WHOSE GLOBE, WHOSE
GLOBALIZATION:
THE DIMINISHING WORLD ORDER
Hans-Henrik Holm and Michael Stohl
Paper presented at Conference on Global Governance: 21st Century Dynamics
Orfalea Center for Global & International Studies
University of California Santa Barbara, October 3-4, 2015
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In the book “Whose World Order” Holm and Sørensen (1995) presented a
perspective and a question on World order and globalization in the aftermath of the end of
the Cold War. They asked: “What has changed?” and “What are the consequences of the
changes?”
Twenty years later we explore those questions again and in so doing address some
basic questions about power and globalization dynamics, including how power and its
distributions impact globalization, how those globalization processes impact
distributions of power, which elements of power influence globalization dynamics and
which nations, groups of nations and classes dominate and benefit from these
dynamics. As we do so, we examine changes in the role of the state, changes in the
concept of power and the resulting “diminishing world order”.
In the nineties World Order looked ripe with, and for, change. It appeared that the
constituent states of the international system and the “order” within both regions and the
system as a whole were altering. Borders were redrawn in what was now the former Soviet
Union, economic and social globalization was transforming the countries of Europe and
ever closer relationships among the actors within the European Union and the possibilities
that it would continue to include more and more nations within its borders appeared to be
ever greater, and in Asia the potential of China was being assessed. As Yunling (1995:102)
pointed out, China would have to resist the temptation to fill the regional power vacuum
left by the end of the Cold War…” For Africa the tall order was to focus on democracy
and even development (Ake, 1995:42). In the case of Latin America, more democratic
states with determined public strategies and economic growth were foreseen (Sunkel,
1995:67).
Holm and Sorensen argued that one of the consequences of these fundamental
global changes was that states and regions were becoming more different- despite the
forces of globalization (an argument explored later by Cynthia Stohl who described global
processes of convergence and divergence (Stohl, 2005). In short, globalization
a p p e a r e d t o bring convergence on many different fronts- technology, media,
culture, consumer products, economic processes, finance and ideas making nations and
peoples more similar across a number of organizational, economic, political and cultural
dimensions. But globalization also created and confronted both resistance and backlash
in which national and local cultures, beliefs, and cultures a r e a s s e r t e d wi t h
r e s u l t i n g divergence in both where parts of the globe are going and where they want
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to go. Seen from today’s perspective there was an underlying belief that world order
was not only being reshaped but also reproduced in new forms.
Holm and Sorensen identified three main types of states: The premodern, the
modern and the post-modern state, Georg Sørensen later modified these state types by
calling them weak, modern and post-modern (Sørensen,2006: 346). Irrespective of the
labeling, Holm and Sorensen were arguing that “the logical next step is to further analyze
characteristics and typical relations of such distinct types of units, that is, to combine the
system level approach pursued here with a unit level approach” (Holm and Sørensen,
1995, 205). The point was that world order was produced on the basis of very different
actor units.
Whose World Order was a plea for understanding the world through the lenses of
regional variation. It was an attempt to push the IR agenda towards a more detailed and
nuanced understanding of the differences in types of relationships among types of states.
As such it was critical of contributions to the globalization literature that assumed that
systemic logics could be described under heading like “The Clash of Civilizations”, “The
Coming Anarchy,” Jihad vs. McWorld” etc. It was also critical of the world system
analysis point of view that saw the relations between the post-modern and the pre-modern
states as one of continued economic exploitation that doomed the developing world to
failure and their domestic policies to irrelevance. Holm and Sorensen argued that
domestic preconditions in the developing countries were essential elements in facing
external challenges and opportunities. The twin drivers of global change were identified as
uneven globalization and the end of the cold war. Together these forces created increased
regional variation and less systemic determinism.
In this contribution we will judge the foregoing insights and examine the results of
the past twenty years and what we think that portends for future global transformations and
the constituent units. We will attempt to provide answers by looking at the relationships
among power, globalization and states. And our overarching answer is that uneven
globalization keeps pushing World Order away from hierarchical orders, challenging
power distributions and relocating power in a diverse processes. It is these diverse
processes that together constitute the current world order (and disorder) and it is the object
of this paper to examine these processes of divergence and convergence and what they
portend for the next twenty years. The diminishment of world order appears to be one of
the consequences.
World Order approaches
Within the fields of global and international studies there are a number of
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contending approaches to understanding and labeling the dominant world order and its
principles.
