T-Surveillance
A. Domestic surveillance is info gathering on US persons
IT Law Wiki 15 IT Law Wiki 2015 http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Domestic_surveillance
Definition Edit
Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons.
B. Backdoors are used for cyberwarfare—not surveillance
Gellman and Nakashima 13
(Barton Gellman. Barton Gellman writes for the national staff. He has contributed to three Pulitzer Prizes for The Washington Post, most
recently the 2014 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service. He is also a senior fellow at the Century Foundation and visiting lecturer at Princeton’s
Woodrow Wilson School. After 21 years at The Post, where he served tours as legal, military, diplomatic, and Middle East correspondent,
Gellman resigned in 2010 to concentrate on book and magazine writing. He returned on temporary assignment in 2013 and 2014 to anchor
The Post's coverage of the NSA disclosures after receiving an archive of classified documents from Edward Snowden. Ellen Nakashima is a
national security reporter for The Washington Post. She focuses on issues relating to intelligence, technology and civil liberties. She
previously served as a Southeast Asia correspondent for the paper. She wrote about the presidential candidacy of Al Gore and co-authored a
biography of Gore, and has also covered federal agencies, Virginia state politics and local affairs. She joined the Post in 1995. "U.S. spy
agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011, documents show," Washington Post. 8-30-2013.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-documentsshow/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-fd7ce041d814_story.html//ghs-kw)
an implant’s purpose is to create a back door for future access. “You pry open the window
somewhere and leave it so when you come back the owner doesn’t know it’s unlocked, but you can
Sometimes
get back in when you want to,” said one intelligence official, who was speaking generally about the topic and was not privy to the budget. The official spoke on the
condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive technology. Under U.S. cyberdoctrine, these operations are known as “exploitation,” not “attack,”
but they are essential precursors both to attack and defense. By the end of this year, GENIE is projected to control
at least 85,000 implants in strategically chosen machines around the world. That is quadruple the number — 21,252 — available
in 2008, according to the U.S. intelligence budget. The NSA appears to be planning a rapid expansion of those numbers, which were
limited until recently by the need for human operators to take remote control of compromised machines. Even with a staff of 1,870 people, GENIE made full use of only 8,448 of the 68,975
the NSA has brought online an
automated system , code-named TURBINE, that is capable of managing “potentially millions of implants” for intelligence gathering
machines with active implants in 2011. For GENIE’s next phase, according to an authoritative reference document,
“and
active attack.”
C. THE AFFIRMATIVE INTERPRETATION IS BAD FOR DEBATE
Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and their interpretation
makes the topic too big. They include cyberwarfare--- and thus include TONS of nonsurveillance affs destroying limits.
D. T is voter for good, well-prepared debating
Foreign Backdoors CP
Counterplan: the United States federal government should ban the creation of
intentionally deployed vulnerabilities in domestic data security technologies ¶ but
should not prohibit the surveillance of such vulnerabilities and should mandate
clandestine corporate disclosure of foreign-government-mandated backdoors to the
United States federal government.
1. Backdoors are inevitable—we’ll use backdoors created by foreign governments
Wittes 15
(Benjamin Wittes. Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is
the author of several books and a member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law. "Thoughts on Encryption and
Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits," Lawfare. 7-22-2015. http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-encryption-and-going-dark-partii-debate-merits//ghs-kw)
Still another approach is to let other governments do the dirty work. The computer scientists' report
cites the possibility of other sovereigns adopting their own extraordinary access regimes as a reason for
the U.S. to go slow: Building in exceptional access would be risky enough even if only one law
enforcement agency in the world had it. But this is not only a US issue. The UK government promises
legislation this fall to compel communications service providers, including US-based corporations, to
grant access to UK law enforcement agencies, and other countries would certainly follow suit. China has
already intimated that it may require exceptional access. If a British-based developer deploys a
messaging application used by citizens of China, must it provide exceptional access to Chinese law
enforcement? Which countries have sufficient respect for the rule of law to participate in an international exceptional access framework?
How would such determinations be made? How would timely approvals be given for the millions of new products with communications
capabilities? And how would this new surveillance ecosystem be funded and supervised? The US and UK governments have fought long and
hard to keep the governance of the Internet open, in the face of demands from authoritarian countries that it be brought under state control.
Does not the push for exceptional access represent a breathtaking policy reversal? I am certain that the
computer scientists are
correct that foreign governments will move in this direction, but I think they are misreading the consequences of this.
China and Britain will do this irrespective of what the United States does, and that fact may well
create potential opportunity for the U.S. After all, if China and Britain are going to force U.S.
companies to think through the problem of how to provide extraordinary access without
compromising general security, perhaps the need to do business in those countries will provide much
of the incentive to think through the hard problems of how to do it. Perhaps countries far less
solicitous than ours of the plight of technology companies or the privacy interests of their users will
force the research that Comey can only hypothesize. Will Apple then take the view that it can offer phones to
users in China which can be decrypted for Chinese authorities when they require it but that it's
technically impossible to do so in the United States?
Military DA
1. Cyber-deterrence is strong now but keeping our capabilities in line with other
powers’ is key to maintain stability
Healey 14
(Healey, Jason. Jason Healey is a Nonresident Senior Fellow for the Cyber Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council and Senior Research
Scholar at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, focusing on international cooperation, competition, and conflict
in cyberspace. From 2011 to 2015, he worked as the Director of the Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative. Starting his career in the United
States Air Force, Mr. Healey earned two Meritorious Service Medals for his early work in cyber operations at Headquarters Air Force at the
Pentagon and as a plankholder (founding member) of the Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense, the world's first joint cyber
warfighting unit. He has degrees from the United States Air Force Academy (political science), Johns Hopkins University (liberal arts), and
James Madison University (information security). "Commentary: Cyber Deterrence Is Working," Defense News. 7-30-2014.
