Business Case and Intervention Summary
Title: Support to the International Budget Partnership (IBP) 2013 to 2017 to increase
budget transparency, participation and accountability.
What support will the UK provide?
How much funding does the UK expect to provide? £4.8m ($7.51m) over 5 years (2013/14 to
2017/18). This would result in DFID funding 15 per cent of the International Budget Partnership’s (IBP)
5 year programme which has a funding requirement of £32.1m ($50m). Remaining funding needs will
be met by private foundations.
What is the funding for:
The funding is for DFID to contribute to the IBP’s 5 year programme to improve global budget
transparency, participation and accountability. The expected outcomes of the IBP’s work are:
1) More transparent budget processes: timely, accessible, useful budget information is available
to citizens and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).
2) CSOs analyse and participate in government budget processes, and work with formal
oversight institutions to hold government to account.
3) International policy community actively promotes budget transparency, participation, and
accountability.
IBP anticipates spending annually £2.9m ($4.5m) on research, £2.6m ($4.0m) on in country work and
£1.0m ($1.5m) on international advocacy.
How will the intervention be delivered:
The intervention will be delivered through the IBP.
The current funding commitments, from private foundations, amount to $42.5m (£27.3m) and thus with
the amount from DFID, IBP would have the minimum amount needed to carry out the programme.
1
Using the an exchange rate of 1 USD = 0.642339 GBP on 9th May 2013.
1
Why is UK support required?
There is a need to increase budget transparency, accountability and participation in order to achieve
the key development goals DFID is committed to. Increased transparency is now appreciated to be an
essential component of development conditions that enable open economies and open societies to
thrive. The UK’s G8 Presidency and its commitment to open government, reflects this view and pushes
for greater transparency around the world.
Currently many governments of the countries that DFID is working with do not have transparent
budgets or allow citizen participation, thus preventing effective oversight, reducing the quality of public
financial management systems and providing greater possibilities for resources to be mismanaged or
misused. As noted in the Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2012 Report, ‘only a minority of governments
publish significant budget information. Fewer still provide appropriate mechanisms for public
participation, and independent oversight institutions frequently lack appropriate resources and
leverage’. This undermines the likelihood that developing country public expenditure will be used to
best effect for development and also poses a risk for DFID funds if government systems are used to
disperse money.
There is a need for more information on the causes and/or drivers of fiscal transparency, and the role
of civil society and other oversight actors in the budget process to improve budget transparency,
accountability and participation. There is a need for an international comparative assessment of budget
transparency, to incentivise compliance with international standards. There is a need to support CSO
budget activities which some case studies2 have shown to able to improve fiscal accountability and
2 For
example:

in Argentina the a CSO campaign for children’s right to early education which involved budget analysis and
media dissemination lead to a legally binding agreement to address the shortage of pre-schools and
kindergartens (Basch, 2011).

In Ghana a CSO monitored the budget of the Ghana school feeding programme, and increased the local
monitoring capabilities. They used this information to promote improvements in the programme with district
assembles and officials from collaborating ministries and departments and this resulted in improved services
(Dogbe and Kwabena-Adade, 2010)

In Mexico a campaign used data on the recipients of agricultural subsidies and published the information online
to focus the debate on how equitably subsidies were being distributed which led to the Ministry of Agriculture
reforming the system of subsidies to ensure they were flowing to only those who needed them (Cedujo, 2012).
2
participation3 and lead to more efficient/ effective/ equitable budgets. There is also a need to
strengthen the international policy community’s activities on budget transparency, accountability and
participation even though to date there is little systematic evidence which traces the impact of the
(relatively new) international policy community’s activities on outcomes.
DFID could carry out some of these activities itself at headquarters and through the country offices, it
could commission another organisation or it could fund IBP to implement their programme of activities
to address these needs. As seen in the appraisal section, funding IBP with15 per cent of the required
programme costs at $7.5m (£4.8m) is more cost effective than either DFID carrying out these activities
itself or trying to support the development of the skills required in another organisation. In choosing
IBP, DFID will have some influence over which countries the IBP focus extra resources on, which will
enable DFID to ensure that some priority countries benefit from the IBP programme.
UK support to the IBP will contribute to improving transparency, participation and accountability
standards internationally.
About the IBP
The International Budget Partnership (IBP) is an independent organisation based in Washington DC,
which has previously been funded by DFID (£3.5m) Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) and
private foundations. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) was formed in 1997 within the Centre
on Budget and Policy Priorities (an American non-profit think tank) to collaborate with civil society to
undertake budget analysis and advocacy in order to improve governance and reduce poverty. In its first
15 years, the IBP has grown tremendously in scope and impact and currently:

IBP’s Open Budget Survey is the only objective, comparative, and regular worldwide measure
of budget transparency, participation, and accountability and covers 101 countries

100 CSOs across the world now benefit every year from the IBP's core training programmes.
There are many examples of how IBP’s partner civil society groups have successfully
influenced budget policies, shifted allocations to important priorities, and exposed corruption
[see Annexes C and D]

The IBP has influenced budget transparency work at an international level, for example,
through helping to establish the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and playing a

3
See strategic case and Annex B for more examples.
However experts caution that it is premature to reach universal generalisations.
3
leadership role in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which the UK currently co-chairs.
IBP are experienced in the field of: civil society organisations (CSO), budget analysis and advocacy,
building capacity of CSOs, working with the international community to promote the importance of
budget transparency, and influencing government budget practices. IBP are at the forefront of the
recent efforts to create international norms for transparent and accountable governance. Through
DFID’s funding of IBP in previous years and seeing the results achieved, DFID can have confidence in
their work.
What are the expected results?
If DFID funds IBP, the following outputs are expected:
1) Information on budget transparency:
a. Open Budget Survey (OBS) 2015 and OBS 2017
b. New tools for other transparency measures that are complementary to OBS (OBS
Budget Tracker and modified subnational OBS)
c. Research on key policy questions that are relevant to both country work and
international advocacy work (e.g. what makes civil society groups effective and what are
the causes and/or drivers of fiscal transparency)
d. Deeper understanding on how to strategically direct and support civil society
engagements in budget oversight work based on reflection on experiences and
outcomes of CSO engagements
e. Strengthened capacities of at least 100 CSO research partner organisations to
undertake research and evidence-based advocacy on government transparency
2) CSOs have the tools they need to analyse, question and participate in government
budget processes
In 5 focus countries4, the IBP will give CSOs tools to engage effectively with broader
accountability networks:
a. Detailed articulation of civil society budget transparency, accountability, and
participation that CSOs and their networks agree on and rally around
4
Chosen countries not yet finalised. If DFID fund IBP they will be able to ensure at least some of these focus countries
are DFID priority countries.
4
b. Skilled and sustainable CSOs and CSO networks engage strategically with their
governments and formal oversight institutions to promote budget transparency,
accountability and participation
c. CSO partnerships within and across countries promote peer learning and exchange,
and enable meaningful and measurable joint analysis and advocacy
d. CSOs and formal accountability institutions are able to work together to hold
governments to account for use of public resources.
For all other CSOs interested in pursuing budget work and building capacity in general:
e. Resource materials are electronically available.
3) International policy community working together effectively on budget transparency,
accountability and participation:
a. Greater alignment in the definition and understanding of budget transparency and
citizen participation across international and multilateral organisations, and CSOs and
CSO networks
b. Formal international agreements forged at United Nations
c. Strengthened capacities of CSO networks for effective engagements with the
international policy community, particularly around the broadly agreed agendas for
budget transparency, accountability and participation.
Activities that will produce information on transparency:
1) OBS questionnaire will reflect shifts in standards and good practices for fiscal transparency
recognized by the IMF, WB, and the INTOSAI:
a. develop online survey management system for OBS
b. update OBS Guide to the Questionnaire for the research partners
c. update training materials on survey methodology for orientation/training of research partners.
2) Undertake OBS surveys, increasing coverage from 100 to 130 countries.
3) Disseminate survey results widely (globally and regionally, and with targeted institutions).
4) Develop Open Budget Survey Budget Tracker (OBS Budget Tracker) to monitor the real time
public availability of key budget documents assessed in the OBS:
a. pilot the OBS Budget Tracker in at least 30 countries (this will include 20 countries currently
covered by the OBS; and 10 countries not yet monitored by the OBS)
b. extend the coverage of countries covered by OBS Budget Tracker to match the number of
countries covered by the OBS Survey.
5) Dialogue with governments covered by the OBS on transparency reforms based on OBS results:
5
a. invite governments from at least 40 countries to OBS results dissemination events
b. respond to invitations from other governments who are interested and willing to engage the
IBP and other CSOs on dialogue on transparency reforms
c. initiate, wherever possible, any joint actions between governments and CSOs that will progress
budget transparency reforms.
6) Develop and frame research agenda on strategic policy questions that consider information from
all areas of work (to include themes such as incentives for shifting policies and practices of
governments on budget transparency, participation, and accountability):
a. develop specific research frameworks for specific policy research projects
b. undertake research
c. publish and promote research (including dialogue with government and other audiences).
7) Conduct research on key elements critical for advancing country strategies work for each of the 5
focus countries:
a. undertake background research needed to refine budget transparency, accountability, and
participation agenda of CSOs
b. document the ways in which accountability networks work and deliver changes in each of the
priority countries. Generate at least 1 research project in each focus country in year 1, at least
2 case studies of impact in each focus country from year 2 onwards.
8) Develop and frame a “documentation” agenda on strategic impacts of civil society engagements in
budget policy and processes:
a. research and document the methods and impact of civil society budget work and other
oversight actors, and what makes them effective.
9) Build and strengthen capacities of at least 100 CSO research partners (progressively increasing to
130) for assessing budget transparency and oversight and identifying gaps in country systems:
a. transfer diagnostic skills to CSO research partners and strengthen their ability to identify
priority agendas to focus on
b. coach participating 100 OBS research partners on effective dissemination
c. support advocacy work of partners on survey-related tasks through advocacy and
communications training and technical assistance.
10) Provide limited targeted funding support for campaigns specifically directed at improving
government transparency in at least 5 countries covered by the Open Budget Survey, based on
the recommendations of the survey results.
11) Develop and frame a learning agenda for the IBP on how to improve strategic direction and
support to civil society engagements in budget work.
6
Activities to strengthen and build CSOs to engage effectively in government budget processes
are divided into two categories: those that engage effectively in government processes and
those that influence the international policy community.
The activities that the IBP will undertake to strengthen CSOs to engage effectively in government
budget processes, as part of their country’s broader accountability network for the CSO partner
organisations in 5 focus countries, are:
1) Develop a country strategy for each priority country in close coordination with the civil society
groups in the country, and in consultation with other accountability stakeholders (including formal
oversight institutions such as Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliaments). Country strategies
outline clear and context-specific goals, strategies and partnerships to engage with the
accountability system for budget reforms:
a. regularly review and update country strategies for sustained/increased impact.
2) Provide funding support to at least 3 CSO partner organisations in each of the 5 focus countries:
a. provide at least 1 multi-year institutional support grant to at least 1 “anchor” partner 5in each
priority country to work closely with the IBP
b. provide between 2 and 5 shorter-term, smaller, more targeted grants to other “core partners”
6
in each focus country to implement work called for by the country strategy.
3) Extend CSO partners’ (anchor and core) capacity building support to CSO partner organisations in
each of the 5 focus countries:
a. provide at least 10 training and technical assistance interventions, adapted to both the country
context and what is required by the country strategy, in each of the focus countries every year.
b. extend mentor support and technical assistance to CSO partners (anchor and core), and their
networks as may be required by the country strategy
c. work with anchor and core partners in each priority country to evaluate organisational strengths
and weaknesses to better tailor technical assistance covering organisational health, impact
planning, research and advocacy, and learning issues.
5
“Anchor” partners are key partner organizations that, because of their experience in budget work and capacities to work
with other budget stakeholders, will be expected to work very closely with the IBP in leading the implementation of the
country strategy. For each of the focus countries, the IBP anticipates having at least 1, and where needed or appropriate,
2 “anchor” partners.
“Core partners” are other partner organizations that the IBP will be providing support because they are either
undertaking work that is central to the country strategy in a focus country, or are best placed to begin undertaking work
that is called for by the country strategy.
6
7
4) Ensure that CSO partners (anchor and core) ensure that they have maximum opportunities to work
with each other, as well as other CSOs, as part of networks and alliances promoting budget
transparency.
5) Support linkages and collaboration between key stakeholders within the budget accountability
network:
a. include and convene other key stakeholders within budget accountability networks (e.g., other
CSOs more broadly, media, oversight institutions, academia, decision-makers themselves) in
priority countries as may be required by the country strategy
b. ensure that CSO networks increasingly collaborate with formal oversight institutions and
reformers within government. Support at least 5 meetings of CSO partners (anchor and core)
and other oversight actors per year in each of the focus countries. This may also include CSO
collaborations with government designed to increase budget transparency (e.g., development
and production of citizens’ budgets)
c. facilitate and create opportunities for working to strengthen capabilities of other accountability
stakeholders with donors and other NGOs in priority countries.
6) Foster horizontal learning across civil society partners (anchor and core) within and across
countries.
7) Draw from the OBS and the OBS Budget Tracker, as appropriate, the information for civil society
campaigns in priority countries.
In relation to other worldwide CSOs interested in budget work, more generally:
8) Make available on the IBP website resources relevant to or useful for budget work: case studies
that document partners’ work; policy papers and other research papers produced collaboratively
with partners; and guides and training modules and materials.
9) Encourage sign up to the IBP newsletter and other social media outlets.
Activities which influence international policy community on budget transparency,
accountability, and participation agenda:
1) Multi-stakeholder initiatives that promote budget transparency, accountability and participation
agenda (GIFT, OGP, GMBTAP, and others):
a. actively undertake committee work within multi-stakeholder initiatives (GIFT, OGP, GMBTAP, and
others).
2) Ensure that budget transparency, accountability, and participation remains a policy focus for
8
international multi-stakeholder initiatives (GIFT, OGP, GMBTAP, and others):
a. prepare position papers that synthesize civil society policy, positions, and experiences that relate
to budget transparency, accountability, and participation
b. convene and/or participate in strategic opportunities where policy debates and discussions take
place in relation to these policy demands
c. Undertake evidence-based advocacy in and with different forums where decision makers of
international policy community are present (UN, GIFT, OGP, others).
3) Provide technical assistance and support to International NGOs to strengthen their understanding
of and capacity to engage in policy debates relating to budget transparency, accountability, and
participation.
4) Undertake communications outreach on international advocacy initiatives.
5) Selectively undertake lobbying on specific issues that present strategic opportunities for promoting
the budget transparency, accountability, and participation agenda.
6) Provide technical assistance and support to GMBTAP movement campaigns and advocacy
initiatives.
The appraisal case and Annex A discusses the theory of change and how these activities lead to the
outputs which lead to the outcomes. The strategic case sets out the evidence that these outputs will
lead to the desired outcomes.
The UK is proposing to contribute 15% of the total funding required so 15% of the results achieved will
be attributable to the UK.
Whether the results have been achieved will be assessed through the monitoring of the log frame,
which IBP will report on annually to all partners.
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Case for efficient, effective and equitable budgets
Budgets are a government’s most powerful tool to meet the needs and priorities of a country and its
people. If we want to fight poverty and improve governance, then we have to focus on government
decisions to raise and spend funds through the budget. Having efficient, effective and equitable
9
budgets should contribute to the achievement of development goals.
However, evidence to support this is much harder to come by (Khagram et al, 2013). Most studies
tend to look at immediate process-related impacts or intermediate changes, such as improved
accountability and participation (Carlitz, 2010, p. 12; Bosworth, 2005). Other studies will link
transparency with longer-term outcomes but often do not establish the middle step of improved
accountability and participation7.
Evidence that improved budget accountability and participation can lead to improved
development goals
Some authors highlight that there is a growing body of evidence that supports the relationship
between public sector transparency and better economic and social outcomes, proving that the best
way to manage funds effectively and equitably is through accountable and participatory budget
processes (Carlitz, 2010; Bastido and Benita, 2007). Studies have found that more transparent
governments are less corrupt (Bastido and Benita, 2007); have better credit rating and fiscal
discipline (Hameed, 2005, 2011); lower borrowing costs (Glennerster and Shi, 2008); have better
quality governance (Islam, 2003); more efficient and effective government agencies (Bellver and
Kaufmann 2005); and better socio-economic and human development indicators (Bellver and
Kaufmann, 2005; Fukuda-Parr et al, 2011)(studies taken from Carlitz, 2010). However note that
these tend to investigate ‘budget transparency’ rather than participation or accountability, because
budget transparency is often used as a proxy for harder-to-measure accountability and there is a lack
of cross-country data-sets on budgetary participation.
Other experts warn that there is no guarantee that budget transparency will result in more
developmental policies, especially when activities are focused on formal budget documents and may
not take account of the politics of the contract among elites that underlies any budget (Simson,
2013). A 2008 review of DFID’s Citizen Voice and Accountability (CV&A) initiatives, which include
budget activities, finds the effect on development outcomes is neither direct nor obvious, and no
evidence can be found, within the sample studied, of a direct contribution of CV&A interventions to
poverty alleviation or the meeting of the MDGs (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008, p. xi). Still,
7
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
10
Khagram et al (2013, p. 8) caution that successful cases may indicate isolated impact, concluding
that ‘even with more robust fiscal transparency and participation systems in place, there is no
guarantee that these will produce … downstream, substantive effect’. This is because of the
complexity of fiscal information and the paucity of strong reasons for potential users to act on that
information when the main benefits are public goods, and openness and inclusiveness does not
necessarily translate into citizen influence on policy decisions.
Budget transparency activities are one component of a wider set of demand-side social accountability
activities. A sub-set of this broader literature examines the effects of participation, with relevant
findings for understanding the link between improved budgetary participation and development
outcomes.
This literature explains that while the normative belief that citizen participation can contribute to
improved governance and multiple development outcomes and has been mainstreamed in
development policy and discourse, evidence of the impact has been hard to establish, with
findings tending to be mixed8, even from studies based in the same country (Gaventa and Barrett,
2010). Further, little is known on how best to foster ‘a more engaged citizenry’ (Mansuri and Rao,
2013, p. 1). Gaventa and Barrett (2010) argue that variations depend on whose perspective is
privileged, which methodologies are used, how the meaningfulness of changes is determined, and
how the contextual and multi-directional nature of change is dealt with.
8
Key evidence includes:

Gaventa and Barrett (2010) undertook a meta-case study analysis of nonrandomised sample of 100 research
studies of four types of citizen engagement in 20 countries. They found that, of almost 830 outcomes in 100
cases studied, some 75 per cent were positive, in that they contributed to the construction of citizenship,
strengthened practices of participation, the building of responsive and accountable states, or more inclusive and
cohesive societies.

J-PAL summarised randomised controlled trials on the impact of participation initiatives (Simson, expert
comments). Evidence from randomised evaluations provides very mixed results about community participation.
Successful cases tended to happen when the community had more direct control over service providers and
when people getting involved in participation were given specific tasks and training. A common finding across all
the studies was that community participation at the start of the evaluations was weak, even though in all cases
mechanisms for community participation existed on paper.8

Mansuri and Rao (2013) review almost 500 studies on the impact of large-scale, policy-driven efforts to induce
participation (and not organic participation – the endogenous efforts by civic activists to bring about change).
They find that: ‘greater community involvement seems to modestly improve resource sustainability and
infrastructure quality. But the evidence suggests that people who benefit tend to be the most literate, the least
geographically isolated, and the most connected to wealthy and powerful people. Participation thus appears to
affect the distribution of benefits in ways that suggest that capture is often not “benevolent” or altruistic’ (p. 6).
They distil the findings into three key lessons: 1) Induced participatory interventions work best when they are
supported by a responsive state; 2) Context, both local and national, is extremely important; and 3) Effective
civic engagement does not develop within a predictable trajectory (p. 12).
11
Case for an improved level of government budget accountability and participation
Governments have traditionally excluded the public from understanding and participating in the
budget process. The IBP’s Open Budget Survey (OBS) illustrates the problem. The OBS found that
‘the state of budget transparency and accountability is generally dismal’9 and that at the current pace
of improvement, significant levels of budget transparency around the world will not be reached until
2030. The results indicate that most countries currently provide few opportunities for public
engagement. Among the 100 countries surveyed in 2012, the average score on the indicators of
public participation in the budget process is just 19 out of 100 and eight countries provided no
opportunities for public engagement.
If there is no accountability or participation then, the executive can choose unpopular or inappropriate
programmes, waste money, and allow or engage in corruption. Conversely, as emerging research
shows (see Annex B shows), when ordinary people have information, skills, and opportunities to
participate in government budget processes and hold them accountable, they can promote real
improvements in budget policies, processes and rules and regulations. Improved government budget
participation and accountability should lead to more efficient, effective, equitable budgets:
1. Resources are collected and allocated in line with national strategies and priorities (efficient
budgets)
2. Service delivery is improved and revenue is collected (effective budgets)
3. Budget policies more effectively address the needs of the poor and the marginalised
(equitable budgets)
As set out in the log frame, the main assumptions behind this theory are that budgets will become
more efficient, effective and equitable if:
1. Budget processes are more transparent and participatory
2. CSOs are effective at promoting budget transparency and participatory budgets, and
3. The international policy community actively promotes budget transparency, accountability and
IBP (2013), ‘Open Budgets. Transform Lives.’ http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-ReportEnglish.pdf
9
12
participation
Evidence10 that improved budget accountability and participation will lead to more efficient
budgets
There are mixed results, however a growing number of case studies find a link between improved
budget accountability and participation and efficient budgets:

A 2005 DFID review of 87 public expenditure accountability initiatives in 27 countries finds it
difficult to ascertain clear impacts on public expenditure, with only a small number of
instances where changes have occurred in the incidence of corruption and in financial
management as a result of DFID interventions (Bosworth, 2005, p. ii, reported in Carlitz,
2010).

In Indonesia, Olken’s (2007) random control trial examines the effects of participatory
approaches such as accountability meetings and anonymous feedback forms and, on the
other hand, greater probability of governmental audits. He finds that the participatory
approaches had little impact, due to free rider and elite capture problems, while the increase
in government audits led to an 8% decline in missing expenditures. (McGee and Gaventa,
2010)

However a range of other studies have found, under certain conditions, positive effects of
citizen monitoring and advocacy on corruption issues (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Robinson,
2008). Examples include the MKSS11 campaign and later social audit approaches in India,
and work by the Omar Asghar Khan Development Foundation in Pakistan to document
mismanagement of earthquake construction funds (McGee and Gaventa, 2010, p. 23).
Robinson (2008, p. 173) cites firm evidence from civil society activity for the benefit of tribal
communities in Gujarat and poor rural communities in Uganda. One case study is in India
where the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights used budget tracking and analysis to
expose how the government had diverted funds for programs for poor and marginalised Dalit
communities to finance the 2010 Commonwealth Games, resulting in the government
10
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
11 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, translated as translated as Movement for the Empowerment of Peasants
and Workers.
13
returning some of the funds (Ramachandran and Goel, 2011;).

DFID promotes the practice of public audits – a form of community monitoring of aid where
beneficiary communities review the design, delivery and financial management of
aid-financed projects. ICAI (2011, p. 10) report that in Nepal a community user group
confirmed that, through their monitoring, they had successfully avoided any instance of fraud
or corruption over a period of many years. The Government of Nepal is now introducing public
audit requirements for a range of public services in rural communities.
Evidence12 that improved budget accountability and participation will lead to more effective
budgets
There is some evidence linking improved budget accountability and participation with improved
service delivery:

McGee and Gaventa (2010) find that transparency and accountability initiatives driven by civil
society have, under some conditions, resulted in better use of the budget and more effective
delivery of services.

The International Budget Partnership reports that there is evidence that transparency can
improve the effectiveness of budget. For example:
-
In Mexico, CSO monitoring of government farm subsidies revealed that a small group of
wealthy farmers had captured the vast majority of subsidy funds over time. The
government responded to the publicity generated by implementing important reforms,
including capping individual payments and increasing the amount provided to the smallest
farmers (Cedujo, 2012; see Annex B for more details).
-
In Ghana, a financial audit and CSO publication of a series of reports on weak
governance of the school feeding program resulted in the government instituting major
reforms. It turned school feeding into a very successful programme that is providing
unprecedented opportunities for children in formerly neglected regions of the country to
access schooling (IBP, expert comments; Dogbe and Kwabena-Adade, 2012; see Annex
B for more details).
12
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
14

There is an emerging body of evidence on the impact of Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
(PETS). A well-known case is the Uganda PETS conducted in the 1990s which showed that
only 20% of the primary education grant programme reached their intended target (Chêne,
2012). The government’s resulting action has been widely held up as proof that PETS can
reduce leakages in public expenditure and improved service delivery. However, others
suggest that different factors (such as concurrent reforms) played a greater role than the
PETS in accounting for the reduction in leakages (McGee and Gaventa, 2010, p. 21). Other
studies have also shown some positive effects of PETS in both Malawi and Tanzania,
sometimes due to civil society advocates taking up their findings (McGee and Gavaenta,
2010). Others emphasise that the impact of PETS in these other cases has been more limited
than in Uganda.

Joshi’s (2010) assessment of the impact of transparency and accountability initiatives on
service delivery covers budget-related work and other types of initiatives. Most available
evidence of impact is based on collective rather than individual action. Several studies
highlight that citizen-led initiatives have an impact when there is willingness from the public
sector to support attempts to improve accountability. Accountability or transparency
mechanisms that have the potential to trigger strong sanctions are more likely to be used and
be effective in improving responsiveness by providers. Information is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for desired outcomes to be realised. Without corresponding support for
increasing the capacity to respond, accountability and transparency initiatives can lead to
inaction and frustration on the part of providers.
Turning to look at effects on revenue collection, Carlitz (2010) notes that less attention has been paid
to the revenue side of the budget. Nevertheless, in a comprehensive study charting the relationship
between taxation and state-building, Pritchard (2010) finds ‘compelling’ evidence that measures to
increase dialogue, transparency, equity and bargaining are essential to building a culture of tax
compliance, and thus to maximising revenue and minimising political conflict. He notes that the
potential benefits of greater transparency in publicising tax information appear substantial,
particularly when linked to efforts at broader community mobilisation (p. 30).
15
Evidence13 that improved budget accountability and participation will lead to more equitable
budgets
Evidence suggests that improved budget accountability and participation can lead to more equitable
budgets but it is not automatic. The key evidence includes:

From his review of six country case studies, Robinson (2008) finds that civil society activities
are most likely to improve resources for existing programmes and in budget efficiency, but are
less likely to result in major changes in policy priorities and legal frameworks as these
emanate from political decisions (p. 171-172). Examples of increased allocations for social
welfare expenditure priorities due to increased budget analysis and advocacy include
increased allocations for reproductive health in Mexico, child support grants in South Africa
and tribal development expenditures in Gujarat. Caveats include that in Mexico and South
Africa the additional resources generated were relatively small in relation to the government’s
overall budget, and it was not possible to test whether there were major changes in budget
policies through this reallocation of spending. A key finding is that advocacy efforts to revise
allocations or introduce new budget lines have limited room for manoeuvre outside electoral
or budget cycles (p. 175).

A 2003 study by Devas and Grant investigating decision-making about the use of resources in
a sample of municipal governments in Kenya and Uganda finds no guarantee that
decentralised decision-making will be inclusive of the poor. Factors like committed local
leadership, central monitoring of performance, articulate civil society organisations and the
availability of information are critical.

Khagram et al (2013, p. 8) note that various researchers (citing five studies spanning from
1998 to 2011) ‘have documented how participatory budgeting processes contribute to
extending service provision and redirecting public resources toward poor neighbourhoods and
spurring the creation of new civic associations’.

There are examples where evidence-based budget advocacy has resulted in more attention
and funding for poor and marginalised people; the International Budget Partnership provides
13
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
16
evidence of where transparency fosters equity by matching national resources with national
priorities (see Annex B).
-
For example, in South Africa, the national government resisted funding HIV/AIDS
treatment programs arguing they were unaffordable. In response, the Treatment Action
Campaign took the government to court and presented evidence showing that there was
money in the health budget to fund the programs. TAC won its case, and the government
increased spending on HIV/AIDS treatments by US$6 billion, providing lifesaving ARVs to
1.6 million people who were not receiving medicines before. (see Annex B for more
details)
-
In Argentina, the Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ) pressured the formerly
reluctant government of the city of Buenos Aires to acknowledge an unsatisfied claim
related to school vacancies for early childhood education and commit to making significant
policy changes. ACIJ succeeded in its campaign by implementing a complex litigation
strategy that involved “freedom of information” requests, budget analysis, and media
dissemination. ( Basch, 2011; see Annex B for more details)

Schneider and Goldfrank (2002) find that successful scaling up of participatory budgeting
initiatives from the municipal to the state level in Brazil may have improved the efficiency of
public spending and contributed to effective planning, enhanced participation and
redistribution (Carlitz, 2010).

