The Evolution of the
APS Beamline Personnel Safety System
(PSS)
Phil McNamara-Presenter
Kenneth Belcher
Greg Markovich
Advanced Photon Source
Safety Interlocks Group
Work supported by U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of Basic Energy Sciences, under
Contract No. DE-AC02-06CH11357
PSS History Overview
GENERATION 1
Chain A
Chain B
AB PLC 5 GE 90-70
ESD
ESD
C&C
Hardwired I/O Interface
LED & PB HMI
2 Day Validations
GENERATION 2
GENERATION 3
Chain A
Chain B
Chain C
AB PLC 5 GE 90-70
PC .
ESD
ESD
C&C
Hardwired I/O Interface
Touchpanel HMI
2 Day Validations
Chain A
Chain B
Chain C
Contrologix Contrologix Contrologix
ESD
ESD
C&C
Circuit Board I/O Interface
Touchpanel HMI
2 Day Validations
GENERATION 1M
GENERATION 1U
Chain A
Chain B
AB PLC 5 GE 90-70
ESD
ESD
C&C
Hardwired I/O Interface
LED & PB HMI
2 Day Validations
Analog Modules & Latch Chain B
Chain A
Chain B
AB PLC 5 GE RX7i
ESD
ESD
C&C
Hardwired I/O Interface
LED & PB HMI
Acceptance Test performed
Resulting in 1/2 Day Validations
GENERATION 3U
Chain A
Chain B
Chain C
Contrologix Contrologix Contrologix
ESD
ESD
C&C
Circuit Board I/O Interface
Touchpanel HMI
Acceptance Test performed
Resulting in 1/2 Day Validations
2
GEN1 PSS

Processors:
–
Dissimilar:
•
•

Programming Languages
–
Dissimilar :
•
•

Hardwired to terminal blocks
Inconsistent addressing
DIW Monitoring
–

LEDs and mechanical PBs
I/O Interface:
–
–

LOVE process controllers, binary output, 1 channel per station
Validations
–
Invasive, 2-3 days
•
•