http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140730/DEFFEAT05/307300017/Commentary-Cyber-Deterrence-Working//ghs-kw)
Despite the mainstream view of cyberwar professionals and theorists,
cyber deterrence is not only possible but has been
working for decades. Cyberwar professionals are in the midst of a decades-old debate on how America could deter
adversaries from attacking us in cyberspace. In 2010, then-Deputy Defense Secretary Bill Lynn summed up the prevailing view
that “Cold War deterrence models do not apply to cyberspace” because of low barriers to entry and the anonymity of Internet attacks. Cyber
attacks, unlike intercontinental missiles, don’t have a return address. But this view is too narrow and technical. The
history of how
nations have actually fought (or not fought) conflicts in cyberspace makes it clear deterrence is not only
theoretically possible, but is actually keeping an upper threshold to cyber hostilities. The hidden hand of
deterrence is most obvious in the discussion of “a digital Pearl Harbor.” In 2012, then-Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta described his worries of such a bolt-from-the-blue attack that could cripple the United
States or its military. Though his phrase raised eyebrows among cyber professionals, there was broad agreement with the
basic implication: The United States is strategically vulnerable and potential adversaries have both the
means for strategic attack and the will to do it. But worrying about a digital Pearl Harbor actually dates
not to 2012 but to testimony by Winn Schwartau to Congress in 1991. So cyber experts have been
handwringing about a digital Pearl Harbor for more than 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl
Harbor. Waiting for Blow To Come? Clearly there is a different dynamic than recognized by conventional wisdom. For over
two decades, the United States has had its throat bared to the cyber capabilities of potential adversaries
(and presumably their throats are as bared to our capabilities), yet the blow has never come. There is no
solid evidence anyone has ever been killed by any cyber attack; no massive power outages, no disruptions of hospitals or faking of hospital
records, no tampering of dams causing a catastrophic flood. The
Internet is a fierce domain and conflicts are common
between nations. But deterrence — or at least restraint — has kept a lid on the worst. Consider: ■ Large
nations have never launched strategically significant disruptive cyber attacks against other large nations.
China, Russia and the United States seem to have plans to do so not as surprise attacks from a clear sky, but as part of a major (perhaps even
existential) international security crisis — not unlike the original Pearl Harbor. Cyber
attacks between equals have always
stayed below the threshold of death and destruction. ■ Larger nations do seem to be willing to launch
significant cyber assaults against rivals but only during larger crises and below the threshold of death
and destruction, such as Russian attacks against Estonia and Georgia or China egging on patriotic hackers to disrupt computers in dustups with Japan, Vietnam or the Philippines. The United States and Israel have perhaps come closest to the threshold with the Stuxnet attacks
but even here, the attacks were against a very limited target (Iranian programs to enrich uranium) and hardly out of the blue. ■ Nations seem
almost completely unrestrained using cyber espionage to further their security (and sometimes commercial) objectives and only slightly more
restrained using low levels of cyber force for small-scale disruption, such as Chinese or Russian disruption of dissidents’ websites or British
disruption of chat rooms used by Anonymous to coordinate protest attacks. In
a discussion about any other kind of military
power, such as nuclear weapons, we would have no problem using the word deterrence to describe
nations’ reluctance to unleash capabilities against one another. Indeed, a comparison with nuclear
deterrence is extremely relevant, but not necessarily the one that Cold Warriors have recognized. Setting a
Ceiling Nuclear weapons did not make all wars unthinkable, as some early postwar thinkers had hoped.
Instead, they provided a ceiling under which the superpowers fought all kinds of wars, regular and
irregular. The United States and Soviet Union, and their allies and proxies, engaged in lethal, intense conflicts from Korea to Vietnam and
through proxies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Nuclear warheads did not stop these wars, but did set an upper
threshold neither side proved willing to exceed. Likewise, the most cyber capable nations (including America,
China and Russia) have been more than willing to engage in irregular cyber conflicts, but have stayed well
under the threshold of strategic cyber warfare, creating a de facto norm. Nations have proved just as
unwilling to launch a strategic attack in cyberspace as they are in the air, land, sea or space. The new
norm is same as the old norm. This norm of strategic restraint is a blessing but still is no help to deter cyber crime or the
irregular conflicts that have long occurred under the threshold. Cyber espionage and lesser state-sponsored cyber disruption seem to be
increasing markedly in the last few years.
2. Backdoors are key to cyberoffensive capabilities
Schneier 13
(Schneier. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America
Foundation's Open Technology. He is an American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer. He is the author of
several books on general security topics, computer security and cryptography. He is also a contributing writer for The Guardian news
organization.[ "US Offensive Cyberwar Policy.” 06-21-2013. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/06/us_offensive_cy.html//ghskw)
Cyberattacks have the potential to be both immediate and devastating. They can disrupt
communications systems, disable national infrastructure, or, as in the case of Stuxnet, destroy nuclear reactors; but
only if they've been created and targeted beforehand. Before launching cyberattacks against another country,
we have to go through several steps. We have to study the details of the computer systems they're
running and determine the vulnerabilities of those systems. If we can't find exploitable vulnerabilities, we need
to create them: leaving "back doors," in hacker speak. Then we have to build new cyberweapons designed
specifically to attack those systems. Sometimes we have to embed the hostile code in those networks -- these are called "logic
bombs" -- to be unleashed in the future. And we have to keep penetrating those foreign networks, because
computer systems always change and we need to ensure that the cyberweapons are still effective. Like
our nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, our cyberweapons arsenal must be pretargeted and ready to launch. That's
what Obama directed the US Cyber Command to do. We can see glimpses of how effective we are in Snowden's
allegations that the NSA is currently penetrating foreign networks around the world: "We hack network
backbones -- like huge Internet routers, basically -- that give us access to the communications of
hundreds of thousands of computers without having to hack every single one."
3. Loss of cyber-offensive capabilities incentivizes China to take Taiwan—turns heg
and the economy
Hjortdal 11
(Magnus Hjortdal received his BSc and MSc in Political Science, with a specialization in IR, from the University of Copenhagen. He was an
Assistant Lecturer at the University of Copenhagen, a Research Fellow at the Royal Danish Defence College, and is now the Head of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Denmark. “China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence ,” Journal of Strategic Security,
Vol. 4 No. 2, Summer 2011: Strategic Security in the Cyber Age, Article 2, pp 1-24.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=jss//ghs-kw)
China's military strategy mentions cyber capabilities as an area that the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
should invest in and use on a large scale.13 The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has also declared that China's
development in the cyber area increasingly concerns him,14 and that there has been a decade-long trend of cyber attacks
emanating from China.15 Virtually all digital and electronic military systems can be attacked via cyberspace. Therefore, it is essential for
a state to develop capabilities in this area if it wishes to challenge the present American hegemony. The
interesting question then is whether China is developing capabilities in cyberspace in order to deter the United States.16 China's military
strategists describe cyber capabilities as a powerful asymmetric opportunity in a deterrence strategy.19
Analysts consider that an "important theme in Chinese writings on computer-network operations (CNO)
is the use of computer-network attack (CNA) as the spearpoint of deterrence."20 CNA increases the
enemy's costs to become too great to engage in warfare in the first place, which Chinese analysts judge
to be essential for deterrence.21 This could , for example, leave China with the potential ability to deter the
United States from intervening in a scenario concerning Taiwan. CNO is viewed as a focal point for the People's
Liberation Army, but it is not clear how the actual capacity functions or precisely what conditions it works under.22 If a state with
superpower potential (here China) is to create an opportunity to ascend militarily and politically in the
international system, it would require an asymmetric deterrence capability such as that described
here.23 It is said that the "most significant computer network attack is characterized as a pre-emption
weapon to be used under the rubric of the rising Chinese strategy of […] gaining mastery before the
enemy has struck."24 Therefore, China, like other states seeking a similar capacity, has recruited massively within the hacker milieu
inside China.25 Increasing resources in the PLA are being allocated to develop assets in relation to cyberspace.26 The improvements are visible:
The PLA has established "information warfare" capabilities,27 with a special focus on cyber warfare that, according to their doctrine, can be
used in peacetime.28 Strategists from the PLA advocate the use of virus and hacker attacks that can paralyze and surprise its enemies.29
Aggressive and Widespread Cyber Attacks from China and the International Response China's
use of asymmetric capabilities,
especially cyber warfare, could pose a serious threat to the American economy.30 Research and development in
cyber espionage figure prominently in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) that is being drafted by both the Chinese central government and
the PLA.31 Analysts say that China
could well have the most extensive and aggressive cyber warfare capability in
the world, and that this is being driven by China's desire for "global-power status."32 These observations do not
come out of the blue, but are a consequence of the fact that authoritative Chinese writings on the subject present cyber warfare as an obvious
asymmetric instrument for balancing overwhelming (mainly U.S.) power, especially in case of open conflict, but also as a deterrent.33
4. Escalates to nuclear war and turns the economy
Landay 2k
(Jonathan S. Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, -2K [“Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in
Asian Conflicts”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis. Ghs-kw)
Few if any experts think China
and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight.
