Firestone Tire Recall
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Firestone Tire Recall
Cody Lewis, Joshua Palmer, Brian Riley
Webster University
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When an individual looks for a lifelong partner, he or she looks for someone that is
compatible, trustworthy, and who shares common interests. In business, the process is no
different. Choosing the right business partner, whether it be a supplier, investor, or a retailer, is
important to the success of the company. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company partnered with
Ford Motor Company in the early 1900’s. The partnership lasted almost a century, until the two
companies went their separate ways. This case study will discuss the partnership between the
two companies, the correlation between this case and Management 5910, and finally, an analysis
of the case.
A simpler time of the early 1900’s allowed businesses to interact on a more personal
level. The relationship between Henry Ford and Harvey Firestone was just that. They were both
avid campers and often vacationed together, including Thomas Edison, (Ohio Historical Society,
2012) in what was known as “The Millionaires’ Club”. Their relationship started when Henry
Ford needed tires for his Model T in 1906; he chose Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (Manor &
Popely, 2001). Maintaining this relationship over the years has proven difficult.
Public criticism can hurt any company, but when there seems to be a trend more than
their name becomes tarnished. The first major blow came in the early 1970’s with Firestone’s
500 tire. By Oct 20, 1978 Firestone was essentially forced to recall over 7 million tires
(Associated Press, 1978) making this the largest tire recall at the time. To make matters worse,
the company attempted to cover up known safety issues and were subsequently fined $500,000
(Schubert, 2011). They were proven guilty of hiding facts and left with “…an enormous black
eye…due to a failure to act quickly and decisively” (Wharton School, 2000). These events
decreased public confidence, and in turn, led to the merger between Bridgestone and Firestone.
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Jump ahead twenty years and it would seem that past mistakes would make Firestone more
proactive and better prepared to deal with production issues.
When news broke, August 9th 2000 would prove to be a date Firestone would never
forget. That day they recalled an unprecedented 14.4 million tires in an attempt to correct a
discovered safety-related defect (NHTSA, 2001). To make matters worse, Ford, Firestone and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) knew about the problems months,
if not years, earlier yet did nothing (Ammons & Vujasinovic, 2001). Tire tread separation had
surfaced as a possible cause in many cases, and accounted for more than 70% of claims (Ford
Motors, 2001). What made matters worse is the majority of failures could be linked back to
Firestone’s Deactur, Illinois plant. Then evidence surfaced that most rollovers were occurring in
the warmer states; particularly Texas, Arizona, California and Florida. Early in the investigation
Firestone wished to lay blame on design stability of Ford vehicles claiming they were prone to
rollovers. Were tread separations a simple fact of high road temperatures common in the
southern states? Was there an inherent stability problem with Ford vehicles? Was a single type
of Firestone tire failing more often than other brands? To find out why these tread separations
and rollovers started occurring we need a basic understanding of tire manufacturing. This is key
to root cause analysis and therefore can lead to determining liability.
To the common eye a tire is simply a rubber doughnut attached to a car and inflated with
air. Most people realize that proper air pressure in the tire is required for safe driving. Many
more realize that when a tire becomes worn, it loses its ability to grip the road like it did when it
was new. What most do not realize is how complicated making a tire can get. Each step
becomes a critical layer on which the whole tire relies. The steel ‘bead’ of the tire, the part that
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gives strength between the tire and wheel, essentially act as the spine of the tire. A wire mesh
web of nylon and steel wires are attached to this bead cable. Upon and within this skeleton are
layers of rubber and tire tread. The tire then undergoes arguably the most critical step,
vulcanization. The vulcanization process is simply the fusing by heat and high pressures of the
rubber, steel and nylon components into one solid form. Under proper conditions, the resulting
product is one singular item, a tire. When contaminants such as dirt or moisture are allowed into
the mix, an imperfect bond it the result. This is precisely what happened at a Firestone plant.
After the disaster in 1978, you could assume that any problems that happened in the past
had been corrected. Unfortunately, that was not the case in Firestone’s Decatur, Illinois plant.
