States Counterplan
1NC’s – Topic Specific
1NC – Offshore wind
The fifty state governments and relevant territories should substantially increase
[Plan]
States solve best – no barriers
Sims 13 - Senior Energy Project Finance Specialist - Center for Market Innovation. Prior to joining
NRDC, Doug was an attorney for 8 years at international law firm Allen & Overy LLP, where he was part
of the Project Finance and Latin America groups. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School (J.D.) and
Stanford University (B.A.). ( Doug, February, Fulfilling the Promise of U.S. Offshore Wind:¶ Targeted State
Investment Policies to Put an¶ Abundant Renewable Resource within Reach)
A state or state instrumentality could fund an offshore wind¶ program by issuing bonds, repurposing
existing funds, or¶ both to help finance a limited amount of initial projects,¶ just as the KfW program
does. This could be done under¶ the auspices of a public private financing institution that¶ focuses on
clean energy, colloquially called a “green bank.”¶ Because of their low cost of capital, these entities
can work¶ creatively in partnership with private banks to deliver lower¶ blended cost loans and
increase the overall capital pool,¶ allowing lenders to diversify across projects and more deals¶ to be
done. In 2011, Connecticut launched the first green¶ bank and several other states have similar entities
under¶ active consideration.41 In January 2013, New York’s Governor¶ Cuomo announced a new,
potentially game-changing green¶ bank in New York that will have an initial capitalization of¶ US$1
billion.42 It would be a powerful market precedent if¶ the New York Collaborative mentioned earlier—
LIPA, NYPA,¶ and Con Ed—were able to bundle New York green bank¶ anchor financing together with
lease and power purchase¶ agreements and then competitively bid the entire package.¶ This
combination of revenue certainty, site control, and anchor¶ financing would likely produce very
competitive bids and low¶ costs of delivered energy.
The co-lending model minimizes political, technological, and¶ economic risks. First, there are no losses
from the subsidy,¶ since the government’s lower cost of capital means it can¶ lend at a lower cost than
private banks and still make a profit.¶ Second, the repaid principal fees and interest earned by the¶
green bank can be recycled and lent out again in a virtuous¶ cycle. Third, the program is insulated
from critics who insist¶ that private lenders are not at risk since no government¶ guarantees are
given and private lenders have “skin in the¶ game.” Finally, the commercial banks’ stringent due
diligence¶ and structuring requirements mitigate the technology and¶ other risks.
A lower interest rate and a longer tenor provided by a green¶ bank co-lending program will have the
impact of reducing¶ the cost of energy generated by an offshore wind farm.¶ However, it is important
to note that even if a co-lending¶ program were to lend on the same terms as the commercial¶ banks
(as is the case in the KfW program), the total financing¶ costs would likely be lower than if the green
bank financing¶ were provided by commercial banks. This is because in the¶ absence of the program
and assuming, realistically, that there¶ is a limited amount of private capital available at a given¶ price,
the hypothetical offshore wind borrower would have to¶ pay more to entice additional private banks to
enter the deal.¶ Once the borrower makes such concessions to new lenders,¶ it is obliged to extend the
same deal to the existing ones,¶ increasing overall costs. By contrast, with a governmentowned¶ bank
providing matching funds as an anchor, the¶ borrower has increased bargaining power vis-à-vis the
banks,¶ which lowers overall financing costs.
-- RPS plank
State RPS policies solve wind best.
Bird and Parsons et al 3. [L. Bird and B. Parsons, National Renewable Energy Lab, T. Gagliano and M. Brown, Nat’l Conference of
State Legislatures, R. Wiser and M. Bolinger, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, “Policies and market factors driving wind power
development in the United States” National Renewable Energy Laboratory Technical Report -- July]
Renewable portfolio standards—RPS
policies or purchase mandates are the most powerful tool that a state can use to
promote wind energy. So far, these have been particularly important for driving wind energy investment
in Texas, Minnesota, and Iowa, where more than 1,700 MW of new capacity has been developed to meet the requirements of just
these three states. In addition, some portfolio standards, such as those in Wisconsin and New Jersey, have been directly
responsible for wind development, not only within the state, but also in neighboring states. In the
future, state RPS policies, such as those under development in California and New York, are expected to play a leading
role in stimulating wind energy development. However, not all RPS policies are equally effective; details in design and
implementation make a difference.
1NC – Offshore oil
The United States federal government should devolve authority over offshore oil
drilling to the fifty state governments and relevant territories. The fifty state and all
relevant territories should [Plan]
Delegation over offshore drilling solves best – state expertise.
Dunlop 8. [Becky Norton, senior management team of The Heritage Foundation as Vice President for External Relations, “Offshore
Drilling: An Alternative to Funding Terrorism,” Heritage Foundation -- October 30 -- http://www.heritage.org/about/speeches/offshore-drillingan-alternative-to-funding-terrorism]
What this issue comes down to is Constitutional federalism. It needs to be accepted that the states can responsibly
control and maintain their own waters instead of being micromanaged from above. Increasing energy supply
is a necessary step that the United States must take to be ensured of continued and new economic growth. It is ridiculous to think that with
America’s current mobile workforce infrastructure we can simply turn off all the gas pumps overnight and wake up the next morning on a
renewable energy source. We are working on renewable energy. And certainly even more needs to be done. But in the interim, that transition
can be made easier with the production of our own fuels to ease the burden on the average American at the pump. In addition, producing
more of our own energy means that we will not have to depend on imports from country’s that do not
have our interests in mind. It is a very serious matter the possibility that taxpayers and consumers are putting dollars into the hands
of those who support terrorism and seek to undermine the United States. These include of course, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Becoming a
nation in which America can be much more self reliant for its energy needs prevents the potential funding of those who wish to destroy us. We
can and should have trading relationships for energy with other nations but they should be ones we deem to be friends and allies in the quest
for greater human liberty. When I worked with Governor George Allen in Virginia we realized early with the EPA that a one-size-fits-all blanket
policy does not work. How could it? When you look over the landscape of our nation, it should be apparent that what works for the beaches of
Florida is most likely not going to be appropriate for the Black Hills of South Dakota. The
states should decide what policies
best work for their citizens and their environment. Under the policy I advocate, states would have option of
choosing how to deal with their Outer Continental Shelf lands, and the benefits of permitting drilling
would go to the states. In a state like Florida, where there are objections to energy development, there would be the option of not
drilling but I would argue that by delegating these decisions to the local level, Florida’s citizens would have more of a voice in how the drilling
was conducted and how the revenues would be spent. By
letting the state decide how to go about developing OCS,
citizens can hold their elected legislators accountable. If Floridians disapprove of how a legislator stands on OCS
development, they can vote him out in the next election. Or conversely, if the drilling produces more revenue it can be used for something like
the Everglades Restoration of improving the stewardship of other state resources, or even reducing the tax burden on Floridians. Santa Barbara
County in California recently reversed their stand on offshore drilling and passed resolution supporting more drilling. Even with the federal
moratoria lifted on Oct 1st, current Washington policy dictates that a federal regulator knows better. More importantly is the matter of
revenue. Currently, the federal government receives the revenue derived from OCS energy production. Bills like H.R.6899 would continue this
trend. In addition, it would strip the oil companies of $18 billion in tax breaks leaving both the states and oil companies with little incentive to
allow or explore drilling, respectively. I purpose that the federal government would no longer receive a cut of the money until the resources
were developed and then its “cut” would come in the form of tax revenue generated by increased economic activity. The simple fact would be
that if OCS has been removed from federal jurisdiction, each state would receive 80 percent of the revenues generated from production off its
shore. It would share the remaining 20 percent with other states. Obviously, a revenue-sharing structure of this sort would find critics in the
federal government, which would lose roughly $5 billion each year. Many big government environmentalists would object because the federal
government uses some of these funds for environmental purposes, like the Land and Water Conservation Fund and the National Historic
Preservation Fund. Without OCS revenues, they would argue, these programs would lose important income. My response to these critics would
be that I
would rather have these revenues in the hands of the states and not the federal government.
When the states control the money, they would be free to use it for the purposes they see fit. In many
cases, this money could be used to fund environmental initiatives that are made to fit the specific needs of the states
as determined by their governors and state legislatures. And, if citizens are not pleased with the way these revenues are being spent, they can
simply elect new officials. It’s a much better system than when the policy is centered in Washington, D.C. with bureaucrats who neither knew
nor frankly care what states, localities and citizens want or need. Current OCS policy is dictated by Washington and is a complex maze of
bureaucratic regulations even without the moratorium. In the case of OCS, a simple policy is the best policy. The
federal government
should cede its authority to the states. Let’s allow the states to decide what to do with their lands.
Let’s stop the micromanagement, and understand that those at the state level will without a shadow
of a doubt responsibly take care of their environment, their home. Let states use new tax revenues from drilling to reduce
taxes on entrepreneurs, so they can fund and develop all matter of energy sources and infrastructure and increase the invention of new and
better technologies.
Devolution of offshore drilling authority solves.
Dunlop 5. [Becky Norton, senior management team of The Heritage Foundation as Vice President for External Relations, "Improve the
Environment... Leave it to the States... and the People" Heritage Foundation -- April 20 -- www.heritage.org/about/speeches/improve-theenvironment-leave-it-to-the-states-and-the-people]
What can Congress do to more effectively deal with some of the remaining environmental challenges?
To begin with, Congress needs to turn even more authority over to the states as they begin revising the Endangered
Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Congressmen and women should look for ways to give states incentives to be excellent
and wise managers of our natural resources. One particular piece of legislation of note could
improve America’s access to its
own oil resources – Seacor[7]. The idea of Seacor is to give coastal states the authority to approve off-shore
drilling out to the 200-mile limit, which is the point where America has control of the ocean and ocean bottom. There are enough
oil and gas resources in that area of the United States to make America energy independent. We have improved and sophisticated ways of
extracting oil and gas from environmentally sensitive areas in cost-effective ways. The
goal of this legislation is to pass on royalties
from oil and gas production to the states to be invested in environmental improvements. It could pay the
bill for the Everglades restoration plan, for example. Of course, a portion of the revenue generated needs to come to inland states, as well,
because off-shore resources within the 200 mile limit belong to all Americans. Seacor is an innovative way of thinking. It uses the best new
technologies available today. It
ensures that the states are overseeing the exploration so they can be satisfied
that it is being done in a manner that is compatible with the desires of their citizens. A portion of the value of
the extracted resources then can be used to improve the environment of each state as its representatives see fit. In closing, I would like to
mention a report that the American Enterprise Institute and the Pacific Research Institute publish annually, The Index of Leading Environmental
Indicators.[8] The most recent Index was released in late April 2005. The report catalogues continuing improvements in environmental quality
in the United States of America. If you take the time to look it over, you will be impressed with the progress shown. Hopefully, you also will be
inspired to do more to make certain that America continues to enjoy economic growth and environmental improvements. The United States
leads the rest of the world economically and environmentally. We offer opportunities for the rest of the world. We have demonstrated that a
wealthier society is a healthier society -- a society that is good for the environment and good for the people. We should be upbeat but we
should also look for ways to continue this record of economic growth and environmental
improvement. In my view, this can best be accomplished by leaving environmental policy to the state
1NC – Aquaculture
The fifty state governments and relevant territories should substantially increase
[plan]
States can effectively shape aquaculture policy
Buck ‘12 [Lisa E. Buck, Master of Marine Affairs from the University of Washington, “U.S. Development
of Offshore Aquaculture: Regulatory, Economic, and Political
Factors,”https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/21752/Buck_washington_02
50O_10741.pdf?sequence=1]
While this project focused on federal regulation, many interviewees stressed the ¶ importance of state
governments in the development of offshore aquaculture. At the state ¶ level, government attitudes
toward the development of offshore aquaculture tend to ¶ reflect the priorities of the state’s elected
officials and their constituencies, and will be ¶ reflected in the state’s CZM Plan. These priorities
reflect in turn the economic, social and ¶ political situation of the state. States can develop their own
aquaculture policies, which ¶ may outline specific goals and objectives unique to the priorities of their
residents. As ¶ regulations currently stand, it is wise for any action taken by a party interested
in ¶ developing an offshore aquaculture project to not only be consistent with federal laws ¶ and
regulations, but also with the policy of the state whose coast they will be developing. ¶ As is discussed
in Section 5.1.3 of this thesis, states can invoke the Federal Consistency ¶ clause of the CZMA and appeal
any federally permitted action that will have an impact ¶ on their state’s coastal zone. In this way, the
coastal states of the United States have a ¶ distinct political stake in the development of a domestic
offshore aquaculture industry.
1NC – Ocean Exploration
Washington D.C., the fifty states, and all relevant territories should…
The cp is sufficient to solve the aff
Mineta 14 - By Norman Y. Mineta¶ Co-Chair, Joint Ocean Commission Initiative; ¶ Former Secretary of
Commerce, Transportation ( Time to Chart a New Course For the Health of Our Oceans January 2014
Issue http://www.sea-technology.com/features/2014/0114/7_Mineta.php)
Action three is to support state and regional ocean and coastal priorities . Because ocean ecosystems
span jurisdictional lines, it is imperative that federal, state and tribal governments work collaboratively
at a multistate or regional scale to ensure more effective ocean management. One way to increase
that kind of collaboration is through regional ocean planning, which enables more effective
coordination of data across jurisdictions, greater engagement of ocean and coastal stakeholders, and
improved decision making about ocean and coastal resources and priority economic drivers. Private
sector engagement is critical to the success of these efforts and can lead to new partnerships and
opportunities, resulting in less conflict among competing uses. The Joint Initiative calls on the
administration and Congress to provide additional financial and technical assistance to support the
continued success of these regional efforts.
1NC – Nuclear
Washington D.C., the fifty states, and all relevant territories should…
Uniform state action can solve all aspects of nuclear power and spark federal
modeling
- NEI ‘8 (Second Quarter 2008, The Trickle-Up Effect, States Put Singular Stamp on Energy Policy—With
National Implications, Nuclear Energy Institute,
the pace of state
activity on energy policy in general—
and nuclear power in particular—has skyrocketed in the past few years Energy, environmental and
Spurred by federal legislation and public concern about energy costs, electricity supply and environmental issues,
and local government
.
economic concerns are coalescing, and states are taking action
the federal government seems too
removed
Most
people look to the state for policy They know us one-on-one and state policy directly affects their lives.
. “For most people,
from their daily lives,” said Del. Sally Jameson (D), a member of the Maryland House of Delegates since 2003. Her district straddles the nation’s capital and Calvert County, Md., home to Constellation Energy’s Calvert Cliffs n uclear plant. “
.
“The federal government is so huge that they believe they will get lost in it At the state level,”
voices are heard.”
.
she noted, “
their
Looking to the future, the United States must maintain at least the current 30 percent share of non-emitting electric generating capacity if it is to meet its clean-air goals. Even with conservative assumptions about increases in electricity
a wide
range of measures to support current nuclear plants and
incentives for building new nuclear plants,
reflects a national commitment
legislation includes investment incentives to encourage
demand and a doubling of renewable energy production, the United States faces a challenge to maintain its current proportion of carbon-free electricity production. A substantial increase in nuclear energy is essential. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, which incorporated
provided important
to carbon-free energy sources. The
construction of new nuclear plants, including production tax credits, loan guarantees and business risk
protection
for companies pursuing the first new reactors. Now, states are linking environment and energy in the policy calculus. “The view is that when the federal government isn’t taking the lead, the legislatures need to step up to the plate,” said Melissa Savage,
program director for the Agriculture, Energy and Environmental Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NC SL). States are “repealing moratoriums, holding committee session study hearings, looking at changing regulations, and just getting the conversation started in
some cases,” she noted. “We’re facing a pretty critical energy crunch in the country. The issue is starting to bubble back up,” Savage said. “In some states, it never went away.” Ten states have passed policies instituting some form of cost recovery assurance for nuclear plant
construction. Three states have introduced and one has passed legislation requiring that nuclear energy be included in some form of clean or alternative energy portfolio. Six of the 13 states with moratoriums preventi ng new nuclear plants are considering removing those bans. Two
states have passed local tax incentives for nuclear plants. For Maryland’s Jameson, the link between environmental and energy policy is a driving factor in policy formulation. “We are nearly s urrounded by water in Maryland,” she said, pointing to the Chesapeake Bay, Atlantic Ocean and
a network of rivers. “We are doing everything we can to limit harm to our waterways and environment because of climate change and global warming.” The state has taken a “fairly proactive approach” to addressing both environmental and energy issues in the face of a Maryland Public
Service Commission warning that electricity customers could face power restrictions or rolling blackouts as early as 2011, she said. STATES AS POLICY LABORATORIES “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country,” Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in 1932.
the way
Historically state and local governments have led
,
on issues as varied as child labor, the environment and social reform. And state governments indeed are serving as laboratories in the development of policy supporting nuclear energy. One such policy is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI, a cooperative
effort by 10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Participating states have agreed to implement RGGI through a regional ca p-and-trade program whereby participating states anticipate auctioning nearly the entire annual regional emissions budget,
approximately 188 million tons of carbon dioxide. Each ton of carbon dioxide will constitute an “allowance.” The multi-state agreement treats all carbon-free sources of electricity, such as nuclear energy and renewables, equally in the framework for awarding monetary credits for
greenhouse gas reduction. The RGGI states have agreed to participate in regional auctions for the allowances, beginning this September. Officials have scheduled a second auction in December. OUT OF THE GATE IN 2008 The first half of 2008 has seen significant state activity on nuclear
power and other energy issues. Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland in May signed electricity rate legislation that includes nuclear power among the technologies available to satisfy an advanced-energy portfolio standard. Ohio’s move represents the first time nuclear energy has been included in a
state’s clean-air energy portfolio. Several states have passed renewable energy standards, mandating that certain percentages of energy supply come from renewable sources. States are now tackling energy and environmental concerns with “advanced energy” or “clean energy” portfolio standards, which require that a dictated amount of energy come from technologies that include clean-coal, nuclear and renewables. The South Carolina House of Representatives passed legislation adding nuclear power to the list of sources to be included in any energy strategy
promoting carbon-free, non-greenhouse-gas-emitting technologies. Likewise, Washington state lawmakers have introduced requirements to include nuclear power in a study of energy sources that reduce greenhouse gas emissions. California, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma and
Wisconsin have considered legislation to lift bans on new nuclear power plants. Other states have moved beyond the ideological into the nuts and bolts of getting new plants built. Most recently, Florida lawmakers this year approved a state energy bill permitting cost recovery for
transmission lines to nuclear plants, and the Missis-sippi legislature adopted a cost-recovery bill that helps utilities finance baseload power plants by allowing approval of rate increases before construction of a plant is started or finished to cover costs from preconstruction planning and
then construction. When Kansas examined its need to increase baseload electricity generation this spring, the state’s public utility commission hos ted a roundtable on nuclear development to determine obstacles that may prevent utilities from initiating, licensing and planning activities
states are not acting in isolation. Regional organizations and coalitions are furthering the
cause of clean, reliable electricity generation and related issues. NCSL in May unanimously adopted a
resolution supporting off-site interim storage of used nuclear fuel
for a new reactor. Moreover,
The
. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) also backed a resolution
supporting interim storage, as did the Energy Council, comprised of 10 energy-producing states. Wisconsin state Rep. Frank Lasee (R) echoed the passion for nuclear energy increasingly heard from state legislators across the country. “Europeans have used nuclear power for years
without incident. So have we. The French have been recycling spent uranium for years. We could do the same. Nuclear is the cleanest source of electricity and is inexpensive,” Lasee wrote in his May newsletter to constituents. “We have had two nuclear power plants in Wisconsin for
many years, and we should have more. I support changing the law in Wisconsin to allow more.” FUEL DIVERSITY, ECONOMIC FACTORS PLAY ROLE A May survey by the consulting firm Deloitte found that state public utility commissioners across the country believe nuclear energy is the
best technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, ranking it above energy efficiency, renewable energy and advanced coal technologies. The survey also gauged how regulators believe consumers would react to increases in electricity rates. A majority said they anticipate the cost of
electricity production to rise in the coming months, but that they believe consumers would be willing to pay more (some believe up t o 15 percent more) for their electricity if it results in lowering greenhouse gas emissions. Another survey of 1,000 adults nationwide, conducted by ICR for
Deloitte, revealed that 53 percent would support the construction of new power plants—and of those, 60 percent would be willing to have new plants built within 20 miles of their homes. Seven in 10 surveyed said they believe state regulation is needed to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, while 62 percent are willing to pay 5 percent or more for electricity if it would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is unclear to what extent public opinion shapes policymaker actions and vice versa, but the message is clear—both are paying attention to climate change and
energy policy and are open to solutions that meet both challenges. Fuel diversity in the electric sector and nuclear energy’s low-carbon footprint are driving the industry’s resurgence in Florida, said Katrina McMurrian, a commissioner on the Florida Public Service Commission. She
pointed to several other factors underpinning Florida’s support for nuclear energy generation, including federal and state investment incentives for new-reactor construction and increased public acceptance of new reactors. State and federal actions to curb greenhouse gases are driving a
re-examination of nuclear energy among regulators and lawmakers alike. “Passage of some type of climate change bill seems to be a question of when—not if,” she said. Recognizing Florida Gov. Charlie Crist’s support for nuclear energy and renewable resources as a means to achieve
the state’s greenhouse gas emission goals, McMurrian noted the commission’s determination that two additional reactors at Florida Power & Light’s Turkey Point plant “will provide a clean, non-carbon-emitting source of baseload power to meet Florida’s growing energy needs.” POWER
DEMAND PROMPTS ACTION IN MARYLAND Some 700 miles north of the Sunshine State, Maryland saw an example of business groups, labor organizations, utilities and cooperatives banding together to promote energy policy at the state level last month. Rising demand and insufficient
infrastructure prompted formation of Marylanders for Reliable Power, a coalition to push the state to build more power lines. The group has the support of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the Greater Baltimore Committee. “There has been insufficient investment in energy
infrastructure,” Don Fry, president of the coalition, told The Washington Post. “It’s imperative that we have sources of energy available.” The group supports upgrades to the state’s electric power grids and lines, construction of power plants, and conservation efforts. The region’s
bottlenecked transmission grid forces Maryland to import more than 30 percent of its electricity from other states, according to the group. Russell Frisby, a former chairman of the state’s utility commission who now is a spokesman for the coalition, said the group also plans to launch a
marketing campaign to raise awareness of the state’s energy crisis. “Our goal is to raise public awareness about the need for reliable power,” he said. The state’s General Assembly has approved several measures proposed by Gov. Martin O’Malley aimed at conserving energy, investing in
efficiency and bolstering the state’s renewable portfolio standards. After touring the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant, O’Malley said he supports building an additional nuclear reactor at the site. Constellation Energy submitted a license application for the reactor last July to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. “It is a huge moral challenge and it is a moral imperative,” O’Malley said when discussing the role of nuclear energy in reducing greenhouse gases. He believes the new reactor also will slow the rising rates consumers are paying for electricity. Maryland legislator
Jameson said such support is crucial to the formulation of sound energy policy in the state, Jameson said. Ultimately, s he would like nuclear energy included in the state’s renewable energy portfolio. “It’s not renewable,” she said, “but we nee d to start thinking differently. It is a clean-air
source of electricity.” Jameson added that a program to recycle used nuclear fuel could prompt more legislators to see nuclear energy as renewable. “There is a lot more energy in spent fuel that can be us ed and will be used in the future,” she said. Such an effort is important since
Jameson noted that support for nuclear energy from some constituents and policymakers carries this caveat: “How do we deal with nuclear waste?” A fully integrated used fuel management approach that includes interim storage and recycling helps answer that concern. States and
coalitions overlapping state boundaries have pushed federal policymakers toward action on building new plants and addressing climate change and other energy issues. Governors of five southern states sent letters last year to President Bush urging nuclear waste reform. The American
Legislative Exchange Council—consisting of state regulators—passed a resolution in 2007 updating its policy on used nuclear fuel and new plants. At the same time, the Southern States En ergy Board identified the region’s need to increase nuclear generation. A RGGI report issued earlier
this year said the continued operation of New England’s five nuclear power plants would be a necessary part of the region’s c ommitment to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and that rising electricity demand may prompt construction of new reactors. In all aspects of energy policy,
state and local leaders are actively seeking solutions and making their voices heard. NEI, INDUSTRY OUTREACH TO STATES The nuclear energy industry is embracing the role states play in determining energy policy by reaching out to educate, organize and advise. Much of the outreach
focuses on the environmental benefits of nuclear energy and the development of new nuclear power plants. “
States are not waiting for the federal government to take
“We know nuclear energy has to be and will be a part of that eventual
equation, but it is important for us to act together now and take a proactive approach on this issue and others
at the state level.”
action,”
said Marshall Cohen, NEI senior director for state and local government affairs.
In the Lone Star state, Nuclear Energy for Texans is a coalition of decision-makers who advocate an increased role for nuclear power in a state already below accepted levels for reserve electric capacity. The coalition leadership includes state
and local elected officials, representatives of business and industry, academics, and the scientific and engineering communities. Exelon has chosen a site in Victoria County, Texas, for a potential new nuclear plant, NRG is planning two new reactors at the South Texas Project and Luminant
is considering expanding its Comanche Peak nuclear plant in Glen Rose, Texas. “We must have an energy mix in place that allows Texas to stay competitive as the need for power is expected to grow 48 percent by 2030,” said Tom Forbes, the coalition’s president. The group “believes
nuclear energy must be part of that mix.” NEI is working with various national organizations to ensure state policymakers continue to consider nuclear energy, including NCSL, the National Governors Association and regional governors’ groups, NARUC, National Association of Attorneys
General, and the National Association of Regional Councils. “
You can make things happen in the states and move issues forward,”
said Mike McGarey, NEI’s director of state
They really are the laboratories of democracy and they can be very influential in
Washington.”
and local government affairs. “
1NC – Other options
1NC – State Tax Credits (Generic)
The 50 States should substantially increase tax credits for [PLAN]
States tax credits for energy are great
Ralis 6 (Sr. Regulatory Counsel-National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, “Congress Got it Right:
There’s No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards,” 27 Energy L. J. 451)
State incentives, like their federal counterparts, provide critical benefits for renewable resources that
do not distinguish among consumer groups. Many states offer tax credits/rebates to various taxpayer
groups. For instance, residential consumers in Idaho, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Utah can
receive personal tax credits on equipment and installation costs for renewable heating and/or electric
generation. n74 In New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, commercial and
industrial consumers can receive corporate tax credits on property using renewable systems. n75 The
credits can be focused on those renewable technologies that are available in individual states. Likewise,
manufacturers of renewable equipment in North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Washington can receive
corporate tax credits, which can be used to attract manufacturing jobs to the state, and can also be
focused on manufacturers locating in depressed communities within the state. n76 Renewable systems
in Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, and Tennessee may be eligible for special property assessments to
reduce the tax burden on those who make significant capital investments in renewable technologies.
n77 Purchasers of renewable equipment and systems in Florida, Idaho, and Nevada can receive
rebates on sales taxes, lowering the up-front cost of renewable energy technologies, which is often
the greatest barrier to investment. n78 Similarly, in states such as California, Illinois, and Rhode Island,
purchasers of renewable equipment and systems can receive state rebates on a percentage of the actual
equipment or system costs or on a MWh basis, which also serves to lower the up-front costs of
investment in renewable energy technologies. n79
1NC – Clean Energy Funds (Generic)
The 50 United States should substantially increase funding for [PLAN]
States solve
Milford 12 - Sr. Fellow-Brookings & President-Clean Energy Group, “Leveraging State Clean Energy
Funds for Economic Development,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0
111_states_energy_funds)
Washington is again paralyzed and pulling back on clean energy economic development. New funding
solutions seem unlikely and existing financial supports appear tenuous, given that many of the federal
tax incentives, subsidies, and loan guarantees made available through the 2009 stimulus law and
elsewhere are set to expire. All of which raises a daunting question: If the country is to take advantage
of the economic, environmental, and health benefits of clean energy, how will its development be
financed, its emerging companies be supported, and its markets be structured—and who is in the best
position to decide and act? And yet, there is actually a promising partial answer to that question. With
federal clean energy activities largely on hold, U.S. states hold out tremendous promise for the
continued design and implementation of clean energy solutions and economic development. State
governments led the nation’s initial responses to the challenge of energy system transformation a
decade ago and since then have developed a broad array of cleantech development tools, ranging from
financial support tools and net metering to incubators, cluster supports, and workforce training. Among
the states’ initiatives, meanwhile, the nearly two dozen state-side clean energy funds (CEFs) stand as
one of the most important clean energy forces at work in the nation—yet they remain little-known. To
date, over 20 states have created a varied array of these public investment vehicles to invest in clean
energy pursuits with revenues often derived from small public-benefit surcharges on electric utility bills.
Over the last decade, state CEFs have invested over $2.7 billion in state dollars to support renewable
energy (RE) markets while leveraging another $9.7 billion in additional federal and private sector
investment, with the resulting $12 billion flowing to the deployment of over 72,000 projects in the
United States ranging from solar installations on homes and businesses to wind turbines in communities
to large wind farms, hydrokinetic projects in rivers, and biomass generation plants on farms. State CEFs
have played an equally important role in expanding opportunities in energy efficiency (EE). Ratepayerfunded energy efficiency spending has grown from $1.7 billion in 2004 to $4.4 billion in 2009 with
approximately 55 percent (or $2.4 billion) of program budgets devoted to incentives for utility
customers and the rest going towards program design and implementation, and evaluation,
measurement, and verification. In terms of their focus, CEFs have tended to engage primarily on
individual project financing and deployment through the use of rebates, grants and performance-based
incentives that have directly subsidized the installation of clean energy technologies (Table 1). In
addition, many state programs have also leveraged their CEFs for project financing and deployment
through the use of leasing programs, project equity investments, revolving loans, on-bill financing
programs, and credit enhancement tools such as loan loss reserves, interest-rate buy-downs, and loan
and performance guarantees. In short, for most of the last decade, state clean energy funds have served
the nation and its regional and state economies as a critical and innovative source of much-needed
public capital supporting the installation of clean energy technologies in American regions.
1NC - Loan Guarantees (Generic)
The 50 United States should expand loan guarantees for [PLAN]
States have awesome loan guarantees
Saha, 11
(Sr. Policy Analyst-Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, January, “State Clean Energy:
Financing Guidebook,”
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1101CLEANENERGYFINANCING.PDF)
States can use their own funds to reduce the risk for private sector investors and thus encourage greater
private sector participation in clean energy. Decreasing risk is especially important in new markets, such
as clean energy. The sections below describe four credit enhancement mechanisms that states can use
to support clean energy. Loan Loss Reserve Funds (LRF). These are funds set aside to cover potential
defaults in a loan portfolio. A loss reserve fund provides partial risk coverage to encourage lenders to
pioneer new products, broaden access to financing, increase the size of unsecured loans, extend loan
tenors, and/or lower interest rates. LRFs are particularly useful in markets consisting of a large number
of small projects, where financial institutions will be making a large number of relatively small loans,
such as loans for energy efficiency improvements or residential-scale renewable projects. Loan loss
reserves can exceed 20 percent of the total loan portfolio, but have typically been set at around 10
percent, sometimes with the ability to adjust as these loan performance data become available. The
Clean Energy Works Portland program, in Oregon, has set up a 10 percent loan loss reserve fund for its
energy efficiency retrofit program. More detail on this program can be found in Chapter 3. The Michigan
SAVES residential retrofit program entails a 20 percent loan loss reserve for the first $200,000 in loans
and a 5 percent loan loss reserve for each future loan. Debt Service Reserves. States can set aside cash
reserves to guarantee the payment of principal and interest. Such a reserve may be a useful tool for
state bond issuers who wish to boost the security of their bonds. The reduced risk from adding a debt
service reserve may help states expand the market for their bonds while reducing the bond coupon rate.
For example, states can use SEP funds to establish a debt service reserve to support federally authorized
clean energy bonds, such as QECBs and CREBs. Private business and public entities have used debt
service reserves for years to support debt issues; they typically represent about 10 percent of the bond
principal. Subordinated Debt. State governments can use a subordinated debt structure to help
guarantee the capital cost of a clean energy project. This involves the use of two separate loans (senior
and subordinated). The state project funder (which acts as the subordinated lender) takes on much
greater risk than the senior lender. This structure permits the senior lender, typically a private sector
entity experienced in project finance, to put in more capital and charge a lower interest rate because
the subordinated lender is absorbing most of the project risk. State governments, utilities, or others
investing in clean energy funds (for example, public benefit funds) agree to act as the subordinated
lender, guaranteeing any project losses up to the value of their loan. The Vermont Clean Energy
Development Fund (CEDF) uses subordinated debt financing. Established in 2005 by state statute, the
fund receives between $4 million and $7 million per year from the Department of Public Service and the
utility Entergy. It has a fund manager who, with an investment committee of expert stakeholders,
identifies and allocates funds to subordinated debt investments. Loan Guarantees. States can also
reduce risk for private capital by guaranteeing repayment of loans in the event of default. This reduces
the interest rate the state must pay and helps secure participation by private sector partners. Although
most examples of loan guarantees are federal, states can develop their own loan guarantee programs.
In Illinois, the legislature passed a bill bringing renewable energy projects under the state’s development
assistance umbrella, managed by the Illinois Finance Authority (IFA). The legislation authorized the IFA
to issue $3 billion in loan guarantees for economic development purposes. Under this expanded
financing model, a developer would still launch a renewable energy project using traditional lenders but
add the IFA as a partner, providing a loan guarantee to the private sector lenders. IFA participation adds
the state’s moral obligation, which is expected to help to reduce the cost of the loan. State governments
rely on a number of different sources of capital to support clean energy finance programs. States
seeking to secure clean energy capital may wish to consider a number of approaches described here,
either alone or in combinations.
1NC – Interstate Compact (Generic/Energy)
The 50 states and territories should establish an interstate compact aimed at the
development of [plan]
Interstate compacts allow states to carve out exemptions to existing federal
regulations that supersede national law
Cruz 10 – Sr. Fellow-Center for Tenth Amendment Studies (Shield of Federalism: Interstate Compacts
in Our Constitution, December, http://www.texaspolicy.com/center/tenth-amendment/reports/shieldfederalism-interstate-compacts-our-constitution)
The American Republic is facing one of the greatest challenges of our history. In Washington,
Republicans and Democrats alike have indulged the runaway spending and regulatory overreach of a
federal government that continues to expand the scope of its powers unabated. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ObamaCare”) marks a dramatic new milestone in that expansion.
Americans are starting to realize that restoring and protecting self-government requires a return to our
founding principles of limited government and local control. As this nationwide movement gathers
momentum, Americans are searching for tools to restore the Constitution’s founding principles.
Among the most promising is the interstate compact. Its power as a constitutional device to regulate a
multitude of regional issues has already been demonstrated: More than 200 interstate compacts are
currently in force. And yet, as this paper shows, that power remains largely unexploited. Under our
Constitution, interstate compacts that regulate matters within the enumerated powers of the federal
government require congressional consent. That consent can be express (an affirmative majority vote
in Congress) or even implied by congressional acquiescence. In the case of express congressional
consent, historically that has been accomplished through either a bill or a resolution that typically has
been presented to the President for his signature into law. Critically, once Congress consents to an
interstate compact, the compact carries the force of federal law, trumping all prior federal and state
law. Few issues have energized citizens nationally more than the recent federal health care legislation—
seen by many as a federal power-grab at the expense of state authority and individual liberty. An
interstate health care compact would present a powerful vehicle for the States to confront Obama Care
directly. Two insights give force to this Policy Perspective, a legal insight and a political insight. First,
legally, the problem confronted by most state efforts against federal health care legislation is that,
under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law. However, with congressional consent, an
interstate compact is federal law. Hence, it can supersede all prior federal law—including ObamaCare.
Second, politically, if States enter into an interstate compact, it becomes very difficult for their elected
congressional representatives to deny them consent. It is one thing to vote in the abstract for federal
legislation; it is quite another to tell your home-state constituents that you will not respect their views
and expressed desire not to be bound by ObamaCare. More broadly, in the decades ahead, interstate
compacts could gain increasing use as a shield against federal overreach. With congressional consent,
federalized interstate compacts could shield entire areas of state regulation from the power of the
federal government. This paper explores the history and law of interstate compacts, with particular
focus on federalized interstate compacts.