The classical perspective is, of course, the neo realism approach of Kenneth Waltz
Waltz, 1979). This approach is widely described and widely popular in both media
reporting on international politics and in popular conceptions of what makes the world
order tick. The basic argument is that it is the power of states that determines outcomes
and orders in international relations. More sophisticated versions of the neo realism
approach recognize that not all outcomes and not all actions are power relations, but the
argument remains that the really important ones are. The consequence is that the best path
to understanding the world is therefore to look at how states utilize resources to acquire
and employ power.
In reaction to this perspective, fifty years ago Hedley Bull ( 1977), representing the
English School of international relations, argued that this world of power was restrained
by underlying norms and rules, These norms and rules constituted an international society
in which states in their actions let themselves be constrained in actions. The world order
was thus an order based on commonly accepted norms stretching from laws of war to
regimes of international organizations.
More recently, based on a combination of these two traditions, Robert Jackson
(2003) argued that the world order was built on a fundamental covenant. Namely that the
sovereignty of states constituted the most solid of international orders. By constructing an
international system built on state sovereignty and the mutual acceptance of this
sovereignty, a world order was founded, epitomized in the peace of Westphalia, but since
then codified in many other bodies of international law, such as the charter of the United
Nations the principles of sovereignty shaped the states and according to Jackson, should
shape world order. Breaking these fundamental principles through intervention in others
states or violations of recognized borders endangered world order. The covenant was the
fundamental stability-creating factor in a world of anarchic international relations.
In contrast, Samuel Huntington (1993) had argued that what created clashes in
international politics in the years after the end of the cold war and in particular after the
events of 9.11 were not challenges to sovereignty principles, norm clashes or even power
balancing. It was the “clash of civilizations.” The mobilization of peoples around cultures
and belief systems created fault lines in geography and war, terrorism and conflict. In
particular, Huntington looked at the fault lines between Islam and the west. The different
conceptions of the relationship between power and belief, between state and religion and
between different cultures created foundations for clashes fundamental and unavoidable.
Huntington’s perspectives pointed to the growing importance of individual and group
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beliefs as they manifested themselves in religions and cultures. Many of Huntington’s
characterizations of the fault lines between and among civilizations as well as the
characterization of those civilizations themselves were widely criticized but the main
argument about the clash and hence divergent aspects of global relations were echoed in
widely read contributions by Kaplan (1994), Barber (1995) and Friedman (1999).
This perspective was given a manifestly different outline in parts of the growing
globalization literature. In WWO Holm and Sorensen (1995:4) defined globalization as the
intensification of economic, social and cultural relations across borders. They further
distinguished between (a.) the increased internationalization of economic intercourse and a
qualitatively new global economy. A distinction between more of the same and a
consolidated global economy that subsumes national economies and (b.) the increased
interconnectedness between people in a simple way of more contact as opposed to a
fundamental qualitative shift in how people live their lives. Distant events have immediate
consequences for individual conditions of life and attitudes towards the other.
The combined effect of this form of globalization is a series of challenges to how
states do their business. In some cases the challenges may be successfully utilized by the
state as a new instrument to pursue their goals, in others it severely restricts the ability of
states to control and structure their relations with other states and actors.
Based on the economic, technological and social breakdowns of borders and
barriers, the globalization literature focused on the respatialization of social space
(Scholte, 2005). In this linguistically inelegant formulation was expressed an important
new quality in world order. The conception of the importance of time and space was
changing. The difference between what was local and what was global was disappearing.
For some people global human rights issues were just as important as local rights issues.
For some the threat of global warming was the most important issue facing all of the 7-8
billon people on the planet. People’s agendas and identities were being transformed by the
power of global instant communication. This created a qualitative new form of
globalization that constituted a new conception of world order.
In a similar vein the effect of globalization on the social level is complex. Economic
globalization has both increased economic opportunities involving major economic
disruptions which have had both positive and negative effects on different sectors within
capital and labor markets both within and among states. The ubiquity of new technology,
like the iPhone or the iPad may create similar platforms for global use and at the same
time reinforce linguistic national barriers. Globalization involves respatialization and
spacialization at the same time. This signifies fundamental change in the life conditions of
both economic and social spheres, but it is a messy descriptor of ongoing changes with no
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clear direction or causality. At the same time the processes of globalization have had (and
should have) implications for the global distribution of power and thus the shaping of the
underlying dynamics of whose power is most important in the processes of shaping the
future dynamics and “rules” and norms by which processes continue to proceed and the
“order” which results.
With respect to the other type of power shift, that from states to other forms of
organizations such as corporations, and licit and illicit non-governmental organizations
we enter the realm of the discussion about the demise of the state or at least of state
power. We would argue, and this is based on work that Stohl and Stohl (2005,2007)
have done with respect to both human rights networks and terrorist networks that the
organizational networks that have developed have actually created very interesting
interdependent and sometimes paradoxical relationships, which while transferring some
state functions to other organizations serve in the end to actually strengthen many parts
of the state system at the same time that they create alternative power challenges on the
global stage.
