Understanding political
disenchantment in
contemporary
democracies
Gerry Stoker, Canberra and
Southampton @ProfStoker
What I am not arguing
 That citizens were ever enchanted with
politics
 That there is imminent crisis in politics
 That anti-politics is conceptually
unambiguous
2
What I am arguing
 Decline and change are observable
 Differences between countries
 Differences over time
 Differences between social groups
 Complexity in and of explanation
 Research beginning to offer new insights
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Anti-Politics: What is it?
 AMONG CITIZENS: Negativity towards
politics rather than democracy
 Attitudes?
 Individual Behaviours?
 Collective Actions?
FROM
ABOVE:
let’s
exploit it;
lets remove
issues from
politics
FROM
BELOW:
: passive
and active
forms
Source:
Vittorio Mete,
2010
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Five types of “decline” trajectory
 Flatliners: Italy, Greece
 Modest decliners: Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Germany
 Slow burning and deep decliners: UK, US
 Abrupt decliners: Spain, Portugal , Japan
 Blessed decliners: Australia, Canada
 NB Other countries, other trajectories. In each case of course the
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story is complicated…let’s explore some narratives of decline
Italy: flatliner
 Bad now and bad then
 Partisan breakdown and populism
 Non-government?
 Regional differences more pronounced?
 Firsts in decline : Media magnate, nonelected, comedian ....
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Sweden: modest decliner
 Modest loss of trust and large decline in
reach of party machine
 Increased numbers of "critical" citizens
 online/offline divide more prominent
 Compromise more difficult and populist
challenge ( immigration issue)
 Significant experiments in democracy
taking place
7
Spain: abrupt decliner
 Politics and parties central to transition
from dictatorship
 Multiple examples of corruption recently
revealed
 Economic reversal had a big impact
 Organized political response still
observable but it’s a mess
8
USA : slow and deep decliner
 long decline from heydays of 1950s
 Perfect storm ....in recent years economic
decline, partisan bickering and
irresponsible deadlock
 Leads the way in the marketization of
politics
 Race and changing demography
 Shocks jocks and the politics of negativity 9
Australia: blessed decliner
 Lucky country : Donald Home ( success
despite incompetent elites )
 But negative aura around politics
 Negative campaigning: migrants,
environment
 Negative about leaders and parties ; tall
poppy phenomenon
 Role for bizarre independents and mavericks
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Three broad types of explanation
 Inputs have changed
 Processes have changed
 Outputs have changed
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INPUT: SOCIAL CHANGE
 1/1 Input/ social capital
 Decline in social capital ( and more broadly the quality of civil
society) means loss of capacity to engage in associational
activity and impacts on anti-politics as citizens support and
independent dynamic to engage is weakened
 1/2 Input/ decline of collectivism
 Decline in collective institutions from trade unions, through
churches and large firms reflects an individualisation of life (
more consumer focus and less citizenship focus)
 1/3 Input / inequality
 Increased inequality given impact of economic globalization
has created a more fragmented citizenry and led to the
intensified exclusion of some from the political process
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INPUT: ATTITUDINAL CHANGE
 2/1 Input / Less deferential more critical citizens
 As citizens have become more educated and information more freely
available they have become more critical and challenging to all types
of authority, including political authority
 2/2 Input / More issue oriented, more on-line and less partisan
 Citizens are less committed to one partisan perspective or party and
more issue-driven and fragmented in their interests and more on-line
therefore less loyal and more selective in their political engagement
 2/3 Input / Impact of neo-liberalism and depoliticization
 The dominance of neo-liberal ideology has weakened citizens’ sense
of what government can do and what action in the public realm can
address, thereby limiting engagement with politics and processes of
depoliticization have removed a swathe of decisions from public
input
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THROUGHPUT
 3/1 Throughput / political elites out of touch and managerial
 Political leaders are drawn from an increasingly small pool, often lack a
broader life experience. The declining social base of political elites in turn
rests on the weak and declining membership and active capacity of political
parties. Politics offered more managerial and less value driven
 3/2 Throughput : media culture and spin response
 The emergence of intense 24 hour media coverage of politics, and the
parallel developments in social media has developed a sense that politics is
obsessively short-term, focused on spin and presentation and lacks the