a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even
start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a
But even
few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped
keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as
high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a
Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering
confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential
disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser
Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are
100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United
States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea.
While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a
conflict between the two could end the global
taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation
regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports
and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs
depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.
Gender Privacy K
1. Discourse of National Security is dominated by masculine high politics--- and
ostracizes female voices
Blanchard 3 (Eric M. Blanchard, is currently Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Political Science
department at Columbia University in New York City. Summer 2003. “Signs: Journal of Women in Culture
and Society”. Signs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Summer 2003), pp. 1289-1312 //MV)
National security discourses are typically part of the elite world of masculine high politics. Statesmen,
diplomats, and the military conduct the business of states, and too often war, imbuing the relations and
processes of the society of nation-states with an atmosphere seemingly devoid of women and an
interest in issues of concern to women. The academic discipline charged with theorizing this world, international
relations (IR), has only recently made a place for feminist analysis, and then only grudgingly. Academic
feminism and IR are contemporaries, each developing through the war-torn twentieth century and
motivated by some of the same international events, although work in IR often overlooks women’s
contributions, such as the 1919 International Congress of Women, which ran parallel to Versailles (Grant 1992, 86). While in some respects
estranged from the mainstream of IR, feminist and gender scholars have launched an important critique of the
core issues of the discipline: war, peace, and the quest to secure the boundaries of the nation-state. In a
rapidly changing, post-9/11 world, feminist voices must be heard if the international system is to
achieve a more comprehensive security in the face of terror networks, technowar, and mounting civilian
casualties.
2. The alternative is to vote negative and endorse a “politic of testifying” that replaces
public representation with the private world--- thus bringing the oppression of women
into light
3. Patriarchal Militarism will cause extinction—recognition of the non-male in a
reversal of the public and private is key to prevent it
Reardon 93 (Betty, UN consultant, 1993, Women and Peace—Feminist Visions of Global Security p.
21-25 //MV)
Women's traditional roles of engaging in multiple activities, as generalists, have given them this broad, integrated view of peace and secunty
that provides a hopeful alternative to the more narrow and fragmented views that most influence present processes of national and
international security policy formation. Perhaps nothing
can be more provocative of new ways of thinking about
security than turning the present notions upside down. The shortest. strongest. and perhaps mostmeaningful way of
describing this view is reversing the common relationship between means and ends. Women, as is evident from the foregoing passages quoted
from The Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies, see peace as the route to security rather than the other way around. Gandhi's assertion, "There is
no way to peace. Peace is the way," is an excellent summary of a feminine view of security, a view largely formed by women's experience of
nurturing, caregiving, and household maintenance. Peace, as will be noted in the discussion of positive peace in chapter 3, provides the
conditions and resources most conductive to caregiving and nurturing. War and preparation for war reduce and destroy resources and limit and
complicate the conditions for care and nurture. Women who bring forth human life, and carry the responsibility for maintaining it and providing
it with the most humane quality possible see security in terms of the possibilities for life, its maintenance, and the improvement of its quality.
Security lies in things hoped for and planned for, perhaps more than in things as they are. Secunty is in large part futures perception.
Security, we argue, is as much a matter of perception as "reality"; as is well attested by the real insecurity
produced by the present security system which (in spite of the warming ofthe Cold War) still relies heavilv on armed
force and the threat system, a reliance which erodes all other dimensions of security. Authentic human security,
we believe, derives mainly from the reasonable expectation of well being. In that women's lives have been largely devoted to fulfilling
expectations of well-being, feminists who see the relevance and values of women's experience discern it in a new multi-dimensional approach
to security… The holistic feminist approach contrasts starkly with conventional security, views and policies which reduce virtually all the issues
to the questions of "national security" and "military preparedness." The dysfunctionality of this reductionist view of security is readily evident
to all who are concerned with the quality of the life to be made secure. Feminists see in its deleterious effects on women how the inordinate
priority given to the military erodes authentic security, global, national, and local. (Scott and Reardon 1991) What women householders and
caregivers experience as authentic security is the expectation of well-being for those for whom they are providing care: their families, their
communities, and the vulnerable and impoverished whose need for care and nurturance many women feel as they feel the needs of "their
own." It
is the pursuit of these positive expectations that women bring to the endeavor, both in the
private sphere and in the public sphere, where they campaign for security at all social levels from
neighborhood or village to the international system. Their campaigns reveal their notions of what
constitutes security. Women's views of global security might be summarized as a world in which all the Earth's peoples could live with
four fundamental expectations. And women's actions for peace are inspired by the severe threats to the realization of those expectations
posed by the present world order. First, that our planet will continue to be able to sustain life. Yet scientists have warned that the ozone layer
has been so seriously damaged that it may be irreparable. The damage is causing severe harm to the human immune system and bringing
about a drastic increase in skin cancer. Deforestation, especially in the Amazon Basin, has significantly reduced the Earth's supply of oxygen.
