Nuclear Deterrence Policy
and Responsible Retailing:
The application of game theory to
predict outcomes among cooperating
and non-cooperating parties as a
paradigm for Responsible Retailing
Brad S. Krevor, Ph.D.
Schneider Institute for Health Policy,
The Heller School for Social Policy
and Management,
Brandeis University
I. Game Theory
“Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making
in the sense that those involved are affected by their own
choices and by the decisions of others.”
~ Larry Samuelson
2
I. Game Theory
“Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that
those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of
others.”
~ Larry Samuelson
“Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest”
~ C. Thomas
3
I. Game Theory
“Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that
those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of
others.”
~ Larry Samuelson
“Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest”
~ C. Thomas
Game theory analyzes interactions between agents
and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and
final outcomes
4
I. Game Theory
“Game theory is the study of interactive decision-making in the sense that
those involved are affected by their own choices and by the decisions of
others.”
~ Larry Samuelson
“Games are the theoretical models of conflicts of interest”
~ C. Thomas
Game theory analyzes interactions between agents and formulates
hypotheses about their behavior and final outcomes
Game theory can be used to study how parties will
behave . . .
. . . or how parties should behave
5
I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory
Games may be “co-operative” ( in which players work
together; or players merely share, or signal, information)
or “non-cooperative”
6
I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory
Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or
players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”
“Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e.
they will choose outcomes which are in their own best
interest
7
I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory
Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or
players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”
“Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose
outcomes which are in their own best interest
Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or noncooperatively” (hawks): but even when acting cooperatively, players are acting individually rationally,
i.e. are motivated by self-interest
8
I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory
Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or
players merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”
“Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose
outcomes which are in their own best interest
Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or non-cooperatively” (hawks):
but even when acting co-operatively, players are acting individually
rationally, i.e. are motivated by self-interest
“Utility” or “Pay-off” are the value of an outcome
measured in units
9
I. The “Vocabulary” of Game Theory
Games may be “co-operative” (in which players work together; or players
merely share, or signal, information) or “non-cooperative”
“Players” are assumed to act individually rationally, i.e. they will choose
outcomes which are in their own best interest
Players may act “co-operatively” (doves) or non-cooperatively” (hawks):
but even when acting co-operatively, players are acting individually
rationally, i.e. are motivated by self-interest
“Utility” or “Pay-off” are the value of an outcome measured in units
Games may be zero-sum (winner/ loser) or non zero-sum
10
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a
crime have been caught. In the absence of proof of guilt,
the police offer this choice:
TV version
11
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught.
In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice:
TV version
Original version:
a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to
confess, you get the minimum” (payoff= -5)
12
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been
caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice:
TV version
Original version:
a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get
the minimum” (payoff = -5)
b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplice
confesses, you will be convicted and receive
the maximum sentence ” (payoff= -15)
13
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been
caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice:
TV version
Original version:
a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get
the minimum” (payoff = -5)
b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will
be convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15)
c. “If you both confess, then you both will be
convicted but not receive maximum
sentences” (payoff= -8)
14
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been
caught. In the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice:
TV version
Original version:
a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get
the minimum” (payoff = -5)
b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will
be convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15)
c. “If you both confess, then you both will be convicted but not
receive maximum sentences” (-8)
d. “If neither of you confesses, then you will be
convicted of possessing stolen property and
will receive a certain conviction” (payoff= -1)
15
II. Examples of Games
Prisoner’s Dilemma: 2 people who have committed a crime have been caught. In
the absence of proof of guilt, the police offer this choice:
TV version
Original version:
a. “If you confess and your accomplice fails to confess, you get the
minimum” (payoff = -5)
b. “If you fail to confess but your accomplish confesses, you will be
convicted and receive the maximum sentence” (-15)
c. “If you both confess, then you both will be convicted but not
receive maximum sentences” (-8)
d. “If neither of you confesses, then you will be convicted of possessing
stolen property and will receive a certain conviction” (-1)
Best payoff (-1) is not to confess (d) but this risks payoff
of –15 (b). Confession brings payoff of either –5 (a) or –8
(c) but avoids –15 (b)
16
II. Examples of Games
(cont.)
Stag Hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a
high utility (payoff = 10). A hare can be captured by only
1 player but has a low utility (payoff = 2). If 2 players
attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be scared
off and escape.
17
II. Examples of Games
(cont.)
Stag Hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a high utility (payoff
= 10). A hare can be captured by only 1 player but has a low utility (payoff
= 2). If 2 players attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be scared
off and escape.