Norton and Elson (2002) find that successful work to take forward social goals in budget
processes often involves networks of actors (CSOs, legislatures, government officials, political
parties), donor support (through support to civil society groups, sometimes through support to
building capacity in government, and sometimes through the provision of extra funding).
Successful initiatives (such as the participatory budgeting movement in Brazil, or the gender
budget initiative in South Africa) have often been facets of a broader popular political
movement or project.
Case and evidence that budget transparency (outcome 1) will lead to increased budget
participation and accountability
Effective oversight institutions and public participation needs to improve if there is to be better
accountability and better budgeting results in a country. Without access to information, CSOs,
17
legislators, auditors, the media, and the broader public cannot hold the executive accountable for
how it uses public resources. Budget transparency is necessary but not sufficient for improved
accountability. Although budget transparency leads to greater accountability and participation under
certain conditions, four main factors outside budget transparency stand out as also contributing to
improvements in accountability and participation:

processes of political transition towards more democratic forms of political contestation and
alternation:

fiscal and economic crises that force governments to put in place enhanced mechanisms for
fiscal discipline and independent scrutiny;

widely publicised cases of corruption that give reformers political space to introduce reforms
that improve public access to fiscal information; and

external influences.
Key evidence on the link between budget transparency and accountability, participation are
summarised below14:

Khagram et al (2013) conclude that the use and impact of available fiscal information is
mostly limited to some of the better-performing countries (e.g. Brazil, South Korea). In
most of the other cases studied, transparency did not lead to broad demands for increased
participation or to more robust engagement and oversight. Moreover potential users of
information such as journalists, CSOs, ordinary citizens and even politicians often failed to
take advantage of budget data put in the public domain. While many countries have improved
the transparency of their budgets, in only a relatively small proportion of those have
organisations and individuals used the information to participate in budget decision-making
process, and in even fewer countries has this resulted in increased public accountability.

In a comprehensive literature review of the evidence on budget transparency and
accountability initiatives, Carlitz (2010) cautions that outcomes are by no means
guaranteed and even well-regarded cases show some contradictory results.
Nevertheless, she highlights evidence that a number of budget initiatives have improved
accountability and participation, including:
-
Numerous studies on participatory budgeting that opens up budgets in Porto Alegre
(synthesised by Goldfrank, 2006). It is noteworthy that there is a wealth of material on
14
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
18
this formative experience that inspired many spin-offs, in Latin America in particular
but also globally.
-
The success of Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Survey on galvanising the
government to reduce leakages.
-
The impact of more targeted citizen-led expenditure monitoring initiatives and social
audits leading to recovery of funds and/or disciplinary action against officials found to
be diverting funds, and improved participation and link to legislative reform – such as
the enactment of Freedom of Information Acts in India and a Procurement Law in the
Philippines.
-
The success of a Ugandan local government in introducing bottom-up participatory
revenue mobilisation, leading to less harassment of community members because tax
collectors have more accurate data and citizens who perceive over-assessments have
greater opportunities for redress.

Shah (2007) reports mixed findings from experiences with participatory budgeting
around the world:
-
In Latin America, national legal mandates for participatory budgeting have not created
widespread local success in improving transparency, participation and accountability,
in part due to local obstacles (such a weak or reluctant local government and CSOs).
Nevertheless participatory budgeting has succeeded in some remarkably diverse
locales where there is support from external donors, weak political opposition,
revenues for public works or programmes, and a tradition of civic participation.
-
In Central and Eastern Europe, participatory budget activities are new and fairly weak
but show some potential for increasing participation. The activities are hampered by
issues with local government autonomy, local resource availability, citizen organisation
and interest, and undeveloped political party systems.
-
In Asia, case studies offer evidence that civic participation mechanisms can improve
budgetary and development outcomes while improving the quality of the citizen/state
relationship, particularly in terms of local responsiveness to citizens, improved
accountability of public officials and elected representatives, and more trust in
government.
-
In Central and Southern Africa, case studies show that participation often remains
19
limited, but most stakeholders believe civic participation has increased local projects
that have a direct impact on communities and improved relations between citizens and
local authorities.

In a strategic review of budget transparency and monitoring activities, Fölscher (2010, p. 5)
reports that several case studies of impact have documented the positive changes in
budget institutions, policies, allocations and the quality of expenditure. She notes that
there is stronger evidence of widespread change in middle-income countries, but there are
also important examples of meaningful impact in low-income and challenging environments,
such as Chad, India, Malawi and Pakistan.
Case and evidence that civil society budget work (outcome 2) will lead to increased budget
participation and accountability
The case for civil society budget work is growing; case studies show how CSO budget activities have
been able to improve fiscal accountability and participation (see Annex B), but it is premature to
reach universal generalisations. Success factors include the capabilities of citizens and CSOs and
whether initiatives are linked to broader forms of collective action and mobilisation. CSO work can be
impeded by structural factors (whether there are formal and informal opportunities to engage in the
budget process) and cultural factors (e.g. low levels of education and male dominance).
Key evidence on the link between civil society work and accountability, participation are summarised
below15:

Robinson (2008) finds that in six country cases, civil society budget groups ‘had ‘a major
effect’ (p. 178) in interpreting and disseminating budget information to enable broader society
and other actors to engage with the budget process in more meaningful ways (Khagram et al,
2013, p. 43). He finds improved accountability, including through support to enhanced
legislature oversight (in India, Mexico, Gujarat, South Africa and Uganda). From the same six
case studies, De Renzio and Krafchik (2007, p. 6-7) concluded that the groups worked closely
with legislatures and the media, improving their capacity to engage in the budget process.
Challenges included reaching remote or rural citizens and expanding their influence over a
greater proportion of the government budget.
15
Taken from GSDRC Research Helpdesk report prepared for DFID 2013, Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget
accountability and participation. (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of
Birmingham
20

Shah (2007) presents seven country case studies on civil society’s role in participatory
budgeting. There are mixed findings on the effects of these activities, with some
successes (e.g. civic forums have increased trust in local government in Thailand) and some
challenges (e.g. in Russia activities were hampered by the lack of a clear division of
responsibilities between regional and local governments).

Authors (IDEA et al, 2011) from civil society organisations in Indonesia present case studies
on their budget work to fight against corruption and improve the allocation of government
resources. The cases include successful examples of CSOs’ budget transparency
activities leading to improved budget accountability and participation. One of the case
studies looks at advocacy around local school budgets which led to improved engagement
between civil society and government, and ultimately an increase in the allocation for school
budgets.

McGee and Gaventa (2010) find that transparency and accountability initiatives (including
budget focused ones) driven by civil society have, under some conditions, resulted in
increased state or institutional responsiveness, the building of new participatory
spaces for citizen engagement and the empowerment of local voices.

In the last few years the IBP has started to document a series of cases of civil society
campaigns, across diverse contexts, using a ‘more rigorous methodology’ (Khagram et al,
2013, p. 43). A summary of 18 IBP impact case studies is provided in Annex B. Khagram et al
(2013) conclude that while this is an important evidence base, it requires further
systematisation. Some overall points on this diverse set of case studies are:
-
Some of the case studies are about general budget transparency and accountability
(for example, Schouten and Samolia Monamoto (2013) looking at the impact of the
open Budget Initiative in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Others are about single
issue campaigns that have used budget analysis of a critical part of their advocacy
strategy (for example, Cedujo (2012) investigates the impact of a campaign on
agricultural subsidies in Mexico). The CSOs use a broad range of tactics, covering
broad communications campaigns, government engagement and pressure, coalitionbuilding, litigation.
-
Most if not all the cases report some impact on intermediate success indicators
such as improved accountability and participation. Indeed all appear to have
achieved at least some success; it is not stated if this is a criteria for inclusion in the
21
case study series.
-
Common success drivers are: taking advantage of political circumstances
(‘windows of opportunity’), support from external donors and building on preexisting broad networks.
-
Many of the studies discuss the difficulty in attributing impact to one individual actor in
contexts where multiple stakeholders and factors influence budget transparency and
participation.

ONE (2013) presents synopses of various case studies that link open budgeting
initiatives by civil society to better development results. These case studies include
some by the International Budget Partnership (mentioned above) and some by other
stakeholders (e.g. Oxfam UK’s (2012) case study of Kenyan community action strengthening
local government budgeting in Turkana and the World Bank Institute’s (2007) case study on a
budget transparency movement challenging local budget misappropriation in Indonesia).

The Revenue Watch Institute (2013) provides snapshot anecdotal case studies of impact from
Peru, Ghana and Indonesia on how civil society interventions and collaboration with
other stakeholders led to increased resource revenues and benefits from extractives
that positively affected spending decisions and outcomes.
The evidence that international policy community activities(outcome 3) will lead to increased
budget participation and accountability
To date there is little systematic evidence tracing the impact of the (relatively new) international
policy community’s activities on outcomes. Case studies are starting to record the impact of the
International Budget Partnership and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative on improved
transparency, accountability and participation.
There is evidence that the international policy community has invested in developing an
increasingly cohesive and focused approach on budget transparency, accountability and
participation (through initiatives such as the International Budget Partnership and its Open Budget
Index; the global civil society Budget Transparency, Accountability and Participation movement and
the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT); and related broader initiatives – the Open
Government Partnership, and the Freedom of Information and Open Data movements. There are
also the related initiatives in the natural resources sector (Extractive Industries Transparency
22
Initiative and Publish What You Pay campaigns) and aid transparency (Publish What You Fund and
the International Aid Transparency Initiative).
However, Fölscher cautions that because the budget movement grew from the ‘bottom up’, driven by
country-based CSOs, budget transparency has still not captured global attention in the way
that other related movements have, and it has yet to galvanise a coherent international movement
(though bottom-up dynamics mean there are strong institutions in a wide range of countries on which
to build international cooperation).
Most of the limited evidence focuses on whether the initiatives have led to improved transparency,
rather than improved accountability and participation.

Some experts find that external pressure and promotion of best practice from donors has, in
some cases, led recipient governments to improve budget transparency, often to signal
good governance practices (IBP, 2012; Khagram et al, 2013, p. 34).

There has been limited work to date on whether and how broader open data initiatives have
facilitated budget monitoring and advocacy (Carlitz, 2010). However the IBP has documented
how groups in Argentina, India, Mexico and have used Freedom of Information laws to
conduct budget monitoring (Carlitz, 2010 citing Ramkumar, 2008).

The IBP has documented various case studies where it has worked with civil society partners,
donor agencies and directly with key reformers within government to support changes.
Examples of positive impact include in Afghanistan (with an increase in its Open Budget
Index score from eight in 2008 to 21 in 2010) (Bizhan, 2013), Honduras (starting to publish
key budget reports) (Noe Pino, 2013), and the DRC (publishing its Executive’s Budget
Proposal and a budget timetable for the first time) (Schouten and Samolia Monamoto, 2013)
(IBP, expert comments).

There are a number of resources documenting the impact of the EITI:
-
ONE (2013, p. 1) has brought together a comprehensive synthesis of case studies. It
concludes that the EITI (while voluntary and only partially applied) has had a positive
impact in Africa through highlighting resource leakages, identifying opportunities to
increase revenues and making information available to citizens to hold governments to
account. The document links results in extractive resource governance to EITI
23
activities in: the improvement of Burkina Faso parliament’s oversight of extractives;
civil society action in the Democratic Republic of Congo that lead to a review of mining
contracts; Ghana’s new national EITI transparency law and tax rate revisions; Liberia’s
overhaul of its Social Development Fund; Nigeria’s closure of loopholes highlighted by
EITI leading to revenue savings, improved credit rating and sizeable increases in
foreign direct investment; Sierra Leone’s online publication of mining contracts;
Tanzania’s revision of its mining policies; and Zambia’s sector reforms and tightened
controls.
-
EITI (2012) has produced a case study on the impact of EITI in Nigeria, which finds
that in 2010 Nigeria became one of the first countries to achieve EITI Compliant
status, even though there is still a long way to go before rampant corruption is reduced
-
. Translating this improved transparency into greater accountability is the next step.
-
EITI has also produced some news stories on the impact of EITI in Liberia which
details some of the improvements made.
-
A review of EITI in Peru is less positive, finding little discernible impact so far in
promoting transparency, public debate and accountability for the revenues obtained
from extractive industries. Issues have included inadequate outreach, stakeholders’
desire for local level information that is more relevant to their lives; insufficient
attention given to the local context (where views tend to polarise) or to the different
audiences of the EITI reports; and few links made to other initiatives, such as wider
investment and tax regimes, government development planning or environmental
issues (Tearfund et al, 2013).
-
O’Sullivan (2013) reviews EITI in Timor Leste, Liberia and Nigeria, concluding that
EITI could be seen as a potentially useful catalyst for governance reforms, not as a
transformative or automatic one. Given that transparency can only achieve so much
on its own, he calls for the EITI to maximise its influence by enabling its reports to be
used more widely as tools for locating and delineating governance problems, and
using its own institutional voice to support reforms of these problems (p. 37).
In summary there is some evidence that the outputs will lead to the desired outcomes. However
the evidence is stronger for some outputs (such as civil society support) than others (such as
international policy work).
24
Budget transparency, accountability and participation16 is a relatively young sector and the evidence
base is limited and underdeveloped. There is a need for more comparative and holistic analysis of
interactions between the different types of transparency and accountability Initiatives such as service
delivery, budgets, information, natural resource and aid (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Carlitz, 2010;
Khagram et al, 2013). This is why increasing evidence in this area, as IBP’s plans to do, is
important for DFID to support.
The case for DFID intervention
Increasing budget transparency, participation, and accountability is strategically important to DFID on
a number of fronts:

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency with transparency being one of
the three main focuses of the UK’s G8 presidency. By encouraging developing countries to
have more transparent budgets, the UK Government aims to enable citizens in developing
countries to see how their own governments raise and spend resources and hold their
governments to account, and to enable governments to identify areas for improvement. This
should ensure that domestic resources, as well as aid, are better directed towards poverty
reduction and delivering results.

Support to IBP fits well with the UK Government’s emphasis on openness, transparency, and
accountability and on tackling corruption. Greater openness makes it more difficult for funds
to be misused. As developing countries attract investment, expand their tax bases and exploit
their natural resources, transparency becomes even more important. The IBP work
contributes to putting these principles into practice, particularly increasing domestic
accountability through greater transparency and citizen engagement.

DFID’s strengthened approach to budget support Partnership Principles includes commitment
to improving public financial management, promoting good governance and transparency and
fighting corruption; and commitment to strengthening domestic accountability. As part of a
wider agenda on empowerment and accountability, DFID has made a commitment on
16
For definitions of these terms Carlitz (2010, p 1-3) provides a useful glossary.
25
spending an amount equivalent to 5% of Budget Support to enable people in budget support
countries to hold their governments to account. The IBP work complements this.