Without sufficient oxygen, life cannot be sustained. Waters polluted by poverty and industrial misuse, and atmosphere damaged by weapons
testing, are destroying natural systems. Yet research and development of chemical and biological weapons continue. The
very weapons
we have developed to defend our security are themselves a threat to our security in the potential
consequences of their use in combat and in the actual processes of their development and testing. Next,
that the basic needs of life will be met. Yet. as more people of the world fall into poverty, millions are without clean, potable water, housing,
adequate food, fundamental education, and health care of any kind. Most of these are women. Inflation is rampant, unemployment is
increasing; uncared for children roam the streets of the world's great cities. Third, that human dignity and integrity will be respected, and
personal well-being and possibilities for individual and social development will not be impeded by traditional customs, social structures, or
political policies at local, national, or global levels. Yet a review of the Declaration of the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against
Women provides a list of a broad and tragic range of impediments to women's personal well-being that still prevail throughout the world.
Apartheid and racism in various forms impede the social development of many indigenous peoples. The
arms produced for national
defense have been used to maintain racist, repressive systems that deny the personal well being and
human rights of ethnic groups and political dissenters. Fourth, that we can be protected from preventable harm and cared
for in times of disaster without enduring greater harm, that the life and well-being of the Earth’s peoples will not be harmed as a consequence
of imbalanced security policies, preparation for war, and armed conflict. Yet, in
a highly militarized world. local conflicts rage
that daily impose death and suffering on noncombatants as well as armed forces. The 1991 war in the Persian
Gulf and the 1992 war in a disintegrating Yugoslavia took uncounted numbers of civilian lives, produced hundreds of thousands of refugees.
and reduced living conditions to circumstances that of themselves were lethal. A
flourishing trade in conventional arms fuels
the flames of these conflicts and consumes resources in a truly incendiary manner, leaving in ashes
people's hopes for even a minimal standard of life. The technological arms race, with its advancing
weapons development, has also further diverted resources from social and human purposes as it
escalates to the point of the possibility of total destruction. Arms development cannot be relied upon to prevent
aggression and warfare. A case can be made that, on the contrary, arms production and trafficking encourage armed conflict, eroding rather
than assuring our expectation of protection or "defense." Each of these expectations has been the focus of major United Nations reports and
declarations on development, human rights, the environment, and disarmament and security. But little public heed has been paid. However,
women's movements and initiatives are insisting that we must turn our attention to meeting these four fundamental expectations that
constitute authentic security. They help to point out that we must attend to the obstacles to these expectations in an integrated,
comprehensive fashion based on an understanding of the interrelationships among them. Until we understand the connections among these
four expectations and the other global problems deriving from their frustration, neither the world nor any of its people will be secure.
Alternative approaches are an urgent necessity. Women's experiences and feminine values are sources
of such alternatives. Feminine Characteristics as Approaches to Peace and Security The discussions in this book and elsewhere of the
need for women's participation in public affairs are essentially a call to valorize those feminine characteristics that are conducive to peace and
comprehensive approaches to security. Some feminists argue that these
characteristics hold the greatest possibilities to
move us from the present condition of continuous armed conflict, potential nuclear annihilation, and
ecological collapse toward the achievement of a truly just world peace and authentic global security.
worries about her children, attends dinner parties.
Case
Cyber
1. No internal link—absent ev that the NSA puts backdoors in electric grids you should
give them 0% risk because they don’t have an advantage
NYT 13
(Editorial Board. "Close the N.S.A.’s Back Doors," New York Times. 9-21-2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/opinion/sunday/close-the-nsas-backdoors.html//ghs-kw)
In 2006, a federal agency, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, helped build an international
encryption system to help countries and industries fend off computer hacking and theft. Unbeknown to the
many users of the system, a different government arm, the National Security Agency, secretly inserted a “back door”
into the system that allowed federal spies to crack open any data that was encoded using its technology. Documents
leaked by Edward Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor, make clear that the agency has never met an encryption system that it has not tried
to penetrate. And it frequently tries to take the easy way out. Because modern cryptography can be so hard to break, even using the brute
force of the agency’s powerful supercomputers,
the agency prefers to collaborate with big software companies and
cipher authors, getting hidden access built right into their systems. The New York Times, The Guardian and
ProPublica recently reported that
the agency now has access to the codes that protect commerce and banking
systems, trade secrets and medical records, and everyone’s e-mail and Internet chat messages,
including virtual private networks. In some cases, the agency pressured companies to give it access; as The Guardian reported
earlier this year, Microsoft provided access to Hotmail, Outlook.com, SkyDrive and Skype. According to some of the
Snowden documents given to Der Spiegel, the N.S.A. also has access to the encryption protecting data on iPhones,
Android and BlackBerry phones.
2. Their evidence concedes that there’s no impact to a cyberattack – empirically
proven
Macri, 14
(Giuseppe, staff writer for the Daily Caller, citing NSA head Michael Rogers, “NSA Chief: US Will Suffer A
Catastrophic Cyberattack In The Next Ten Years,” http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/21/nsa-chief-us-willsuffer-a-catastrophic-cyberattack-in-the-next-ten-years/, BC)
N ational S ecurity A gency and U.S. Cyber Command head Adm. Michael Rogers warned lawmakers during a congressional briefing
this week that
the U.S. would suffer a severe cyberattack against critical infrastructure like power or fuel
grids in the not-too-distant future.∂ “I fully expect that during my time as a commander, we are going to be tasked with defending critical
infrastructure in the United States,” Rogers said while citing findings from an October Pew Research Center report. “ It’s only a matter
of the when, not the if , that we’re going to see something dramatic … I bet it happens before 2025 .”∂ Rogers
told the House Intelligence Committee Thursday he expected the attack to occur during his tenure as head of NSA the U.S. military’s cyber-war
branch, and that it
would likely come from state-sponsored hackers with ties to China, Russia or several other
countries, many of whom have already successfully breached the systems of critical U.S. industries .∂
“There are multiple nation-states that have the capability and have been on the systems,” Rogers told the committee, adding that many were
engaged in “reconnaissance” activities to surveil “specific schematics of most of our control systems.”∂ “There shouldn’t be any doubt in our
minds that there are nation-states and groups out there that have the capability… to shut down, forestall our ability to operate our basic
infrastructure, whether it’s generating power across this nation, whether it’s moving water and fuel,” Rogers said, warning
China and
“one or two others” had already broken into the U.S. power grid .∂ Rogers also predicted that in the coming
years, cyber
criminals previously engaged in stealing bank, credit card and other financial data would start to be co-opted by
nation-states to act as “surrogates ,” obscuring countries’ fingerprints in the infiltration and theft of information valuable to
planning attacks.∂ The admiral added that such
criminal groups, which are often Russian-speaking, have already
been using state-developed cyber tools.
