Lecture 6
2 Nov., 2005
Semantics and Cognition
Helena Gao
1
Required readings:
 Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language: Brain,
Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Oxford University
Press.Chapter 10: Reference and Truth. pp. 53-67;
Chapter 11: Lexical Semantics. pp. 333-377
 Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’:
the semantics of human categorization. American
Ethnologist , Vol. 11, No. 2, 313-328.
Recommended readings:
 Talmy, L. (2000). Toward a Cognitive Semantics. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press. Vol. 1. Chapter 7: Force dynamics in
language and cognition. pp. 409-47
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The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics

Semantic structure is conceptual structure


Semantic structure (the meanings conventionally
associated with words and other linguistic units) is
equated with concepts.
Conceptual structure is embodied

The nature of conceptual organization arises from
bodily experience
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The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics
Cont’d

Meaning-representation is encyclopedic


Words (and other linguistic units) are treated as
“points of access” to vast repositories of knowledge
concerning a particular concept.
Meaning-construction is conceptualization

Meaning construction is equated with
conceptualization, a dynamic process whereby
linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of
conceptual operations and the recruitment of
background knowledge.
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Issues in Cognitive Semantics

Conceptual structure

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a) Conceptual structure vs. conceptual content
b) profile/base organization
c) mappings: projection, pragmatic-function, schema
Word-meaning
Categorization
Bodily basis of meaning


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a. John got the highest score on the test.
b. Oil prices have fallen lately.
c. Be nice to people on your way up because you meet them
on your way down.
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According to Jackendoff (1992),
Within a cognitive theory
Conceptual
Well-Formedness Rules
linguistic
structures
conceptual
structures
perceptual
and action
Inference
rules
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the resources available
in the brain for forming
concepts
Conceptual
Well-Formedness Rules
linguistic
structures
conceptual
structures
Inference
rules
the brain’s
combinatorial
organization
perceptual
and action
Similar to logical
inference
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Contributions from perceptual modalities for
the structure of meaning (Jackendoff, 2002)

How perceptual structures are stored?

According to Jackendoff, a major division in the
structure of meaning appears to lie between
conceptual structure (CS) and spatial structure (SpS)
(see Jackedoff, 1978, 1996b; Landau and Jackendoff,
1993)
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Conceptual Structure (CS)

CS is a hierarchical arrangement built out of
discrete features and functions.

It enables such aspects of understanding as
category membership (taxonomy) and predicateargument structure.
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Spatial Structure (SpS)

SpS is concerned with encoding the spatial
understanding of the physical world – not just moment
by moment appearance, but the integration over time
of the space, motion, and layout of objects in space
(and possibly the forces among them).
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The “upper end” of the visual system
Also receives and integrates inputs about shape and spatial
somatosensory system (felt position of one’s own body)
This integration is what enables you to know by looking at an
object where to reach for it, and what it should feel like when
you handle it.
Thus SpS should be thought of as a system of central
cognition, to some degree modality-independent.
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SpS

SpS must encode the shape of objects in a form that is suitable
for recognizing an object at different distances and from
different perspectives.
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It must be able to encode spatial knowledge of parts of object
that cannot be seen (e.g., the hollowness of a balloon).
It must support visual object categorization as well as visual
object (identification)

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e.g., making explicit the range of shape variations possible among
different cups
It must be able to encode the degrees of freedom in objects that
can change their shape
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E.g., it must solve the classic problem of object consistency
e.g., human and animal bodies.
It must be suitable for encoding the full spatial layout of a
scene , and for mediating among alternative perspectives.
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The Difference between Image and SpS

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An image is restricted to a particular point of view,
whereas SpS is not.
An image is restricted to a particular instance of a
category, whereas SpS is not.
An image can’t include the unseen parts of an object –
its back and inside – whereas SpS does.
An image is restricted to the visual modality, whereas
SpS can equally well encode information received
haptically or through proprioception.
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Functions of CS and SpS

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Judgments and inferences having to do with
predicate-argument relations, category
membership, the type-token distinction,
quantification, and so forth can be formulated
only in terms of CS.
Judgments and inferences having to do with
exact shapes, locations, and forces can be
formulated only in terms of SpS.
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Overlap between CS and SpS


The notions of physical object, part-whole
relationships, locations, force, and causation
have reflexes in both systems.
It is these shared components that enable the
two systems to communicate with each other
through an interface of the usual sort.
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Jackendoff ’s (1996) Hypothesis

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The grammatical aspects of language make
reference only to CS, not to SpS.
Nothing in grammar depends on detailed shapes
of objects.
SpS is language’s indirect connection to visual,
haptic, and proprioceptive perception, and to
the control of action.
It is through the SpS connection that we can talk
about what we see.
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Incorporating the CS-SpS split in meaning
(Jackendoff, 2002, 348)
Visual system
Noises
Language
F- MIND
CS
SpS
Haptic system
Object
Action system
WORLD
However, not all lexical terms have a SpS component. e.g., abstract concepts such as
fairness and values and logical concepts such as and, if, not
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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection
(Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

a. Lexical items supplemented by SpS
Phonology + Syntax + CS
LANGUAGE
+ SpS
???
SpS falls outside the standard tripartite organization of language
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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection
(Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

