary rights to other natural resources such as water
and generous concession timelines. Mining concessions often enjoy legal preeminence over other forms of land tenure on the principle that the development of
mineral resources is in the public interest.4 Fourteen Latin American mining
nations overhauled their regulatory regimes with the help of the World Bank,
advisors from the industry and development organisations such as the Canadian
International Development Agency (Chaparro Avila2002).5 As a part of the changes in land tenure, communal
lands were privatised by the Fujimori administration in Peru in the 1990s and integrated into potential mining concession as part of
their “servitude” (Szablowski 2007, 46). The duration of mining concessions was also extended from 20 to 50 years.¶ In a
recent meeting, the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería (CONACAMI)
denounced the contemporary boom in transnational mining as a “pillage of our
natural commons”, a phrase that neatly captures the opposition between
neoliberal and communitarian natural resource regimes (CONACAMI 2011). “Pillage”
connotes colonial and neocolonial forms of extraction. It refers to the way
dominant discourses have represented minerals as treasures to be disinterred or
otherwise appropriated and set to external ends. The multinational mining corporations of today echo
the Spanish conquistadores and the British and American enclaves and monopolies from the early twentieth century. If the
neoliberal reforms of the 1990s ushered in the latest cycle of extraction,
contemporary post-neoliberal states such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela have been
unable or unwilling to make a clear break from this model (Gudynas 2012).¶ Henry Veltmeyer's
article conceptualises such changes by situating them within the “new imperialism” of contemporary forms of capitalist
development. In Latin America, he argues, these changes unfolded in two successive
stages: a first wave of foreign investment expansion primarily directed at
acquiring the assets of state enterprises with minimal transfer of capital or
technology, followed by a second wave focused on direct investment in natural
resources. These changes set out a neoliberal regime of resource extraction , a
revival of the liberal regimes established across the continent in the late
nineteenth century. Within this regime, the state positions itself as the facilitating agent of
transnational capitalist forms of extraction of natural resources, supporting their sale on the
global market. By doing so, however, it simultaneously sets itself in opposition to the communities directly affected by these
operations.¶ Today, mining concessions comprise hundreds of millions of hectares,
accounting for large swaths of territory: over 20 per cent of Mexico and Ecuador; and 5 to18
per cent of Colombia, Chile and Peru (The Dominion, July 5, 2007; La Jornada, August 8, 2011; El Espectador, January 12, 2011).
According to Veltmeyer, up
to 70 per cent of the Mexican concessions used to explore and
extract minerals belong to Canadian firms. In Argentina, almost 30 million hectares in 23 provinces are
under foreign concessions, with another 13 million hectares still available. Large-scale mining has generated significant state
revenue and growth in urban sectors, with mines employing technologies that involve extensive use of land to create open pits.
However, it has also heightened environmental risks, especially deforestation and
the contamination of water, which are becoming a source of socio-environmental
conflicts in the rural and remote communities where these resources are found. In
most instances, the areas in concessions are also among the poorest, with limited
infrastructure (water and energy supply, roads), populated by indigenous people
who traditionally use superficial land for subsistence farming.6¶ As a mitigating strategy,
mining companies have mobilised resources in developing new forms of governance, with the support of governments and
international development agencies, most especially the development of CSR frameworks. These initiatives rely on voluntary codes
and self-regulation. In Latin America, CSR practices have positioned the Canadian mining
industry as modern and sustainable, promising a new form of mining, different
from the American, British or Spanish mining of previous generations and centuries. While CSR
has legitimated transnational mining for certain audiences, it has been ineffective
in addressing issues raised by the affected communities. Karyn Keenan argues that the
Government of Canada's CSR framework and the federally appointed office of the
CSR Counselor have demonstrated an inability to carry out independent
investigations of alleged corporate violations of various sets of rights (human,
labour, environmental or indigenous).¶ The politics of natural resources have
moved to the grassroots level. Since late 1990s, an increasing number of social and
environmental conflicts protests have arisen around large private mining and oil
projects across Latin America. Over 160 mining conflicts have been accounted by the Chilean
Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de America Latina(OLCA), information which is available online on the group's site.7 McGill
University's Research Group Investigating Canadian Mining in Latin America
(MICLA) has documented over 80 involving a mining corporation registered and
capitalised in Canada as listed on its website.8 These mobilisations against
extractive industries have focused on land and water rights, indigenous claims to
self-determination and territorial rights and, lastly, environmental damage . The
majority of these conflicts concerns gold mines, a metal used mostly as a reserve – a medium of exchange, rather than an industrial
input, as North and Young point out in their article.¶ Veltmeyer argues that environmental
devastation and corruption in the management of a resource, due to
circumvention of mining legislation by local authorities, ensured the plunder of
the region's natural resources. A 2008 report by Mexico's Auditor General exposed
that the fees paid for the concessions to mine were well below the costs of the
administrative procedures involved and not reflective of the volumes of
nonrenewable mineral resources extracted during the period 2005 to 2010. As the
number of social conflict rises in communities directly affected by these operations, governments and private firms have taken
repressive measures to control or neutralise them.9¶ Luis Ángel Saavedra examines the environmental destruction wrought by
Texaco – now Chevron – during its 28 years of operation in Ecuador (1964–1992) and the tireless efforts to make this company
accountable in United States courts. As in the Mexican case, the opposition to transnational oil companies in Ecuador was provoked
by unfulfilled promises made to local communities. According to Saavedra, only 10 per cent of oil company representatives
honoured their verbal commitments to local indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian province of Orellana. This gave rise to
demands by indigenous communities asking that companies write and sign documents to guarantee the compliance of
commitments. In time, organised resistance grew against these types of extractive activities. Saavedra also examines the unexpected
social mobilisation (and subsequent criminalisation of) citizens' organisations against three mining projects operated by
Ecuacorriente (a Sino-Canadian company) and the Canadian companies Iamgold and Kinross.¶ The rise of judicial harassment in the
Ecuadorian provinces with mining projects has resulted in over 360 social leaders taken to court, where they have been accused of
crimes such as sabotage, injury and robbery. In the past, these cases were brought up by companies, but since 2008, allegations have
been brought up by government officials in what Saavedra calls the “criminalisation of social protest”. The initiation of
trials and repressive measures against individuals opposed to extractive activities
have resulted in the violation of human and ecological rights. Using the methodology of the
Ecuadorian Human Rights Ombudsman, Saavedra distinguishes two types of criminalisation:
primary and secondary. Primary criminalisation refers to the elaboration of legislation and
typification of inadmissible social behaviour (sabotage, terrorism, rebellion, obstruction of public
space, illicit association) in the penal code to deter social protests. Secondary
criminalisation is de facto and creates “delinquents” in the realm of public
opinion. It uses media statements and representations that contain elements of classism, racism and
sexism.¶ According to Liisa North and Laura Young, only a handful of mining companies have been driven out of Latin
American due to malpractice. Further, in all these cases, local solidarity and organisational capacity have formed the basis for
informed and widespread opposition. Protests leading to greater public awareness about the issues and successful political
mobilisation may have convinced some governments to alter their paths. However, it has proven difficult for these governments to
sue corporations to protect their nationals or to establish regulations that run counter to the trade and investment treaties that
favour companies.¶
Canada’s corruption in Latin America violates their human rights –
net worse than the aff
Keenan, 10 - is Program Officer at the Halifax Initiative, a coalition of Canadian civil society organizations that focuses on
public financial institutions. She has worked directly with indigenous communities in Latin America that are affected by mining, oil,
and gas operations (“Canadian Mining: Still Unaccountable” North American Congress on Latin America,
https://nacla.org/article/canadian-mining-still-unaccountable)//GP
On November 27, 2009, Mariano Abarca Roblero was shot dead outside his home in Chiapas, Mexico. Abarca was a well-known
community activist who led local opposition to a mining operation near his home. The aptly named Payback mine is owned by a
Canadian company, Blackfire Exploration. Mexican police have arrested three men in connection with Abarca’s death, one of whom
is currently employed by the company. The other suspects are former Blackfire employees, and allegations have surfaced that the
company repeatedly bribed local authorities to quell local dissent. The Mexican government temporarily halted Blackfire’s
operations after Abarca’s killing, citing environmental violations at the mine site. According to media reports, the company has
threatened to sue the Mexican government under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for damages incurred as a
result of the mine closure. In Canada, civil society organizations have requested a government investigation of Blackfire under
legislation that bars Canadian citizens from bribing foreign public officials.¶ Unfortunately, as remarkable as these events may
sound, they are not as uncommon as one might expect. Not only do Canadian mining operations in
Latin America cause significant environmental damage, but they are also
associated with social disruption and human rights violations, and generate
conflict with and among local communities.1 Those who oppose mining operations
are often harassed and intimidated.2 In recent months, several critics of Canadian mining
companies have been murdered in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico.3 Moreover,
according to a former cabinet minister from Argentina who recently testified
before Canadian Parliament, Canadian mining companies unduly influence the
legislative process in her country.4(Canadian mining company Barrick Gold refutes her testimony on its
website.)¶ Local communities have responded to the arrival of Canadian mining
companies with a variety of strategies aimed at protecting their land and
resources. Some of these efforts have yielded positive results. For example, an overwhelming majority of local residents in
Tambogrande, Peru, opposed the extraction of a gold deposit located underneath their town, as proposed by Manhattan Minerals, a
junior Canadian mining company. The municipal government convened a referendum on the project so that local perspectives would
be considered in decision-making concerning the project. Ninety-eight percent of registered voters rejected the project, which was
eventually turned down by the Peruvian government.¶ Unfortunately, Tambogrande is an anomaly .
In most cases,
communities are marginalized from the decision-making over mining projects in
their areas. Moreover, host governments are often unwilling or unable to effectively
regulate the operations of transnational companies in their territories. Communities are
commonly denied access to meaningful mechanisms of legal redress in their countries regarding the damages they suffer as a
consequence of poorly regulated mining operations. Several mining-affected populations have turned
to international mechanisms to voice their grievances. For example, indigenous
communities affected by the Marlin mine in Guatemala brought complaints before
the World Bank’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and the Canadian National
Contact Point. However, the non-binding recommendations that are produced by
these offices are of limited impact.¶ Other populations affected by Canadian mining
operations have sought redress through the Canadian judicial system.