3. Their impacts are all hype—no cyberattack
Walt 10 – Stephen M. Walt 10 is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of international relations at
Harvard University "Is the cyber threat overblown?" March 30
walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is_the_cyber_threat_overblown
Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "
cyber-warfare" business may be overblown? It’s clear the U.S. national security
establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine -- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are increasingly worried by the danger of
some sort of "cyber-Katrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure
looks to me like a classic opportunity for threat-inflation .¶ Mind you, I'm
not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of cyber-warfare don't have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-
here’s what makes me worry that the threat is being overstated .¶ First, the whole issue is highly
esoteric -- you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software, encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might be. Unfortunately, details
about a number of the alleged incidents that are being invoked to demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a
cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard for us lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really
was or is. Moreover, even when we hear about computers being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing,
etc., it’s hard to know how much valuable information was stolen or how much actual damage was
done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of the experts have a clear vested interest in
the-sand complacency. But
hyping the threat , so as to create greater demand for their services. Plus, we already seem to have
politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their states.¶ Second, there are lots of different problems
being lumped under a single banner, whether the label is "cyber-terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an
enemy’s military capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys would penetrate computer networks and
shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other important elements of infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the
movie Live Free and Die Hard. A third problem is web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in Nigeria announcing
that they have millions to give us once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is “cyber-espionage”; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or
defense contractors’ computers and download valuable classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect
This sounds like a rich menu of potential
trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun makes it sound trendy and a bit
more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to be different
too. Some issues -- such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical fixes
but simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems may not
require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and the private sector
the stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP).¶
have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs to civil
liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet. ¶ Third, this is another issue that cries out
Is the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid greater than the
likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of cyber-espionage greater than the
potential danger from more traditional forms of spying? Without a comparative assessment of different risks and the costs of mitigating
for some comparative cost-benefit analysis.
each one, we will allocate resources on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable precautions against a potential set of dangers; my
concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as dangerous as we are currently being told they are.
4. No impact to or risk of nuclear meltdowns – their evidence
Cappiello 3/29/11 – national environmental reporter for The Associated Press, master’s degrees in
earth and environmental science and journalism from Columbia University (Dina, “Long Blackouts Pose
Risk To U.S. Nuclear Reactors” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/blackoutrisk-us-nuclear-reactors_n_841869.html)//IS
A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that should
earthquake or tornado it
power be knocked out by an
"would be unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame to prevent core
meltdown." In Japan, it was a one-two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled
plant, found other ways to cool the reactor core and so far avert a full-scale meltdown without electricity. "Clearly the coping duration is an
issue on the table now," said Biff Bradley, director of risk assessment for the Nuclear Energy Institute. "The industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission will have to go back in light of what we just observed and rethink station blackout duration." David Lochbaum, a former plant
engineer and nuclear safety director at the advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, put it another way: "Japan
shows what
happens when you play beat-the-clock and lose." Lochbaum plans to use the Japan disaster to press lawmakers and the
nuclear power industry to do more when it comes to coping with prolonged blackouts, such as having temporary generators on site that can
recharge batteries. A
complete loss of electrical power, generally speaking, poses a major problem for a
nuclear power plant because the reactor core must be kept cool, and back-up cooling systems – mostly
pumps that replenish the core with water_ require massive amounts of power to work. Without the
electrical grid, or diesel generators, batteries can be used for a time, but they will not last long with the
power demands. And when the batteries die, the systems that control and monitor the plant can also go
dark, making it difficult to ascertain water levels and the condition of the core. One variable not
considered in the NRC risk assessments of severe blackouts was cooling water in spent fuel pools, where
rods once used in the reactor are placed. With limited resources, the commission decided to focus its
analysis on the reactor fuel, which has the potential to release more radiation. An analysis of individual
plant risks released in 2003 by the NRC shows that for 39 of the 104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core
damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other plants the risk is greater than 1 in
1 million , the threshold NRC is using to determine which severe accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. The Beaver Valley
Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania had the greatest risk of core melt – 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. But that risk may have been
reduced in subsequent years as NRC regulations required plants to do more to cope with blackouts. Todd Schneider, a spokesman for
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., which runs Beaver Creek, told the AP that batteries on site would last less than a week. In 1988, eight years
after labeling blackouts "an unresolved safety issue," the NRC required nuclear power plants to improve the reliability of their diesel
generators, have more backup generators on site, and better train personnel to restore power. These steps would allow them to keep the core
cool for four to eight hours if they lost all electrical power. By contrast, the newest generation of nuclear power plant, which is still awaiting
approval, can last 72 hours without taking any action, and a minimum of seven days if water is supplied by other means to cooling pools.
Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts – the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power – remained "a
dominant contributor to the risk of core melt at some plants." The events of Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have
to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued regulations requiring that
plants have
portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to manually operate an emergency reactor
cooling system when batteries go out. The NRC says these steps, and others, have reduced the risk of
core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants.
latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that
For instance, preliminary results of the
any release caused by a blackout there would be far less
rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken.
With more time, people can be evacuated . The NRC says improved computer models, coupled with up-to-date information
about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook. "When you simplify, you always err towards the worst possible circumstance," Scott Burnell, a
spokesman for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said of the earlier studies.
The latest work shows that "even in
situations where everything is broken and you can't do anything else, these events take a long time to
play out," he said. "Even when you get to releasing into environment, much less of it is released than
actually thought. " Exelon Corp., the operator of the Peach Bottom plant, referred all detailed questions about its preparedness and the
risk analysis back to the NRC. In a news release issued earlier this month, the company, which operates 10 nuclear power plants, said "all
Exelon nuclear plants are able to safely shut down and keep the fuel cooled even without electricity
from the grid." Other people, looking at the crisis unfolding in Japan, aren't so sure. In the worst-case scenario, the NRC's 1990 risk
assessment predicted that a core melt at Peach Bottom could begin in one hour if electrical power on- and offsite were lost, the diesel generators – the main back-up source of power for the pumps that keep the
core cool with water – failed to work and other mitigating steps weren't taken. "It is not a question that
those things are definitely effective in this kind of scenario," said Richard Denning, a professor of nuclear engineering at
Ohio State University, referring to the steps NRC has taken to prevent incidents. Denning had done work as a contractor on severe accident
analyses for the NRC since 1975. He retired from Battelle Memorial Institute in 1995. "They certainly could have made all the difference in this
particular case," he said, referring to Japan. "That's assuming you have stored these things in a place that would not have been swept away by
tsunami."
5. No motivation for US/China war – relations are resilient
Lee 13 (Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of on Singapore, The Atlantic, “Interview: Lee Kuan Yew
on the Future of U.S.- China Relations,” March 5,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/interview-lee-kuan-yew-on-the-future-ofus-china-relations/273657/BB)
How likely is a major confrontation between the United States and China? Competition
between the United States and China
is inevitable, but conflict is not. This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global
supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world.