The facility was a repurposed storage warehouse built in 1942 for the US military. The creature
comforts we have come to expect in modern buildings were non-existent. Winters were cold,
summers were hot…and very humid. This uncontrolled high humidity environment proved to be
an unforeseen problem for Firestone. During the vulcanizing process, high ambient humidity
can cause inadequate bonding of the layers of rubber and steel. This weak bonding caused by
imperfections resulted in the layers to not remain unified after vulcanization (Ammons &
Vujasinovic, 2001). When this was coupled with a strike of workers in 1994 conditions became
worse. The Decatur plant was in a panic. Faced with a possible work stoppage they opted to
hire 1400 replacements that were put on 12-hour shifts (Ammons & Vujasinovic, 2001). Now
mixing the new employees with the horrible environmental conditions only exacerbated what
minor issues they had before. These carelessly made tires were time bombs waiting to go off.
But when push came to shove, all Firestone could do was try to blame someone else, anyone
else, for the mistakes that were made.
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In the eyes of Firestone only one thing was wrong, Ford. They continue to claim that the
tires were underinflated causing excess stress on the sidewall of the tires. These extra stresses
lead to higher tire temperatures, which can lead to blowouts and other tire failures. They also
claimed the Ford SUV’s were extremely unstable compared to other similar vehicles. What
Firestone was hoping for was an easy way out. Ford obliged by rethinking their recommended
tire pressure on the Explorer SUV and increased it to 30 psi. For 10 years, Ford had
recommended that 26 psi was an acceptable pressure and up until weeks before the recall, so had
Firestone (Bradsher, 2000). Instead of standing behind their product, all Firestone attempted was
to duck and cover hoping that consumers would side with them. This completely unethical
behavior should not be accepted; fortunately, Ford and the NHTSA actually humored Firestone
and allowed further research and testing to be completed.
Nearly a year after the initial recall, Firestone was still busy attempting to lay blame until
the NHTSA stepped in and completed their own study. They found that “a vehicle cannot be
found to contain a safety-related defect under our statute solely because it has not been designed
to preclude linear range oversteer following an unexpected, catastrophic event such as a tread
separation” (Weinstein & Runge, 2001). Amazingly, common sense prevailed for the time
being. Firestone was now unable to point their corporate finger at Ford and pass the buck of
failure onto them. What caused anger is the fact that despite “Firestone’s assertions regarding
the difficulty of controlling an Explorer after a tread separation were correct, it would not affect
Firestone’s duty to recall defective tires” (NHTSA, 2001). Firestone’s focus was clearly on
factors they said were out of their control; simple integrity to stand behind your product is what
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needed to happen. In the end, 192 deaths and over 500 injuries (as of September 2001) were a
result of defective tires manufactured by Firestone (NHTSA, 2001).
The Firestone tire recall is a great example of company’s negligence that led to tort suits.
The definition of negligence by Merriam-Webster is “failure to exercise the care that a
reasonable prudent person would exercise in like circumstances.” Also worth stating is the
example Merriam-Webster uses, “the company was charged with negligence in the
manufacturing of the defective tires (Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2012).” Over the next section of
this paper we will look at Firestone and Fords duty to their customers and how it applies to this
case. When proving negligence, four elements must be present to show that one party was
negligent to another. The questions we will be answering to prove that the elements of
negligence exist are, did the companies owe a duty of care to the customer, did the companies
violate that duty of care, was the violation the cause of the damage, and was that violation
foreseeable by the companies. As the answers are discussed at length it will become evident that
the companies were guilty of a negligent tort and the suits brought against them following the
tire recall were valid.