Representatives of indigenous communities in Guyana filed a suit in a Canadian
court after a tailings dam failure caused massive environmental contamination at
a Canadian mine in their country. The Canadian court refused to hear the case,
arguing that Guyana was the appropriate legal forum. The Guyanese judicial
system proved equally ineffectual. Now Ecuadoran plaintiffs are testing the
Canadian legal system once again, suing the Canadian mining company Copper
Mesa, its directors, and the Toronto Stock Exchange in association with death
threats and assaults committed against community members who opposed the
development of a copper mine.¶ Several Latin American governments have taken
steps to better regulate the mining industry. But these efforts are often stymied. For
example, the Argentine Congress unanimously passed legislation to protect that country’s glaciers from mining activities. Large
tracts of the Andean cordillera on the country’s Chilean border have been included in mining concessions granted to Canadian
companies. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner vetoed the legislation, according to some sources, in response to pressure from
Canadian mining interests.5
In other cases, governments are penalized when they
strengthen environmental and health protections in relation to mining
operations . For example, Canadian mining company Pacific Rim responded to the
Salvadoran government’s decision not to issue permits for the company’s El
Dorado project by suing it for damages under the Dominican Republic–Central
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).¶ *¶ Nowhere is the Canadian mining
sector’s presence felt overseas more acutely than in Latin America. The region is the single
most important destination for Canadian mining capital, surpassing by a wide margin Africa, the industry’s second choice. In
2008, more than half of Canadian mining companies’ global assets were located in
Latin America, at a value close to $57 billion (all values throughout this article are in Canadian dollars).6
The Canadian government is an important partner with this flagship industry,
actively supporting mining companies’ overseas operations through the provision
of both financial and political backing.¶ This state support takes various forms. Extractive companies (mining,
oil, gas) are the single greatest recipient of backing from Export Development Canada (EDC), a state-owned “Crown corporation”
that provides financing and insurance to facilitate Canadian exports and overseas investments. In 2008, EDC facilitated Canadian
business in the Latin American extractive sector worth more than $4 billion and is poised to expand its support for the Canadian
mining industry in the region.7 With new offices in Santiago and Lima, EDC now has a permanent presence
in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, countries that, together with Argentina, were the top five destinations for Canadian mining
capital in Latin America from 2002 to 2008.8Meanwhile, the Canada Pension Plan, a publicly administered fund to which most
working Canadians are legally required to contribute, holds equity worth about $2.5 billion in publicly traded Canadian mining
companies that operate in developing countries.9 And the Canadian Trade Commissioner facilitates access to foreign markets for
Canadian mining companies. For example, Manhattan Minerals obtained its interest in the Tambogrande mine concession shortly
after participating in a Team Canada trade mission to Peru.¶ Canadian embassies also provide valuable political backing. The
Canadian ambassador to Guatemala published an opinion piece in a local paper, praising the Canadian mining industry, when
indigenous communities expressed opposition to the Canadian-owned Marlin mine. In Peru, communities frustrated with
operations at the Antamina mine blocked an access road to the mine site.10 Days later, an article appeared on the front page of the
Canadian Embassy website showcasing Antamina and praising its achievements as a socially responsible company. According to a
representative of Canadian company Corriente Resources, whose operations in Ecuador have been associated with violent conflict
and allegations of human rights abuse, “the Canadian Embassy in Ecuador has worked tirelessly
to affect [sic] change in the mining policy—including facilitating high-level
meetings between Canadian mining companies and President Rafael Correa.”11
Corriente Resources participated in one such meeting, during which the Canadian ambassador expressed the government of
Canada’s concerns regarding changes to Ecuador’s regulatory framework.¶ *¶ The challenges created by
Canadian mining companies’ international operations are not unique. A vibrant
international debate is under way concerning the responsibility of home countries for the overseas activities of their transnational
companies. Home countries are those jurisdictions in which transnational companies incorporate, raise capital, and receive public
backing. In Canada, this debate has focused on the federal government’s
responsibility regarding the international operations of the Canadian extractive
sector. Canada currently falls short in two respects. First, it lacks an effective legal
or policy framework to regulate the overseas operations of Canadian extractive
companies. Applicable legislative provisions are extremely limited in scope. And the Canadian
government’s policy of corporate social responsibility for the extractive sector,
described below, is unlikely to have a positive impact. Second, non-nationals who are
adversely affected by the overseas operations of Canadian extractive companies
face daunting barriers in accessing the Canadian legal system.¶
Canada shouldn’t do the plan – violate human rights and non-existent
environmental standards
Whalen, 11- Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate (Daniel Whalen, 7/25/11, “Hidden Hegemony: Canadian
Mining in Latin America”, COHA, http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latinamerica/#sthash.6ZZMHvFu.dpuf)//GP
Canada’s mining industry is the largest in the world, with a sizable presence in the
developing world.¶ In Latin America, Canadian mining companies are often
involved in environmentally destructive and socially irresponsible practices.¶ One
Canadian mining company, Pacific Rim, is accused of killing activists opposed to its
ongoing mining activities in El Salvador.¶ To date, the Canadian government has not
taken measures to hold its mining industry to human rights and environmental
standards abroad.¶ A grassroots protest in Peru, which unfortunately turned
violent, may represent a policy shift with regard to foreign mining on indigenous
lands.¶ Canada’s mining industry is the largest in the world, and in 2004 its world market share accounted for 60 percent of all mining companies. In fact, the entire Latin American region is second only
to Canada in terms of the breadth of its mining exploration and development activity.[i] In what some call the “halo effect,” Canadian industries have been
perceived as the more conscientious alternative to their U.S. equivalents. Since
Canadian industries are understood to have socially responsible practices,
especially in contrast to those of American companies, they are typically welcomed
abroad.[ii] Nonetheless, recent accusations that the Canadian mining company
Pacific Rim played a role in the death squad killings of anti-mining activists in El
Salvador has brought this reputation into question, while further investigation into
the Canadian government’s regulation reveals that the government has mandated
no true restrictions on its industry’s mining practices abroad. Left to its own accord, the
Canadian mining industry has no problem destroying landscapes, uprooting
communities, and even resorting to violence to promote its interests; for this reason, only government
regulation can affect true change. A recent move by the Peruvian government to protect citizens near the city of Puno demonstrates that Latin American governments may finally be willing and able to regulate
Canadian mining companies operating within their nations.¶ The Evolution of Canadian Mining in Latin America¶ In the period from 1990 to 2001, mineral investment in Latin America increased by 400 percent,
The Canadian mining industry’s share of the
Latin American market is the largest of any country, at 34 percent in 2004.[iii] However, even with a
substantial flow of Canadian investment in the mining sectors of these countries,
living standards have not tangibly improved for those in proximity of the mines,
despite the image portrayed by the mining industry.¶ For a large part of the 20th century, the majority of
the mineral wealth in Latin America was government property
and by 2005, the region was receiving 23 percent of total worldwide exploration investments.
Canada poisons Latin America – worsens the lives of the locals
Whalen, 11- Council on Hemispheric Affairs Research Associate (Daniel Whalen, 7/25/11, “Hidden Hegemony: Canadian
Mining in Latin America”, COHA, http://www.coha.org/hidden-hegemony-canadian-mining-in-latinamerica/#sthash.6ZZMHvFu.dpuf)//GP
¶ The Negative Effects of Canadian Mining Around the World¶ Canadian industries operating
abroad have
always benefitted from positive perceptions of the nation’s practices resulting
from the aforementioned “halo effect.”[xvii] However, in truth, Canadian mining often
has drastic consequences for local environments and communities; thus, recent
activities, in reality, stand to dampen this image. Across the globe, Canadian mining
companies destroy landscapes, contaminate the environment, and disturb the
lives of locals.
Meanwhile,
the Canadian government does little, if anything, to hold
these companies accountable for their exploits. In effect, environmental groups recognize that Canadian
mining firms are “just as bad as the most ruthless of American companies.”[xviii]¶ To illustrate, one Canadian gold mining company,
Goldcorp, maintains mines in the following Latin America nations: Mexico, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Brazil,
Chile, and Argentina. Goldcorp represents just one of the many Canadian mining companies in Latin
America, yet its mines have been associated with numerous infractions, including
the destruction of archaeological sites, acid mine drainage, water resource
depletion in drought-prone areas, polluting water resources with copper and iron,
high levels of arsenic and lead in local inhabitants, mercury poisoning, pipeline
bursts, and disregarding the pleas of locals.[xix]¶ The Effects of Mining on the Environment¶
Depletion of water resources and contamination are the principal negative
ramifications of mining, in addition to physical destruction. Mining companies often forcibly
monopolize water resources, as many mining techniques require large amounts of water. As a result, local communities
are left with a profound shortage or impaired quality of water . For example, Goldcorp’s
Marlin mine in Guatemala uses approximately 2,175,984,000 liters per year compared to the 153,300 used by an average North
American citizen or the average 13,505 liters used by an African citizen.[xx] The problem is exacerbated in areas that receive as little
as 150 mm of rainfall per year such as northwest Argentina, where the joint venture Alumbrera mine operated by Goldcorp,
Xstrata and Northern Orion depletes
the already precarious water supply, leaving locals in
desperation.[xxi]¶ Water pollution has a more detrimental and long-lasting effect on
the environment than water depletion. Acid Mine Drainage (AMD), the most common form of
mining contamination, occurs when sulfides housed in the rock are exposed to air during excavation, forming sulfuric acid. This
acid runs off into nearby streams and lakes, polluting the surrounding watershed.
The acid dissolves other heavy metals it encounters such as copper, lead, arsenic,
zinc, selenium and mercury, which further pollute the surface and ground water of
the region.[xxii] AMD can continue for thousands of years after the mine is closed, as illustrated by a 2,000-year-old mine in
Great Britain that continues to produce AMD today. Goldcorp mines have been associated with AMD
in four Latin American countries: Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and Argentina.[xxiii]¶ Cyanide, used to extract gold and
silver from the surrounding rock, makes large-scale processing possible, but when released into the environment, it can have
serious consequences. On average, 70 tons of waste is created in the processing of 1 ounce of gold. At Goldcorp’s San Martín mine in
Honduras, an average of .78 ounces of gold is extracted from every ton of ore, and an enormous amount of rock must be moved.
When chemically treated rock and ore, known as ‘mine tailings,’ spill during transport, the water supply can become contaminated
with cyanide.[xxiv] Though mining companies report that cyanide is broken down by sunlight and transformed into a nontoxic form,
it frequently harms, or even kills, aquatic life.[xxv] At the La Coipa mine in Chile, a former Goldcorp holding, mercury as well as
cyanide was discovered in groundwater as a result of mine seepage. Blood samples taken from the local
community population near Goldcorp’s San Martín mine in Honduras registered
high levels of mercury, lead and arsenic.[xxvi]¶ False Hope and Canadian Bill C-300¶ The Canadian
mining industry’s operations in Latin America have unquestionably harmed the
surrounding environments and communities and influenced the policies of the
host nations.[xxvii] Despite this, the Canadian government refuses to enforce any type of
human rights regulations outside of Canadian territory; instead, the government
supports the mining industry both financially and politically regardless of its
practices. Several enlightened segments of the Canadian government took a stand against the government’s policy with respect
to foreign mining practices, but to no avail. The parliamentary Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Trade
issued a report calling for reforms regarding mining in foreign countries. However, the government responded
stating that no precedent for prosecuting or regulating practices outside of the
Canadian territory currently exists. The government established a round-table to address the issue, viewed by
many critics as an ineffective stalling tactic. [xxviii]¶ Canadian Bill C-300, also known as the Responsible Mining Bill, provided a
glimmer of hope for increased accountability of Canadian mining industry practices in the developing world. The bill would have
ensured compliance with the stringent international environmental practices the Canadian government claims to uphold, as
well as reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to human rights. Additionally, the bill would have
outlined environmental standards for the Canadian extractive industry, provisions for grievances to be brought before the ministers
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and public reporting of any dismissed complaint in the Canada Gazette.[xxix] According
to Bill C-300, any government funding for Canadian extractive companies abroad would be contingent upon compliance with the
aforementioned standards and would require confirmation by the local Canadian embassy. C-300 was the legal apparatus to ensure
acceptable practices by Canadian mining firms abroad. Although C-300 passed on the second reading in 2009, the bill ultimately
failed to pass the final vote in the House of Commons on October 27, 2010.[xxx] This was an unfortunate victory for the Canadian
mining industry, and was yet another sign that the current Conservative government does not
support human rights and environmental health, at least not when Canada’s
extractive industry could see its profit margin adversely affected in any way.¶ However,
the government holds that it does in fact support human rights in developing nations through the controversial IMF and World Bank
structural adjustments plans.[xxxi] In spite of Canada’s rather flattering reputation for high
moral standards, at least in comparison to the U.S., Canada’s support for human
rights appears quite dubious at times. Ottawa refused to sign the United Nations’ Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples that requires consent from indigenous groups before any projects can commence on their land.
