Philosophy 220
Reproductive Technologies: Cloning
A Brave New World
Louise Brown, the first
child born using in vitro
fertilization
Dolly, the first successfully
cloned large animal.
The Issue
• The remarkable progress made in our ability to manipulate
mammalian reproduction raises some pressing moral
questions.
• While some technologies, like In vitro fertilization, seem at
this point relatively uncontroversial, others like reproductive
cloning (cloning aimed at producing a new member of the
species), therapeutic cloning (cloning aimed at the production
of embryos for use in medical interventions and research),
and genetic manipulation (or enhancement) (manipulation of
genetic material to enhance or correct the capacities of animals
or their offspring) raise a number of serious concerns.
• We can summarize the central moral concerns as follows:
o Is either type of cloning, or genetic manipulation or enhancement, ever
morally permissible?
o What explains why or why not?
Some Important
Terminology
• Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer: a form of asexual
reproduction where the nucleus of an unfertilized
mammalian egg is replaced by the nucleus of a donor
cell.
• Stem Cells: cells found throughout the body that can
develop into a wide variety of specific cell types.
o Adult Stem Cells are tissue or organ specific, embryonic stem cells are
pluripotent (they can become any cell type).
• Eugenics: program of improving a species through
genetic manipulation.
The Theories
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Natural Law Theory: Concerns about these reproductive
technologies can be understood as developing from a two different
directions. First, in as much a cloning is asexual reproduction, it may
be argued to be unnatural (Corvino?). Second, if procreation is a
fundamental good, then it and its products (children) are things for
which we have fundamental responsibilities. RT threaten to
undermine this fundamental character.
Kantian Moral Theory: Kantian concerns are going to focus on
whether or not we are treating the individuals produced through
these technologies as ends in themselves rather than as means.
Consequentialism: As always, consequentialists are going to focus
our attention on likely or possible consequences of that adoption of
these technologies.
Rights-Based Theory: How should we balance the rights of the donors
against the rights of the individuals produced.
Virtue Theory: Is cloning consistent with virtue? What sorts of habits or
dispositions would result from the adoption of these technologies?
Robertson, “Human
Cloning”
• Robertson’s starting point is the assumption that at some
point we will develop human cloning programs that are
safe and effective.
• If we reach this point, for Robertson the question
becomes would such programs fall within the range of
what could be called “procreative freedom,” the liberty
to exercise what for him is a fundamental right to decide
whether or not to reproduce.
o For Robertson, “reproduction” involves not only the creation of new life, but also
the rearing of that individual (430c2).
• Though obviously a moral issue, Robertson is also
concerned about the creation of appropriate public
policy.
The Call for Human
Cloning
• One question we might ask is why people might be
interested in cloning.
o Clearly, many people would be interested in pursuit of a family, motivated by the
desire to have and rear a child.
• A couple might choose to have and rear a clone because
of the advantages of cloning over other assisted
reproductive techniques; or because it gives them a
choice over their offspring’s genetics.
• In this context, the key question is, “Can cloning be used
responsibly to help a couple achieve legitimate
reproductive goals?”
o And, If so, do these uses fall within the “procreative freedom” of individuals?
Procreative Freedom and
Cloning
• It is generally acknowledged that people should be free
to make decisions about their reproduction.
• On the assumption that infertile couples have the same
interests in reproducing as fertile couples, the fact that
they are infertile should not bar them from reproducing
with technological assistance any more than the blind
should be barred from reading with the assistance of
Braille.
• Assuming non-problematic technological capacity,
Robertson insists that couples should have the right to
gamete and embryo donors for the purposes of
reproductive and therapeutic cloning.
Reproductive and
Theraputic Cloning
• For Robertson, if most current forms of assisted reproduction
and genetic selection fall under procreative freedom, so too
should human cloning, whether reproductive or therapeutic.
o Unlike other forms of assisted reproduction, however, cloning is not
concerned only with producing a child, but also with the genes the child
will have.
• People make decisions to reproduce or not in part because of
the desire for experiences that reproduction would bring
about.
o Since the desire for these experiences are central to the decision whether or
not a couple reproduces, a right to reproductive decisions based on these
experiences should follow.
o Since such decisions may be made on the basis of the characteristics of the
child, some right to choose the child’s characteristics should follow as well.
What’s the Difference,
anyway?
• Cloning is so similar to standard coital and non-coital
forms of reproduction that they should be treated in the
same way, regardless of who serves as the genetic source
for the clone.
• A couple may choose to clone an existing embryo, either
through embryo splitting or nuclear transfer.
o Such an action is intended to bring about the birth of a child that will be reared
by its parents, whether as an additional child, or to replace a child who has died.
• Couples may seek to clone embryos not to produce a
child to rear, but for embryonic stem cells for an existing
child.
o As such an act involves reproduction and enables an existing child to live, it too
should be found within the couple’s procreative liberty.
The Boys (or Girls) from
Brazil?
• Parent’s might instead choose to clone an existing child,
for a variety of possible reasons.
o Where the existing child is so perfect the parents don’t want to “roll the
dice” again.
o Where the existing child might need an organ or tissue transplant.
o Where the existing child is dying (or has died) and the parents want to
allow it to “continue” to live.
• These might be the same (or similar) motivations for a
couple who reproduces in standard coital or non-coital
ways.
• As such standard reproduction would fall within the
realm of procreative liberty, so too should cloning to
produce the same ends.
What about Clones of Third
Parties?
• A desire to clone another individual is most likely to
arise in couples who are otherwise unable to reproduce.