Empirically solves on energy policy and requires no federal involvement
Pincus 9 - JD Columbia & Articles Editor-Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, “When Should
Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?”,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Summer2009/02Pincus.42.4.pdf)
B.THE CONTEMPORARY USES OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE COMPACTS
The approximately 200 interstate compacts now in effect cover a broad range of issues, from water
allocation and conservation (thirty-seven compacts) to energy and low-level radioactive waste disposal
(fifteen compacts). n37 Numerous compacts also address crime control (eighteen compacts), education
(thirteen compacts), and child welfare (five compacts). n38 One of the most prominent compacts to
have gone into effect in the last decade is the Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), under which
forty-six states agreed to end their litigation against the four largest tobacco companies in 1998. n39
Shortly after this agreement went into effect, Star Scientific, a tobacco company that did not participate
in the agreement, brought an unsuccessful but widely noted suit to have the MSA invalidated as
unconstitutional under the Compact [*520] Clause since it had never been approved by Congress. n40
The MSA's enactment in 1998 and the subsequent court challenges to it brought interstate compacts
back onto the radar of legal scholarship and were at least partially responsible for the conception of new
possible roles for the interstate compact. The last few years have seen ambitious efforts to utilize
interstate compacts to address particularly tough national issues. In the environmental arena, the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), which came into effect in September of 2008, n41
originated as a response to federal inaction in the face of rising greenhouse gas levels. n42 The RGGI
obliges signatory states to implement a cap and trade arrangement for carbon dioxide emissions from
power plants. States will freeze emissions at approximately current levels and reduce them over the
following decade while allowing power plants to trade emissions credits among themselves. n43
Currently, ten states have joined the RGGI. n44 It seems likely that, under the current U.S. Steel test,
the RGGI would not be found to require congressional approval. n45 The interstate compact that has
generated the most publicity over the last few years is the National Popular Vote ("NPV") compact.
Originating in suggestions by Robert W. Bennett, n46 as well as by Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David
Amar, n47 this proposal was explicitly presented as an alternative to Constitutional [*521] amendment
through the process outlined in Article V. n48 The motivating force behind the compact is dissatisfaction
with the current method of electing a president, particularly with the way the Electoral College system
disincentivizes candidates from collecting votes in states that are either clearly sympathetic or obviously
hostile. n49 Because of the impossibility of changing this system through legislation, and because of the
significant hurdles involved in enacting a constitutional amendment, the compact presents a feasible
way to achieve an otherwise impossible result. The NPV's proponents emphasize that Congressional
consent is not required for the compact to be found valid by the courts. n50 If backers of the compact
needed to secure its validation in Congress, which they could not accomplish simply by securing support
of the legislatures of a handful of populous states, the compact would represent a less attractive way to
effect change. As of January 5, 2009, the NPV compact was signed into law in four states, Hawaii, Illinois,
New Jersey and Maryland, n51 and had been approved by both houses of the Michigan, Rhode Island
and Massachusetts legislatures. n52 Both the RGGI and the NPV compacts exploit the slackness of the
U.S. Steel test in order to transform the interstate compact from a device for addressing local issues
into an alternative to federal legislation. Both proposals are attractive to their proponents precisely
because they are viewed as free from the requirement of congressional assent. Supporters attempt to
utilize the interstate compact device in a way that appears pretextual and designed to accomplish goals
that they think they would be unable to accomplish by constitutional amendment or by federal
legislation. Increased activity in areas where states have not previously formed compacts is likely in the
coming years. A recently released handbook published by the American Bar Association, [*522]
Evolving Use and Changing Role of Interstate Compacts: A Practitioner's Guide, identifies insurance
regulation, prescription drug purchasing and election administration as likely topics for future compact
formation. n53 While the NPV is the most dramatic recent proposal to utilize the device of the interstate
compact to create an extreme change on a national level, future compacts aiming towards the same
goal of national action are possible. This is especially true if commentators or courts find that the NPV
does not require congressional consent. In view of the possibility of new and currently unidentified uses
of interstate compacts on the horizon, the need to reevaluate the current criteria for when such
agreements require the consent of Congress is all the more pressing.
2NC – Top shelf
2NC – Generic
States lead in energy production and enviro policy – they should take the lead on the
aff
Carley and Browne 2013 –School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,¶
Bloomington, IN, USA (Sanya Carley and Tyler R. Browne Innovative US energy policy: a¶ review of states’
policy experiences WIREs Energy Environ 2013, 2: 488–506 doi: 10.1002/wene.58)
In recent years, concerns about these and related¶ issues have caused energy policy to rise in perceived¶
importance in the public policy domain. Despite the¶ national prominence of the issue, US energy
policy¶ and, specifically, policy focused on the electricity sector,¶ has developed predominantly at the
state level.5–7¶ In the absence of any comprehensive national legislation¶ over the past two decades
focused on electricity¶ sector generation or emissions, state governments¶ have assumed strong
leadership roles in energy policy.¶ During this era of state energy policy innovation,state
governments have adopted a variety of different¶ policies aimed at diversifying the mix of
generation¶ sources with a greater percentage of renewable energy,¶ reducing the carbon intensity
of the sector, and¶ increasing the use of smaller and more localized generation¶ units. These three
objectives—diversification,¶ decarbonization, and decentralization—have increasingly¶ guided state
energy policy since the mid-1990s.
Policy instruments designed to achieve one or¶ more of these objectives include but are not limited¶
to the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), net metering¶ and interconnection standards, various tax
incentives,¶ the energy efficiency resource standard (EERS),¶ and energy public benefit funds (PBFs).
RPSs mandate¶ that a state’s utilities must provide a specific¶ amount or percentage of total energy
from alternative¶ energy sources by a specific year (e.g., 20% renewable¶ energy by 2025). Net
metering and interconnection¶ standards provide electricity customers that own¶ their own
generation units access to the electric grid¶ and outline rules and procedures for connecting these¶
distributed systems to the grid. Tax incentives provide¶ financial support for renewable energy or
energy¶ efficiency systems, generally as a percentage of total¶ upfront costs. EERSs require that
utilities improve the¶ operating efficiencies of their infrastructure and also¶ promote programs that
help electricity customers reduce¶ consumption; these standards are translated as¶ specific energy
savings mandates over time. PBFs, also¶ referred to as system benefit charges, are collected via small
surcharges on end-users’ electricity bills, and¶ used to support investments in energy efficiency,
renewable¶ energy, or research and development.
The adoption of these different policies among¶ US states is becoming increasingly common,
although¶ the current landscape exhibits a diverse patchwork of¶ different policies across space.
Currently, 29 states¶ and the District of Columbia have some form of RPS¶ and an additional 8 states have
voluntary RPS policies.¶ A total of 47 states and District of Columbia have¶ either net metering or
interconnection standards, or¶ both; and 20 states have an EERS with an additional¶ 6 that have a
voluntary standard.8 The designs of¶ these policy instruments also demonstrate significant¶ variation
across states. States choose among a vast¶ menu of different policy design features to tailor specific¶
policy goals and standards to their own circumstances.¶ Table 1 presents a detailed state inventory of¶
policy portfolios and instrument design features, and¶ demonstrates this immense variation in policy
adoption¶ and design across states.
Throughout the era of state energy policy innovation,¶ the energy policy literature has developed¶
along with states’ experiences with these policies.¶ Early evaluations focused on the effects of more
basic¶ forms of these various policy instruments; as states¶ have developed more sophisticated policy
variations¶ and as the number of these policies has increased, so¶ too has the literature evolved toward
increasing sophistication¶ of analysis and prevalence of studies.
Particularly given that states are still active energy¶ policy leaders, and are continually adopting
new¶ or revising existing policies , there is great need for¶ evaluation of the effects, effectiveness,
challenges, and¶ opportunities associated with these different policy¶ instruments. This analysis
therefore seeks to synthesize¶ major findings in the literature and to provide¶ a summary of both the
policy landscapes and the¶ effects associated with some of the leading energy¶ policies, both in their
elementary and more nuanced¶ forms. This study evaluates in depth four state-level¶ energy policies that
are representative of the larger¶ suite of state energy policies highlighted above: the¶ RPS, the EERS, net
metering, and the interconnection¶ standard. The disproportionate share of attention,¶ however, is
focused on the RPS policy, as this¶ policy instrument is more extensively studied than¶ other policies due
to the popularity and prevalence of¶ the policy among states, and the availability of data¶ that allow
analysts to measure policy outcomes. Each¶ of the following sections outlines the current understanding¶
about these policies, with an overview of the¶ policy landscape, effectiveness, and other important
policy effect considerations revealed in the associated¶ literature to date. Following this discussion, we
also¶ provide a brief overview of other policy actions most¶ commonly pursued by states, including tax
incentives,¶ PBFs, and institutional reforms. The review concludes¶ with a brief summary of general
trends and opportunities¶ for further research.
( ) State action solves best
Northrop and Sassoon ‘8
[States Take the Lead on Climate, by Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, June 2008 in Environment
360, the new online magazine form the Yale School of Forest & Environmental Studies.
http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015 ]
But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures
affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions
and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and
weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar
two-pronged benefits.¶ These
policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing
percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many
states — chief among them California — have shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards,
leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the
states in court.¶ The fact that so many states are acting with a similar impetus begs an important question: What
would happen if
you aggregated these policies and applied them on a national scale?¶ One study conducted by the
Center for Climate Strategies (CCS) — a non-partisan group that has worked on climate policymaking
and analysis with many of these states — indicates that the adoption of a comprehensive,
nationwide climate and energy policy would have substantial economic benefits. Using data from 12 states that
are leaders in the field of climate change and energy, CSS calculated that were all 50 states to adopt similar rules
and legislation, the aggregate economic savings would be $25 billion. The nation could achieve a 33%
reduction in projected greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 — a common interim target — and save
money doing so.
2NC – Follow on
CP causes federal modeling- solves their USFG key warrants
Goulder and Stavins ’11 [Lawrence H. Goulder, Department of Economics, Stanford University, Robert
N. Stavins, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Challenges from State-Federal
Interactions in US Climate Change Policy,”
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/Papers/Goulder&StavinsAERPapers&Proceedings.pdf]
State and federal policies can interact along other dimensions, which may lead to positive outcomes.
First, strategic interactions can arise between states and the federal government. In particular, state
efforts can create pressure for more stringent federal policy. There is, in fact, a considerable history of
California air standards having precisely this effect on federal policy developments, because industry
is reluctant to face different standards in different parts of the country. For example, the California-led
state-level tightening of greenhouse-gas-per mile standards helped bring about the subsequent
tightening of federal CAFE standards. 5 Of course, such triggering of stronger federal policy is desirable only if the previous
federal policy was insufficiently stringent.
The federal government models state-led innovation
Klass and Wilson ’12 [Alexandra Klass, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Solly
Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, University of Minnesota Law School, Elizabeth Wilson, Associate
Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of
Minnesota, “Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch,”
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Klass_Transmission_Article_2_12.pdf]
The fact that transmission line siting in modern times is interstate in nature but is still subject to virtually exclusive state authority raises
particular federalism concerns. As Justice Brandeis stated in 1932, one
of the core values of our federalist system is that it
encourages innovation by allowing that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 134 This model of states as
“laboratories of democracy” has led to innovative state policy over the decades in social security (Wisconsin),
health care reform (Massachusetts), environmental protection (California), and other policy areas, many of which
were ultimately adopted by the federal government. 135 Notably though, in each of these areas, states could work
independently to set policy for their citizens without the need to work cooperatively with other states or the federal government. With their
own taxing power and regulatory authority, states can for the most part create significant environmental protection programs, health care
programs, education programs, and other policies even if other states choose not to do likewise. Thus, each state can serve as its own
laboratory.
Federal Government Will Model The CP
NOGEE 7, ET AL, energy analyst and advocate for UCS, 2007
(Alan – energy analyst and advocate for UCS , “The Projected Impacts of a National Renewable Portfolio
Standard”, The Electricity Journal, May, lexis)
In addition, early successes in states like Texas, Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin, along with the continuing growth of new state RPS adoption and expansion
State governments are often the laboratories for national
policy. If a policy is successful in one state—as with California's standards for energyefficient appliances—it is usually replicated and expanded by others until it is ultimately
considered at the national level. Furthermore, renewable energy provides important benefits to all consumers, not just those in
have demonstrated that the policy can be effective.6
states required to use it. Leveling the playing field by requiring all states and electricity providers to share in the cost of renewable energy investment is fair,
as well as publicly and politically popular.
State action is modeled by the federal government – state initiated policies don’t link
to national politics
Halberstam and Hills, 1
(Daniel Halberstam, - assistant professor law at the University of Michigan Law School specializing in U.S.
constitutional law and **professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School, specializing in U.S.
constitutional law, local government law, the law of federalism and intergovernmental relations and
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The American Academy of Political and Social Science, “State Autonomy in
Germany and the United States,” pg Lexis)
The states may exploit this power to initiate programs as a practical means to counteract Congress's constitutional authority to federalize
policy areas. For example, before
Congress generates enough political will to legislate in any given
area, states may step into the field with their own policy proposals. One result is that state
policy initiatives may be quite influential in the federal lawmaking process by providing the
initial impetus and sometimes even blueprint for federal action (Elliot, Ackerman, and Millian 1985). To bypass or overrule
the states, not only must Congress often demonstrate that its proposed regulatory scheme is politically desirable, but it must do so by
arguing specifically against the continued existence of active state regulation.
Empirically, the federal government models the states
Katz et al 10 (Bruce Katz, Jennifer Bradley, and Amy Liu, November, “Delivering the Next Economy: The
States Step Up,” The Brookings Institution, Brookings- Rockefeller Project on State and Metropolitan
Innovation )
State innovation is part of the genius of our federalist system.1 Health care reform was law in
Massachusetts years before the recent passage of federal legislation. During the 1980s, governors from both parties
experimented with welfare and healthcare reforms, paving the way for federal advances in the next
decade. Throughout the 1950s, public university systems, established by states like California and North
Carolina, set the stage for the federal technology investments of the 1960s and 1970s. And before he was
president, New York Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt experimented with interventions that foreshadowed the New
Deal.
No solvency deficit – the federal government will model state action – delay
counterplan that solves the whole aff
Halberstam ‘1
[Dan. Prof Law – Michigan. “The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on the Benefits of State
Participation” The Villanova Law Review, 2001 ln)
131
The pervasive influence that these various actions have on the Nation's foreign affairs, however, cannot be cast only in terms of the potential
harm that they inflict. Instead, these
initiatives also may have a positive [*1040] impact on the national
foreign policy making process. Perhaps ironically, this positive impact is more apparent where
state and local officials direct their actions specifically toward the conduct of the
Nation's foreign affairs. By challenging the absence of federal foreign policy on an issue, state
and local actors may raise national awareness of an issue, place issues on the agenda of
federal officials or even induce the federal government to take action on behalf of the Nation.
Obama will follow state leadership
Kinkaid, 10 – John, Robert B. and Helen S. Meyner Professor of Government and Public Service and Director of the Meyner Center for the Study of State and
Local Government at Lafayette College (“State-Federal Relations: Cooperative Coercion,” The Book of States 2010, The Council of State Governments,
http://dspace.lafayette.edu/bitstream/handle/10385/886/Kincaid-BookoftheStates-2010.pdf)
Generally, Democrats oppose total preemption of state authority in many matters of social and business regulation such as
consumer protection, product liability and environmental protection. The Obama administration supports what some have called
progressive federalism, whereby state and local governments forge ahead of the federal government on
such things as consumer and environmental protection. The administration also supports states developing policies that can
be adopted by the federal government.32
2NC – Incentives Solve
State incentives programs solve – they can drive the market towards widespread
alternative energy acceptance
Brown et al 2. [Elizabeth Brown, Patrick Quinlan, Harvey M. Sachs, and Daniel Williams, Am. Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy,
March 2002, "Tax Credits for Energy Efficiency," http://aceee.org/pubs/e021full.pdf?CFID=1059758%26CFTOKEN=72603414]
States play a fundamental role in addressing energy use and the adoption of energy efficiency measures at the regional
and local level States can provide tax incentives that foster technology options matched to the needs of their
residents. This report describes the current status of energy efficiency and “green buildings” tax incentives that states offer. Our goal is to assist
state policymakers in designing and evaluating their own programs by providing insights about current programs in other states. A
properly
designed state tax incentive has both short-term and long-range benefits. In the short run, the incentive
can effectively increase market share of an advanced technology or practice that otherwise would be harder for the state’s
residents, businesses, and other organizations to find. By itself, the state’s action increases the visibility of the
technology or practice and validates it with the state’s credibility. Greater market share bunches a “virtuous circle.” As
market share increases, more market actors (salespeople. specifiers. installers, etc.) become vested in the
technology or practice because it can be more profitable than the status quo and can increase customer satisfaction. This vestment
induces more firms to enter the market and the resulting competition can drive down prices and
further increase market share. At some point, market share is large enough that the technology or practice is clearly cost-effective
and has broad support from those who profit from it. By then, a state tax credit is no longer needed and building codes and other regulatory
mechanisms can be revised to make use of the technology or practice mandatory. State-funded
energy efficiency incentive
programs increase consumer choices by inducing innovation in the private sector. The programs thus benefit
state energy, economic, and environmental objectives. The private sector needs encouragement to provide products and
services that address broader energy security, system reliability. environmental, and economic goals. In particular. marker failures limit private
investment in cost-effective efficiency measures: for example. projected returns may be lower than for other, non-energy investments or
technology deployment timeframes may be too long. Tax
credits can accelerate customer acceptance and increase
market share for high-efficiency products and services. Benefits accrue to the state and its residents. the United States and its
citizens, and the global climate.
States can provide financial incentives for energy policy – already being done
Piscitello and Bogach 97 (E. Scott and V. Susan, “Financial Incentives for Renewable
Energy Development”, 1997, pg. 33)
Financial incentives for renewable energy development in the U nited S tates are set at both the federal and state
levels. In many cases, policy frameworks are set by the federal government with states required to design and
implement policy details . As a result, financial incentive policies for renewable energy development in the
United Slates vary greatly among individual states. States often formulate financial incentive policies to
promote development of a resource within their particular borders, but which is not as prominent in other states
(such as financial incentives for energy from biomass in Georgia, Alabama, and other states located in the southeastern United States). The
State of California, however, developed strong financial incentive policies that have succeeded in promoting a broad range of renewable energy
resources, including wind and solar resources. California was therefore chosen as a focus for the financial incentives offered for renewable
energy development in the United States. Examples of incentives used in other states arc documented at the end of this section-In reaction to
the oil crisis of the 1970s, the State of California adopted energy policies for (a) promoting energy diversity; (b) reducing dependence on fossil
fuels; (c) using indigenous energy resources; and (d) promoting environmentally benign energy sources.
These principles led to a
series of financial incentive policies for renewable energy development that has resulted in significant
installed capacity . By the early 1990s, renewable energy facilities comprised approximately 10 percent of the installed generating
capacity in California Due to an oversubscription by renewable energy facilities in the late 1980s and 1990s, financial incentives for renewable
energy development were removed. At the same time, California was and is continuing to move toward deregulating its electric utility industry.
Despite uncertainties regarding future evolution of the deregulated industry, energy prices are expected to remain below
those at which renewable energy facilities are financially viable- As a result, California
is presently developing new financial
incentives aimed at maintaining its existing renewable energy facilities as well as promoting further
development of the most promising technologies in the deregulated power market.
2NC – States best for Energy
State action is better than the fed
Pursley and Wiseman 11 - Garrick, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law,
and Hannah, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, (“Local Energy”, Emory Law
Journal, 60 Emory L.J. 877)
The familiar idea that empowering subnational governments allows for a greater influence of state or
local preferences in policy and enhances the democratic responsiveness of the federal system is also
relevant here. 325 In federalism scholarship, it is commonly claimed that state governments are
"closer" - that is, more accessible and accountable - to citizens than the federal government. 326 The
characteristics of state governments that support this claim - their smaller electorates, greater
transparency and access to elected officials, and greater opportunities for citizen participation in
governance - suggest that local governments are closest to the people. 327 Local "elected officials tend
to be more responsive to voter demands because it is easier ... to monitor politicians and it is easier for
new politicians to challenge unpopular incumbents[,] ... smaller political units allow for more
deliberation and consensus building among members," and "politics on a small scale ... enables less
affluent grassroots organizations to promote their interests through marches, speeches, and creative
forms of activism that would not work on a national or regional scale." 328 In the distributed
renewables area, this means that yet another argument against primarily federal-level action is that
people in different locations may have different ideas about how much and what kind of renewable
energy they want, and, as far as our broad energy [*939] transition goals and the need to encourage
citizens to do their part will allow, we should do what we can to honor those preferences. 329
States solve – FITs solves industry growth – local tailoring key.
Ferber 13. [Dan, reporter, "Report: Lack of consistent policy holding back clean energy industry" Midwest Energy News -- January 24 -www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/01/24/report-lack-of-consistent-policy-holding-back-clean-energy-industry/]
States matter , too¶ The policy changes Pew suggests could go a long way, but changes at the state level are
also
essential , Arnold said.¶ Germany and Italy, for example, have feed-in tariffs, which reward people for installing solar panels
Midwestern states chose to establish such
policies, markets would grow, helping the region’s clean-energy industry flourish, Arnold said.¶ In Indiana, in
contrast, “you can’t buy electricity from anyone other than your friendly electric utility,” she said. Policies that allow more choice
would grow the market for renewable energy, she emphasized.¶ Other state and local policies could spur demand for
by ensuring a long-term, steady, and high price for the electricity they generate. If
renewable energy in the region. Today, there are people in urban neighborhoods who might want to install solar panels but don’t have good
exposure to the sun. If
a church in the neighborhood has an annex with a great rooftop, they could provide
solar power to their neighbors, but only if local and state policies allow for community energy
systems, Arnold said.¶ “I’m not sure how to do that with national legislation. I think it has to be done at
the state level to permit more creative ways for people to own a piece of a small distributed system,”
she said.
2NC – State RPS solves
State RPS is awesome and solves the aff and promotes investment
Carley and Browne 2013 –School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,¶
Bloomington, IN, USA (Sanya Carley and Tyler R. Browne Innovative US energy policy: a¶ review of states’
policy experiences WIREs Energy Environ 2013, 2: 488–506 doi: 10.1002/wene.58)
Because RPS policies are intended to increase electricity¶ generation from renewable energy sources,
a¶ review of the policy’s effectiveness should begin with¶ the discussion of how well the policy
increases development¶ activity and rates of renewable energy¶ deployment. Several case studies
have found that¶ the RPS policy is effective at increasing renewable¶ electricity generation in specific
locations.6,17 Some¶ case studies have also found that RPS policies facilitate¶ competition between
renewable energy producers,¶ such as in Texas, where Langniss and Wiser17¶ found that the RPS
policy encourages competition¶ between wind power producers. Some note, however,¶ that RPS
case studies that focus only on positive policy¶ results are misleading because some states, such¶ as
Massachusetts and Nevada, remain noncompliant¶ with their RPS targets and others, such as
California,¶ have not experienced any measurable increase¶ in nonhydro renewable electricity
generation.26 Yet¶ many empirical studies that take into account the diverse¶ experiences of all
states conclude convincingly¶ that the RPS policy on average effectively increases¶ the amount of
electricity generated from renewable¶ sources of energy,20,27–30 thus validating the findings¶ from
various case studies.
One could claim that the objective of the RPS¶ policy is not solely to increase renewable energy
development¶ and deployment, but additionally to diversify¶ a state’s electricity portfolio mix with a
greater¶ proportion of electricity sourced from alternative energy¶ resources. Several researchers
have either directly¶ or indirectly addressed the policy’s ability to achieve¶ such objectives. In a
national energy modeling analysis,¶ Palmer and Burtraw11 found that the RPS has¶ the potential to
offset carbon-intensive generation,¶ particularly from natural gas as it typically competes¶ with
renewables for a share of new capacity and at¶ similar load requirements. In a similar energy
modeling¶ exercise, Kydes31 found that a national 20% RPS¶ has the potential to reduce statewide
emissions of nitrogen¶ oxides, carbon dioxide, and mercury due to¶ the replacement of renewable
energy for fossil fuel¶ resources. Other studies have found that the RPSinduced¶ renewable energy
primarily serves as new capacity,¶ not as a replacement for other generation.32¶ An RPS policy in
absence of energy efficiency mandates¶ also does not affect demand. These two trends¶ suggest, and
as is also confirmed by other studies, that¶ RPS policies may fail to significantly increase the
percentage¶ share of renewables in a state’s total energy¶ mix.5
2NC – Gov F/ws prove
New York proves – State development possible and desirable
MarineLog 2014 - largest circulation and most popular B to B marine magazines in the world (
Simmons-Boardman Publishing Inc.New York moves ahead on offshore
renewableshttp://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=207:new-yorkmoves-ahead-on-offshore-renewables&Itemid=224)
New York's plans for offshore renewable energy are moving along. Yesterday, BOEMRE held its first
offshore renewable energy task force meeting in partnership with New York's Office of the Governor.
The task force was established to facilitate communication between BOEMRE and state, local, tribal
and federal stakeholders concerning commercial renewable energy leasing and development on the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) off the coast of New York. The task force includes state government
officials designated by Governor David Paterson, officials from affected federal agencies, elected local
government officials and tribal leaders.
"BOEMRE created this task force to facilitate the efficient and effective review of proposed renewable
energy projects on the OCS offshore New York," said BOEMRE Director Michael R. Bromwich. "We will
continue to work together to initiate the commercial leasing process that will enable New York to meet
its renewable energy development goals and expand our nation's energy resource portfolio."
"The offshore renewable energy task force will provide a forum for communities and tribal
governments along Long Island's south shore to review future offshore renewable energy proposals,"
Acting Secretary of State Ruth Noemi Colon said. "We know that the Department's efforts to plan for
offshore renewable energy projects and to protect important ocean habitats will benefit greatly from
task force discussions."
The task force meeting featured a discussion about the commercial leasing process for OCS renewable
energy and a presentation of the draft task force charter. The task force members discussed options
for starting the leasing process and the timelines for specific actions required by BOEMRE and the
state for developing offshore renewable energy.
Maine Proves
Davies 2007 - University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2008 (Lynne D. Davies “ REVISING THE
NATIONAL OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE ACT OF 2007: USING STATE OF MAINE AQUACULTURE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AS A PROTOTYPE FOR THE PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK”2007 Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School of Law ¶ Ocean and Coastal Law
Journal¶ 2007¶ 13 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 95)
Maine's Department of Marine Resources (DMR) is responsible for overseeing and implementing
regulations relating to the state's finfish and shellfish aquaculture industries, n94 and generally serves
as the primary state agency that assists Maine's fishing community. n95 Exclusive authority to
implement DMR laws and regulations is vested in the Commissioner, who, in regard to the
aquaculture industry, has the power to grant leases and licenses upon review of submitted
applications. n96 Leases provide a facility operator with a greater proprietary interest in the coastal
waters. In contrast, temporary licenses are issued to entrepreneurs entering the industry who are
experimenting with various farmed species and locations. In addition, the Commissioner also has
exclusive authority to establish conditions for [*111] compatible use of each lease site, n97 as well as
to implement and sponsor programs for research, development, and marketing techniques. n98
2NC – Climate Negotiations
State policies solve
Dutzik 9 - Sr. Policy Analyst-The Frontier Group( “America on the Move State Leadership in the Fight
Against Global Warming, and What it Means for the World,” December,
http://www.stateinnovation.org/Publications/All-Publications/2009-10-EnvironmentAmericaAmericaontheMove.aspx)
But in America’s 50 states, where the “rubber meets the road” on many areas of energy policy in our
federal system – from utility regulation to transportation to home energy efficiency – a different story
was being written. There, building on a legacy of state energy policy innovation dating back to the mid1970s, states began to devise and implement strategies to shift to cleaner sources of energy and
reduce global warming pollution. While leading-edge states – particularly on the East and West coasts –
moved first, the clean energy revolution has spread rapidly into America’s heartland. Today, most states
have taken at least the first steps to encourage improved energy efficiency in homes and businesses,
spur the use of renewable energy, curb emissions from automobiles, and plan for future reductions in
global warming pollution. States had once been forced to steer their clean energy efforts into the
headwind created by the pro-fossil fuel policies of the Bush administration. But with the arrival of the
Obama administration, state clean energy innovators now have the wind at their backs. The first year
of the new administration has seen the lifting of federal policies that once impeded state action, as well
as the nationwide adoption of key clean energy policies initially developed in the states. States also have
been given a key role in implementing the specifics of President Obama’s economic recovery strategy,
which is built around the promise of enduring prosperity achieved through a transition to a clean energy
economy. Taken together, the actions initiated by the states, coupled with the clean energy policies and
programs implemented thus far by the Obama administration, rival the scope and ambition of the
actions taken to address global warming anywhere in the world. Of course, there is far more work to be
done. To date, the actions taken by the United States and the rest of the world pale in comparison to
the challenge posed by global warming. The United States must implement mandatory emission
reductions at the pace and scale science tells us are necessary to prevent the most dangerous impacts of
global warming. The rest of the world must do the same. But make no mistake: it is the record of
widespread state innovation and leadership on global warming over the past decade – not the
recalcitrance of the Bush administration, nor even the slow legislative pace of a U.S. Senate that, in
the American system of government, is uniquely sensitive to regional interests – that should
characterize America’s reputation before the world as the crucial negotiations begin in Copenhagen.
2NC – AT: Uniformity
States will cooperate to solve expertise and jurisdiction questions.
Lutsey and Sperling 8. [Nicholas, Program Director at The International Council on Clean Transportation, Daniel, Director of the
Institute of Transportation Studies, Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Professor, Environmental Science and Policy Faculty director,
Policy Institute for Energy, Environment and the Economy, “America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy” Energy Policy -- Vol 36 -Science Direct]
Local and state
governments in the US are expanding their multi-government alliances to develop emissiontracking
of policy
expertise in these areas and their inability to deal with cross-boundary jurisdictional issues. To address these
limitations, hundreds of dispersed city governments have joined together in information-sharing alliances,
states are engaging in cross-sector cooperation and developing emissions trading mechanisms to connect
systems and trading systems. As introduced in the literature review, state-level actions are often confounded by lack
and incentivize actions across state lines , and some states are even forging alliances with other
countries. This section investigates these multi-government trends. Table 4 summarizes the scale and coverage of major multi-government
climate mitigation alliances in the US. These initiatives are listed chronologically in order of their particular statements or commitments that
relate specifi- cally to GHG mitigation. The
alliances engage in standardization of emissions inventories and
tracking, development of region-specific energy and emissions technologies, and development of emissions trading or
cap-and-trade mechanisms to integrate the diverse mitigation programs of the participants. Two important features in these multi-government
developments are (1) the mandatory aspect of the cap-and-trade system for participants of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and (2) the
setting of a specific time (i.e. August 2008) for establishment of a multi-sector market-based emissions trading system in the Western Climate
Initiative. The time trend of the US multi-government climate policy cooperation is shown in Fig. 5. Most growth in multi-government
coordination has occurred since 2002. Comparing these trends with the very similar trends in Figs. 1 and 2 for state action plans, it would
appear that states
are becoming increasingly concerned about climate change and are recognizing the
importance of allying with other states to coordinate, collaborate, and integrate their emission-reduction
initiatives. When including all of the states (and the cities not in those states) that are involved in the six major climate-mitigation
coordination efforts, approximately 90% of population and GHG emissions of the US are involved in mid-2007 in actions to coordinate subnational climate change mitigation.
State policy diffusion solves uniformity.
Stoutenborough and Beverlin 8. [James, PhD in PoliSci @ UKansas, Post Doctoral Research Associate @ Texas A&M,
Matthew, Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science @ Rockhurst Univ., “Encouraging Pollution-Free Energy: The Diffusion of State Net
Metering Policies” Social Science Quartlery -- Vol 89, No 5 -- December -- http://kups.ku.edu/people/pdf/StoutenboroughandBeverlin-2008EncouragingPollution-FreeEnergy-TheDiffusionofStateNetMeterin.pdf]
Policy Diffusion States often pass similar policies over time. When one state adopts an innovative
policy, it tends to spread throughout the country. Innovative policies are generally defined as being new to the government
that is adopting it (Walker, 1969:881). Similarly, Rogers (1995:11) defined innovation as an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by
an individual or other unit of adoption. Over time,
a number of states have earned a reputation for their role in
developing innovative policies (Walker, 1969). Usually, these states tend to be wealthier and more industrialized (Ringquist, 1993).
-- AT: Patchwork
Nahh
Lutsey and Sperling 8. [Nicholas, Program Director at The International Council on Clean Transportation, Daniel, Director of the
Institute of Transportation Studies, Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering Professor, Environmental Science and Policy Faculty director,
Policy Institute for Energy, Environment and the Economy, “America’s bottom-up climate change mitigation policy” Energy Policy -- Vol 36 -Science Direct]
Lower-level US governments are learning to avoid the problem of creating a patchwork of diverse
regulations for industry. They are accomplishing this by following consistent sets of mitigation actions
prescribed by state policy innovators and adopting approaches that do not dictate particular technologies. Government action
on climate change mitigation is generally following the steps of establishing an emissions inventory, developing a mitigation action plan, setting
an emission reduction target, enacting sector-specific policies, and partnering with other governments to integrate their efforts and leverage
their reductions. To
accommodate further adoption by other states, principles of flexibility and incentives
are being widely adopted. The California vehicle GHG regulation, the California low-carbon fuel standard, and renewable electricity
standards are all performance standards that allow individual states (and industries in those states) the flexibility to choose the emissionreduction technologies that suit local circumstances.
The ‘‘commons’’ problem is falling away as more subnational
governments learn to work together . Early pioneering state actors saw themselves as models and leaders to be followed by
others. For example, the first state-level emission target-setting, by Vermont, was advanced with a stated objective to demonstrate that ‘‘there
are things individual Vermonters, the state and the nation can do’’ (Vermont, 1989). When
California was developing its vehicle
GHG regulations and later its low-carbon fuel standard, state leaders very deliberately watched and coordinated
their efforts with other governments, within and outside the US. The vehicle regulatory report cites the importance of
the combined impact of the adoption of similar mitigation measures for vehicles in other US states and other countries (Canada, Japan, and in
Europe) (CARB, 2005), and the lowcarbon fuel standard was developed through continuing discussion with leaders in other US states and the
European Union, which proposed to adopt a standard nearly identical to California’s just weeks after California’s initial announcement (EU,
2007; California, 2007).
2NC – AT: Innovation
States Solve Better
-
Labs of innovation
Solves the link to politics
Better at economic/civil rights issues.
Federal modeling
Duvivier 7. [K.K., Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death:
The Role of Direct Democracy in Federalism,” 86 Or. L. Rev. 895 -- lexis]
In a few instances, the Supreme Court has begun to articulate the benefit of shifting some weight back to state-side deference. 22 While the
Court has declared it "unwise to attempt to identify a list of "traditional' state functions," 23 the federalization of issues traditionally identified
as local matters, such as crime, has brought criticism. 24 Likewise, the
balance has also shifted in the areas of economics, the
environment, and civil rights. In the last century, many problems were "best solved at the national [*903] level," 25
but more recently, local action has led the way on economic and environmental issues. 26 In addition, many state
constitutions now afford greater civil rights protections for citizens than they enjoy under the Federal Constitution. 27 Placing more
weight on the state side of the federalism equation has a number of advantages. For one, it helps avoid
dissatisfaction with a remote federal government. Proponents of "anti-nationalizing movements ... reflect[] unease among the people about
the extent to which governmental authority is slipping from their grasp." 28 Respect for state authority under the concept of federalism can
assuage those who bristle because of the "disadvantages [of] overweening national authority." 29 Initiatives force local
representatives to be in touch directly with their constituents' desires. Thus, the initiative process can
be [*904] one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting federalism, resulting in a more responsive and
robust form of democracy. 30 Furthermore, surrendering total authority to distant representatives not only weakens accountability but also
can promote dishonesty. 31 Allocating more power back to the state side of the federalism equation may address "the clear loss of faith in
democracy many in this country feel" due to "the corrupting influence of interest groups and money in the national Congress." 32 Initiatives can
be a salutary response to the voters' "disenchantment" 33 with corruption in government and satisfy federalism's focus on more local
participation. Finally, federalism allows
states to act as laboratories. Centralization at the federal level can
stifle innovation, with congressional "stasis" preventing any positive action from that national legislative body.
34 Instead, dispersing power to the states encourages the evolution of ideas that can help advance an
issue nationally . The "evolutionary process" of "innovation" works best when experimentation is
diffused. 35 More progress is likely when "fifty different parallel state governments and countless substate
governments" are working on possible solutions to problems that face the nation. 36 Some of these ideas will be rejected, but
the odds improve with the existence of multiple, creative options.
States are innovation laboratories- empirical success
Klass and Wilson ’12 [Alexandra Klass, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Solly Robins Distinguished
Research Fellow, University of Minnesota Law School, Elizabeth Wilson, Associate Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy, Humphrey
School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, “Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch,”
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Klass_Transmission_Article_2_12.pdf]
The fact that transmission line siting in modern times is interstate in nature but is still subject to virtually exclusive state authority raises
particular federalism concerns. As Justice Brandeis stated in 1932, one of the
core values of our federalist system is that it
encourages innovation by allowing that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” 134
This model of states as “laboratories of democracy” has led to innovative state policy over the decades
in social security (Wisconsin), health care reform (Massachusetts), environmental protection (California), and other policy
areas, many of which were ultimately adopted by the federal government. 135 Notably though, in each of these
areas, states could work independently to set policy for their citizens without the need to work
cooperatively with other states or the federal government. With their own taxing power and regulatory authority,
states can for the most part create significant environmental protection programs, health care programs,
education programs, and other policies even if other states choose not to do likewise. Thus, each
state can serve as its own
laboratory.