Chain A – Ladder Logic
Chain B – State Logic, Ladder Logic and MegaBasic
HMI:
–

Chain A - Allen Bradley (AB) PLC5 – ESD, C&C intermixed
Chain B - General Electric (GE) 90-70 – ESD only – Faults were not latched
Hardwired Front-End Simulator
Laptops running DOS (Windows 98)
Communication
–
–
Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat)
One-way communication to EPICS
•
•
Chain A – DH+ through a Data Communications Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)
Chain B – RS232 through a Processor Control Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)
3
GEN1 PSS
Open status
Open status
Closed status
Open status
Chain A
Emergency Shutdown and
Command and Control PLC
Estop
Safety
Shutter 2
Photon
Shutter 2
ACIS
Station A
Global Online
Solenoid
Estop
Air Supply
Closed
status
Open status
Safety
Shutter 1
SR
Trip/Fault
Closed status
Door closed
Station A Beam Ready
Station A Searched
WDT
Integral
Shutters
WDT
Beam Line
Door closed
Closed
status
SR
Trip/Fault
Photon
Shutter 1
Chain B
Emergency Shutdown PLC
Closed status
Open status
Open status
Note: No closed switch status for PS1 to ACIS
4
GEN1 PSS
Beamline
vacuum
sensors
Beamline
components
DIW flow
sensors
Beamline
valves
position
FE shutter & valve status
FEEPS
( Mezzanine Rack)
FEEPS
EPICS
IOC
PSS
EPICS
IOC
Beamline component
DIW flow sensors
BL Shutter
status
Front - End vacuum
sensors
FE shutter & vacuum permit
Beamline EPS
BL Shutter
permits
Front -End
components
DIW flow sensors
Storage Ring
MPS
Beamline PSS interface diagram
PS 1 open request
FE shutter permit
Remote
Shutter
Interface
Relay contact from Love Controllers
Front - End vacuum
valves position
( SV , FV , FEV , BIV )
FES Open status
PSS PLC
Front -End Control System
( Mezzanine Rack)
User Panels
( Pushbuttons, key
switches and LED
Indicators)
Shutter air supply
Pressure sensors
Beamline Shutters
(1 ,2 or 3 )
Closed switches
FE shutter permit
GOL key status
PSS
Beamline Control System
(Station Enclosure)
PSS SR trips
Solenoid
control
Remote IO link
Open switches
Hutch doors
Solenoid control
Closed switches
(except PS1)
Air supply shutoff
(except PS1)
ACIS Sector Interface
Enclosure
Search
stations
Remote I/O link
E - stop
buttons
Up to 6 stations
Front - End Shutters
FES Closed status
ACIS
IOC
ACIS PLC
( Main Control
Room)
ACIS
Controlled
Equipment
( RF & Dipole)
5
GEN1 PSS
Testing Methodology
1. The Front-End Shutter (FES) Simulator is connected.
• The Front-End Shutters are critical devices that can’t be operated during the validation. Therefore
their operations and statuses must be simulated.
• The connectors on the Front-End Relay Distribution Panel (FERDP) for the Front-End Shutters (FES),
Access Control Interlock System (ACIS), Front-End Equipment Protection System (FEEPS), De-Ionized
Water (DIW) and Beamline Equipment Protection System (BLEPS) systems are unplugged and the
simulator connectors are plugged in their place.
• The simulator allows the operator to manipulate and monitor the signals normally supplied by these
devices and/or systems.
2. An Input/Output Validation is performed.
• Verify that each device is properly functioning and wired to the assigned input or output of the
Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system’s PLC.
• Verify chain independence.
3. A Functional Test (Validation) is performed.
• The system is monitored for proper response to inputs from the field devices and/or the simulator
for each test case.
• In order to facilitate specific test cases for critical devices, the Station User Panel (15U) connectors
are unplugged, and a test box is plugged in series with the existing devices.
• This test box is used to interrupt the signals from the field devices to simulate individual tests cases.
• After these particular tests are done, the test box is unplugged and the connectors are plugged back
into their original receptacles.
• This process is repeated at each 15U several times during the validation.
4. At the end of the Functional Validation, the FERDP simulator is unplugged and the connectors
are plugged back in, and a functional test of the front end components is performed.
6
GEN1 PSS
GEN1 PSS Front-End Relay Distribution Panel (FERDP)
7
GEN1 PSS
Validation FES Simulator Cables
Validation FES Simulator Rear Panel
8
GEN1 PSS
Validation FES Simulator
9
GEN1 PSS
DOS-based GE validation laptop
10
GEN1 PSS
Testing Methodology Problems
1. Disconnecting the real I/O for validation is invasive.
2. Problems in reconnecting the real I/O.
•
•
•
Not reconnected in the proper location
Not seated fully
Connectors or wires broken during the process
3. Maintaining laptops that are compatible with Windows 98 & DOS.
11
GEN2 PSS

Processors:
–
Dissimilar
•
•
•

Programming Languages
–
Dissimilar :
•
•
•

Hardwired to terminal blocks
DIW Monitoring
–

Soft Panel displays & controls
I/O Interface:
–

LOVE process controllers, binary output, 1 channel per station
Validations
–
Invasive, 2-3 days
•
•

Chain A – Ladder Logic
Chain B – State Logic, Ladder Logic and MegaBasic
Chain C – Cimplicity soft PLC (Wonderware)
HMI:
–

Chain A - AB PLC5, ESD
Chain B - GE 90-70, ESD
Chain C - Industrial computer utilizing Siemens I/O, Command & Control
Front-End Simulator
Laptops running DOS (Windows 98)
Communication
–
–
–
Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat)
One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Profibus (ESD systems write only, no read functions)
Profibus between Chain C and EPICS
12
GEN3 PSS

Processors:
–
Similar - AB ControlLogix L61
•
•
•

Programming Languages
–

Hardwired to Circuit Boards
Consistent locations
DIW Monitoring
–
–

Soft Panel displays and controls
I/O Interface:
–
–

Ladder Logic
HMI:
–

Initially LOVE process controllers, binary output,
1 channel per station
Migrated quickly to Analog modules in the ESD PLCs
Validations
–
2-3 days
•
•