Canada, along with Australia, called for revision, which significantly slowed the process and ultimately blocked its passage. [xxxii]
The failure of this declaration was a certain victory for the Canadian mining industry in Latin America, which conducts its business
almost exclusively on inhabited territory.
Can’t Solve Cuba
Canada fails at engaging with Cuba --- here’s the laundry list.
Wylie, ’10 - Associate Professor in Political Science at McMaster University, Ph.D in Political Science from University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, (Lana, “Reassessing Canada’s Relationship with Cuba in an Era of Change,” October 2010, http://www.opencanada.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/Reassessing-Canada%E2%80%99s-Relationship-with-Cuba-in-an-Era-of-Change-Lana-Wylie1.pdf)//A-Berg
Canadian companies have been among the investors that responded to this opening in Cuba. Some Canadian companies see Cuba as a key opportunity
since the American embargo prevents competition from their business rivals in the United States. Yet many
Canadian companies are
hesitant about investing in Cuba because of the special difficulties related to Cuba’s economic system
and the complications that arise from the tension between Havana and Washington. The
structure of the Cuban economy poses unique problems for foreign investors. The centrally planned
economy is complicated by a dual monetary system: most domestic exchanges for average Cubans take
place within the peso economy, but foreigners, including foreign investors, must operate in a separate
system with a different currency, the Cuban convertible peso (CUC), that is pegged to US dollars. The existence of a large
informal economy that operates mainly beyond state control further complicates the situation.
However, Raúl Castro has taken steps to address some of the issues with the Cuban economy. For example, in early 2010, he appeared to be acting on
his earlier announcement that the government would slowly phase out the two-tier currency system as more stores and restaurants began to conduct
business in the peso system.56 The business
culture in Cuba presents additional impediments. Since Cubans have
with common business practices
and norms. This presents a challenge for the Cubans who are now attempting to do business with foreign companies and often
creates headaches for the companies involved in negotiations with the Cubans. Other complications
are directly related to Cuba’s approach to foreign investors. Although there are laws governing foreign investment projects,
every investment inquiry is dealt with individually, which has led to inconsistent applications of
the law.57 Thus it is often difficult to predict if a project will acquire initial approval and, even if
approval is given, whether the decision will be reversed at a later date. A number of foreign firms claim
that approved projects have been stalled or cancelled without warning. For example, a Canadian company,
operated largely outside the capitalist system for decades, they are sometimes unfamiliar
Cuban Canadian Resorts International, had an agreement to develop luxury beachfront condominiums in Cuba that was approved by the Executive
Committee of the Council of Ministers and signed by Vice-President Carlos Lage in 1998. The company also had Cuba’s minister of tourism, the
minister of finance, and the minister of foreign investments onside.58 Despite this level of approval, in 2000 the Cuban government declared that it
would not allow foreign ownership of condominium projects; this put an abrupt end to the project, which had been well under way. Further
complications arise from the fact that the Cuban government retains control over the hiring
decisions, wage rates, and other labour matters on all joint venture projects. When the Cuban economy
encounters difficulty, these hurdles are likely to be intensified, creating even more headaches for foreign investors . For
instance, recent economic troubles in Cuba have created additional problems for foreign investors, as some report having trouble
transferring profits out of the country or even having their funds in Cuba frozen.59 As well as dealing with the unique
challenges related to the Cuban economy and investment policies, foreign investors must contend with obstructions
emanating from Washington. The United States has imposed an embargo against Cuba since the early days of the Revolution and as
such has tried to discourage other countries from doing business with the embargoed state. However, in the 1990s, this dissuasion became more
explicit. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 forbade subsidiaries of US companies in other countries from trading with Cuba. The Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, known as the Helms-Burton Act, further complicates foreign business ventures in Cuba. Helms-Burton
targets companies accused of “trafficking” in property that was formerly owned by US citizens (including the property of Cubans who have since
acquired American citizenship).
Can’t Solve Mexico
Multiple structural barriers prevent effective energy cooperation
Canadian Council of Chief Executives 12 - not-for-profit, non-partisan organization composed of the CEOs of
Canada’s leading enterprises, (FRAMING AN ENERGY STRATEGY FOR CANADA, Submission to the Council of the Federation,” July 2012
http://www.ceocouncil.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Framing-An-Energy-Strategy-for-Canada-FINAL-July-20122.pdf
Recent estimates
suggest as much as $300 billion of investment will be needed in Canada over the next two
sustain and strengthen energy infrastructure. Much of the existing infrastructure is in need of
refurbishment/upgrading, but also new transmission systems and pipelines will be required to enhance
regional interconnections and expand export opportunities. In particular, Premiers should focus on greater regional
decades to
cooperation to enable infrastructure solutions that take advantage of regional energy assets and meet the specific needs of their populations. Through
improving liability and expanding access to a broader array of both traditional and renewable energy, governments should seek to ensure affordable
energy for consumers and a stronger competitive position for Canadian industry. Investments in infrastructure also are essential to enable Canada to
access new market for its energy products. Both the federal and affected provincial governments should work together with industry to examine the
potential for multiple energy corridors to the Pacific, in the interests of expanding exports to growing Asian markets. 6. Create a Canadian energy
technology advantage Growing world energy demand brings not only the opportunity for expanding our share of bulk energy exports. Cleaner
technologies related to energy, as well as related services and expertise, will be in high demand as services with lower environmental and social impact.
The competition to provide next-generation technologies is already proving to be fierce, and Canada cannot be left out of the game. As a country, we
strive to develop the most supportive public policy framework to spur development and deployment of sounder energy technologies. The
Canadian energy industry already is working with governments, researchers and other partners
on next-generation technology development. But more needs to be done to foster effective
collaboration among the private sector, governments and academia, and to ensure non-private
sector research fits the needs of Canadian companies. Clearly, not all of the innovation will happen in Canada, but there is more to
be done in establishing cutting-edge laboratories and formulating practical policies that support
expanded private sector R&D. One critical issue, not unique to the energy sphere, is how to get beyond the development and
demonstration of advanced technologies to full-scale commercialization. There also is a need to think about infrastructure that could support advanced
transportation technologies – such as biofuels, natural gas and hydrogen – as well as the potential to create a Canadian advantage in the growing field
of energy storage technology. The
energy industry also needs to upgrade its commitment to research and
development of energy technologies. One promising initiative is the launch of the Canadian Oil Sands Innovation Alliance
(COSIA), a consortium of 12 leading companies engaged in oil sands development. COSIA will pool industry efforts toward technology development
and deployment aid at developing solutions to the industry’s most pressing environmental challenges. Efforts of this sort are critical, since they will
help solidify Canada’s reputation as a developer of sustainable energy solutions, but also because innovation inside the energy industry can spur new
levels of innovation outside it. 7. Ensure efficient regulatory processes The
World Economic Forum has identified “efficient
government bureaucracy” as one of the key impediments to doing business in Canada. Our
federal system can sometimes compound our disadvantage, which is why we need to set a goal of an
innovative, modern and reformed regulatory system that is a comparative advantage for Canada.
When it comes to the approval process for major energy projects, an inefficient regulatory system can easily frustrate
efforts to enhance Canadian prosperity, as well as limit Canadians’ access to sounder energy
choices and affordable energy with lower environmental impact. The federal government’s announcement of its
“Responsible Resource Development” initiative is a significant step towards the reform that has been promised for several years by both levels of
government. It has a number of important elements: Establishing appropriate timelines for decision-making to increase timeliness and
predictability;
Clarifying responsibility among the myriad federal departments and centralizing and simplifying the decision-making process;
Specifying the types of major projects that require formal federal assessment and those for which an equivalent provincial process can be substituted.
Clarifying what issues are for assessment by the appropriate regulatory body with respect to the individual project, and what issues are the
prerogative of government as the key decision-maker with respect to the overall public interest.
Streamlining the intervenor process so that all
legitimate points of view can be heard, but avoiding duplication and delays that do not enhance the final decision. The
problem of
overlapping departmental responsibilities also is an issue within several provinces. By simplifying and clarifying their
own approval processes, provinces and territories can help to realize the long-stated goof “one project, one review”. With its recent reform proposals,
the federal government appears willing; now it is time for the provinces and territories to do their part.
US prevents effective engagement.
