SOCRATES ON
DISAGREEMENTS AND
KNOWLEDGE
Introduction
The (epistemological) problem of peer disagreement:
Epistemic peer: someone just as smart as you are, and just
as well acquainted with the evidence.
Introduction
A case of peer disagreement:
You believe that p,
Someone else (a peer) believes that not-p.
You meet and talk.
After a thorough discussion (“full disclosure”, i.e. after both
parties to the disagreement have presented their reasons),
the disagreement remains.
Introduction
What should you think/believe now?
• Should you be less confident that p?
• Should you not change your mind at all?
• Should you with-hold judgment that p?
• Should you think that the person you had the discussion is
not your peer?
Introduction
The significance of the problem:
(a) Practical significance – situations similar to the idealized
peer disagreement case abound.
(b) Theoretical significance – peer disagreement is linked to
central philosophical issues of (epistemic) justification,
knowledge, etc.
Introduction
Outline of the presentation:
(i) Socrates on disagreeing with yourself.
(ii) Socrates on disagreeing with others.
(iii) Remarks on a (possible) Socratic reaction to peer
disagreement.
Disagreeing With Yourself
• Socrates does not address the issue of peer-
disagreement directly.
• But, for Socrates, there is a connection between (peer)
disagreement and a lack of knowledge.
•
• This connection has ramifications for the issue of peer
disagreement.
Part I
Disagreeing With Yourself
Disagreeing With Yourself
Socratic method (elenchos), in Plato’s early dialogues:
• Socrates asks the interlocutor a question the answer to
which is meant to exhibit the interlocutor’s wisdom
concerning the definition of some moral concept.
• The interlocutor provides the answer, p.
• The interlocutor provides answers, q, r, and s to a series
of other Socratic questions.
• Socrates goes on to show that these further answers
entail the negation of the original answer and that the
interlocutor believes both p and not-p.
Disagreeing With Yourself
(Charmides 159B-160D, abridged):
“So I think,” he said, “taking it all together, that what you ask
about [i.e. what is temperance] is a sort of quietness.” “Perhaps
you are right,” I said, “Let’s see if there is anything in it. Tell me,
temperance is one of the admirable things, isn’t it?” “Yes indeed,”
he said. “Well then,” I said, “is facility in learning more admirable
or difficulty in learning?” “Facility.” “But facility in learning is
learning quickly? And difficulty in learning is learning quietly and
slowly?” “Yes.” “And to teach another person quickly—isn’t this
far more admirable than to teach him quietly and slowly?” “Yes.”
“Well then, to recall and to remember quietly and slowly—is this
more admirable, or to do it vehemently and quickly?”
“Vehemently,” he said, “and quickly.” … “Therefore, Charmides,” I
said, “in all these cases, we think that quickness and speed are
more admirable than slowness and quietness?” “It seems likely,”
he said. “We conclude then that temperance would not be a kind
of quietness.”
Disagreeing With Yourself
• Socrates asks the interlocutor (Charmides) “what is
temperance”.
• Charmides provides the answer, p (temperance is “a sort
of quietness”).
• Charmides provides answers, to a series of other Socratic
questions (“temperance is admirable”, “learning quietly is
not admirable”).
• Socrates goes on to show that these answers entail the
negation of the original answer (that “temperance is not
quietness”) and that Charmides believes both p and not-p.
What’s the point of this procedure?
Disagreeing With Yourself
“Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles, but will be
dissonant with you all your life long. And yet for my part, my
good man, I think it’s better to have my lyre or a chorus
that I might lead out of tune and dissonant, and have
the vast majority of men disagree with me and
contradict me, than to be out of harmony with myself,
to contradict myself, though I’m only one person.”
(Gorgias 482B-C, modified)
Disagreeing With Yourself
• Disagreeing with yourself: holding contradictory beliefs.
• Beliefs are dispositional, one need not be aware that one
is holding inconsistent beliefs.
• Why is disagreeing with yourself so bad?
Disagreeing With Yourself
“Well then, given that your opinion wavers so much, how
likely is it that you know about justice and injustice?”
(Alciabiades 112D, abridged)
Disagreeing With Yourself
• Two contradictory beliefs about the same subject matter cannot
both be true.
• Knowledge entails having true beliefs about the subject matter.
• If one holds contradictory beliefs about the subject matter, one
holds false beliefs about the subject matter, and therefore does
not know.
• Even one’s true beliefs do not count as knowledge, if the
“neighboring beliefs” are false.
• Disagreement within one person shows that this person lacks
the relevant knowledge.
Disagreeing With Yourself
• The main aim of Socratic method – showing that the
interlocutor disagrees with himself/herself, and therefore
lacks (moral) knowledge.
• Consequently, if the interlocutor disagrees with himself, he
can never live a happy life (unless he acquires the moral
knowledge).
Part II
Disagreeing With Others
Disagreeing With Others
 Socrates disavows moral knowledge.
 Socrates also thinks that moral knowledge is necessary
for a just and happy life.
 This forces him to search for a teacher, someone who
does have moral knowledge (a “moral expert”).
Disagreeing With Others
Danger!!
“There is a far greater risk in buying teachings than in buying food.