State-level innovation is good and causes federal modeling
Goulder and Stavins ’11 [Lawrence H. Goulder, Department of Economics, Stanford University, Robert N. Stavins, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Challenges from State-Federal Interactions in US Climate Change Policy,”
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rstavins/Papers/Goulder&StavinsAERPapers&Proceedings.pdf]
Second, states
can serve as laboratories for experimenting with innovative policy approaches. Approaches
that prove successful on cost effectiveness or other dimensions could later be adopted at the federal
level. The interaction here is one of information transfer. The case for state-level experimentation needs to be considered
carefully: why the laboratories should be at the state, rather than national, level is not clear, and—in any event—there is some question
regarding whether state authorities will allow their “laboratory” to be closed after the experiment has been completed and the information
delivered.
2NC – AT: Accountability
States solve better - accountability
Rosenbloom 98. (David, Public Admin Prof, "American Review of Public Administration, June, p 107)
administration .Greater
state and local responsibility for problem solving will probably heighten attention to
accountability. State and local politicians administrators will have greater difficulty explaining low costeffectiveness in terms of national regulations and bureaucrats - especially if neighboring jurisdiction are doing a better job
and knowledge of best practice is broadly disseminated. Finally, the changing constitutional .'doctrine affords, the public
administration community an opportunity to invigorate its discourse on federalism. Perhaps most profitably, it can bring its expertise to bear
on two areas In which the new jurisprudence is ineffective: the interests of local _ governments in intergovernmental relations and the
resolution of collective action problems in the absence of national intervention.
States are more accountable - improving decision making
Calabresi 95. [Steven G., Assistant Professor @ Northwestern Law, “SYMPOSIUM: Reflections on United States v. Lopez: "A
GOVERNMENT OF LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS": IN DEFENSE OF UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ” Michigan Law Review -- December -- lexis]
d. Improved Quality of Governmental Decisionmaking and Administration. Decentralized governments make better decisions
than centralized ones for reasons additional to the whip they feel from competition. Decentralization ensures that “those
responsible for choosing a given social policy are made aware of the costs of that policy.” This helps ensure a more
informed weighing of costs and benefits than often occurs at the national level where taxpayers often may be less
cognizant of the social costs of the particular legislation.
2NC – AT: Fed Backing Key
No need for fed backing—state support can bridge the commercialization gap
Sinclair 10 - JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance(“Federal Climate and
Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles
and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April
http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)
As is so often the case, selected state funding mechanisms have already demonstrated that new
approaches for bridging the commercialization finance gap can have important results. In many
states, for example, agencies commit to build a strong industrial “cluster” around high growth
technologies such as nanotechnology or life sciences research and commercialization. Similar programs
could be envisioned to spawn robust clean energy industrial clusters across a variety of dedicated
subsectors nationwide. Allocating allowance funds to support such programs, perhaps augmented with
state matching funds, would be a natural extension of these already successful programs. Allowance
funding also could be used in a number of ways to make progress toward other related efforts to help
bridge the commercialization finance gap. At the national level, most programs, such as the current
DOE Title 1703 effort and the proposed Clean Energy Deployment Administration, focus on the provision
of attractively priced debt capital for emerging technologies. An important complementary program
could be modeled on the Massachusetts Renewable Energy Trust program for equity investments. It
made a key equity investment in the then struggling Evergreen Solar company. With the later
commercial success of the firm, the Trust realized significant gains on its investment and was able to
utilize these gains to fund its own expanded solar programs. Similar efforts could be envisioned in
other states, perhaps spurred by match funding from federal emissions allowance resources. Such
investments can hit key state priorities (protecting jobs and promoting state economic development), at
the same time that they help push towards the nation’s goal of accelerated clean energy development.
This approach is particularly interesting because it would have states work alongside local technology
development firms to aid them in “de-risking” an emerging technology as it moves towards
commercialization. State agencies could also provide lower costs of capital and/or more forgiving
performance requirements than other, largely private investors in an investment, in return for the
important economic development impacts that a successful new clean energy enterprise can provide.
2NC – AT: Funding
States have cash
Milford 12 - Sr. Fellow-Brookings & President-Clean Energy Group ( “Leveraging State Clean Energy
Funds for Economic Development,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0
111_states_energy_funds)
In sum, the need of the hour is for smarter strategies and greater funding for clean energy economic
development that will enable states to innovate, manufacture, and export in the clean energy space.
Too few states are engaged in rigorous and robust efforts to bolster this dynamic source of growth. And
yet, state clean energy funds—by redirecting portions of their funds towards economic development
activities—can play an important role in filling this gap and contributing to economic transformation and
job-creation in U.S. states and metropolitan areas. III. Toward A New State Approach
And so U.S. states, as classic “laboratories of experimentation,” should build on leading-edge CEFs’
recent experiments with economic development and move more expansively to spur economic
growth in clean energy. To that end, this paper suggests a number of strategies for best utilizing CEFs
that states can explore in pursuit of clean energy economic development. In this regard, it is worth
noting that state CEFs are public entities with a unique history of success in financing clean energy
projects that can now be brought to bear on the need in many states for more aggressive clean energy
economic development. In a time of tough fiscal austerity and reluctance to dedicate new funds, then,
state public CEFs are in a perfect position to institute a new set of economic development strategies to
create thriving clean energy industries. To act on this promise, states without clean energy funds
should consider establishing dedicated clean energy revenue streams to engage in project finance and
smart industry support. These states typically do not have dedicated support for either clean energy
projects or clean energy-related economic development activities. A range of sources for these funds
exists and includes general revenue bonds, tax or lottery revenues, pollution charges, and renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) compliance fees. However, experience has shown that electricity surcharges
set on electricity consumption or “wires charges” tend to be the most stable and reliable revenue
source, as well as the most fair as they internalize the environmental consequences of electricity
purchases. States should examine these sources as potential bases for the establishment of new clean
energy funds. In those states where CEFs already exist, fund administrators should seek to expand the
funds’ economic development role. Specifically, states with funds should pursue four major agendas:
➤ Reorient a significant portion of state CEF money to clean energy-related economic development
➤ Develop detailed state-specific clean energy market data
➤ Link clean energy funds with economic development entities, development finance organizations and
other stakeholders in the emerging industry
➤ Collaborate with other state, regional, and federal efforts to best leverage public and private dollars
and to learn from each other’s experiences
Along these lines state clean energy leaders should: Reorient a significant portion (at least 10 percent of
the total portfolio) of state CEF money to clean energy-related economic development. Over the last
decade, states with clean energy funds have dedicated almost $3 billion to individual project support.
That has made it possible to create thousands of clean energy projects across the country. But only a
small fraction of this funding has been dedicated to activities and investments aimed at bolstering clean
energy economic development. Given that, it is time to increase state budgets for economic
development activities. For that reason, state clean energy fund administrators should consider
reorienting a portion of their existing program funding to economic development programs. In addition,
this expansion of funding sources should also tap financing from existing economic development and
CDFI resources as well as matching funding from federal programs to incentivize states to invest more in
clean energy-related economic development strategies. What is required from a technical perspective to
enable this transition? In most cases, existing enabling legislation or regulatory authority will allow
states to reorient their CEFs to include a significant economic development agenda. For states that
have existing CEF legislative authorization, those laws generally give the agencies managing the funds
the authority to not only fund clean energy projects but also related economic development and
innovation activities. In these cases, an internal administrative decision should allow CEF administrators
to develop and fund clean energy-related economic development programs. In fact, many of the CEFs
mentioned in this report have already made this turn and are already engaged in some sort of economic
development activities.
2NC – AT: Bankruptcy
Even if some private companies fail, it’s part of clearing the way for the winners
Winston 2010 – applied micro-economist and senior fellow in the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, he specializes in
the analysis of and has written extensively on industrial organization, regulation, and transportation (Clifford, Last Exit: Privatization and
Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System, p. 16-17)
Indeed, the justification for government intervention and takeover of transportation during the past century is far from clear. One cannot make
the case by simply pointing to alleged market failures, such as the existence of scale economies in transit operations, and claim that workable
competition was not possible. In theory, market
failures should be compared with government failures and how
the consequences of each will evolve over time. Periodic financial failures by private firms are not
necessarily bad if inefficient firms exit and are eventually replaced by firms that use more efficient
production methods and up-to-date technologies. Public provision and regulation may cause greater
social costs than are caused by private firms that are struggling financially. Moreover, such costs maybe
concealed from the public, the majority of whom do not realize the extent of increasing public sector inefficiencies and taxpayer subsidies.
Indeed, the
strongest justification for privatization may be that it can eliminate dynamic X-inefficiencies-steadily rising production costs and little innovation and technological advance.
2NC – AT: Investor Signal
State policies are a better signal for investors
Sinclair 10 - JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance (“Federal Climate and
Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles
and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April
http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)
1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and
economic development because most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local
utility and customer level. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are made closer to the
markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged. 3. There
is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon
stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and
assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create
the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing,
experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and
expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop more nuanced
and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know
their markets, their market players and their barriers to success.
6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive
and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy
investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express
authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than
the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations
regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching
principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized,
and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based
financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance
Funding
For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state
programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success.
2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3.
Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing
tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource
context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage
their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible.
5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program
investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6.
Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects
and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization
activities across states and regions.
Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed
Milford 12 - President-Clean Energy Group (“Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,”
http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)
As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we
might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are
the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale
needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support
this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.
Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean
energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a
return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that states have been
the clean energy innovators. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy
investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively
bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large
group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities
that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s
infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S.
over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date,
these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they
now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal
bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3
billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible
declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax
credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was
about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every
week of the year, all across the country.
Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could
usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the potential to enlist major capital players
such as institutional investors and pension funds that look for longer term, more predictable returns
from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with investors that
finance at scale. So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In
New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public
authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency
finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country. Oddly enough, until
now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in
any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization
of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a
partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding
tools to finance clean energy.
So we have a unique financing situation for clean energy. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we
have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for
infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy
using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space,
with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in
Washington and the uncertainty over federal support is unwelcome, it need not mean a death knell for
the clean energy industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for
our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we
scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways
for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to
considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role
to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this
new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape
a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.
2NC – AT: International Signal
State action solves environmental leadership
Northrop 8 - Program Director for Sustainable Development-Rockefeller Brothers Fund( 6/3, “States
Take the Lead on Climate” http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015)
The leadership of states such as California, Arizona, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida is crucial not
only because it provides a template for federal climate legislation that will no doubt be adopted under
the next presidential administration. State action is also vital because among the top 75 emitters of
greenhouse gases worldwide, half are U.S. states. Individually, the size of many of these state economies
rivals those of most countries. State climate policy initiatives — though not yet implemented on a
national scale — are collectively among the most advanced anywhere in the world. They provide a
profound but largely unrecognized platform for national action, and for a potential reassertion of
global environmental leadership by the United States. Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided
hope to those in the global community who have waited patiently for the United States to engage
meaningfully in international climate efforts.
State support has a much larger and sustainable impact than high-profile national
efforts
Rabe 7 - Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan (“Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in
Multilevel Governance Systems,” Governance, Vol. 20, Issue 3, July)
The translation of international agreements on climate change into domestic policy remains at a very
early stage. But recent experience in multilevel governance systems, including the United States,
Canada, and even the EU, suggests that greenhouse gas emission reduction does not automatically
follow the ratification of an international accord. American states, Canadian provinces, and European
nations continue to play central roles in policy development, raising enormous governance challenges
for a policy problem that cuts across conventional policy and agency lines. In the American case, an
unexpectedly robust body of state policy development has taken advantage of “policy room” created
by federal government disengagement from Kyoto. States have clearly drawn from prior experience in
related policy areas, utilized available resources, and secured supportive coalitions that cut across
traditional party divides. They provide a surprisingly diverse and continually expanding set of policy
innovations that appear, in many respects, consistent with the tenets of smart practices, although
many uncertainties remain concerning their implementation and further diffusion to other states.
Clearly, certain states such as California have assumed leadership roles on climate policy development,
offering a distinct contrast to continuing federal government inertia. In the Canadian case, the
prolonged debate over Kyoto ratification has coincided with paralysis in provincial policy development.
Canadian greenhouse gas emissions have grown at a significantly greater rate than in the United States
and no provinces begin to approach the more active states in terms of enacting and implementing
policies that promise significant emission reduction. Neither federal nor provincial governments have
devoted resources necessary to establish the kinds of policy analysis and development infrastructures so
influential in the most active American cases. The province that has been most engaged on climate
policy has been motivated principally by fervent opposition to Kyoto. In response, Alberta has promoted
an alternative, a homegrown initiative that emphasizes voluntary programs and a focus on carbon
intensity as opposed to outright emission stabilization or reduction. In turn, a prolonged process of
intergovernmental haggling continues with no clear policy outcomes in sight. In the EU case, one sees
differential national policy responses, somewhat comparable to the range of states, despite the
existence of steadfast and vocal support for the united stance suggested by Kyoto ratification. These
varied responses from diverse multilevel systems suggest that the next challenge for climate policy may
be to move beyond the continuing focus on international compacts that may be largely meaningless in
such a new and complex policy arena. The American states, Canadian provinces, and (now 25) EU
nations provide intriguing testing grounds for what does—and does not—work to stabilize and reduce
greenhouse gases. The prolonged quest for the best practice in international climate policy has long
crowded out serious analysis of what constitutes politically, economically, and managerially viable
climate governance at the national or subnational levels. Looking ahead, these 85 jurisdictions offer an
extraordinary laboratory for beginning to consider the policy architecture of the next generation of
climate policy. Systematic study of actual experience in policy development and implementation might
help move the debate from a feckless quest for the optimal toward a more realistic exploration of what
policy tools do—and do not—hold considerable promise. In turn, there may also be growing
opportunities for cross-jurisdictional policy learning and formal collaboration. This is clearly evident in
the growing American pattern whereby multiple states have begun to work together and is reflected
in a few initial forays whereby neighboring states and provinces have entered into serious discussion
over collaborative opportunities. In North America, these range from exploration of common policies
among New England states and eastern Canadian provinces to improving east–west and north–south
infrastructure for moving renewable electricity from its point of generation to areas of high demand.
The continuing expansion and diversification of these kinds of cases move us closer to the nitty-gritty
of policy development and implementation, processes that are far less glamorous than all-night
binges of international diplomacy but ones that are fundamental to setting the stage for expanded
development of smart practices to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the coming decades.
2NC – AT: State Fiat
The States CP is the topic---jurisdictional questions are key to energy production
debates
Kay 12 - Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell
Dept. of Sociology, (“Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,”
http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/ge
tfile&PageID=1071714)
Questions about energy production and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st
Century. Some go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism, as an underlying but ever-present
friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and
more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “the choice of
regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy. That may explain why
Americans have traditionally shed so much metaphorical and genuine blood deciding what are
essentially jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions.”
A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific influences
include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and increased
awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and production. Another
element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a broad based consensus over energy
policy at the federal level, despite calls for such a policy that date back to at least the Nixon
administration. These have been superimposed on shifting political trends in other areas, including the
expanding national political divide. After the crest of federal adoption of new environmental
legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative”
and anti- (or anti-“big”) government forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and
property rights movements.
In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of economic and
environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information technology) by
promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local empowerment in others.
Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on the
national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but insufficiently
appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial hydraulic fracturing
technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” reserves of shale and other rocks.
The second and third involve the generation and distribution of electricity: where the authority to site
electricity generating stations is vested, and who has the authority to site transmission lines that move
electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of
consumption. These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the
proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense
tangle.
The judge should be an independent policy analyst.
Their interpretation is incoherent – no one person is the federal government.
Sole decision maker is wrong and kills education
Rabe 8 - Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan (“States on Steroids: The Intergovernmental
Odyssey of American Climate Policy,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 25, Issue 2, March)
Climate change has conventionally been framed as an issue that would be addressed by an international
regime established through negotiation among nation-states. The experience of policy development in
the decade following the signing of the Kyoto Protocol indicates that climate change also needs to be
examined as a challenge of multilevel governance. The increasingly central role of state governments
in American climate policy formation squares with recent experience in other Western democracies
that share authority across governmental levels. This paper examines the American experience,
considering factors that have contributed to a state-centric policy process and using that body of
experience to assess competing strategic choices faced by individual states based on their mix of
emission trends and policy adoption rates. In turn, the collective state experience allows for
consideration of the varied political feasibility of competing climate policy tools that remain under
active review in subnational, national, and international contexts. The paper concludes with a set of
scenarios that explore different ways in which a state-centric system may be integrated with expanding
involvement at the national level. Most scholarly and journalistic analysis presents the odyssey of
climate change policy in the United States as if America was a unitary system of government. This
leads to a familiar tale, whereby the federal government signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, spurned
ratification four years later, and neither the Clinton nor subsequent Bush Administration and respective
Congresses have been able to agree to anything beyond climate research funding and voluntary
reduction programs. At the same time, conventional analysis has assumed that climate policy would
entail bargaining and implementation among nations, culminating in a world climate regime. More than
a decade after the signing of Kyoto, it is increasingly evident that climate policy is proving far messier
than prevailing depictions had anticipated. The Kyoto process is in tatters, attributable not only to
American disengagement but also to an inability of many ratifying nations to honor their commitments.
This is reflected in numerous failures to approach pledged emissions reductions, as in the Canadian and
Japanese cases, or to successfully implement national or multinational policies, as in the stumbles of the
Emissions Trading Scheme in the European Union. There also continues to be enormous uncertainty
about engagement by developing nations, at the very point where China is primed to eclipse the United
States as the world's leading national source of greenhouse gases. But perhaps the biggest single
surprise as climate policy continues to evolve is that in the American case and many others, it is
becoming increasingly evident that climate policy constitutes an issue of federalism or multilevel
governance. As the recent emergence of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as a claimant to
the title of “world leader” in the development of far-reaching climate policy attests, individual units
across different federal or multilevel governance systems may have more in common with one
another in climate policy than they have with the neighboring units of their overall federation. Indeed,
one can see stronger parallels between such jurisdictions as Connecticut and Sweden, Pennsylvania and
Germany, New York and New South Wales, and North Carolina and Ontario than exists across many
members of the same federation. This paper will focus primarily on the American case, considering
more than a decade of state and federal policy experience and attempting to distill lessons that could
guide future policy development. First, it will offer an overview of American subnational policy
development, attempting to provide a review of the tapestry of policies that have been enacted over
the past decade and some of the key factors that have led to such a robust state response in the
absence of federal mandates or incentives. Second, this will lead to a consideration of the divergent
paths taken by the 50 states, reflected in their carbon dioxide emission trends since 1990 and varied
levels of climate policy development. This section will explore the unique contexts facing various states,
particularly the differing strategic considerations for them (and for their representatives in Congress) as
they consider unilateral policy steps or the possibility of federal policy in the 110th Congress and
beyond. Third, the collective state experience offers some possible lessons for future policy
development at either subnational or national levels. In particular, we will see that there appears to be a
nearly inverse relationship between those policies that policy analysts tend to endorse as holding the
greatest promise to reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner and the political feasibility of respective
policy options. These patterns could offer significant lessons for the future of climate policy
development, outlining both challenges and opportunities for future policy whether enacted at the
single-state, multistate, or federal levels. Finally, we look ahead and consider alternative scenarios for
future development of American climate policy, building on recent experience to anticipate possible
next directions (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007).
CP key to neg strategy—prevents small sector affs.
CP is real world---NGA acts together on energy issues
ENN 1 - Environmental News Network (8/17, Governors Want State, Local Input into National Energy
Plans, Lexis)
The governors of the 50 states, 3 territories, and 2 commonwealths have adopted a comprehensive
national energy policy emphasizing conservation.
At the closing session of the 93rd Annual Meeting of the National Governors Association last week in
Providence, R.I., the governors sent a message to the White House that state and local authorities
must have input into the nation's energy plans. "The policy sends a clear message that solving our
nation's energy problems demand more conservation, especially utilizing renewable fuels like ethanol,"
said Iowa Gov. Thomas Vilsack, chairman of the association's Committee on Natural Resources. Ensuring
"environmental quality" comes second in the list of 10 principles.
2NC – AT: Links to Politics
Noone would blame Obama – States acting
States avoid politics
Rabe 7 - Prof of Public Policy-Ford School at Michigan (“Beyond Kyoto: Climate Change Policy in
Multilevel Governance Systems,” Governance, Vol. 20, Issue 3, July)
Those more active states include many that have conventionally been among the most innovative in
environmental and energy policy, particularly those lodged along the respective national coasts, but
they increasingly include a diverse set from other regions such as the Southwest and Midwest (Rabe
2006). Most of the initiatives have been enacted with minimal partisan rancor and have not been
dominated by a single political party. Most of these also appear quite capable of enduring once
partisan control of a state government, including the governorship, changes hands, and have not
proven very controversial to enact or implement. Clearly, state agencies have played a central role in
policy development, building coalitions rather quietly around policies that are tailored around relatively
inexpensive reduction opportunities. This is entirely consistent with a pattern of “bureaucratic
autonomy” and agency-based entrepreneurship that has been established in other American policy
contexts (Carpenter 2001; Mintrom 2002).
These steps have often been linked to early signs of climate change as manifest in a particular state,
thereby framed as a response to a specific environmental problem facing the state. A further source of
bipartisan appeal for these initiatives has been the promise of multiple benefits, whereby agency
advocates demonstrate the potential of a program not only to reduce greenhouse gases but also to
achieve other goals, such as reduction of conventional air pollutants, reduced reliance on imported fossil
fuels, and longer term regulatory predictability to electrical utilities and other regulated entities, as well
as economic development opportunities (Rabe 2004). Hence, a considerable part of the appeal of statebased climate policy initiatives has been the simultaneous pursuit of environmental protection and
potential contribution to economic growth or stability. Indeed, much of this comports with Eugene
Bardach's definition of smart practice: “What makes a practice smart is that the method also involves
taking advantage of some latent opportunity for creating value on the cheap” (Bardach 1998, 36). In
contrast, climate policy initiatives, whether or not they meet the definition of smart practices, are simply
much harder to find at the Canadian provincial level. Only one of the 10 provinces, Manitoba, begins to
approach the 15 most active American states in terms of the breadth and rigor of its greenhouse gas
reduction strategy. Instead, most provinces remain focused on preliminary study of the issue and
consideration of alternative policies that might be established at some future point. Among the three or
four more active provinces, climate policy is almost exclusively confined to nonbinding “goals” and
voluntary efforts. Any regulatory provisions, or exact rules to guide reduction, are focused narrowly on
provincially funded activity, such as a mandate in Alberta to purchase a set of hybrid vehicles for
government use. Fifteen years after Rio and nearly a decade after the signing of Kyoto, it remains very
difficult to discern much of a pulse on serious climate policy development in most provinces, quite
contrary to the experience of a growing and diverse set of American states. American state engagement
on climate policy may be every bit as surprising as Canadian provincial disengagement. Given
conventional depictions of the United States as a North American climate policy laggard and Canada as a
devoted adherent to Kyoto, why are so many—and such diverse—states apparently taking the lead in
devising policies to reduce greenhouse gases? Why do the American states offer an increasingly large
and robust set of policy initiatives where there is no evidence of a comparable trend in Canada?
Subsequent discussion will explore three distinct factors that emerged through the comparative case
analysis to explain this variability. Differing Intergovernmental Context The divergent paths of the
respective federal governments on Kyoto served to create very distinct contexts for states and provinces
to consider their own policy development options. These differing contexts were clearly unintended byproducts of the very different ways in which the debate over Kyoto, involving both those steps leading
toward final negotiations and consideration of possible ratification, played out in Washington and
Ottawa. In turn, they illustrate the very differing roles that subnational units—states and provinces—
played in these processes, with attendant impacts on their own involvement in climate policy
development. A hallmark of the American federal government through the two Clinton administrations
and the second Bush presidency has been a consistent inability to reach agreement on legislation
related to environmental protection, energy, and other areas vitally important to climate change.
During this period, every possible partisan configuration within the American two-party system has
existed for at least some period of time and yet a consistent outcome has been lack of domestic policy
consensus, even in terms of needed updating of established legislation such as air quality (Binder 2003).
This divide is equally evident in the international climate realm, as the Clinton administration agreed to
Kyoto in December 1997 even though a number of its key provisions directly contradicted a Senate
resolution that passed by a 95–0 vote six months earlier. A few states sent representatives to Kyoto and
earlier rounds of negotiation but they were not formally consulted either in developing the treaty or in
examining ways in which the Senate might be persuaded to ratify it. Instead, Kyoto was widely
recognized through the remaining three years of the Clinton administration as doomed politically, so
much so that the administration never submitted it to the Senate for ratification nor actively developed
a strategy seeking ratification. In many respects, the 2001 actions by the Bush administration were
anticlimactic and neither the 2000 nor 2004 Democratic presidential nominees offered any blueprint for
jump-starting Kyoto. In many respects, Kyoto was politically “dead on arrival” but nonetheless attracted
tremendous division and controversy in Washington during subsequent years. As states were essentially
excluded from this process, they had a relatively quiet decade in which to think about climate change, in
terms of both how it might affect them in distinct ways and how they might fashion their own policies to
reduce greenhouse gases and simultaneously promote economic development. In some instances,
states have clearly responded to a perception that climate change poses serious threats to their
residents—such as sea-level rise in coastal states and severe droughts in agricultural states—and that
there is a significant environmental need to craft responsive policies as soon as possible. But these
responses have also been coupled with efforts to design policy that “fits” the economic and political
realities of a particular state. These are intended to minimize any economic disruptions that might occur
during implementation and to take maximum advantage of economic development opportunities that
may stem from early action on climate change. What has been missing in these state policy processes is
the kind of anguished, often moralistic, rhetoric that has polarized national debate and made any
semblance of consensus at that level so elusive. Instead, state policy deliberations over climate change
have benefited from a kind of “political cover” provided by the widely held presumption that states
lacked the incentives, resources, or authority necessary to play any serious role. Many states used this
extended period to reflect seriously about the issue of climate change and how they might begin to
respond to it. Many began with symbolic initiatives and analytical exercises, gradually moving toward
policy development as ideas converged and opportunities arose. At various points, these efforts took
institutional form, such as creation of a cross-agency task force or designation of a unit with a lead role
in policy development. All of this continued apace, receiving surprisingly little attention from
environmental groups, the media, or federal policymakers, while the latter continued to dominate
public attention by thrashing over the details of Kyoto and its aftermath. This served to give state
officials considerable time to contemplate climate policy options, including the forging of policies that
made considerable political, economic, and environmental sense for them to pursue unilaterally, with
the reasonable expectation that no federal action of any consequence was in the offing.
2NC – Perm
2NC – AT: Perm do both
Links to politics – includes immediate federal action. Perm doesn’t shield: state support is
slow. Delay means it won’t take effect until after the vote.
Perm causes overlap – guts resources, causes waste – shortcircuits solvency.
Wagle 95. [Susan, former Speaker Pro-Tempore, House of Reps (Kansas), “TESTIMONY March 29, 1995 SUSAN WAGLE SPEAKER PROTEMPORE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, KANSAS HOUSE BUDGET REGULATORY REVISION & FEDERALISM” FDCHC Testimony – March 29 -- lexis]
There is a similar problem with funded mandates. Like unfunded mandates, funded mandates distort the State and local government
prioritization process, diluting the power of State and local voters. Even funded mandates are costly, though their primary cost is not measured
in dollars. It is, rather, measured by the extent to which they make it more difficult for the people to impose their will upon government. It is
this problem of remote government that contributed so significantly to the electoral reversals of 1994, and it is remote government that has
generated this historical constitutional debate. The lines of governmental authority have become blurred, in large measure, because of federal
mandates. Overlapping
Federal and State powers have led to massive duplication, waste, and even
abuse. Moreover, where authorities overlap unnecessarily, it is more difficult for people to assign
responsibility for the failures of government. This encourages government that is less responsive to the people
in direct violation of the most basic principles of American democracy.
Perm pre-empts state action – jacks innovation.
Shobe and Burtraw ’12. [William M. Shobe, Director, Center for Economic and Policy Studies Weldon Cooper Center for Public Service
Professor of Public Policy, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, Dallas Burtraw, PhD in Economics from University of Michigan,
Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future, “Rethinking Environmental Federalism in a Warming World,” http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFFDP-12-04.pdf]
A third view is historical. Our scientific understanding of climate change is rapidly unfolding, and a social consensus on how to respond is far
from mature. This is analogous to early periods in other historical social movements. When
the national government acts, and
preempts state and local governments from acting, it removes from the bubbling policy caldron the
development of ideas that work their way through subnational political decisionmaking. 24 In other words, subnational
activity is not just about innovation in policy design, but also about the development of a national
consensus. The political process at the subnational level may be very important to that process as climate science continues to develop.
The history of RGGI clearly indicates that the organization of the regional program was at least partly
intended to act as a spur to national climate legislation. So, state and local actions to address climate
change may have as part of their local justification the purpose of signaling a willingness to cooperate in the
formation of a national climate policy. Preempting local actions would interfere with this signaling.
when it
-- Federalism DA 2 Do both
State and federal power is zero-sum – perm tanks federalism.
Nell 92 (Roger, United States Army Judge Advocate, Stetson Law Review, XXI, p. 4904)
Inherent equality of state and federal governments creates a zero sum power struggle. The universe
of power is finite and that universe is divided between the state and the national governments. Any increase in national power (for example, extending the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions) results in an equal reduction in state power. Dual federalism thus shuns any
cooperation between the two sovereigns because it would necessitate a decrease in state power.
2NC – AT: Cooperation Perm
First -- it’s intrinsic – no element of the counterplan involves cooperation –
intrinsicness is a voter because it explodes aff ground gutting neg strategy and
predictability which is key to clash and education.
Second – cooperation fails – only the cp alone solves.
The Standard 1. (The Weekly Standard 01/29/2001
Diversity among states enables us to manage our differences -- on economic and especially on social issues -in a sensible manner. The regulatory packages offered by Maryland and Virginia differ a great deal, as do those offered by New York and New Jersey. Those differences matter both to citizens and to
. Competition for productive citizens will discipline state governments
just as market competition disciplines private producers. State governments will be more responsible and responsive to citizens' preferences not because
businesses, which will sort themselves into jurisdictions to their liking
they are "closer to the people" (they are as interest-group ridden as the federal government, maybe more so), but because there are 50 of them. Unlike the monopolistic federal government, states will respond to the threat of
losing their residents. If you doubt it, imagine how high state sales and income taxes would be if citizens couldn't choose to shop and work elsewhere. A competitive federalism means, first, that conservatives must stop worrying
the federal government's power. So long as that power is taken to be unlimited, Washington will remain free to wipe
out diversity and competition among the states, and the Tenth Amendment -- which merely reserves to the states or the people all powers not granted to the federal
about "states' rights" and instead start worrying about
government -- will remain empty. Second, conservatives must stop obsessing over the states' complaints about federal "unfunded mandates" and instead focus on the far larger problem of oppressive federal-state cooperation.
State and local governments rarely cooperate with the federal government because they are compelled to do so; far more often, they sell their regulatory autonomy, in areas ranging from education to the environment to, more
As the Supreme Court has observed on numerous occasions, federal-state
cooperation obscures political accountability and responsibility, thus encouraging policy disasters .
When things go awry, state and local officials blame federal regulators and a "lack of adequate funding";
recently, crime control, for a handful of federal dollars.
federal regulators and legislators blame irresponsible state officials. In a world flattened by cooperative
policies, citizens can neither identify the culprits, nor throw them out of office, nor even escape to more
hospitable states. More federal money and less federal regulation -- "block grants" and "devolution," in political parlance -- provide no cure. Just as much as
) divides responsibility and obscures accountability.
an unfunded mandate, a funded non-mandate (that is, a block grant
2NC – AT: Perm Do the CP
Clearly severs the agent –
They have to defend only federal action
Webster’s 76 (New International Dictionary Unabridged, p. 883)
Federal government. Of or relating to the
central government of a nation, having the character of a federation as distinguished
from the governments of the constituent unites (as states or provinces).
Voting issue – stable agent is the locus of all ground
2NC – Offshore Wind
2NC - Top shelf
State offshore wind push sends a signal that revitalizes the industry
Gordon 12. [VP for Energy Policy at American Progress, April, Taking Action on Clean Energy and Climate Protection in 2012 -http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/energy_solutions.pdf]
Expedite permitting processes for offshore wind development in state waters Why it matters: Offshore wind is a
commercially scalable source of renewable energy. Some of the best wind resources in the world exist in close proximity to some of the most
In Maine, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and
Maryland, legislatures and governors are eager to tap into this resource for its potential clean energy
contribution and the opportunity to establish a beachhead in their state for an industry with the
potential to create hundreds of thousands of jobs, according to “Untapped Wealth: Offshore Wind Can Deliver Cleaner,
More Affordable Energy and More Jobs Than Offshore Oil,” a 2010 study by the ocean protection nonprofit organization Oceana. States
only control ocean space out to three miles from their shoreline, which limits the potential size of wind
farms in state waters. Yet the immense value of these installations as pilot projects is compounded by
the relative ease of permitting—taking the federal government out of the process eliminates
numerous hurdles. A concerted push from a state government to expedite its permitting process will
allow that state to stake an early claim to “first in the nation” status for a demonstration project and
provide a launching pad for a renewable energy industry with tremendous economic promise.
densely populated regions in America, such as the northeast and Mid-Atlantic.
Coordinated state level support solves alone
Mausolf, 12 (JD-Detroit Mercy School of Law, Clearing the Regulatory Hurdles and Promoting Offshore Wind Development in Michigan,
Winter, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 223)
While there is certainly opposition to the normative position that building offshore wind turbines is beneficial, this Note takes the position that
offshore wind development should be encouraged. n22 Part I explains [*227] why Michigan
should support wind
development in the Great Lakes. Part II explains why offshore wind farms are currently not a realistic possibility in the State of
Michigan: first, Michigan has no siting process for leasing lands to wind farm developers; second, there is confusion
over the federal regulatory process. Part II also explores how other states have been more successful in their
development of a regulatory process. Further, Part III discusses possible solutions to Michigan's regulatory problems. Specifically,
Michigan should adopt legislative and regulatory policies that signal to developers that the State is
committed to offshore wind development. To do this, the State should pass legislation that governs
offshore wind and tailor its Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS") so that it requires at least some of the energy used by
companies to come from offshore wind.
State law preempts federal action on offshore wind—submerged lands subject to
essentially no limitations on state control
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
The Cape Wind project illustrates how state regulation of submerged lands is a critical component of
the current regulatory regime that controls the siting of offshore wind energy facilities. To build the
submarine cable to connect the proposed turbines in federal waters in Nantucket Sound to the
electricity grid on Cape Cod, the sponsor has sought a state Chapter 91 Waterways License, the state's
primary tool for regulating private development on submerged lands. n44 Apparently to subject the
project to the most rigorous state review possible, the Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs
has taken the position that the proposed submarine cables represent "nonwater- [*385] dependent
uses." n45 The state issues licenses for "nonwater dependent uses" only if they meet a strict
"overriding public interest" standard. n46 Cape Wind has vigorously objected to the state's position,
and the state has not yet made a decision on the application. n47
Legislative proposals also illustrate the potential for aggressive state action to shape the deployment
of offshore wind energy facilities through the control of submerged lands. In Massachusetts, Governor
Mitt Romney has proposed major changes in the way the state would manage submerged lands, and
the Governor's proposal includes a policy on offshore wind energy. n48 Part of the so-called
"Massachusetts Ocean Management Initiative," the legislation would require the Secretary of
Environmental Affairs to promulgate a binding ocean use management plan for areas between the low
water mark and seaward boundary of the commonwealth, including submerged lands. n49 With the
exception of certain exempted activities, the legislation would prohibit construction on submerged
lands unless the activity is consistent with the ocean use management plan. n50 Notably, the
legislation would allow the ocean use management plan to permit construction of offshore "renewable
energy facilities" but not in the Cape Cod ocean sanctuary, which generally includes submerged lands off
of the coast of outer Cape Cod but does not include the location proposed for Cape Wind. n51
Legislation explicitly focused on offshore wind energy also has been proposed in New Jersey, with one
proposal requiring the State Department of Environmental Protection to adopt regulations for the siting
of offshore wind energy facilities that minimize environmental impacts. n52 The proposal would
prohibit the grant of any state permits before such regulations have been adopted. n53 A [*386]
competing proposal would impose a seven year moratorium on the construction of wind turbines in
New Jersey coastal waters. n54
The power of states to restrict facility siting through their control of submerged lands appears subject
to relatively few limitations . In particular, state ownership of submerged lands and the public trust
doctrine reflect separate "background principles" of property law that likely would bar most
regulatory takings claims brought by project sponsors. n55 Furthermore, in contrast to other types of
public lands, governments have not managed submerged lands to favor private development and
exploitation; instead, they have been viewed as public trust resources with private development
opportunities constrained by the need protect the public's rights. n56 If anything, legislative initiatives
that favor development, not those that restrict it, may be subject to challenge under state-specific
conceptions of the public trust doctrine. n57
The CP results in the plan—approved state action influences the federal government
to act.