Chain A – ESD
Chain B – ESD
Chain C – Command & Control
All I/O simulated (Diode injection)
Touch Panel HMI
Communication
–
–
–
Electronic isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat)
One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Profibus (ESD systems write only, no read functions)
Profibus between Chain C and EPICS
13
GEN3 PSS
Station B
Door Control
HMI &
Non Critical I/O
Chain A
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) PLC
Photon
Shutter 2,
Safety
Shutter 1,
data
E
P
I
C
S
Chain-C
Command & Control (C&C) PLC
WDT,
Cross Trip,
Search
Status, etc
ACIS –PSS
Interface
Station A
Safety I/O
HMI
Safety
Shutter 2
Station B
Safety I/O
HMI
data
Beam Line
Station A
Door Control
Chain B
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) PLC
Integral
Shutters
Global On/Off Line
Air Supply
FES limit switches are not shown but are interfaced the same as GEN1 PSS with ACIS connected directly to FES
closed limit switches. ACIS does not monitor PS1 closed limit switches.
14
GEN3 PSS
Beamline
vacuum
sensors
Beamline
valves
position
Beamline
components
DIW flow
sensors
FE shutter & valve status
BL Shutter
permits
Front - End vacuum
sensors
FE shutter & vacuum permit
Beamline component
DIW flow sensors
Beamline EPS
FEEPS
( Mezzanine Rack)
FEEPS
EPICS
IOC
PSS EPICS
IOC - RSI &
Clock Sync
Front - End vacuum
valves position
( SV , FV , FEV , BIV )
PS1 Open request
FE shutter permit
Analog PLC modules
direct to transducers (8)
BL Shutter
status
Front -End
components
DIW flow sensors
Storage Ring
MPS
Beamline PSS interface diagram
FES Open status
PSS PLC
Front -End Control System
( Mezzanine Rack)
User Panels
( HMI’s and key
Shutter air supply
Pressure sensors
Chain A only
Beamline Shutters
(1,2 or 3)
Switches)
Closed switches
FE shutter permit
GOL key status
PSS
Beamline Control System
(Station Enclosure)
PSS SR trips
PSS Trip
Test
Solenoid
Control
MEZZIE
Remote IO link
Hutch doors
Open switches
Solenoid control
Closed switches
(except PS1)
Air supply shutoff
(except PS1)
ACIS Sector Interface
Enclosure
Search
stations
Remote I/O link
E - stop
buttons
Up to 8 stations
Front - End Shutters
FES closed status
ACIS
IOC
ACIS PLC
( Main Control
Room)
ACIS
Controlled
Equipment
( RF & Dipole)
15
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology
1. A testing system is connected in parallel.
• The Front-End Shutters are critical devices that can‘t be operated during the validation.
• A HMI & PLC are connected to all 3 PLCs via Ethernet.
• When the Test Cover is lifted the Front-End Shutters solenoid outputs and ACIS SR Permit are disconnected through
relays.
• The HMI system will allow the operator to monitor signals coming from the PSS.
2. An I/O Validation is performed.
• This will still be done to verify that each device is properly functioning and wired to the assigned input or output of the
Emergency Shut Down (ESD) system’s PLC.
• Verify chain independence.
3. A Functional Test (Validation) is performed.
•
•
•
•
•
The Validation injection hardware is connected with no field device disconnections.
The power supplies are disconnected from the field devices via electro-mechanical relays via the Validation system.
The Validation system will allow the operator to manipulate all inputs going to the PSS.
The ESD system can be monitored for proper response to inputs.
All test case scenarios can be simulated.
4. At the end of the Functional Test, the Validation system is disconnected.
5. The field devices, inputs and outputs are re-enabled with none of the PSS wiring being disturbed.
6. The method of disabling and re-enabling the PSS inputs and outputs is failsafe.
16
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology – Key Changes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Once the Validation system is connected, there is no unplugging and plugging in of connectors during the
functional test.
The I/O Validation uses a touch panel HMI instead of laptop computers.
All inputs are disabled via relays instead of being unplugged.
All functional testing is done via injection of test signals. This allows for a full functional test of the system
to be performed.
Upon completion of the functional test, the critical devices are re-enabled instead of reconnected.
17
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology
Normal Operation-Validation System not connected
Door Switch
PSS
D1
Shutter Closed
Limit Switch
D2
2
1
Shutter Open
Limit Switch
D3
+24V
CR1
Connections for the Validation System
1
Power is supplied to the PSS field device inputs via CR1
2
Signals from the field devices pass through the series diodes
18
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology Validation System connected
Door Switch
PSS
Shutter Closed
Limit Switch
Shutter Open
Limit Switch
1
+24V
2
CR1
Test
Mode
Enabled
Disable
power to
field
devices
Bus Monitor
Injected
Test Signals
Removable Test Connector
1 Power is still supplied to the PSS field device inputs via CR1
2 Chain C verifies Validation System is connected to turn OFF its outputs
19
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology
Validation System connected
Door Switch
PSS
Shutter Closed
Limit Switch
Shutter Open
Limit Switch
1
+24V
CR1
Test
Mode
Enabled
Disable
power to
field
devices
Bus Monitor
Inject
Test Signals
3
2
Removable Test Connector
1 Power is removed from the PSS field device inputs via CR1
2 The Validation System verifies field device power is disabled
3 Test signals can now be injected for functional testing
20
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology - Disabling of FES
Validation System connected
OA_STORAGE_RING_PERMIT
ESD-A STORAGE RING PERMIT TO ACIS
OC_PS1_OPEN_COMMAND
OA_PS1_PERMIT
OB_PS1_PERMIT
INJECTED FROM VALIDATION SY STEM
PS1 Solenoid
VA-COM
VC-COM
VB-COM
PS1 OPEN TO VALIDATION SY STEM
VA
IA_FES_CONNECTED
3
Mezz Test Cov er
MEZZIE Ov erride
Station A Test Cov er
2
Station X Test Cov er
VC
1
VC-COM
1
Front-End Shutter (FES) operations and Storage Ring Permit enabled via 4-pole
relays
2
All systems can verify FES is disabled
3
Outputs are monitored for proper operation
21
GEN3 PSS
22
GEN3 PSS
Validation System Main menu allows for configuration of beamline
23
GEN3 PSS
Front-End Shutter Functional Validation screen
24
GEN3 PSS
Station Functional Validation screen
25
GEN3 PSS
Testing Methodology Problems
1. The connectors used in the Validation system are Multi Pin (~120) and are very fragile.
2. Real equipment is only exercised during the I/O validation.
26
The GEN1 Mini-Upgrade
GEN1 PSS with the following important but quick and cheap fixes

