Natural Kinds, Naturalistic
Epistemology and
Philosophical Method
Richard Boyd
October 2007
Big Questions
• Goodman, “The New Riddle of Induction” +
• Quine, “Natural Kinds” and “Epistemology
Naturalized”
• → Renewed interest in philosophical
naturalism
• Naturalism? About kind? About
epistemology? About metaphysics?
• Philosophical naturalism?
• Relationship between philosophy and (other)
sciences?
BIG CONCLUSIONS:
METAPHYSICS OF KINDS
• KINDS ARE DISCIPLINE SPECIFIC SOCIAL
ARTIFACTS
• “REALITY” OF KINDS ≈ CONTRIBUTION TO
ACCOMMODATION OF DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES TO CAUSAL STRUCTURES
• REALISM STILL OK
• NEED TO REFORMULATE “MIND
INDEPENDENCE”: SOCIAL PRACTICES ARE
“METAPHYSICALLY INNOCENT”
BIG CONCLUSIONS:
EPISTEMOLOGY
• NO FOUNDATIONS: RELIABILITY OF METHODS IS
RADICALLY CONTINGENT
• NO CONTEXT OF DISCOVERY VS CONTEXT OF
CONFIRMATION
• NO INTERNAL VS EXTERNAL FACTORS
• NO A PRIORI “CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS”
• NO TRANSPARENCY RE: SOURCES OF SCIENTIFIC
JUDGMENTS
• NEEDED: AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF INEXPLICIT
INSIGHT, ERROR RE: ACCOMMODATION
• (ALMOST) ALL EPISTEMOLOGY IS (NATURALISTIC)
SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
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BIG CONCLUSIONS: SEMANTICS AND
REPRESENTATION
REFERENCE ≈ LANGUAGE MEDIATED
ACCOMMODATION
REFERENCE → SOME ≈LY TRUE CONCEPTIONS,
≈LY RELIABLE METHODS
↛ANY A PRIORI (EVEN ≈LY) TRUE/RELIABLE
CONCEPTIONS, METHODS. INDEED,
CONCEPTUALLY CENTRAL BELIEFS/INFERENTIAL
PRACTICES SOMETIMES IRREDEEMABLY FLAWED!
TRUTH, REFERENCE ARE EPISTEMIC NOTIONS
NEEDED: SEMANTICS OF INSIGHT/ERROR TO GO
WITH THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF INSIGHT
TRUTH/FALSITY SPECIAL CASES OF
SUCCESSFUL/FAILED ACCOMMODATION
Background Philosophy of Science, I:
Projectibility and Confirmation
• To a good first approximation:
• At time, t, in research community, C, T is highly
confirmed by evidence, E,
↔
T is projectible by standards current in C at t,
AND
E favors T over all relevant alternatives ( = rival
theories also projectible @ C, t)
AND
E was gathered so as to control for artifacts
suggested by theories projectible @ C, t.
• WHERE: Projectibility = plausibility given the
theories best established @ C, t.
Background Philosophy of Science, II:
Projectibility is Evidential
• Projectibility, unprojectibility are evidential @ C, t:
Theory, T, is projectible → already some “indirect”
evidence @ C, t for T
T is unprojectible → already some “indirect” evidence @
C, t against T
• Projectibility comes in degrees
T is highly projectible + no highly projectible rival →
minimal additional evidence required
T is highly unprojectible → Ignore T altogether
Example: Neutrinos
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Puzzle: β-decay. Neutron gives off electron to become proton
E.g,: 3H → 3He + e- (Tritium to helium 3 + an electron)
1913: discovered that total energy 3H > energy 3He + energy eEnergy not conserved??
1930: Wolfgang Pauli: new particle; 1933: F. Perrin: (almost) massless!
Projectible just because preserves conservation of energy
•
Experimental confirmation:
1956: Faint light emissions 15 microseconds apart in tank of
CdCl2 solution near nuclear reactor; predicted by theory of neutrinos
(Reines and Cowan). Neutrinos detected! Nobel Prize to Reines 1995.
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Role of projectibility:
Suppose theory of neutrinos predicts flashing lights but no crisis
re conservation of energy
Then, theory of massless particle not projectible
Experiment: no evidence at all for neutrinos!
But T highly projectible, so experiment counts as neutrino
detection
Objectivity: Reliability of Theory Dependent
Methods
• Basic methodological rule: Carefully choose from
among relevant alternatives (= theories
recommended by best current theories), controlling
for effects suggested by best current theories.
• Why is this rule reliable? In particular, what makes
relying on current theories reliable?
•
NOT: Their currency
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IN FACT: ≈ly their approximate truth
•
Basic rule reliable ≈ly to the extent that current
theories are relevantly ≈ly true!