There will be a struggle for influence. I think it will be subdued because the Chinese need the United States, need
U.S. markets, U.S. technology, need to have students going to the United States to study the ways and means
of doing business so they can improve their lot. It will take them 10, 20, 30 years. If you quarrel with the United
States and become bitter enemies, all that information and those technological capabilities will be cut off. The
struggle between the two countries will be maintained at the level that allows them to still tap the
United States. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, there is no irreconcilable ideological conflict between
the United States and a China that has enthusiastically embraced the market. Sino-American relations are both
cooperative and competitive. Competition between them is inevitable, but conflict is not. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been
cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding
that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow
all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive. A stabilizing factor in their relationship is that each nation requires
cooperation from and healthy competition with the other. The danger of a military conflict between China
and the United States is low. Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so
for the next few decades. They will modernize their forces not to challenge America but to be able, if necessary, to
pressure Taiwan by a blockade or otherwise to destabilize the economy. China's military buildup delivers a strong message to the United
States that China is serious about Taiwan. However, the Chinese do not want to clash with anyone -- at least not for the next
15 to 20 years. The Chinese are confident that in 30 years their military will essentially match in sophistication the U.S. military. In the long
term, they do not see themselves as disadvantaged in this fight. China will not let an international court arbitrate territorial disputes in the
South China Sea, so the presence of U.S. firepower in the Asia-Pacific will be necessary if the U.N. Law of the Sea is to prevail.
6. China is not in the position to wage a trade war with the United States in the SQ–
it’s stock market is down by more than a third and is continuing to drop. China
depends on the United States for stability and now is not a time to wage an attack.
Heg
1. US tech leadership is strong now, despite Asia’s rise in science—their ev
Segal 4
(Adam, director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations
(CFR), An expert on security issues, technology development, November/December 2004 Issue, “Is
America Losing Its Edge,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-11-01/americalosing-its-edge, BC)
The
U nited S tates' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and
industries faster than anyone else . For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological
entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power . It was
Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the
Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead.∂ Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for
granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies,
increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and
technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and
ensuring the exploitation of future innovations . The percentage of patents issued to and science
journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian
companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing
database and other types of software for clients around the world. South
Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S.
advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has
made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials
used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing.∂ Although the United States'
technical dominance remains solid , the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the
American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological
innovation and a significant threat to it. The
United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can
remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep
its privileged position in the world, the U nited S tates must get better at fostering technological
entrepreneurship at home.
2. Companies won’t leave the US—market is too large
Corn 7/13
(Corn, Geoffrey S. * Presidential Research Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General’s Corps. Prior to joining the faculty at South Texas, Professor Corn served in a variety of military assignments, including as the Army’s Senior
Law of War Advisor, Supervisory Defense Counsel for the Western United States, Chief of International Law for U.S. Army Europe, and as a Tactical
Intelligence Officer in Panama. “Averting the Inherent Dangers of 'Going Dark': Why Congress Must Require a Locked Front Door to Encrypted Data,”
SSRN. 07-13-2015. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2630361&download=yes//ghs-kw)
The risks related to “going dark” are real. When the President of the United States,60 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,61 and the
Director of the FBI62 all publically express deep concerns about how this phenomenon will endanger their respective nations, it is difficult to
ignore. Today, encryption technologies that are making it increasingly easy for individual users to prevent even lawful government access to
potentially vital information related to crimes or other national security threats. This evolution of individual encryption capabilities represents a
fundamental distortion of the balance between government surveillance authority and individual liberty central to the Fourth Amendment. And
balance is the operative word. The right of The People to be secure against unreasonable government intrusions into those places and things
protected by the Fourth Amendment must be vehemently protected. Reasonable searches, however, should not only be permitted, but they
should be mandated where necessary. Congress
has the authority to ensure that such searches are possible. While
some argue that this could cause American manufacturers to suffer, saddled as they will appear to be by
the “Snowden Effect,” the rules will apply equally to any manufacturer that wishes to do business in the
United States. Considering that the United States economy is the largest in the world, it is highly unlikely
that foreign manufacturers will forego access to our market in order to avoid having to create CALEA-like
solutions to allow for lawful access to encrypted data. Just as foreign cellular telephone providers, such as
T-Mobile, are active in the United States, so too will foreign device manufacturers and other
communications services adjust their technology to comply with our laws and regulations. This will put
American and foreign companies on an equal playing field while encouraging ingenuity and competition.
Most importantly, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” will be protected not only “against
unreasonable searches and seizures,” but also against attacks by criminals and terrorists. And is not this, in essence, the primary purpose of
government
3. Alt cause—military budget cuts
Morrison 14
(Charles Morrison. Morrison received his MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University and his BA in IR from Tufts University.
"Technological superiority no longer sufficient for US military dominance," AEI. 8-5-2014. http://www.aei.org/publication/technologicalsuperiority-no-longer-sufficient-for-us-military-dominance///ghs-kw)
The panel outlines three disturbing trends that are helping to close this capability gap. For one, advanced military technologies—many of which
used to be America-only capabilities—are now proliferating to potential competitors. For instance, at least 75 states are currently pursuing
unmanned systems. Secondly, states
like China and Russia have focused their military investments on countering
US systems and exploiting their weaknesses. And finally, the US government’s relative share of research and
development spending has declined. As a result of these developments, the report argues that the US “must now
plan for battlefields that are more lethal, conflict that unfolds more rapidly, and greatly restricted operational depth making sanctuary far more
difficult to create and maintain.” If that wasn’t depressing enough, the panel also warns that even
if the US is able to maintain a
technological edge through increased investment, “capability is not always a substitute for capacity.” In
other words, if the US military keeps shrinking, no amount of innovation or advanced technology will
make up for real losses in combat power. Yet, at the same time, without “significant investments” to
maintain US technological superiority, the Pentagon’s ability to meet national objectives will be greatly at risk. Fortunately,
policymakers can eliminate the false choice between capability and capacity now facing the Pentagon. As the panel recommends, Congress
and the President can immediately overturn the 2011 Budget Control Act and restore defense spending to the plan set forth
by Robert Gates in 2012. By itself, this step would be insufficient to rebuild American military strength, however, without higher
budgets, the Pentagon will increasingly face devastating tradeoffs that will end up costing American lives. While
restoring Pentagon spending to 2012 levels will not be easy, the NDP makes clear that experts from both political parties now
agree that higher defense budgets are a national imperative. With higher funding levels, the Pentagon
could get serious about military modernization and begin to invest in the kind of 21st century military
arsenal that raises the bar for conflict and ensures the men and women of the American military never
face a fair fight.
