Epistemology MA exam/Spring 2011
Answer one question from each part. Time limit: 3 hours
Part I
1. One of the central questions in modern epistemology is whether there are any incorrigible beliefs. Why has this question been so important? Should it continue to be? Explain your answer.
2.
How are “internalism” and “externalism” understood in the context of epistemic justification? What are the most fundamental intuitions motivating each of the two positions? Is there any way of resolving the dispute between the two positions? Can you think of an analogue in some other branch of philosophy to the internalist/externalist distinction in epistemology?
3. Some contemporary philosophers, most notably John McDowell, have argued that human experience is “conceptualized.” What does he mean by this? What motivates his claim? What are the most serious objections to the position? Assess the debate.
Part II
4.
Wittgenstein remarks, “We just do not see how very specialized the use of ‘I know’ is. –For ‘I know’ seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I knew’.” (
On Certainty ) How, if at all, do the fundamental problems of epistemology arise from ways in which the use of ‘I know’ is very specialized, and what implications does this have for the problems themselves?
5.
“No naturalistic criterion for justified belief is possible, for given any naturalistic criterion, one could still ask whether we are justified in accepting beliefs that satisfy the criterion, and that question would not be trifling.” Discuss this argument as a sweeping reply to naturalized epistemology.
6. If we were to treat epistemology from a scientific perspective, which science or sciences should we appeal to? Quine seems to assume that the appeal should be to the cognitive and/or brain sciences, but what about the sociology of knowledge?
Are there other possibilities? What, if anything, of epistemological significance hangs on the choice?
Part III
7. The conclusion of a valid deductive argument, philosophers have generally argued, makes no assertion beyond the assertions contained collectively in the

8.
9. premises. From this one might conclude that knowledge of the premises of any valid deductive argument implies knowledge of the conclusion. Is this plausible?
Some linguists and philosophers have argued that our knowledge of the grammar of our native tongue is “tacit knowledge.” What have they meant by this? Others have claimed that the notion of tacit knowledge is an oxymoron. Why have they claimed this? What is your position on this matter, and what arguments can you offer for your position?
What are some of the forms that transcendental arguments can take? What, in your view, is the most promising? Could a transcendental argument succeed?