As stated by Reed, “The critical element of the negligence tort is duty. Without a duty to
another person, one does not owe that person reasonable care (Reed, 2010, p. 295).” The first
question we will look at is - did the company owe a duty to the customer? For both companies
the short answer is yes. Firestone owes a duty to supply quality tires that do not pose a danger to
the customer using them. In this case, Firestone has a duty to its customers to use proper
processes and techniques when manufacturing its tires. That includes making sure that the plant
in which the tires are manufactured in have the humidity and temperature regulated to the right
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measurements that support the best conditions for the rubber and adhesive being used in the
manufacturing process. It also includes testing the tires to prove that the manufacturing process
was done properly and testing met the required safety standards. Firestone then owes a duty that
if test results show that tires were not manufactured properly or do not meet safety standards,
then those tires should not be sold and the manufacturing process should undergo inspections for
flaws. All these things are included in the duty of safety that Firestone owes their customers. In
Ford’s case safety is also a duty they owe their customers but safety as a duty for Ford means
something else entirely. Ford owes a duty to supply quality automobiles that offer as much
safety as possible, in the event that an accident occurs, to the customer operating them. Ford also
owes a duty to supply quality automobiles that do not pose a safety risk to the customer when
operated in normal conditions. What that means is Ford must ensure every part of their
automobiles is of high quality and does not pose a risk to the operator. In this case that means
Ford must ensure through rigorous testing that the automobiles they manufacture do not pose a
high risk of harm to the operator in the event of an accident such as a sudden loss of tire pressure
or blowout. It also means Ford must take measures to guarantee the tires they put on their
automobiles do not pose a risk to their customers. They need to make certain the supplier of tires
being installed on their automobiles is supplying quality tires that do not pose a risk to the
operators.
According to Reed, “At the core of negligence is the unreasonable behavior that breaches
the duty of care that the defendant owes to the plaintiff (Reed, 2010, p. 297).” Did the company
violate their duty to the customer? Again, for both companies the short answer is yes. On
numerous occasions Firestone violated its duty of safety to the customer by not only
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manufacturing bad tires but when they realized their faults they covered it up. We now know,
Firestone had a recall of tires in 1978 that was a result of bad tires made at the Decatur, IL plant.
It is no coincidence that the Decatur plant is again the culprit in this recall. In an interview with
the Chicago Tribune 10 former workers assert sweeping problems in many phases of tire
production at the Decatur plant, including an overemphasis on quantity at the expense of quality,
inadequate worker and supervisor training, sloppy manufacturing processes and sketchy
inspection systems (Garza, 2000). Also in an article by ABCNEWS it is stated that, “eight
former employees of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., have testified or promise to testify that they
used out-of-date rubber stock for their tires; that radial coils were exposed to humidity, making
them vulnerable to rust; and that final inspections were done too quickly (Sciutto, 2000).” These
are just a few examples of how Firestone violated its duty of safety to its customers with blatant
disregard for quality and safety of tires produced and the Decatur plant. As we shift our view to
Ford we find that they as well violated their duty of safety to the customer.
As discussed above it is Fords’ duty to make sure the parts, including tires, put on its
automobiles are of quality and don’t add to a risk of harm the customer. Even though Ford and
Firestone had been long time partners at this time it was still Fords duty to ensure the quality of
Firestones tires and not take the company at its word. To ensure a safe product to its customers
Ford should have had an employee of Ford Motor Company within each Firestone plant for the
sole purpose of quality controls analysis. This person’s job would be to inspect and oversee the
manufacturing of the tires and to guarantee Firestone is producing quality tires at a safety
standard that meets Fords requirements.
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“Before a person is liable to another for negligent injury, the person’s failure to use
reasonable care must actually have ‘caused’ the injury,” as stated by Reed (Reed, 2010).
Therefore the next question in the series is - was the violation responsible for the damages?