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
Despite the federal government's retained authority over submerged lands and the outer continental shelf,
Congress empowered states to influence federal agency actions like the issuance of RHA permits or Section 388
leases, easements, and rights-of-way through the federal consistency review process set forth in the CZMA. n72 Described by the
National Oceanic and [*389] Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") as a "limited waiver of federal supremacy and authority,"
n73 federal consistency review requires federal agencies to act in manner consistent with "enforceable
policies" contained in "coastal management programs" prepared by states and approved by the Secretary of Commerce.
n74 "Enforceable policies" include "state policies which are legally binding through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans,
ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions, by which a State exerts control over private and public land and water uses and natural
resources in the coastal zone." n75 In other words, once
a state's coastal management program has been approved,
federal agencies must comply
management program.
- at least to a point - with
the enforceable policies included in that coastal
2NC – Solvo
States empirically better—taking the lead now and various technological limitations
places offshore wind squarely in their regime
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University Environmental Law Journal, 14
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
In addition to Congress, state
governments have responded to the potential of offshore wind energy development,
and these state actions set the stage for the premise of this Note: when designing the regulatory regime to weigh competing
environmental values implicated by offshore wind energy projects, decisions must be made about how to divide regulatory authority between
the federal government and the states. Recent
state regulatory actions are particularly important for offshore wind
to transmit power to the electricity grid, facilities inevitably will include submarine
transmission cables running to the mainland that pass through submerged lands subject to state control. n16 Furthermore,
existing marine foundation technologies currently restrict development to relatively shallow locations near
the coastline, raising the potential for states to exert influence over federal decisions to issue permits or
property interests needed to develop facilities. n17 Examples of recent state regulatory actions include proposed legislation in
Massachusetts that would dramatically restructure the regulatory regime for offshore areas under state control,
and a New Jersey executive order that imposes a moratorium on state approval of offshore wind energy
facilities and establishes an expert panel to make policy recommendations on how the State should regulate offshore wind energy. n18 In
addition to regulatory initiatives, New York has taken a more direct role in project development through the Long
Island Power [*379] Authority's ("LIPA") support of the "Long Island Offshore Wind Park," a facility proposed for south
energy because
of Jones Beach Island. LIPA did the initial technical work and public outreach to select a suitable location, solicited proposals from developers,
and intends to purchase power from the facility pursuant to a long-term contract. n19 LIPA and FPL Energy (a leading owner of land-based
wind energy projects) recently submitted
build the facility. n20
a joint permit application to the Army Corps of Engineers for permission to
2NC – Solvo Reg Uncertainty
Lack of state action causes regulatory uncertainty—scares away investors
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
It is not clear how NOAA would rule in a consistency dispute concerning federal license or permit activities for an
offshore wind energy facility. The Department of Commerce issued only one decision under the regulations promulgated in 2000, and
NOAA just issued changes to the federal consistency regulations. n107 In the single decision made under the 2000 regulations,
the Secretary found that the development of any "coastal dependent energy facility" would (pursuant to
its regulations) further the national interest in a significant or substantial manner, with "coastal dependence" depending on
whether locating the facility "in or near the coastal zone is required to achieve the primary goal of the project in question." n108 This goalsbased assessment of coastal dependence infuses discretion and therefore regulatory uncertainty [*395] into
these administrative reviews. If the Secretary views the primary goal of a project broadly (e.g., power generation for wholesale),
then that project may not qualify as a coastal dependent energy facility. On the other hand, if the Secretary takes a
narrower view on the goal of a project (e.g., to harness offshore wind resources to generate power), then that project may
qualify as a coastal dependent energy facility. What is clear, however, is that federal consistency review
provides states with opportunities to stop or at least delay the issuance of federal authorizations for offshore
wind energy facilities like those required under the RHA and Section 388 of the EPAct of 2005. By objecting to sponsor
certifications that a project is consistent with a state's enforceable policies, states can force sponsors into a largely
untested adjudicatory process within the Department of Commerce where the regulations appear to give the agency
considerable discretion in decision-making. Furthermore, these agency decisions are subject to judicial review, which provides states
with an additional chance to prevent or delay federal authorizations.
2NC – Solvo - RPS/Tax Credit
The 50 states should create a uniform permitting process for offshore wind
production, include offshore wind energy production as a qualifying energy in existing
Renewable Portfolio Standards, and provide a long term investment tax credit for
offshore wind development in the United States.
State offshore wind push sends a signal that revitalizes the industry
Gordon 12 - VP for Energy Policy at American Progress, April, Taking Action on Clean Energy and
Climate Protection in 2012
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/energy_solutions.pdf)
Expedite permitting processes for offshore wind development in state waters Why it matters: Offshore
wind is a commercially scalable source of renewable energy. Some of the best wind resources in the
world exist in close proximity to some of the most densely populated regions in America, such as the
northeast and Mid-Atlantic. In Maine, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Maryland, legislatures and
governors are eager to tap into this resource for its potential clean energy contribution and the
opportunity to establish a beachhead in their state for an industry with the potential to create
hundreds of thousands of jobs, according to “Untapped Wealth: Offshore Wind Can Deliver Cleaner,
More Affordable Energy and More Jobs Than Offshore Oil,” a 2010 study by the ocean protection
nonprofit organization Oceana. States only control ocean space out to three miles from their shoreline,
which limits the potential size of wind farms in state waters. Yet the immense value of these
installations as pilot projects is compounded by the relative ease of permitting—taking the federal
government out of the process eliminates numerous hurdles. A concerted push from a state
government to expedite its permitting process will allow that state to stake an early claim to “first in
the nation” status for a demonstration project and provide a launching pad for a renewable energy
industry with tremendous economic promise.
Coordinated state level support solves alone
Mausolf 12 - JD-Detroit Mercy School of Law (Clearing the Regulatory Hurdles and Promoting
Offshore Wind Development in Michigan, Winter, 89 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 223)
While there is certainly opposition to the normative position that building offshore wind turbines is
beneficial, this Note takes the position that offshore wind development should be encouraged. n22 Part
I explains [*227] why Michigan should support wind development in the Great Lakes. Part II explains
why offshore wind farms are currently not a realistic possibility in the State of Michigan: first, Michigan
has no siting process for leasing lands to wind farm developers; second, there is confusion over the
federal regulatory process. Part II also explores how other states have been more successful in their
development of a regulatory process. Further, Part III discusses possible solutions to Michigan's
regulatory problems. Specifically, Michigan should adopt legislative and regulatory policies that signal
to developers that the State is committed to offshore wind development. To do this, the State should
pass legislation that governs offshore wind and tailor its Renewable Portfolio Standard ("RPS") so that
it requires at least some of the energy used by companies to come from offshore wind.
2NC – Solvo Warming
States are far more effective at offshore wind
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
States generally have demonstrated an ability to consider horizontal spillovers in their policies
towards offshore wind energy that cuts against calls for federal legislative action at this time. New
York has taken the particularly aggressive step of actively participating in the development process of
the Long Island Offshore Wind Farm, and notwithstanding the controversy surrounding Cape Wind, legislative proposals
in Massachusetts leave open the possibility of development of offshore wind energy [*418] facilities in
state waters. n186 New Jersey's approach, which has included a temporary moratorium on development, raises concerns, but final
judgment must be reserved until the state's Blue Ribbon Panel on Development of Wind Turbine Facilities in Coastal Waters has issued its final
recommendations and the political branches have responded. n187 Furthermore, the
general posture of state and federal
climate change policies does not indicate that coordination problems dissuade state action on climate
change generally. n188 On the contrary, if anything the states poised to host offshore wind energy facilities in
the near future have been more aggressive than the federal government in attempts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. n189
2NC – AT: Perm
State initiative must come first—perm makes it impossible for private investors to get
a foothold
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
Once a state has an approved coastal management program, federal consistency review plays out in the
context of specific federal agency actions, including decisions on individual applications for federal
licenses or permits. As part of federal license or permit applications, project sponsors need to certify
that the project is consistent with the state's enforceable policies and furnish data, information, and a
set of findings demonstrating that the certification is accurate. n92 The CZMA requires that before the
federal agency issues the license or permit, the state must affirm the applicant's certification that the
proposed actions are consistent with the state's enforceable policies. n93 The substance of the state's
review depends on the particular enforceable policies included in its management program. n94 In the
event that a state objects to a sponsor's consistency certification, the state must describe why the
proposed activity is inconsistent with its specific enforceable policies or, alternatively, why the
information provided by the applicant is insufficient. n95 Commentators have noted that private
sponsors face a nearly impossible task in demonstrating consistency with the enforceable policies of
coastal management programs, because state enforceable policies, reflecting the conflicting policies of
the CZMA to both preserve and develop coastal zones, often clash with one another. n96
State law influences and controls federal action on offshore wind—perm would be
blocked by state governments
Eberhart ‘6 [Robert, MFS Harvard, JD Candidate and Senior Notes Editor, NYU, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 374, FEDERALISM AND THE SITING OF OFFSHORE WIND
ENERGY FACILITIES, lexis]
In addition to the control of submerged lands, states also have the ability to influence federal
permitting activities , including those authorizing the construction of wind turbines and other facility
components on near-shore portions of the outer continental shelf. This authority derives principally
from the consistency review process under the CZMA. n58 Although the scope of state control under the
CZMA is less expansive than that pertaining to submerged lands, consistency review appears to give
states significant opportunities to stop or delay the issuance of federal approvals needed for offshore
wind energy projects, including Section 388 property interests.
2NC – AT: Shore Jurisdiction
Turbines outside state control still have to run cables through state land—makes
regulatory regime essentially equivalent
Firestone et al ‘5 (College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware, REGULATING OFFSHORE WIND
POWER AND AQUACULTURE: MESSAGES FROM LAND AND SEA, CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY, Vol. 14:7)
Finally, although a comprehensive analysis of state laws is beyond the scope of the article, we do wish to
draw some attention to the issue of regulation pursuant to state law because various state laws could
apply even when marine aquaculture facilities or wind farms are located outside state jurisdictional
waters. For example, in the marine aquaculture context, states may require a permit to transport live
fish through state jurisdictional waters.46 States’ roles are likely to be even more central in the wind
power context because in any instance where a developer proposes to transmit electrical power
generated at sea to land, the developer will also need approval from the state to place transmission
cables on the submerged lands that are under its jurisdiction.47
2NC – Offshore Solar
2NC – Solvo
Comprehensive state action key – federal alone fails.
-
Incentives, net metering, interconnection combo key.
Ross and Hendricks 8. [JP, MA in Energy and Resources @ UC Berkeley, VP of Strategic Relationships @ Sungevity Inc., Bracken,
Project Manager @ CAP, “Developing State Solar Photovoltaic Markets” Center for American Progress -- January 30 -http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/solar_report.html]
Yet federal
action is not enough. Energy policy is largely determined at the state level through state and local
laws and utility regulation. States must therefore take the lead to ensure that incentives are properly
structured to keeps costs declining while regulatory processes become more easily navigable by businesses and consumers. Solar photovoltaics must rival
power from the utility grid in both cost and accessibility in order to make solar power appealing to consumers. Four policies are central to ensuring the wide-scale
deployment of solar energy: Financial incentives: Financial
incentives for solar power, sustained over five to 10 years at a
declining rate, ensure market stability and cost reductions, and will build a state-based industry by
stimulating customer investment. Interconnection standards: Solar PV customers must be able to connect to the utility grid without undue delay
and expense. If the process is lengthy or difficult, it will dissuade many consumers. Net metering: Net metering ensures that consumers are
equipped with PV systems that meet their energy needs while crediting customers for all the energy they
generate. Rate design: Utilities should charge consumers fairly for the electricity they consume and make the same rate choices available to solar customers
that are available to other customers. This report highlights model policies and case studies of four
states that have effectively developed
thriving solar markets. These models provide guidance to states looking to boost their economies by
developing a strong solar industry and show that stronger energy independence through solar power is achievable for every state. These
successes will provide essential lessons in shaping a bold national solar policy. Why Solar Over 70 percent of our
electricity in the United States is generated from fossil fuels, a finite resource that emits greenhouse gases and other pollution. We must transition to domestic,
clean, renewable sources of energy in order to avoid a climate crisis and reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and foreign sources of energy. Solar photovoltaics,
which convert light from the sun into electricity, are a mature technology with the potential to play a large part of the solution. The benefits of PV are clear: it
provides zero-emission electricity at peak times when energy grids are strained and is a proven, reliable technology with warranties for 20 years. It also improves
national security and strengthens the utility grid by delivering energy to American rooftops every day, and it creates economic security by creating more jobs than
any other energy technology. Solar energy can play a central role in improving our energy independence and making the transition to a renewable energy economy.
The sooner we begin, the sooner we can reap the benefits. The cost of solar PV has declined sharply over recent years as the technology has matured and
manufacturing volumes in the solar industry have grown. Every time production has doubled, manufacturing costs have fallen by approximately 20 percent. Solar PV
will be competitive with grid power (Figure 1); the only question is when. The federal government has recently initiated programs to increase the use of solar energy
across the country. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a 30 percent Investment Tax Credit for solar power systems that expires at the end of 2008. The Securing
Energy Independence Act of 2007 would extend the credits through the end of 2016, but these measures alone are not sufficient. Most energy policy is set at the
state action is necessary to clear the regulatory hurdles that stand in the way of wide-scale
deployment of solar energy and provide incentives to spur development of solar markets . The solar industry had global
state level, so
gross revenues of $19 billion in 2006 and is projected to grow to $70 billion in 2010.2 This growth means new jobs, a stronger economy, and increased energy
independence for states that establish the right market conditions to ride this wave. Many
states are already taking action to create
conditions that will allow solar energy projects to flourish.
Comprehensive state approach solves the aff and spurs follow-on.
Ross and Hendricks 8. [JP, MA in Energy and Resources @ UC Berkeley, VP of Strategic Relationships @ Sungevity Inc., Bracken,
Project Manager @ CAP, “Developing State Solar Photovoltaic Markets” Center for American Progress -- January 30 -http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/01/solar_report.html]
States that provide financial incentives for investing in solar power and eliminate regulatory barriers for doing so are realizing the benefits of
increasing consum- ers’ access to clean, renewable distributed generation that provides energy when and where it is needed most. This
forward-thinking state leadership in solar energy pol- icy and investment is causing a boom in new solar
markets and driving investment and innovation in a technology that will increase our energy
independence while strength- ening the economy, reducing pollution, and diminishing the threat of global warming. While no single
policy or program is sufficient in isolation, the trailblazing policies of California, New Jersey, and
Colorado highlighted in this report together create the conditions for a robust, self-sufficient solar market and
can serve as models for other states to follow. Timely state and federal leadership will be necessary to achieve a full-scale
transition to clean energy. Since most energy policy is determined at the state level,
state leader- ship is essential to establish
the market conditions for solar energy to thrive.
In addition state
solar successes will inform federal
policy , moving the nation to develop a bold and integrated strategy to transition to a domestic, robust, and secure
energy system based on clean, abundant energy like solar power.
Solves market creation.
Kubert and Sinclair 11. [Charles, Sr. Business Specialist with the Environmental Law & Policy Center, Mark, Executive Director of
Clean Energy States Alliance and Vice President of Clean Energy Group, “State support for clean energy deployment: Lessons learned for
potential future policy” National Renewable Energy Laboratory -- April]
Market Growth: State and utility RE
incentive programs are playing an important market- building role for RE
technologies in the United States, in particular for solar PV. First, over 85% of the installed solar PV is in states
with public benefit funds, and almost all of the remainder is in states with utility incentive programs
(Wiser et al. 2009). Second, the installed cost of solar PV systems has been showing steady declines of about $0.30/watt/year and in 2008
averaged $7.50/watt (Wiser et al. 2009) with further declines in 2009 due to the reduced cost of solar PV panels globally. The
lowest
installed costs are in states with the most comprehensive and well- funded solar incentive programs,
such as California and New Jersey. State programs are leading to a reduction in installation costs by stimulating
the growth of a competitive dealer and installer market.
2NC – Ocean Exploration
2NC – Solvo
Alaska proves states can explore the oceans – sufficiency framing is best
Roberson 13 - directs Ocean Conservancy’s ocean acidification program ( Why Exploring the Ocean is
More than Cool, it’s Vital¶ Posted On June 11, 2013 by Julia Roberson
http://blog.oceanconservancy.org/2013/06/11/why-exploring-the-ocean-is-more-than-cool-its-vital/)
Later today filmmaker and ocean explorer James Cameron will be headlining a hearing in the Senate
Commerce Committee about the importance of funding ocean science and exploration. Also on
display outside the hearing is the Deepsea Challenger, the submersible Cameron piloted in a historic
solo dive to the Challenger Deep in the Marianas Trench.
Fantastic voyages like the one taken by James Cameron are truly inspiring for the sheer physical
accomplishment. But they are also a stark reminder of how little we still know and understand about
the ocean. In a world where the chemistry of the ocean is now changing faster than life can adapt, it’s
vitally important that we learn as much as we can about the ocean to better prepare for the future.
The knowledge gained through these inspiring feats of marine exploration must be used to drive
meaningful policy. Today’s hearing is exactly the kind of follow-through that is needed. Blockbuster
expeditions like that taken by the Deepsea Challenger are few and far between, but basic research
and monitoring of the ocean should be happening every day.
The Senate hearing today will focus on key issues, like how the government could fund more research
on critical topics like ocean acidification, or on globally important areas like the Arctic Ocean.
Ocean acidification happens when significant amounts of carbon dioxide pollution are absorbed by the
ocean. A chemical reaction is occurring in our oceans right now as our carbon emissions increase,
making the water more acidic, thus making it harder for some sea creatures to thrive.
Last year Washington State established a panel to develop recommendations for how the state should
address ocean acidification. Its oyster industry nearly went bankrupt because of the problem, and
they’re worried about other impacts to species, such as salmon and crab. The panel is providing some
money for research but a great deal more is needed to address this challenge. We are just beginning to
understand the effects ocean acidification in fragile ecosystems like the Arctic. Other states like
California and Maine are beginning to express concerns about ocean acidification as well. Just
yesterday Maine’s legislature announced a resolution identifying ocean acidification as jeopardizing
their coastal economy.
On the federal level we are fortunate to have the Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring
Act of 2009. That Act was designed to help coordinate and promote research across the country, but
right now it is far from being funded at levels that are equal to this massive challenge.
Some non-governmental organizations are responding to the need - the X-Prize foundation is
developing a prize for improvements in ocean acidification sensors, but federal funding is still a critical
need for scientists working on acidification and businesses impacted by it.
Separate from the challenge of acidification, temperatures in the Arctic are warming at twice the rate
of the global average, seasonal sea ice is diminishing rapidly, and there is increased interest in oil
exploration, commercial fishing, shipping, and tourism in the region. Senator Begich of Alaska has
introduced legislation that acknowledges that lack of integration and coordination among existing
Arctic research and science programs has limited our ability to understand the important changes that
are taking place in the Arctic. Our understanding of the Arctic marine ecosystem, which provides
irreplaceable benefits, is further hampered by a lack of reliable baseline data, critical science gaps, and
limited documentation and application and use of traditional knowledge. In addition to urgently-needed
baseline data and analysis of ecosystem functions in Arctic marine waters, Senator Begich’s legislation
would enable the gathering of information about subsistence resources and patterns of use in local
economies, which are essential to the people and cultures coastal communities in the Arctic.
The kind of broad, steady monitoring of the ocean’s health may not be as spectacular as recordbreaking dives to the deepest, darkest sea floor, but the knowledge we can gain and the benefits we
can reap from a healthy ocean are certainly no less valuable.
Maine Proves
Davies 2007 - University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2008 (Lynne D. Davies “ REVISING THE
NATIONAL OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE ACT OF 2007: USING STATE OF MAINE AQUACULTURE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AS A PROTOTYPE FOR THE PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK”2007 Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School of Law ¶ Ocean and Coastal Law
Journal¶ 2007¶ 13 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 95)
Maine's Department of Marine Resources (DMR) is responsible for overseeing and implementing
regulations relating to the state's finfish and shellfish aquaculture industries, n94 and generally serves
as the primary state agency that assists Maine's fishing community. n95 Exclusive authority to
implement DMR laws and regulations is vested in the Commissioner, who, in regard to the
aquaculture industry, has the power to grant leases and licenses upon review of submitted
applications. n96 Leases provide a facility operator with a greater proprietary interest in the coastal
waters. In contrast, temporary licenses are issued to entrepreneurs entering the industry who are
experimenting with various farmed species and locations. In addition, the Commissioner also has
exclusive authority to establish conditions for [*111] compatible use of each lease site, n97 as well as
to implement and sponsor programs for research, development, and marketing techniques. n98
2NC – Offshore Oil
2NC – Solvo
Devolution of offshore drilling authority solves.
Dunlop 5. [Becky Norton, senior management team of The Heritage Foundation as Vice President for External Relations, "Improve the
Environment... Leave it to the States... and the People" Heritage Foundation -- April 20 -- www.heritage.org/about/speeches/improve-theenvironment-leave-it-to-the-states-and-the-people]
What can Congress do to more effectively deal with some of the remaining environmental challenges ?
To begin with, Congress needs to turn even more authority over to the states as they begin revising the Endangered
Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Congressmen and women should look for ways to give states incentives to be excellent
and wise managers of our natural resources. One particular piece of legislation of note could
improve America’s access to its
own oil resources – Seacor[7]. The idea of Seacor is to give coastal states the authority to approve off-shore
drilling out to the 200-mile limit, which is the point where America has control of the ocean and ocean bottom. There are enough
oil and gas resources in that area of the United States to make America energy independent. We have improved and sophisticated ways of
extracting oil and gas from environmentally sensitive areas in cost-effective ways. The
goal of this legislation is to pass on royalties
from oil and gas production to the states to be invested in environmental improvements. It could pay the
bill for the Everglades restoration plan, for example. Of course, a portion of the revenue generated needs to come to inland states, as well,
because off-shore resources within the 200 mile limit belong to all Americans. Seacor is an innovative way of thinking. It uses the best new
technologies available today. It
ensures that the states are overseeing the exploration so they can be satisfied
that it is being done in a manner that is compatible with the desires of their citizens. A portion of the value of
the extracted resources then can be used to improve the environment of each state as its representatives see fit. In closing, I would like to
mention a report that the American Enterprise Institute and the Pacific Research Institute publish annually, The Index of Leading Environmental
Indicators.[8] The most recent Index was released in late April 2005. The report catalogues continuing improvements in environmental quality
in the United States of America. If you take the time to look it over, you will be impressed with the progress shown. Hopefully, you also will be
inspired to do more to make certain that America continues to enjoy economic growth and environmental improvements. The United States
leads the rest of the world economically and environmentally. We offer opportunities for the rest of the world. We have demonstrated that a
wealthier society is a healthier society -- a society that is good for the environment and good for the people. We should be upbeat but we
should also look for ways to continue this record of economic growth and environmental
improvement. In my view, this can best be accomplished by leaving environmental policy to the state
2NC – State demonstrations Prove
New yorks proves development for oil can be done by the states
MarineLog 2014 - largest circulation and most popular B to B marine magazines in the world (
Simmons-Boardman Publishing Inc.New York moves ahead on offshore
renewableshttp://www.marinelog.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=207:new-yorkmoves-ahead-on-offshore-renewables&Itemid=224)
New York's plans for offshore renewable energy are moving along. Yesterday, BOEMRE held its first
offshore renewable energy task force meeting in partnership with New York's Office of the Governor.
The task force was established to facilitate communication between BOEMRE and state, local, tribal
and federal stakeholders concerning commercial renewable energy leasing and development on the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) off the coast of New York. The task force includes state government
officials designated by Governor David Paterson, officials from affected federal agencies, elected local
government officials and tribal leaders.
"BOEMRE created this task force to facilitate the efficient and effective review of proposed renewable
energy projects on the OCS offshore New York," said BOEMRE Director Michael R. Bromwich. "We will
continue to work together to initiate the commercial leasing process that will enable New York to meet
its renewable energy development goals and expand our nation's energy resource portfolio."
"The offshore renewable energy task force will provide a forum for communities and tribal
governments along Long Island's south shore to review future offshore renewable energy proposals,"
Acting Secretary of State Ruth Noemi Colon said. "We know that the Department's efforts to plan for
offshore renewable energy projects and to protect important ocean habitats will benefit greatly from
task force discussions."
The task force meeting featured a discussion about the commercial leasing process for OCS renewable
energy and a presentation of the draft task force charter. The task force members discussed options
for starting the leasing process and the timelines for specific actions required by BOEMRE and the
state for developing offshore renewable energy.
SEACOR Model Solves
Seacor model solves all jurisdiction claims and boosts oil production.
Cohen 4. [Bonner, senior fellow of The National Center for Public Policy Research, "Continental Shelf's Energy Riches a potential bonanza
for cash-strapped states" National Policy Analysis -- March -- www.nationalcenter.org/NPA507.html]
Their plan would end the federal ban on offshore drilling for oil and natural gas, while allowing coastal
states to decide whether they want energy development off their shores. America has abundant reserves of oil
and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf. But most of the mineral-rich area is off-limits to energy exploration thanks to bans imposed by
the federal government. The bans were first imposed by Congress on an annual basis in 1982, and were extended for ten years by Presidents
Bush in 1990 and Clinton in 1998. Currently, only the only areas open to oil and gas exploration are in the central and western Gulf of Mexico
and in some waters off Alaska.1 Fed by a growing population and by the proliferation of electricity-hungry high-tech gadgetry, demand for
energy has soared in recent years. Yet, at the start of this decade, the nation produces 14 percent less natural gas than it did in 1973.2 Natural
gas is used to heat 60 percent of America's homes and supplies electricity for 40 percent of U.S. businesses.3 Unless the widening gap between
supply and demand is closed - and closed quickly - our nascent economic recovery is in jeopardy. This
is where the State Enhanced
Authority for Coastal and Offshore Resources Act (SEACOR) comes in. Under the draft legislation,
offshore state boundaries would be expanded seaward to nine nautical miles - from the current three. States
would be able to control all resource development within those nine miles. Existing drilling leases would be
exempted, but states would receive 27 percent of the royalties. The plan also gives states the right to veto all or part of oil
and gas leasing up to 50 miles from shore proposed by the federal Department of Interior. Beyond 50 miles (in 25-mile increments up to 100
miles), states could reject oil and gas leasing proposals.4 As
an inducement not to exercise their veto rights, states
would be offered revenues from the drilling they do allow. The more drilling allowed, the more money
the states would receive. According to estimates by the House Resources Committee staffers, the proposal would generate $108 to
$175 billion in revenues to states between 2004 and 2067, depending on the level of energy extracted. What's more, all 50 states would share
in some of the revenue, giving inland states such as Tennessee, Missouri, Iowa and Colorado a stake in the Outer Continental Shelf.5
2NC – Aquaculture
2NC – Solvo
Consensus believes states solve and that barriers are minimal
Siddiki and Weible 2010 - PhD Candidate and Assistant Professor @ University of Colorado Denver
(Saba Siddiki Dr. Chris WeibleState Aquaculture Coordinators¶ Study Report¶ PREPARED FOR THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE¶ AQUACULTURE COORDINATORS AUGUST 2010)
Responding state aquaculture coordinators showed support for the regulatory¶ landscape overall .¶
Respondents were equivocal about the degree of regulatory stringency in¶ their state . A strong
majority did not view their state regulations as having¶ severe penalties or being outdated . They
also perceived regulations as¶ being somewhat to fairly clear . The permitting process was not
perceived as¶ a problem. Most disagreed that the permitting process was too expensive¶ and too
complex that individuals will conduct aquaculture without permits or¶ not enter the industry at all.
Respondents also did not feel that more¶ permits were required and that there was too much paper
work associated¶ with the permitting process.¶ While most monitoring and enforcement is conducted by
government and not¶ by industry, a large majority agreed that compliance was high in their state¶ with
the most influential factors contributing to compliance being trust and¶ cooperation among industry
members, clear well-defined regulations, and¶ regulations that are scientifically and technically
appropriate. Guilt, shame,¶ and strong penalties were not factors perceived as major contributing
factors¶ for compliance.
States can effectively handle control
Davies 2007 - University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2008 (Lynne D. Davies “ REVISING THE
NATIONAL OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE ACT OF 2007: USING STATE OF MAINE AQUACULTURE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AS A PROTOTYPE FOR THE PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK”2007 Marine Law Institute, University of Maine School of Law ¶ Ocean and Coastal Law
Journal¶ 2007¶ 13 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 95)
Maine's Department of Marine Resources (DMR) is responsible for overseeing and implementing
regulations relating to the state's finfish and shellfish aquaculture industries, n94 and generally serves
as the primary state agency that assists Maine's fishing community. n95 Exclusive authority to
implement DMR laws and regulations is vested in the Commissioner, who, in regard to the
aquaculture industry, has the power to grant leases and licenses upon review of submitted
applications. n96 Leases provide a facility operator with a greater proprietary interest in the coastal
waters. In contrast, temporary licenses are issued to entrepreneurs entering the industry who are
experimenting with various farmed species and locations. In addition, the Commissioner also has
exclusive authority to establish conditions for [*111] compatible use of each lease site, n97 as well as
to implement and sponsor programs for research, development, and marketing techniques. n98
Environmental Federalism
1NC
1NC – Shell
Federal action over state destroys dynamic federalism – Energy and the environment
is key
Ofosky and Wiseman, ‘12 [Hari M. Osofsky is an Associate Professor & 2011 Lampert Fesler Research Fellow, University of
Minnesota Law School. Hannah J. Wiseman is an Assistant Professor at the Florida State University College of Law. “Dynamic Energy
Federalism”. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-44 .
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138127&download=yes]
II. FEDERALISM CHALLENGES TO ENERGY TRANSFORMATION
The production and movement of
energy presents one of the greatest governance challenges of our time.
The physical processes that underlie much of our modern energy system—including electricity generation,
transportation, and distribution9—are necessary to sustain human life as we know it and yet are unusually complex and difficult
to manage. Because energy is at the core of every human necessity, from enabling the provision of food, shelter, and
clothing to driving economic growth and essential interpersonal communications, it is inextricably intertwined with
fundamental societal values of fairness, justice, economic opportunity, and environmental protection.
As humans demand energy transformation in the form of cleaner, more affordable, and more accessible
energy, and as technology introduces new opportunities into an already complex system, these developments
run up against the boundaries of traditional governance structures and call for rapid regulatory
innovation. This innovation, in turn, requires new theoretical approaches to governance, and particularly
to federalism—the guiding force behind decisions about interactions of governmental and nongovernmental
actors across levels of government .¶ This Part provides three maps of energy governance and its challenges. First, it
delineates the complex grid of physical, market, and regulatory interactions that comprise the current U.S. energy system. Next, it brings
together energy federalism with dynamic federalism to introduce a model of the spatial and crosscutting dynamics that this complex grid produces. Finally, it analyzes four energy-specific governance challenges that add an
additional layer of complexity to this map. These factors, which are unique to energy due to its tripartite structure, interact with already
complex federalist dimensions to further concentrate barriers to effective and dynamic governance.¶
Dynamic environmental federalism gets modeled globally
Sovacool 08 (Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and
Globalization, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. Adjunct
Assistant Professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute [Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds:
Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change,
Stanford Environmental Law Journal, Date: June 1, 2008]
Part Four posits a theory for when the
federal government should intervene within the states to address
environmental issues—effectively replacing a “devolved” federalist stance with a more “interactive” and “dynamic”
federalism that learns from state experiences but ultimately sets a minimum national standard for environmental
protection. This stance captures a number of benefits from devolved and centralized theories of federalism while avoiding many of their
deficiencies.
The importance of exploring environmental federalism and the need for federal action on the environment extends beyond merely promoting
renewable energy and addressing climate change. First, such a discussion should give pause to those who are driving for more decentralized
environmental regulation or at least a general presumption towards devolution. This conclusion has far-reaching implications for other areas of
social regulation where discussions about decentralization and centralization continue to dominate deliberations about the proper scale of
government intervention. The lessons from environmental federalism can inform policymaking relating to areas as diverse as health care,
welfare reform, tax policy, and education.
Second, the Article is an attempt to invigorate the environmental policy debate and move from discussing what we regulate to how we
regulate. Focusing on the merits of the differing types of environmental federalism explores which scale of environmental regulation best
maximizes social welfare, and offers a more nuanced discussion of how the states and the federal government can serve supportive roles in
advancing public policy goals. For American democracy is about more than just “one person, one vote.” The opportunities for the individual
voter to affect the outcome of a particular election are quite small. In contrast, under a “conversational” model of democracy, citizens can
influence policymakers by participating in public conversation.23 By balancing and preserving prerogatives for local, state, and national
governments in environmental policy, interactive federalism offers opportunities for meaningful involvement in the political process for
millions of Americans.
Third, other
countries continue to model American-style federalism. Germany, the Republic of Austria,
Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria have all based parts of their government structure on American
federalism, choosing to decentralize power by adopting constitutions that are more federalist than the ones that they have replaced.24
The “American experience with . . . federalism,” writes John Kincaid, “may have useful implications for an
emerging federalist revolution worldwide.”25 Mikhail Gorbachev even stated that “the phenomenon of
federalism affects the interests of the entire global community.”26 Given such trends, it seems likely that
other countries may model American environmental federalism. If this is the case, ensuring that the United
States government addresses renewable energy and climate policy at the proper scale becomes even
more important for the signal it sends to the world.
That solves climate adaptation
Burleson 11 [Professor Elizabeth Burleson has a L.L.M. from the London School of Economics and a J.D. from the University of
Connecticut School of Law. She has written reports for the United Nations and teaches at the Pace Law School. “ENERGY REVOLUTION AND
DISASTER RESPONSE IN THE FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE”. Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 169, 2011.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962375]
Emergency preparedness requires substantive and procedural coordination to harmonize initiatives at
various levels of governance. Dynamic federalism can occur in a manner that allows federalist systems
to address climate change.15 Nascent disaster planning has begun to harmonize the roles of the public
sector’s various layers, fleshing out the means by which communities will address human security as climate risks become better
understood.16 An adaptive process informed by new scientific understanding of where and in what manner climate disruptions are likely to
occur provides for better planning for potential extreme flooding and heat waves. For instance, local jurisdictions can work with their national
partners to update maps in order to reflect the climate impacts for given areas. Current maps are not likely to adequately guide flood insurance
decisions or requisite emergency response resources. Overall, adaptation
measures need to integrate policies to protect
food security and such infrastructure as transportation systems and power stations in the face of fires,
floods, and other potential disasters. 17
III. CHANGE IS THE ONLY CONSTANT: RESILIENCE AND
COLLABORATIVE ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
“Adaptation policy must operate at all scales in an interconnected network of decision making.”18 Responding resiliently at inter-linking scales
to an increasing array of disasters requires cooperation. While reducing levels of greenhouse gases that
contribute to climate
change can achieve climate stabilization, the effects of existing accumulated atmospheric
concentrations will last many years. Different kinds of adaptation are needed throughout the world, with developing countries
facing the greatest need to adapt while having the least capacity to do so and lowest contribution to climate change. A comprehensive,
cooperative adaptation framework can support national adaptation plans that facilitate climateresilient development. 19 Each country should implement early warning systems, disaster risk reduction strategies, and risk
management plans.20
Following a massive earthquake in Japan on March 11, 2011, philosophy and law merged in this author’s Oregonian community. Residents not
only scrambled for potassium iodide while trying to make sense of disaster law and policy gone nuclear, but they also struggled with how to
respond to a potential crest of water few coastlines currently have the capacity to withstand. Learning how to transcend panic and respond
effectively in the long-term continues to stymie individuals and cultures alike.21 Expecting the best yet preparing for the worst should be a
rational response, with communities remaining calm but recognizing likely mortality rates and geographical vulnerabilities.22
Such a
rational response, however, requires technology transfer to communities lacking the capacity to
warn civil society of pending disasters, comparable to the reverse 9-1-1 calls that Oregon and California residents received
shortly after the Japanese earthquake.23 Wake up calls seem to be coming fast and furiously. Communities can accomplish a
great deal of good by channeling crisis awareness into effective disaster planning for resilient coastlines.