Transparency and participation can provide citizens, including the marginalised and poor, with
opportunities to improve their own lives. This is consistent with the UK Government’s
determination to reduce inequalities of opportunity.
Case for IBP as delivery mechanism
The IBP provides a credible platform for achieving DFID aims in the area of budget transparency,
participation and accountability and supports the establishment of a harmonised approach to
improving budget transparency.
IBP has played a catalytic role in creating and establishing the field of independent budget work and
has acquired international level influence on budget transparency work including Global Initiative for
Fiscal Transparency (GIFT). When IBP started there were only a handful of independent
organisations with the capacity to monitor government budgets. Today, there are organisations in
over 100 countries – a very large majority of which have received IBP support.
The IBP also plays a leadership role in the Open Government Partnership (OGP)17, which the UK
currently co-chairs. The OGP is a major opportunity for the IBP’s civil society partners in up to 70
countries around the world to be involved in establishing and implementing open budgeting-related
commitments. The OGP also uses the IBP OBS results to help decide which countries are eligible for
membership of OGP.
IBP’s comparative advantages are:

IBP is the leading provider of training and technical assistance on public financial
management to CSOs. Their training is in high demand by both country-based CSOs and
NGOs. Even more important than their formal training, is IBP’s approach to organisational
accompaniment and mentoring. To support this work, IBP employs the most experienced
trainers and maintains a substantial network of leading independent service providers in the
17
The OGP promotes open and accountable governance, a policy priority for DFID, and already includes commitments to
open government from 54 governments.
26
field.

IBP’s research on open budgets has received widespread recognition and acclaim. IBP
produces and maintains the only global, independent, regular, comparative survey (the OBS)
of budget transparency and the strength of oversight institutions. The OBS is widely
recognized by donors, civil society, and governments around the world for both its innovation
and the quality of its data. Based on the OBS, IBP has built the largest global database on
budget transparency.

IBP has very strong convening capacity in the public finance community. As evidenced by
IBP’s role in launching the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, IBP is able to talk to or
bring together civil society, the donor community, formal oversight institutions, and
governments.

IBP is widely recognised as the leading independent organisation for information and
expertise on fiscal transparency, and particularly on the role of civil society in the budget
process. IBP operates as the hub for information for organisations around the world that are
interested or engaged in public finance monitoring and advocacy.
The work of the IBP also complements the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
performance measurement framework. PEFA has some indicators on the quality of the budget,
participation of the budget, and the accountability of the Public Financial Management (PFM)
systems. However, PEFA does not collect as detailed information as the OBS on budget
transparency18 and participation. In addition to this, PEFA assessments are carried out irregularly
(recommended every 3-5 years) and only published with the approval of the government. Thus, by
producing the OBS which covers over 100 countries and is carried out every 2 years, the IBP is filling
a gap in the market for a regular, independent, survey of budget transparency.
18
The OBS has over 100 questions on budget transparency.
27
Theory of change
diagram.
For more detailed
information see Annex
A
Inputs
2013-17
DFID:
£4.8m
Other
donors:
approx.
£27.3m
Outputs
1.Information
produced on
transparency
2.CSOs have
the tools they
need to
analyse,
question and
participate in
government
budget
processes
3.International
policy
community
working
together
effectively on
budget
transparency,
accountability
and
participation
Outcomes
Intermediate
impact
1. Budgets
processes more
transparent:
Timely, accessible
information is
available to
citizens and CSOs
2. CSOs are
analysing and
questioning
government
budgets and are
engaged in
broader
accountability and
participation work
at the national and
subnational
government level
3 International
policy community
actively
promoting budget
transparency,
accountability
and participation
agenda
Improved level
of government
budget
accountability
and
participation
and thus
improved
budget
policies,
processes and
rules and
regulations.
Highest level
of impact
Impact
An improved level of
government budget
accountability and
participation
(intermediate impact)
should lead to more
efficient, effective,
equitable budgets:
1 Resources are
collected and
allocated in line with
national strategies
and priorities (efficient
budgets)
2 Service delivery is
improved and
revenue is collected
(effective budgets)
3 Budget policies
more effectively
address the needs of
the poor and the
marginalized
(equitable budgets)
Efficient,
effective and
equitable
budgets
contribute to
the
achievement
of
development
goals.
28
Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
The options being considered are:
1) Do nothing.
2) Fund IBP £4.8m ($7.5m) to produce outputs to improve budget transparency, participation
and accountability.
3) DFID, or another organisation, produces outputs to improve budget transparency,
participation and accountability from existing programmes.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
None
Medium
Limited
Option 1: Do nothing
DFID would not contribute to better budget transparency participation and accountability outputs or
outcomes if the option to do nothing is chosen.
Option 2: Fund IBP £4.8m ($7.5m) to produce outputs to improve transparency, participation
and accountability.
The strategic case assesses the evidence that the identified outputs will lead to the desired
outcomes. What is being considered here is if IBP will produce the specified outputs.
DFID has previously funded IBP £3.5m over 5 years to carry out the OBS and as such IBP has a
good track record at producing planned outputs. This past success inspires confidence that the next
phase of the IBP’s work will continue to achieve results. Previous achievements of IBP give
assurance that IBP will be able to achieve the planned outputs. A few of these are listed below,
however note these are just a few highlights, and a more comprehensive list of achievements can be
29
found in the 2012 annual report:19

A major achievement is the publication of the Open Budget Index (OBI), which uses the
results of the OBS to publicly rank countries on their budget transparency, accountability and
participation. IBP have produced research that is rigorous and relevant, with at least 420
international initiatives using IBP research for their policies and procedures, and 12,179
downloads from their website in 2012.

Through working with CSO partners, IBP has helped to shift budget allocations to important
priorities and expose corruption. For example, in India, IBP’s partner civil society group
exposed how the government diverted $150m (£96.4m) from programmes for the poor to the
2010 Commonwealth Games. To date, 75% of these funds have been returned to their
original purpose. In South Africa, IBP’s partner organisation has boosted the country’s efforts
on HIV/AIDs programmes by extensively monitoring planning, funding and implementation.
See Annex B for more examples.

IBP has raised the profile of budget work and the importance of engagement on the budget.
For example, the World Bank and IMF have used the assessment criteria used in the OBS to
expand their recommendations on what good budget practices should include and the IMF
now recommends the publication of Citizen Budgets (a simplified and accessible document
outlining the budget). Several bilateral and multilateral donors have begun using the OBI as a
key measure of budget transparency in the countries to which they give aid, and some have
even used it to guide their country assistance strategies.
Option 3: DFID, or another organisation, produces outputs to improve budget transparency,
participation and accountability from existing programmes.
There is limited evidence that DFID’s Research and Evidence Division would currently be able to
carry out the transparency research that is required within their current budget. There is no evidence
that any other organisation exists that would be able to undertake this work. There is no evidence
that there is capacity for DFID or another organisation to carry out a survey on the transparency of
DFID priority countries. Even if DFID or another organisation had the resources available to carry out
19
http://internationalbudget.org/2013/04/hot-off-the-presses-its-the-ibps-2012-annual-report/
See IBP 2012 Annual Report for more information on achievements: http://internationalbudget.org/2013/04/hot-off-thepresses-its-the-ibps-2012-annual-report/
20
30
the research required, unless the researchers had the same level of expertise as the IBP
researchers, it is likely that the quality of the outputs would be lower than those produced using
option 2.
There is limited evidence that there are 5 or more DFID country offices which could carry out the
work with civil societies to ensure they have the tools they need to analyse, question and participate
in government budget processes. It is unlikely that any country office would be able to redirect
funding to delivering these outputs, and again, even if this was possible, the outputs achieved may
not be as high quality as if IBP carried out these outputs as DFID does not have the same
experience, expertise, network, and existing relationships with CSOs as IBP that is needed to be
successful in this work. No other organisation has the expertise or network that is needed to be
successful in this work.
DFID does have limited engagement with international budget transparency initiatives; however it
does not currently have the capacity within the relevant team to increase engagement. DFID also
does not have staff with the same specialist knowledge and experience as IBP has, therefore again it
is likely that the outputs would be lower quality than in option 2. There are other organisations
engaged in budget transparency but none that has the scope and range of experience and contacts
to undertake this work, especially not the Open Budget Surveys and the research work.
Assessing the need for Capacity Development
The desired outputs in options 2 and 3 involve activities that aim to strengthen capacity of those
affected by the activities. For example a major part of the work with CSOs is about increasing their
capacity. The other activities proposed in options 2 and 3, (research and international influencing
work) will be carried out by IBP staff who have the capacity to carry out the required activities, if the
recommendation for option 2 is approved. However in option 3 there would be a need for capacity
development of some DFID staff.
31
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Option
Climate change & environment risks
Climate change and environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities and risk, Category
(A, B, C, D)
1. Do
Low impact- Category C
Low opportunities -Category C
Low impact - Category C
Potential opportunity- Category B.
At the moment, climate public
expenditure analysis is in nascent
stages but this will rise rapidly once
the Green Climate Fund comes into
place. If IBP could assess climate
screening during their budget
transparency work this could
produce very useful information
which could contribute to better
decisions being made on how to
finance climate mitigation and
adaptation activities. IBP
understands the timeliness and
urgency of this work, and is very
keen to explore this issue. IBP has
started discussions internally on
what kind of contribution they could
make in the field, including
developing good practices for
disclosing climate actions. They also
intend to discuss opportunities with
like-minded organisations, such as
the World Resources Institute.
However they are only at an early
stage of their analysis. IBP is
committed to exploring this issue and
to see what is useful and possible.
IBP has asked to work closely with
DFID on this issue as they start the
process.
Low impact – Category C
Low impact – Category C
nothing
2. Fund
IBP to
produce
outputs
3. DFID or
another
Limited evidence that DFID or
organisat
another organisation is able to carry
ion
out the survey, or additional analysis
produces
on climate change and budget
outputs
transparency.
32
Donors, including DFID, may provide resources in the form of promised increases in donor aid for
climate change mitigation or adaptation. These funds often will be managed by governments in
countries with the least transparent budget processes. Further revenue windfalls that are generated
by such development are often not spread widely across a country’s population. The resources
involved are potentially enormous, and they could generate lasting advances in the welfare of the
world’s most vulnerable populations. But if government budget processes are broken and closed, the
chances are much smaller that the governments in question will use the climate change mitigation
funds as they are intended for and, even if they do so, will use them effectively. Thus improving
budget transparency and participation in budgeting could have a positive effect on climate change
mitigation and adaption, through more efficient use of climate funds.
Social impact assessment
Option 2
The IBP works on the widely-accepted principle that public spending is more relevant to the poor
and marginalised than other socioeconomic groups and that improvements in its efficiency and
effectiveness therefore benefit the poor and marginalised more. This ‘universalist’ approach to equity
issues is most clearly seen in IBP’s work on budget transparency. IBP views improvements in
budget transparency as key to enhancing the opportunities citizens and civil society organisations
have to monitor and influence government decisions on the use of public funds. Citizens, especially
poor and marginalised citizens, will have an opportunity to monitor government budgets and to
identify whether or not budget plans reflect their priorities and whether the budgets have been
implemented efficiently. Citizens will also benefit from formal mechanisms through which they can
participate in budget decision-making. Such mechanisms will significantly empower them to use the
available information and participation mechanisms to provide the government with specific
feedback on problems in budget plans and implementation. This feedback could in turn be used by
the government to make additional improvements in governance and service delivery.
In addition to this ‘universalist’ approach to equity, IBP also supports specific budget advocacy
campaigns that target specific demographics, such as women21, children, indigenous communities,
21 For example the International Budget Partnership reports that in Mexico gender evidence-based budget advocacy
resulted in more funding for reproductive health services and a governmental process to debate women’s health issues.
This has helped ensure that funding is sustained and that women in the poorest Mexican states benefit from it. For more
33
people with disabilities22, farmers, and other low-income communities in countries. For example, IBP
is committed to advancing the field of gender budgeting. To support the demand for gender budget
training, IBP has several full-time and part-time staff members that are pioneers in the field23. IBP
views gender budgeting as an approach, rather than just a specific technique, that should be
mainstreamed throughout public finance practices. To this end, IBP ensures that issues of gender
and equity are included in all of its training and its own analysis.
Option 3
DFID is committed to improving the lives of the poor and marginalised and if DFID or another
organisation carried out the proposed work it would ensure that the approach it took considered
equity as described in option 2 above. However note that IBP is more experienced in its work on
budget transparency to improve the lives of the poor and marginalised and it expected that
DFID or another organisation would not be as effective as IBP in doing this.
Impact on fragile and conflict countries
Option 2
The IBP work with both government and civil society and they find that their work facilitates
collaborative relations between CSO partners and governments rather than increase tensions. The
IBP provides information and tools to increase the opportunities for constructive dialogue within all
the countries it works. In fragile and conflict affected states, there can be special challenges for civil
society to operate and this needs sensitive handling. In many situations, the IBP has actually found
that working on public resource issues early in a transition contributes to a more stable transition.
However, they acknowledge that discussions on public resources can be uncomfortable for
governments, particularly those that are not used to having these discussions with stakeholders
outside of the executive. The IBP manage this risk by being very sensitive to these tensions by
working with partners to carefully read the environment and tailor with partners what work is possible
and not possible in a particular environment. Where a situation arises that may place the IBP’s
partners at risk, the IBP has several possible responses, including the following: keep the partner
anonymous, conduct research from outside the country or with a national of another country. In
information on gender equity work IBP has done see: http://internationalbudget.org/budget-analysis/sectors-issuesdemographic/gender-equity/
22 For more information on IBP’s work here see: http://internationalbudget.org/budget-analysis/sectors-issuesdemographic/people-disabilities/
23
For example Debbie Budlender, and Helena Hofbauer
34
extreme cases, the IBP can cease their activities and provide CSO partners with legal support, or
encourage them/facilitate their spending time outside of the country.
The work of the IBP will have some impacts on government officers and CSOs’ time, however this is
seen to have positive rather than negative results. IBP works together with local CSOs on the OBS,
both on completing the research and also on dissemination and advocacy. As a result of this
government staff may need to respond to additional pressure to open up their budgets or queries
about the budgets. In addition to staff time costs, IBP has increasingly worked directly to support
government efforts at reform. However usually, this engagement is initiated by the government itself
looking for technical advice on how to improve transparency, including improving OBS scores24. As
the cost to government and CSO staff time in most of these cases is due to IBP activities which are
demand driven from the government or CSOs themselves, the staff time taken by IBP activities is not
seen as a negative effect.
In addition to this government and CSO resource cost government officers and CSO staff help
complete the OBS every 2 years. However no extra reports or other work are requested from
governments and the main recommendations of the survey, such as ensuring minimum budget
documents are available in a timely manner, can usually be implemented at a limited cost. For
example, by publishing budget information onto the internet in Excel format.
Option 3
As above, however again note that as DFID does not have the same experience, capacity, or existing
relationships as IBP, it expected that DFID would not be as effective as IBP. The same applies to
any other organisation.
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Option 1: Do nothing
Benefits
24
Over the past two years, IBP has provided such “mentoring” to, amongst others, the governments of Ghana, Mali,
Zambia, the Philippines, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Brazil, and El Salvador. IBP’s efforts here have usually included
direct discussions with appropriate government personnel but have also included producing guides and manuals for
government, for example on how to produce a Citizen’s Budget.
35
If DFID chooses option 1, then no benefits would be attributed to DFID.
Costs
There would be no direct financial cost to DFID of the do nothing scenario.
The costs that a lack of budget transparency has on developing countries would continue and the
needs set out in the intervention summary would not be addressed. There may also be a reputational
impact to the UK/DFID if it were perceived that DFID had failed to engage on the transparency
agenda given its importance in the G8 agenda.
Option 2: Fund IBP £4.8m ($7.5m)
Benefits
The main benefits are:
1) IBP will be able to carry out their planned activities and deliver the full range of outputs
a. If the programme is successful and the activities lead to the specified outputs which
lead to the outcomes and impacts that are expected to follow from such activities, then
the most important benefit is that there would be improved value for money on every
unit of money in the affected countries budgets, whether this be money from the UK,
other donors, or the countries own government revenues. The outcome of this would
be better development outcomes through more efficient, effective, equitable budgets.
2) The contribution to a harmonised approach to improving budget transparency
a. Funding through IBP will contribute to establishing a harmonised approach to
improving budget transparency. DFID and the other donors will be avoiding
proliferation of budget transparency assessment tools and avoiding multiple donors
carrying out similar activities with civil society and other key institutions. It will also
help harmonise research and knowledge in the area, reducing repetition and the
waste of resources.
3) DFID will be able to benefit from the opportunities for interaction provided by being a donor to
36
IBP.
a. DFID will be able to influence some of IBP’s areas of work25. If DFID is able to use its
position to ensure that some of IBP’s focus countries are DFID priority countries this
could result in a substantial amount of the programme fund being focused in countries
in which DFID is working. If IBP gets the required $50m (£32.1m), it anticipates to
spend approximately $4m (£2.57m) a year on at least 5 focus countries. As DFID’s
proposed contribution is £0.98m a year, if DFID could influence IBP to choose 2 or
more of its focus countries as DFID priority countries then at least as much money as
DFID is putting in to IBP would be going straight back into work with CSO’s to improve
budget transparency participation and on accountability in DFID’s priority countries.
Whilst it is not possible to accurately calculate the monetary value of the benefits, there is evidence
that the benefits of budget transparency, participation and accountability work outweigh the costs. It
is expected that, if the assumptions in the theory of change section hold, that every pound spent by
IBP on budget transparency, would result in at least an extra pound being spent on the poor or
marginalised, through increased allocations for social welfare expenditure priorities due to increased
budget analysis and advocacy. For example, as Annex B shows, budget analysis and advocacy have
increased allocations for reproductive health in Mexico, child support grants in South Africa and tribal
development expenditures in Gujarat (Robinson 2008).
Costs
The cost of this option would be £4.8m ($7.5m) over 5 years for DFID, which is 15 per cent of the
costs of the proposed programme. The current funding commitments, from private foundations,
amount to £27.3m ($42.5m). The proposed annual allocation of £960,000 represents 18% of DFID’s
Governance, Open Societies and Anti-corruption (GOSAC) Department’s Public Financial
25 IBP has expressed that they would welcome communication with DFID staff about their work and they are considering
setting up a formal process to engage with donors to provide them with opportunities to influence their strategic choices.
One option they are considering is establishing an IBP Donor Forum or Council that would meet once a year at a time that
partly overlaps with their governing board meeting. This would provide DFID with a substantive opportunity to engage with
the IBP board and staff around critical strategic decisions such as which subset of fragile and conflict countries they
include in their work over the next five years. This would give DFID an opportunity to express their views on which
countries would benefit most from improved support to civil societies to improve budget transparency and participation.
37
Management (PFM) programmes. This option will also cost DFID in staff time for oversight and
monitoring of the programme.
Option 3: DFID or another organisation produces outputs to improve budget transparency,
participation and accountability from existing programs.
Benefits
The benefits to DFID producing the outputs would be that there would be:
1)
a more direct link with DFID other programming in each country;
2) increased alignment with existing government-to-government relations; and
3) potentially greater leverage politically than through an NGO.
The benefits to DFID if another organisation produces outputs:
1) DFID passes the responsibility to another organization for delivery and is able to monitor and
evaluate results
2) Potentially different CSOs are engaged in the process.
Costs
This option assumes that it is possible for DFID to incorporate activities into existing programmes and
therefore would have no direct costs. However by redirecting existing programmes to focus on
producing the outputs required, there is an opportunity cost of not doing other activities. IBP
anticipates spending annually £2.9m ($4.5m) on research, £2.6m ($4.0m) on in country work and
£1.0m ($1.5m) on international advocacy. This gives an idea of the costs incurred if DFID were to try
and produce the same outputs as IBP. However note that DFID costs are likely to be higher than IBP
has IBP already has better capacity, expertise, network and structure to deliver these outputs
compared to DFID.
Other costs to DFID would be the administration costs as there would be business cases required for
each country; central funding could not be disbursed via country programmes. There is also a risk
that country programmes might not have same priorities, and there may not be resources available.
There would also be the cost of the loss of organisational and policy coherence offered through IBP
and the marshalling and sharing of lessons learned through policy networks would be less likely.
38
If another organisation is commissioned to undertake the work there will be costs in them staffing up
and learning how to do the work as there is currently no organisation in existence which meets the
levels of skills and experience as IBP.
Summary
Option 2 is the preferred option. Option 1 results in DFID not addressing the needs set out in the
interventions summary and option 3 is overwhelmingly less efficient than supporting a global
platform, as in option 2. Option 2 gives an effective and efficient way of contributing to improving
global budget transparency, participation and accountability.
Sensitivity analysis
If the assumptions set out in the theory of change do not all hold then option 2 is still preferred to
option 3, as option 2 is still a more efficient use of resources. If none of the assumptions in the theory
of change hold then option 1 would be preferable to option 3. However although the evidence for the
assumptions is somewhat limited and underdeveloped, there is evidence to back the theory of
change and it is concluded that this risk of not doing anything in option 1 is greater than the risk of
the assumptions in the theory of change not holding. In addition to this, choosing option 2 will
increase the evidence on theory of change.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
Value for money can be considered in terms of whether the programme provides the outputs it is
supposed to and whether these outputs will be delivered efficiently. Progress of achievement of the
outputs will be assessed using the indicators set out in the log frame. If the outputs are no longer
being achieved then the intervention would no longer represent value for money.
Another way to monitor if value for money is being met is if DFID, and other organisations, continue
to use the information that IBP produces to inform future programme decisions and monitoring PFM
reforms that affect budget transparency and participation. For example, currently the OBS is one of
the three indicators used to measure the success of the Governance and Transparency Fund
projects having the following impact: ‘Governments are more capable, accountable and responsive to
39
meet the needs of poor people” and is one of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) criteria.
However if the OBS was deemed no longer useful, then this would indicate that value for money for
this output was not being met.
Efficiency of cost delivery within IBP
One way that DFID could assess if the outputs are being delivered efficiently is by assessing various
aspects of cost of delivery of outputs by IBP in each annual review. This will involve looking at
aspects such as:

Staff costs

Administrative percentages

Cost of different outputs e.g. cost of OBS, cost of training and technical support.

Cost of managing grants
The annual reports IBP have submitted to DFID for their previous funding have shown that: overall
progress was ‘good’ and ‘on track’, the internal issues relating to programme management / staffing /
internal project issues and partnerships was seen to be ‘good’, the programme’s own judgement of
risk and mitigation both internal and external was seen to be adequate and the assessment of
logframes was seen to be ‘good’. This gives confidence that IBP will continue to deliver results cost
efficiently.
The following questions will also answered by the annual reviews in order to assess value for money:

Is the actual cost out-turn for the year comparable to that forecast by IBP? If not, is there a
reasonable explanation for the variation? This should include both the overall cost and
individual lines within the budget (staff costs, grant admin, training etc).

Have the milestones in the log frame been met? If not is there a reasonable explanation for
the variation?

Does IBP have a clear view of costs throughout the delivery chain?

Have CSO grants been subject to a satisfactory assessment process?

Does IBP have satisfactory grant management processes in place?
IBP has a good record of keeping costs within budget and providing the detailed information required
40
where multi-year budget amendments are beneficial. Progress against the results framework will be
monitored and adjustments can be made to the programme in response to difficulties encountered or
opportunities identified.
As well as IBP’s good track record of producing the expected outputs, there are other reasons to
suggest that IBP will provide value for money. For example the IBP has invested considerable time in
developing an organisational approach that emphasizes close collaboration and integration between
different programs. As a result, IBP staff members from different programs coordinate their activities,
which can sometimes result in cost savings and maximizing of benefits from the IBP’s total resource
availability. Wherever possible, IBP staff members coordinate their visits to countries, and strive to
achieve multiple objectives when IBP visits a country, thereby avoiding the need to travel multiple
times, saving on costs. This makes IBP an effective organisation and provides cost savings.
CSO partners of IBP are willing to participate in the Open Budget Survey without receiving financial
gratification because they recognise the benefits that the OBS has. This keeps the financial cost of
carrying out the survey low. The perceived legitimacy and importance attributed to the
implementation of the Open Budget Survey, and the prominence of budget transparency as an issue
for civil society advocacy work, means many of IBPs partner organisations want to participate in the
Survey for nonmonetary reasons, such as increased visibility for their organisations. In some
instances, IBP has not had to pay peer reviewers, who are interested in participating in the research
pro bono. All these factors have meant that the average cost of conducting the Open Budget Survey
in one country is approximately only $22,000 (£14,000). This figure is significantly less than the
nearest comparable peer level assessments. For example the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability studies cost a minimum of $50,000 (£32,500) and on average cost $125,000
(£81,000) and the IMF’s fiscal Reports on Observance Standards and Codes (ROSC) cost between
$120,000 (£78,000) and $180,000 (£117,000) per country26.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
The preferred option is for DFID to fund IBP £4.8m.
This investment in budget transparency and participation is expected to have a much greater pay-off
than the cost because it enables citizens to question and hold governments to account. Citizens have
26 Mackie, A. (2010) ‘ Stocktaking Study of PFM Diagnostic Instruments’ PEFA.
41
an incentive to do this because their government’s budget has a strong impact on their livelihoods. If
the result in this is that a government’s own resources and aid can be spent more in line with the
priorities of citizens, then IBP would be exerting influence over resources vastly greater than its own
budget. Annex B, gives some examples of where this has happened.
42
Commercial Case
Indirect procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
There is no direct procurement involved in this intervention. The programme will be funded through a
contribution to the IBP.
B. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of agreement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
IBP is the only supplier that exists that can deliver the outputs required. This is why indirect
procurement is the right funding mechanism for this intervention. IBP will manage the programme
and have the capacity to manage their resources. This has been demonstrated through previous
funding to IBP.
No intermediary is required.
B. Value for Money through Procurement.
IBP’s procurement processes
The International Budget Partnership (IBP) is a division of the Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities.
All grants to the Centre for the IBP are managed according to the Centre’s accounting and finance
policies and procedures. The Centre follows United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) for recording and summarising transactions and for preparing financial statements.
The Centre maintains separate records and ledger accounts for all contributions to and
disbursements from the bank account on behalf of the grant. The Centre prepares annual budgets for
all programmes. Budget authorisation is approved by the independent Board of Directors and the
budgets are revised in conjunction with the mid-year Board meeting.
A member of the Centre’s staff will be responsible for overseeing the management of grant resources
43
ensuring conformity to the Centre’s policies and procedures for personnel management, procurement
and cash disbursements. Responsibilities will include ensuring that grant expenditures are
segregated and recorded in a timely and accurate manner. Additionally, monthly programme reports
are prepared and reviewed with the Centre’s executive team to ensure proper oversight of grant
funding and expenditures.
All assets related to the programme will be monitored and managed in accordance with the Centre’s
policies. Given the nature of the awards, the primary DFID asset used by the Centre will be cash
received and expended. All cash transactions are recorded and reviewed and reconciled in
accordance with Centre policies. Bank reconciliations are prepared on a monthly basis by Centre
finance staff, and reviewed monthly by Centre finance executives.
Procurement of goods and services, as well as the disbursement of funds are monitored and
reviewed in accordance with the Centre’s policies and procedures. Prior to issuing a grant or contract
for goods or services the Centre requires a pre-execution checklist which helps to identify any issues,
and mitigate the risk of fraudulent disbursement through multiple layers of review. The Centre
requires that all required licenses and permits be obtained prior to entering into an agreement with an
entity with links to countries on the lists of the US State Department and the Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Additionally, the Centre uses LexisNexis Bridger Insight
Online Database to review consultant names and names of associates to mitigate the risk of
disbursing funds to blocked individuals or entities on many more alert lists maintained both in the US
and overseas. The Centre disburses significant funds to hotels and airlines to host or attend
meetings and conferences. In order to ensure proper procurement of these services, the Centre
requests proposals from hotels in the destination city to ensure the best overall package. Additionally,
the Centre has a contract with a travel agency that guarantees the lowest available fares, and
ensures the guarantee by comparing rates among agencies using industry standards.
In conclusion IBP’s procurement processes appear sound and able to deliver value for money.
However, a Due Diligence assessment is being carried out on IBP to enable these processes to be
looked at in further detail and identify any risks.
44
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
The total DFID funding of the IBP 5 year program is proposed at £4.8m to bring IBP’s total funding up
to the required $50m (£32.1m). There is space in the current Governance, Open Societies and Anticorruption (GOSAC) team budget for this allocation.
This is to be dispersed as follows:
2013/14: £960,000
2014/15: £960,000
2015/16: £960,000
2016/17: £960,000
2017/18: £960,000
The money will be dispersed though three payments in year one and henceforth through quarterly
payments. IBP will submit quarterly financial reports to ensure we can forecast accurately.
B. How will it be funded? Capital/programme/admin?
The project will be funded from programme funds. The funding is available in the FACT team budget.
The level of funding is such that there will be no significant effect on DFID’s accounts if payments
move from one financial year to another, although this is not anticipated.
C. How will funds be paid out?
This will be paid in arrears, in 3 payments of £320,000 in 2013/14 and from 2014/15 onwards in each
quarter, at a total sum per quarter of £240,000.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Financial risk and fraud risk are considered to be low. The programme builds on a previous
programme which has a good track record, and for which audit reports have not found any concerns.
However as a safeguard, if this business case is successful a Due Diligence assessment will be
45
carried out on IBP which will enable financial risks to be looked at in more detail.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
The IBP will receive and utilise financial contributions from the donors. They will provide DFID and
all donors with an annual independent audit report which will include an attestation from the IBP’s
external auditors concerning the financial statements and financial position of the organisation.
Audited statements will be available by June for the previous year.
Concurrently, IBP will also provide DFID with an audit of the statement of grant income and
associated disbursements and funds for all DFID awards. In addition to the external audits, as a
501(c)3 tax-exempt organisation registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), IBP also
prepares and submits to the IRS the required form 990 providing the public with financial information
about the organisation. These independently reviewed financial statements and reports mitigate the
risk of fraudulent reporting by contracting with reputable independent audit firms working under
United States Generally Accepted Auditing Standards.
IBP will produce an annual report on all activities and outcomes, which will be available by end
February/beginning of March for the previous year. This will report on the progress of targets
identified in the log frame. Note that the log frame is in a different format to the usual DFID logframe
template as this is the logframe which IBP will use to report to all financial contributors. It will also
include unaudited financial statements. IBP will also produce quarterly financial statements as they
have been previously doing for the last funding they received from DFID.
46
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
Within DFID, the lead adviser for this programme is Anna Downs, the quality assurer is Honor
Flanagan, senior governance adviser, and the project officer is Susan Cassidy. The lead adviser will
maintain the relationship with IBP and ensure that the programme is delivered according to the
expected outputs and outcomes. This will include ensuring regular checks are carried out on
performance to authorise payments of the grant, arranging annual reviews and following up on
recommendations and participating as required in meetings of sponsors of IBP. The quality assurer will
ensure that all these measures are taking place in a timely manner and will act as a backstop to the
lead adviser. The project officer will ensure that the processes are supported and delivered and that
the agreement is honoured, including payments made on time.
The IBP plans and implements the IBP program. IBP is managed by its Executive Director and IBP
Deputy Director manages the administration and human resource policies of the organisation. IBP
reports to the Board of the Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities and day to day decision-making is
the responsibility of an executive management team, consisting of: Executive Director, DeputyDirector/Operations Director, Finance Director, and the Directors of country work and Open Budget
Survey and advocacy. IBP program management team consists of the above program staff, as well as
the managers of communication, learning and training. The remainder of IBP staff report to one of the
project management team members, the Operations Director, or Finance Director.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
Likelihood
Impact of
Response
risk
IBP does not
Low
High
This risk will be managed through the M&E arrangements so
fulfil the program
that the likelihood of the programme not achieving its
objectives
objectives is recognised in good time. Responses to the
reasons why the programme is not achieving will then be
addressed.
47
IBP does not
Medium
Medium
IBP has in place plans to reduce the scope of its country
secure sufficient
coverage or shift the timing of its major research outputs,
funding
such as the OBS, in order to adapt to respond to lower levels
of funding. In addition, IBP fundraising is on-going and
continues to explore new areas of funding from institutional
and private sources.
The political
High
Medium
IBP can in most cases continue with its work in a given
situation in a
country by protecting the identity of researchers or by using
small number of
by using external researchers. This is how they have
countries poses
managed their work in China and Saudi Arabia, for example.
a threat to IBP
If the threat to a partner’s physical safety is serious, IBP will
staff or partner
withdraw from its work in the country until the situation
organisations
stabilises. IBP does not work in countries where there ongoing wide-spread conflict is on-going.
Core IBP
Medium
Medium
Working in a large number of countries - and given
partners
precarious funding for civil society - IBP partners experience
undergo serious
organisational transitions and crises. IBP deals with these
organisational
situations by mobilising its training and technical assistance
crises and this
teams that specialise in providing in-depth mentoring to
threatens IBP's
partner organisations on a variety or organisational and
research or
technical issues. For this purpose, IBP maintains both
other
internal capacity and a cadre of external consultants. In
addition, in most countries, IBP works with multiple partners
and is able to substitute researchers where necessary.
C. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
IBP will produce an annual report on all activities and outcomes. This report will be available by end
February/beginning of March for the previous year. Progress and results will be monitored, measured,
and evaluated against the log frame. Note that until IBP is sure of the total amount of resources they
will have for the 5 year programme that the exact targets and milestones will not be finalised however
the business case and log frame sets out the indicative targets. By December 2013 the IBP’s total
resources will have been confirmed and they will be able to finalise their plans and agree on milestones
to have the achievement of outputs and outcomes measured against. The logframe will then be
updated.
48
References
Awasthi, R. (2011). Samarthan’s Campaign to Improve Access to the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme in India. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-study-Samarthan.pdf
Basch, F. (2011). Children’s Right to Early Education in the City of Buenos Aires: A
Case Study on ACIJ’s Class Action. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-study-ACIJ.pdf
Bastida, F. and Benito, B. (2007). Central Government Budget Practices and
Transparency: An International Comparison. Public Administration 85, no. 3: 667716. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00664.x/abstract
Bellver, A. and Kaufmann, D. (2005). Transparenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and
Policy Applications. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=808664
Bizhan, N. (2013). Budget Transparency In Afghanistan: A Pathway To Building Public
Trust In The State. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-case-study-Afghanistan.pdf
Bofin, P. (2012). Freeing Funds to Meet Priorities and Needs: Sikika’s Campaign to
Curb Unnecessary Expenditure in Tanzania. Study No. 8, September 2012.
International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/LP-case-study-Sikika.pdf
Bosworth, J. (2005). Citizens, Accountability and Public Expenditure: A Rapid Review of
DFID Support. DFID Working Paper 17, July 2005.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67850/
wp17.pdf
Carlitz, R. (2010). Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and
Accountability Initiatives: Annex 2 Budget Processes. Prepared for the Transparency
and Accountability Initiative Workshop October 14 – 15, 2010. Institute of
Development Studies.
http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/IETAAnnex2BudgetProcessesCarlitzFinal28Oct2010
.pdf
Carter, B. (2013). Evidence on budget accountability and participation. (GSDRC
Helpdesk Research Report 973). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/research-helpdesk
Cejudo, G.M. (2012). Evidence for Change: The Case of Subsidios al Campo in Mexico.
International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/LP-case-study-Fundar.pdf
Chêne, M. (2012). Impact of community monitoring on corruption. U4 Expert Answer. U4
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Transparency International and Chr. Michelsen
Institute.
Dabla-Norris, E., Allen, R., Zanna, L.-F., Prakash, T., Kvintradze, E., Lledo, V.,
Yackovlev, I. and Gollwitzer, S. (2010). Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in
Low-Income Countries. International Monetary Fund WP/10/80.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1080.pdf
Devas, N. and Grant, U. (2003), Local government decision-making—citizen
participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda. Public
Admin. Dev., 23: 307–316.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pad.281/abstract
Development Initiatives, International Budget Partnership and Global Witness. (2013).
An Open Goal: How to empower the post-2015 framework.
49
http://www.devinit.org/wp-content/uploads/An-Open-Goal-How-to-empower-the-Post2015-framework-Feb-2013.docx
Dogbe, T. and Kwabena-Adade, J. (2012). Ghana: Budget Monitoring by SEND-Ghana
and its Partners Helps Improve Nutrition for Children and Support Local Farmers.
International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/Long-Final-SEND-case-study-English.pdf
Fölscher, A. (2010). Budget transparency. New frontiers in transparency and
accountability. Transparency and Accountability Initiative. London: Open Society
Foundation.
Fukuda-Parr, S., Guyer, P. and Lawson-Remer, T. (2011). Does Budget Transparency
Lead to Stronger Human Development Outcomes and Commitments to Economic
and Social Rights? (December 1, 2011). International Budget Partnerships Working
Paper No. 4. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2211584
Gaventa, J. and Barrett, G. (2010). So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the
Outcomes of Citizen Engagement. IDS Working Paper 347. Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies. http://www.drccitizenship.org/system/assets/1052734701/original/1052734701-gaventa_etal.2010so.pdf
Glennerster, R. and Shin, Y. (2008). Does Transparency Pay? IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 55,
No. 1: 183-209. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2008/01/pdf/glennerster.pdf
Goldfrank, (2006). Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting.
Presentation at the Latin American Studies Association Meeting, San Juan, Puerto
Rico, March 2006. http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/PB/LatinAmerica.pdf
Hameed, F. (2005). Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes. IMF Working Paper
No. 05/225. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05225.pdf
Hameed, F. (2011). Budget Transparency and Financial Markets. International Budget
Partnership Working Paper No. 1: December 2011. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/IBP-Working-Paper-1-Budget-Transparency-and-FinancialMarkets.pdf
Hickey Tshangana, A. (2013). The Impact of Litigation by the Legal Resources Centre
for Adequate Classroom Infrastructure in South Africa. International Budget
Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-studyLRC.pdf
ICAI (2011). The Department for International Development’s Approach to AntiCorruption. Report 2 – November 2011. Independent Commission on Aid Impact.
http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/DFIDs-Approach-to-AntiCorruption.pdf
IDEA, the Inisiatif Association, Lakpesdam NU, the Centre for Information and Regional
Studies (PATTIRO), and the Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency (FITRA).