Hardware Changes
–
–

Changed the DIW monitoring to analog modules in the ESD PLCs (default set points are loaded at power up and allow adjust
via HMI thereafter).
Added Chain B Fault Lights to the Panel.
Software Changes
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Modified Chain B code to require a reset before re-granting Storage Ring Permit .
Modified Chain B code to indicate a flow fault condition by blinking the new Chain B Minor Fault LED.
Modified Chain B code so that any remote block to PLC communication loss will latch a fault, remove all shutter permits, and
indicate a fault via blinking Chain B Fault LED.
Modified Chain A code so that the Storage Ring Permit was not a latched signal.
Modified Chain A code to lose station "Searched" status when it sees a Crash button pressed.
Modified Chain A code to generate a “Chain B Shutter Permit Lost" minor fault when a shutter is open and the
corresponding Chain B shutter permit goes low.
Modified Chain A code to add a “quick search” when a signal, only available when the FES simulator is connected to the
FERDP during validations, is asserted.
Modified Chain A code to lose search status for all stations any time a remote I/O communications fault exists.
Modified both Chains A & B to add a DIW bypass signal which is only available when the FES simulator is connected to the
FERDP during validations, is asserted.
Modified both Chains A & B to remove all Shutter permits when the Storage Ring Permit is removed.
27
The GEN1 Upgrade