Globalization, world order and the changing nature of state power
It has been more than twenty years since the initial attempts at trying to understand
the dynamics and principles of the post-cold war globalization dynamic were first posed.
Many of these initial claims provide insights to the developments of the last two decades
but also they offer some caution in putting too much emphasis on simple or single ordering
principals of world order. The result as we will show in the following is that not only has
no clear new world order developed but also no agreement has emerged as to which of
these approaches provides the best approach to understanding . World order is indeed out
of order. Globalization has perhaps entered a phase of diminishing returns.
State power has been undergoing a transformative process in the last twenty years. In order
to understand how world order may be produced we need to look in detail at the changing
nature of power. Throughout much of the 20th century there was within the international
relations literature significant consensus that the crucial components of State Power
were related to military strength, which in turn was dependent upon geography (with
the debate whether coast lines or and heartlands and borders were the most relevant),
natural resources, size of population, level of industrialization, per capita income,
governmental stability and efficiency, national morale and alliances. All these things
are still important but today we also consider communication, coordination and
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information as key components and not simply on the battlefield. In addition, as Nye
(1990) has argued, it is important to recognize the contributions of both hard power and
soft power. While Hard power describes a nation or political body's ability to use
economic incentives or military strength to influence other actors' behaviors, Soft power
refers to an actor's values, culture, policies and institutions—and the extent to which
these "primary currencies," as Nye calls them, are able to attract or repel other actors to
"want what you want.” Both hard and soft power signify power as a relationship, the
ability to shape and control the political behavior of others. Employing Nye’s
categorization of Hard and Soft Power we can identify significant components of
each form of power that may shed some light on the movement of the distribution of
power and the attempts to build world order (as well as to challenge it). Hard Power is
characterized by “Bullets and Bucks” while soft power is composed of “Bits, Buddies,
Ballots and Beliefs”. The components which make up both hard and soft power require
investments and tradeoffs in terms of resources.
Hard Power
BULLETS: Military Power
Military power remains significant on the global stage. As
a l w a y s t h e r e a r e t wo components of military power, even if in the past states
have acted as if first component, the power to hurt (both to destroy and threaten it) was
more important than the power to protect. In the past, policy makers and scholars
were primarily concerned with other states in terms of the power to hurt and the power
to protect, but clearly, as the mobilization of resources and responses to various threats
from non-state actors employing terrorism have demonstrated in the past twenty years,
this is no longer the case and there are significant debates occurring in major power
capitals over what the most important military threat facing their nation actually is.
This has more clearly revealed a number of paradoxes of power in the asymmetries of
not only capabilities but also vulnerabilities. The larger the power, the greater the
number of targets and the greater the difficulty to protect targets from terrorists,
criminals, pirates. And thus because of the reciprocal relationship of military power, it
is now “easier” to protect a nation from another nation than from a non-territorial based
or illicit enemy. The order produced by a mutual security concern between states is
no longer as manifest.
`Bucks: The Power to Build-.
When we think about the impact of globalization and other global
processes discussed above we should be thinking about multiple categories o f
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global processes and how they impact the relationships and the
power disparities among the component parts of the international
s y s t e m . These would include first, possible geographic shifts in state power from one
state or states to others and secondly, the movement of state powers to other forms of
organization within and beyond the state as constituent unit within global relations, and
thirdly the basis upon which aspects of power counts most in different processes of
globalization.
For example, as we are all aware, there has been phenomenal growth in the Chinese
economy and at various times in the last two decades the BRICs and Asian economies in
general have been more dynamic and robust than those in North America and Europe.
So if we look at certain aspects of trade and production, which are recognized as
among the key components of economic power, we can witness a definite shift in an
east and south direction from traditional northern and western dominance in the total
production and percentage of trade figures. However, while there is a shift in the relative
totals of these factors, there has been no challenge to the underlying rules and norms of
interactions and thus no change in the controlling economic “regime” which underlies it,
as the recent Chinese “crisis well illustrates. We are still “playing” under the same basic
rules of the economic and financial games. The impact of these rules on populations within
both the “winning” states as well as the losers has meant greater dissatisfaction with the
underlying rules while reinforcing the power of those who have established the basic
dynamics of the systems. Thus while these hard resources matter, the vast economic shifts
we have seen in the last twenty years are straining the global institutional framework to its
limits.