(2011). Show Me the Money: Budget Advocacy in Indonesia. Budget Advocacy
Stories. International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/Show-Me-the-Money-Budget-Advocacy-in-Indonesia.pdf
International Budget Partnership (2012). Open Budget Survey 2012. International
Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012Report-English.pdf
International Monetary Fund (2012). Fiscal Transparency, Accountability, and Risk. IMF.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/080712.pdf
Joshi, A. (2010). Do They Work? Assessing the Impact of Transparency and
Accountability Initiatives in Service Delivery. R4D.
http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/Mis_SPC/60827_DPRJoshi_Preprint.pdf
50
Khagram, S., Fung, A. and de Renzio, P. (2013). Open Budgets: The Political Economy
of Transparency, Participation, and Accountability. Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press.
Mansuri,G. and Rao, V. (2013). Localizing Development : Does Participation Work?
Washington, DC: World Bank.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11859
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (2010). Synthesis report. Review of impact and
effectiveness of transparency and accountability initiatives. London: Open Society
Foundation.
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (2011). Shifting Power? Assessing the Impact of
Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. IDS Working Paper Volume 2011 No
383. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2011.00383_2.x/pdf
Mills, L. (2013). Foreign Assistance and Fiscal Transparency: The Impact of the Open
Budget Initiative on Donor Policies and Practices. (March 2013). International Budget
Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Foreign-Assistanceand-Fiscal-Transparency-Final-Report.pdf
Noe Pino, H. (2013). The Impact of the International Budget Partnership’s Open Budget
Survey and its Partner Institutions’ Advocacy on Budget Transparency in Honduras.
International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/OBI-case-study-Honduras.pdf
Norton, A. and Elson, D. (2002). What's Behind the Budget? Politics, Rights and
Accountability in the Budget Process. Overseas Development Institute: London.
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/2422.pdf
O’Sullivan, D. (2013). What’s the Point Of Transparency. The Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative and the governance of natural resources in Liberia, Timor
Leste and other countries. Global Witness.
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/What's%20the%20point%20of
%20transparency%20April%202013.pdf
ONE (2013a). Extractives Revenue Transparency Helps Overcome the Resource Curse
in Africa. ONE. https://www.box.com/s/q73r1hh8itg5c0mzdzn8
ONE (2013b). Open Budgeting Brings Better Development Results. ONE.
https://www.box.com/s/ru7qq2elk58musf6qalw
Oxfam UK (2012). Where Does the Money Go? Citizen Participation in Turkana County.
Oxfam UK. http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/where-does-the-moneygo-citizen-participation-in-turkana-county-kenya-226751
Overy, N. (2011). In the Face of Crisis: The Treatment Action Campaign Fights
Government Inertia with Budget Advocacy and Litigation. International Budget
Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-studyTAC.pdf
Overy, N. (2010). Impact Case Study Of Civil Society Interventions Around The Child
Support Grant In South Africa. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-study-CSG.pdf
Overy, N. (2013). The Social Justice Coalition and Access to Basic Sanitation in Informal
Settlements in Cape Town, South Africa. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/LP-case-study-SJC.pdf
Prichard, W. (2010). Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax
Reform Agenda. Institute of Development Studies.
http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/Wp341%20web.pdf
51
Ramachandran, V. and Goel, S. (2011). Tracking Funds for India’s Most Deprived: The
Story of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights’ “Campaign 789” .
International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/LP-case-study-NCDHR.pdf
Ramkumar, V. (2009). Our money, our responsibility. A Citizen’s Guide to Monitoring
Government Expenditures. The International Budget Project.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Our-Money-Our-Responsibility-ACitizens-Guide-to-Monitoring-Government-Expenditures-English.pdf
de Renzio, P. and Krafchik, W. (2007). Lessons from the Field: The Impact of Civil
Society Budget Analysis and Advocacy in Six Countries. International Budget
Project. http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Lessons-from-theField-The-Impact-of-Civil-Society-Budget-Analysis-and-Advocacy-in-SixCountries.pdf
Revenue Watch Institute (2013). From Transparency and Dialogue to Better Spending –
Case Studies. Draft - for submission to DFID/Cabinet Office as inputs into 3Ts event
on 15 June 2013 – prepared by RWI on behalf of the PWYP coalition.
Roba A. and Budlender, D. (2010). Quality of Education Reforms: The Case of
HakiElimu’s Campaign of 2005-2007. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-case-study-HakiElimusummary.pdf
Robinson, M. (ed.) (2008). Budgeting for the Poor. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B. 2008. Joint Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and
Accountability: Synthesis Report. DFID.
Salvador, E. (2012). The Role Of Brazilian Civil Society In The Tax Reform Debate:
INESC’s Tax Campaign. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-INESC-case-studycomplete.pdf
Schneider, A. and Goldfrank. B. (2002). Budgets and ballots in Brazil: participatory
budgeting from the city to the state. IDS Working Paper 149, January 2002.
http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/wp149.pdf
Schouten, C. and Samolia Monamoto, J.-P. (2013). The Impact of the Open Budget
Initiative Secretariat and its Partners on Budget Transparency in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. International Budget Partnership.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI-case-study-DRC.pdf
Shah (Ed.) (2007). Participatory Budgeting. Public Sector Governance and
Accountability Series. World Bank.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf
Simson, R. (2013). The flip side of the coin: accountability as a precondition for
meaningful budget transparency. Beyond Budgets Blog.
http://www.beyondbudgets.org/blog/2013/6/18/the-flip-side-of-the-coin-accountabilityas-a-precondition-f.html
Tahir, P. (no date). Earthquake Reconstruction In Pakistan: The Case of the Omar
Asghar Khan Development Foundation’s Campaign. Short Summary. International
Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/LP-casestudy-OAKDF-summary.pdf
Tearfund, Revenue Watch Institute and Paz y Esperanza. (2013). Dissemination and
Impact of EITI National Reports In Peru Summary Report.
http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Tilz/Research/Summary%20EITI%20Peru%20Feb%2
02013%20final.pdf
52
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (2011). Opening government. A guide to best
practice in transparency, accountability and civic engagement across the public
sector. Open Society Foundation. http://www.transparency-initiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/Opening-Government.pdf
van Zyl (2009). The methodology for the Partnership Initiative Prospective Case Studies.
(June 2009). International Budget Partnership. http://internationalbudget.org/wpcontent/uploads/Prospective-Case-Study-Methodology.pdf
World Bank Institute (2007). Case Study: Indonesia Forum for Budget Transparency.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCACCDEMSIDEGOV/Resources/Empowe
ringTheMarginalizedFinalVersion.pdf
53
Annex A: Theory of Change
IMPACT
OUTCOME
(3 main
outcomes
that will lead
to the impact)
OUTPUTS
(3 main
outputs that
will lead to
the
outcomes in
each of the 3
areas of
work)
Highest level of Impact: Efficient, effective and equitable budgets should contribute to the achievement of development goals.
Impact: An improved level of government budget accountability and participation (intermediate impact) should lead to more efficient, effective,
equitable budgets:
1 Resources are collected and allocated in line with national strategies and priorities (efficient budgets)
2 Service delivery is improved and revenue is collected (effective budgets)
3 Budget policies more effectively address the needs of the poor and the marginalized (equitable budgets)
Intermediate Impact: There is improved level of government budget accountability and participation and thus improved budget policies,
processes and rules and regulations.
1 Budgets processes more transparent:
2 CSOs are analysing and questioning
3 International policy community actively promoting
Timely, accessible information is available government budgets and are engaged in budget transparency, accountability and participation
to citizens and CSOs
broader accountability and participation
agenda
work at the national and subnational
government level
Information produced on transparency: CSOs have the tools they need to
International policy community working together
analyse, question and participate in
effectively on budget transparency, accountability
1.1 OBS 2015 and OBS 2017
government budget processes
and participation:
1.2 New tools for other transparency
measures that are complementary to OBS
3.1 Greater alignment in the definition and
(Indicators: OBS Budget Tracker, and
In 5 focus countries, the IBP will give
understanding of budget transparency and citizen
modified subnational OBS)
CSOs tools to effectively engage with
participation across international and multilateral
1.3 Research on key policy questions
broader accountability network:
organisations, and CSOs and CSO networks
relevant to both country work and
(Indicators: Broad consensus on principles for budget
international advocacy work (Indicators:
2.1 Detailed articulation of civil society
transparency and participation that reflect CSO position;
Incentives for Shifting government policy & budget transparency, accountability, and
Number of institutions more closely aligning their
practice, Impact of CSO engagements in
participation agenda that CSOs and their
policies and practice with broad principles; Number of
budget policy & processes)
networks agree on and rally around
donor institutions that have strategies congruent with
1.4 Deeper understanding on how to
CSO position; GIFT membership [governments,
strategically direct and support civil society 2.2 Skilled and sustainable CSOs and
institutions, and CSOs]; Open data protocols for GIFT;
engagements in budget work based on
CSO networks strategically engage with
GIFT support for initiatives like OGP)
reflection on documentation of
their governments and formal oversight
3.2 Formal international agreements forged by the
experiences and outcomes of
institutions to promote budget
international policy community
engagements
transparency, accountability and
(Indicators: Indicator on fiscal transparency in post-2015
1.5 Strengthened capacities of at least
participation
agenda; other UN agreements)
100 CSO research partners for
3.3 Strengthened capacities of CSO networks for
undertaking research and evidence-based 2.3 CSO partnerships within and across
effective engagements with the international policy
advocacy on government transparency
countries promote peer learning and
community, particularly around the broadly agreed
exchange, and enable “impactful” joint
agendas for budget transparency, accountability and
analysis and advocacy
participation
54
2.4 CSOs and formal accountability
institutions able to work together to hold
governments to account for use of public
resources.
For all other CSOs interested to pursue
budget work and build capacity in
general:
ACTIVITIES/
INPUTS
(these are
the activities
that will lead
to the
outputs that
have been
listed for each
of the three
areas of work
above.
Activities that will lead to the outputs
above:
Activities that will lead to the outputs above:
1)
1)
2)
3)
4)
Update OBS questionnaire to
reflect shifts in standards and
good practices for fiscal
transparency recognized by the
IMF, WB, and the INTOSAI
a. Develop online survey
management system for
OBS
b. Update OBS Guide to
the Questionnaire for
the research partners
c. Update training
materials on survey
methodology for
orientation/training of
research partners
Undertake OBS surveys, increasing
coverage from 100 to 130 countries
Disseminate survey results widely
(globally and regionally, and with
targeted institutions)
Develop Open Budget Survey
2.5 Resource materials are electronically
available
In relation to the CSO partners in 5 focus
countries, the activities that will lead to
the outputs above:
1)
Develop a country strategy for
each priority country in close
coordination with the civil
society groups in the country,
and in consultation with other
accountability stakeholders
(including formal oversight
institutions). Country strategies
outline clear and contextspecific goals, strategies and
partnerships to engage with the
accountability system for budget
reforms
a. Regularly review and
update country strategies
for sustained/increased
impact
2) Provide funding support to at least
3 CSO partner organisations in
each of the 5 focus countries
a. Provide at least 1 multi-year
2)
Engage in a variety of ways in various
multi-stakeholder initiatives that promote
the budget transparency, accountability
and participation agenda (GIFT, OGP,
BTAP, and others).
a. Actively undertake
committee work within multistakeholder initiatives (GIFT,
OGP, BTAP, and others),
especially in specific themes
around which civil society
asks relevant
Ensure that budget transparency, accountability,
and participation remains a policy focus for
international multi-stakeholder initiatives (GIFT,
OGP, BTAP, and others)
a. Prepare position papers that synthesize
civil society policy asks, positions, and
experiences that relate to budget
transparency, accountability, and
participation
b. Convene and/or participate in strategic
opportunities where policy debates and
55
Budget Tracker (OBS Budget
Tracker) to monitor the real time
public availability of key budget
documents assessed in the OBS
a. Pilot the OBS Budget Tracker in
at least 30 countries (this will
include 20 countries currently
covered by the OBS; and 10
countries not yet monitored by
the OBS)
b. Extend the coverage of
countries covered by OBS
Budget Tracker to match the
number of countries covered by
the OBS Survey
5) Dialogue with governments covered
by the OBS on transparency reforms
based on OBS results
a. Invite governments from at least
40 countries to OBS results
dissemination events
b. Respond to invitations from
other governments who are
interested and willing to engage
the IBP and other CSOs on
dialogue on transparency
reforms
c. Initiate, wherever possible, any
joint actions between
governments and CSOs that will
progress budget transparency
reforms
6) Develop and frame research agenda
institutional support grant to at
least 1 “anchor” partner 27in
each priority country to work
closely with the IBP
b. Provide between 2 and 5
shorter-term, smaller, more
targeted grants to other “core
partners” 28in each focus
country to implement work
called for by the country
strategy
3) Extend CSO partners (anchor and
core) capacity building support to
CSO partner organisations in each
of the 5 focus countries
a. Provide at least 10 training and
technical assistance
interventions adopted to both
the country context and what is
required by the country strategy
in each of the focus countries
every year.
b. Extend mentor support and
technical assistance to CSO
partners (anchor and core),
and their networks as may be
required by the country
strategy
c. Work with anchor and core
partners in each priority
country to evaluate
organisational strengths and
weaknesses to better tailor
3)
4)
5)
6)
discussions take place in relation to these
policy asks
c. Undertake evidence-based advocacy in and
with different forums where decision makers
of international policy community are present
(UN, GIFT, OGP, others)
Provide technical assistance and support to
International NGOs to strengthen their
understanding of and capacities to engage in
policy debates relating to budget transparency,
accountability, and participation
Undertake communications outreach on
international advocacy initiatives
Selectively undertake lobbying on specific issues
that present strategic opportunities for promoting
the budget transparency, accountability, and
participation agenda
Provide technical assistance and support to Global
BTAP movement campaigns and advocacy
initiatives
“Anchor” partners are key partner organizations that, because of their own experience in budget work and capacities to work with other budget
stakeholders, will be expected to work very closely with the IBP in leading the implementation of the country strategy. For each of the focus
countries, the IBP aniticipates to have at least 1, and where needed or appropriate, 2 “anchor” partners.
27
“Core partners” are other partner organizations that the IBP will be providing support because they are either undertaking work that is central to
the country strategy in a focus country, or are best placed to begin undertaking work that is called for by the country strategy.
28
56
on strategic policy questions that
considers information from all areas
of work (to include themes such as
incentives for shifting policies and
practices of governments on budget
transparency, participation, and
accountability)
a. Develop specific research
frameworks for specific policy
research projects
b. Undertake research
c. Publish and promote research
(including dialogue with
government and other
audiences)
7) Conduct research on key elements
critical for advancing country
strategies work for each of the 5
focus countries
a. Undertake background research
needed to refine budget
transparency, accountability, and
participation agenda of CSOs
b. Document the ways in which
accountability networks work and
deliver changes in each of the
priority countries. Generate: at
least 1 research project in each
focus country in year 1, at least 2
case studies of impact in each
focus country from year 2
onwards
8) Develop and frame a
“documentation” agenda on strategic
impacts of civil society engagements
in budget policy and processes
a. Research and document the
methods and impact of civil
society budget work and other
oversight actors, and what
makes them effective
technical assistance covering
organisational health, impact
planning, research and
advocacy, and learning issues
4) Ensure that CSO partners (anchor
and core) ensure that they have
maximum opportunities to work with
each other, as well as other CSOs,
as part of networks and alliances
promoting budget transparency
5) Support linkages and collaboration
between and among key
stakeholders within the budget
accountability network
a. Reach out to and convene other
key stakeholders within budget
accountability network (eg,
other CSOs more broadly,
media, oversight institutions,
academia, decision-makers
themselves) in priority countries
as may be required by the
country strategy
b. Ensure that there CSO
networks increasingly
collaborate with formal
oversight institutions and
reformers within government.
Support at least 5 meetings of
CSO partners (anchor and
core) and other oversight
actors per year in each of the
focus countries. This may also
include CSO collaborations
with government designed to
increase budget transparency
(eg, development and
production of citizens’ budgets)
c. Facilitate and create
opportunities for working to
strengthen capabilities of other
57
9)
Build and strengthen capacities of at
least 100 CSO research partners
(progressively increasing to 130) for
assessing budget transparency and
oversight and identifying gaps in
country systems.
a. Transfer diagnostic skills to CSO
research partners and strengthen
their ability to identify priority
agendas to focus on
b. Coach participating 100 OBI
research partners on effective
dissemination
c. Support advocacy work of
partners on survey-related asks
through advocacy and
communications training and
technical assistance
10) Provided limited targeted funding
support for campaigns specifically
directed at improving government
transparency in at least 5 countries
covered by the Open Budget Survey,
based on the recommendations of
the survey results
11) Develop and frame a “learning”
agenda for the IBP on how to more
strategically direct and support civil
society engagements in budget work
6)
7)
accountability stakeholders
with donors and other NGOs in
priority countries
Foster horizontal learning across
civil society partners (anchor and
core) within and across countries
Draw from the OBI and the OBS
Budget Tracker, as appropriate, the
information for civil society
campaigns in priority countries
In relation to other CSOs interested in
budget work, more generally:
8) Make available on the IBP website
resources relevant to or useful for
budget work: case studies that
document partners’ work, policy
papers and other research papers
produced collaboratively with
partners, and guides and training
modules and materials
9) Encourage sign up to the IBP
newsletter and other social media
outlets
58
Annex B: International Budget Partnership CSO Case Studies
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
Results (process and
intermediate)
1. Afghani
stan
(Bizhan,
2013)
Open Budget
Survey (OBS):
IBP and
partner,
Integrity Watch
Afghanistan
(IWA)
Preparation and
publication of the Open
Budget Survey 2008;
advocacy campaign;
training for government
officials.


Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
Lessons learned

Attention generated by the
2008 OBI release provided
some momentum, and the
government used the OBI
indices as an easy guide
for improving its reputation
in the area of budget
transparency
Government made
important progress
increasing its OBI score
from 8 in 2008 to 21 in
2010. In 2011 published a
Citizen’s Budget.
2. Argenti
na (Basch,
2011)
Civil
Association for
Equality and
Justice –
campaign for
children’s right
to early
education
Complex litigation
strategy that involved
“freedom of
information” requests,
budget analysis, and
media dissemination

A high-profile public
hearing hosted by the
city’s highest court that
raised awareness of the
issue.

A legally binding
agreement from the
government to address
the shortage of preschools and
kindergartens
3. Brazil
(Salvador,
Institute for
Socioeconomi
Dialogues with
government officials

Brought unprecedented

Blocked a regressive
Drivers of improvements in transparency: a
desire on the part of the government to
improve its international image; technical
assistance provided by donor
organisations; international pressure; and
small but effective campaigns by CSOs
and the media.
 The OBI focus on the government budget
is problematic as the budget only
represents a small percentage of
resources. Meanwhile donors have paid
little attention to increasing transparency
among ‘off-budget’ projects.
 There is need for country-specific approach
to deal with limited access to the Internet
and the low level of literacy in Afghanistan
that have made the measures to improve
transparency less effective than they
should be.

ACIJ was an experienced actor in public
debates; it had well-established contacts
with the education community and
journalists; and its staff includes attorneys
who were more willing to negotiate and
were experienced in both class-action
litigation and budget analysis.

The litigation strategy succeeded because
of the incorporation of budget analysis —
an innovative approach for Argentina’s
legal practice that no organisation in either
the legal or the education community had
pursued before.
The technical capabilities of INESC were
crucial for 1) mobilizing such a broad swath of
59
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
2012)
c Studies
(INESC) and
its partners
formed a
coalition
movement to
defend social
rights under
threat by tax
reform
Open Budget
Initiative (OBI):
IBP and
partner, the
Réseau
Gouvernance
Economique et
Démocratie
(REGED)
and parliamentarians;
petitions; audience with
lawmakers; analysis.
4. DRC
(Schouten
and
Samolia
Monamoto,
2013)
5. Ghana
(Dogbe
and
KwabenaAdade,
2012)
Social
Enterprise
Development
(SENDGhana)
Foundation,
one of the
IBP’s partners
Results (process and
intermediate)

1) Training and
research of the Open
Budget Survey in 2008
and 2010, and
consistent and
constructive
engagement with
government on survey
results; 2) Evidencebased advocacy for
specific transparency
reforms in the context
of broader PFM
reforms; 3) Training of
media and legislature
to use the information
for wider economic
governance reforms.
From 2007 to 2010,
budget monitoring of
the Ghana School
Feeding Programme
(GSFP), engaging with
district assemblies,
CSOs, and District
Highly Indebted Poor
Countries



Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
attention to the role of the
tax system in fostering
social justice.
Built a network of
organisations that is far
more capable of taking on
tax issues than ever
before
For the first time, the
government published a
range of budget
documents, including the
Executive’s Budget
Proposal and budget
timetable, and also
included transparency
provisions in several new
public finance laws and
regulations.
The DRC’s overall OBI
score rose from 0 out of
100 in 2008 to 28 out of
100 in 2012. While the
information provided is still
limited it is a notable
improvement over 2008.
The work done by SENDGhana and its partners to
monitor the GSFP is
widely acknowledged.
Nonetheless, it is still
difficult to directly attribute
the changes at the GSFP
National Secretariat to
SEND-Ghana’s campaign
tax reform bill
Lessons learned
civil society against the bill, and 2) persuading
decision makers.
Separate from INESC’s campaign, governors
were also lobbying against the proposal




IBP identify the
following outcomes
from the campaign:
improved
infrastructure,
agricultural services,
health services and
education services.