Parliament of Canada no date – (CHAPTER 5: A CANADIAN AGENDA FOR ENHANCING BILATERAL AND TRILATERAL
RELATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA,
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=1032320&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&Language=E&File=332The )//Modermatt
NAFTA relationship, now almost a decade old; the watershed democratic election of Vicente Fox as Mexico’s president in 2000, and his
administration’s advocacy of closer North American cooperation; a continental focus following the events of September 11: all these have brought
greater attention to the ties between Canada and Mexico. Before the NAFTA era — and it is worth recalling that NAFTA originated as a bilateral
Mexican initiative with the United States to which Canada had reacted coolly — Professor Laura Macdonald observed: “… there were hardly any
Mexican experts in Canada. Hardly anyone was interested in Mexico. We had this big mountain between us, the United States, and we couldn’t peer
over that big mountain to see each other.”48 Or if Mexico was noticed it was usually in comments like the following: “ Canada
and Mexico, as
only one common problem between them. This problem, of course, is their relationship with
the United States.”49 Even today, there is a tendency for such longstanding separate if parallel bilateral
preoccupations to come to the fore. It is harder to sustain political engagement on the still-developing
Canada-Mexico and trilateral agenda. Antonio Ocaranza, Director of Public Strategies Inc., described to the Committee in Mexico City a
“difficult paradox: Mexico and Canada cooperation is most effective if it plays a significant role in each country’s relationship with
the United States. At the same time, it is the significant weight of the United States which impedes Mexico and
Canada from being more effective in developing their bilateral relationship.”50 A bit of history provides
the saying goes, have
some context for the current state of the relationship. Prior to the 1990s, Canada’s relations with Mexico (and indeed with Latin American countries in
the rest of the hemisphere) were both very limited and overshadowed by each country’s particular bilateral focus on the United States. As several
scholars describe that period: “While it is undoubtedly unfair to expect an equivalent relationship to that experienced with the United States, it is
nonetheless notable that bilateral Canada-Mexico ties remained underdeveloped, at best, or ignored, at worst.”51 Canada’s 1990 decision to become a
full member of the Organization of American States (OAS), followed by Canada’s joining the Mexico-U.S. trade negotiations, which then led to the
trilateral NAFTA, signalled a major policy shift. NAFTA, in particular, carried the relationship to a new level. Writing before the election of President
Fox and the activist diplomacy pursued by his Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, Julian Castro Rea, a professor with both the Centre for Research on
North America at the Universidad Autónoma de México and the University of Alberta, put it this way: NAFTA helped Canada and Mexico discover each
other after many decades of a relationship that one could characterize as “polite indifference”. The last five years have witnessed an unprecedented
deepening of Canada-Mexico relations. Mexico and Canada now cooperate in a wide variety of issues that extend far beyond trade and include a
comprehensive agenda that is assessed yearly by joint ministerial teams. Canada has become the most immediate alternative for Mexican desires to
diversify its foreign relations, away from its overwhelming priority on the United States.52 Early evidence of a post-NAFTA widening and deepening of
the bilateral agenda was the “Declaration of Objectives for the Canada-Mexico Relationship” and “Action Plan” signed by the two heads of government
in June 1996. As well, notwithstanding the effects of Mexico’s financial crisis of the mid-1990s, bilateral trade and investment posted impressive growth
through the last half of the decade.53 While Canada-Mexico trade is still a very small part of total NAFTA trade, the statistical tables in Chapter 2 show
a more than five-fold increase in this trade since 1990. Indeed, the value of Canada’s exports to Mexico increased by 93% from 1997 to 2001, compared
with an increase of 44% in the value of Canada’s exports to the United States over the same period. Priority export sectors identified by the Canadian
government in regard to Mexico have included advanced manufacturing and information technologies, agricultural modernization, automotive
products, and oil and gas equipment and services. Beyond these burgeoning commercial ties, there has also been significant growth in civil-society
linkages with Mexican NGOs, and in cooperation in the fields of higher education, training and research. In terms of people-to-people exchanges,
DFAIT Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas Marc Lortie told the Committee: “Now almost one million Canadian tourists travel to Mexico
annually, with over 180,000 Mexicans visiting Canada. Canadian educational institutions host over 10,000 Mexican students annually, and 11,000
seasonal Mexican agricultural workers come to Canada.”54 Parliamentary exchanges with Canada, begun formally in 1975, have intensified too, and
there is increased potential to benefit from these exchanges, given the push for democratic reforms within Mexico and the greater role being assumed
by the Mexican Congress, in matters, inter alia, of foreign policy. Despite such advances, Wood and MacLean, writing at the end of the 1990s,
observed several remaining obstacles to be overcome in realizing
a closer and fuller Canada-Mexico
relationship.55 The first and most obvious of these is the large gap in the level of development between the
two countries. This is a persistent problem that is manifested in socio-economic and regional
inequalities within Mexico that have grown despite the aggregate trade and investment gains promoted by NAFTA. These political
and social, as well as economic, development challenges are perceived as holding Mexico back from being a full
North American partner. They surfaced as a repeated and underlying concern during the Committee’s meetings in Mexico City in March
2002. Canadian policy towards Mexico has gone some way towards responding. As Marc Lortie stated to the Committee: “Mexico now sees Canada as a
valuable partner in its efforts to address its many and deep-seated social, political, and economic challenges. Cooperation on governance has provided
the new focus to bilateral relations.… Canada is clearly committed to helping Mexico reform its government institutions so that it may address
overriding concerns of poverty and regional disparity. In addition, CIDA, primarily through the Partnership Branch, has disbursed an average of $7
million per year in Mexico over the past three years. This includes the Canada Fund for local initiatives, with $500,000 in annual funding for grassroots
projects, most of which is disbursed in the poorest states in southern Mexico.”56 A strong message conveyed by many Mexicans is that NAFTA has left
unfinished business.57 Equally, Mexicans would welcome increased Canadian partnerships (private-sector and non-governmental as well as
governmental) in working, both bilaterally and trilaterally, to address Mexico’s development challenges from an increasingly integrated North
American regional perspective. Two
more subtle obstacles to closer relations were identified by Wood and MacLean: the lack of a
deep understanding between the two countries at a broadly social and cultural level; and historic
divergences in foreign policy goals, notably in the lack of a common security agenda and in
sensitive areas such as human rights. The first may be gradually overcome through the educational initiatives and people-topeople exchanges noted above (including more Canadians learning Spanish;58 unlike the United States, Canada does not have a large population of
Mexican or Hispanic origin), improved communications and media links, and more public diplomacy, including regular contacts among Canadian and
Mexican legislators. The second issue of closer cooperation and coordination in international affairs has taken on a new light under the Fox
administration and since September 11, 2001. Mexico was already a convert to trade liberalization and has now signed ten free trade agreements with
31 countries including those of the European Union. With regard to other multilateral arenas (and it should be noted that Mexico is currently serving a
two-year term on the UN Security Council), under Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, there has recently been a pronounced shift away from Mexico’s
traditionally non-interventionist posture towards a position much closer to Canada’s. As Castañeda has stated: “We are convinced that it is in Mexico’s
best interest to adapt itself to the new rules-based international system that is gradually emerging. We therefore now subscribe to the argument that
Mexico has never
enjoyed the decades-old closely integrated relationship that Canada has had with the United
States through NATO and NORAD. Mexico’s relationship with the United States along its northern border has also been a thorny
certain principles are universal and beyond the sovereignty of the state.”59 In continental security matters, however,
one given issues such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, Mexico’s border region — which has
been its most economically dynamic even though still beset by social and environmental problems — quickly felt the negative effects of new U.S.
security measures,60 a situation with which Canadians can certainly empathize. While Canadian officials have tended to see the resolution of CanadaU.S. border access concerns as a separate bilateral discussion, the Mexican government has suggested the goal of a more comprehensive North
American approach to securing continental borders without jeopardizing the growing volumes of trade and travel within the NAFTA area. For the
moment there are two bilateral tracks. Canada was first off the mark in negotiating a 30-point “Smart Border” accord with the U.S. in December 2001.
Mexico was, however, able to use that as a model in pursuing its own 22-point “Smart Border” agreement with the United States, which was signed by
presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey in March 2002 at the time of the UN Summit on Financing for Development.
Can’t Solve Venezuela
Venezuela says no to the CP, and even if they don’t Canada wont
invest
Graham 13 -
foreign minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004, (Bill, Canada-Venezuela ‘reset’ isn’t yet in the cards, Mar. 08 2013,
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/canada-venezuela-reset-isnt-yet-in-the-cards/article9519784/?service=mobile)//A-Berg
And so with his death,
it might seem like an opportune time to push the “reset” button on CanadaVenezuelan relations. But that is unlikely, at least for a while. For the moment, it is difficult to foresee any
immediate change in the domestic or international policies of Venezuela that would bring about
such a rapprochement, especially with no likely electoral change in the near future. To begin with, Canadians business in
general will continue to be discouraged by years of the regime’s anti-business rhetoric and
actions. And even if the opposition is elected, it will take a number of years to overcome the
perceived problems in the judiciary or even for foreigners to feel safe on the mean streets of Caracas, one of the
most dangerous cities in the world. In the international sphere, there is even less likelihood that the Canadian
government would go out of its way to seek to establish closer ties, at least for a while. In recent years, Ottawa has
signed free-trade agreements with many states – Colombia, Panama, Chile, in particular – that have no affinity for Mr. Chavez’s “Bolivarian” vision,
exported by its commandante and endorsed by hemispheric outliers.
Venezuela’s relationship with Iran and anti-business policies
prevents CP solvency
Graham, 3/8/13 Foreign Minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004, former Minister of national Defence (Bill, 8 March 2013,
“Canada-Venezuela ‘reset’ isn’t yet in the cards,” The Globe and Mail, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/canadavenezuela-reset-isnt-yet-in-the-cards/article9519784/)//KP
Foreign Minister of Canada from 2002 to 2004 Served as Minister of Foreign Affaris, Minister
of National Defence Hugo Chavez was an extraordinary individual, a player on the hemispheric if
not global stage. Unpredictable as he was charismatic, Mr. Chavez was the joker in the Latin American pack of cards. In other words,
he was just the kind of leader who causes headaches for governments like Canada’s,
both with his policies and his persona. At the 2001 Summit of the Americas, the question was “What would Chavez do?” This was
early in George W. Bush’s presidency and rioters were in the streets of Quebec City; things could have gone badly. But prime
minister Jean Chrétien, an old hand at wrangling egos, mollified him by putting him next to Brazilian President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, who kept his Venezuelan counterpart under control. That time, it worked. Things didn’t go as well for me as foreign
minister at the 2004 Summit in Monterrey, Mexico, when I expressed Canadian policy critical of Mr. Chavez – while he was sitting
next to me. He was surprisingly quiet for someone normally so verbose, but he looked at me with the fierceness of a man who had
both instigated and survived coups d’état. And so with his death, it might seem like an opportune
time to push the “reset” button on Canada-Venezuelan relations. But that is
unlikely, at least for a while. For the moment, it is difficult to foresee any immediate change in
the domestic or international policies of Venezuela that would bring about such a
rapprochement, especially with no likely electoral change in the near future. To begin with,
Canadians business in general will continue to be discouraged by years of the regime’s antibusiness rhetoric and actions. And even if the opposition is elected, it will take a number of
years to overcome the perceived problems in the judiciary or even for foreigners to
feel safe on the mean streets of Caracas, one of the most dangerous cities in the world. In the international
sphere, there is even less likelihood that the Canadian government would go out of
its way to seek to establish closer ties, at least for a while. In recent years, Ottawa has signed free-trade
agreements with many states – Colombia, Panama, Chile, in particular – that have no affinity for Mr. Chavez’s “Bolivarian” vision,
exported by its commandante and endorsed by hemispheric outliers. Canada has quite a bit on its plate
working with these receptive jurisdictions without expending energy in trying to
bring about a better relationship with Venezuela. That role is perhaps best left to Brazil, a neighbour
and self-perceived hegemon, as Mr. Cardoso demonstrated in Quebec City. In recent years, another powerful irritant
has poisoned Venezuela’s hemispheric relations: its role as a host to Iran in the
Americas. In recent years, Mr. Chavez made a point of cultivating close relations with
Iran as a part of his anti-Americanism and oil strategy to the point where it is
alleged that Venezuela furnished passports to Hezbollah operatives. These actions
have provoked a vigorous U.S. response, one manifestation of which is a recent House of Representatives
bill, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act – yet another extraterritorial extension of American legislative jurisdiction,
and making specific reference to Canada and Mexico. Canada’s present relations with Iran are at a low
point in any event, but this is an unneeded complication in relations with both the United States and Venezuela. Until
this potentially explosive issue is resolved to the satisfaction of both Washington
and Ottawa, it is hard to see why any Canadian government would seek to make
serious overtures to Venezuela. Mr. Chavez is dead, but the joker he dealt us lives
on.
Perm
generic
do both
Perm: have Canada and the US do the plan together
ActionPlan 11- Canada’s Economic Action Plan (“Joint Action Plan for the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation
Council, http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/rcc-ccr/joint-action-plan-canada-united-states-regulatory)//Modermatt
On February 4, 2011, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and President Barack Obama announced the creation
of
the Canada-United States Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC) to increase regulatory transparency
and coordination between the two countries. Regulation plays an important role in both our countries.
Effective regulations protect our health, safety and the environment while
supporting growth, investment, innovation and market openness. Canada and the
U.S. each have well-developed, independent regulatory regimes and regulatory
departments and agencies with experience, expertise and skill in their respective
fields, that support each of our domestic and legal policy requirements. While our
regulatory systems are very similar in the objectives they seek to achieve, there is value in enhancing the mechanisms in place to
foster cooperation in designing regulations or to ensure alignment in their implementation or enforcement. Unnecessary regulatory
differences and duplicative actions hinder cross-border trade and investment and ultimately impose a cost on our citizens,
businesses and economies. Given the integrated nature of our economies, greater alignment
and better mutual reliance in our regulatory approaches would lead to lower costs
for consumers and businesses, create more efficient supply chains, increase trade
and investment, generate new export opportunities, and create jobs on both sides
of the border. The RCC will undertake efforts to better align the regulatory environment between Canada and the United
States through a variety of tools such as enhanced technical collaboration, mutual recognition of standards and joint work sharing,
in an effort to address root causes of regulatory misalignments, develop lasting solutions and avoid future misalignments from
developing. This initial Joint Action Plan seeks to foster new approaches to regulatory
alignment and serve as a template for future efforts at Canada-U.S. coordination.