4. Economic decline and internal domestic conflict following it has made American soft
and hard power unsustainable and ineffective at current levels
Cedras, Undergraduate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at
the University of Reading, 14 (Jamina, 7-3-14, Academia, “Is US power in decline?” ,
https://www.academia.edu/7516584/Is_US_power_in_decline)
A state’s ability to exercise both soft and hard power stems primarily from its intrastate stability and domestic capabilities. Given that
contemporary declinist rhetoric has centered on the economic rise of China, it is fundamental to note that the rise of one country's power does
not necessarily translate to the fall of another in absolute terms. The
decline of American power in absolute terms may
thus be made apparent through an internal examination of the United States. Economically, politically,
socially and environmentally, the US now faces an array of complications that have burdened its role as
the global hegemony. Granted these complications are nothing new, they are worrisome given the interdependent nature of
economies today. At present, the economic foundation of US hegemony stems from the dollar’s role as the
international system’s reserve currency (Layne, 2012: 418). However, given the US’s economic downturn post
2008 and the federal government’s credit rating downgrade to AA+ in 2011, fears of dollar devaluation are
not unwarranted. The American budget and trade deficits have ballooned and discredited the US’s debt
repayment capabilities. Although it is essential to note that no country is without fault, surely it is not irrational to expect a
global hegemony to help solve an economic crisis and not initiate one. The US deficit shows no signs of
reduction within the foreseeable future and imperial overstretch has been costly for the US national
budget, a decline in US power is obvious from this perspective. The political rigidity surrounding the legislative
branch of government has also had a magnitude of implications for the US economy. At present the US is
exhibiting the greatest division over foreign policy between the Democrats and Republicans since the Second World War (Trubowitz, 2012:
157). As Timothy Ash asserts: “The
erosion of American power is happening faster than most of us predicted - while
behave like rutting stags with locked antlers" (Timothy Garton Ash, 2013). One only needs to consider the
2013 Government shutdown and its subsequent costs as confirmation of this. In addition to these monetary costs, the
continual trend of rising income inequality and the deep rooted concerns surrounding the education and
healthcare market alike have raised intrinsic equity concerns that may pose threats to future political
stability in the US, damaging both America’s soft and hard power.
the politicians
5. Status quo solves innovation—new programs
WashPo 11/16
(Robert Burns. "Hagel announces DOD plan to maintain U.S. military’s superiority," Washington Post. 11-16-2014.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hagel-announces-innovation-initiative-to-fend-off-risks-to-us-militarysuperiority/2014/11/16/e2257a42-6db5-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html//ghs-kw)
Hagel announced a “defense innovation initiative” that he likened to historic and successful campaigns
during the Cold War to offset the military advantages of U.S. adversaries. He described a “gamechanging” strategy to sharpen American’s military edge in the face of budget impasses on Capitol Hill.
“We must change the way we innovate, operate and do business,” he told a defense forum at the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library. In a memo to Pentagon leaders in which he outlined the initiative, Hagel said the United States must not lose its
commanding edge in military technology. “While we have been engaged in two large land-mass wars over the last 13 years, potential
adversaries have been modernizing their militaries, developing and proliferating disruptive capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. This
represents a clear and growing challenge to our military power,” he wrote. Speaking just a short walk from Reagan’s tomb, Hagel invoked the
late president’s legacy as a rebuilder of U.S. military strength in the 1980s and cited Reagan’s famous call for the Soviets to tear down the Berlin
Wall, which epitomized a divided Europe and a world at risk of a new global war. “America and its allies prevailed over a determined Soviet
adversary by coming together as a nation — over decades and across party lines — to make long-term, strategic investments, including in
innovation and reform of our nation’s military,” he said. Those investments “ultimately helped force the Soviet military and Soviet regime to
fold its hand.” In separate remarks to the defense forum, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr., said Russia
and China began reasserting themselves on the world stage to capitalize on America’s “distraction” in the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. “In
protecting our allies against potential mischief from these powers, we’ve always counted on our overmatch in capability and capacity to offset
the challenges of distance and initiative,” Winnefeld said. “That overmatch is now in jeopardy.” Hagel, a Republican who served two terms in
Congress as a senator from Nebraska, said the United States can no longer count on outspending its rivals and potential adversaries. But longstanding overseas alliances and America’s reputation for dependability require, he said, that the military be able to project power abroad — an
expensive capability that he said is now at risk. “If this capability is eroded or lost, we will see a world far more dangerous and unstable — far
more threatening to America and our citizens here at home than we have seen since World War II,” he said. Hagel said the United States cannot
afford to relax or assume that the military superiority it developed during the Cold War will automatically persist. “We
are not waiting
for change to come to us — we are taking the initiative, getting ahead of the changes we know are
coming and making the long-term investments we need for the future,” he said. Hagel said he is launching a
long-range research and development program to find and field breakthroughs in key technology,
including robotics, miniaturization and advanced manufacturing techniques such as 3-D printing. He said the
Pentagon will call on the private sector and on academia for help. “This program will look toward the
next decade and beyond,” he said. “In the near-term, it will invite some of the brightest minds from
inside and outside government to start with a clean sheet of paper and assess what technologies and
systems DOD ought to develop over the next three to five years.”
Solvency
1. HUGE SOLVENCY DEFICIT– their plan text is The USFG should substantially curtail its
surveillance of intentionally deployed vulnerabilities in domestic data security
technologies but their solvency advocate talks about the Secure Data Act, which bans
government mandated backdoor construction. The plan text only curtails its
surveillance so it doesn’t stop the creation of the backdoors. Further, it only curtails
surveillance of SECURITY backdoors--- means they can’t solve their tech advantage
because companies will still be forced to create backdoors
2. Circumvention – their evidence concedes NSA will force companies to build
backdoors
Trevor Timm 15, Trevor Timm is a Guardian US columnist and executive director of the Freedom of the
Press Foundation, a non-profit that supports and defends journalism dedicated to transparency and
accountability. 3-4-2015, "Building backdoors into encryption isn't only bad for China, Mr President,"
Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/04/backdoors-encryption-chinaapple-google-nsa)//GV
Want to know why forcing tech companies to build backdoors into encryption is a terrible idea? Look no further than President Obama’s stark
criticism of China’s plan to do exactly that on Tuesday. If only he would tell the FBI and NSA the same thing. In a stunningly short-sighted move,
the FBI - and more recently the NSA - have been pushing for a new US law that would force tech
companies like Apple and Google to hand over the encryption keys or build backdoors
into their products
and tools so the government would always have access to our communications. It was only a matter of time before other governments jumped
on the bandwagon, and China wasted no time in demanding the same from tech companies a few weeks ago. As President Obama himself
described to Reuters, China has proposed an expansive new “anti-terrorism” bill that “would essentially force all foreign companies, including
US companies, to turn over to the Chinese government mechanisms where they can snoop and keep track of all the users of those services.”