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b. Non-linguistic concept attached to words
Phonology + Syntax
+ CS + SpS
LANGUAGE
“CONCEPT”
An evolutionary perspective: Suppose one deletes the
phonological and syntactic structures


What is left is a non-linguistic association of cognitive
structures in memory, much of which could be shared by a
non-linguistic organism.
Phonological and syntactic structures can then be viewed as
further structures tacked onto this concept to make it
linguistically expressible.
18
Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’:
the semantics of human categorization



Our principle categorization of the world does seem to
be taxonomic, both in the areas of biological kinds and
of “manufactured” environment.
But, above this basic level of categorization, it is only
with respect to the biological environment that we
group kinds of things into superkinds
With respect to the manufactured environment, we
proceed differently –

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we group kinds of things into supercategories on a different
basis.
We no longer ask, what kind of thing is it?; rather we ask,
what is it for? How can one use it? Where does it come from?
Why is it there? (Wierzbicka, 1984: 325).
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Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 314)

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Taxonomic categorization does play a role in
human thinking as reflected in natural language,
but it does not dominate that thinking as has
been assumed.
Other classification principles also play an
important role; and in some areas of the lexicon,
a more important role at that.
20
Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984:
315)

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Scientific classification, according to which a bird, a fish,
or a spider is a kind of animal, is not at issue.
In ordinary language they are not so classified.
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One would say of a parrot, a fish, or a spider: “A beautiful
creature!” or “A repulsive creature!” but not “A beautiful
animal!” or “A repulsive animal!”
In nonscientific English the word animal does not apply to
everything that zoologists call animal, and the word plant does
not apply to everything that botanists call plant.
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Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984:
316)

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When we define a cat as a kind of animal, a parrot as
kind of bird, a rose as a kind of flower, or an oak as a
kind of tree, we are implying that conceptually a cat is
above all a kind of animal, a parrot is a kind of bird, and
so on, and that all the other defining features are
subordinate to this one.
A concept that identifies a kind of thing stands for
something that has certain perceptual characteristics
and can therefore be imagined or drawn.

Thus, one can draw not only a parrot but also an unspecified
bird, not only a rose but also a flower, not only an oaktree but
also a tree in general.
22
Functional concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984: 316)

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Functional concepts stand for artifacts if any kind
made with a particular function in mind
The crucial differences between taxonomic
supercategories such as birds or flowers or trees and
nontaxonomic ones such as toys or weapons or
ornaments can be seen immediately when one tries to
represent them pictorially.

One cannot draw a toy, a weapon, a container, or a utensil “in
general.”

purely functional and thus imply no visual or more generally
perceptual properties.
23
Functional concepts vs. taxonomic concepts
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)

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For taxonomic concepts (concepts that stand for a kind
of thing), such as tricycles or balls, visible
characteristics are crucial.
But a concept such as toy or weapon stands neither for “a
kind of thing” nor strictly speaking, for “a kind of
function”. It stands for anything that has a particular
function.
“Imaginability” is a useful criterion to distinguish
concrete concepts that stand for “a kind of thing” from
other concrete concepts.
24
Semantic “fuzziness”
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)

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The difference between taxonomic and
functional concepts is reflected in the greater
semantic “fuzziness” of the latter.
This “fuzziness” has been presented as a
fundamental feature of human categorization
reflected in natural language (e.g., cup, knife, etc.)
25
The concept of contiguity
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 319)

The concept of contiguity plays crucial role in
natural language in the area of concrete lexicon.

A concept based on anthropologists distinction
between taxonomies (systems of kinds) and
partonomies (systems of parts).

Thus a nose is not a kind of thing (that sticks out in
the middle of the face, etc.) but a part of the face
(that sticks out in the middle of the face, etc.).
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singularia tantum
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 320-321)
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Collective concepts based on contiguity and function, such as
furniture, are singularia tantum.
A misconception to assume that tables are semantically a kind of
furniture; shirts, a kind of clothing; or apples, a kind of fruit.
There is nothing wrong to say so but semantically they are not.
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E.g., cockroaches can be described as vermin, but semantically they are
not a kind of vermin – they are a kind of bug.
Vermin is a collective concept and cockroach is an individual one.
The grammatical difference between vermin (a mass noun) and a
cockroach (a countable) reflects a difference in the conception.
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pluralia tantum
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)

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Collective concepts based on contiguity without a reference to
function, such as leftovers and contents, are pluralia tantum.
E.g., goods, , clothes, goodies groceries, refreshments, odds-andends, bits-and-pieces, remains, belongings, supplies, trappings,
trimmings, spoils, valuables, nuts-and-bolts, covers, dishes.
All these words are designate heterogeneous collections of
things: things that at some particular time are, or are expected to
be, in the same place.
In some instances the lack of a common function is transparent.
In other instances a common function does seem to be implied.
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singularia tantum vs. pluralia tantum
(Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)

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The two types of supercategories are both based on
contiguity.
Singularia tantum such as furniture stand for categories
the members of which are physically separate from one
another and therefore could be counted together.
Memebers of categories designated by pluralia tantum
such as groceries are not only heterogeneous but also not
fully discrete.
The pluralia tantum class has a nontaxonomic character
while the singularia tantum one does not.
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