Council members agreed to the RCC's Terms of Reference,1 which established the mandate, principles and structure of the RCC and
will guide the work of the RCC throughout its mandate. Nothing in this Joint Action Plan is intended to give rise to rights or
obligations under domestic or international law.
Perm do both – stability and democracy promoting polices are
stronger when cooperating with Canada
Inter-American Dialogue 12 leading US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues in
Western Hemisphere affairs (April 2012, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” The Inter-American
Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)//KP
The democratic outlook in the Americas is on balance positive, particularly when compared with previous
periods and to the rest of the world. Free, competitive
elections are regularly held and, happily, the massive
human rights violations associated with earlier periods of authoritarian rule have passed. Nonetheless,
there are fundamental challenges that, if unaddressed, could spread and become far more serious.
These problems need to be dealt with collectively through established regional mechanisms.
Among these is the defense of democracy, an important area for greater cooperation among the
United States, Canada, and Latin America. Today, threats to democratic rule from the actions of the military, as
occurred in the June 2009 coup in Honduras, are rare. More commonly, elected executives, once in office, centralize power and
assume increasing control of critical institutions, public and private. Checks on presidential authority are, thereby, weakened or
eliminated. Governments in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Ecuador have all followed this pattern, undermining press freedom and
other basic rights. Although the Inter-American Democratic Charter calls for collective action to prevent
and repair such transgressions, they have, in fact, been met with relative silence. Indeed, the charter has rarely been
invoked. This inaction stems from the lack of consensus in the hemisphere about what constitutes violations of democratic
principles and how best to respond to them. The charter should be reformed to establish mechanisms for redress when elected
executives run roughshod over independent institutions.
Perm do both solves – Canada and the U.S. have the same interests
Ek and Fergusson 4/5 Specialist in International Relations; Specialists in International Trade and Finance (Carl Ek, Ian
F. Fergusson, 5 April 2013, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96397.pdf)//KP
In 2007, Prime Minister Harper
declared that the Americas are a critical foreign policy priority for
Canada, and committed to deepening and broadening Canada’s engagement in the region. Since then, Canada has sought to
expand its presence throughout the region while reinforcing bilateral ties and strengthening
regional organizations. The Conservative government’s current objectives for the hemisphere closely
align with those of the Obama Administration, with both countries advancing policies designed
to reinforce democratic governance, increase economic prosperity, and enhance regional
stability and security. Background and Analysis Although Canada has long been active in the region, its commitment to
sustained engagement in inter-American relations is relatively recent. Throughout the 20th century, Canada
forged strong diplomatic and commercial ties with many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Nevertheless, it generally did not consider the
region to be a top foreign policy priority. Authoritarian governance and widespread poverty fueled negative perceptions of the region and led Canada to
focus its attention elsewhere. According to a number of analysts and former officials, Canada was also reluctant to engage extensively in hemispheric
affairs out of concern that it could be drawn into disputes with the United States, which had traditionally played a dominant role in the region
cuba
do both
Perm do both – unilateral Canadian action can’t solve the net benefit
– the U.S. will punish them
Dade 2/20/13 senior fellow at the University of Ottawa’s School of International Development (Carlo Dade, 20 February
2013, “On Cuba, Canada has no choice but to walk Washington’s tightrope,” The Globe and Mail,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/on-cuba-canada-has-no-choice-but-to-walk-washingtonstightrope/article8878654/)//KP
As hard as it may be to believe, one of the most difficult foreign files for any Canadian government
to
manage is the Cuba file. The importance of Cuba, throughout the hemisphere, is as a symbol. The country is
of marginal, if any, economic interest and is not a real security threat to anyone in the hemisphere larger than, say, Grenada. The
importance of Cuba in the rest of the hemisphere is that it serves as a reminder of centuries of American
bullying and degradation. It is hard to overstate the degree of visceral anger that U.S. policy toward Cuba elicits in the
region. It is also a subject with which any Latin American government, even one of the few right-of-centre governments such as
Colombia, earns cheap points at home and with its neighbours by symbolically kicking the United States. In Canada, Cuba
serves a different purpose: It is a symbol of what distinguishes Canada from the United States . Most
Canadians strongly disagree with U.S. policy toward Cuba and find it offensive. Instead of anger, though, Canada is more often
embarrassed for its neighbour. The U.S. also sees no need to afford Canada the same slack it affords Latin
American countries on Cuba. Twice each year the U.S. embassy in Ottawa has to certify that
Canada is, more or less, in compliance with the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as
Helms-Burton, which requires the United States to penalize any foreign companies that do business with Cuba. (Canadian
companies are among the largest international investors in Cuba). The gist of the exercise is to demonstrate that, despite
clearly violating the intent if not the letter of Helms-Burton, Canada is doing enough other
things to push reform in Cuba to earn a pass from direct sanction by the U.S. The exercise is
essentially a series of winks and nods on each side followed by a round of beers. And each year the
State Department and congress go along with this while the Canadian government grumblingly counts its blessings. Canada has
of course vociferously opposed Helms-Burton, has challenged it under NAFTA, and has adopted
laws to counter it. In this it has international law and public opinion on its side. But should the Americans decide to take
unilateral action, that combination would prove as effective in defending Canadian interests on Cuba as it did on softwood lumber.
As has been seen time and again, all it takes is one member of the U.S. congress (such as a member of the easilyriled congressional Cuba lobby) to
raise a fuss, and Canada is left with nothing but a wink and a nod to
cover its privates while the bone-chilling breeze of U.S. unilateralism flaps around it. Yes, cooler
heads would prevail – eventually. But a lot of damage would be done in the meantime. The fine line that Canada walks on
Cuba is an object lesson on the Faustian bargain that the country has struck to enable it to get rich and fat off of easy and privileged
access to the U.S. market. Criticize the government if you will, but what choice does Canada really have? Before
answering, think
of the $1-billion in daily trade across the border. Canada can, does and will have
differences with the United States. But it has to pick its fights carefully, and Cuba is not on that
list. Making that reality clear to the rest of hemisphere, while explaining how much we do manage to differ from the U.S., is crucial.
It appears that this is what the government belatedly did with Foreign Affair Minister John Baird’ trip to the region.
AT: Soft power
Alt causes to Canada soft power
Matthews 10 – (Kyle, “The GPS report: A blueprint for operationalizing strategic change,” June 23, 2010, http://opencanada.org/foreignexchange/the-gps-report-a-blueprint-for-operationalizing-strategic-change/)//A-Berg
The report describes in detail the
withering of Canada’s soft power through the continual disinvestment in
our diplomatic corps, the shuttering of embassies and high commissions, the failure to leverage our
multicultural communities in a strategic manner, and the transformation of our civil service into a cowering army
of bureaucrats that focuses too much on departmental interests rather than advancing the national interest. We have entered a new century that
will require forward-looking and bold leadership to navigate a world of both opportunity and danger.
Reliance on soft power has made Canada irrelevant
Robson, John 04- columnist and commentator with Sun Media, is also an Invited
Professor at the University of Ottawa (“Reliance on 'soft power' made Canada irrelevant”, 3/1/04,
http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Reliance+
on+%27soft+power%27+made+Canada+irrelevant&rft.jtitle=Times+-+Colonist&rft.au=John+Robson&rft.date=2004-0301&rft.pub=Infomart%2C+a+division+of+Postmedia+Network+Inc&rft.spage=A.6&rft.externalDocID=572689181)//Modermatt
What ever happened to soft power? Its advocates seem to be flourishing professionally. But what have they to say about the affairs of
the day, such as nuclear proliferation or Haiti? On nuclear proliferation, we all know now that the Americans, and almost everyone
else, badly overestimated Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But we also know now they badly underestimated the international
trade in nuclear materials to rogue states (and most Western governments still would if the American invasion of Iraq had not
frightened Libya's Col. Gadhafi). You can't just chant "BUSH LIED!" History, as is its wont, has moved on. What shall we do? We
need better intelligence or, if we decide that's not really possible, some plan for dealing with inherently inadequate intelligence. Yet
Canada basically doesn't do foreign intelligence. We also need some sort of firm plan for dealing with
nuclear proliferation. Even in Europe, the realization that biting America's ankles doesn't qualify is painfully sinking in and policy is
changing. In a story I don't recall seeing in Maclean's, in late January, Germany's foreign minister told Britain's Daily Telegraph that
of course there were no plans for a European superstate. Two days later, "senior German officials" told the Telegraph the quarrel
with the U.S. over Iraq had been "catastrophic" for Germany and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had become "a prisoner" of French
President Jacques Chirac's anti-war campaign. (Also, the implosion of its fledgling democracy makes Russia an increasingly
unsuitable third partner.) Moreover, while many Canadians seem to regard the American concern with militant Islamism as redneck
xenophobia, in France they have voted to ban headscarves in schools while the ultra-liberal Netherlands is trying to expel thousands
of illegal immigrants and Denmark is undertaking immigration reforms openly aimed at radical imams. Such policies put those
governments at risk from terrorism that won't be diminished by insulting George Bush especially since, unlike Canadians, they don't
secretly know the U.S. must defend them no matter what. The New York Times, not exactly pro-Bush, recently noted that despite
"headlines around the world about how American credibility has been reduced to tatters," its allies are now seeking to work more
closely with the U.S. to keep WMDs out of the hands of rogue states. Even Hans Blix now says, "We Europeans cannot simply resist
forceful action by the United States and leave it at that. We have to take positive action also. We have to push the United States to
use international organizations to face threats to our common security." Right. We must face the threats, not deny them. And only
the U.S. has the hard power to do so. Yet Canada's government dithers on whether to make a
typical "all aid short of help" offer on missile defence involving neither money nor
sites, while our foreign minister pushes hard for a treaty to ban weapons in space.
The high-tech U.S. military relies on satellite communications, which it must protect from bad guys who laugh at treaties. We're
trying to make sure it can't. And we will fail. So far soft power looks like weakness. What
about Haiti? It should be the ideal spot for a kinder, gentler Canadian
intervention. First, it's in serious need not of a clean military operation to oust the
villains but of some of the sensitive nation-building liberals tend to favour.
Second, such an intervention would have the quality appealing to liberals of having
almost no relevance to our national interest, unless you believe (a) all failed states
are breeding grounds for terror and (b) we as well as the Americans are
threatened if terror comes to North America. Third, Haiti is a French-speaking
nation, and we have a francophone regiment. But we can't do it. We haven't got the ships or the planes, and the Van Doos, as
horribly overextended as everyone else in our military, just left for Afghanistan. On the TV news last week, the prime minister said
we were monitoring the situation in Haiti closely and were concerned. In other words, we're impotent and frustrated. I'm not sure
they give Nobel Peace Prizes for that. There was a time when leftists were prone to expansive, even daffy visions of remaking the
world. But they knew, as only a few like historian Jack Granatstein now seem to, that such plans require even more robust military
capabilities than realpolitik is likely to. In his excellent new book Who Killed the Canadian Military?
Granatstein says
that because "soft power" meant military neglect, "Canada has ceased to matter
internationally." Ooops. Lloyd Axworthy promised us a world transformed, not ignored. Well? What can "soft power" do
on nuclear proliferation, or even Haiti? Guys?