Soft Power
Bits: The Power to Communicate, Mobilize, Share and Produce
knowledge
The relative global position of the West has fallen in this category because there
has been great improvement in other parts of the world. However, while the distribution
of communicative power has improved worldwide and the production of global media is
not as fully dominated by the West (witness the rise of Bollywood and Nollywood), the
west is still the predominate power. Michael Curtin (2007) has indicated t h a t none of
the leading producers of globally consumed media are found in China and thus China
does not have the power to contribute to, or frame the global narrative in the same way
as the US and the West. Thus while China is continuing to invest heavily in education
and computer power, its commitment to the flow of information and free flow of
communication because of political reasons robs it of much of the power of the new
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social media and the ability to create new organizational structures and innovation.
Making changes in this area opens up issues of collaboration and political power.
Indicative of this connectedness, Facebook recently announced its one billionth
member producing a map of its connectedness.
Compare this distribution to the remarkably consistent connectedness of the 1900 map
of telegraph connections. The form and power of connectedness has indeed changed
but not the pattern of the distribution of the relationship.
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As we will discuss below, what has changed is the ability of non-state actors to exploit
this connectedness both for convergent as well as divergent purposes.
Buddies (Networks): The Power to Collaborate and Cooperate
With very few exceptions, U.S. and European citizens are major players in many
more of the hard and soft power networks that more and more define our contemporary
social and political relationships- that is military alliances and multilateral institutions,
and non-governmental civil society organizations, scholarly scientific and cultural
organizations. In general these forms of organization are convergent in their effects.
These networks of people and organizations provide opportunities to bridge structural
holes (see Stohl and Stohl, 2005) and to play the role of “honest broker” in disputes
among nations and peoples.
There are also however, divergent consequences of the power to collaborate and
cooperate. As Moses Naim (2005) has explored how illicit networks of various forms
of criminal enterprises (smugglers of both goods and people, drugs, counterfeit goods
etc.), terrorists and other illicit political actors have formed huge profitable and
powerful actors. These actors often control organizations which are far more powerful
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in terms of finance and military power than some states and often threaten those states
ability to govern or even continue to exist as functioning entities as well as directly
flaunting the “rules” and practices of order.
Ballots: The governance process
Though as the horrific events in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other locations constantly
remind us there have been and continue to be significant challenges to Fukuyama’s (1989.
1992) end of history thesis based on the triumph of liberal democracy at the close of the
cold war. The trend, nonetheless over the past two decades, though frequently interrupted
is to greater democratic processes and accountability within nations, more free, fair and
competitive elections and judicial independence and accountability. C e n t r a l i z e d
Control, Repression and Backlash against democratic choices all occur but the idea of
democratic process and accountability is a strong part of the consequences of
globalization and the greater the integration into the global economy the greater the
pressure grows for inclusion in the governance process. As Fukuyama points out, Law,
democratic accountability and the state are the three fundamentals of modern political
order. However more democracy may not lead to better governance. The relation
between the two is complicated “all good things do not necessarily go together”
(Fukuyama, 2014, p 1338)
Beliefs: the Power to Frame and Inspire, Who controls the narrative?
As indicated above much of global culture is generated in the west and while it
often incorporates music, art and literature from the global south it has for the most
part, incorporated that southern generated culture into the global narrative. How much
will this change in the next twenty years, whose narrative will frame the future. While
proponents of the transformative power of Facebook, iPhone and other forms of media
dominate, it is clear also from the success of ISIS and other divergent forces that this
power may also be employed to directly challenge convergence with extraordinarily
powerful results. Narratives are appearing that are challenging to world order. The
liberal western order is challenged. The state and sovereignty based order is
challenged. And no clear dominant narrative is replacing them.
Conclusion
How does the world order look now twenty years later? As we have discussed in
this paper the changes over the last twenty years are hard to put into a simple formula. One
thing is clear however. The optimism and belief that accompanied the “triumphalist”
reading of the end of the Cold War is gone. And this is more than taking exception to the
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liberal credo of Francis Fukuyama and his “End of History”. In fact the many wars in the
Middle East and Africa, have put a question mark to the hope that popular participation,
democratic regimes and common solutions to joint challenges would constitute a
transformative trend. The liberal world order is in crisis. (Sørensen, 2011:184)
Secondly the belief, or hope, is gone, that globalization was a transformative process
whereby the dismantling of borders, the amazing advances in technology and the
economic growth of the new powers in the world were moving world order to a foundation
of joint interests. Many (most prominently, Friedman, 2005) argued that globalization was
a force that states could not ignore or even fight against. Clearly seen in Europe, but
evident on a world scale, borders were coming down, communication was globalizing,
economic liberalization was moving towards realizing the liberal dream of a global
market. Some even went as far as suggesting that there was a respatialization of social
space creating a qualitatively different form of globalization at both the level of
individuals and groups. (Scholte 2005)
Thirdly the belief has disappeared that somehow world order was going to be
produced by either hegemonic states or by states in cooperation. The hegemonic, unipolar
moment of USA preponderance was a short moment. Indisputably the USA is still the
preponderant power particularly in military terms. The USA has been actively at war since
2001, with wide-ranging goals of creating democracy such as was the case in Iraq, with
more limited goals of removing dictators such as Khadafi in Libya, and with reactive goals
such as the air strikes and limited intervention in the war against ISIS. But the many
inconclusive wars have both reduced the US appetite for certain types of military
engagement (at least under the current administration) and eroded the belief that military
power can not only destroy the enemy but be employed to build world order effectively.