Donors also played a significant role (e.g.
the IMF and World Bank demanded fiscal
transparency under the HIPC initiative;
multiple donors support the government’s
PFM reforms; the Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability (PEFA) study
funded by the European Commission and
IMF mission reports encouraged budget
transparency and accountability).
However, donors’ own practices may not
promote transparency, and some donors
(China) don’t call for transparency.
The government is also influenced by, and
attempts to imitate, budget transparency as
increasingly highlighted in various
international forums.
SEND-Ghana was able to capitalise on its
experience, network, capacity and diverse
funding.
It benefited from good timing: there was
already debate and agitation from previous
analysis by Pricewaterhouse Coopers that
has unearthed rampant malfeasance with
the programme.
60
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
Results (process and
intermediate)
(HIPC)/Citizens
Monitoring Committees
(DCMC) in seven
regions. Used the
monitoring information
to promote
improvements in the
program with district
assemblies and officials
from collaborating
ministries, departments
and agencies at the
national, regional and
district levels, and
through the media.



6. Hondur
as
7. (Noe
Pino,
2013)
Open Budget
Survey (OBS):
IBP and
partner, the
Fundación
Democracia
sin
Fronteras(FDs
F)
Preparation and
publication of the Open
Budget Survey 2010;
advocacy campaign;
training for government
officials.


Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
After the release of
SENDGhana’s first report,
for example, the
leadership of the GSFP
was changed, and a fivemember GSFP Review
Committee was
established
Government cooperated
with SEND-Ghana to host
a National Policy Dialogue
on the GSFP and various
government commitments
emerged from this
gathering that aimed to
resolve problems identified
in SEND-Ghana’s reports.
Most important: improved
local capabilities to
monitor the GSFP.
Increased awareness of
Honduras’ budget
transparency problems
In 2011 the government
formulated a Plan to
Improve Fiscal
Transparency and
Management, drawing on
findings of PEFA and OBI
reports.
Lessons learned



8. India
(Awasth,
Samarthan's
campaign to
Social audits, budget
tracking technique,

Assisted government in
identifying a number of

Publicly available
figures on the NREGA

IBP’s technical assistance to the
government of Honduras played an
important role in the recent publication of
budget documents but ultimately these
documents would not have been published
without strong government will.
After 2009 troubled financial situation, new
government keen to fulfil international
donor transparency requirements (e.g.
Millennium Challenge Corporation) to
secure funding. At same time citizen-led
efforts to increase transparency are
growing.
While some government sectors are
reforming, others are resisting.
Some of the hard won gains do appear to
have been eroded by persistent
61
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
2011)
make real the
right to work
community
organisation,
government
engagement, media
outreach
9. India
(Ramachandran
and Goel,
2011)
National
Campaign for
Dalit Human
Rights
(NCDHR)
Working together with
the Centre for Budget
and Governance
Accountability to
develop a methodology
that involved budget
analysis and the
tracking of
expenditures intended
for a fund earmarked
for Dalits (the
Scheduled Caste SubPlan).
Strategies: right to
information petition;
multi-pronged
communication
strategy; held rallies;
litigation against the
State of Delhi;
Results (process and
intermediate)
blockages in the process
of managing and
budgeting for National
Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA).
It also played a significant
role in mobilizing the
population to demand
work in terms of NREGA.



Access to detailed budget
information and the ability
to analyze that data
provided the evidence that
civil society advocate
NCDHR needed to
pressure government in
India to keep its promise to
target resources to benefit
one of India’s most
deprived social groups.
The campaign has
certainly contributed to
making an important
component of government
expenditures more
transparent and
accountable.
Government admitted that
misdirection of funds was
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
Lessons learned
suggest that the
campaign had an initial
but unsustained
impact. In the villages
where Samarthan was
active, there was a
marked increase in the
percentage of workers
getting employment
through the program.
Once the campaign
had ended, however,
that surge tapered off
as workers became
reluctant again to
demand their
entitlements.
challenges.


Other factors played key roles: India’s
democratic institutions (e.g. independent
judiciary); vibrant civil society; political
climate created by scandal around
Commonwealth Games.
NCDHR able to capitalise on many years’
experience on the issue, drew from its
established method of budget tracking,
able to use its networks.
62
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
Results (process and
intermediate)
parliamentary outreach;
citizen engagement;
government
engagement

10. Kenya
(IBP, no
date)
11. Mexico
(Cedujo,
2012)
Muslims for
Human Rights
(MUHURI)
Subsidios al
Campo campa
ign
Working to bridge the
Constituency
Development Fund’s
accountability gap by
conducting “social
audits”—a participatory
process in which CSOs
and communities
evaluate the use of
public resources and
identify how best to
improve outcomes of
public programs and
policies.
Using Mexico’s
freedom of information
laws to obtain official
data on the recipients
of agricultural
subsidies, and then
publishing the data


wrong, implemented
budget rules and set up
task-force. However, there
is still long way to go: the
government has not yet
returned diverted funds.
The campaign contributed
to a shift in the public
mood. In the year following
there have been several
protest marches, hunger
strikes, and sit-ins to
demand more effective
laws and systems to
punish corrupt politicians
and administrators
Demonstrated the
significant role budget
transparency plays in
improving accountability
and how public
engagement in the budget
process can strengthen
oversight.
It brought a large amount
of new information into the
public domain, and
managed to shift the
debate about agricultural
subsidies from a focus on
their overall size to a
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
Lessons learned

Demonstrates how
public engagement in
the budget process can
lead to improved public
service delivery.

The Mexican Ministry
of Agriculture reacted
by reforming the
system to ensure that
subsidies were flowing
only to those that
needed them.




MUHURI’s impact has been restricted by
the lack of a Freedom of Information (FOI)
law
A MP got involved because it helped him
win an election.
One of the lessons of this campaign is that
gathering all available evidence and
building a powerful argument is not enough
in a context of ineffective accountability
institutions
The coalition quickly understood that
access to information alone would not
63
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Activity
online.
Results (process and
intermediate)
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
Lessons learned
discussion of how
equitably they were being
distributed, challenging a
powerful agricultural
industry in the process.


12. Pakista
n (Tahir,
2011)
Omar
Asghar Khan
Development
Foundation’s
Campaign on
earthquake
reconstruction
Coalition building,
research and analysis,
outreach and
advocacy, engagement
with government.


change policy, so it drew upon a network of
researchers to deepen analysis of the
problem. One important lesson from the
success of this manoeuvre was that
discoveries and insights produced might
have been dismissed as propaganda had
they not been carried out by reputable
researchers and backed up by official data.
Early efforts to work with journalists
generated mostly sensationalist headlines.
It was only after several efforts to engage
with journalists that the campaign finally
elicited in-depth reporting on the root
causes of the problem.
None of the achievements would have
been possible without the diversity of the
coalition. Bringing together activists, a
peasant farmer’s organisation, information
and communication experts, and
academics required an especially adept
networker that the coalition was fortunate
to count upon.
Rapid increase in
activity in the sectors of
housing compensation,
health, water supply,
and sanitation: a broad
positive trend of
improvement in the
rate of reconstruction
that corresponded with
the timing of the
Foundation’s
campaign.
Creation of a central
structure that was
established to oversee
64
Case
study
13. Tanzan
ia (Bofin,
2012)
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Sikka –
campaign to
curb
unnecessary
expenditure /
use of
government
slush funds
Activity
Providing consistent,
comparable, and
reliable budget analysis
to media and decisionmakers, principally
through annual Health
Sector Budget Analysis
(one of the few CSOs
in Tanzania to provide
such information).
Results (process and
intermediate)



Considerable activity and
coverage: undoubtedly
helped to keep the matter
in the public eye
Assisted other CSOs in
making evidence-based
claims.
Helped MPs to analyse
budget proposals and
proposing budget revisions
to the Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)

the reconstruction
effort, and is able to
spend more effectively
than the prior
decentralized structure.
Important reductions in
government training
budgets attributable in
part to Sikika’s efforts
Lessons learned



14. South
Africa
(Overy,
2013)
Social Justice
Coalition
(SJC): Clean
and Safe
Sanitation
Campaign
Broad communications
campaign; protests and
creative demos; limited
amount of budget
analysis; working with
researchers and policy
experts.


Release of the service
contracts
Budgetary tools and
analysis played a
significant factor in
demonstrating the
feasibility of the proposal
for a janitorial service. The
SJC is aware that
budgetary analysis will
continue to be an
important tool for holding
the City of Cape Town to
account for its promises
and so it has recently sent


Instrumental in getting
approval and funding
for the janitorial service
for public toilets in
informal settlements.
A number of other
immediate sanitation
improvements within
Khayelitsha



Hard to directly attribute results to Sikka as
one of multiple actors (donors, the offices
of the President and the Prime Minister,
and other CSOs) seeking a more rational
allocation of government funds
A focus on media outreach and raising
public awareness may not be enough to
bring about changes in contexts where
budget allocation processes are closed
and there are strong internal pressures to
maintain the widespread patronage and
rents that can be drawn from recurrent
expenditures in the budget
More persistent issues may require an
approach that integrates analysis with
targeted advocacy of key decision-makers
and public mobilization.
A number of external factors contributed to
the pressure on the City of Cape Town to
implement these measures. In a sense the
CSSC could be seen as a beneficiary of
good timing. Sanitation, and toilets in
particular, became a political issue after a
row between political parties.
The SJC’s legitimacy with its members, its
ability to garner support from a broad
swath of civil society groups, and its
exceptional communication skills are all
credited for its achievements.
The SJC itself has also highlighted the
importance of working both on the inside,
as a collaborator with government, and as
65
Case
study
15. South
Africa
(Overy,
2011)
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
Treatment
Action
Campaign
(TAC), an
advocacy
group run by
people living
with
HIV/AIDS
Activity
Budget analysis to
prove the money was,
in fact, there to address
the HIV/AIDS crisis.
Funding research and
formulating wellevidenced policy
recommendations,
mobilizing protesters,
and using the media to
raise awareness and
fight stigma. Eventually,
the TAC also sued the
South African
government, relying in
part on budget analysis
to make its case.
Results (process and
intermediate)




16. South
Africa
(Overy,
A range of civil
society
organisations
Litigation, supporting
research, and media
campaigning

its staff (along with staff
from NU) to a series of IBP
budget training workshops
The TAC's advocacy
efforts could be credited
with bringing HIV/AIDS
issues to the political fore
in the first place
The TAC's use of budget
analysis was critical for
overcoming the
government's inertia on
HIV/AIDS. By creating its
own cost estimates and by
pointing to the
government's record on
health expenditure, the
TAC was able to dismantle
the technical and depoliticizing defense the
government had
constructed around cost
and affordability
Perhaps the clearest
indication of the TAC's
influence, however, is that
the final spending plan
was drawn up with
substantial consultation
from the organisation.
The TAC’s advocacy is
now seen globally as an
inspiring model for how to
win a human rights victory.
Has kept this important
issue moving for more
than a decade and shows
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
Lessons learned
an independent agitator for change from
the outside.




As a result of the
TAC’s efforts,
hundreds of thousands
of HIV/AIDS-related
deaths have been
prevented.
The TAC's advocacy
and lawsuit directly
forced the South
African government to
implement a program
to prevent mother-tochild transmission of
HIV
The TAC's precise
contribution to the
passage of a national
treatment program,
however, is less clear
because a number of
other factors also
added pressure on the
South African
government to
formulate a large-scale
response to the
epidemic






Another factor that clearly assisted the
TAC in its struggle for access to treatment
was the constant decline in drug prices
during the same period
The TAC benefited tremendously from the
dynamic leadership of its first chairperson;
his principled stand earned him
international humanitarian awards and this
high-profile attention bolstered the TAC.
TAC’s success also stemmed from its
reimagining of anti-apartheid activist
strategies, so that many South Africans
associated the struggle for the right to
healthcare with the anti-apartheid struggle
for freedom.
Sophisticated use of strategies that
positioned it alternatively as both
constructive proponent and radical activist,
and as ally and adversary of the
government.
The TAC also was exceptional at both
mobilizing grassroots support for its
objectives while concurrently courting
international solidarity.
Successful extensive use of mass media
opportunities through radio, newsprint,
television and the Internet, framing its
argument as a human rights issue and
benefiting from its networking skills.
Contributed to
significant budget and
policy changes over
66
Case
study
Civil society
organisation /
initiative
2010)
and coalitions
17. South
Africa
(Hickey
Tshangana
, 2013)
Legal
Resources
Centre –
campaign for
adequate
education
facilities
Activity
Results (process and
intermediate)
Results (efficient,
effective, equitable
budgets)
no sign of flagging.
Litigation; budget
analysis a core
component of the legal
strategy; support to
schools against
government backlash;
monitoring progress on
commitments

Effective use of budget
research and analysis to
refute government
arguments related to
‘limited resources’ and
‘progressive realization.’



18. Tanzan
ia (Roba
and
Budlender,
2010)
CSO HakiElimu
Budget analysis and
advocacy to improve
education. Media
strategy a key
component.

Government instituted
several reforms that
addressed some of the
key issues highlighted by
HakiElimu’s campaign.
Stakeholders think
HakiElimu created greater
awareness and helped
generate public debate.

Lessons learned
the last decade, such
as the expanded
eligibility for the Child
Support Grant.
Litigation and
recommendations seen
to directly impact on
reforms with the CSG.

Obtained budget
allocations and work
plans for addressing
poor infrastructure in
schools.
Established new legal
mechanisms for
holding national and
provincial governments 
to account.
Improvement of
conditions at a few of
the schools
represented in the
cases.
Stakeholders link

changes (particularly in
teachers’ welfare) to
HakiElimu’s campaign

Litigation alone is often insufficient. A
comprehensive campaign that includes
grassroots mobilization and community
ownership, a plan for obtaining high level
political support, and a deliberate strategy
to harness the media is often necessary to
convert court victories into meaningful
policy changes.
CSO preparation was a consequence of
their previous efforts in the field of
educational justice, efforts that included
budget monitoring and evaluation.
Support by media and wide CSO network
critical for HakiElimu’s success. Also timely
general election and use of enrolment as a
campaign issue.
While acknowledging HakiElimu’s impact,
government respondents expressed strong
reservations about HakiElimu’s general
approach. Some government officials and
politicians felt that HakiElimu was a “donordriven” organisation that sought to
disparage government in its campaign.
They complained that HakiElimu was
always “negative”
67