Recent storm surges highlight the urgent need for a collective consensus within the international
community on enhancing resilience to disasters.24 If not now, then when?
Adaptation commissions facilitate integration and harmonization and, by doing so, enhance adaptive capacity.25 As recent climate negotiations
have demonstrated, geo-political pendulums also affect adaptive capacity. Adaptation measures should be based on emerging and traditional
“sound scientific and technological knowledge.”26 Approaches to adaptation should also be environmentally sound, informed by the best
science, as well as sensible from financial and sustainability standpoints. 27 Temporal and spatial scales of adaptation are both important to
framing adaptation strategies. On-the-ground results should come from “predictable, sustainable, timely, adequate and stable financial
resources” on top of official development assistance by developed countries. 28 Countries can implement integrated best practices29
consistent with such international instruments as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),30 the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification,31 the Convention on Biological Diversity, 32 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.33 Periodic reviews34 of national adaptation plans should assess and update measures for “climate refugees,”35 increasing
resilience through economic diversification, as well as the transfer of such adaptation technologies as levy designs, green building innovations,
and a wide range of other means by which to respond to climate change.36
Professor J.B. Ruhl artfully notes that “institutional inflexibility is increasingly being adopted as a means to protect legitimate interests excluded
from dominant resource allocation regimes.”37 Coordinated,
flexible responses are at the core of effective climate
adaptation. Existing property rights and risk will likely see unprecedented change. Traditional water,
land-use and environmental law are likely to melt into something that can respond to climate
instability. Both this instability and the resulting legal responses will have significant human rights
implications that communities should address at the outset, rather than acknowledge in retrospect.
Rule of law is at the core of effective communities and need not be compromised in the effort to adapt effectively to climate instability.
Effective climate measures can occur through coordination among all levels of governance and decision-making. This decision-making should
address climate change legislatively, judicially, and administratively, while remaining mindful of the need for both flexibility and capacity
building.38 Many adaptation measures can be addressed at the proactive or reactive stage. Arguably, a proactive response leaves greater
flexibility with which communities can respond.39 Emergency
response and disaster recovery are classic reactive
adaptive measures that can be prepared for, while proactive measures include: “crop and livelihood
diversification, seasonal climate forecasting, community-based disaster risk reduction, famine early
warning systems, insurance, [and] water storage.” 40
While reducing vulnerability can avert directing resources to postdisaster recovery, climate vulnerabilities will remain. The level of risk will
depend upon interrelated knowledge, technology, and capacity gaps.41 Robust
habitat protection/restoration and
emergency response systems are resilience enhancers.42 Resilience need not be the baby thrown out with the bathwater.
There is a growing understanding that stationarity is giving way to a climate change-induced no-analog future in which ecological variability will
not stay within known parameters.43
Professor Robin Kundis Craig notes that “water law is almost uniquely available to support some of the adaptive management regimes that
climate change adaptation will require [and] public trust doctrines can be particularly well-suited to providing legal support for adaptive
management-based climate change adaptation regimes.”44 Given the need for a legal system that both provides stable expectations and
adapts to climate change, the common law may be in a good position to respond flexibly.45 Craig has identified at least sixteen states in the
United States that have ecological public trust doctrines, and at least six states that describe such doctrines as adaptive and evolutionary.46
Explicitly includ-ing climate as a threat to public trust resources allows states to respond to climate instability through public trust doctrines.
Adaptive public trust doctrines enable states to address some waterrelated climate change. For example, judicial adaptive management may
follow the approach taken in the South Dakota case of Parks v. Cooper.47 In this case, three lakes resulted from an area receiving higher than
normal precipitation, perhaps a new normal for the region. Riparian landowners sued to exclude members of the public from using the new
bodies of water for fishing and recreation upon a private lake argument. 48 The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that “all water in South
Dakota belongs to the people in accord with the public trust doctrine and as declared by statute and precedent, and thus, although the lake
beds are mostly privately owned, the water in the lakes is public and may be converted to public use.”49
Parks v. Cooper may be at the forefront of a growing state trend to address climate change via state public trust doctrines. Should this method
gain momentum,
a body of common law may develop that effectively addresses climate disruptions too
unpredictable at present for the public sector to feel comfortable legislating. International
frameworks, national climate thresholds, state common law, local zoning, tax abatement for individuals, and civil
society participation can together facilitate resilience efforts at all scales that remain mindful of human and
ecological vulnerabilities.
Prevents multiple scenarios for global war
Werz & Conley 12 - Senior Fellow @American Progress where his work as member of the National Security Team focuses on the
nexus of climate change, migration, and security and emerging democracies & Research Associate for National Security and International Policy
@ the Center for American Progress [Michael Werz & Laura Conley, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict: Addressing complex crisis
scenarios in the 21st Century,” Center for American Progress, January 2012]
The costs and consequences of climate change on our world will define the 21st century. Even if nations across
our planet were to take immediate steps to rein in carbon emissions—an unlikely prospect— a warmer climate
is inevitable . As the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, noted in 2007, human-created “warming
of the climate system
is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and
ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.”1
As these ill effects progress they will have serious implications for U.S. national security interests as well as global stability—extending from the
sustainability of coastal military installations to the stability of nations that lack the resources, good governance, and resiliency needed to
respond to the many adverse consequences of climate change. And as
these effects accelerate, the stress will impact
human migration and conflict around the world.
It is difficult to fully understand the detailed causes of migration and economic and political instability, but the
growing evidence of
links between climate change, migration, and conflict raise plenty of reasons for concern. This is why it’s time to
start thinking about new and comprehensive answers to multifaceted crisis scenarios brought on or worsened by global climate change. As
Achim Steiner, executive director of the U.N. Environment Program, argues, “The question we must continuously ask ourselves in the face of
scientific complexity and uncertainty, but also growing evidence of climate change, is at what point precaution, common sense or prudent risk
management demands action.”2 In the
coming decades climate change will increasingly threaten humanity’s shared
interests and collective security in many parts of the world, disproportionately affecting the globe’s least developed countries. Climate
change will pose challenging social, political, and strategic questions for the many different multinational, regional, national, and nonprofit
organizations dedicated to improving the human condition worldwide. Organizations as different as Amnesty International, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the World Bank, the International Rescue Committee, and the World Health Organization will all have to tackle
directly the myriad effects of climate change.
Recent intelligence reports and war games , including
some conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense, conclude that over the next two or three decades, vulnerable regions (particularly
sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia) will face the prospect of food shortages,
water crises, and catastrophic flooding driven by climate change. These developments could demand U.S.,
European, and international humanitarian relief or military responses , often the delivery vehicle for aid in crisis situations.
Climate change also poses distinct challenges to U.S. national security.
This report provides the foundation and overview for a series of papers focusing on the particular challenges posed by the cumulative effects of
climate change, migration, and conflict in some of our world’s most complex environments. In the papers following this report, we plan to
outline the effects of this nexus in northwest Africa, in India and Bangladesh, in the Andean region of South America, and in China. In this paper
we detail that nexus across our planet and offer wide ranging recommendations about how the United States, its allies in the global
community, and the community at large can deal with the coming climate-driven crises with comprehensive sustainable security solutions
encompassing national security, diplomacy, and economic, social, and environmental development.
Here, we briefly summarize our arguments and our conclusions.
The nexus
The Arab Spring can be at least partly credited to climate change. Rising food prices and efforts by authoritarian regimes to crush political
protests were linked first to food and then to political repression—two important motivators in the Arab makeover this past year.
To be sure, longstanding economic and social distress and lack of opportunity for so many Arab youth in the Middle East and across North
Africa only needed a spark to ignite revolutions across the region. But environmental degradation and the movement of people from rural areas
to already overcrowded cities alongside rising food prices enabled the cumulative effects of long-term economic and political failures to sweep
across borders with remarkable agility. It does not require much foresight to acknowledge that other effects of climate change will add to the
pressure in the decades to come. In particular the cumulative overlays of climate change with human migration driven by environmental crises,
political conflict caused by this migration, and competition for more scarce resources will add new dimensions of complexity to existing and
future crisis scenarios. It is thus critical to understand how governments plan to answer and prioritize these new threats from climate change,
migration, and conflict.
Climate change
No matter what steps the global community takes to mitigate
carbon emissions, a warmer climate is inevitable. The effects are already being felt today and will intensify as climate
Climate change alone poses a daunting challenge.
change worsens. All of the world’s regions and nations will experience some of the effects of this transformational challenge.
Here’s just one case in point: African states are likely to be the most vulnerable to multiple stresses, with up to 250 million people projected to
suffer from water and food insecurity and, in low-lying areas, a rising sea level.3 As little as 1 percent of Africa’s land is located in low-lying
coastal zones but this land supports 12 percent of its urban population.4
Furthermore, a majority of people in Africa live in lower altitudes—including the Sahel, the area just south of the Sahara—where the worst
effects of water scarcity, hotter temperatures, and longer dry seasons are expected to occur.5 These developments may well be exacerbated by
the lack of state and regional capacity to manage the effects of climate change. These same dynamics haunt many nations in Asia and the
Americas, too, and the implications for developed countries such as the United States and much of Europe will be profound.
Migration
Migration adds another layer of complexity to the scenario. In
the 21st century the world could see substantial
numbers of climate migrants—people displaced by either the slow or sudden onset of the effects of climate change. The United
Nations’ recent Human Development Report stated that, worldwide, there are already an estimated 700 million internal migrants—those
leaving their homes within their own countries—a number that includes people whose migration isrelated to climate change and
environmental factors. Overall migration across national borders is already at approximately 214 million people worldwide,6 with estimates of
up to 20 million displaced in 2008 alone because of a rising sea level, desertification, and flooding.7
One expert, Oli Brown of the International Institute for Sustainable Development, predicts a tenfold increase in the current number of
internally displaced persons and international refugees by 2050.8 It is important to acknowledge that there is no consensus on this estimate. In
fact there is major disagreement among experts about how to identify climate as a causal factor in internal and international migration. But
even though the root causes of human mobility are not always easy to decipher, the policy challenges posed by that movement are real. A 2009
report by the International Organization for Migration produced in cooperation with the United Nations University and the Climate Change,
Environment and Migration Alliance cites
numbers that range from “200 million to 1 billion migrants from
climate change alone, by 2050,”9 arguing that “environmental drivers of migration are often coupled with economic, social and
developmental factors that can accelerate and to a certain extent mask the impact of climate change.”
The report also notes that “migration can result from different environmental factors, among them gradual environmental degradation
(including desertification, soil and coastal erosion) and natural disasters (such as earthquakes, floods or tropical storms).”10 (See box on page
15 for a more detailed definition of climate migrants.) Clearly, then, climate
change is expected to aggravate many existing
migratory pressures around the world. Indeed associated extreme weather events resulting in drought, floods, and disease
are projected to increase the number of sudden humanitarian crises and disasters in areas least able
to cope, such as those already mired in poverty or prone to conflict.11
Conflict
This final layer is the most unpredictable, both within nations and transnationally, and will force the United States and the international
community to confront climate and migration challenges within an increasingly unstructured local or regional security environment. In contrast
to the great power conflicts and the associated proxy wars that marked most of the 20th century, the immediate post- Cold War decades
witnessed a diffusion of national security interests and threats. U.S. national security policy is increasingly integrating thinking about nonstate
actors and nontraditional sources of conflict and instability, for example in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups.
Climate change is among these newly visible issues sparking conflict. But because the direct link between conflict and climate change is unclear,
awareness of the indirect links has yet to lead to substantial and sustained action to address its security implications. Still the
potential
for the changing climate to induce conflict or exacerbate existing instability in some of the world’s most vulnerable regions is
now recognized in national security circles in the United States, although research gaps still exists in many places.
The climate-conflict nexus was highlighted with particular effect by the current U.S. administration’s security-planning reviews over the past
two years, as well as the Center for Naval Analysis, which termed
climate change a “ threat multiplier ,” indicating that it
can exacerbate existing stresses and insecurity.12 The Pentagon’s latest Quadrennial Defense Review also recognized climate
change as an “ accelerant of instability or conflict,” highlighting the operational challenges that will confront U.S. and partner
militaries amid a rising sea level, growing extreme weather events, and other anticipated effects of climate change.13 The U.S. Department of
Defense has even voiced concern for American military installations that may be threatened by a rising sea level.14
There is also well-developed international analysis on these points. The United Kingdom’s 2010 Defense Review, for example, referenced the
security aspects of climate change as an evolving challenge for militaries and policymakers. Additionally, in 2010, the Nigerian government
referred to climate change as the “greatest environmental and humanitarian challenge facing the country this century,” demonstrating that
climate change is no longer seen as solely scientific or environmental, but increasingly as a social and political issue cutting across all aspects of
human development.15
As these three threads—climate change, migration, and conflict—interact more intensely, the consequences will be far-reaching and
occasionally counterintuitive. It is impossible to predict the outcome of the Arab Spring movement, for example, but the blossoming of
democracy in some countries and the demand for it in others is partly an unexpected result of the consequences of climate change on global
food prices. On the other hand, the interplay of these factors will drive complex crisis situations in which domestic policy, international policy,
humanitarian assistance, and security converge in new ways.
Areas of concern
Several regional hotspots
frequently
come up in the international debate on climate change, migration, and
conflict. Climate migrants in northwest Africa , for example, are causing communities across the region to respond in different ways,
often to the detriment of regional and international security concerns. Political and social instability in the region plays
into the hands of organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. And recent developments in Libya, especially the
large number of weapons looted from depots after strongman Moammar Qaddafi’s regime fell— which still remain unaccounted for—are a
threat to stability across North Africa. Effective solutions need not address all of these issues simultaneously but must recognize the layers of
relationships among them. And these solutions must also recognize that these variables will not always intersect in predictable ways. While
some migrants may flee floodplains, for example, others may migrate to them in search of greater opportunities in coastal urban areas.16
Bangladesh , already well known for its disastrous floods, faces rising waters in the future due to climate-driven glacial
meltdowns in neighboring India. The effects can hardly be over. In December 2008 the National Defense University in Washington,
D.C., ran an exercise that explored the impact of a flood that sent hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring
India. The result: the exercise predicted a new wave of migration would touch off religious conflicts , encourage the
spread of contagious diseases , and cause vast damage to infrastructure. India itself is not in a position to absorb
climate-induced pressures—never mind foreign climate migrants. The country will contribute 22 percent of global population growth
and have close to 1.6 billion inhabitants by 2050, causing demographic developments that are sure to spark waves of internal migration across
the country.
Then there’s the
Andean region
of South America, where melting
glaciers and snowcaps will drive climate, migration, and
security concerns. The average rate of glacial melting has doubled over the past few years, according to the World Glacier Monitoring
Service.17 Besides Peru, which faces the gravest consequences in Latin America, a number of other Andean countries will be massively
affected, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. This development will
put water security, agricultural production, and
power generation at risk —all factors that could prompt people to leave their homes and migrate. The IPCC report argues that the
region is especially vulnerable because of its fragile ecosystem.18
Finally, China is now in its fourth decade of ever-growing internal migration, some of it driven in recent years by environmental change. Today,
China continues to experience the full spectrum of climate change related consequences
that have the potential to continue to encourage such migration. The Center for a New American Security recently found
that the consequences of climate change and continued internal migration in China include “water stress; increased
droughts, flooding, or other severe events; increased coastal erosion and saltwater inundation; glacial melt in the Himala as that could
affect hundreds of millions; and shifting agricultural zones ”—all of which will affect food supplies. 19 Pg. 1-7
across its vast territory,
2NC
Uniqueness
North Carolina Proves
Smith 14 - associate editor of Carolina Journal ( McCrory: DHHS Too Big To Succeed?¶ Guv’s first-year
review suggest changes may be in store for state agency¶ By Barry Smith¶ Jan. 22nd, 2014
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=10780)
Berger also applauded McCrory for his commitment to boosting the state’s economy, expanding the
domestic energy jobs sector, improving education and transportation infrastructure, and streamlining
the government.¶ McCrory also said he and the General Assembly made the right decision last year
when they refused to expand Medicaid as a part of the Obamacare rollout. Even so, McCrory said he
wouldn’t rule out an expansion down the road.¶ "I keep the door open for all options in the future,"
McCrory said.¶ McCrory called for pushing forward with offshore energy exploration. “We’re 10 years
behind in this effort,” McCrory said. ¶ He also announced that Transportation Secretary Tony Tata will
unveil a 25-year transportation plan that focuses on moving people.
States lead on energy and the environment now
Carley and Browne 2013 –School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University,¶
Bloomington, IN, USA (Sanya Carley and Tyler R. Browne Innovative US energy policy: a¶ review of states’
policy experiences WIREs Energy Environ 2013, 2: 488–506 doi: 10.1002/wene.58)
In recent years, concerns about these and related¶ issues have caused energy policy to rise in perceived¶
importance in the public policy domain. Despite the¶ national prominence of the issue, US energy
policy¶ and, specifically, policy focused on the electricity sector,¶ has developed predominantly at the
state level.5–7¶ In the absence of any comprehensive national legislation¶ over the past two decades
focused on electricity¶ sector generation or emissions, state governments¶ have assumed strong
leadership roles in energy policy.¶ During this era of state energy policy innovation,state
governments have adopted a variety of different¶ policies aimed at diversifying the mix of
generation¶ sources with a greater percentage of renewable energy,¶ reducing the carbon intensity
of the sector, and¶ increasing the use of smaller and more localized generation¶ units. These three
objectives—diversification,¶ decarbonization, and decentralization—have increasingly¶ guided state
energy policy since the mid-1990s.
Policy instruments designed to achieve one or¶ more of these objectives include but are not limited¶
to the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), net metering¶ and interconnection standards, various tax
incentives,¶ the energy efficiency resource standard (EERS),¶ and energy public benefit funds (PBFs).
RPSs mandate¶ that a state’s utilities must provide a specific¶ amount or percentage of total energy
from alternative¶ energy sources by a specific year (e.g., 20% renewable¶ energy by 2025). Net
metering and interconnection¶ standards provide electricity customers that own¶ their own
generation units access to the electric grid¶ and outline rules and procedures for connecting these¶
distributed systems to the grid. Tax incentives provide¶ financial support for renewable energy or
energy¶ efficiency systems, generally as a percentage of total¶ upfront costs. EERSs require that
utilities improve the¶ operating efficiencies of their infrastructure and also¶ promote programs that
help electricity customers reduce¶ consumption; these standards are translated as¶ specific energy
savings mandates over time. PBFs, also¶ referred to as system benefit charges, are collected via small
surcharges on end-users’ electricity bills, and¶ used to support investments in energy efficiency,
renewable¶ energy, or research and development.
The adoption of these different policies among¶ US states is becoming increasingly common,
although¶ the current landscape exhibits a diverse patchwork of¶ different policies across space.
Currently, 29 states¶ and the District of Columbia have some form of RPS¶ and an additional 8 states have
voluntary RPS policies.¶ A total of 47 states and District of Columbia have¶ either net metering or
interconnection standards, or¶ both; and 20 states have an EERS with an additional¶ 6 that have a
voluntary standard.8 The designs of¶ these policy instruments also demonstrate significant¶ variation
across states. States choose among a vast¶ menu of different policy design features to tailor specific¶
policy goals and standards to their own circumstances.¶ Table 1 presents a detailed state inventory of¶
policy portfolios and instrument design features, and¶ demonstrates this immense variation in policy
adoption¶ and design across states.
Throughout the era of state energy policy innovation,¶ the energy policy literature has developed¶
along with states’ experiences with these policies.¶ Early evaluations focused on the effects of more
basic¶ forms of these various policy instruments; as states¶ have developed more sophisticated policy
variations¶ and as the number of these policies has increased, so¶ too has the literature evolved toward
increasing sophistication¶ of analysis and prevalence of studies.
Particularly given that states are still active energy¶ policy leaders, and are continually adopting
new¶ or revising existing policies , there is great need for¶ evaluation of the effects, effectiveness,
challenges, and¶ opportunities associated with these different policy¶ instruments. This analysis
therefore seeks to synthesize¶ major findings in the literature and to provide¶ a summary of both the
policy landscapes and the¶ effects associated with some of the leading energy¶ policies, both in their
elementary and more nuanced¶ forms. This study evaluates in depth four state-level¶ energy policies that
are representative of the larger¶ suite of state energy policies highlighted above: the¶ RPS, the EERS, net
metering, and the interconnection¶ standard. The disproportionate share of attention,¶ however, is
focused on the RPS policy, as this¶ policy instrument is more extensively studied than¶ other policies due
to the popularity and prevalence of¶ the policy among states, and the availability of data¶ that allow
analysts to measure policy outcomes. Each¶ of the following sections outlines the current understanding¶
about these policies, with an overview of the¶ policy landscape, effectiveness, and other important
policy effect considerations revealed in the associated¶ literature to date. Following this discussion, we
also¶ provide a brief overview of other policy actions most¶ commonly pursued by states, including tax
incentives,¶ PBFs, and institutional reforms. The review concludes¶ with a brief summary of general
trends and opportunities¶ for further research.
Arizona proves
Fanshaw 14 – Environment Arizona ( Bret Fanshaw,¶ Environment Arizona¶ New Report: Phoenix Ranks
3rd Among Major Cities for Installed Solar 4/10 http://environmentarizonacenter.org/news/aze/newreport-phoenix-ranks-3rd-among-major-cities-installed-solar)
City leaders can work with state government to ensure that they have strong programs to expand
solar, including renewable energy standards, solar carve-outs or feed-in tariffs, net metering and
community solar programs. Arizona’s renewable energy standard of 15% by 2025 played a role in the
success of solar in Phoenix, as well as the city’s standard which mirrors the statewide RES.
City leaders can also demand a strong partnership with the Federal government to ensure that federal
incentives such as tax credits are continued. And, that federal programs, such as the Solar America’s
Cities and the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant programs continue to provide support
and technical assistance to cities seeking to expand solar.
“The sky’s the limit on solar energy. Phoenix is a shining example of solar leadership,” said Fanshaw.
“But, we’ve barely scratched the surface of the potential to capture this pollution-free energy source.
By committing to bold goals and expanding on the good policies we’ve adopted, we can take solar to
the next level.”
The feds are pulling back their energy policies- states are ramping up control
Milford et al ’12 [Lew Milford is a non-resident senior fellow at Brookings and president of Clean Energy
Group. Mark Muro is a senior fellow and director of policy for the Metropolitan Policy Program at
Brookings. Jessica Morey is a consultant to Clean Energy Group. Devashree Saha is a senior policy
analyst at the Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program. Mark Sinclair is executive director of Clean Energy
States Alliance, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic Development,” January,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0
111_states_energy_funds.pdf]
Washington is again paralyzed and pulling back on clean energy economic development. New funding
solutions seem unlikely and existing financial supports appear tenuous, given that many of the federal
tax incentives, subsidies, and loan guarantees made available through the 2009 stimulus law and elsewhere are set to
expire. 2 All of which raises a daunting question: If the country is to take advantage of the economic, environmental, and health benefits of
clean energy, how will its development be financed, its emerging companies be supported, and its markets be structured—and who is in the
best position to decide and act? And yet, there is actually a promising partial answer to that question. With
federal clean energy
activities largely on hold, U.S. states hold out tremendous promise for the continued design and
implementation of clean energy solutions and economic development.
No federal action on energy anytime soon- all major action is shutting down
Muro 1-12-12 [Mark Muro, senior fellow and policy director at the Metropolitan Policy Program at the
Brookings Institution, “Brookings' Muro says state clean energy funds could help boost the economy,”
http://www.eenews.net/tv/transcript/1457]
Monica Trauzzi: And so is
your sense then, at this point, that we won't see any kind of federal action on clean
energy for some time? Mark Muro: You could bet that there will be no action for at least 18 months and I
think, you know, the subject of work we are doing also will be -- we're going to be seeing a massive
pullback in tax programs, subsidies, incentives. Already many of the programs of the stimulus package
will be sunsetting. Dozens of programs are expiring, so I think over the next five years we're going to
have to deal with a different finance and policy background for clean energy. So, we're looking where is
there usable funding around and the states have some and we all do well to think about how it could
be best leveraged.
States are poised for energy leadership now- lack of federal action is key
Milford and Muro 12 [Lewis Milford is the founder and President of Clean Energy Group (CEG), a
national U.S. nonprofit organization that promotes effective clean energy policies, Mark Muro, a senior
fellow and director of policy for the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, manages the program's
public policy analysis and leads key policy research projects, 1-11-12 “State Clean Energy Funds Provide
Economic Development Punch,” http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/01/11-energy-fundsmuro-milford]
To date, over 20 states have created a varied array of these public investment vehicles to invest in
clean energy pursuits with revenues often derived from small public-benefit surcharges on electric utility bills. Over the last
decade, state CEFs have invested over $2.7 billion in state dollars to support renewable energy
markets, counting very conservatively. Meanwhile, they have leveraged another $9.7 billion in additional
federal and private sector investment, with the resulting $12 billion flowing to the deployment of over
72,000 projects in the United States ranging from solar installations on homes and businesses to wind
turbines in communities to large wind farms, hydrokinetic projects in rivers, and biomass generation plants on farms. In so doing, the
funds stand well positioned—along with state economic development and other officials—to build on a pragmatic
success and take up the challenge left by the current federal abdication of a role on clean energy
economic development. Yet here is the rub: For all the good the funds have achieved, project-only financing—as needed as it is—will
not be sufficient to drive the growth of large and innovative new companies or to create the broader economic development taxpayers demand
from public investments. Also needed will be a greater focus on the deeper-going economic development work that can help spawn whole new
industries. All of which points to the new brand of fund activity that our paper celebrates and calls for more of. In recent years, increasingly
ambitious efforts in a number of states have featured engagement on at least three major fronts somewhat different from the initial fund
focus: (1) cleantech innovation support through research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) funding; (2) financial support for earlystage cleantech companies and emerging technologies, including working capital for companies; and (3) industry development support through
business incubator programs, regional cluster promotion, manufacturing and export promotion, supply chain analysis and enhancement, and
workforce training programs. These
new economic development efforts—on display in California,
Massachusetts, New York, and elsewhere—show the next era of state clean energy fund leadership
coming into focus. States are now poised to jumpstart a new, creative period of expanded clean
energy economic development and industry creation, to complement and build upon individualistic
project financing. Such work could not be more timely at this moment of federal gridlock and market
uncertainty.
Federalism is strengthening – the states are stepping up
Katz 12 – Vice President and Director, Metropolitan Policy Program, Global Cities Initiative (Bruce,
03/18, “Will the Next President Remake Federalism?”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/03/18-federalism-katz)
The genius of American federalism is that it diffuses power among different layers of government and
across disparate sectors of society. States are the key constitutional partners, because they have broad
powers over such market-shaping policy areas as infrastructure, innovation, energy, education and
skills training. But other sub-national units - particularly major cities and metropolitan areas - also are
critical, because they concentrate and agglomerate the assets that drive prosperity and share leadership
with actors in the corporate, civic, university and other spheres. When the federal government
becomes polarized and fails to act on critical issues of national importance, states and metros can step
in to take on larger roles. With Washington mired in partisan gridlock, the states and metropolitan
areas are doing just that. With federal innovation funding at risk, metros like New York City and states
like Ohio and Tennessee are making sizable commitments to attract innovative research institutions,
commercialize leading-edge research and grow innovation-intensive firms. With the future of federal
trade policy unclear, metro areas like Los Angeles, San Francisco and Minneapolis/St. Paul and states like
Colorado and New York are reorienting their economic development strategies toward exports and the
attraction of innovative foreign companies and skilled immigrants. With federal energy policy in
shambles, metro areas like Seattle and Philadelphia are cementing their niches in energy-efficient
technologies, and states like Connecticut are experimenting with green banks to help deploy clean
technologies at scale. State green banks can play a crucial role in financing clean energy projects by
combining scarce public resources with private investment, and then leveraging the funds to make each
public $1 support $5 or $10 or even more dollars of investment. With federal transportation policy in
limbo, metro areas like Jacksonville and Savannah and states like Michigan are modernizing their air,
rail and sea freight hubs to position themselves for an expansion of global trade. What unites these
disparate efforts is intent. After decades of pursuing fanciful illusions (e.g., becoming the next Silicon
Valley) or engaging in copycat strategies, states and metros are deliberately building on their special
assets, attributes and advantages using business-planning techniques honed in the private sector. The
bubbling of state and metro innovation offers an affirmative and practical counterpoint to a
Washington that has become increasingly hyper-partisan and overly ideological and gives the next
president an opportunity to engage states and metropolitan areas as true working partners in a focused
campaign for national economic renewal.
Federalism high – internet
Dean 12 – served six terms as the 79th Governor of Vermont, former chairman of the Democratic
National Committe (Howard, 05/10, “Decentralization in the 21st century: the internet gives power to
the people,”
http://www.montrealgazette.com/health/Decentralization+21st+century+internet+gives+power+people
/6601105/story.html)
The plain truth is that there is
no real future for the decentralization of government in the United States. There is
too much to undo, and the price tag would be prohibitive, even in better economic times. But there will be a massive
decentralization anyway . Young people on the Internet have now achieved an extraordinary
influence on public policy, vastly exceeding the influence of Congress on issues they care about. In
2011, the largest bank in the U.S., Bank of America, announced that it would impose a $5-a-month fee
on those who used debit cards. In the old days there would have been a public uproar but eventually it
would have faded and the fee structure would have remained. But within three days of the 2011 fee
announcement, over a million people, organized by various online groups, had pledged to remove their
deposits from Bank of America and put them in credit unions instead. On the fourth day, Bank of
America rescinded the new fees. More impressive was the collapse of the intellectual-property bill that
had made it out of committee in the Senate with bipartisan support, a rare occurrence in today’s
political environment in the U.S. The entertainment industry, which had lobbied for the bill, knew well
how to move the process in Washington, while the Googles of the world knew little. (The bill favoured
the creative industry at the expense of the internet providers.) But Google and its friends did know how
to reach almost all of the Americans who have contempt for Congress – about 90 per cent of them, if
the polls are to be believed. After a campaign that involved the voluntary shutdown of major websites,
and notices explaining what Americans could do to get their views known by public officials, both the
White House and congressional email services stopped working because of the enormous outpouring of
messages from outraged users of the net. After a fruitless day of bluster trying to explain the reason for
the bill, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that the bill would not be voted on, and two
years of work was washed away. The future of decentralization is alive and well in America and
elsewhere, but it is not the federal or central governments that will effect the change. That will be
done by the public, newly empowered by the increasing penetration of the preferred weapon of
democracy advocates everywhere: the World Wide Web.
Generic Link
Federal action over states crushes the adoption of dynamic federalism
Adelman and Engel 7 (David- Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of
Arizona, Kirsten- Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, September, “Adaptive
Federalism: The Case Against ¶ Reallocating Environmental Regulatory ¶ Authority”,
https://www.law.arizona.edu/faculty/FacultyPubs/Documents/Adelman/ALS07-23.pdf)
The debate over environmental federalism is very much in flux. Two schools of thought, ¶ which we will refer to as
“classical” and “dynamic” federalism, dominate the current debate. ¶ The classical school is largely defined by its
commitment to the matching principle as a means of ¶ selecting the level of government that an environmental problem should be
regulated.14 The
¶ dynamic school prizes governmental regulatory autonomy, the virtues of multiple
regulatory ¶ approaches, and the benefits of a dynamic give-and-take between regulatory officials
across ¶ different jurisdictions. Both conceptions raise challenges to the system of cooperative
federalism ¶ that dominates environmental law in the United States. ¶ In the sections that follow, we examine both
schools of federalism and describe the ¶ evolution of the environmental federalism debate. Although the classical school currently
has ¶ the upper hand, the dynamic school is challenging long-held assumptions and gaining ground. ¶
Calls for devolving environmental regulation to the states figure prominently in this discourse as ¶ well.
Devolution emerged as a rallying cry among mostly conservative scholars, and political ¶ activists, in the 1990s,15 and it was initially
embraced by the administration of George W. Bush. The Bush administration soon backtracked,
though, and sought both to centralize control over ¶ environmental policymaking at the federal level
and to preempt state initiatives.16 This move, ¶ which we believe has gone too far, is an important motivation of the
Article. Finally, we address ¶ the distinctive position of cooperative federalism, which incorporates elements of dynamic ¶ federalism into a
classical regime, in the pantheon of federalism scholarship.
Putting states in charge is key – Sends the signal of suring up federalism
Rabe 7 (Barry, professor of Public Policy, University of Michigan, and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the
Brookings Institute, April, “Can Congress Govern the Environment?”
http://64.233.179.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&safe=off&q=cache:0cclJf49oQkJ:www.brookings.edu/views/p
apers/rabe/20070330.pdf)
This reflects a larger pattern whereby federal-state relations have been deeply strained in recent
years, perhaps most notably in such policy arenas as education, homeland security, energy, and
elections management. Environmental protection has long suffered from significant federal-and-state
tensions, attributable in part to the steep ratio of federal mandates to states as opposed to
intergovernmental revenue transfers (Gormley 2006). These tensions have only intensified in recent
years and Congress has clearly not found a way to actively engage states in constructive di scussion on
future directions in environmental policy, much less options for collaborative federalism in the future
development of climate policy. Since the demise of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations in 1995, there has not been a replacement mechanism that encourages intergovernmental
learning or formal deliberations between legislators at the federal and state levels. As a result, according
to Paul Posner, we now lack “institutional opportunities for officials to meet collectively to discuss
agreements that cross Page 10 governmental and sectoral boundaries” (Posner 2006). No Congressional
committees or members have emerged as effective champions of serious intergovernmental
deliberations, with the missed opportunities in climate policy reflective of these larger trends.
Consequently, a vast body of state officials may literally have considerably greater expertise with
climate science and policy design than their federal counterparts and yet have remained untapped
resources by Congress. As Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) noted in a 2006 press conference,
“Washington law-makers don’t yet sufficiently realize that there is a growing cadre of experts in many
states across the country who do know how to develop climate legislation” (Northrup and Sassoon
2006, 536).
Energy Link
States have chosen energy as a key site for federalist expansion- plan uniquely
destroys the balance
Deitchman 3-30-12 [Benjamin, Evaluation Fellow at Georgia Institute of Technology, former Regional
Program Coordinator at National Association of State Energy Officials, “Changing the State of State-Level
Energy Programs: Policy Diffusion, Economic Stimulus, and New Federalism Paradigms,” Workshop on
Original Policy Research, http://www.spp.gatech.edu/faculty/WOPRpapers/Deitchman.WOPR12.pdf]
State and local governments have, in fact, chosen this area of opportunity for legislation, litigation,
and action due lack of federal policy adoption (Engel 2009). Rabe (2008) notes that most analysis of American climate policy
focuses on the failure of the Senate to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of significant proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
the Administration of George W. Bush. The contemporary wisdom focusing
on the United States’ climate policy
exclusively at the federal level misses significance of the “bottom-up” efforts of the states, with the
leadership of almost every state passing or proposing significant actions. These include state-level RPS legislation,
regional emissions trading schemes, and energy efficiency financing opportunities. State and local intervention into pollution
prevention and ecological conservation pre-date federal efforts and the creation of the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and US Department of Energy (DOE) in the 1970s (Yandle 1989). Owing to a perceived “race-to-the-bottom,” in
which sub-national governments chose assumed economic advantages over potentially costly environmental regulation, the federal
government found justification to act in this subsystem in the 1970s through the Clean Air Act among other landmark pieces of legislation.
Revesz (1992), in an often-cited law review article, argues that the race-to-thebottom was a form of the prisoner’s dilemma in its mechanisms
for strategic interaction that lead to suboptimal outcomes in economic, as well as environmental, issues for the society. Although his argument
is lucid, Revesz does not consider that a prisoner’s dilemma economic game generally relies on an assumption of non-communication between
the players in leading towards a poor result for each individual, firm, or state and the society as a whole. In environmental regulation, states can
and do communicate. Federal
intervention, however, does place limitations on the game that, at its best, forces
the players to cooperate for the greater good of the economy and environment of the United States,
but can also serve as an impediment to innovation in state and local governments. There is concern
that too much federal intervention could, in fact, hamper state and local energy and environmental
programs. In another law review article, Rose (2008) delves into the implications of a policy shift at the top of the federalist structure, which
could be beneficial, detrimental, or mixed towards the capabilities and capacity of sub-national actors. The national level government,
however, also provides important financial support to state and local energy and environmental programs. In addition, qualitative research
indicates that the diversity and incongruence of state and local policies can have a negative impact on the deployment of low carbon
technologies (Brown & Chandler 2008).