Processors:
–
Redundant and Dissimilar:
•
•

Programming Languages
–
Similar :
•
•

Analog modules in the ESD PLCs
Acceptance testing
–

Hardwired to terminal blocks
Software mapping of all I/O for standardization
DIW Monitoring
–

LEDs and mechanical PBs
I/O Interface:
–
–

Done in Lab (when changes are made or every 5 years) using a Wonderware-based software simulator
Validations
–
Annual, Noninvasive, 1/2 day
•

Chain A – Ladder Logic
Chain B – Ladder Logic and C++
HMI:
–

Chain A - AB PLC5 ESD and C&C in Separate routines
Chain B - GE RX7i, ESD
Touch Panel HMI Simulating the Front-End Shutters
Communication
–
–
Relay isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat)
One-way communication to EPICS
•
•
Chain A – DH+ through a Data Communications Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)
Chain B – RS232 through a Processor Control Module (PLC writes only, no read functions)
28
The GEN1 Upgrade
Software Changes


A thorough and concise specification document
Each PLC chain separates logic routines - functionally
–
–
Input and Output map(s)
ESD – immediate radiation hazard - logic
•
–
ESD – potential radiation hazard - logic
•
•
–
–
–







Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips
Front-End Shutter Permit removing faults and trips
Beamline Shutter Permit removing faults and trips
Command and Control logic (Chain A only)
Status logic
Warning logic
Major, Serious, and Minor Faults were changed to Faults, Trips, and Warnings with much
clearer diagnostics for troubleshooting
ESD Permits driven by real equipment status rather than resulting fault codes
Standardized station addressing (100s = Station A, 200s = Station B)
Chain B reports the faults and trips
Chain B looks at Search status from Chain A at the leading edge of the searched signal
Doors locked when the search is complete, eliminating many Lock and Unlock buttons.
Each station now has Beam Ready, Fault/Trip, and No Access Allowed indicators.
29
GEN 1 Upgrade PSS
Open status
Hardware Changes
Open status
Closed status
Open status
Chain A
Emergency Shutdown and
Command and Control PLC
WDT
Closed status
WDT
Global Online
Solenoid
Air Supply
Closed
status
Open status
Photon
Shutter 2
ACIS
Crosstrip
Crosstrip
Station A Beam Ready
Station A Searched
Estop
Safety
Shutter 2
Station A
Door closed
Integral
Shutters
Safety
Shutter 1
SR
Trip/Fault
Estop
Beam Line
Door closed
Closed
status
SR
Trip/Fault
Closed status
Chain B
Emergency Shutdown PLC
Photon
Shutter 1
Closed status
Open status
ACIS now monitors PS1 as a backup for PS2
Chain B PS1 Permit added
Search Status from A to B is now leading edge trigger
Cross-trips were added
Open status
30
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Beamline
vacuum
sensors
Beamline
valves
position
Beamline
components
DIW flow
sensors
FE shutter & valve status
FEEPS
( Mezzanine Rack)
FEEPS
EPICS
IOC
PSS
EPICS
IOC
Beamline component
DIW flow sensors
Front - End vacuum
valves position
( SV , FV , FEV , BIV )
PS1 Open request
FE shutter permit
EPICS clock sync
Remote
Shutter
Interface
Analog PLC modules
direct to transducers (8)
BL Shutter
status
Front - End vacuum
sensors
FE shutter & vacuum permit
Beamline EPS
BL Shutter
permits
Front -End
components
DIW flow sensors
Storage Ring
MPS
Beamline PSS interface diagram
FES Open status
PSS PLC
Front -End Control System
( Mezzanine Rack)
User Panels
( Pushbuttons, key
switches and LED
Indicators)
Shutter air supply
Pressure sensors
Chain A only
Beamline Shutters
(1,2 or 3)
Closed switches
FE shutter permit
GOL key status
PSS
Beamline Control System
(Station Enclosure)
PSS SR trips
Solenoid
control
Remote IO link
Open switches
Solenoid control
Hutch doors
ACIS Sector Interface
Enclosure
Search
stations
ALL Closed switches
Air supply shutoff
(except PS1)
Remote I/O link
E - stop
buttons
Up to 6 stations
Front - End Shutters
ACIS
IOC
ACIS PLC
( Main Control
Room)
ACIS
Controlled
Equipment
( RF & Dipole)
FES closed status
31
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Testing Methodology
•
Internal memory tables were created to map all beamline I/O to a common addressing
scheme (I/O wiring is not consistent across all beamlines).