Canadian soft power is useless – hard power overwhelms
Journal of Commerce, October 20, 1998-
ROBERT SIBLEY ("Soft power' draws hard comments Journal of
Commerce” October 20, 1998, Tuesday)//Modermatt
Under the government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Canada's international reputation has been dilettantish and irrelevant. In
particular, the fondness of Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy for his notion that ,
in the post-Cold War world, costly ""hard-power'' resources, such as an army,
are of lesser importance
than "" soft-power' ' persuasion have been scorned as naive. Mr. Axworthy favors ""getting others to
want what you want'' through "" peacebuilding'' and ""constructive engagement.'' ""In the real world, whether Mr.
Axworthy will admit it or not, hard power does a better job of protecting Canada's interests when
others refuse to want what we want,'' says Kim Richard Nossal, one of Canada's pre-eminent political scientists. Similarly, Nobel
Peace Prize-winner Jose Ramos Horta has dismissed Canada's foreign policy as ""wishy-
washy'' and ""bankrupt.'' A policy of ""constructive engagement,'' he says, is merely a smokescreen to justify trading with
repressive regimes. But perhaps the harshest criticism has come from British Lt. Gen. Sir Hew Pike, a NATO commander in Bosnia,
who declared that the Canadian military had ""surrendered any claim to be a war-fighting force.'' There is some justice in the claim.
When NATO asked members in July to contribute fighter planes for possible attacks against Serbian forces, Canada conveniently
didn't have any aircraft available. Likewise, the Canadian government offered only token support for a show of force against Iraq
earlier this year. Such behavior - ""defense lite,'' as one analyst puts it - does not win Canada much respect. In Bosnia in 1994,
Canada's objections to NATO air strikes were ignored by both the Americans and the British, who thought the country's meager
troop contribution didn't warrant it a hearing. All in all, Canada's soft-power policies are little more
than foreign policy on the cheap. Soft power is effective only when it's backed up
by a country's willingness ""to commit its treasure to world affairs,'' as Mr. Nossal puts it.
And that means, in part, spending to have a credible military force.
AT: Conflict Resoulation
Soft power won’t be used for peace-keeping
Michael Forrestall98 - Senator of Canada (Soft power dead wrong for Canada: [Final Edition], May 6, 1998,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/240188678)//Modermatt
I was concerned by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's April 25 letter, "Why `soft power' is the right policy for Canada." Mr.
Axworthy attacks one of Canada's foremost academics, Prof. Kim Richard Nossal; academics in general who disagree with him; and
Canada's senior military leadership who do not accept the Canada 21 agenda for a constabulary military and feel-good peacekeeping
operations conceived in the Pearsonian Liberal past. The minister should, and indeed is obligated, to bring himself up to date, and
take some note of international events. It is a sin that he has not, and shows an amazing lack of knowledge with regard to recent
international history. Soft power and Pearsonian peacekeeping died at Srebrenica, where
lightly armed peacekeeping troops were forced to lay down their weapons and
watch as the civilian population was systematically butchered. Similarly, Mr. Axworthy might
want to go and visit the families of Belgian peacekeepers who were butchered by superior forces in Rwanda. The examples go on and
on, but armed conflict continues throughout the globe, and between groups and states. If Canada is to be as
engaged on the world stage, as Mr. Axworthy suggests, then Canada must maintain
well-equipped, modern, combat- ready forces geared for activities all across the
spectrum of combat. Without question, soft power was rejected in the 1993 Special
Joint Committee Report on Canada's Defence and in the 1994 White Paper, and for
well-thought-out reasons. It is time for Mr. Axworthy to accept the realities of
world politics/power politics and stop living in the woolly-headed past of Trudeau
Liberal defence and foreign policy.
Canadian soft power fails at resolving conflicts—peacekeeping provespeacekeeping
Nunez ‘4- Joseph R Nunez, U.S. Army colonel, assigned as an adjunct research professor to the Strategic Studies Institute
(“Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power” Storming Media Pentagon Reports, January 1
http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5546/A554684.html)//Modermatt
Abstract: Even before 2001, Canada was out of synch in its global vision. Ottawa's
peacekeeping orientation was no match for failed states and terrorism. While soft
power may be an effective foreign policy approach in this millennium, it is largely ineffective without
significant hard power to back it up. And the truth is that today Canada has little
hard power. A country that cannot muster and deploy even one self-sufficient
brigade to global hot spots is not going to be taken very seriously, and is certainly
not a middle power by military measure. In concrete terms, it is certainly wise for Canada to further
institutionalize its partnership with the United States in defense of North America. Joining Northern Command would accomplish
this, particularly since NORAD is decreasing in importance. Formally joining Northern Command, just as Canada did with NORAD,
would confirm that the relationship between Canada and the United States is a model of liberal interdependency suitable for
emulation. Democracy, capitalism, and security cooperation can keep the neighboring states strong and successful allies. Ottawa
clearly benefits by working closer in defense matters with Washington it can gain significant improvements in training, lift, logistics,
and technology, not to mention respect. These benefits will enable the country to quickly deploy a well-trained and equipped military
force to global hot spots and sustain them properly. Additionally, such cooperation demonstrates that Canada can provide valuable
leadership in the Americas. But Ottawa should understand that Washington needs competent
allies -- ones that possess a modicum of hard power.
AT: diversification
No need for diversification – every country took a hit in the trading
realm
Marowits 4/16/13 business reporter-editor for The Canadian Press (Ross Marowitz, 16 April 13, “Canada needs to
diversify trade partners to avoid another lost decade: reports,” Winnipeg Free Press,
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/business/canada-should-look-beyond-traditional-export-nations-for-growth-cibc203145781.html)//KP
Companies need to take more risks in emerging markets so Canada doesn't
experience another lost decade for exports, says CIBC's senior economist. Despite nine free trade
agreements, the volume of Canadian exports has receded back to about the same level it
was a decade ago. That's because exports to countries outside the U.S. have hardly
increased over the past four years — and in recent quarters, volume has actually dropped. Benjamin Tal said part of the reason
is that Canadian exporters have been squarely focused on China and the United
States for growth. While global trade has surged 70 per cent and imports have increased by 45 per cent since 2002, the
volume of exports has hardly changed over the same time, he said. "That's basically a lost decade. Now for a small open
economy that relies heavily on exports, that's not a very positive trajectory ," he said
after releasing the report titled "Stuck in Neutral." Tal said the stagnant growth can't solely be blamed on the strength of the loonie,
but also other factors, including the struggling U.S. economy and heightened competition from emerging markets. Tal said
Canadian companies need to look beyond its two largest trading partners, which
promise only slow and unreliable economic growth in the near term, and focus more on
emerging countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia. "I think it's more a problem of attitude, it's more a problem of
taking risks and I think that it's doable because we have proven that we can do it ," he said. Export
Development Canada chief economist Peter Hall said the report doesn't reflect the
efforts by Canadian companies to expand trade outside China. "To say it's a lost
decade is more true of the world than it is for Canada in isolation," he said. "I think it's
important to put this in a context of a world that has seen incredible duress in the
last four to five years." Hall said the high Canadian dollar has had a bigger impact on
exports than the report captures. Canadian exports to almost all countries but China got pummelled in the
downturn. Using 2009 as a reference year would reveal growth in emerging countries such as Brazil,
Hong Kong, Indonesia and Russia that are on par with China, he said. Hall doesn't dispute the
general thrust of the report, adding Canada can do a better job of boosting trade with South Korea, India and the Middle East. "A
very strong growth trend was resumed post-crisis," he said. "It's just that trade was
affected in most nations in the crisis year." Lakehead University economics professor Livio di Matteo
agreed that trading diversification has stalled even though Canada has become less reliant on the U.S. Canada has traditionally been
a "monogamist trade country" — first focused largely on Britain and after the Second World War, on the United States and then
China. Di Matteo said Canada can accelerate its ties with emerging countries by increasing international business student exchanges.
Overstretch DA
Canada is overstretched with commitments – further involvement in
the region is futile and a duplication of resources
The Canadian Press, 5/23/13 (23 May 2013, “Canada eyes Latin America ‘launching pad’ for freer trade,” CBC news,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/05/23/pol-cp-harper-colombia-trade-pacific-alliance.html)//KP *quotes Don Davies,
member of Canadian Parliament
There's no doubt that Canada's approach to economic growth is compatible with
the Pacific Alliance at a high level, Fast said. "They are the most like-minded and trusted partners in the region."
Even though most of the alliance members have seen changes in government
recently, their free-market approach to economic growth is well-entrenched, Fast
added. Critics see political motives It's that kind of statement that makes NDP
international trade critic Don Davies believe Ottawa's aims are more political than
economic. Canada already has free trade agreements with all the Pacific Alliance
members. So the federal Conservatives seem more interested in joining a rightwing club that would counter the left-wingers that are so powerful in Latin
America, Davies said. The involvement with the Pacific Alliance "seems quite clear to be
primarily a political initiative, not a trade one," Davies said in an email. From a trade perspective,
Canada is already stretched too thin, he added. "I have huge concerns about the
Conservatives' scatter-shot trade strategy. There appears to be no sense of prioritizing. Our trade
negotiators are overstretched." Given that almost all of Canada's trade with the
alliance countries is tariff-free, and that Canada is already talking to most of the
members in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, "it seems clear that the
Pacific Alliance is a waste of energy and unnecessary duplication of resources."
Impact D
China japan
No China-Japan war
Business Pundit 10 9/13, “Why China-Japan Spat Won’t Lead to War,” http://www.businesspundit.com/why-chinajapan-spat-wont-lead-to-war/, AJ
a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese coast guard
boats near the tiny Diaoyutai Islands (as they’re known to Taiwan. China calls them the
Diaoyu. Japan calls them the Senkaku. All three countries claim them as their own.) Japan took the
captain and crew of the fishing boat hostage. It released the crew today, but the
Last Tuesday,
captain and boat remain in custody, pending a Japanese investigation. The arrests underline an ongoing power
struggle between the two Asian superpowers, with China increasingly on the offensive. But, according to the
China and Japan are too economically interdependent
to risk a full-scale conflict : But a serious military showdown is unlikely, for
many reasons. Perhaps the most important is the unprecedented economic
ties between East Asia’s two big powers. In 2007, China surpassed the U.S. as
Japan’s top economic partner. Since then, the two countries haven’t looked
back: Two-way trade hit a record of nearly $140 billion in the first half
of this year, a 34.5 percent jump from the same period last year,
according to Japanese government figures. Japan’s exports to China
are rising even faster than its imports, due to rising Chinese
consumption that shows China’s increased importance as a market,
not just the world’s factory. All of which suggests that Japan has a strong interest in
resolving the current spat quickly, and, to the extent
Global Post’s Jonathan Adams,
No risk of Chinese aggression – Japan has substantial geographic and
military advantages
Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 97 (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey
Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997)
Current US strategy implicitly assumes
that America must remain engaged because of the Asian
countries' failure to balance against Chinese strength. But Japan and Taiwan, the two plausible
targets for Chinese aggression, are more than capable of defending themselves from
conventional attack. Both enjoy the geographic advantage of being islands. The surrounding
oceans ensure a defense dominance that could only be overcome with enormous material or
technological advantages. The amphibious operations required for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or Japan would be
extremely difficult and at a minimum would require substantial investment in amphibious warfare capability. Taiwan could extract a
withering toll on invading forces. Its air force is large, sophisticated, and growing; its navy has deadly missile boats; and it produces
anti-ship cruise missiles. The same Taiwanese forces would make a Chinese blockade of Taiwan even harder. China would find it
difficult to harass Taiwanese ports on the eastern side of the island with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.41 Chinese
attacks on shipping would be blocked by Taiwan's air superiority and sea control, and Chinese blockading forces would find it
difficult to cover the wide swath of ocean around Taiwan, China could use its ballistic missile force to conduct terror attacks against
Taiwanese targets, but terror attacks have negligible military or long-run political effects-witness the failures of the German Blitz
and of the sustained IRA bombing campaign against the United Kingdom. As long as Taiwan has access to advanced Western
weapons, it will be able to defend itself, Japan's threat environment is even more benign. Its "moat" is wider than the Taiwan Strait.