States have constitutional dominion over energy policy
Deitchman 3-30-12 [Benjamin, Evaluation Fellow at Georgia Institute of Technology, former Regional
Program Coordinator at National Association of State Energy Officials, “Changing the State of State-Level
Energy Programs: Policy Diffusion, Economic Stimulus, and New Federalism Paradigms,” Workshop on
Original Policy Research, http://www.spp.gatech.edu/faculty/WOPRpapers/Deitchman.WOPR12.pdf]
In the Federalist #46, James
Madison (1788) asked with regards to locally-minded politicians, “And if they [state legislators] do
not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can
it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its
government, the objects of their affections and consultations?” Looking out on the vast wilderness of North America, the future President
Madison did not envision a future where politicians and bureaucrats in state governments would lead beyond their own borders in an issue not
just of national interest, but also of international importance. The
procedures and division of responsibilities in the
Constitution that President Madison fathered, however, have afforded the flexibility to state governments to
innovate in clean energy and climate policy in the absence of strong Federal action. In a dissenting opinion last
century, Justice Louis Brandies (1932) wrote, “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country […].” This paper and proposed research program will analyze the policy
experiments in states across the country in tackling the interrelated challenges of climate change and energy security in the twenty-first
century. Since
the 1700s, and even since the 1930s, policy problems and the American system of
governance have evolved into complex and conflictive issues, particularly in the arena of energy and
the environment. The challenges today are wicked problems, in that they lack simple, “correct”
solutions to the on-going dilemmas requiring action under conditions of uncertainty (Rittel & Webber 1973).
When it comes to climate and energy, institutions and actors do not always agree that there is a problem, debate the nature of the problem,
and do not always agree on the level of governance for the problem. In exploring solutions, policy-makers and the public also must compromise
on competing policy goals related to individual liberties and opportunities, program cost and economic development, and environmental
outcomes. State
government programs are useful examples of these policies in process.
Renewables Link
States are in charge of renewable policy- plan upsets the balance of federalism
Klass and Wilson ’12 [Alexandra Klass, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and Solly
Robins Distinguished Research Fellow, University of Minnesota Law School, Elizabeth Wilson, Associate
Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of
Minnesota, “Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch,”
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Klass_Transmission_Article_2_12.pdf]
As noted earlier, it
is primarily the states rather than the federal government that are setting renewable
energy policy throughout the country, aside from the PTC and the current administration’s policy for federal lands. Moreover,
the bulk of siting and permitting authority for transmission lines continues to rest with the states . As a
result, at least until Congress takes an active role in renewable energy policy or partially or fully preempts state authority with regard to
transmission siting, it is impossible to talk about renewable energy or interstate transmission without placing a significant focus on the states.
As noted in Part I, state public utility commissions have authority to consider, evaluate, approve, and site intrastate and interstate transmission
lines. 122 Resting
so much authority with the states for the siting and operation of what is a regional and
national transmission system poses unique federalism challenges. As background, the U.S.
Constitution creates a system of “dual sovereignty” between the federal government and the states,
where the federal government has enumerated and supreme powers that are limited in scope and the
states have residual broad and plenary powers. 123 This federalist system assures: A decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry. 124
States Key
Dynamic federalism puts more responsibility on the states to reduce environmental
problems associated with fracking
Powers, ’11 [Emily C. Powers, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School. Journal of Law & Policy.
“FRACKING AND FEDERALISM: SUPPORT FOR AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH THAT AVOIDS THE TRAGEDY OF
THE REGULATORY COMMONS”. LexisNexis.]
2. Adaptive Federalism and the Regulatory Commons¶ One theory has recently emerged that describes an
"ecological" approach to environmental federalism. n142 Critiquing economics-based theories as ill equipped to address
the complexity of environmental issues, not to mention the environmental law framework, Kirsten H. Engel and David E. Adelman describe
"adaptive
federalism" as a form of federalism that embraces flexibility and overlap, features that
make ecological systems more durable. n143 According to Engel and Adelman, adaptive federalism is likely to be
more responsive to the complexities and variation inherent in environmental problems and to result
in higher levels of protection than the "classical" or "static" conceptions, like the matching principle, which they
argue assume away critical [*937] variables. n144 By contrast, adaptive federalism relies on the institutional stability of
our existing environmental law while encouraging flexibility that allows regulators to react to an everevolving body of information. n145¶ William Buzbee's discussion of the regulatory commons supplements adaptive federalism by
focusing on the operative concerns about overregulation that motivate proponents of matching approaches. n146 Buzbee points out that
matching jurisdiction to environmental problems can be difficult because many issues are crossjurisdictional. n147 Buzbee argues that even where there appears to be too much regulation, as in apparently
robust regulatory frameworks, gaps develop due to perceptions of jurisdictional inadequacy, paucity
of incentives, and political machinations. n148 Regulators become inattentive to regulatory opportunities because, for
instance, multiple regulators share jurisdiction, or causes and effects of an activity make it difficult to identify the regulatory body with
controlling jurisdiction. n149 Buzbee's discussion suggests that the etiology of commons problems is structural and behavioral, and may be
pervasive even where a state has sole regulatory authority. Moreover, despite
the potential for jurisdictional confusion that
commons problems are more likely to be
prevented by clarifying roles and granting a variety of regulators increased responsibility for problems
than by contracting jurisdiction and reducing available resources. n151¶ [*938] ¶ III. Hydrofracking: The
Regulatory Framework ¶ Several holes in federal environmental laws allow hydrofracking to escape
federal oversight. n152 Some exemptions have been explicitly placed in statutes. n153 Other aspects of hydrofracking slip through
loopholes in the laws or simply do not trigger the existing scheme. n154 Therefore, regulatory authority has been handed to
state governments. New York's proposed regime may not provide adequate protection from hydrofracking's harms. n155 In addition,
overlapping vertical jurisdiction presents, n150 one can conclude that regulatory
New York prevents local governments from exercising direct regulatory authority over hydrofracking processes, leaving localities vulnerable to
potential environmental and public health harms. n156¶ A.
Federal Regulation ¶ Like any activity with an impact on the environment,
oil and gas industry successfully lobbied
federal environmental laws touch upon aspects of hydrofracking. n157 However, the
for exemptions for hydrofracking n158 from several major federal environmental laws, many of which went into effect with the
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("the Act"). n159 Apparently, the view that exemption from federal statutes and [*939] reduced
federal oversight of oil and gas development would lead to increased energy independence and development of so-called bridge fuels, like
natural gas, prevailed in Congress. n160 However, some critics are suspicious of the motives behind what skeptics have termed the "Halliburton
loophole." n161 Whatever its intent, Congress
removed federal oversight of most aspects of hydrofracking and
its component practices.¶ Section 322 of the Act exempts hydraulic fracturing from the SDWA, which protects public and municipal
water supplies from underground injection and disposal of hazardous substances through imposition of water quality standards. n162 Further,
the Act effectively exempted wellpad construction activities associated with hydrofracking from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) under the CWA. n163 In addition, because Congress rolled hydrofracking-related practices into its [*940] exemption language,
it potentially expanded existing oil and gas exemptions in CERCLA to aspects of site construction, drilling, and postfracking production. n164 The
Act also weakened review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by presuming that certain categorical exclusions apply for oil and
gas extraction. n165 Hydrofracking is also exempt from RCRA, which provides for federal oversight of storage and disposal of hazardous
materials, n166 and from toxic substance reporting requirements under EPCRA. n167¶ Hydrofracking is not entirely beyond the scope of federal
oversight, yet significant federal involvement is unlikely given the structure of potentially applicable laws .
States must still meet water quality standards under the CWA and the CAA's national ambient air quality standards via existing state-formulated
plans. However, current interpretations
of "navigable waterways" make it unlikely that the federal
government has jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate emissions unless a "significant nexus" exists
between an impacted groundwater connection and navigable waters. n168 Establishing a "significant nexus" is
likely a difficult showing in the hydrofracking context, as most impacts will be on groundwater sources that are hard if not impossible to trace to
navigable waters. n169 In addition, the EPA will not aggregate air [*941] emissions from the various operations that occur on a wellpad, and the
agency has exempted pollutants emitted by surface waste, like fracking fluid, from stationary source regulation under the CAA. n170 Courts are
also unlikely to hold that the CAA applies to increased emissions from truck traffic. n171 Finally, although savings clauses in federal laws
preserve state police powers and common law authority, n172 including tort liability for harm after the fact, standing and evidentiary hurdles
typically prevent recovery in suits brought over environmental harms. n173 Thus, the
federal government has effectively
vacated the field, and regulation of hydrofracking is achieved via a patchwork of state policies. n174
Although industry often welcomes federal standard setting when faced with the burden of meeting a proliferation of state schemes, n175 it is apparent that in the hydrofracking context,
industry supporters have preferred a state-led approach. n176¶ B. State Regulatory Scheme ¶ State police power includes the authority to regulate activity that impacts natural resources and
human health, and New York State has exercised this power to propose comparatively stringent [*942] environmental regulations on hydrofracking. n177 Article 23 of the New York
Environmental Conservation Law n178 ("Article 23") establishes the DEC's broad jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas extraction via its Division of Mineral Resources, n179 with dual regulatory
goals of encouragement of natural gas development and protection of correlative ownership. n180 In addition, the Department of Transportation has jurisdiction over transportation of
hazardous materials, n181 and the Public Service Commission regulates siting of gas gathering lines, which is not subject to public review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), New York's NEPA corollary. n182¶ Pursuant to SEQRA, the DEC has devised a land use focused regulatory strategy over hydrofracking implemented largely via permitting and
reporting requirements. n183 The DEC prepared its draft supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS), released in 2009, after receiving applications for permits to drill using
high-volume hydrofracking methods. n184 The SGEIS supplements the DEC's Generic Environmental Impact Statement, n185 which outlines the agency's approach to conventional [*943]
extraction methods and which proved inadequate to address the significantly greater environmental impacts from high volume hydrofracking. n186¶ The regulatory strategy the DEC has
presented in the SGEIS concerns many New Yorkers. The most significant concern that critics share is that the agency is inadequately funded or staffed to ensure compliance with state
regulations and policies. n187 For instance, as of 2009, the Division of Mineral Resources had only sixteen enforcement staff members to oversee more than thirteen thousand conventional
wells. n188 Even drillers are concerned that their permits will be held up by administrative delays because DEC's staff is inadequate to process the large number of forthcoming requests.
n189¶ [*944] Critics are also concerned that the DEC's plan does not address the cumulative impacts of even routine aspects of hydrofracking. n190 The SGEIS deals with these effects in a
cursory fashion and asserts that too much uncertainty exists to be able to assess them with accuracy. n191 Many critics feel the DEC's failure to address these impacts is unsatisfactory, for it is
the uncertainty of these effects that frustrates attempts to prepare for them and compounds the risk of harm. n192 For example, small-scale chemical spills, accidents, and incremental
burdens on surface waters and infrastructure are difficult for localities to anticipate without more information about how extensive drilling will be. n193 Some also suggest that the state has
not recognized the extent of hidden economic costs associated with environmental contamination and the potential loss of ecosystem services. n194 Similarly, there are concerns that
emergency management plans are lacking and that worst case scenarios have not been sufficiently elaborated, in light of federal exemptions. n195 Moreover, many hold that the DEC
inadequately considered the findings and conclusions of regulators from other states that have experienced harms from horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing. n196 There is
widespread concern that the DEC has not ensured there will be full, public disclosure of chemical components in fracking fluid, and some urge public reporting requirements for frack fluid
components, all locations of [*945] drilling operations, and any spills or contamination. n197 Overall, the SGEIS leaves concern that once hydrofracking kicks into high gear, the State will not be
poised to address problems that arise. Addressing emergencies and incidental effects will be largely left to localities, which bear the most risk of immediate harms from hydrofracking.¶ C.
Local Roles ¶ As a home rule state, New York typically allows municipalities a degree of latitude to govern local activities. n198 However, Article 23 stipulates that the State's regulatory
program "supersedes all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining industries" although local primacy over road use and property taxes are retained.
n199 For instance, the State will not require local approval of permits under its State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) and corollary Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan
(SWPPP) program. n200 Thus, localities will not have control over such critical decisions as wellpad siting, stormwater planning, erosion control, or pipeline placement. n201 The State has
issued nonbinding directives to industry to consult with local planning documents and procedures in siting decisions, and operators are expected to comply with local floodplain permitting
[*946] requirements that establish broadly applicable siting and setback guidelines. n202 However, localities cannot set any laws or regulations that specifically refer to or are clearly directed
at hydrofracking activities. n203 Thus, hydrofracking is not subject to zoning restrictions, although zoning has long been considered a valid exercise of local authority. n204 Localities are
nonetheless expected to investigate water quality complaints n205 and provide emergency response services. n206 Waste disposal and sanitation are also typically local responsibilities, which
will be dramatically impacted by the high volume of flowback water, waste, and drill [*947] cuttings from hydrofracking operations. n207 Despite the significant emergency responsibilities and
infrastructural demands hydrofracking poses, localities have few authoritative tools to help them prepare. n208¶ 1. Local Responses ¶ Many local officials in communities where hydrofracking
activity is likely to occur have been attempting to prepare for its probable impacts. n209 Several officials in gas-rich Tioga County, an area likely to see extensive hydrofracking activity, have
expressed frustration with their limited ability to influence the course of drilling or its effects. n210 In particular, some are frustrated by the fact that local discretion has been removed from
activities typically subject to local input, such as permitting for construction and industrial activities. n211 Others are less concerned about the State's primacy, do not feel lack of federal
oversight is an issue of concern, and downplay fears over some of hydrofracking's risks. n212 While some are concerned to an extent about threats to the environment and public health, few
feel it is within his or her authority to take a position on whether hydrofracking should be encouraged or prevented. n213 Most see the value in compromise, [*948] given the contentious
nature of hydrofracking and its perceived inevitability. n214 Understandably, local officials are interested in achieving pragmatic solutions with what little regulatory authority they have. n215
Several seem persuaded that, as heavy users of natural gas, New Yorkers have an obligation to permit drilling. n216 Furthermore, local officials recognize the State's interest in encouraging gas
production and understand the rationale behind cutting off local input and control. n217 Opposition at the local level could allow a few individuals to stall or prevent fracking, which would be
undesirable and unacceptable n218 given the many interests in favor of drilling and the benefits that would come from gas production - even if local opposition could provide a bulwark against
hydrofracking's harms.¶ [*949] ¶ 2. Mitigating Impacts from Hydrofracking ¶ Some officials in Tioga County seek to mitigate impacts from hydrofracking through traditional means of municipal
control. n219 While a few towns and villages in New York State are testing their zoning discretion, n220 this power is less relevant in Tioga County, where most towns and villages do not have
comprehensive zoning plans in place. n221 Therefore, concerned county officials have focused instead on tweaking traffic rules and on implementing light, noise, and wellhead protection
ordinances, which restrict uses and set water quality standards within municipal borders. n222 Localities may also require ancillary service providers or businesses, such as pipe yards and
chemical storage facilities, to comply with standards for lighting, traffic flow, and signage under site plan review ordinances - although site plan review does not apply to drilling or hydraulic
fracturing processes themselves. n223¶ It is important to note the limitations of these regulatory tools. In Tioga County, for example, while twelve of the fifteen towns and villages do now
have site plan review ordinances in place, only four have enacted zoning regulations. n224 The majority of towns have not enacted new ordinances in anticipation of hydrofracking besides site
plan review, and enacting these measures would not ultimately be feasible. n225 Zoning plans require staff and expertise to formulate, while noise and light ordinances and traffic plans
require prohibitively expensive environmental testing and [*950] engineering consultants. n226 In addition, wellhead protection plans do not apply where a town lacks a public water supply
and are not applicable to wellpad activity. n227¶ There are also political obstacles to implementing new measures. n228 Many towns and villages have only part-time or volunteer officials
without the institutional capacity or political will to enact new ordinances. n229 Furthermore, there is frequently opposition to measures that appear to increase governmental interference
with private property rights, even in protective ways. n230 In addition, county legislators have proven to be unwilling to address fears about hydrofracking given uncertainty over practical
issues, n231 such as whether groundwater contamination is a serious concern. The county is also suffering from "personnel drain," as some of the best-trained and most knowledgeable
workers are hired by industry in anticipation of drilling. n232 Furthermore, the State has not provided supplemental resources to help localities prepare, nor has it indicated it will do so once
fracking begins in earnest. n233¶ Perhaps the most crucial tool localities lack is adequate [*951] enforcement ability. n234 Towns and villages do not have the necessary financial resources to
conduct adequate oversight or ensure that violations of local laws are addressed. n235 By contrast, energy companies generally have more than sufficient resources to pay small fines, which
are therefore not likely to deter behavior that results in harm. n236 Energy companies also tend to have significant legal resources readily available to challenge town enforcement attempts or
to counter opposition. n237¶ Aware of their disproportionate resources, localities have facilitated relationships with industry and sought voluntary agreements in which they seek
commitments for infrastructure investments. n238 For instance, officials seek promises that industry will purchase firefighting equipment; n239 build, repave, and [*952] maintain roads; n240
use closed systems to store fracking fluid; n241 and disclose the chemicals used in fracking mixtures. n242 In one striking example, the Tioga County Emergency Management Office will rely
solely on industry to extinguish any wellpad fires. n243 In addition to realizing that basic needs will be better met if they work with private industry, local officials are interested in fostering
positive and cooperative relationships with firms operating in and among their communities. n244¶ IV. Hydrofracking and Environmental Federalism¶ New York's experience with
an adaptive approach to regulation is more likely to result in sufficient environmental
protection than an approach that attempts to match potential problems with a level of authority
based on geography. While an essentially localized activity, hydrofracking nonetheless presents a regulatory
challenge to state and local governments. n245 Deciding whether to encourage or limit hydrofracking requires a highly
subjective analysis that relies on uncertain and incomplete [*953] information about risk. n246 Meanwhile, state and local
hydrofracking illustrates how
decisionmakers are incentivized to accept risk of harms they lack resources to prevent or mitigate. n247
Applying federal laws to hydrofracking would help relieve some of the pressures on state and local authorities by placing the burden of
precaution onto energy companies. n248 Moreover, there may be appreciable benefits to fostering a flexible regime that includes responsive
interaction among all three levels of government. n249 Finally, an active
federal role in regulating new technologies like
hydrofracking can give states and localities a better chance to formulate policies aligned with their
resources and expertise, leading to increased political accountability, jurisdictional confidence, and
fewer regulatory commons problems. n250¶ A. Strict State Primacy: A Poor Match for Hydrofracking¶ In many respects, the
existing federal approach to regulation of hydrofracking would likely meet the approval of matching principal proponents. A land-based activity
without any obvious interstate impacts, hydrofracking seems a good candidate for a state-led approach, and the federal government essentially
has mandated state primacy. n251 Federal regulation would increase costs and slow fracking efforts. n252 If federal laws were operative,
[*954] industry, states, and localities would bear additional SDWA compliance burdens. n253 Energy companies would have to comply with and
obtain permits under the CWA, which are costly and delay development. Aggregation of emissions from wellpad activity or truck traffic under
the CAA would increase permitting and cause companies to incur pollution control costs. Removal of exemption from CERCLA would increase
risk of liability that would create disincentives to drill, and strengthened NEPA review would also add time and cost to preproduction planning.
Regulation under RCRA would also add time and expense to disposal of fracking byproducts. Moreover, and especially given the extensive
private property interests involved in hydrofracking, local geographic, socioeconomic, geological, and hydrological differences make state
regulation arguably more appropriate than federal regulation to meet unique state preferences. n254¶ However, an
analysis of New
York's experience with hydrofracking to date suggests that state primacy may well result in
underprotection and even hamper production activity. n255 Notably, New York's proposed regulations are more
protective than those in many other states, n256 yet its plan nonetheless has demonstrated weaknesses. n257 New York's inadequate
enforcement and oversight capacity and its failure to anticipate cumulative impacts may mean that state primacy will result in unintended and
undesirable outcomes. n258¶ First, it is important to note that New York's regulations
may not result in protection of some
baseline standards that EPA has established. n259 For instance, concentrations of toxic pollutants in flowback hydrofracking
fluids have measured in excess of amounts [*955] that would be permissible under the SDWA, and flowback fluids can be high in pollutants
ruled hazardous under RCRA. n260 Because New York State has not updated its wetland map after pivotal Supreme Court decisions that altered
federal jurisdiction over wetlands, n261 there may be pollutant releases onto what should be federally regulated land. n262 New York's ability
to achieve water quality standards under the CWA may be seriously overestimated in light of criticism that the State has not accurately
estimated the extent of cumulative impacts on water quality. n263 Air emissions from wellpad activities, if aggregated, might far exceed the
minimum requirements that trigger the CAA. n264 These
examples demonstrate that New York's scheme might
result in failure to meet federal standards that would apply absent exemptions or do apply to the
same or similar harms caused by other industries and suggest that as a threshold matter, state
primacy over hydrofracking will create results inconsistent with existing law .¶ Furthermore, the New York
scheme's reliance on local implementation of emergency planning, public health, waste disposal, and road regulation enhances the probability
that unintended harms may occur. The
level of risk that localities are expected to bear is disproportionate to the
resources they have to handle that risk. n265 As a result, the State's regulatory regime is [*956] effectively
dependent on voluntary industry action. n266 Local officials hope energy companies will agree to provide necessary
infrastructure - like roads - and emergency response support - like basic firefighting equipment - even though the industry has incentives to
downplay and minimize concerns to the detriment of preparedness. n267 Moreover, experiences
of local officials show that
localities do not feel well equipped to handle even routine incidental, let alone catastrophic, impacts
from fracking and that they lack reliable information to help them bargain with energy companies
optimally. n268¶ Lack of oversight and enforcement powers at state and local levels may lead to lax,
inconsistent, or insufficient compliance with existing state and local regulations. n269 Even where officials are
dedicated to proactive prevention and oversight efforts, local [*957] staffs are inadequate to conduct inspections that would ensure
that companies - who may be unfamiliar with desired or mandated local practices, given variation from town to town - are heeding regulations
and ordinances. n270 If noncompliance is detected, local
enforcement power does not appear sufficient to induce
inspectors can lead to severely
adherence to laws. n271 Furthermore, at the state level, an insufficient number of wellpad
reduced checks on drilling and production activities, which may make it more likely that harm-generating errors will occur. n272 If harm
does occur, lack of oversight may make identification of the responsible party difficult, given the number of
component processes that make up hydrofracking. n273¶ New York's experience also illustrates some of the difficulty of drawing jurisdictional
lines around complicated environmental problems that have corollary economic benefits. New York is proceeding to set its jurisdictional lines
by declaring what hydrofracking's impacts are likely to be, by establishing permitting and policy standards in its SGEIS to respond to these
impacts, and by restricting local authority. n274 Yet the defects in New York's [*958] proposed scheme suggest that state regulators have
downplayed or failed to anticipate fully the gravity of uncertain impacts, which has led to inaccurate characterization of problems and poor
allocation of authority. n275 Furthermore, because DEC regulators are not responsible for the kinds of issues that first responders at the local
level face, such as waste disposal, road degradation, emergency response, or even local air quality, problems within the jurisdiction of localities
are likely to prove beyond any local regulator's control or resources to address. n276 Moreover, the
uncertainty over whether
hydrofracking should be viewed as presenting problems rather than opportunities has fostered
ambivalence that colors local elected officials' willingness to cast hydrofracking as a policy priority . n277
Thus, many of the attempts to address potential harms have been initiated by unelected officials who
are concerned about harm and feel they should prepare now in order to help forestall foreseeable
problems. n278 Unelected local officials effectively are left with a Hobson's choice - they can either curry favor with energy companies and
establish voluntary agreements and risk considerable harm, or push the boundaries of what might be permitted by law, such as attempting to
zone out hydrofracking, only to find they have overstepped their power and in the process have alienated and lost the ability to work with and
extract concessions from gas producers. n279 In addition, confusion
about jurisdiction with regard to foreseeable
harms may lead local decisionmakers to be even more reluctant to grapple with [*959] unforeseeable
and novel problems that arise. n280 Drawing strict jurisdictional boundaries around an environmental
issue without fully addressing the scope of possible problems or recognizing the asymmetry between
local and industry resources creates a danger that the drawn boundaries will prove arbitrary or fail to
account for the broad scope of consequent harms. Thus, setting strict jurisdictional lines - especially
where, as here, there is pressure to underregulate n281 - might leave designated regulators unprepared,
while responsibility for handling many intractable problems will be pushed off onto those who are not
politically accountable. n282
Yes Modeled
Yes cooperative federalism is the US is modeled by Russia and solves forest fires
Wilkson 5 (Jim, “Up in Smoke: Using Cooperative U.S. Forest Fire Management Policies as a Model for
Implementing an Effective Forest Fire Prevention Program in the Russia Far East,” Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal, 14(2), p. 575-606, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/676/14PacRimLPoly J575.pdf?sequence=1)
2. The U.S. NFP Is a Working Example of "Cooperative Federalism" and Could Provide a Workable
Model for Wildfire Prevention in the RFE After fires burned millions of acres across the American West during the severe 2000
directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior Department to prepare a
report recommending how best to respond to severe fires, reduce the impacts of wildfires on rural
communities, and ensure sufficient firefighting resources for the future. 125 This report became known as the NFP,
126 a cooperative, intergovernmental fire management program aimed at preventing wildfires. 127 The NFP prioritizes federal and
local community cooperation to reduce fire danger, in part through fuel reduction projects and prescribed burning.1 28 It
wildfire season, President Bill Clinton
expands community participation in fire management and improves local fire protection capabilities through financial and technical assistance
to state, local, and volunteer firefighting efforts. 129 The Wildland Fire Leadership Council, an oversight committee composed of federal, state,
tribal, and county officials, coordinates and implements the NFP. 3 ° Reducing fire danger in the wildland/urban interface is a major goal of the
NFP. 13 1 Federal land management agencies are implementing community-assistance programs that focus on "building state and community
capacity to develop and implement citizen-driven solutions that will lessen local vulnerability to risks associated with wildland fires."' 32 For
example, federal and state agencies in Oregon, using NFP funds, are working with local fire departments and community officials to complete
preventative hazardous fuels reduction projects. 133 In California, a state-led process identified more than seven hundred communities as high
risk for extreme fires. Local crews are now working to reduce hazardous fuels on adjacent federal forest lands and NFP funds are partially
funding the project. 134 If adequately funded and implemented in an ecologically sensitive manner, cooperative
fire management
programs like the NFP have the potential to provide local governments and communities with the tools
necessary to better prevent forest fires. Programs created under cooperative fire management policies
like the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act and the NFP have resulted in measurable success reducing the risk of
severe fires.'
35 As of 2001, the Forest Service had released $118 million of NFP grants for community fire-assistance programs.' 36 These
NFP grants have funded numerous projects, including state fire readiness plans, community fire prevention education programs, and hazardous
fuels elimination. 137 Russia would be better equipped to prevent wildfires in the RFE if it implemented a similar fire management framework.
This approach should be mandated in the Draft Forest Code. Like the RFE, the American West has experienced catastrophic wildfire seasons in
recent years, in large part due to historically misguided fire suppression policies. 138 Unlike
the Russian government, however,
the U.S. government has responded to the crisis through legally-mandated fire management programs
that emphasize cooperative solutions to reducing the fire danger at the community level. The common thread
running between the two countries is the need for cooperative fire management programs between
the federal and local levels. The United States has created a workable framework for coordinated fire management through
programs like the NFP, which integrates federal agencies, state governments, and communities into the fire management process. Applying
a similar framework in Russian forestry laws would help fire protection agencies and local citizens
establish effective fire prevention programs in the RFE. Implementing a cooperative fire management
framework would also move Russia towards compliance with international forestry guidelines, as
discussed in the following section.
Turns Case
This cards good – it does turn and solve the case
Kay 12 - Cornell Community and Regional Development Institute( Energy Federalism: Who Decides?¶
David Kay July 2012)
The theory of devolved federalism turns several of these arguments on their heads, reframing them to
provide support for states’ rights and local home rule. These arguments have been prominent in
much modern land use and environmental legislation during the recent decades of devolutionary
policy at the federal level. Briefly, decentralization is advocated because it enables experimentation
and innovation (eg. “ let 50 state regulations bloom” ). Devolved federalism posits a kind of race to
the top. It focuses on models of innovation wherein forces of competition enable the adoption and
diffusion of best governance and regulatory practices (“positive contagion”). Because of the
pragmatics and politics of information flows (ie. it is difficult to monitor, communicate with, and
influence multiple agencies) and the need to access many different decision makers, devolution makes
it less rather than more likely that single powerful interests will “capture” all regulatory agencies.
Devolved federalism facilitates greater flexibility in tailoring regulation to state and local problems,
based on a) better and more relevant information for the issue at hand, associated with an
acknowledgement of the importance of diversity in local conditions, and b) variable local preferences
and the importance of optimizing the potential for choice (c.f public choice theory). Devolved
federalism also improves accountability and equity insofar as it is deeply influenced by theories and
normative values associated with participatory democracy and, in turn, its roots in ancient republican
ideas about “civic virtue”.
China Russia !
Lack of Chinese climate adaptation causes China-Russia War
Weitz 12 - Director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis [Richard Weitz, “Superpower Symbiosis: The RussiaChina Axis,” World Affairs, November/December 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/cjcc3v2
A major worsening
of China-Russia ties would actually represent a regression to the mean . The modern
Chinese-Russian relationship has most often been characterized by bloody wars , imperial conquests ,
and mutual denunciations . It has only been during the last twenty years, when Russian power had been decapitated by its lost
Soviet empire and China has found itself a rising economic—but still militarily weak—power that the two countries have managed to achieve a
harmonious balance in their relationship. While China now has the world’s second-largest economy, Russia has the world’s second most
powerful military, thanks largely to its vast reserves of nuclear weapons. But China
could soon surpass Russia in terms of
conventional military. Under these conditions, Moscow could well join other countries bordering
China in pursuing a containment strategy designed to balance, though not prevent, China’s rising power.
Heightened China-Russia tensions over border regions are also a possibility. The demographic disparity
that exists between the Russian Far East and northern China invariably raises the question of whether
Chinese nationals will move northward to exploit the natural riches of under-populated eastern Russia.
Border tensions could increase if poorly managed development, combined with pollution, land seizures, and climate
change , drive poor Chinese peasants into Russian territory. Russians no longer worry about a potential military
clash with China over border issues, but they still fear that the combination of four factors—the declining ethnic Russian population in the
Russian Far East, Chinese interest in acquiring greater access to the energy and other natural resources of
the region, the growing disparity in the aggregate size of the Chinese and Russian national economies due to China’s higher growth rate,
and suspected large-scale illegal Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East—will result in China’s de
facto peaceful annexation of large parts of eastern Russia. Although the Russian Federation is the largest country in the world in
terms of territory, China has more than nine times as many people.
With the end of the NATO combat role in Afghanistan, an immediate source of tension could be Russian pressure on China to cease its buckpassing and join Russia in assuming the burden of stabilizing that country. Should US power in the Pacific falter, China
and Russia
might also become natural rivals for the allegiance of the weak states of East Asia looking for a new great-power patron. But for
now such prospects linger in the background as Beijing and Moscow savor a far smoother
relationship than the one they shared back in the day, when they competed to see which would achieve
the one true communism.
Russia will fight to control the RFE. It can’t win without nuclear escalation
Rousseau 12 - Professor and Chair of Political Science and International Relations @ Khazar University [Richard Rousseau, “Will China
Colonize and Incorporate Siberia?,” Harvard International Review, July 9, 2012 | 12:07 AM, pg. http://tinyurl.com/c55zp3n
If Siberia is in fact awaiting a Chinese Future, a number of scenarios might unfold over the next decade. The
Russia
is not only the continuation of ethnic
worst-case scenario for
Chinese migration but a substantial rise of it in response to changes taking place in
northern China. Russia’s Far East would then become predominantly inhabited by ethnics Chinese, resulting in a decisive change in
the nature of a region already far-removed from European Russia.
Military aggression, which seems highly improbable for now, cannot be totally ruled out in the long term. Although it is a
fact that the Russian army lacks the latest modern weaponry, historically its strength has always lain in its
number of troops, not in its cutting-edge technology. At Poltava in 1709, Galicia in 1914 and Stalingrad in 1942, the
Russians did not liberate or retake these lands because they had more advanced military technology at their
disposal or developed cleverer tactics, but rather because they had a large numerical superiority over the enemy. This
numerical advantage would dissipate entirely in the face of the Chinese armed forces , which are ten
times larger. The inferiority of Russia’s conventional forces is also aggravated by the shortage of
conscripts, a consequence of the country’s demographic decline. However, with regards to nuclear weapons, Russia’s
total of approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads surpasses China‘s total of approximately 240 nuclear
warheads. The Russian economy may lag far behind China’s, but the Russian Army is still a frightening force and should not be
underestimated.
For instance, in June and July 2010,
Russian armed forces conducted Vostok 2010, a series of 10-day
unprecedented military exercises. These were made up of a set of strategic exercises that involved 20,000 troops, up to 70
warplanes and 30 warships from the Far Eastern, Siberian and Volga-Urals military districts, as well as the Pacific Fleet. Designed primarily to
put the military to the test, these
wargames were also a warning to Chinese military officials who were present during
the exercise. Vostok 2010 simulated a response to a possible attack from China. It included the firing of live
ammunition, simulated airborne assaults and amphibious assault landings.
Disasters !
Dynamic environmental federalism is key to disaster mitigation.
Griffin 7[Stephen M. Griffin, Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School,
Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, Journal of Civil Rights and
Economic Development, Volume 21, Issue 2 Volume 21, Spring 2007, Issue 2 Article 6]
And so it is still the case that when
natural disasters strike, the divided power of the federal structure presents
a coordination problem. The kind of coordination that had to occur to avoid the Katrina disaster requires long-term planning before the
event. The American constitutional system makes taking intergovernmental action difficult and complex.
The process of coordinating governments can take years. In many ways, the government was just at the beginning of that process at the time of
Katrina,48 although we are now four years distant from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that set the latest round of disaster coordination in
motion.
Suppose, however, that we don't have the luxury of taking the time to satisfy every official with a veto. This
is the key point of tension between what contemporary governance demands and what the
Constitution permits. The kind of limited change that occurred in 1927 can take us only so far. What Hurricane Katrina showed
was that even after decades of experience with natural disasters, the federal and state governments were still
uncoordinated and unprepared. The reasons they were unprepared go to the heart of the
constitutional order.
III. FEDERAL LESSONS
Unless we learn some lessons, Katrina
will happen again. It may be a massive earthquake, an influenza
pandemic, a terrorist attack, or even another hurricane, but the same ill-coordinated response will
indeed happen again unless some attention is paid to the constitutional and institutional lessons of Katrina.
We need to "stop federalism" before it kills again. That is, we need to stop our customary thinking about what federalism
requires in order to prevent another horrific loss of life and property. First, let's approach the difficult questions left by the legacy of decades of
informal constitutional change not reflected in the text of the Constitution. These changes mean that there is no real sense in which we can act to
preserve and extend eighteenth century federal values. Much of the formal institutional structure is there (but not all - see the Fourteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments), but its meaning has been altered by informal constitutional change, most of which occurred in the twentieth century. So if
we sound the call, as the House Committee did, for remaining faithful to the values of eighteenth century federalism, we become unthinking believers
in an ideology that does not relate to contemporary reality. Moreover, the formal structure that does carry over from the eighteenth century is
misleading because it has been supplemented and subtly altered by continuous institutional change.
The federal system as it exists today is our system, not that of the founding generation. "We" - generations still alive - created it and we are continuing
to change it. The best example during the Bush administration was the No Child Left Behind Act,49 legislation that involved an unprecedented
intrusion into a subject, education, that everyone used to agree should be left to the states - at least left to the states for most of American history. 50
In any event, if this system is ours, we are responsible for its successful operation and we can decide to change it for good and sufficient reasons.
There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent us from doing better the next time. We can stop
traditional federalist ways of thinking in order to prevent disasters and aid disaster victims when the worst
occurs. An obvious place to start, one that has occurred to both the White House and the House Select Committee, is with the assumption that the
initiative should lie with state and local governments and that the federal government should wait until their help is requested. The federal government
already had installations, resources and personnel in the New Orleans area prior to Katrina and could have moved far more aggressively on its own to
render assistance. Only previous national policy, based not on the Constitution itself, but on a sense of constitutional protocol, stood in the way.
Unfortunately, more than protocol stands in the way of preventing future disasters. Whether the policy is flood
control, communications, or (perhaps in a future disaster) a massive need for medical care, the separated layers of government make coordination
inherently difficult and time-consuming. Here the
federal government will have to be far more directive than it has been
in order to avoid future Katrinas. It will have to condition federal aid in these areas on timetables, the use of specific technology, and
review by independent experts such as the National Academy of Sciences.
Unmitigated disasters cause extinction.