This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to have a single program for all beamlines.
This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to control where the inputs to the ESD logic
originate (i.e., from either real world devices or software signals).
This allows the Acceptance and Validation Systems to simulate the Front-End Shutters and other
critical signals.
32
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Testing Methodology – The ATS
•
•
Before PLC code is downloaded for testing at a beamline, testing is performed in a lab simulator
called the Acceptance Test System (ATS)
The ATS procedures tests ALL of the PLC logic
•
ESD – immediate radiation hazard - logic (each fault and trip tested n+1 times)
•
•
Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips
ESD – potential radiation hazard - logic (each fault and trip tested n+1 times)
•
•
Front-End Shutter Permit removing faults and trips
Beamline Shutter Permit removing faults and trips
•
Command and Control logic
•
Warning logic
33
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Acceptance Test System
INPUT
IMAGE
TABLE
INTERNAL
INPUT
TABLE
All
Inputs
ALL
LOGIC
OUTPUT
IMAGE
TABLE
INTERNAL
OUTPUT
TABLE
DISABLE
REAL
INPUTS
INTERNAL
INPUT
STATUS
SIMULATED
ALL
INPUTS
INTERNAL
OUTPUT
STATUS
SIMULATED
OUTPUTS
QUICK
SEARCH
Cross Trip FAULT/TRIP
DISABLE
INHIBIT
ACCEPTANCE TEST SYSTEM HMI
34
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Testing Methodology – The VTS
•
I/O validation is performed first to verify that all beamline input and output devices operate
correctly and are mapped properly to internal memory tables
•
The VTS procedures perform testing for ONLY the following PLC logic
•
ESD – immediate and potential radiation hazard - logic
•
•
Storage Ring Permit removing faults and trips
Shutter Permit removing faults and trips
•
After a Validation is complete, the Validation System is disconnected from the PSS and the PSS
returns to normal with no residual data (created by the Validation System) remaining in the data
tables of the PLCs.
•
It is of utmost importance to ensure the real inputs are mapped to the internal files/bits and no
faults or trips are blocked after the Validation System is removed. This is accomplished by the
following method:
–
–
A pulse, originating from the Validation System, must be present to activate any of these Validation
System functions in the PLCs.
Perform End-to-End Test (PSS input through ACIS output to dump beam).
35
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Validation Test System
V+
All others
LIMIT SWITCHES
INPUT
MODULE
PUSHBUTTONS
INPUT
IMAGE
TABLE
INTERNAL
INPUT
TABLE
Some inputs
depends on
test type
ALL OTHER INPUTS
MEZZIE
ESD
LOGIC
All others
ACIS SR
PERMIT
LED
SHUTTER
SOLENOIDS
PSS FEILD I/O
KEYSW
OUTPUT
MODULE
OUTPUT
IMAGE
TABLE
FES
solenoids
& manual
door lock
commands
INTERNAL
OUTPUT
TABLE
DOOR LOCKS
LEDS
DISABLE DISABLE
REAL
REAL
INPUTS OUTPUTS
INTERNAL SIMULATED I/O
INTERNAL
SIMULATED
OUTPUTS
TEST
OUTPUT
INPUT
INPUTS
STATUS (for I/O ENABLE
STATUS
check)
QUICK
SEARCH
Cross Trip
INHIBIT
ALL OTHER OUTPUTS
Trapped Door
Limit SW Disable
VALIDATION SYSTEM HMI
36
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Validation System Main menu allows for configuration of beamline
37
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Functional Validation screen manipulates FES switches to create trips and faults
38
GEN1 Upgrade PSS
Main Functional Validation screen contains mezzanine based signals and allows Validator
to monitor SR Permit status
39
GEN3 Upgrade PSS

