Psychological
Impact and Risk
Communication
Scientific Advice, Crisis
Management and the Media
Hotel Grand Bretagne
Athens, Greece
9–10 June 2003
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
Michael J. Hopmeier, MSME
Chief, Innovative and Unconventional
Concepts
Unconventional Concepts, Inc.
COL Boaz Tadmor
Israel Defense Forces
Dr. Zohar Rubinstein
Tel Aviv University
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September 11, 2001
World Trade Centers
Towers 1 and 2
New York City
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Suicide Bombings
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Psychological Definitions of Crisis/
Disaster Situations
An external situation which presents a threat
to a person or his/her relatives, interrupts the
functional, cognitive and historical
continuance amongst individuals, families,
groups and the community.
—Home Front Command
Israel Defense Forces
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Psychological Trauma and Communication:
Brief Overview
 Orson Wells’ 1938 radio broadcast “War of the
Worlds” resulted in pandemonium and paranoia
 Coverage of recent terrorist events reveals that
the media must strike a balance between
informing the public and not contributing to
psychological trauma
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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PTSD and the Effects
of Traumatic TV Images
 Study by Ahern et al. (2002) found that people who
were directly affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and who viewed disturbing TV images >7 times were
7 times more likely to develop PTSD
 The same study found that 3.6% who were not
directly affected by the attacks still developed PTSD
from repeatedly watching disturbing TV images
 Previous studies with children with direct involvement
in the Oklahoma City bombing and Gulf War suggest
a causal link between PTSD and watching violent
images of events on TV
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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The Public Wants to “Do Something”
 Although duct tape defense provides minimal
physical protection, there is something to be said
for the sense of psychological comfort created by
having “done something” to prepare for a
potential attack
 However, a recent Harvard study found that 73%
were aware of the posted high alert level (orange)
but only 12% had developed an evacuation plan
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Before the 2003 Iraq War
Israel Defense Forces
 Distributed protective kits (including gas masks)
to the entire Israeli population
 Informed the public how to create protected and
sealed spaces in dwellings
 Created an efficient medicine distribution system
and a nationwide alarm system
Home Front Command
 Launched an information campaign to educate
the public on what to expect and how to cope
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Israeli Public Response
 In spite of everything, as recently as 1 week
before the outbreak of hostilities, compliance with
safety directives was as low as 60%
 The psychological impact of seeing the war
progress and the nation’s emotional response (as
measured by numerous polls) correlated almost
perfectly
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Communication and
Psychological Impact
 There is unquestionably a link
Over 2,000 studies in the past 30 years on
children and exposure to TV violence find an
increase in aggressive behavior
 The long-term negative psychological effects of
the media and disasters can be mitigated, but
only with proper preparation
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Mitigation
 Anticipate what the audience wants to hear to
allay fears
 Hurricane George in Puerto Rico in 1998
was an example of excellent communication
with a constant flow of updated, accurate
information
 Communication clearly addressed the
audience’s main concern: the hurricane’s
impact on tourism, one of the island’s main
industries
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New York Times,
October 28, 2001
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Anthrax Scare
Negative psychological effects—fear and paranoia—are
more damaging than anthrax
In April 1997, 17 employees at the B'nai Brith National
Headquarters went to D.C.- area hospitals after feeling
ill—tests later proved the substance they encountered
was not anthrax
In fall 2001, 35 people in a Maryland subway reported
nausea, sore throat, and headache after exposure to
hoax “liquid anthrax” —window-cleaning fluid
“But in my opinion we need to protect the Americans
not from anthrax, but from the feeling of fear... I'm
serious... Panic is even worse than the disease."
—Benjamin Cherkassky, a senior scientist at Moscow's
Central Institute of Epidemiology
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Anthrax Scare—Lessons Learned
 Decisions had to be made rapidly in the absence of
data
 Access to subject matter experts was limited
 No “textbook” experience to guide a response
 Understanding of “risk” evolved as outbreak unfolded
 Exaggerated or ambiguous risk assessment creates
elevated fear and establishes a sense of distrust among
the public for future warnings
 Advising the public not to panic induces the opposite
response
 Need a coherent, rapid process for addressing
scientific issues in the midst of a crisis
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Communication
 It is both information and education!
 It works both ways: to and from leadership
The principal source of intelligence and realtime planning information is the media!
The public depends on the media to provide
background and guidance on how to react
 It is vital both before and after an incident
It prepares the public so they understand what
is happening
It gives them instruction on how to respond to
what is happening
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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“Principles for Intervention amongst
Disaster Stricken Population”
 “’Help them help themselves’—Create a feeling of
competence
 “Create minimal dependence on formal and
external assistance
 “Channel the negative responses to positive
action
 “What appears as panic stricken civilians is
nothing other than unorganized activity, which
can be organized”
—Home Front Command
Israel Defense Forces
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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“Principles for Intervention amongst
Disaster Stricken Population”
 “Prevent or minimize secondary gains
 “Utilize the population as a resource
 “Secure initial success in order to build trust in the
community and authorities
 “Support the community with ongoing
information
 “What works in routine should work in an
emergency”
—Home Front Command
Israel Defense Forces
Presentation © 2003 Unconventional Concepts Inc.
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Summary
 “Mob psychology” is the ruling factor
 We do not have enough resources to provide for the
public independently, so we must involve the public
in its own protection
 To do this, the members of the public must know how
to protect themselves and be confident that they can
 Using the media to educate people and quell their
fears is the only practical way this can be done
 Media should be considered on par with fire, police,
and emergency medical personnel
The media can be your enemy if you work with them-they will be if you don’t!
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And Finally...
We must all hang together or,
most assuredly,
we shall surely hang separately!
—Benjamin Franklin
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