Sid-Ahmed 5 [Mohamed, Political analyst for the Al-Ahram Newspaper, The post-earthquake world,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/724/op3.htm]
The contradiction between Man and Nature has reached unprecedented heights, forcing us to re-examine our understanding of the existing world system. US President
George W Bush has announced the creation of an international alliance between the US, Japan, India, Australia and any other nation wishing to join that will work to help
the stricken region overcome the huge problems it is facing in the wake of the tsunamis. Actually,
regional but
the implications of the disaster are not only
global, not to say cosmic. Is it possible to mobilise all the inhabitants of our planet to the extent and at the speed necessary to avert similar disasters in
future? How to engender the required state of emergency, that is, a different type of inter-human relations which rise to the level of the challenge before contradictions
between the various sections of the world community make that collective effort unrealisable?
The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What
happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and climatic disturbances in general threaten to
make our natural habitat unfit for human life. The extinction of the species has become a very real
possibility, whether by our own hand or as a result of natural disasters of a much greater magnitude than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it
spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in
the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life.
Today, human conflicts have become less of a threat than the confrontation between Man and Nature. At least they are less likely to bring about the end of the human
reactions of nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies have become more important in
determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself.
species. The
Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet.
Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level. This perception has changed following the devastating earthquake and tsunamis that hit the coastal
regions of South Asia and, less violently, of East Africa, on 26 December.
This cataclysmic event has underscored the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature and shaken the sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way
away.
Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with the notion that the extinction of the
human race will not occur before a long-term future that will only materialise after millions of years and not affect us
directly in any way. We are now forced to live with the possibility of an imminent demise of humankind.
Fracking !
Dynamic federalism is key to fracking regulation
Powers, ’11 [Emily C. Powers, J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School. Journal of Law & Policy.
“FRACKING AND FEDERALISM: SUPPORT FOR AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH THAT AVOIDS THE TRAGEDY OF
THE REGULATORY COMMONS”. LexisNexis.]
2. Adaptive Federalism and the Regulatory Commons
One theory has recently emerged that describes an "ecological" approach to environmental
federalism. n142 Critiquing economics-based theories as ill equipped to address the complexity of environmental issues, not to mention
the environmental law framework, Kirsten H. Engel and David E. Adelman describe "adaptive federalism" as a form of
federalism that embraces flexibility and overlap, features that make ecological systems more durable.
n143 According to Engel and Adelman, adaptive federalism is likely to be more responsive to the complexities
and variation inherent in environmental problems and to result in higher levels of protection than the
"classical" or "static" conceptions, like the matching principle, which they argue assume away critical [*937] variables. n144 By
contrast, adaptive federalism relies on the institutional stability of our existing environmental law while
encouraging flexibility that allows regulators to react to an ever-evolving body of information. n145
William Buzbee's discussion of the regulatory commons supplements adaptive federalism by focusing on the operative concerns about
overregulation that motivate proponents of matching approaches. n146 Buzbee points out that matching
jurisdiction to
environmental problems can be difficult because many issues are cross-jurisdictional. n147 Buzbee argues
that even where there appears to be too much regulation, as in apparently robust regulatory
frameworks, gaps develop due to perceptions of jurisdictional inadequacy, paucity of incentives, and
political machinations. n148 Regulators become inattentive to regulatory opportunities because, for instance, multiple regulators
share jurisdiction, or causes and effects of an activity make it difficult to identify the regulatory body with controlling jurisdiction. n149 Buzbee's
discussion suggests that the etiology of commons problems is structural and behavioral, and may be pervasive even where a state has sole
regulatory authority. Moreover, despite
the potential for jurisdictional confusion that overlapping vertical jurisdiction
commons problems are more likely to be prevented by
clarifying roles and granting a variety of regulators increased responsibility for problems than by
contracting jurisdiction and reducing available resources. n151
[*938]
III. Hydrofracking: The Regulatory Framework
Several holes in federal environmental laws allow hydrofracking to escape federal oversight. n152 Some
presents, n150 one can conclude that regulatory
exemptions have been explicitly placed in statutes. n153 Other aspects of hydrofracking slip through loopholes in the laws or simply do not
trigger the existing scheme. n154 Therefore, regulatory authority has been handed to state governments. New York's
proposed regime may not provide adequate protection from hydrofracking's harms. n155 In addition, New York prevents local governments
from exercising direct regulatory authority over hydrofracking processes, leaving localities vulnerable to potential environmental and public
health harms. n156
A. Federal Regulation
Like any activity with an impact on the environment, federal environmental laws touch upon aspects of hydrofracking. n157 However, the
oil
and gas industry successfully lobbied for exemptions for hydrofracking n158 from several major federal
environmental laws, many of which went into effect with the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ("the Act"). n159 Apparently, the view
that exemption from federal statutes and [*939] reduced federal oversight of oil and gas development would lead to increased energy
independence and development of so-called bridge fuels, like natural gas, prevailed in Congress. n160 However, some critics are suspicious of
the motives behind what skeptics have termed the "Halliburton loophole." n161 Whatever its intent, Congress
removed federal
oversight of most aspects of hydrofracking and its component practices.
Section 322 of the Act exempts hydraulic fracturing from the SDWA, which protects public and municipal water supplies from underground
injection and disposal of hazardous substances through imposition of water quality standards. n162 Further, the Act effectively exempted
wellpad construction activities associated with hydrofracking from the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under the
CWA. n163 In addition, because Congress rolled hydrofracking-related practices into its [*940] exemption language, it potentially expanded
existing oil and gas exemptions in CERCLA to aspects of site construction, drilling, and postfracking production. n164 The Act also weakened
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by presuming that certain categorical exclusions apply for oil and gas extraction.
n165 Hydrofracking is also exempt from RCRA, which provides for federal oversight of storage and disposal of hazardous materials, n166 and
from toxic substance reporting requirements under EPCRA. n167
Hydrofracking is not entirely beyond the scope of federal oversight, yet significant
federal involvement is unlikely given the
structure of potentially applicable laws. States must still meet water quality standards under the CWA and the CAA's national
ambient air quality standards via existing state-formulated plans. However, current interpretations of "navigable
waterways" make it unlikely that the federal government has jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate
emissions unless a "significant nexus" exists between an impacted groundwater connection and
navigable waters. n168 Establishing a "significant nexus" is likely a difficult showing in the hydrofracking context, as most impacts will be
on groundwater sources that are hard if not impossible to trace to navigable waters. n169 In addition, the EPA will not aggregate air [*941]
emissions from the various operations that occur on a wellpad, and the agency has exempted pollutants emitted by surface waste, like fracking
fluid, from stationary source regulation under the CAA. n170 Courts are also unlikely to hold that the CAA applies to increased emissions from
truck traffic. n171 Finally, although savings clauses in federal laws preserve state police powers and common law authority, n172 including tort
liability for harm after the fact, standing and evidentiary hurdles typically prevent recovery in suits brought over environmental harms. n173
Thus, the
federal government has effectively vacated the field, and regulation of hydrofracking is
achieved via a patchwork of state policies. n174 Although industry often welcomes federal standard setting when faced with
the burden of meeting a proliferation of state schemes, n175 it is apparent that in the hydrofracking context, industry supporters have
preferred a state-led approach. n176
B. State Regulatory Scheme
State police power includes the authority to regulate activity that impacts natural resources and human health, and New York State has
exercised this power to propose comparatively stringent [*942] environmental regulations on hydrofracking. n177 Article 23 of the New York
Environmental Conservation Law n178 ("Article 23") establishes the DEC's broad jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas extraction via its Division of
Mineral Resources, n179 with dual regulatory goals of encouragement of natural gas development and protection of correlative ownership.
n180 In addition, the Department of Transportation has jurisdiction over transportation of hazardous materials, n181 and the Public Service
Commission regulates siting of gas gathering lines, which is not subject to public review under the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), New York's NEPA corollary. n182
Pursuant to SEQRA, the DEC has devised a land use focused regulatory strategy over hydrofracking implemented largely via permitting and
reporting requirements. n183 The DEC prepared its draft supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS), released in 2009,
after receiving applications for permits to drill using high-volume hydrofracking methods. n184 The SGEIS supplements the DEC's Generic
Environmental Impact Statement, n185 which outlines the agency's approach to conventional [*943] extraction methods and which proved
inadequate to address the significantly greater environmental impacts from high volume hydrofracking. n186
The regulatory strategy the DEC has presented in the SGEIS concerns many New Yorkers. The most significant concern that critics share is that
the agency is inadequately funded or staffed to ensure compliance with state regulations and policies. n187 For instance, as of 2009, the
Division of Mineral Resources had only sixteen enforcement staff members to oversee more than thirteen thousand conventional wells. n188
Even drillers are concerned that their permits will be held up by administrative delays because DEC's staff is inadequate to process the large
number of forthcoming requests. n189
[*944] Critics are also concerned that the DEC's plan does not address the cumulative impacts of even routine aspects of hydrofracking. n190
The SGEIS deals with these effects in a cursory fashion and asserts that too much uncertainty exists to be able to assess them with accuracy.
n191 Many critics feel the DEC's failure to address these impacts is unsatisfactory, for it is the uncertainty of these effects that frustrates
attempts to prepare for them and compounds the risk of harm. n192 For example, small-scale chemical spills, accidents, and incremental
burdens on surface waters and infrastructure are difficult for localities to anticipate without more information about how extensive drilling will
be. n193 Some also suggest that the state has not recognized the extent of hidden economic costs associated with environmental
contamination and the potential loss of ecosystem services. n194 Similarly, there are concerns that emergency management plans are lacking
and that worst case scenarios have not been sufficiently elaborated, in light of federal exemptions. n195 Moreover, many hold that the DEC
inadequately considered the findings and conclusions of regulators from other states that have experienced harms from horizontal drilling and
high-volume hydraulic fracturing. n196 There is widespread concern that the DEC has not ensured there will be full, public disclosure of
chemical components in fracking fluid, and some urge public reporting requirements for frack fluid components, all locations of [*945] drilling
operations, and any spills or contamination. n197 Overall, the SGEIS leaves concern that once hydrofracking kicks into high gear, the State will
not be poised to address problems that arise. Addressing emergencies and incidental effects will be largely left to localities, which bear the
most risk of immediate harms from hydrofracking.
C. Local Roles
As a home rule state, New York typically allows municipalities a degree of latitude to govern local activities. n198 However, Article 23 stipulates
that the State's regulatory program "supersedes all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining
industries" although local primacy over road use and property taxes are retained. n199 For instance, the State will not require local approval of
permits under its State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) and corollary Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) program.
n200 Thus, localities will not have control over such critical decisions as wellpad siting, stormwater planning, erosion control, or pipeline
placement. n201 The State has issued nonbinding directives to industry to consult with local planning documents and procedures in siting
decisions, and operators are expected to comply with local floodplain permitting [*946] requirements that establish broadly applicable siting
and setback guidelines. n202 However, localities cannot set any laws or regulations that specifically refer to or are clearly directed at
hydrofracking activities. n203 Thus, hydrofracking is not subject to zoning restrictions, although zoning has long been considered a valid
exercise of local authority. n204 Localities are nonetheless expected to investigate water quality complaints n205 and provide emergency
response services. n206 Waste disposal and sanitation are also typically local responsibilities, which will be dramatically impacted by the high
volume of flowback water, waste, and drill [*947] cuttings from hydrofracking operations. n207 Despite the significant emergency
responsibilities and infrastructural demands hydrofracking poses, localities have few authoritative tools to help them prepare. n208
1. Local Responses
Many local officials in communities where hydrofracking activity is likely to occur have been attempting to prepare for its probable impacts.
n209 Several officials in gas-rich Tioga County, an area likely to see extensive hydrofracking activity, have expressed frustration with their
limited ability to influence the course of drilling or its effects. n210 In particular, some are frustrated by the fact that local discretion has been
removed from activities typically subject to local input, such as permitting for construction and industrial activities. n211 Others are less
concerned about the State's primacy, do not feel lack of federal oversight is an issue of concern, and downplay fears over some of
hydrofracking's risks. n212 While some are concerned to an extent about threats to the environment and public health, few feel it is within his
or her authority to take a position on whether hydrofracking should be encouraged or prevented. n213 Most see the value in compromise,
[*948] given the contentious nature of hydrofracking and its perceived inevitability. n214 Understandably, local officials are interested in
achieving pragmatic solutions with what little regulatory authority they have. n215 Several seem persuaded that, as heavy users of natural gas,
New Yorkers have an obligation to permit drilling. n216 Furthermore, local officials recognize the State's interest in encouraging gas production
and understand the rationale behind cutting off local input and control. n217 Opposition at the local level could allow a few individuals to stall
or prevent fracking, which would be undesirable and unacceptable n218 given the many interests in favor of drilling and the benefits that
would come from gas production - even if local opposition could provide a bulwark against hydrofracking's harms.
[*949]
2. Mitigating Impacts from Hydrofracking
Some officials in Tioga County seek to mitigate impacts from hydrofracking through traditional means of municipal control. n219 While a few
towns and villages in New York State are testing their zoning discretion, n220 this power is less relevant in Tioga County, where most towns and
villages do not have comprehensive zoning plans in place. n221 Therefore, concerned county officials have focused instead on tweaking traffic
rules and on implementing light, noise, and wellhead protection ordinances, which restrict uses and set water quality standards within
municipal borders. n222 Localities may also require ancillary service providers or businesses, such as pipe yards and chemical storage facilities,
to comply with standards for lighting, traffic flow, and signage under site plan review ordinances - although site plan review does not apply to
drilling or hydraulic fracturing processes themselves. n223
It is important to note the limitations of these regulatory tools. In Tioga County, for example, while twelve of the fifteen towns and villages do
now have site plan review ordinances in place, only four have enacted zoning regulations. n224 The majority of towns have not enacted new
ordinances in anticipation of hydrofracking besides site plan review, and enacting these measures would not ultimately be feasible. n225
Zoning plans require staff and expertise to formulate, while noise and light ordinances and traffic plans require prohibitively expensive
environmental testing and [*950] engineering consultants. n226 In addition, wellhead protection plans do not apply where a town lacks a
public water supply and are not applicable to wellpad activity. n227
There are also political obstacles to implementing new measures. n228 Many towns and villages have only part-time or volunteer officials
without the institutional capacity or political will to enact new ordinances. n229 Furthermore, there is frequently opposition to measures that
appear to increase governmental interference with private property rights, even in protective ways. n230 In addition, county legislators have
proven to be unwilling to address fears about hydrofracking given uncertainty over practical issues, n231 such as whether groundwater
contamination is a serious concern. The county is also suffering from "personnel drain," as some of the best-trained and most knowledgeable
workers are hired by industry in anticipation of drilling. n232 Furthermore, the State has not provided supplemental resources to help localities
prepare, nor has it indicated it will do so once fracking begins in earnest. n233
Perhaps the most crucial tool localities lack is adequate [*951] enforcement ability. n234 Towns and villages do not have the necessary
financial resources to conduct adequate oversight or ensure that violations of local laws are addressed. n235 By contrast, energy companies
generally have more than sufficient resources to pay small fines, which are therefore not likely to deter behavior that results in harm. n236
Energy companies also tend to have significant legal resources readily available to challenge town enforcement attempts or to counter
opposition. n237
Aware of their disproportionate resources, localities have facilitated relationships with industry and sought voluntary agreements in which they
seek commitments for infrastructure investments. n238 For instance, officials seek promises that industry will purchase firefighting equipment;
n239 build, repave, and [*952] maintain roads; n240 use closed systems to store fracking fluid; n241 and disclose the chemicals used in
fracking mixtures. n242 In one striking example, the Tioga County Emergency Management Office will rely solely on industry to extinguish any
wellpad fires. n243 In addition to realizing that basic needs will be better met if they work with private industry, local officials are interested in
fostering positive and cooperative relationships with firms operating in and among their communities. n244
IV. Hydrofracking and Environmental Federalism
New York's experience with hydrofracking illustrates how an
adaptive approach to regulation is more likely to result in
sufficient environmental protection than an approach that attempts to match potential problems with
a level of authority based on geography. While an essentially localized activity, hydrofracking nonetheless presents a
regulatory challenge to state and local governments. n245 Deciding whether to encourage or limit hydrofracking requires
a highly subjective analysis that relies on uncertain and incomplete [*953] information about risk. n246 Meanwhile, state and local
decisionmakers are incentivized to accept risk of harms they lack resources to prevent or mitigate. n247
Applying federal laws to hydrofracking would help relieve some of the pressures on state and local authorities by placing the burden of
precaution onto energy companies. n248 Moreover, there may be appreciable benefits to fostering a flexible regime that includes responsive
interaction among all three levels of government. n249 Finally, an active
federal role in regulating new technologies like
hydrofracking can give states and localities a better chance to formulate policies aligned with their
resources and expertise, leading to increased political accountability, jurisdictional confidence, and
fewer regulatory commons problems. n250
A. Strict State Primacy: A Poor Match for Hydrofracking
In many respects, the existing federal approach to regulation of hydrofracking would likely meet the approval of matching principal proponents.
A land-based activity without any obvious interstate impacts, hydrofracking seems a good candidate for a state-led approach, and the federal
government essentially has mandated state primacy. n251 Federal regulation would increase costs and slow fracking efforts. n252 If federal
laws were operative, [*954] industry, states, and localities would bear additional SDWA compliance burdens. n253 Energy companies would
have to comply with and obtain permits under the CWA, which are costly and delay development. Aggregation of emissions from wellpad
activity or truck traffic under the CAA would increase permitting and cause companies to incur pollution control costs. Removal of exemption
from CERCLA would increase risk of liability that would create disincentives to drill, and strengthened NEPA review would also add time and
cost to preproduction planning. Regulation under RCRA would also add time and expense to disposal of fracking byproducts. Moreover, and
especially given the extensive private property interests involved in hydrofracking, local geographic, socioeconomic, geological, and
hydrological differences make state regulation arguably more appropriate than federal regulation to meet unique state preferences. n254
However, an
analysis of New York's experience with hydrofracking to date suggests that state primacy
may well result in underprotection and even hamper production activity. n255 Notably, New York's proposed
regulations are more protective than those in many other states, n256 yet its plan nonetheless has demonstrated weaknesses. n257 New York's
inadequate enforcement and oversight capacity and its failure to anticipate cumulative impacts may mean that state primacy will result in
unintended and undesirable outcomes. n258
First, it is important to note that New York's regulations may
not result in protection of some baseline standards
that EPA has established. n259 For instance, concentrations of toxic pollutants in flowback hydrofracking fluids have measured in
excess of amounts [*955] that would be permissible under the SDWA, and flowback fluids can be high in pollutants ruled hazardous under
RCRA. n260 Because New York State has not updated its wetland map after pivotal Supreme Court decisions that altered federal jurisdiction
over wetlands, n261 there may be pollutant releases onto what should be federally regulated land. n262 New York's ability to achieve water
quality standards under the CWA may be seriously overestimated in light of criticism that the State has not accurately estimated the extent of
cumulative impacts on water quality. n263 Air emissions from wellpad activities, if aggregated, might far exceed the minimum requirements
that trigger the CAA. n264 These
examples demonstrate that New York's scheme might result in failure to
meet federal standards that would apply absent exemptions or do apply to the same or similar harms
caused by other industries and suggest that as a threshold matter, state primacy over hydrofracking
will create results inconsistent with existing law.
Furthermore, the New York scheme's reliance on local implementation of emergency planning, public health, waste disposal, and road
regulation enhances the probability that unintended harms may occur. The
level of risk that localities are expected to bear
is disproportionate to the resources they have to handle that risk. n265 As a result, the State's regulatory
regime is [*956] effectively dependent on voluntary industry action. n266 Local officials hope energy companies will
agree to provide necessary infrastructure - like roads - and emergency response support - like basic firefighting equipment - even though the
industry has incentives to downplay and minimize concerns to the detriment of preparedness. n267 Moreover, experiences
of local
officials show that localities do not feel well equipped to handle even routine incidental, let alone
catastrophic, impacts from fracking and that they lack reliable information to help them bargain with
energy companies optimally. n268
Lack of oversight and enforcement powers at state and local levels may lead to lax, inconsistent, or
insufficient compliance with existing state and local regulations. n269 Even where officials are dedicated to proactive
prevention and oversight efforts, local [*957] staffs are inadequate to conduct inspections that would ensure that companies - who
may be unfamiliar with desired or mandated local practices, given variation from town to town - are heeding regulations and ordinances. n270
If noncompliance is detected, local
enforcement power does not appear sufficient to induce adherence to laws. n271
inspectors can lead to severely reduced checks on
drilling and production activities, which may make it more likely that harm-generating errors will occur. n272 If harm does occur, lack of
oversight may make identification of the responsible party difficult, given the number of component processes that
Furthermore, at the state level, an insufficient number of wellpad
make up hydrofracking. n273
New York's experience also illustrates some of the difficulty of drawing jurisdictional lines around complicated environmental problems that
have corollary economic benefits. New York is proceeding to set its jurisdictional lines by declaring what hydrofracking's impacts are likely to
be, by establishing permitting and policy standards in its SGEIS to respond to these impacts, and by restricting local authority. n274 Yet the
defects in New York's [*958] proposed scheme suggest that state regulators have downplayed or failed to anticipate fully the gravity of
uncertain impacts, which has led to inaccurate characterization of problems and poor allocation of authority. n275 Furthermore, because DEC
regulators are not responsible for the kinds of issues that first responders at the local level face, such as waste disposal, road degradation,
emergency response, or even local air quality, problems within the jurisdiction of localities are likely to prove beyond any local regulator's
control or resources to address. n276 Moreover, the
uncertainty over whether hydrofracking should be viewed as
presenting problems rather than opportunities has fostered ambivalence that colors local elected
officials' willingness to cast hydrofracking as a policy priority. n277 Thus, many of the attempts to address
potential harms have been initiated by unelected officials who are concerned about harm and feel
they should prepare now in order to help forestall foreseeable problems. n278 Unelected local officials effectively
are left with a Hobson's choice - they can either curry favor with energy companies and establish voluntary agreements and risk considerable
harm, or push the boundaries of what might be permitted by law, such as attempting to zone out hydrofracking, only to find they have
overstepped their power and in the process have alienated and lost the ability to work with and extract concessions from gas producers. n279
In addition, confusion
about jurisdiction with regard to foreseeable harms may lead local decisionmakers
to be even more reluctant to grapple with [*959] unforeseeable and novel problems that arise. n280
Drawing strict jurisdictional boundaries around an environmental issue without fully addressing the
scope of possible problems or recognizing the asymmetry between local and industry resources
creates a danger that the drawn boundaries will prove arbitrary or fail to account for the broad scope
of consequent harms. Thus, setting strict jurisdictional lines - especially where, as here, there is pressure
to underregulate n281 - might leave designated regulators unprepared, while responsibility for handling
many intractable problems will be pushed off onto those who are not politically accountable. n282
Key to prevent catastrophic water contamination
Argetsinger, 11 -- J.D. Candidate, Certificate in Environmental Law, Pace Law School
(Beren, Pace Environmental Law Review, "The Marcellus Shale: Bridge to a Clean Energy Future or
Bridge to Nowhere?," 29 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 321, Fall 2011, l/n, accessed 5-24-12, mss)
As noted above, the EIA's long-term projections estimate that over forty-five percent of all natural gas produced in the United States by 2035 will come from shale
gas. Experience in shale gas-producing states reveals that hydraulic fracturing has significant impacts on water and air resources;
with nearly half the country's natural gas supply expected to come from shale, the long-term consequences must be considered and addressed now. Reports of
shale gas development in Colorado, Wyoming, Texas, and Pennsylvania highlight numerous water and air contamination problems that have arisen from shale gas
production. n53 Improper [*331] well
casing, lax on-site wastewater storage practices and perhaps even the hydraulic
fracturing process itself, can allow natural gas constituents to migrate into and permanently contaminate
underground aquifers and private wells. n54 The dumping of flowback waters into streams and onto roads contaminates surface waters and improperly
treated fracking wastewater at sewage treatment plants (often defined as publicly owned treatment works or "POTWs") damage streams and drinking water
supplies, putting human and ecological health at risk. n55 Air pollutants in the form of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nitrous oxides
(NOx), which are precursors to ground level ozone, a respiratory hazard, arise from the concentrated operation of diesel pumps, truck traffic, and on-site
generators. n56 Methane gas, a highly potent greenhouse gas, and other pollution constituents are released through the drilling, fracturing, venting, flaring,
condensation, and transportation processes of a well's lifecycle. n57 A. Water Pollution The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC or
DEC) estimates that the hydraulic fracturing process requires anywhere from 2.9 million to 7.8 million gallons of injected water combined with chemicals and sand
to fracture a single well, depending on the depth of the well and geology of the area. n58 DEC estimates that over the next thirty years, "there could be up to 40,000
wells developed with the high volume hydraulic fracturing technology." n59 Reports from hydraulic fractured wells in northern Pennsylvania indicate that between
nine and thirty-five percent (or 216,000 to 2.8 million [*332] gallons) of the water-chemical solution used in fracking returns as "flowback" before a well begins to
produce gas. n60 Handling and treating these high volumes of flowback
water is a significant operational challenge of extracting
has not been met in some states. The treatment of flowback waters has proven a persistent challenge in Pennsylvania,
causing environmental damage that regulators in some areas have been slow to address. n61 Former Pennsylvania
shale gas and one that
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) Commissioner John Hanger said in a DEP press release in April 2010: The treating and disposing of gas drilling brine
and fracturing wastewater is a significant challenge for the natural gas industry because of its exceptionally high total dissolved solid (TDS) concentrations... .
Marcellus drilling
is growing rapidly and our rules must be strengthened now to prevent our waterways from
being seriously harmed in the future. n62 However, the DEP has largely limited its regulatory oversight on the issue of wastewater disposal at POTWs
to a request that shale gas producers "voluntarily" cease disposing of flowback water at some POTWs. n63 The issue of improper treatment of hydraulic fracturing
wastewater is compounded by specific exemptions for hydraulic fracturing from certain federal environmental laws. For example, [*333] the Energy Policy Act of
2005 amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to largely exempt gas drillers from the SDWA, from EPA regulation, and from disclosure of the chemicals used in
hydraulic fracturing operations. n64 While some states such as New York would require drillers to meet higher standards, n65 industry has largely fought efforts to
force public disclosure as well as federal efforts to study the impacts of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing on drinking water. n66 Independent analysis of
products used in some western states for the production of oil and gas revealed more than 350 products containing hundreds of chemicals, the vast majority of
which have known adverse effects on human health and the environment. n67 However, industry feet dragging on public disclosure has contributed to incomplete
knowledge of the chemical makeup and concentrations used in fracturing fluids, and the full extent of the risk the chemicals pose to human and environmental
health is unknown. n68 The NYS DEC advised in its Revised Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (Revised dSGEIS) that: There is little
meaningful information one way or the other about the potential impact on human health of chronic low level exposures to many of these chemicals, as could occur
if an aquifer were to be contaminated as the result of a spill or release that is undetected and/or unremediated. n69 Incomplete knowledge of the chemical
constituents injected into wells during the fracturing process raise concerns about [*334] understanding their effects on people and how to treat acute and chronic
exposure. Further, as noted above, the fracturing fluids that return to the surface in flowback wastewaters create particularly daunting treatment challenges. The
fracking solution pumped into the wells dissolves large quantities of salts, heavy metals such as barium and strontium, and radioactive materials. n70 When the
water returns to the surface, it is stored for reuse, recycled, or treated and disposed. Currently, Pennsylvania is the only state that allows for the primary method for
disposal of drilling wastewaters at POTWs. n71 Many POTWs are incapable of treating fracking wastewater and discharges of untreated fracking wastewater into
surface waters create environmental and human health hazards. n72 The chemicals, radioactivity levels, and high salt concentrations pose difficulties for managers
because most POTWs are not equipped to test for or treat all of these substances. n73 John H. Quigley, former Pennsylvania Secretary of the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources, stated: we're
burning the furniture to heat the house ... in shifting
away from coal and
toward natural gas, we're trying for cleaner air, but we're producing massive amounts of toxic wastewater with salts
and naturally occurring radioactive materials, and it's not clear we have a plan for properly handling this waste. n74
Extinction
WWP, 10
(Western Watersheds Project, "Protecting Watersheds," 2010,
www.westernwatersheds.org/issues/protecting-watersheds, accessed 5-29-12, mss)
Protecting Watersheds A watershed is land that contributes water to a stream, river, lake, pond, wetland or other body of water. The boundary that separates one
watershed from another, causing falling rain or melting snow or spring water to flow downhill in one direction or the other, is known as a “watershed divide”. John
Wesley Powell put it well when he said that a watershed is: "that area of land, a bounded hydrologic system, within which all living things are inextricably linked by
their common water course" The defining watershed divide in the United States is the Continental Divide which generally follows the Rocky Mountains and
determines whether water flows to the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean. Our biggest watershed is that of the Mississippi River which starts in Minnesota and spreads across
40% of the lower 48 states, drawing its water from the Yellowstone, Missouri, Platte, Arkansas, Canadian, Red, Wisconsin, Illinois, Ohio and Tennessee Rivers---and
their drainages. While major watersheds are clearly visible on satellite photographs and maps, within each one is an intricate web of secondary drainages, each fed
by a myriad of streams and smaller creeks, many unnamed and so small a person can jump across them. In many parts of the country, particularly in the arid West,
these smaller drainages may cover thousands of acres, yet collect far less water than those in the East. For example, the Hudson River has a flow equivalent to that
of the Colorado, yet collects its water from a land area less than 1/20th the size required by the Colorado River which is 1,400 miles long. Because there is very little
land that is truly flat, watersheds and drainages are all around us, and just about everybody in the United States is within walking distance of one whether
they live in a city, on a farm, in a desert, or on an island. Some carry the names of well known rivers like the Columbia and the Rio Grande. Most, however, do not,
and remain anonymous, hidden in culverts or ditches or flowing only intermittently in high deserts, unrecognized and unheralded as vital,
contributing
parts of the complex system that supplies all of our fresh surface water. “Surface water” runs through watersheds and
drainages, from mountains or high ground to the sea. Underlying watersheds, or adjacent to most of them, however, is an even greater source of supply, “ground
water”. Ground water is formed when falling rain or melting snow percolates deep into the ground over time, sometimes centuries, to a level where it is stored in
porous rock and sand and accumulates there until tapped by drilled wells or comes to the surface of its own accord as a spring or artesian well. This stored ground
water is commonly referred to as an “aquifer” and its level is measured in terms of a “water table”. Like watersheds, water stored in aquifers generally seeps
downhill, and many, like the Mississippi River drainage, cover wide areas of the United States. The nation’s largest deposit of ground water is the Ogallala
Aquifer System that underlies 8 states, Wyoming, Colorado, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico. Many smaller aquifers are found
across the country and some remain unnamed and uncharted. These two water
resources, surface and ground water, not only sustain all life
but are the only practical source of fresh water we have for industry, agriculture, and municipal use. And although they are often
viewed as two separate entities, they are, for the most part, inextricably linked. For example, in addition to rain and melting snow, ground water
springs are vital to maintaining the flow of many streams and rivers in a watershed. And a great deal of surface water, about 25% of it, percolates deep into the
ground where it is stored in or helps recharge our aquifers. The remaining surface water, after evaporation, which claims some 40%, becomes the complex system
of streams and rivers that flow through watersheds from the mountains or high ground to the sea. Along the way, however, some of that water is temporarily held
back in ponds, wetlands and the land bordering creeks, streams and rivers where water may not be visible but lies just below the surface. These areas are
collectively referred to as riparian zones, and while they constitute only a small percentage of the land in most watersheds, they
are the heart and
soul of a delicately balanced natural system that, collectively, produces our fresh water. A healthy, functioning riparian zone
is a virtual classroom in life sciences---botany, biology, animal ecology, fisheries, entomology and ornithology---and contains a
miraculous diversity of wildlife, fish, birds, bugs and an array of vegetation ranging from trees and grasses to algae and other
aquatic plants. Riparian zones and the biodiversity they contain are interdependent. That is, the trees, plants, grasses,
reeds, and algae provide food, shade, protection and habitat for wildlife, birds and fish. Their root systems stabilize soil and prevent
erosion and flooding in wet seasons; and in dry seasons, this vegetation retains water and releases it slowly to maintain even stream flows. For their part, the
variety of animals, fish, birds, and bugs living in these zones aerate the soil, spread pollen and seeds and eventually, when they die and fungi and bacteria break
down the dead organic matter, provide nourishment for a new generation of riparian vegetation. This is an oversimplified description of a pristine riparian zone
within a source watershed, that critical part of the system where water is gathered from a web of springs, bogs and creeks and begins its long, twisting journey from
the mountains to the sea. Such pristine conditions still exist in some isolated areas, but today no major river arrives at its terminus in this condition, and some don’t
make it at all. Along the way, watersheds are radically transformed by man. Rivers are dammed, channeled, and otherwise diverted to serve a multitude of
agricultural, industrial and municipal purposes. And while a good portion of the water is eventually released back into the system, much of it is polluted and requires
costly purification. Today, water
conservation is one of the most serious natural resource issues facing this
country, and nowhere is conservation more important than in the arid West which is literally running out of water.
Russia Econ !
Dynamic federalism in land policy is modeled by Russia and prevents far east wildfires
Wilkson 5 (Jim, “Up in Smoke: Using Cooperative U.S. Forest Fire Management Policies as a Model for
Implementing an Effective Forest Fire Prevention Program in the Russia Far East,” Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal, 14(2), p. 575-606, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/676/14PacRimLPoly J575.pdf?sequence=1)
FIRE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES A MODEL FOR COOPERATIVE FIRE PREVENTION IN
THE RFE The forest fire environment and fire management strategies in the United States and Russia share many parallels. Unlike Russia,
however, laws in the United States have provided for cooperative fire control at all levels of government for nearly a century. 99 As with Soviet
fire suppression in the RFE, most of these early cooperative efforts focused on heavy-handed fire suppression programs.' 00 In response to the
recognition of the natural role of fire in forest ecosystems, coupled with an acknowledgment that complete exclusion of fire from the forest
simply has not worked, fire management laws and policies in the United States have undergone a significant transformation in recent
years. 101 Severe fire seasons in recent years have provided the impetus behind the creation of new programs like the National Fire Plan
("NFP"), which coordinates
federal, state, and local fire prevention efforts. 102 In order to better cope with the severe
threat that human-caused fires pose to the RFE, Russia should replace its jurisdictionally fragmented fire
management responsibilities with a cooperative approach akin to the NFP. A. Historic U.S. Public
Lands Management Laws Provided a Framework for Cooperative Fire Management , But Prevention and
Suppression Programs Failed to Recognize the Ecological Necessity of Fire in Some Landscapes Like the Russian Constitution, the U.S.
Constitution provides the framework for shared federal and state decision-making power over a wide
range of issues, including natural resource management. 03 Unlike Russia, however, the United States has benefited
from nearly a century of a cooperative, inter-governmental approach to fire prevention and suppression. Congress has consistently worked to
facilitate a cooperative approach to fire management starting with the passage of the Weeks Act in 1911, which authorized the Forest Service
to cooperate with state governments to organize and maintain fire protection systems for state lands. 1 0 4 The ClarkeMcNary Act of 1924
extended the Weeks Act to include provisions for allocating federal money to help states finance their forest protection programs.' 0 5 The
Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978 further expanded the cooperative principles embodied in the Clarke-McNary Act and, for the first
time, endorsed the use of prescribed fires to prevent forest fires. 1° 6 The 1995 Federal Fire Policy further recognized that wildland fire is "a
critical natural process [and] must be reintroduced into the ecosystem" and stressed the importance of cooperative, inter-governmental fire
management. 01 7 Finally, in 2002, Congress endorsed the NFP, which expanded the ability of federal and local agencies, working alongside
local communities, to prevent forest fires in fire-prone communities through reduction of hazardous fuels. 108 This shifting emphasis-from one
of complete fire suppression to one of prescribed burning and fuels thinninghas ironically been necessitated by the success of programs like the
Smokey Bear campaign.