Obama continued: “Those kinds of restrictive practices I think would ironically hurt the Chinese economy over the long term because I don’t
think there is any US or European firm, any international firm, that could credibly get away with that wholesale turning over of data, personal
data, over to a government.” Bravo! Of course these are the exact arguments for why it would be a disaster for US government to force tech
companies to do the same. (Somehow Obama left that part out.) As Yahoo’s top security executive Alex Stamos told NSA director Mike Rogers
in a public confrontation last week, building backdoors into encryption is like “drilling a hole into a windshield.” Even if it’s technically possible
to produce the flaw - and we, for some reason, trust the US government never to abuse it - other countries will inevitably demand access for
themselves.
Companies will no longer be in a position to say no, and even if they did, intelligence services
would find the backdoor unilaterally - or just steal the keys outright. For an example on how this works, look no
further than last week’s Snowden revelation that
the UK’s intelligence service and the NSA stole the encryption keys
for millions of Sim cards used by many of the world’s most popular cell phone providers.
It’s happened
many times before too. Security expert Bruce Schneier has documented with numerous examples, “Back-door access built for the good guys is
routinely used by the bad guys.” Stamos repeatedly (and commendably) pushed the NSA director for an answer on what happens when China
or Russia also demand backdoors from tech companies, but Rogers didn’t have an answer prepared at all. He just kept repeating “I think we can
work through this”. As Stamos insinuated, maybe Rogers should ask his own staff why we actually can’t work through this, because virtually
every technologist agrees backdoors just cannot be secure in practice. (If you want to further understand the details behind the encryption vs.
backdoor debate and how what the NSA director is asking for is quite literally impossible, read this excellent piece by surveillance expert Julian
Sanchez.) It’s downright bizarre that the US government has been warning of the grave cybersecurity risks the country faces while, at the very
same time, arguing that we should pass a law that would weaken cybersecurity and put every single citizen at more risk of having their private
information stolen by criminals, foreign governments, and our own. Forcing backdoors will also be disastrous for the US economy as it would be
for China’s. US tech companies - which already have suffered billions of dollars of losses overseas because of consumer distrust over their
relationships with the NSA - would lose all credibility with users around the world if the FBI and NSA succeed with their plan. The White House
is supposedly coming out with an official policy on encryption sometime this month, according to the New York Times – but the President can
save himself a lot of time and just apply his comments about China to the US government. If he knows backdoors in encryption are bad for
cybersecurity, privacy, and the economy, why is there even a debate?
3. No impact to backdoors, and there are already solutions to backdoors – their
evidence
Kohn 14
(Cindy, writer for the Electronic Freedom Foundation, 9-26-14, “Nine Epic Failures of Regulating
Cryptography,” https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failures-regulating-cryptography, BC)
For those who weren't following digital civil liberties issues in 1995, or for those who have forgotten, here's
a refresher list of why forcing
companies to break their own privacy and security measures by installing a back door was a bad idea 15
years ago:∂ It will create security risks. Don't take our word for it. Computer security expert Steven Bellovin has
explained some of the problems. First, it's hard to secure communications properly even between two parties. Cryptography with a back
door adds a third party, requiring a more complex protocol, and as Bellovin puts it: "Many previous attempts to add such features have resulted in
new, easily exploited security flaws rather than better law enforcement access." It doesn't end there. Bellovin notes: ∂ Complexity in the protocols isn't the only
problem; protocols require computer programs to implement them, and more complex code generally creates more exploitable bugs. In the most notorious
incident of this type, a cell phone switch in Greece was hacked by an unknown party. The so-called 'lawful intercept' mechanisms in the switch — that is, the
features designed to permit the police to wiretap calls easily — was abused by the attacker to monitor at least a hundred cell phones, up to and including the prime
minister's. This attack would not have been possible if the vendor hadn't written the lawful intercept code. ∂ More recently, as security researcher Susan Landau
explains, "an IBM researcher found that
a Cisco wiretapping architecture designed to accommodate law-
enforcement requirements — a system already in use by major carriers — had numerous security
holes in its design. This would have made it easy to break into the communications network and
surreptitiously wiretap private communications."∂ The same is true for Google, which had its
"compliance" technologies hacked by China.∂ This isn't just a problem for you and me and millions of companies that need secure
communications. What will the government itself use for secure communications? The FBI and other government agencies currently use many commercial products
— the same ones they want to force to have a back door. How will the FBI stop people from un-backdooring their deployments? Or does the government plan to
stop using commercial communications technologies altogether? ∂ It won't stop the bad guys. Users who want strong encryption will be able to get it — from
Germany, Finland, Israel, and many other places in the world where it's offered for sale and for free. In 1996, the National Research Council did a study called
"Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society," nicknamed CRISIS. Here's what they said: ∂ Products using unescrowed encryption are in use today by
millions of users, and such products are available from many difficult-to-censor Internet sites abroad. Users could pre-encrypt their data, using whatever means
were available, before their data were accepted by an escrowed encryption device or system.
Users could store their data on remote
computers, accessible through the click of a mouse but otherwise unknown to anyone but the data
owner, such practices could occur quite legally even with a ban on the use of unescrowed encryption .
Knowledge of strong encryption techniques is available from official U.S. government publications and other sources worldwide, and experts understanding how to
use such knowledge might well be in high demand from criminal elements. — CRISIS Report at 303∂ None of that has changed. And of course, more encryption
technology is more readily available today than it was in 1996. So unless the goverment wants to mandate that you are forbidden to run anything that is not U.S.
It will harm innovation . In order to
ensure that no "untappable" technology exists, we'll likely see a technology mandate and a draconian
regulatory framework. The implications of this for America's leadership in innovation are dire. Could
Mark Zuckerberg have built Facebook in his dorm room if he'd had to build in surveillance capabilities
before launch in order to avoid government fines? Would Skype have ever happened if it had been forced to include
an artificial bottleneck to allow government easy access to all of your peer-to-peer communications? This has especially
serious implications for the open source community and small innovators. Some open source developers
have already taken a stand against building back doors into software.∂ It will harm US business . If, thanks to
government approved on your devices, they won't stop bad guys from getting access to strong encryption.∂
US businesses cannot innovate and cannot offer truly secure products, we're just handing
business over to foreign companies who don't have such limitations . Nokia, Siemens, and Ericsson
would all be happy to take a heaping share of the communications technology business from US
companies. And it's not just telecom carriers and VOIP providers at risk. Many game consoles that people can use to play over
the Internet, such as the Xbox, allow gamers to chat with each other while they play. They'd have to be
tappable, too.
this proposal,