Democratic Transition and Consolidation
Kathryn Stoner
July 26, 2013
Where am I going?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Transition vs. consolidation
Transition to what?
Some theories of transition.
Why the Soviet/Russian case?
What are the general lessons we
can draw from this case?
Democratic Triggers?
Death of a Long Serving Leader
Defeat in War
Decolonization/Collapse of Empire
External Occupation
Economic Growth
Economic Crisis
Do Democratic Transitions Have
Preconditions?
1. Wealth and democracy: “Modernization
theory.” (Lipset)
* Positive relationship between wealth and
democracy: Why?
Actors = society
* Literacy
* Urbanization
* Demands of Greater Number of Owners
-creates mobilization of socially excluded and
demands for change.
IN THIS THEORY, CHANGE COMES “FROM BELOW,”
THAT IS, FROM THE PEOPLE ON THE STREET.
.
Modernization Theory:
-Dominant theory of democratic transition from
about 1960’s onward.
-Emphasis on Economic Change leading to Social
Change
Policy prescriptions:
- develop economies,
- open trade,
-educate population
All of this will create a constituency for
representative government; people will demand it!
Holes in Modernization Theory
How wealthy does a country have to be
before it tips to democracy?
 There are some poor countries that have
transited to democracy and maintained
the system (eg. India)
 There are some relatively rich countries
that have maintained dictatorships or
monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia).
Still… the correlation remains, but direction
of causality is not crystal clear

Elite Pacting: The“3rd Wave” Paradigm
1. Waves concept (Huntington);
*
First wave in Europe- 1828-1926 (industrialization)
*
Second wave LA/Africa 1943-1962 (de-colonization;
post WWII effect)
Third wave – 1974-1989, with what Huntington
calls a second phase beginning in 1991 onward (L.America,
Southern Europe; elite led)
*
2. Third Wave paradigm vs. modernization
theory:
Transition is not about society and changing socioeconomic structure as much as it is about ELITES
The “Third Wave” Paradigm
(Rustow, O’Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl)
•
•
Actors = Elites
• Splits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus Hardliners
• Moderates versus Radicals (in society)
Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts
• “Limit agenda of policy choice”
• Share proportionally in the distribution of benefits
• Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.
* Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers
* Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum
* Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy (“democracy without
democrats”)
Manezh Square, Moscow
March 10, 1991
3. The “Fourth Wave” Paradigm
(Bunce, Fish, McFaul,)

Actors = Elites AND Masses

Pacts Not a Key Ingredient for Success

Agenda of policy choice was not limited
• Distribution of benefits NOT shared proportionally
• Participation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to
elites
• Mobilization not a threat to democratization

Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success

Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum

You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) “Democrats”
4. Transitions from outside?
• Can democratic transition be imposed
from outside? (Iraq? Afghanistan?
Germany? Japan?)
• What can/do external actors do to
encourage transition?
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Media
Civil society
Demonstration effect
Contagion encouragement
Election monitoring training
What works???
Democratic Transitions
vs.
Democratic Consolidation
The causes of democratic transition are not necessarily
the same factors as the causes of democratic consolidation
Factors Facilitating Democratic
Stability (Consolidation)

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•
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Levels of Wealth
Income Equality
Form of transition: from below and non-violent; Pacted
Transitions Non-Violent Transitions; What to do with old
elites? “torturer problem” and “praetorian problem
Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (procedural
legitimacy)
Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”)
Diffusion: Democratic Neighborhoods
Performance (political and economic)
Time (Huntington): Two turnover test?
Income and Consolidation

“…there is no doubt that democracies are
more likely to be found in the more highly
developed countries. Yet the reason is not
that democracies are more likely to
emerge when countries develop under
authoritarianism, but that, however they
do emerge, they are more likely to survive
in countries that are already developed.”
(Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)
New Democracies and Economic
Performance
• Life expectancy of democracy with
decline in incomes: 19 years
• Life expectancy of democracy with rise
in incomes: 64 years
Why Is Wealth Good for
Democracy?


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Do democracies govern better?
Is democracy good for the poor? (eg.
increase in education, opportunity)?
Lowers the Intensity of Distributional
Conflicts? (greater equality?)
Does Prior Regime Type Matter?
Conventional Wisdom before 1989

Authoritarian Regimes Can
Democratize (Totalitarian cannot)
• Private Sector Exists
• “Resurrection” of Civil Society
• Restoring democratic institutions
• Changing “regime” easier than changing
whole system
Does Priori Regime Type Matter?
(Cont.)

Totalitarian Regimes Cannot
Democratize
• No Private Sector
• No Civil Society to “Resurrect”
• Stakes of Change Too High

Political and economic power intertwined
Does Prior Regime Type Matter?
The New Conventional Wisdom, (Geddes)

Military Juntas Easier to democratize
• Soldiers go back to barracks
• Old institutions can be revived

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“Re”democratization easier
Personalist Regimes
• Small group relying on state for wealth
• Who governs after death of dictator?

