Air Cargo Actors and WMD Proliferation
EU threat - EU solutions
Draft Presentation
Centre de Conférences Internationales Paris, 16 July 2008
Counter-Illicit Trafficking Mechanism Assessment Project (CIT-MAP), SIPRI
“Some air cargo entities, straddling a grey market sector soliciting licit and illicit goods
deliveries have garnered a reputation in parts of the Middle East, Africa, Eastern
Europe and South West Asia for having a “no questions asked” policy.... [they] leave
themselves open to exploitation by extremist groups....the practices employed by a
number of air cargo entities could provide avenues for schemes involving the airborne
delivery of WMD-type devices or substances consisting of nuclear, biological or
chemical components.”
Air Cargo entities and WMD: two threats
• Assist the process of proliferation through the
transportation of dual use technology,
equipment and personnel.
• Used as a delivery platform or vehicle for a
WMD-type device to facilitate an extreme
event
Air Koryo Ilyushin 76, Source: Airliners.net, Air Transport Data Base (ATDB)
• Air Koryo aircraft have been used to smuggle weapons,
cigarettes and other commodities
• In 1998 Air Koryo aircraft were used to fly technology,
equipment and personnel from and to North Korea and
Pakistan as part of a fissile material/ballistic missile
arrangement
Air cargo transit hubs include those located in United Arab Emirates, Sudan,
Libya, Central Asian states, Russian Federation and Ukraine
• Air cargo network structures a result of globalisation
• State deregulation of administrative and legal barriers to
international trade
•Air cargo networks involved in illicit flows have taken
advantage of financial deregulation and a lack of intergovernmental monitoring
•They operate numerous front companies and use different
off-shore locations and weak states to channel funds and
base assets.
A non-governmental air cargo network: partial view
Air Tomisko
Aerolift
Jet Line International
Asterias
Artic Group
Aerocom
Aeronord
Pecotox Air
GST Aero
Multiple companies in DRC,
Congo
EU solutions
• EU solutions based around the enforcement of regulations and information-sharing
between member states and neighbouring states
• EU technical assistance missions, political dialogue and air safety regulation
enforcement and blacklisting has achieved results
• EU Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) circulates watch list of air cargo companies
• Information-sharing remains in its early stages. Priority and resources could be given
to focused information-sharing mechanisms between EU and certain states
• Prioritisation and resources would serve EU Security Strategy and a range of
political instruments and actions associated with combating illicit flows