Consequently the US is a preponderant power but not a world order creating power. The
move from hard power to soft power and to networks and communication as power
sources implies that order is no longer easily produced by hegemonic states or by any
other actor.
The crises in Europe have reduced the optimism of twenty years ago in the creation
of world order through close cooperation. Back then Europe was seen as a model for a
changing international system. In WWO Michael Zurn used the “view from Europe” to
argue against the determinism inherent in the structural realism approach. (Zurn: 149).
Robert Keohane argued that states would have to surrender sovereignty to international
institutions to create effective governance (Keohane: 185). Now in 2015 it is hard to see
the EU as a model for the production of world order. The Greeks have taught us that much.
The inability of Europe to deal with the immigration crises of 2015 further underscores the
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impotence of the EU while also highlighting its necessity.
The end result in terms of world order is that the hopeful vision of the 1990s was
never realized. The current world order is instead a byproduct of shifting coalitions and the
ordering principles vary from one issue area to another issue area. Kupchan (2013) makes
the point that we are in a period of downturn for Western predominance. The result is a
loss of World Order produced by and based on Western principles. This creates the need
for states and other order producing actors to compromise. One set of rules is no longer
enough. Political diversity will be the dominant principle of the new world and its order.
This political diversity will be based on a much lower common denominator that the
current order rules. Kupchan makes an attempt to define what these rules could be:
A more pluralistic conception of legitimacy;
A more sturdy conception of sovereignty in the face of R2P challenges;
A stronger regional rule setting and a globalization with less inequality in its wake.
Analytically appealing as these new core values may appear, they hold little
prospect of being implemented. The old world order rules of safeguarding sovereignty are
too sticky, and there is little push for a stronger order producing interest in both the USA
and the EU. Instead state power in the form of negative power seems to rule. States may be
weaker in terms of their power to produce common rules and enforce them, but they retain
the significant “power of no”. States may stop immigration, they can change their currency
rules, and they can conduct wars (and perhaps not win them) but they also create crises for
order implementations. The need for governance is increasing but both the possibility of,
and desirability of creating or providing governance at the level of world order has been
diminished during the last twenty years.
The dilemma of the resurgent state
The sense of global crises because world order is harder to produce are clearly
demonstrated in national policies around the world. National rear guard options have
continued to gain more political backing in states. Reinstitution of border controls within
Europe, domestic US opposition to international accords ranging from the Iran deal to
TRIPs agreements on trade. Chinese financial policy on protecting the national currency
and Indian policies of protectionism well illustrate this trend. A plethora of examples of
state resurgence show up in any daily news package.
The state resurgence is a challenge to the provision of world order. States- large and
small- are still fighting a rear guard action, as they were in 1995 but the crucial change has
been that the rear guard action is now directed towards disregarding some of the very
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rules, norms and regimes that produced a different world order twenty years ago. Small
states like the Netherlands and the Nordic countries that twenty years ago were staunch
supporters of multilateral order now question multilateral treaties and norms. Pacta sunt
servanda is no longer a given even for small states.
We face a new challenge for world order provision in that the state system and the
power structure of that system has been eroded. At the same time many states (and
particularly growing political movements within them) are trying to regain control over
decision making and welfare provisions that, particularly in Europe, had been transferred
to the supranational institutions. Multilateralism is more and more challenged by the very
nations that created the multilateral institutions and at the same time assertions of the need
for unilateral action become more frequent. In many ways, while the forces of
globalization in terms of economic, social and communicative processes have become
more and more prevalent, dense and powerful, the forces which create and nurture
processes producing world order have both been weakened and more severely challenged
by forces within and across states.
When we look back at the questions of What has changed? And What are the
consequences of the changes? The answer today is different from 1995. We see a
diminishing world order and a continuing process of uneven globalization. The post-cold
war period has ended and its liberal optimism froze when the Arab spring turned to winter.
The search for a new covenant has barely begun..
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