• We already recognize that couples have a right to use
gamete donation (sperm and egg donors) to form a
family.
• As such, we should also consider embryo donation as a
part of the same liberty.
o It is not a great stretch to recognize the donation of the DNA of a third party as a
part of that liberty.
o Without some overriding harm, there seems no reason for this to fall outside
procreative freedom.
o Of course, the couple must be willing to raise the child—if not, it would seem to
treat children as a commodity.
The Greatest Love of All
• Of course, an individual might be interested in raising a clone
of themselves.
• Robertson suggests that the right way to view the situation is
as a variation on the right to use a gamete donor.
o I’m donating to myself!
o Jokes aside, if such a right exists, it plausibly follows that a possible parent has a right
to choose the source of gamete.
o As such, they should be able to choose their own DNA.
• This is reproduction in it’s purest sense, “[T]he genetic
replication involved in cloning [oneself] is directly and
quintessentially reproductive” (435c1).
• Again, only some overriding harm could justify restrictions
on self-cloning.
What about that slope?
• There are some common slippery slope arguments
that Robertson briefly considers and dismisses.
• The sort of arguments he discusses concern the
possible implications of the widespread acceptance
of cloning on traditional ideas of reproduction,
family, parenting, etc.
• His responds by pointing out that these ideas have
been changing for a long time (perhaps they are
always contested ideas, always in flux) and that we
do no specific harm to them if we recognize cloning
as another reproductive choice.
Policy?
• On the assumption that human cloning could be
done safely and reliably, Robertson believes it
should be permitted.
• Of course, some regulations should be in place
to minimize any possible general harms.
• The most important one he articulates is that
there should be no cloning without associated
parenting.
o This would prevent the possible commodification of clones, or
the creation of an underclass as was portrayed in fiction like
Brave New World and in movies like Gattaca.
Kass, “Preventing”
• Kass raises four particular objections to the project of human
cloning:
1.
2.
3.
4.
That human cloning constitutes unethical experimentation.
That human cloning threatens identity and individuality.
That human cloning turns procreation into manufacture.
That human cloning means despotism over children and the perversion of
parenthood.
• It’s easy to develop possibilities that seem disquieting:
o Kass reviews a number of the possibilities that Robertson happily accepted, but with a
quite different tone.
• Of course, differences in tone do not amount to an argument,
even if the discomfort he portrays suggests that, “cloning
represents a profound defilement of our given nature as
procreative beings, and of the social relations built on this
natural ground” (441c2)
Human Cloning Constitutes
Unethical Experimentation
• Cloning could easily be used to reproduce living or
deceased persons without their consent.
• The success rate of cloning (at least at first) will probably
not be very high.
o Fewer than two to three percent of all animal cloning attempts have succeeded.
o Before Dolly was created, Scottish scientists transferred 277 adult nuclei into
sheep eggs and implanted 29 clonal embryos. Dolly was the only living result.
o Many of the so-called “successes” have included major disabilities and
deformities.
• There is good reason to think the same sort of success
rate would be found in attempts at human cloning.
• “We cannot ethically even get to know whether or not
human cloning is feasible” (442c1)
Human Cloning Threatens
Identity and Individuality
• Even if human cloning were successful, the clone may
experience concerns about his distinctive identity:
o He will be in genotype and appearance identical to another human being.
o The person to whom he is identical will be his “father” or “mother”.
• There are unique, unprecedented dangers of mixing the
twin relation with the parent-child relation.
o Virtually no one will be able to treat his clone as he would a traditional child.
o “What will happen when the adolescent clone of Mommy becomes the spitting
image of the woman with whom Daddy once fell in love?” (442c2).
• The life of the clone will constantly be scrutinized in
relation to that of the older version.
o “Unlike ‘normal’ identical twins, a cloned individual—copied from whomever—
will be saddled with a genotype that has already lived.” (ibid.)
o The matter will only be worse for the clone of somebody famous.
Human Cloning Turns
Procreation into Manufacture
• Human cloning would represent a giant step toward
turning procreation into manufacture.
• Steps have already been made in this direction with in
vitro fertilization and genetic testing of embryos.
• Children would become simply another kind of manmade thing, with prospective “parents” adopting a
technocratic attitude towards their children.
o “The problem is that any child whose being, character, and capacities exist owing
to human design does not stand on the same plane with its makers” (443c1).
• The effect is the dehumanization of children and the
commodification of human life.
Human Cloning Means Despotism over
Children and Perversion of Parenthood
• Normally, in producing children, we embrace the
novelty of the child, and accept the limits of our
control.
• Reproduction by human cloning will create a
“profound misunderstanding” of the parent-child
relationship.
o Children are not our property or possessions.
o Children are supposed to live their own lives, not ours.
o Whereas most parents have hopes for their children, cloning parents will
have expectations.
o Children will hold their cloners fully responsible for their nature and their
nurture.
Down the Slope
• Defenders of cloning want large-scale cloning for
animals, and wish to preserve cloning as a human option
for exercising our “right to reproduce.”
o We already practice forms of “unnatural,” artificial, and extra-marital
reproduction, as well as early forms of eugenics.
o So, defenders argue, cloning is “no big deal.”
• However, such a principle “slips” all the way down to
producing children whose entire genetic makeup will be
the product of eugenics, without limit.
• Once this is a possibility, parents will leap at the
opportunity to “improve” their offspring: “Indeed, not to
do so will be socially regarded as a form of child
neglect” (444c2).