Japan's large, sophisticated air and naval forces give it great defensive capabilities, and air and
naval warfare play directly to Japan’s technological advantage. The side with the best sensors
can target the enemy first, gaining an enormous advantage; empirical evidence suggests that the
better trained or technologically superior air force can achieve favorable exchange ratios of 10:1
or greater. Japan's east-coast ports would make a blockade with ground-launched anti-ship
cruise missiles technically impossible and would increase the area of coverage for blockading
forces beyond the reasonable limits of any non-American navy's sustainment capability. Finally,
anti-submarine warfare capability is a particular strength of the Japanese armed forces because of
the Cold War mission for which they were designed.
Korea
War won’t happen or escalate- China would pull out and destroy
North Korea’s economy
Foulkes 10-reporter at Terre Haute Tribune-Star – citing multiple experts
(Arthur, “U.S.- China war for Korea ‘unlikely,’ says ISU professor,” 12/1/10, http://tribstar.com/news/x1894461173/U-S-China-warfor-Korea-unlikely-says-ISU-professor)
China sees North Korea as a buffer between its northeastern border and U.S. forces in South Korea, said Chambers, who is co-editor
of the scholarly journal Asian Security. For that and other reasons, China, while viewing North Korea as an “unruly
friend,” does not want to see the North Korean state disappear, he said. Diplomatic cables leaked
earlier this week by the website WikiLeaks indicate the Chinese leadership has become frustrated with
North Korea and would not intervene if the country’s government collapses , according to news reports.
China has in the past pressured North Korea, especially regarding the hermit-kingdom’s nuclear ambitions,
Chambers noted. This pressure has sometimes included sanctions, “just not always as much as we have wanted.”
North Korea’s economy is heavily dependent on China for food and energy, Chambers said. If North
Korea enters a genuine crisis of survival, Beijing worries that North Korean refugees will pour
over the border, destabilizing the Chinese economy in the area, he said. By shelling South Korean positions
last week and making announcements regarding its nuclear capabilities, North Korea may be trying to force the west to resume
nuclear talks, Chambers said. The North Korean moves may also be related to the expected transition of power from the “Dear
Leader,” Kim Jong Il, to his son, Kim Jong Un, he said.
No war- too high a cost
Hughes 10- Defense correspondent for the Daily Mirror UK
(Chris, “Stakes too high for war between North Korea and South Korea,” 11/24/10, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2010/11/24/stakes-too-high-for-war-between-north-korea-and-south-korea-115875-22735947/)
All-out war is unlikely as there is nothing to gain for either side. The likely outcome of war is the
reason why it is unlikely either side will allow it to happen. Thirty miles from North Korea, the
South Korean capital of Seoul is vulnerable to attack. A North Korean strike could kill a million.
Then the South would retaliate with air and artillery strikes, obliterating the North's
millionstrong people's army. The toll on human life would be truly horrific.
Asia war
War in Asia is highly unlikely—regional stability concerns are being
settled and alliance structures check
Desker and Bitzinger 2008 – *Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, **Dean of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore (Richard and Barry, Survival 50:6, "Why East Asian War is Unlikely", pages 105-28, EBSCO)
The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic
stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan
Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved
border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila
superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with
considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and
fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of
communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict,
the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might
expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the
Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been
relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states
is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue,
while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation
of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface,
seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party
victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of
consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for crossstrait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the
European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives
dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation –
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic,
social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN
has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the
East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this
suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.
No risk of Asian war – stability now
Desker 8 6/25, *Barry Desker: dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU and writes for The Strait Times,
“Why war is unlikely in Asia,” http://www.asiaone.com/News/the%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080625-72716.html, AJ
THE Asia-Pacific region is both a zone of relative insecurity as well as one of relative stability. On
the one hand, it contains some of the world's most significant flashpoints: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen
glacier. Tensions between nations at these points could escalate into major wars. The region is also replete with border issues, acts of
terrorism and overlapping maritime claims. It is a strategically significant area, sitting astride key sea lines of communication and
important choke-points. Nevertheless, the region is more stable than one might believe. Separatism
remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. The North Korean nuclear issue, while
not fully resolved, is moving towards a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula.
Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt into conflict, especially after the
recent victories of the Kuomintang in Taiwan. The region also possesses significant multilateral
structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, the nascent Six-Party Talks forum and, in particular, Asean. But the rise of China
does not automatically mean that conflict is likely. First, a more assertive China does not
mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully)
through existing avenues and institutions. Second, when we examine the Chinese military buildup,
we find that there may be less there than some might have us believe. The Chinese war
machine is not quite as threatening - although still worrisome - as some fear. Instead of Washington's
perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs coercively, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs. The
nascent 'Beijing Consensus', for want of a better term, would consist of the following attributes: The leadership role of the
authoritarian state, a technocratic approach to governance, an emphasis on social rights and
obligations over individual rights, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and
non-interference, support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions.
The argument that there is an emerging 'Beijing Consensus' is not premised on the rise of the 'East' and decline of the 'West', as
sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier 1990s 'Asian values' debate. But like the previous debate, this new debate will
reflect alternative philosophical traditions. At issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the
individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the values China and other states in
the region share. By contrast, one conventional American view is that Sino-American competition will result in 'intense
security competition with considerable potential for war' in which most of China's neighbours 'will join with the United States to
contain China's power'. Asia's shared values are likely to reduce the risk of such conflict and result in
regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with China, rather than a
confrontation with it. In its interactions with the region, China itself is beginning to be
interested in issues of proper governance, the development of domestic institutions and the
strengthening of regional institutions. Nor is Chinese policy unchanging, even on the issue of
sovereignty. For example, there has been an evolution in Chinese thinking on the question of
freedom of passage through the straits of Malacca and Singapore. China supported the claims of
the littoral states to sovereign control over the straits when the Law of the Sea Convention was
concluded in 1982. But its increasing dependence on imported oil shipped through the straits
has led to a shift in favour of burden-sharing, the recognition of the rights of user states and the
need for cooperation between littoral states and user states. China has also revised its
earlier advocacy of strict non-intervention and non-interference. Its support for
global initiatives such as peacekeeping and nuclear non-proliferation - as well as its restrained
use of its veto in the UN Security Council and its active role in the World Trade Organisation - indicates
it is aware that responsible participation in global institutions can shape perceptions of a rising
China. Beijing has also greatly lowered the tone and rhetoric of its strategic
competition with the US. This is significant as most South-east Asian states prefer not to
have to choose between the US and China, and have adopted 'hedging' strategies in their
relationships with the two powers. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is certainly in the midst of the
most ambitious upgrading of its combat capabilities since the early 1960s. Its current defence
doctrine is centred on the ability to fight 'Limited Local Wars'. The emphasis is on pre-emption,
surprise and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome
of a war. Thus the PLA has pursued the acquisition of weapons for asymmetric warfare. It mimics the US military in
terms of the ambition and scope of its transformational efforts - and therefore challenges the US
military at its own game. Nevertheless, China is still at least two decades behind the US in terms of
its defence capabilities. It is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, but its current
military buildup is indicative of an evolutionary, steady-state and sustaining - rather than
disruptive or revolutionary - innovation and change. War in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely . But
the emergence of East Asia, especially China, will require adjustments by the West, just as Asian societies had to adjust to Western
norms and values during the American century.
Latin America
Escalation’s empirically denied—the region has survived hundreds of
wars
Hartzell 2000 (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin
America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_028628765765_ITM)
Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which
now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some
extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their
resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to
rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which
such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the
following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant
institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in
the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?
Instability’s inevitable—drug trafficking
Grudgings 2009 (Stuart, Rueters, Latin America ex-leaders urge reform of US drug war,
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11358345)
RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The war against drugs
is failing and the U.S. government should break with
"prohibition" policies that have achieved little more than cram its prisons and stoke violence, three former
Latin American presidents said on Wednesday. The respected former presidents urged the United
States and Latin American governments to move away from jailing drug users to debate the
legalization of marijuana and place more emphasis on the treatment of addicts. Former Colombian
President Cesar Gaviria said there was no meaningful debate over drugs policy in the United States, despite a broad consensus that
current policies had failed. "The problem today in the U.S. is that narco-trafficking is a crime and so any politician is fearful of
talking about narco-trafficking or talking about policies because they will be called soft," he said. Gaviria has joined with former
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to try to change the debate on drugs
in Latin America, where trafficking gangs have killed tens of thousands of people and weakened
democracies through corruption. From Mexico's gang wars to the drug-funded FARC guerrilla
group in Colombia and daily shoot-outs between gangs and police in Rio de Janeiro's
shantytowns, much of the region is scarred by drug violence and many believe U.S. policies have
failed. A United Nations meeting in Vienna next month will frame international drugs policy for the next 10 years, and the three
former presidents, whose group is called the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, said it is time for change. They
pointed to falling street prices for cocaine and still high levels of consumption in the United States despite decades of policies
focused on punishing users and cutting supplies from Latin American countries such as Colombia. 'PREJUDICES, FEARS' The
presidents' commission released a report calling on governments to refocus policies toward treating users, move toward
decriminalizing marijuana, and invest more in education campaigns. It said current policies were rooted in "prejudices, fears and
ideological visions" that inhibited debate. Even as the group met in Rio on Wednesday, police arrested 51 people in a major
operation in the city and other states against a suspected drug smuggling ring that sent cocaine to Europe and brought back
synthetic drugs like Ecstasy. Organized crime has flourished around drugs and is now threatening the
stability of Mexico, where a spiraling war between rival gangs killed more than 5,700 people last
year. Cardoso, one of Latin America's most respected figures, said U.S. leadership was essential to break the cycle of drug-related
crime and violence. "It will be almost impossible to solve Mexico's problems and other countries'
problems without a more ample, comprehensive set of policies from the U.S. government," he said.
Despite winning power on broad promises of change, drugs policy featured little in U.S. President Barack Obama's election
campaign and there are few indications that he will embark on a major overhaul. Gaviria said Washington appeared increasingly
isolated in its repressive approach as Latin America and Europe move toward treating drug abuse as a health problem rather than a
crime. (Editing by Raymond Colitt and Kieran Murray)
Brazil checks
Bridges 08 (The Seattle Times. “Brazil on conquest to becoming a major world player”
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008380151_brazil12.html)
For years, critics said that Brazil was long on potential and short on performance. Not anymore. This massive country has
become one of the world's biggest democracies and an economic powerhouse.