Firestone’s lack of quality was directly responsible for the damages caused. On a web site by the
Willis Law Firm, “When the rear tire of a vehicle suffers a blowout, controlling the vehicle
becomes very difficult…this loss of control results in the rear of the vehicle swinging around to
become perpendicular to the direction of travel (yawing) (Willis Law Firm , 2012).” When
Firestone made the choice to put quantity over quality they greatly increased the risk of tire tread
separation and as a result “at least 203 deaths and more than 700 injuries have been linked to
Firestone tire failures in the United States,” as written in an article by CBS News (CBS News,
2001). Stated in that same article is that many of the accidents involved rollovers of the Ford
Explorer (CBS News, 2001). Yawing is dangerous enough when it occurs is a car but when it
occurs on an SUV with a high center of gravity rollovers become a high risk. This risk was
known and accepted by the Ford Motor Company. So why didn’t they ensure the tires placed on
the SUV had an outstanding quality? Maybe it was cheaper, maybe it was trust. Regardless of
why, the fact remains Ford did not and the result of their lack of thoroughness was harm and
damages to the customer.
“It is not enough that a plaintiff suing for negligence prove that the defendant caused the
injury in fact. The plaintiff also must establish proximate cause…the proposition that those
engaged in activity are legally liable only for foreseeable risk that they cause,” discussed by
Reed (Reed, 2010). Thus, the last question needed to prove negligence is - was the violation
foreseeable to the company? It may be obvious that tread separation on the tires made at the
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Decatur plant are a foreseeable outcome based on the fact that they deliberately put quantity over
quality but law requires unreasonable doubt. The fact is that tread separation is a common
problem in radial tires like the ones Firestone was manufacturing and soon recalled. “Due to
difficulty in obtaining adhesion of steel to rubber there is a potential for tread separation of all
steel-belted radial tires. Industry records verify that tread belt separations are the most common
mode of failure of steel belted radial tires (Kaster, 2005).” With that shred of evidence there
really is no possibility that Firestone could not have foreseen a tire tread separation occurring.
One could argue Firestone had no control over the automobile that their tires would go
on. According to an article by Time, “Firestone customized the Wilderness AT tires for the
Explorer to Ford’s specifications (Greenwald, 2001).” Since Firestone designed the tire
specifically for the Ford Explorer they knew all the risks involved and still chose to produce tires
with quantity first rather than quality. As for Ford, they knew the Wilderness AT tire was the
tire they would be putting on the explorer and had data showing the Firestone tires had little to
no margin for safety in top-speed driving at 26 psi (Car-Accidents.com, 2000). So again the
evidence shows that both companies had full knowledge of the implications of their actions and
negligently ignored them and released their products to unsuspecting customers.
All companies need to take a proactive stance when it comes to ensuring their products or
services are safe for the public. In the early 1900s, there was little to no safety standards, it was
left to the individual companies. In 1972, the United States enacted the Consumer Product
Safety Act which established the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). The CPSC has
the power to issue recalls and develop product safety laws that can became the industry standard.
Today, they are consulting companies that specialize in methodologies and processes that
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improve the quality of a manufacturer’s product (i.e. SAP). Most companies understand the
importance of having quality and safe products. If they don’t, a company’s reputation may face
negative publicity and costly lawsuits that can lead to bankruptcy. Not only that, a company’s
name can have a negative cogitation as the case with Firestone. Due to these reasons, a higher
emphasis has been put on consumer safety and quality assurance. As mentioned before, a
company owes their customer a duty and part of that duty is to sell quality products. All
companies are responsible to ensure product safety, not only meeting the standards, but looking
for ways to continuously improve. In doing so, any product that fails will not be a question of
ethics, or whether or not the company performed their duty, but a fluke accident.
***http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/cpsa.pdf
***Suggest measures that Firestone could take to improve tire quality in the future.
In a competitive environment like the tire industry, competitors need to stand out.