Processors:
–
Similar - AB ControlLogix L61
•
•
•

Programming Languages:
–

Analog modules in the ESD PLCs
Acceptance Testing
–

Hardwired to Circuit Boards
Software mapping of all I/O
Diagnostic Modules on Front-End Shutter I/O
DIW Monitoring
–

Soft Panel displays and controls
I/O Interface:
–
–
–

Ladder Logic
HMI:
–

Done in Lab (when changes are made or every 5 years) using a Wonderware-based software simulator
Validations
–
Annual, Noninvasive, 1/2 day
•

Chain A – ESD
Chain B – ESD
Chain C – Command & Control
Touch Panel HMI simulating the Front-End Shutters
Communication
–
–
–
Electronic isolation for signals between chains (status, permits, and heart beat)
One-way communication from ESD systems to Chain C using Produced and Consumed Tags over Ethernet
Ethernet between EPICS and Chain C using Produced and Consumed Tags
40
APS PSS Comparison
Gen 1
Gen 2
Gen 3
Gen 1U
Gen 3U
AB - PLC5-30
AB - PLC5-30
3 - AB Contrologix L61‘
AB - PLC5-30
3 - AB Contrologix L61
GE - 90-70
GE - 90-70
Hardware
I/O Interface
Communication to
EPICS
Software
Acceptance Testing
System Validation
GE - RX7i
Industrial Computer with Semiens I/O
Discrete panel interfaces
GE - Soft panel displays
AB - Soft Panel displays
Discrete panel interfaces
AB - Soft Panel displays
Love Controllers
Love Controllers
Love Controllers /Analog Modules
Analog Modules
Analog Modules
Hardwired - No Standard
Hardwired - No Standard
Circuit board - Standardized
Hardwired - No Standard
Circuit board - Standardized
Mapped in Logic to standardize
Mapped in Logic
Profibus through Chain C
AB - DH+
Ethernet through Chain C
Produce & Consumed Tags
AB - DH+
Profibus through Chain C
GE - Serial
Chain A - ESD and C&C combined
Chain A - ESD only
Chain A - ESD only
GE - Serial
Chain A - ESD and C&C in separate
routines
Ladder logic
Ladder logic
Ladder logic
Ladder logic
Ladder logic
Chain B - ESD only
Chain B - ESD only
Chain B - ESD only
Chain B - ESD only
Chain B - ESD only
State, Ladder and MegaBasic
State, Ladder and MegaBasic
Ladder logic
Ladder logic & C++
Ladder logic
Chain C - C&C
Chain C - C&C
Chain C - C&C
Wonderware
Ladder logic
Ladder logic
None
None
None
Done in Lab utilizing Wonderware
Testing All Logic (safety, C&C and
diagnostic)
Done in Lab utilizing Wonderware
Testing All Logic (safety, C&C and
diagnostic)
Invasive
Invasive
Non invasive
Non invasive
Non invasive
- DOS Based PCs
- DOS Based PCs
Touch Panel HMI
Touch Panel HMI
Touch Panel HMI
- Hardwired FES Simulator
- Hardwired FES Simulator
- simulating FES
- simulating FES
- all other I/O is real
- all other I/O is real
- Diode injection
- Contrologix processor with Seimens
I/O
- all other I/O is real
- all other I/O is real
All Logic is tested (safety, C&C and
diagnostic)
All Logic is tested (safety, C&C and
diagnostic)
Chain A - ESD only
- simulating all I/O
All Logic is tested (safety, C&C and Only ESD – prompt radiation hazard - Only ESD – prompt radiation hazard diagnostic)
logic is tested
logic is tested
41