Now Brazilian President
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wants his nation to have a bigger role in world affairs. He'll press his case when leaders from the major
industrial and developing nations convene Saturday at the G-20 summit in Washington. Before the meeting, Lula has called on
wealthier nations to overhaul the global finance system and give a bigger say to developing countries such as Brazil. "We need new,
more inclusive governance, and Brazil is ready to face up to its responsibilities," Lula said last Saturday at a
meeting of finance ministers and central-bank presidents in São Paulo. "It is time for a pact between governments to build a new
financial architecture for the world." In the short term, Brazil wants the smaller G-7 group of industrialized
countries to expand to include Brazil and other developing countries, said Amaury de Souza, a political
analyst in Rio de Janeiro. "We want a permanent G-14," de Souza said, saying that Russia, China, Mexico and India should be
among the additions. Brazil also wants developing nations to have a greater voice at the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank and the United Nations. "Global power structures were frozen in the aftermath of World War II," de Souza added. "Excessive
latitude of action was given to European countries." Only a few years ago, Brazil's president wouldn't have dared to demand a
greater role. Hyperinflation, a roller-coaster economy and political instability plagued Brazil in the 1990s. The country's stock
market plummeted after Lula was elected in 2002. Investors feared the longtime leftist leader, a former auto-factory worker who
hadn't graduated from high school. However, Lula has promoted business investment while putting more
money into the hands of the poor. The economy has boomed for three years. With the world's
10th-biggest economy, Brazil has surpassed the United States as the biggest producer of iron ore
and coffee. It's become the world's biggest exporter of beef, poultry, biofuels and orange-juice
concentrate, and is rapidly gaining in soybeans, corn and pork. Brazil also has accumulated $200 billion in
foreign reserves, almost as much as the rest of Latin America combined. That money will help cushion the global meltdown. Now,
Brazil wants to be recognized for its fiscal track record and to avoid the risks that come with a global economic crisis. " Brazil has
new standing in the world," said Rubens Barbosa, a private consultant in Brazil who's served as
the ambassador to the United States. "We think we can contribute more."
Climate
No warming now – not anthropogenic, their models are inaccurate
and negative feedbacks check
Hayward 10 (Steven F, F.K. Weyerhaeuser fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 2010, The Weekly Standard, “In
Denial,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/denial)
This central pillar of the climate campaign is unlikely to survive much longer, and
each repetition of the “science-is-settled” mantra inflicts more damage on the credibility of the climate science community. The
scientist at the center of the Climategate scandal at East Anglia University, Phil (“hide the decline”)
Jones dealt the science-is-settled narrative a huge blow with his candid admission in a BBC interview that
his surface temperature data are in such disarray they probably cannot be verified
or replicated, that the medieval warm period may have been as warm as today, and
that he agrees that there has been no statistically significant global warming for
the last 15 years—all three points that climate campaigners have been bitterly contesting. And Jones specifically disavowed
the “science-is-settled” slogan: BBC: When scientists say “the debate on climate change is over,” what exactly do they mean, and
what don’t they mean? Jones: It would be supposition on my behalf to know whether all scientists who say the debate is over are
saying that for the same reason. I don’t believe the vast majority of climate scientists think this. This is not my view. There is still
much that needs to be undertaken to reduce uncertainties, not just for the future, but for the instrumental (and especially the
palaeoclimatic) past as well [emphasis added]. Judith Curry, head of the School of Earth and Atmos-pheric Sciences at Georgia Tech
and one of the few scientists convinced of the potential for catastrophic global warming who is willing to engage skeptics seriously,
wrote February 24: “No one really believes that the ‘science is settled’ or that ‘the debate is
over.’ Scientists and others that say this seem to want to advance a particular agenda. There is nothing more detrimental to
public trust than such statements.” The next wave of climate revisionism is likely to reopen most of the central questions of “settled
science” in the IPCC’s Working Group I, starting with the data purporting to prove how much the Earth has warmed over the last
century. A London Times headline last month summarizes the shocking revision currently underway: “World May Not Be Warming,
Scientists Say.” The Climategate emails and documents revealed the disarray in the
surface temperature records the IPCC relies upon to validate its claim of 0.8 degrees Celsius of
human-caused warming, prompting a flood of renewed focus on the veracity and handling of surface temperature data. Skeptics
such as Anthony Watts, Joseph D’Aleo, and Stephen McIntyre have been pointing out the defects in the surface temperature record
for years, but the media and the IPCC ignored them. Watts and D’Aleo have painstakingly documented (and in many cases
photographed) the huge number of temperature stations that have been relocated, corrupted by
the “urban heat island effect,” or placed too close to heat sources such as air conditioning
compressors, airports, buildings, or paved surfaces, as well as surface temperature series that are
conveniently left out of the IPCC reconstructions and undercut the IPCC’s
simplistic story of rising temperatures. The compilation and statistical treatment of global temperature
records is hugely complex, but the skeptics such as Watts and D’Aleo offer compelling critiques showing that most of the
reported warming disappears if different sets of temperature records are
included, or if compromised station records are excluded. The puzzle deepens when more
accurate satellite temperature records, available starting in 1979, are considered. There is a glaring anomaly: The satellite
records, which measure temperatures in the middle and upper atmosphere, show
very little warming since 1979 and do not match up with the ground-based
measurements. Furthermore, the satellite readings of the middle- and upper-air temperatures fail to
record any of the increases the climate models say should be happening in
response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations. John Christy of the University of Alabama, a
contributing author to the IPCC’s Working Group I chapter on surface and atmospheric climate change, tried to get the IPCC to
acknowledge this anomaly in its 2007 report but was ignored. (Christy is responsible for helping to develop the satellite monitoring
system that has tracked global temperatures since 1979. He received NASA’s Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement for this
work.) Bottom line: Expect some surprises to come out of the revisions of the surface temperature records that will take place over
the next couple of years. Eventually the climate modeling community is going to have to reconsider the central question: Have
the models the IPCC uses for its predictions of catastrophic warming overestimated the climate’s
sensitivity to greenhouse gases? Two recently published studies funded by the U.S.
Department of Energy, one by Brookhaven Lab scientist Stephen Schwartz in the Journal of Geophysical Research, and
one by MIT’s Richard Lindzen and Yong-Sang Choi in Geophysical Research Letters, both argue for vastly lower
climate sensitivity to greenhouse gases. The models the IPCC uses for projecting a 3 to 4 degree Celsius
increase in temperature all assume large positive (that is, temperature-magnifying) feedbacks from a doubling of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere; Schwartz, Lindzen, and Choi discern strong negative (or temperature-reducing)
feedbacks in the climate system, suggesting an upper-bound of future temperature
rise of no more than 2 degrees Celsius. Environmental collapse won’t cause
extinction
Easterbrook, 03 (Gregg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, July 2003, “We're All Gonna
Die!,” Wired Magazine, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html, Hensel)
If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up.
A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines
might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an
adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that
the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain . Depression, which has
become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people
would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design
conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.
Environmental collapse won’t cause extinction
Easterbrook, 03 (Gregg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, July 2003, “We're All Gonna
Die!,” Wired Magazine, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html, Hensel)
If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up.
A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines
might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an
adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that
the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain . Depression, which has
become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people
would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design
conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.
The environment’s stronger than Chuck Norris – it’s survived
everything
Easterbrook, 95 (Gregg, Senior Editor of the New Republic, 1995, A Moment on Earth, p. 25,
Hensel)
In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the
adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive
financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants,
and people are distressingly fragile. The
environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living
environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic
fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense
volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's
magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas
into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels;
shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of
asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these
impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons
before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though
mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed
to resisting .
There have been alternative explanations in the scientific literature for several years, ignored by the media and the IPCC alike. The
IPCC downplays theories of variations in solar activity, such as sunspot activity and gamma ray bursts, and although there is robust
scientific literature on the issue, even the skeptic community is divided about whether solar activity is a primary cause of recent
climate variation. Several studies of Arctic warming conclude that changes in ocean currents, cloud
formation, and wind patterns in the upper atmosphere may explain the retreat of
glaciers and sea ice better than greenhouse gases. Another factor in the Arctic is “black carbon”—
essentially fine soot particles from coal-fired power plants and forest fires, imperceptible to the naked eye but reducing the albedo
(solar reflectivity) of Arctic ice masses enough to cause increased summertime ice melt. Above all, if the medieval warm
period was indeed as warm or warmer than today, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the changes of recent decades are part of a natural rebound from
the “Little Ice Age” that followed the medieval warm period and ended in the 19th
century. Skeptics have known and tried to publicize all of these contrarian or confounding scientific findings, but the compliant
news media routinely ignored all of them, enabling the IPCC to get away with its serial exaggeration and blatant advocacy for more
than a decade.
Bmd turn
US Canada BMD triggers Russia US war
Krieger and Starr, 12 -
is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Steven Starr is an Associate of the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation and Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility. He maintains a website on the long-term environmental consequences of
nuclear war.
(David Krieger and Henry Starr, “A Nuclear Nightmare in the Making: NATO, Missile Defense and Russian Insecurity” by, January 03, 2012¶
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db_article.php?article_id=321)//GP
Suppose for a moment that the situation were reversed, and that it was Russia who
had formed another NATO, a North American Treaty Organization. Russia leads this military
alliance with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Mexico and various other Central
American and Caribbean states. The Russian/NATO states all shared the same
military communication and weapons systems, and had previously fought several
wars in South America.¶ Imagine that, through this alliance, Russia begins deployment of an
integrated missile defense system right up to the borders to the US, as well as on naval vessels
positioned off the East and West coasts of the United States. Russia states the purpose of this system, which
surrounds most of the continental US, is to protect against a possible missile
launch from Canada. The US protests that the deployment of such a missile defense system would undermine its retaliatory potential
and thereby its security. Concerned about the vulnerability of its nuclear forces, the US then
threatens to target the Russian missile defenses and to withdraw from New START.
Instead of taking US security concerns seriously, a Russian ambassador says, “Whether the US likes it or not, we are about defending NATO-American
concerns.Ӧ This is a dangerous scenario, no matter which NATO we are talking about, the real one or the hypothetical one .
Continued US
indifference to Russian security concerns could have dire consequences: a
breakdown in US-Russian relations; regression to a new nuclear-armed standoff
in Europe; Russian withdrawal from New START; a new nuclear arms race
between the two countries; a breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
leading to new nuclear weapon states; and a higher probability of nuclear weapons
use by accident or design. This is a scenario for nuclear disaster, and it is being
provoked by US hubris in pursuing missile defenses, a technology that is unlikely ever to be effective, but
which Russian leaders must view in terms of a worst-case scenario.¶ In the event of increased US-Russian tensions, the worst-case
scenario from the Russian perspective would be a US first-strike nuclear attack on
Russia, taking out most of the Russian nuclear retaliatory capability. The Russians believe the US would be emboldened to make a first-strike
attack by having the US-NATO missile defense installations located near the Russian border, which the US could believe capable of shooting down any
Russian missiles that survived its first-strike attack.¶ The path to a US-Russian nuclear war could also begin with a conventional military confrontation
via NATO. The expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia has created the potential for a local military conflict with Russia to quickly escalate into a
nuclear war. It is now Russian policy to respond with tactical nuclear weapons if faced with overwhelmingly superior conventional forces, such as those
of NATO.
In the event of war, the “nuclear umbrella” of NATO guarantees that NATO
members will be protected by US nuclear weapons that are already forward-based
in Europe.¶ Shortly after President Obama came into office, he said in Prague, “The US seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear
weapons.” If he has any intention of making that dream a reality, he had better instruct the US government to work with the Russians in a way that
The only security
that can exist in the Nuclear Age is common security. An imbalance in security, or perceptions of security,
does not undermine their security, or perceived security, which, from the Russian perspective, is essentially the same. ¶
threatens not only the weaker party, but all parties. NATO missile defense plans have created greater insecurity for Russia, which has set in motion
Russian counteractions that are reducing security for the US, NATO and the world.