• So, for any C, t, “Methods in C at t are reliable” is
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highly contingent and
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anything but a priori
• So, there are no foundational inductive methods!
The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, I: Context
of Discovery and Context of Confirmation?
• Rule for objective testing: Test T under circumstances where
it’s most likely to go wrong if it’s not (relevantly, approximately)
true.
• Rule for identifying such circumstances: Refer to alternative
projectible theories.
• When is rule reliable?
•
Simple answer: @ (C, t,) just when often enough
≈te truth is among projectible alternatives.
•
Naturalistic answer: @ (C, t), just when, often
enough, ≈te truth is among alternatives actually proposed and
publicized as projectible.
• What’s implied?
•
Appropriately reliable cognitive/conceptual
structures
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Appropriate social structures of scientific
communication
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Appropriate patterns of funding, encouragement of
research directions,…
• → No distinction: contexts of discovery and of confirmation
The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, II:
Characterizing Appropriateness for
Cognitive/Conceptual Structures
• How do background theories @ (C, t ) inform projectibility
judgments?
Simple answer: Theories explicitly accepted @ (C, t)
provide reasons to identify some alternatives as plausible;
others as implausible.
Naturalistic answer: Indirectly: @ (C, t) explicit theories
interact with, inform, and are informed by, tacit commitments,
conceptual structures, trained intuitions, etc. All these
determine judgments of relative plausibility.
• What’s the relevant analogue to approximate truth for tacit
commitments, conceptual structures, trained intuitions, etc.?
• Accommodation thesis: The relevant analogue is
accommodation of conceptual, linguistic and methodological
practices to causal structures.
• Natural kinds provide an example of accommodation.
An Accommodationist Theory of Reference and
Natural Kinds
• Key idea (Locke, Goodman, Quine, Putnam,
…): Successful inductive/explanatory
practice requires accommodation between
linguistic, conceptual, taxonomic resources
and relevant causal factors.
• Referential hypotheses: Hypotheses about
how language-world relations contribute to
accommodation in particular disciplinary
matrices.
• Natural kinds are social/linguistic artifacts
• The kind natural kind is itself a natural kind
in the theory of how accommodation is
achieved.
Reference
For terms ti in a matrix M and families, Fi , of
properties:
t1
→
F1
.
ti
→
Fi
.
tn
→
Fn
Satisfying Epistemic Access and
Accommodation Conditions
Epistemic Access and
Accommodation
• Epistemic access condition: There is a systematic
causally sustained tendency for what is predicated
of ti within M to be approximately true of things
which satisfy Fi, i=1,..,n.
• Accommodation condition: This fact, and the causal
powers of things possessing F1,..,Fn, explain how the
use of t1,..,tn in M contributes to whatever tendency
there is for the accommodation demands of M to be
satisfied
• Remark: Accommodation sometimes requires that
Fi’s be homeostatic property clusters.
Metaphysical Lesson: The “Reality” of Kinds
• Don’t ask “Is X a natural kind?”
• Ask instead “To what extent/how does the
deployment of ‘X’ contribute to accommodation in
discipline D?”
• Realism?
Kinds are social constructions
They’re “real” if we are and if they correspond to
relevant causal structures
• Mind independence?
Beaver dams are social constructions but they’re
real
Real issue: Do minds/social practices make
causal reality?
• Realist answer: (2N2C) Human social practices make
no non-causal contribution to causal structures. No
one here but us animals!
Kinds, Modality and Modal Intuitions
• Received view (term t; refers to K in actual world, w; w’ other
possible world)
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Actual world uses of t refer in w’ to K
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K’s definition in w’ is the same as its definition in w
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Intuitions = reliable guide to K’s definition, modal
properties
• Problems
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For HPC K: definition is a clustering: an actual
causal process
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It’s historically and situationally individuated
→members of the cluster vary→ Same variation across
possible worlds
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Trans-world individuation: context dependent,
depends on trans-world individuation of disciplines →
individuation often ambiguous; often breaks down altogether
for (even modestly) distant possible worlds
•
BUT, intuitions deliver determinate (hence false)
judgments
• Philosophically interesting phenomena are HPC: knowledge,
rationality, reference, justification, goodness, representation,
mentality, personhood,…
Appropriateness for Cognitive/Conceptual
Structures: Truth and Reliability as Special
Cases of Accommodation.
• Approximate truth = special case of accommodation
•
≈ly governed by Tarski-style compositional
semantics
•
via accommodation accomplished through use of
natural kind terms
• Reliability of particular methods ≈ reliability with respect to
approximate truth
• Representational function of projectibility judgments,
intuitions, research styles, hunches, etc.:
= causal contributions (+/-) to reliability of practices via
alignment with causal structures, where
+/- contributions are determined by overall
inferential/practical architecture (cf. natural kinds)
• Representational function (≈ computational role) may be
distributed not localized (e.g., projectibility judgments
distributed over colleagues, referees)
• Needed: A better representational theory of insight.