Both players agree to hunt the stag and separate in
search of the stag. Each then has the opportunity to stick
with the plan (dove) or deviate from the plan (hawk).
Is it in the interest of either player to deviate from that
agreement and hunt the hare?
18
II. Examples of Games
(cont.)
Stag hunt: Killing a stag, which requires 2 players, has a high utility (payoff
of 10). A hare can be captured by only 1 player but has a low utility
(payoff of 2). If 2 players attempt to trap a hare, however, the hare will be
scared off and escape.
Both players agree to hunt the stag and separate in search of the stag.
Each then has the opportunity to stick with the plan (dove) or deviate
from the plan (hawk). Is it in the interest of either player to deviate from
that agreement and hunt the hare?
If one player chooses to deviate (Hawk), it in the interest
of that player that the other player not know of the
deviation, since the hare will escape if both players try to
capture it.
19
Nash Equilibrium
A “Nash Equilibrium”: A collection of strategies, one for each
player, that are mutual best replies in the sense that each
agent’s strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other
agents
20
Nash Equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium is a collection of strategies, one for each player, that are
mutual best replies in the sense that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the
strategies of the other agents
A Nash Equilibrium demonstrates that no player has an
incentive to deviate from his strategy given that the other
players don’t deviate
21
Game Theory Applications
22
II. Economic Applications
Convenience Store Game
Store A is considering entering a market (or
introducing a product) which is served (or
produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total
value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either
acquiesce or retaliate.
23
II. Economic Applications
Convenience Store Game
Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product)
which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total
value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.
If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff
=4
24
II. Economic Applications
Convenience Store Game
Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product)
which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total
value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.
If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff = 4
If A enters the market and B acquiesces, they
share the market and each receives a payoff of 2
25
II. Economic Applications
Convenience Store Game
Store A is considering entering a market (or introducing a product)
which is served (or produced) exclusively by Store B, and whose total
value = 4. If A enters the market, B can either acquiesce or retaliate.
If A declines to enter, A’s payoff = 0 and B’s payoff = 4
If A enters the market and B acquiesces, they share the
market and each receives a payoff of 2
If A enters the market and B retaliates with
severe price reductions, they each receive a
payoff of –4
26
II. Environmental Applications
Applied to regional, national and international
policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution,
regulate fishing rights, etc.
Freeloader phenomenon:
The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or
a nation) of abating the production of pollution is very
high
27
II. Environmental Applications
Applied to regional, national and international
policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution
Freeloader phenomenon:
The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or a nation) of
abating the production of pollution is very high
However, the contribution of that player to the
problem of the region (or country or world) is marginal;
and the benefit to that player for abatement may be
marginal or 0.
28
II. Environmental Applications
Applied to regional, national and international
policies (laws or treaties) to reduce pollution
Freeloader phenomenon:
The cost to a player (e.g., an industrial plant, a state or a nation) of
abating the production of pollution is very high
However, the contribution of that player to the problem of the region
(or country or world) is marginal – as may be the benefit to that player
for abatement
optimal payoff: the pollution-creating problem is
abated . . . with other players absorbing all or a
disproportionately higher percentage of the cost!
29
II. Military Applications
War Games
intensive development following WWII
zero-sum games: winners and losers
non-cooperating game
30
II. Military Applications
War Games
intensive development following WWII
zero-sum games: winners and losers
non-cooperating game
M.A.D.: Mutually Assured Destruction
-- a Nash Equilibrium: neither player has an
incentive to deviate (i.e., use nuclear weapons)
unless the other player deviates
31
II. Military Applications
(cont.)
Nuclear treaties
Freezing, or reducing, nuclear arsenals deemed to be
desirable -- possible only if both sides act
Mathematica group
32
II. Military Applications
(cont.)
Nuclear treaties
Rothchild and Waterloo: potential disadvantage of
co-operation
How does one signal information when communicating
what you are willing to agree to in a treaty gives the
other side a bargaining advantage?
33
III. Structural Problems of
Responsible Retailing
Before applying game theory principals to
Responsible Retailing:
What are the “Structural Problems” of Responsible
Retailing – the obstacles at the national (and state)
level, at the level of individual communities, and at
the level of individual stores -- which impede efforts
to prevent underage sales?