substance to demand engaged public attention
 3/3 Throughput: dominance of lobby politics and special interests
 Politics is dominated by special interests and the lobbying of those seeking
favours from government rather than any concern for the public interest. The
nature of campaign and lobby finance, party funding and networks of
influence and ties confirm that politics does its business with the few rather
than for the many
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OUTPUT
 4/1 Output: Opaqueness of Governing System
 The complexity of modern governance arrangements caused by the
impact globalisation and other factors means that the system lacks
a basic accountability or legitimacy, turning many away from politics
 4/2 Output : Failure to tackle big or long-term issues
 Politics cannot grapple with the big issues such as climate change or
economic renewal; nor can it because of democratic myopia driven
by electoral and other popular pressures deal with long-term issues
such as care for the elderly
 4/3 Output : economic austerity
 Politicians and politics have presided over economic failings and loss
of living standards and potentially worse still connived with bankers
and others in making ordinary people pay for the problems caused
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UK case study using framework
 Rule out: 1/1 social capital
 Qualified impact of 4/3 economic decline
 Leaves 10 in play
 Factors with greater impact on some social
groups : 1/2 ; 1/3; 2/1; 2/2
 Time horizon: longer for input, output than
throughput
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From ESRC research
 Project 1: Anti-Politics: Characterising and
Accounting for Political Disaffection ( with
Colin Hay and Ruth Fox, Hansard Society)
 Project 2: Popular Understandings of
Politics in Britain, 1937-2014 ( with Will
Jennings, Nick Clarke and Jonathan Moss)
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Anti-Politics: Characterising and Accounting for Political Disaffection
 Based on focus groups/survey work
 KEY LESSONS:
 Need to develop new survey questions
 Fast and slow thinking: how citizens think/talk about politics
 The contingency of political attitudes
 Populism, the media and anti-politics
 The public wants representative politics as it should be ( plus)
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History of anti-politics: survey
work
 tracking longitudinal trends in public attitudes towards
politics with quantitative data limited by historical repertoires
of question wordings (and contemporary concerns).
 Developing and trialling new questions
 Example of a creative solution: replication of Gallup question
first asked in 1944 (and in 1972).
 “Do you think that British politicians are out merely for
themselves, for their party, or to do their best for their
country?”
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Evidence of decline/change
50
48
40
38
36
35
30
30
%
28
22
22
20
12
10
0
7
1944
1972
Themselves
•
12
10
Their party
2014
Their country
Don't know
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Source: YouGov, 2,103 GB Adults, Fieldwork: 20th - 21st October 2014
Anti-politics: Having political
impact
 Conservative voters are more positive: 34% think
politicians out for themselves, 21% that they are out to
do what is best for their country.
 UKIP voters are most negative: 74% think that politicians
are out for themselves, just 3% to do what is best for
their country.
 Implication: historical comparisons may also provide
insights into current trends/patterns in popular attitudes
towards politics.
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Stage 2 – data collection from Mass
Observation
 Mass Observation
–
–
–
–
–
Est. 1937
1937-60: mass observers
1937-65: panellists (day surveys, directive
responses, diaries)
1970: est. of Mass Observation Archive
1981-present: Mass Observation Project
 Eight relevant directives:
–
–
–
–
Pre-1960s: Feb/Mar 1945, May/Jun 1945,
Nov 1945, Jul 1950, Nov 1950
Post-1960s: Aut/Win 1996 combined with
Spr 1997, Spr 2010, Spr 2014
Responses per directive: 98-369
Panel not formally representative but: it is
more representative than is often
assumed; we can sample within it; this is
not essential
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What can change ( and how) ?
 Input factors can be seen as an opportunity
as well as a threat …that is they could be
(are being) exploited to change politics
 Devolving power surely part of the answer
 Various institutional reforms could make a
difference to throughput concerns and
address some output issues
 Parties, Parliament and Political Class need
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to recognise the scale of change required
Conclusions
 Single club “solutions” unlikely to work
 Politics may well be changing as much as declining
 A party that finds a way could lead the way
 The “Conversation” about change needs to develop,
be open and evidenced-based and not dominated by
established political actors
 Universities could and should play a greater role
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