Firestone did just that, but in the wrong way with having the most recalls in an already plagued
industry. In the future, the tire company needs to become innovative with better technology and
capabilities to stay competitive. Firestone should implement a three step approach to include (1)
reinvest in their manufacturing plants; (2) product testing and; (3) initiate a quality assurance
department. The first thing Firestone needs to focus on is to update their facilities and retrofit the
manufacturing plants with the state of the art equipment. This will ensure the tires are produced
at the correct factors (i.e. humidity) and are quality products. Secondly, a product testing center
responsible for performing extensive testing of their products to ensure the tire can perform in all
types of terrain, weather, and other factors. Finally, the company should stand up a quality
assurance department solely responsible for the quality of the products. This department would
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coordinate with the product testing and development section to brainstorm product improvement
projects. Last but not least, there needs to be a culture shift that educates employees, at all
levels, the importance of quality products, following regulations, and empowers them to point
out problems without retribution.
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***Combined References***Remove this line before final version***
References
Ammons, R., & Vujasinovic, V. (2001). Ford Firestone Rollovers. H.R. Baumgardner.
Associated Press. (1978, October 20). Costly Firestone tire recall set. Salina Journal , p. 1.
Bradsher, K. (2000, September 23). Ford Raises Recommended Tire Pressure. The New York
Times , pp. 1-2.
Car-Accidents.com. (2000). Firestone Tire Recall. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from CarAccidents.com: http://www.car-accidents.com/pages/9_firestone/firestone_overview.html
CBS News. (2001, June 27). Retrieved May 2, 2012, from CBS News:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/06/27/national/main298685.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;10
Ford Motors. (2001). Ford-Firestone Executive Summary. Retrieved May 1, 2012, from Ford
Motor Company Newsroom: http://media.ford.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=5654
Garza, C. C. (2000, August 20). Chicago Tribune. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Chicago
Tribune: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-08-20/news/0008200390_1_decatur-workersdecatur-plant-atx-tires
Greenwald, J. (2001, May 29). Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from
Time: http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,128198,00.html
Kaster, B. R. (2005). Tread Separations. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Tire Failures:
http://www.tirefailures.com/coopertire/tirefailures.html
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Manor, R., & Popely, R. (2001, May 22). Ford plans recall of millions of tires. Chicago Tribune ,
p. 2.
Merriam-Webster, Inc. (2012). Merriam-Webster. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from MerriamWebster: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negligence
NHTSA. (2001). Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision. U.S. Department of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Safety Assurance, Office of
Defects Investigation.
Ohio Historical Society. (2012). Harvey S. Firestone. Retrieved May 1, 2012, from Ohio History
Central: http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=141
Oswald, E. (2012, 01 07). betanews Hot Topics. Retrieved 01 09, 2012, from betanews:
http://betanews.com/2012/01/07/vizio-aims-to-disrupt-the-crowded-budget-pc-market-but-can-it/
Reed, S. P. (2010). The Legal & Regulatory Environment of Business. McGraw-Hill.
Schubert, D. (2011). Firestone's Tire Recall. Retrieved April 24, 2012, from Daniels Fund Ethics
Initiative, University of New Mexico:
http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu/pdf/Firestone%20Case.pdf
Sciutto, J. (2000, August 13). ABCNEWS. Retrieved may 2, 2012, from ABCNEWS:
http://abcnews.go.com/us/story?id=96172&page=1
Spencer, A. (2011). USA: The United Smartphones of America. New York: adsmobi.
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Tode, C. (2012, February 3). Retrieved February 20, 2012, from Mobile Commerce Daily:
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/2012/02/03/mobile-banking-app-usage-grows-74percent-in-a-year-comscore
Wharton School. (2000). Firestone's Second Big Tire Blowout. Knowledge @ Wharton , 1-3.
Willis Law Firm . (2012). Tire Failures and Tire Blowouts. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Tire
Defects: http://www.tiredefects.com/tire-failure-and-tire-blowouts.cfm
***Sources BEFORE combining are all BELOW***
Ammons, R., & Vujasinovic, V. (2001). Ford Firestone Rollovers. H.R. Baumgardner.
Associated Press. (1978, October 20). Costly Firestone tire recall set. Salina Journal , p. 1.
Manor, R., & Popely, R. (2001, May 22). Ford plans recall of millions of tires. Chicago Tribune ,
p. 2.