When you buy food and drink from the merchant you can take each item
back home from the store in its own container and before you ingest it into
your body you can lay it all out and call in an expert for consultation as to
what should be eaten or drunk and what not, and how much and when. So
there’s not much risk in your purchase. But you cannot carry teachings
away in a separate container. You put down your money and take the
teaching away in your soul by having learned it, and off you go, either
helped or injured.“ (Protagoras 314B)
How to decide who should teach us?
Disagreeing With Others
The problem for Socrates is that, at least when it comes to
morality, there are no universally accepted moral experts.
How should a non-expert recognize experts?
Disagreeing With Others
Socrates takes the indicator-properties that enable to
recognize expertise to be the following:
 produce success in practicing expertise
 give an account (a definition) of the particular things that
belong the domain of expertise,
 make reliable prognostic statements about the particular
things that belong to the domain of expertise
 recognize another expert in the same domain
 teach his/her knowledge
 expert agrees with other experts on the facts of her
expertise
Disagreeing With Others
• Lack of disagreement is an indicator-property of the
presence of expertise
• In contemporary epistemology: Disagreement shows (or
may show) that at least one of the putative knowers does
not, in fact, know (or is not an expert). But which one?
Disagreeing With Others
• Lack of disagreement is an indicator-property of the
presence of knowledge/expertise
• In contemporary epistemology: Disagreement shows that
at least one of the putative knowers does not, in fact,
know (or is not an expert). But which one?
• Socratic position: Disagreement shows that neither of the
putative knowers does, in fact, know (or is an expert).
Disagreeing With Others
S: “Yes, my noble friend, people in general are good
teachers of that [Greek language], and it would be only fair
to praise them for their teaching.” A: “Why?” S: “Because
they have what it takes to be good teachers of the subject.”
A: “What do you mean by that?” Socrates: “Don’t you see
that somebody who is going to teach anything must
first know it himself? Isn’t that right?” Alciabiades: “Of
course.” S: “And don’t people who know something
agree with each other, not disagree?” A: “Yes.” S: “If
people disagree about something, would you say that
they know it?” A: Of course not. S: “Then how could
they be teachers of it?” (Alcibiades 111A)
Disagreeing With Others
In the context of the dialogue Alcibiades, Socrates is
making a specific point: people (in general) can teach only
the things they know (e.g. language), but not the things
they don’t know (what is justice, what is virtue. etc.).
But Socrates also makes a very general point:
(D) In case of disagreement, neither of the parties has
knowledge
Does (D) make sense?
Disagreeing With Others
Background assumptions:
The disagreement is persistent and remains in place after
“full disclosure” (i.e. after both parties to the disagreement
have presented their reasons).
The parties of the disagreement are both equally open-
minded, gifted, etc. They are peers.
Disagreeing With Others
Improved (D): In case of disagreement about p involving
mutual full disclosure of reasons and arguments for and
against p, and given that the disagreeing parties are
epistemic peers, neither of the parties can be said to know
that p.
Does Improved (D) make sense?
Disagreeing With Others
But sometimes one can know whithout having access to
one’s reasons (externalism)?!
Sometimes one just can’t share one’s reasons
(internalism)?!
Socratic response:
• If you know, you always have access to your reasons.
• There are no reasons that can’t be shared.
Disagreeing With Others
Dialectical notion of knowledge.
• Knowledge is essentially transferable.
• One must have knowledge in order to transfer knowledge.
• If one knows then, necassarily, one is able to teach (in the
sense of explain why p is true, and also convince that p is
true) what one knows.
Disagreeing With Others
Whether I know that p is not only up to me, it also
depends on whether other people understand me.
In that sense, Socrates’ notion of knowledge is social
(unlike, e.g. Descartes’s).
Disagreeing With Others
• Given that Socraties is committed to the dialectical notion
of knowledge, persistent disagreement is possible only if
one fails to know (i.e. fails to explain and convince).
• Improved (D) makes perfect sense (at least from the
Socratic viewpoint).
Disagreeing With Others
• If one disagrees after full disclosure, this means that one
is unable to teach (what one thinks one knows). If one is
not able to teach (what think one knows), one does not, in
fact, know.
• The indicator-property of the lack of disagreement is not
an independent criterion for expertise – the lack of
disagreement among experts follows, for Socrates, from
their ability to teach (to transmit knowledge).
Disagreeing With Others
What would a Socratic reaction to peer-disagreement look
like?
“It’s not the fact that we disagree that should make me less
confident. Rather, it’s the fact that I can’t convince you
(“teach you”) that should make me think that I don’t know
what I think I know.”
Socratic approach is interestingly different from the
contemporary approaches, since in invokes the notion of
knowledge, rather than the notion of “degrees of
conviction”.
Conclusion
• Given the dialectical notion of knowledge, both types of
disagreement (intra-personal and inter-personal) indicate
lack of knowledge (although not of truth).
Conclusion
• Given the dialectical notion of knowledge, both types of
disagreement (intra-personal and inter-personal) indicate
lack of knowledge (although not of truth).
• If you disagree with someone (who is open-minded and
willing to learn), and are unable to convince her, Socrates
would say that it is very likely that you don’t know what
you are talking about!
Disagreement and Knowledge
Thank you for your attention!