Hegemonic Party Systems
• Have bigger “selectorate”
• Can withstand crises better than generals,
personalist dictators: cooption
Survivability Rates of Autocracies
(1946-1999)

Military Regimes: 9 years
Personalist Regimes: 15 years
Single-party regimes: 23 years

Theocracies

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• Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years)
• Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)
2. Does institutional choice matter?
Parliamentary vs. Presidential
Systems:
Transitions to Dictatorship
1951-1990

39 Presidential Systems

13 Parliamentary Systems
Expected Life of Democracies
1950-1990

Parliamentary Systems: 73 Years

Presidential Systems: 21 Years
How to Undermine
Democracy (and
Development):
Lessons
from Russia
Quick refresher on fall of Soviet
Union

Gorbachev, 1985-1991
• Perestroika and glasnost
• Halting economic reform
• Opens up electoral process
• Attempted coup against him in August
1991; fails but Boris Yeltsin effectively
takes over
• Soviet Union collapses Dec. 25, 1991
• 15 independent countries emerge
Boris Yeltsin
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Elected first President of Russia in June 1991
Former Commie Boss and member of Politburo (so old
regime technically)
Conflict with Gorbachev
1991 August is his finest moment
Economic turmoil 1991-1998 (not all his fault)
Gives democracy a bad name “kleptocracy” because of
economic reforms of 1992-1998
• Chechen war
• Appoints Putin PM in August 1999
• Resigns in December 1999 and tells Putin “Take care of Russia” also
apologizes to Russians!
Fast forward to last year or so
“…there are no steps forward. On the
contrary, they are pulling us back into the
past, while the country is urgently in need
of modernization…
Putin wants to stay in power, but not so that
he can finally solve our most pressing
problems: education, healthcare, poverty.
The people are not being asked, and the
parties are puppets of the regime…”
--Mikhail Gorbachev, August 16,
2012
Population: 141.8 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$19,240 Source: The data above
were provided by The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012.
Modernization (a refresher)

Economic growth leads to social change
• Emergence of propertied middle class
• Urbanization
• Education levels rise
• Middle class demand representation and
accountable government in return for taxation
by state
• Mobilization of society leads to political
liberalization and eventually democratic
institutions of accountability
Modernization Defied?
Putin 2.0
Is Putin’s Russia defying modernization
theory ?
Russian economy grew 7-8 percent year on
year from 2000-2008; emergence of urban
middle class in big cities at least
Content, if not formal institutions, of
democracy steadily eroded, but now erosion
is accelerating under Putin version 2.0
What are implications for political and
economic development in the next 5-11
years?
Russia’s Economic Growth 1999-2012 (with
projected 2013)
Russian Economic Overview 2013
ECONOMY OVERVIEW
REGION
Eastern Europe & Central
Asia
INCOME CATEGORY
Upper middle income
POPULATION
141,930,000
GNI PER CAPITA (US$) 10,400
DOING BUSINESS 2013 RANK 112
DOING BUSINESS 2012 RANK 118
CHANGE IN RANK
6
(Source:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#)
Doing business in russia, 2013
Source:http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/russia/#
TOPIC RANKINGS
2013
2012

Starting a Business
101
Dealing with Construction Permits
105
178
4
180

Getting Electricity
184
184
No change
Registering Property
Getting Credit
Protecting Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading Across Borders
Enforcing Contracts
Resolving Insolvency
46
104
117
64
162
11
53
45
97
114
94
161
12
61
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Change in Rank
-1
-7
-3
30
-1
1
8
2
What is Putinism?
Undermining Development:
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Excessive dependence on natural
resource revenues, even post 2008
Crony capitalism
Extreme inequality
Low investment in human capital
Low investment in infrastructural
capital (even in oil)
Weak rule of law and uncertain
property rights discourage foreign
investment
What is Putinism?
Undermining Democracy
• Weak accountability; elections don’t bring
accountability, participation, or legitimacy
• Personalization of power; informal rules matter
more than formal institutions
• Media control; weak and selective rule of law
• All opposition viewed as subversive rather than
“loyal” or constructive
• state works against society in favor of private
interests over public; corruption flourishes;
security services discourage participation in
public politics
Undermining legitimacy?

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“Castling” of Medvedev/Putin in 201112
Reactions to electoral results Dec. 2011
and then protests in January and May
2012
Democracy not as easily managed as
once was so must manage further and
ultimately undermine it
• Crackdown on civil society
• Create imaginary enemies
• Get rid of foreign influence
Fall 2011
December 2011
Spring 2012
Spring 2012
Arab Spring, but no Russian Winter

Putin is still a relatively popular
incumbent whereas Mubarak, etc. were
not.
• Got 60%+ of vote in March 2012 with
some fraud (probably)
• No real prospect of overthrow
• No real alternative to Putin given poorly
organized opposition and his persecution of
potential opposition
• Be careful not to generalize based on
politics “Inside the Garden Ring” vs. “Rest
of Russia”
Evolution vs. Revolution


Not all protests need to lead to regime
change to have some positive effect
“Russian Winter” lead, at least initially, to
evolutionary, not revolutionary, change in
Russia
• Putin forced to campaign (sort of )
• Promises of some change and reform and now
has to pay for those
• Even evolutionary, incremental change, is
better than no change at all
• But change we seem to be seeing now is more
evolving and hardening of autocracy, not
democracy
The Modern Development Paradigm
(Fukuyama)
Economic Growth
Social Mobilization
Legitimacy
State-building
Rule of Law
Accountability
Lessons
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Wealth and democracy
Institutions matter
Sequence of development?
Performance legitimacy
External Influence on transition
ineffective?