34
III. Structural Problems at the
State (and National) Level
35
Structural Problems: State/ National
1. Divergent objectives of RR stakeholders
Enforcement
Agencies
Retailers
AGs
Wholesalers and
Distributors
CSAP
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
Producers
Advocates and Voluntaries
36
Structural Problems: State/ National
1. Divergent objectives: profit vs. public interest
AGs
Enforcement
Agencies
CSAP
Retailers
Wholesalers and
Distributors
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
Producers
Advocates and Voluntaries
37
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived motives: motives attributed to some
stakeholders (players) by other stakeholders (players)
38
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by retailers
• “We are being
asked to serve as
agents of public
health.” (e.g. “No
Buts”; criticism of
“We Card”)
Retailers
Wholesalers and
Distributors
Producers
39
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by retailers
•
“We are being asked to
serve as agents of public
health.” (e.g. “No Buts”;
criticism of “We Card”)
Retailers
• “Tobacco and
alcohol advocates
are neoprohibitionists.”
Wholesalers and
Distributors
Producers
40
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by public health/ advocates
• Responsible retailing is
only PR
AGs
CSAP
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
Advocates and Voluntaries
41
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by public health/ advocates
•
Responsible retailing is only PR
to buy respectability
• RR always < marketing!
AGs
CSAP
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
Advocates and Voluntaries
42
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by public health/ advocates
AGs
•
Responsible retailing is only PR
to buy respectability
•
RR always < marketing!
• Matt Myers, Campaign
CSAP
for Tobacco-Free Kids
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
Advocates and Voluntaries
43
Structural Problems: State/ National
2. Perceived by public health/ advocates
AGs
CSAP
•
Ed Sweda, Jr. TCRC*
•
Responsible retailing is only PR
to buy respectability
•
RR always < marketing!
•
Matt Myers, Campaign for
Tobacco-Free Kids
• Enforcement agencies
Public Health Depts.
Foundations
aren’t really committed!
Advocates and Voluntaries
44
Structural Problems: State/ National
3. Enmity and mistrust:
Unwillingness to work together
AMA
“anonymous” researcher
PA sales certification program
45
Structural Problems: State/
National
3. Enmity and mistrust:
Brandeis compliance project:
specific protocol for vendors
if followed, 1.5 million premature deaths will
be avoided
non-compliance rate of 40% - 50%
46
Structural Problems: State/
National
3. Enmity and mistrust:
Brandeis compliance project:
specific protocol for vendors
if followed, 1.5 million premature deaths will be avoided
non-compliance rate of 40% - 50%
vendor explanations:
too busy
avoid confrontation
following protocol doesn’t work: it won’t
solve the problem
47
Structural Problems: State/
National
3. Enmity and mistrust:
Brandeis compliance project:
Vendors = Family Physicians
Protocol = PHS Clinical Guidelines
HEDIS: 50% - 60% of patients not counseled
Vendor explanations:
too busy
avoid confrontation
following protocol doesn’t work: it won’t
solve the problem
48
Structural Problems: State/
National
4. Absence of Research
Retailers: not in corporate culture
Public health community: unwilling
Enforcement community
49
Structural Problems: Community
1. Compliance rates are overestimated
50
Structural Problems: Community
1. Compliance rates are overestimated
Brandeis EAV study
-- double vs. single inspection protocol
51
Structural Problems: Community
1. Compliance rates are overestimated
Brandeis EAV study
-- double vs. single inspection protocol
Tobacco
Inspections
Baseline 1
Compliance
Baseline 2
Compliance
Compliant
B1 & B2
Florida
81%
86%
66%
Iowa
43%
51%
33%
52
Structural Problems: Community
1. Compliance rates are overestimated
Brandeis EAV study
DiFranza UMASS study: pairs of inspectors,
identical in all but one respect, attempt
purchases of tobacco (in alternating order) in
160 stores in 8 Massachusetts communities, all
with measured compliance rates > 90%
53
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
54
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Christine Milliken, NAAG:
“tobacco-ization of alcohol”
55
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Christine Milliken, NAAG:
“tobacco-ization of alcohol”
Attorneys General Consumer Protection initiative:
“alcohol-ization of tobacco”
56
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Christine Milliken, NAAG:
“tobacco-ization of alcohol”
Attorneys General Consumer Protection initiative:
“alcohol-ization of tobacco”
There must be strong, explicit policies; but these policies
tend not to be performed
57
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Walgreens age verification:
•
Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30
… low compliance
58
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Walgreens age verification:
•
Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30
After AVC, ID everyone < age 40, i.e.
a 17 yr old looked > 30 but not > 39
… low compliance
59
Structural Problems: Community
2. Policies do not translate into compliance
Walgreens age verification:
Before AVC, ID everyone < age 30
After AVC, ID everyone < age 40, i.e.
a 17 yr old looked > 30 but not > 39
Then, ID everyone, i.e.
a 17 yr old looked > 40, or
a clerk will be more willing to ID a 17 yr old if the
clerk also must now ID a 60 yr old!