The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, III:
Sources of Background Theories, Concepts,…
• Which theories, doctrines, etc. determine projectibility
judgments @ (C, t)?
Simple answer: The most fundamental findings in C at t.
Naturalistic Answer: Complicated story involving ≥ two
important factors.
• Plurality of sources
Disciplinary diversity
Borrowed expertise (auxiliary hypotheses,
instrumentation,…)
Unrefereed common knowledge (or error)
• Each of these → limited individual critical expertise
• Social certification of expertise
By universities, journals, academies, etc
Relative prestige of research institutions, groups
• Each factor socially orchestrated → No viable internal/external
distinction
Naturalistic Epistemology, III, cont’d:
Objectivity and Social Embedding
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When are scientific methods objective?
Simplistic (but common answer): When presupposition free
Simple naturalistic answer: When background theories, methods,
etc are ≈ly true, reliable, …
More sophisticated naturalistic answer: Depends also on the
political economy of science @ (C, t)
When are scientists confident about a finding?
1. Published in major journal
2. From respected author or research group
3. Results relatively unsurprising
When do scientists subject a finding to special scrutiny?
Failure of one or more of above.
When are such practices reliable?
When 1-3 reliably indicate approximate truth
When not? Social ideology in science.
E.g., literature on race, intelligence, IQ
When corrected?
Science and “external” political struggles.
The Naturalistic Epistemology of Objectivity, IV:
“Conceptual Analysis” and Critiques of Scientific
Judgment
• How to understand, criticize the conceptual/inferential
structures of science?
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Simple (logical empiricist) answer: Formally
rationally reconstruct concepts scientists actually use.
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Simple naturalistic answer: Analyze the concepts
scientists actually use as approximations to real definitions (cf.
“causal descriptive” theories of reference)
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More complicated naturalistic answer:
Acknowledge malignant conceptual meanings = massively
mistaken concepts central to scientific communication &
practice.
• Conceptual meaning of term q at (C, t) = cognitive/inferential
commitments regarding q with which one must engage in order
to understand literature, practice.
• Two sorts of engagement:
Uncritical: Acceptance. Think: ordinary sophisticated
practitioner
Critical: Special stance for historian or philosopher of
science
Malignant Conceptual Meanings: Human
Sociobiology
• PREMISE:: Early human behaviors of kind B had evolutionary
function F.
• CONCLUSION: The underlying, innate and relatively
nonmalleable (perhaps unconscious) motive of contemporary
behaviors of kind B is ≈ly to accomplish F.
• Such inferential patterns define the human sociobiological
literature, are presupposed in the writing/reading of articles.
• Their inappropriateness follows from principles all their
authors acknowledge.
• Daly, M. and M. Wilson. 1997. "Child Abuse and Other Risks of
not Living with Both Parents," in L. Betzig ed. 1997. Human
Nature: A Critical Reader. New York: Oxford University Press:
• PREMISE: In early humans evolutionary function of child
rearing was to enhance survival of own/relatives’ children
• CONCLUSION: “…we should expect parental feeling to vary as
a function of the prospective fitness value of the child in
question to the parent.” NB: In contemporary societies.
• Malignant meanings!
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Metaphilosophical Conclusion: Nonreductionist
Philosophical Naturalism
Quine: Philosophy is empirical and continuous with
the empirical sciences
Simple (REDUCTIONIST) reading: metaphysics
≈physics; epistemology ≈ individual perceptual,
cognitive psychology
Correct (NONREDUCTIONIST!) reading:
Philosophy continuous with empirical sciences
including social, cognitive and linguistic architecture
and political economy of science.
No distinctly philosophical methods
Philosophical/linguistic/modal intuitions = trained
judgments ≠ sources of a priori knowledge
FINAL CONCLUSION: ALL THIS → PHILOSOPHY IS
NOT JUST CONTINUOUS WITH, BUT AN ESSENTIAL
COMPONENT OF, SOUND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE.
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Postscript: Clarifying Foundationalism (An
Approximation)
Let F = some set of “foundational” beliefs.
MF = {methods justifiable either a priori or by
reference to members of F}
Foundationalism in domain D with respect to F =
Whenever p (in D) is known it’s justifiable ultimately
from premises in F using methods in MF.
Foundationalism is more or less radical/modest
depending on choice of F
Modest foundationalism: Take F = {q| q is a priori or
q is (true and) commonsensical and could be
doubted only as a philosophical exercise}
NOTE: Modest foundationalism for D ≈ Research
in D is (pre-D) common sense iterated.
Theory-dependence of scientific methods → For
scientific D, no version of even modest
foundationalism is true. Science is not pre-scientific
common sense iterated!