Forest fires collapse Russia’s economy – it’s key to investment
Wilkson 5 (Jim, “Up in Smoke: Using Cooperative U.S. Forest Fire Management Policies as a Model for
Implementing an Effective Forest Fire Prevention Program in the Russia Far East,” Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal, 14(2), p. 575-606, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/676/14PacRimLPoly J575.pdf?sequence=1)
II. FOREST FIRES ARE THE LARGEST SOURCE OF DEFORESTATION IN THE GLOBALLY IMPORTANT BOREAL
FORESTS OF THE RFE The RFE's forests are a rich economic resource ." Even more importantly, they play a crucial
role in maintaining global environmental health . These forests face a variety of environmental threats, but wildfires
are the single largest source of deforestation in the RFE. 12 A number of historic and current trends have combined to
create the perennially severe fire danger in the RFE. The people of the RFE have lit the proverbial match to this
powder keg, as the vast majority of the fires that are threatening these forests are set by humans. 13 The direct costs
to humans are destroyed timber resources, and even destroyed communities. The indirect costs come from the
severe toll the fires take on the environment. A. The RFE's Vast Forests Possess Great Environmental Importance But Face Many Threats The
RFE encompasses a vast geographic area between Siberia and the shores of the North Pacific. This region comprises thirty-six percent of
Russia's landmass,' 4 totaling more than 6215.9 million square kilometers,' 5 containing twenty percent of the world's forested areas, and fifty
percent of its coniferous forest stock. 16
The RFE's rich reserves of timber 7 are extremely important both to
Russia and the world's economic, ecological, and environmental wellbeing.' 8 For instance, the forests of
the RFE act as a massive global carbon sink' -potentially mitigating global warming-and provide
habitat to a large variety of animals, including the critically endangered Siberian tiger 2 and Far
Eastern leopard. 2 ' The RFE has long been considered critical to the Soviet and Russian economies, providing timber and natural
resources to the industries located in the West. 2 2 This trend is expected to continue, as evidenced by the high priority placed by Russian
President Vladimir Putin on paving the trans- Siberian highway 23 in order to increase the accessibility of these resources. Russia is also making
serious efforts to solicit new bids to exploit the RFE's economic potential as a source of raw timber. Finally, Russia's new Draft Forest Code is
primarily aimed at making Russian forest management regulations more business friendly. 25 Despite
these efforts, internal
forces, such as corruption, political instability, and a "frontier mentality" threaten to destroy the very
resource base that Russia promotes to foreign investors. 26
Extinction
Filger 9 (Sheldon, Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com, “Russian Economy Faces
Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economyfaces-dis_b_201147.html)
In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely
encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political
downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect
that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos
following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or nonpayment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly.
Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a
Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse
is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global
desperate attempt to raise cash.
Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities
Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear
arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not
only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect
that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and
political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the
and perceived decline from superpower status,
consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put
out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat
to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces
responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would
illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If
the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate
much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial
impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.
AFF
States
2AC – Generic
Mixing state authority creates massive uncertainty over the Aff
DeShazo and Freeman ‘7 – professor and director of the Lewis Center and professor of law
(J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman, TIMING AND FORM OF FEDERAL REGULATION:
THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 155:1499, 2007)
Industry pressure for a federal standard may also mount when regulatory uncertainty, induced or
exacerbated by inconsistent state activity, produces significant costs, even in the absence of direct
product regulation. 25 This is more likely to be the case when firms are preparing to make substantial
long-term capital investments in the context of confusion about the short-term regulatory playing field.
26 This uncertainty is likely to be especially pronounced when it arises simultaneously at the state,
national, and international levels. With so much in flux and so much at stake, both domestic and
multinational firms will want clarity sooner rather than later.
Too uncoordinated to solve
Maki 2012 –(Wilbur R.
professor at the University of Minnesota, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics “Infrastructure: Rural
America,” March 7th http://american-business.org/3423-infrastructure-rural-america.html)
State and local infrastructure planning efforts remain piecemeal and uncoordinated. There still is no clear
consensus about the implications of these changes on the varying local demands for the many
different kinds of infrastructure investments that most clearly affect the well-being of rural residents
and their local economic base. Spending for broadband and related capital facilities are still being excluded from current infrastructure development initiatives.
-- State Spending Bad
State deficit spending causes chaos and hurts the economy and means they wont
reinvest in the program
Dismile 12 (Daniel, certified financial planner and an investment advisor registered with the state of
California, “APRIL 15, 2012 SECOND QUARTER COMMENTS” April 15th, 2012,
http://disimile.com/News/secondQuarter2012.php)
Paychecks from private businesses are at their smallest share of personal income in U.S. history. As the Bush tax rates expire and the 20
separate Obamacare taxes go into effect, next year a $3-4 Trillion tax increase will be levied on the economy. The
March job statistics
reported that hourly earnings increased 2.1%, but inflation grew by 2.9%, meaning workers got poorer. The drop in average
weekly hours worked of one tenth of an hour to 34.5 hours, has the same impact as losing 385,000 jobs.
¶ Freedom in economic affairs is a basic component of freedom. Without it there can be no political freedom. The financial insolvency
of blue states and countries in southern Europe show that massive state deficit spending did not bring a
promised utopia but fostered chaos amongst some in the Western under-class with no respect for
private property or the rule of law. Free market capitalism is the solution, and the reason why, according to the World Bank, global
poverty has been cut in half over the last 30 years. ¶ Entitlement programs that ignore economic realities will always
fail. When debt exceeds the demand from global capital markets, interest rates and taxes will skyrocket.
In 8 years, federal government spending will grow to 25% of the economy and if state and local obligations are included, by 2020, the
government will control 35% of our economy. It is time to worry about the government.
State budget growth is failing- any added expenditures push states over the edge
The Hill 6/12 (“Report: Medicaid costs squeezing state budgets” June 12th, 2012,
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/medicaid/232283-report-medicaid-costs-squeezing-state-budgets%20-)
The poor economy and rising healthcare costs are driving up states' expenditures on Medicaid, according to
a new report from the bipartisan National Governors Association (NGA).¶ The analysis comes as the Supreme Court prepares
to rule on the 2010 healthcare reform law, which included a massive Medicaid expansion, and as cashstrapped states make cuts to the program. ¶ In its report, the NGA found that Medicaid accounted for the largest share of state
spending in 2011 — 24 percent overall — and that this figure represented a steep rise that continued this year, even as federal Medicaid
spending declined. ¶ Medicaid uses state and federal dollars to provide healthcare for low-income patients, and is administered by the states. ¶
State spending on the program increased 20 percent in FY2012 after rising 23 percent in FY2011, the NGA report stated. ¶ Authors attributed
the sharp increases to declining incomes and job losses, leading to the loss of employer-based healthcare coverage. These developments came
as federal aid to Medicaid under the stimulus bill expired, the report stated. ¶ In response to the squeeze, states' tactics for reducing Medicaid
expenditures have included "reducing provider payments, cutting prescription drug benefits, limiting benefits, reforming delivery systems,
expanding managed care and enhancing program integrity efforts," according to the NGA's executive director, Dan Crippen. ¶ The report
estimated that by 2013, Medicaid enrollment will have risen 12.5 percent over three years, and that the recession's original surge — a 7.2percent increase in enrollment between 2009 and 2010 — approached the peak enrollment increase during the last economic downturn in
2002 (9.5 percent). ¶ Crippen warned in a statement that states alone cannot control rising Medicaid costs.¶ "With the growth of Medicaid
expenditures, spending priorities will again face competition for state budget dollars this fiscal year," he said. ¶ "States
have
undertaken numerous actions to contain Medicaid costs. ... These efforts alone, however, cannot stop
the growth of Medicaid." ¶ The National Association of State Budget Officers, which co-authored the report, cautioned that states are
seeing low budget growth as Medicaid expenditures rise. ¶ "Despite some improvement in state budgets since the
depths of the recession, state budget growth is still significantly below average — growing at less than
half the average growth of the past few decades,” said Scott Pattison, the group's executive director. ¶ In response to the
analysis, the American Health
-- AT Deficit Spending
States would use spending cuts/tax increases to balance their budgets – can’t run a deficit
Johnson 2 – 9 – 11 (Nicholas, Vice President for State Fiscal Policy at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a Washington, D.C-based
research and policy institute. He directs the Center’s State Fiscal Project, which publishes frequent reports on how state budget and tax
decisions are affecting families and communities, Phil Oliff, Policy Analyst with the State Fiscal Project, work includes tracking state revenue
collections and property tax issues, former Carey Fellow in Governmental Finance with New York State’s Division of Budget, Erica Williams, “An
Update on State Budget Cuts”, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214)
Virtually all states are required to balance their operating budgets each year or biennium. Unlike the
federal government, states cannot maintain services during an economic downturn by running a deficit.
States had record reserves heading into this recession, but those have mostly been drawn down. Since
federal economic assistance is slated to expire well before state budgets have recovered, states must
address remaining shortfalls with a combination of spending cuts and/or tax increases.
States printing money is unconstitutional
US Constitution 1787 (Submitted for ratification September 28, 1787, US Constitution, Article 1 - The Legislative Branch, Section
10 - Powers Prohibited of States “U.S. Constitution Online,” http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A1Sec10.html,)
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
-- AT State revenue
Revenues aren’t enough – best case would take 7 years to get back on track – federal
aid is key
Oliff et al 6 – 27 – 12 (Phil Oliff, Policy Analyst with the State Fiscal Project, work includes tracking state revenue collections and property
tax issues, former Carey Fellow in Governmental Finance with New York State’s Division of Budget, Chris Mai, Vincent Palacious, Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact”, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711)
States’ fiscal conditions are improving along with the broader economy. But states are coming out of a very deep
hole. Figure 3 illustrates the magnitude of the problem. State revenues have begun to rebound. State tax intake grew 8.3
percent in the 12-month period ending in June 2011 — the 2011 fiscal year for most states. This encouraging growth offers a glimmer
of hope that states are beginning to climb out of the fiscal hole caused by the recession. Unfortunately,
that hole was so deep that even if revenues continue to grow at last year’s rate — which is highly unlikely, as
explained below — it would take seven years to get them back on a normal track. In other words, revenues
probably won’t come close to what states need to restore the programs that they cut during the
recession unless states raise taxes, at least temporarily, or receive additional federal aid while the economy slowly recovers.
As noted below, additional federal aid is unlikely.
-- AT Gambling
Legalized gambling creates no new money and subtracts from the national income
Kindt 2003 (John Warren Kindt, “The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives
for Perpetual Non-Compliance,” Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Volume 27,
http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Failure-to-Regulate-the-Gambling-IndustryEffectively.pdf)
The United States has periodically experimented with legalized gambling activities. In
each historical “wave,” the social costs related to gambling became both apparent and
overwhelming, consistently leading to the criminalization of all gambling activies. Historically,
policymakers rediscovered that the social costs of gambling were enormous, and experts concluded that
applying those costs to the adult population of the United States [in 1994] implie[d] losses equal to . . .
an additional Hurricane Andrew, the most costly disaster in American history, every year.” Yet
legalized gambling had no significant social or economic benefits, as it “involves simply
sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating no new money or
goods. Although it creates no output, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. When
pursued beyond the limits of recreation, . . . gambling subtracts from the national
income.”
Legalizing gambling is a net loss
Davies 1/22 (Paul Davies, “New York’s Bad Bet,” The New York Times, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/opinion/new-yorks-bad-casino-bet.html)
THE governor of New York, Andrew M. Cuomo, is sending his state down the same wrongheaded path as
other states that are trying to gamble their way out of economic trouble by legalizing commercial
casinos.¶ The casinos might create jobs and generate revenue for state coffers, but those
gains would come at a cost that casino supporters ignore or play down. Various studies,
including research by the economist Earl L. Grinols at Baylor University, have shown
that casinos produce little to no economic spinoff and in fact divert spending away from
surrounding businesses like restaurants, movie theaters and live entertainment. In the
worst cases, some problem gamblers spend money that is needed for groceries, rent or child support.¶
More broadly, casinos are nothing more than a regressive tax that extracts wealth from the
very citizens who can least afford it. The details of Governor Cuomo’s plan — which requires
changing the State Constitution — remain largely under wraps but will likely follow the blueprints of
other states that have allowed casinos at select locations.¶ While those casinos are billed as
“destination resorts,” they are really convenience casinos — typically the size of a big-box retailer —
that rely mainly on repeat gamblers who live in the area. Many are located in rural and working-class
towns and cities that cater mainly to low rollers, not James Bond-type jet-setters.
-- Links to politics
Obama takes the blame for state decisions
Kiely 2/17 [EUGENE KIELY, Washington assignment editor USA today, February 17, 2012
Factcheck.org “Did Obama ‘Approve’ Bridge Work for Chinese Firms?”
http://www.factcheck.org/2012/02/did-obama-approve-bridge-work-for-chinese-firms/]
Who’s to blame, if that’s the right word, if the project ends up using manufactured steel from China?
The National Steel Bridge Alliance blames the state railroad agency. The Alliance for American
Manufacturing says the federal Buy American laws have been “weakened with loopholes and various
exemptions that make it easier for bureaucrats to purchase foreign-made goods instead of those made
in American factories with American workers.” So, how did Obama get blamed for the decisions by
state agencies and for state projects that, in at least one case, didn’t even use federal funds? The
answer is a textbook lesson in how information gets distorted when emails go viral. We looked at the
nearly 100 emails we received on this subject and found that Obama wasn’t mentioned at all in the first
few emails. Typical of the emails we received shortly after the ABC News report aired was this one from
Oct. 11, 2011: “I just got an email regarding Diane Sawyer on ABC TV stating that U. S. Bridges and roads
are being built by Chinese firms when the jobs should have gone to Americans. Could this possible be
true?” The answer: Yes, it’s true. End of story, right? Wrong. Days later, emails started to appear in our
inbox that claimed ABC News reported that Chinese firm were receiving stimulus funds to build U.S.
bridges — even though the broadcast news story didn’t mention stimulus funds at all. (The report did
include a clip of Obama delivering a speech on the need to rebuild America’s bridges and put Americans
to work, but said nothing about the president’s $830 billion stimulus bill.) Still, we received emails such
as this one on Nov. 4, 2011, that included this erroneous claim language: “Stimulus money meant to
create U.S. jobs went to Chinese firms. Unbelievable….” It didn’t take long for Obama to be blamed.
That same day — Nov. 4, 2011 — we received an email that made this leap to Obama: “SOME CHINESE
COMPANIES WHO ARE BUILDING ‘OUR’ BRIDGES. (3000 JOBS LOST TO THE CHINESE FIRM)…..AND NOW
OBAMA WANTS ‘MORE STIMULUS MONEY’…..THIS IS NUTS ! ! ! If this doesn’t make you furious nothing
will….” This year, Obama’s name started to surface in the subject line of such critical emails — raising
the attack on the president to yet another level and perhaps ensuring the email will be even more
widely circulated. Since Jan. 17, we have gotten more than a dozen emails with the subject line, “ABC
News on Obama/USA Infrastructure,” often preceded with the word “SHOCKING” in all caps. The emails
increasingly contain harsh language about the president. Since Jan. 11, 23 emails carried this added bit
of Obama-bashing: “I pray all the unemployed see this and cast their votes accordingly in 2012!” One of
those emails — a more recent one from Feb. 8 — contained this additional line: “Tell me again how
Obama’s looking out for blue collar guys. He cancels pipelines, and lets Chinese contractors build our
bridges…” And so it goes, on and on. All from a news report that blamed state officials — not Obama
— for spending taxpayer money on Chinese firms to build U.S. bridges.
2AC –Nuclear
Has to be the fg
DOE 13 – (Assessment of the Nuclear Power Industry – Final Report
http://naruc.org/Grants/Documents/Assessment-of-the-Nuclear-Power-Industry-Final%20Report.pdf)
Potentially the most detrimental legislation to the construction of nuclear power facilities is in the
definition of what states consider to be a renewable energy source. Only two states in the Eastern
Interconnection consider nuclear power to be a clean or renewable energy source, Indiana (State
Code 8-1-37) and Ohio (129th State Legislature, Senate Bill 315). All other states, including those with
strong pro-nuclear legislation, do not count nuclear power towards meeting the states Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS). The current trend in energy generation in the United States is toward clean,
renewable energy, a solution to both fossil fuel reliance and pollution problems. As such, in order to
ensure that electricity generators undertake programs to achieve such renewable goals, a majority of
states have implemented RPS legislation requiring that a certain percentage of generation is from
renewable resources by a specified year (Ohio requires that 25% of electric generation come from
renewable sources by 2025). However, as nuclear is not considered to be a renewable energy source
many producers will expend their limited resources to meet this regulatory requirement, instead of on
the extravagant price tag that accompanies the construction of nuclear facilities
Federalism
States Power sufficient
States have enough power
Young 3- Ernest Young, Law Prof @ Texas, May 2003, Texas Law Review, ln
One of the privileges of being a junior faculty member is that senior colleagues often feel obligated to read one's rough drafts. On many
occasions when I have written about federalism - from a stance considerably more sympathetic to the States than Judge Noonan's - my
colleagues have responded with the following comment: "Relax. The States retain vast reserves of autonomy and
authority over any number of important areas. It will be a long time, if ever, before the national government
can expand its authority far enough to really endanger the federal balance. Don't make it sound like you think
the sky is falling."
Courts Check
Courts check
Nagel 1- Robert F. Nagel, Law Professor, University of Colorado, March 2001, ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 53
In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system, the Supreme Court has
recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the national government . Some of these decisions, which
set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish
areas that are subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of state
governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state governments to suit in either state or
federal courts and to "commandeer" state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these
decisions seem to reflect a judgment held by a slight majority of the justices that the dramatic expansion of the
national government during the twentieth century has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional
structure.
Not zero Sum
Not zero-sum, states rely upon fed to fund goals
Dilger 11 (Robert, Senior Specialist in American National Government for the
Congressional Research Service, Director of the Institute for Public Affairs at West Virginia
University, "Federalism Issues in Surface Transportation Policy: Past and Present," 4-20-11,
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40431_20110420.pdf SL)
An analysis completed by the
Government Accountability Office in 2004 found that “state and local
governments have used roughly half of the increases in federal highway grants since 1982 to
substitute for funding they would otherwise have spent from their own resources. In addition, our model
estimated that the rate of grant substitution increased significantly over the past two decades, rising
from about 18 cents on the dollar during the early 1980s to roughly 60 cents on the dollar during
the 1990s.”111 Because state revenue growth has declined in recent years, it could be argued that
states facing a budgetary shortfall are not likely to substitute federal funds received from the
economic recovery plan for existing state funds. Instead, it could be argued that at least some states,
particularly those facing budgetary shortfalls, might have a difficult time finding state revenue to
maintain their previous spending levels. In either case, state MOE requirements may become an issue during SAFETEA’s
reauthorization and will be the subject of congressional interest and oversight during ARRA’s implementation.
No modelling
No modeling
Moravcsik, 05 (Andrew, “Dream On America”, Newsweek, 1/31, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6857387/site/newsweek/)
Not long ago, the American dream was a global fantasy. Not only Americans saw themselves as a beacon unto nations. So did much of the rest
of the world. East Europeans tuned into Radio Free Europe. Chinese students erected a replica of the Statue of Liberty in Tiananmen Square.
You had only to listen to George W. Bush's Inaugural Address last week (invoking "freedom" and "liberty" 49 times) to appreciate just how
deeply Americans still believe in this founding myth. For many in the world, the president's rhetoric confirmed their worst fears of an imperial
America relentlessly pursuing its narrow national interests. But
the greater danger may be a delusional America—one
that believes, despite all evidence to the contrary, that the American Dream lives on, that America remains a
model for the world, one whose mission is to spread the word. The gulf between how Americans view themselves and how the world
views them was summed up in a poll last week by the BBC. Fully 71 percent of Americans see the United States as a source of good in the
world. More than half view Bush's election as positive for global security. Other studies report that 70 percent have faith in their domestic
institutions and nearly 80 percent believe "American ideas and customs" should spread globally. Foreigners take an entirely different view: 58
percent in the BBC poll see Bush's re-election as a threat to world peace. Among America's traditional allies, the figure is strikingly higher: 77
percent in Germany, 64 percent in Britain and 82 percent in Turkey. Among the 1.3 billion members of the Islamic world, public support for the
United States is measured in single digits. Only Poland, the Philippines and India viewed Bush's second Inaugural positively. Tellingly, the antiBushism of the president's first term is giving way to a more general anti-Americanism. A plurality of voters (the average is 70 percent) in each
of the 21 countries surveyed by the BBC oppose sending any troops to Iraq, including those in most of the countries that have done so. Only
one third, disproportionately in the poorest and most dictatorial countries, would like to see American values spread in their country. Says
Doug Miller of GlobeScan, which conducted the BBC report: "President Bush has further isolated America from the world. Unless the
administration changes its approach, it will continue to erode America's good name, and hence its ability to effectively influence world affairs."
Former Brazilian president Jose Sarney expressed the sentiments of the 78 percent of his countrymen who see America as a threat: "Now that
Bush has been re-elected, all I can say is, God bless the rest of the world." The truth is that Americans are living in a dream world. Not only do
others not share America's self-regard, they no longer aspire to emulate the country's social and economic
achievements. The loss of faith in the American Dream goes beyond this swaggering administration and its war in Iraq. A President Kerry
would have had to confront a similar disaffection, for it grows from the success of something America holds dear: the spread of democracy,
free markets and international institutions—globalization, in a word. Countries
today have dozens of political, economic
and social models to choose from. Anti-Americanism is especially virulent in Europe and Latin America, where countries have
established their own distinctive ways—none made in America. Futurologist Jeremy Rifkin, in his recent book "The European Dream," hails an
emerging European Union based on generous social welfare, cultural diversity and respect for international law—a model that's caught on
quickly across the former nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In Asia, the rise of autocratic capitalism in China or Singapore is as much a
"model" for development as America's scandal-ridden corporate culture. "First we emulate," one Chinese businessman recently told the board
of one U.S. multinational, "then we overtake." Many are tempted to write off the new anti-Americanism as a temporary perturbation, or mere
resentment. Blinded by its own myth, America has grown incapable of recognizing its flaws. For there is much about the American Dream to
fault. If the rest of the world has lost faith in the American model—political, economic, diplomatic—it's partly for the very good reason that it
doesn't work as well anymore. AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal
innovations—free elections, judicial review, checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th
centuries, countries around the world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today?
When nations write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American
model. When the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a
polite hearing, and were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt
a European-style parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American
democracy. It's very prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want
to follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV debates and
photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country, Kosovo opted for a
European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South
Africa rejected American-style federalism in favor of
a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling African
democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who currently
heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the Americans." The new
democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he
explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last great hope'." Much in American law and society troubles the world these
days. Nearly all countries reject the United States' right to bear arms as a quirky and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and
demand broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign systems reach a reasonable level of affluence, they follow the Europeans in
treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law School, contributes to
the growing sense that American law, once the world standard, has become "provincial." The United
States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist suspects, to ratify global humanrights treaties such as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the International Criminal Court
(coupled with the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that America's Constitution and
legal system are out of step with the rest of the world.
Fed Control High
Federal gov’t has all the control ever
Robb 13 – Robert Robb is a columnist for the Arizona Republic and a RealClearPolitics contributor. (“Obama and the Death of Federalism”,
February 20, 2013, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/02/20/obama_and_the_death_of_federalism_117073.html)
President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address illustrated what a dead letter federalism is among
Democrats. Not that further illustration was necessary.
Federalism holds that the national government should limit itself to things of truly national scope.
Things that are primarily of local concern should be left to state and local governments.
Federalism was a big deal to the founders. They wanted an energetic national government, but one that
was confined to enumerated national functions. The founders also envisioned a bright line between the
federal and state governments, each sovereign within their own spheres.
We are a long way from that. Today, the Democratic Party sees virtually nothing as outside the purview
of the federal government. The Republican Party talks a good game about federalism, but usually ends
up undermining the principle when it acquires national power.
Today, the lines between the federal government and state and local governments are hopelessly
blurred. The federal government spends over $600 billion a year on grants to state and local
governments. Arizona state government receives more in federal funds than it raises in general-fund
taxes.
Today, state governments operate principally as service delivery mechanisms for federal social-welfare
programs. This means that there is no real political accountability for the programs, which is why they
grow and function like a blob.
If Medicaid costs are spinning out of control, who’s to blame and who should do something about it?
The federal government that provides most of the funding and sets up the basic rules, or the state
governments that actually administer the program? The food stamp program has grown astronomically
of late. Purely a function of a bad economy, or is there something else going on? Whose job is it to
figure that out?
President Ronald Reagan wanted to sort out the blob with his new federalism initiative, clearly making
some functions, such as Medicaid, fully federal, while making other functions, including most welfare
programs, fully state and local. There were some Democratic governors at the time, including Arizona’s
Bruce Babbitt, who were also interested in a sorting out of responsibilities.
But agreement was never reached, nothing of significance happened. So, the blob endured and grew.
Obama proposes to feed it even more. The federal government should establish manufacturing
innovation institutes in economically distressed areas and provide incentive grants to states to increase
the energy efficiency of homes and businesses.
The federal government should fix 70,000 bridges and create a federal fund to modernize ports and
pipelines. The federal government should have a new grant program to get high-school graduates better
ready for high-tech jobs. And, according to Obama, the federal government should make sure that every
kid has access to high-quality preschool.
The federal government, however, does not have a greater interest in the recovery of economically
distressed areas than the states in which they are located, or greater insight into how to turn them
around. Every bridge in America is located in a state and local community that has a greater interest in
its condition than the federal government.
Every port and pipeline in the United States is located in a state and local community. If there are gains
to be had from modernizing them, local governments have a greater incentive to get it done and done
right than the federal government.
Every kid in America lives in a state and local community that is more interested in his education and
workplace preparedness than the federal government. What do we really have to show for the
increased federal involvement in education, under George W. Bush or Obama?
The federal government is broke, and broke in a way that threatens the American economy. Proposals
that it do even more are surreal, even if they are supposedly paid for. If there’s loose change to be had,
the federal government should use it to reduce the deficit, not further expand its reach.
Subsidies and entitlements are spinning out of control
Robb 2/20,REP. LEWIS MOORE, R-Edmond, is committee chairman of the States’ Rights (Federalism) Committee of the Oklahoma House
of Representatives. (Lewis, "Don’t remain silent where state’s rights are concerned" 9/28/13, Edmond Sun, http://www.edmondsun.com/
opinion/x1836122784/Don-t-remain-silent-where-state-s-rights-are-concerned#sthash.aygtHt6x.dpuf)//
President Barack Obama’s State of the Union address illustrated what a dead letter federalism is among Democrats. Not that further illustration
was necessary.¶ Federalism holds
that the national government should limit itself to things of truly
national scope. Things that are primarily of local concern should be left to state and local governments.¶ ¶ ¶ Federalism was a big deal to
the founders. They wanted an energetic national government, but one that was confined to enumerated national
functions. The founders also envisioned a bright line between the federal and state governments, each sovereign within their own spheres.¶
We are a long way from that. Today, the Democratic Party sees virtually nothing as outside the purview of the
federal government. The Republican Party talks a good game about federalism, but usually ends up
undermining the principle when it acquires national power.¶ Today, the lines between the federal government and
state and local governments are hopelessly blurred. The federal government spends over $600 billion a year on
grants to state and local governments. Arizona state government receives more in federal funds than it raises in general-fund
taxes.¶ Today, state governments operate principally as service delivery mechanisms for federal socialwelfare programs. This means that there is no real political accountability for the programs, which is why they
grow and function like a blob.¶ If Medicaid costs are spinning out of control, who’s to blame and who should do something
about it? The federal government that provides most of the funding and sets up the basic rules, or the state
governments that actually administer the program? The food stamp program has grown astronomically of late. Purely a
function of a bad economy, or is there something else going on? Whose job is it to figure that out?¶ President Ronald Reagan wanted to sort
out the blob with his new federalism initiative, clearly making some functions, such as Medicaid, fully federal, while making other functions,
including most welfare programs, fully state and local. There were some Democratic governors at the time, including Arizona’s Bruce Babbitt,
who were also interested in a sorting out of responsibilities.¶ But agreement was never reached, nothing of significance happened. So, the blob
endured and grew.¶ Obama proposes to feed it even more. The federal government should establish manufacturing innovation
institutes in economically distressed areas and provide incentive grants to states to increase the energy efficiency of homes and businesses.¶
The federal government should fix 70,000 bridges and create a federal fund to modernize ports and pipelines. The federal government should
have a new grant program to get high-school graduates better ready for high-tech jobs. And, according to Obama, the federal government
should make sure that every kid has access to high-quality preschool.¶ The federal government, however, does not have a greater interest in
the recovery of economically distressed areas than the states in which they are located, or greater insight into how to turn them around. Every
bridge in America is located in a state and local community that has a greater interest in its condition than the federal government.¶ Every port
and pipeline in the United States is located in a state and local community. If there are gains to be had from modernizing them, local
governments have a greater incentive to get it done and done right than the federal government.¶ Every kid in America lives in a state and local
community that is more interested in his education and workplace preparedness than the federal government. What do we really have to show
for the increased federal involvement in education, under George W. Bush or Obama?¶ The federal government is broke, and
broke in a way that threatens the American economy. Proposals that it do even more are surreal, even if they are supposedly paid for. If there’s
loose change to be had, the federal government should use it to reduce the deficit, not further expand its reach.¶ It’s nowhere on the horizon,
but a
revival of Reagan’s new federalism discussion is badly needed.
Cp doesn’t solve
Counterplan's precedent doesn't go far enough—centralized policies ensure alt causes
to federalism
DesOrmeaux 10/07, Writer and Analyst for United Liberty(Matthew, "The answer to government shutdown is less federal power, not more"
10/7/13, United Liberty, http://www.unitedliberty.org/authors/cynicusprime)
In the wake of the now five-day long federal government partial shutdown, center-left pundits have wasted no time calling for drastic changes
to the republic.¶ In the Washington Post, Dylan Matthews openly called for fascism:¶ Max Weber, in conversation with Gen. Erich Ludendorff,
advanced my personal favorite theory of democracy: “In a democracy the people choose a leader in whom they trust. Then the chosen leader
says, ‘Now shut up and obey me.’ ” People and party are then no longer free to interfere in his business.¶ Max Fisher, also in the Post, called for
monarchy:¶ You might find yourself wishing that the United States could follow Australia’s example: Fire everyone in Congress, hold snap
elections next month and restart from scratch. But we can’t, because we haven’t recognized the British monarchy or had a London-appointed
governor -general in more than two centuries. Maybe, if we ask nicely, Britain will take us back?¶ The New Republic suggested the President
dissolve Congress and then attack it:¶ Almost exactly 20 years ago, he dissolved parliament. The vice president and the speaker of the
parliament dissolved Yeltsin’s presidency, and holed up with their supporters in the parliament’s headquarters, now known as “the White
House.”¶ Then Yeltsin [sent in the tanks].¶ It should not be surprising that progressive and statists default to a statist solution to a federal
problem. However, when the centralization of power in the federal government, especially the presidency, has grown dramatically over the last
century, calls for more centralized power to solve the problems it creates should hardly be taken seriously. One does not succeed in herding
cats by acquiring more or stronger cats. “But our dictatorship would be a benevolent one, wielding unchecked power to help people!” Yes,
that’s literally how they all start…¶ It should also be no surprise that libertarians would call for a decentralized solution. However, since we’ve
never really given it a shot, one might be worth looking into. Maybe instead of giving Washington or the President more power to solve these
rare impasses, we should give them less, to prevent them from happening in the first place and minimizing the negative consequences when
they do.¶ We tried a purposefully weak central government in the Articles of Confederation. It didn’t work in the 18th Century (though in a
hyper-connected 21st, who’s to say it wouldn’t?). For
the last hundred years we’ve tried a stronger and stronger
central government. It hasn’t worked well either. Most pundits try to blame this shutdown and other constitutional gridlock on
partisanship, polarization, and more specifically, gerrymandering.¶ They argue or imply that we’d have no problems with one-party rule, two
parties of centrists, or bluntly, that it’s just those extremist Republicans. This completely ignores history. There have been 18 partial shutdowns
of the federal government, all since 1976. Five of them occurred when Democrats controlled the House, Senate, and White House. Five more
occurred when the same party controlled both House and Senate. Of the 18, only seven have been between opposing houses of Congress.¶
Even the history of Obamacare itself belies the partisanship canard. When President Obama took office in 2009, he had a Democratic
supermajority in the Senate capable of passing anything over minority filibuster and a Democratic majority in the House. His
initial
promises of a sweeping health care plan seemed unstoppable.¶ But reality waxed as his first year
waned with no bill passed. Concessions had to be made, the public option was removed, deals had to be cut, and in the
end, the unread 2000-page monstrosity was passed by a razor-thin 219-212 vote in the House (all Republicans and 34 Democrats
voting against). It wasn’t partisanship that made those Democrats vote against the President’s bill, nor was
it polarization. It was a simple difference of opinion. In a constitutional republic, differences of
opinion should lead to an impasse, or at least compromise, not draconian statist machinations to
prevent them.¶ So why not try federalism? Our Constitution was setup to work this way but has been
woefully misused since the Progressive Era of the early 20th Century. The beauty of a strong 10th Amendment,
with only the delegated powers allowed to Congress and the President, and the rest sent back to the States and the people, is that it would
minimize both conflict and dependency, the two primary issues with this situation.¶ If fewer agenda items were handled by Washington, there
would be fewer chances for divisive disagreement, legislative deadlock, and ultimately government shutdown. Fewer
powers in the
federal government would also mean fewer services provided by it, and in the rare case of a shutdown, fewer
subsequent hardships created.¶ For example, if there were no national parks, but all state parks instead, they
would all be open right now. If there weren’t four and a half million federal employees, but that many (or
probably fewer) dispersed throughout the state governments, there wouldn’t be nearly a million of them not working
or working for delayed in the interim. If the states funded WIC and other welfare programs themselves, there might
be fewer people on them and fewer going without assistance right now because of the shutdown.¶ Thomas Jefferson, the Apostle of
Democracy, said it best in a letter to Judge William Johnson of South Carolina in 1823:¶ I answer by asking if a single state of the Union would
have agreed to the constitution had it given all powers to the General government?¶
Alt causes
Alt causes to Federalism Decline—Obamacare, and increasingly Federal governmentcentric policies
Moore 9/28, REP. LEWIS MOORE, R-Edmond, is committee chairman of the States’ Rights (Federalism) Committee of the Oklahoma
House of Representatives. (Lewis, "Don’t remain silent where state’s rights are concerned" 9/28/13, Edmond Sun,
http://www.edmondsun.com/ opinion/x1836122784/Don-t-remain-silent-where-state-s-rights-are-concerned#sthash.aygtHt6x.dpuf)/
EDMOND — Legislation to educate, inform and protect Oklahoma citizens and businesses against unconstitutional federal government
intrusion is an important step for the state of Oklahoma. An interim study is scheduled for Oct. 30 to look at some of the concerns and
actions we can take as a sovereign state.¶ In conjunction with our Oklahoma U.S. Senators, Congressman James Lankford, the state Attorney
General’s office, the state Insurance Commissioner, the governor’s office and the Speaker of the House along with the state Senate we can
coordinate a united front where state
sovereignty issues are in jeopardy.¶ We plan to have the above officials or their
representatives at the interim study to determine a united, coordinated response to unconstitutional federal government overreach.¶ One
of the concerns addressed will be the Affordable Care Act vs. the Oklahoma Constitution and the 2010 referendum vote of
the people of Oklahoma. By almost 70 percent, the people of Oklahoma voted to protect our state from the damaging affects to our
liberty and economy by the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act.¶ Who has the final
authority in where there is a conflict between the State and Federal government? In short, the state is supreme where the U.S. Constitution
does not give the power to the federal government.Ӧ Supremacy relates to which governing entity has ultimate authority if rules or rights
are in conflict. Supremacy is often referred to by lawyers and government officials only as the federal government having unlimited
authority over states and all other subdivisions. However, according to even recent opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, supremacy is not a
one-way street!¶ In the relatively recent Mack-Prinz v. U.S. decision, the U.S. Supreme Court declared, “The local or municipal authorities
form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres; to the general authority than
the general authority is subject of them, within its own sphere.” ¶ In this case the Supreme Court got it right, quoting verbatim Federalist
Papers No. 39. The High Court went on to say this separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.
Further elaborating, by quoting Federalist Papers No. 51 that “just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
federal government serve to prevent the accumulation of excess power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the states
and the federal government will reduce the risk of Tyranny and abuse from either front. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the
people the different governments will control each other at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.Ӧ
The sad thing is
that this had to even go to the U.S. Supreme Court . Our U.S. senators and representatives as well as
the executive branch should have recognized that this is not constitutional and stopped it dead in its
tracks. The U.S. Senate’s primary purpose is to protect states’ rights . It didn’t happen in this case.
we have a constitutional crisis that each state will now have to contend with.
Instead
It is
forcing our state elected officials to exercise our states’ supremacy, concerning this issue, which probably isn’t a bad thing.¶ We are either
going to come out of this a stronger state, having protected individual liberty or we will know that we are no longer free as citizens but
rather subjects, required to submit to a central government that can control much of what we do in our daily lives.
Nothing will be
left unmonitored. Your movement by car and plane, your phone calls, your Internet, your children’s
education, your choice of information sources, your job, college loans, mortgages, health care,
retirement, taxes, tax preparation, energy use, food choices and more will be affected by a federal
government that exceeds their rightful boundaries. If we are ever going to reset our constitutional boundaries the time is
now.¶ There is hope. We have concerned elected officials who are highly motivated to make something happen in the defense of our state.
There is a remedy and it has always been right there in front of us. Knowledge is power and silence is consent.