NHTSA. (2001). Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision. U.S. Department of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Safety Assurance, Office of
Defects Investigation.
Ohio Historical Society. (2012). Harvey S. Firestone. Retrieved May 1, 2012, from Ohio History
Central: http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=141
Schubert, D. (2011). Firestone's Tire Recall. Retrieved April 24, 2012, from Daniels Fund Ethics
Initiative, University of New Mexico:
http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu/pdf/Firestone%20Case.pdf
Weinstein, K. N., & Runge, J. W. (2001). Firestone's Request for a Defect Investigation on the
Handling. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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Wharton School. (2000). Firestone's Second Big Tire Blowout. Knowledge @ Wharton , 1-3.
Works Cited
Associated Press. (1978, October 20). Costly Firestone tire recall set. Salina Journal , p. 1.
Bradsher, K. (2000, September 23). Ford Raises Recommended Tire Pressure. The New York
Times , pp. 1-2.
Car-Accidents.com. (2000). Firestone Tire Recall. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from CarAccidents.com: http://www.car-accidents.com/pages/9_firestone/firestone_overview.html
CBS News. (2001, June 27). Retrieved May 2, 2012, from CBS News:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/06/27/national/main298685.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;10
Ford Motors. (2001). Ford-Firestone Executive Summary. Retrieved May 1, 2012, from Ford
Motor Company Newsroom: http://media.ford.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=5654
Garza, C. C. (2000, August 20). Chicago Tribune. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Chicago
Tribune: http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-08-20/news/0008200390_1_decatur-workersdecatur-plant-atx-tires
Greenwald, J. (2001, May 29). Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from
Time: http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,128198,00.html
Kaster, B. R. (2005). Tread Separations. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Tire Failures:
http://www.tirefailures.com/coopertire/tirefailures.html
Manor, R., & Popely, R. (2001, May 22). Ford plans recall of millions of tires. Chicago Tribune ,
p. 2.
Merriam-Webster, Inc. (2012). Merriam-Webster. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from MerriamWebster: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negligence
NHTSA. (2001). Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision. U.S. Department of
Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Safety Assurance, Office of
Defects Investigation.
Ohio Historical Society. (2012). Harvey S. Firestone. Retrieved May 1, 2012, from Ohio History
Central: http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=141
Oswald, E. (2012, 01 07). betanews Hot Topics. Retrieved 01 09, 2012, from betanews:
http://betanews.com/2012/01/07/vizio-aims-to-disrupt-the-crowded-budget-pc-market-but-can-it/
Firestone Tire Recall
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Reed, S. P. (2010). The Legal & Regulatory Environment of Business. McGraw-Hill.
Schubert, D. (2011). Firestone's Tire Recall. Retrieved April 24, 2012, from Daniels Fund Ethics
Initiative, University of New Mexico:
http://danielsethics.mgt.unm.edu/pdf/Firestone%20Case.pdf
Sciutto, J. (2000, August 13). ABCNEWS. Retrieved may 2, 2012, from ABCNEWS:
http://abcnews.go.com/us/story?id=96172&page=1
Spencer, A. (2011). USA: The United Smartphones of America. New York: adsmobi.
Tode, C. (2012, February 3). Retrieved February 20, 2012, from Mobile Commerce Daily:
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/2012/02/03/mobile-banking-app-usage-grows-74percent-in-a-year-comscore
Wharton School. (2000). Firestone's Second Big Tire Blowout. Knowledge @ Wharton , 1-3.
Willis Law Firm . (2012). Tire Failures and Tire Blowouts. Retrieved May 2, 2012, from Tire
Defects: http://www.tiredefects.com/tire-failure-and-tire-blowouts.cfm
NOTES for talking points?
Merger and Rebuilding of the name
Faults found
Where majority occurred
When problems started showing up
Firestone Tire Recall
Details of how tires are made
Problems with tire pressure
Blaming the road conditions
Were there seat belt issues???
Stability issues
NHTSA issues…delayed responses.
Who’s at fault and the blame game
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