60
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
61
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance –
but enforcement has limits
62
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement
has limits
Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major
chains to independent retailers (MN EAV
study)
63
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement
has limits
Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to
independent retailers (MN EAV study)
Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts
acquisition by minors from commercial to
social sources
64
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement
has limits
Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to
independent retailers (MN EAV study)
Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts acquisition by
minors from commercial to social sources
“Moving” vs. “stationary” targets
65
Structural Problems: Community
3. Paradox of enforcement
Enforcement is sine qua non of compliance – but enforcement
has limits
Enforcement shifts illegal sales from major chains to
independent retailers (MN EAV study)
Compliance with sales to minors laws also shifts acquisition by
minors from commercial to social sources
“Moving” vs. “stationary” targets
Even at 90% - 95% compliance, minors can
purchase alcohol and tobacco
66
Structural Problems: Store
1. Clerk characteristics
67
Structural Problems: Store
1. Clerk characteristics
Turnover > than frequency of inspections
No incentive to comply
Little or no loyalty to employer
Young clerks more apt to sell
Willful collusion
68
Structural Problems: Store
2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store
compliance
EAV study:
Inconsistency of store compliance
multitude of individual attitudes determines
whether clerk adheres to store policy
69
Structural Problems: Store
2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store
compliance
EAV study:
Inconsistency of store compliance
multitude of individual attitudes determines
whether clerk adheres to store policy
Challenge of Responsible Retailing: How do stores
produce organizational and behavioral change?
70
Structural Problems: Store
2. Clerk, not store policy, predictive of store
compliance
Challenge of Responsible Retailing: How do stores produce
organizational and behavioral change?
Autumn Thomas: Identify new corporate models
71
Structural Problems: Store
Big Mac and Large Fries? Yes, Sir!
72
Structural Problems: Store
But could you first step on the scale, sir? …
and show me your cholesterol report?
73
Structural Problems: Store
“I’m so sorry.
…But could I interest you in a Diet Coke and
Chicken Sandwich?”
74
Structural Problems: Store
3. Aversion to confrontation
McDonalds has no confrontation!
Also:
“The person who seeks a job at McDonalds may well
be different in many ways from the person who seeks a
job at ABC Wine and Spirits or at Store 24.”
Bill de Jong, Higher Education Center
75
IV. Game Theory Applications:
“Learnings” for Responsible
Retailing
1.
2.
3.
4.
Pollution abatement models
Convenience store models
Prisoner’s Dilemma
War Games
76
Learnings from Game Theory
1.
(cont.)
Pollution abatement models
“abate” = make investments in Best Practices;
“player”=retailer
77
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
1. Pollution abatement models
“abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer
In absence of enforcement (penalties), the
problem will persist
78
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
1. Pollution abatement models
“abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer
In absence of enforcement (penalties), the problem will persist
No incentive for 1 player to abate problem
unless all players take similar measures.
Abatement may actually cause competitive
disadvantage
79
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
1. Pollution abatement models
“abate” = make investments in Best Practices; “player”=retailer
In absence of enforcement (penalties), the problem will persist
No incentive for 1 player to abate problem unless all players
take similar measures. Abatement may actually cause
competitive disadvantage
“Freeloader effect” will occur if some stores
(typically large chains) invest in abatement
while others do not. Only abatement by all
players will eliminate free-loader effect
80
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
2. Convenience store models
Replace “enter market” with “remain in market”
What would be the incentive (payoff) to remain in
the market, or to withdraw from the market, if each
player were forced to incur the cost of implementing
comprehensive responsible retailing practices?
How many “casual” players would withdraw?
81
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
2. Convenience store models
Replace “enter market” with “remain in market”
What would be the incentive (payoff) to remain in the market, or to
withdraw from the market, if each player were forced to incur the cost
of implementing comprehensive responsible retailing practices?
How many “casual” players would withdraw?
Higher cost for each remaining player may boost
revenues and profitability by concentrating market
82
Learnings from Game Theory
3. Prisoner’s Dilemma
The best possible outcome in this noncooperating game is worse than could be
achieved through co-operation
83
(cont.)
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
4. War Games
co-operative solutions can be produced in noncooperative games: acting out of individual
self-interest, diverse stakeholders can arrive at
a co-operative solution
84
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
4. War Games
co-operative solutions can be produced in noncooperative games: acting out of individual
self-interest, diverse stakeholders can arrive at
a co-operative solution
Responsible retailing is not an irreconcilable “structural
conflict”: co-operative efforts to establish responsible
retailing practices can be a “best strategy” – a Nash
equilibrium
85
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium: A collection of strategies, one
for each player, that are mutual best replies in the
sense that each agent’s strategy is optimal given the
strategies of the other agents
86
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for public health agencies/ advocates:
given
a) private stakeholder propensity to lobby to
keep penalties for non-compliance low, and
b) community and judicial lassitude re:
underage sales . . .
87
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for public health agencies/ advocates:
is to shift social norms: activism to heighten public
concern so as to produce enhanced regulatory,
enforcement, judicial and retailer actions.
88
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for regulatory and enforcement agencies:
given
a) public health and advocacy pressure to reduce
underage sales / use of tobacco and alcohol
products, and
b) retailer profit motive (i.e. unwillingness to incur
the costs of abatement voluntarily and without
all players also absorbing those costs)…
89
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for regulatory and enforcement agencies:
is to conduct frequent enforcement inspections (and
consumer protection actions).
90
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for retailers and retail associations:
given
a) public health and advocacy pressure for
retailers to reduce underage sales, and
b) frequent inspections by enforcement
agencies …
91
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for retailers and retail associations is to:
i. invest in Responsible Retailing practices so as
to avoid fines/ license suspensions and Attorney
General consumer protection actions, and
92
Learnings from Game Theory
(cont.)
5. Nash equilibrium
Best strategy for retailers and retail associations are to:
i. invest in Responsible Retailing practices so as to avoid fines/ license
suspensions and Attorney General consumer protection actions, and
ii. Work at both the state and community level to
insure that all retailers comply with high Respon-sible
Retailing standards so as to eliminate the
competitive disadvantage caused by the free-loader
effect
93
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
1. Policy
Non-Standardization of IDs
•
EAV and uniformity of codes
•
MA license
“only (this state) license is accepted”
“Affirmative defense” in OH, CT and NY
94
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
1. Policy
Non-Standardization of ID
Harsh penalties without remedial actions
(Wagenaar principle)
95
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
1. Policy
Non-Standardization of IDs
Harsh penalties without remedial actions
Health component in clerk/ server training
96
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
1. Policy
Non-Standardization of IDs
Harsh penalties without remedial actions
Health component in clerk/ server training
Possession laws/ cops and shops
97
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
1. Policy
Non-Standardization of IDs
Harsh penalties without remedial actions
Health component in clerk/ server training
Possession laws/ cops and shops
Parental role
98
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
2. Allocation of resources
99
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
2. Allocation of resources
Duplication
e.g. New Mexico retailer training
inconsistencies between tobacco and
alcohol laws
100
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
2. Allocation of resources
Duplication
Enforcement
a. with what frequency?
b. saturation or selective?
c. all stores equally?
d. re-inspections?
e. is tobacco a proxy for alcohol?
101
V. Fall-Out from Non-Cooperation
2. Allocation of resources
Duplication
Enforcement
Retailers don’t co-operate
102
VI. Summary
1. Game theory illustrates that:
103
VI. Summary
1. Game theory illustrates that:
Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse
through non-cooperation
104
VI. Summary
1. Game theory illustrates that:
Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse through noncooperation
Acting out of their own self-interest, stakeholders
can arrive at co-operative solutions—even in
non-cooperative games.
105
VI. Summary
1. Game theory illustrates that:
Outcomes for each stakeholder are worse through noncooperation
Acting out of their own self-interest, stakeholders can
arrive at co-operative solutions
The Nash Equilibrium for stakeholders involves
efforts to shift social norms, aggressive enforcement
and universal adherence to comprehensive RR
practices
106
VI. Summary
2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level
of store, community and state (and nation)
107
VI. Summary
2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level
of store, community and state (and nation)
No single stakeholder, acting individually, can
eliminate these structural problems
108
VI. Summary
2. Structural problems of RR exist at the level
of store, community and state (and nation)
No single stakeholder, acting individually, can eliminate
these structural problems
Acting co-operatively (i.e. working together; or, at
very least, sharing information), diverse stake-holders
can produce co-operative solutions
109
Nuclear Deterrence Policy
and Responsible Retailing:
Brad S. Krevor, Ph.D.
Schneider Institute for Health Policy,
The Heller School for Social Policy
and Management,
Brandeis University