FIN 413 Corporate Financial Policy Clifford W. Smith, Jr. Spring 2007 Presentation 7 * Covers readings on course outline through Doherty/Smith (1993) Risk Management Spectrum Firm Specific Risks – Fire – Lawsuit – Payoffs to R&D projects Market-wide risks – Interest rates – Foreign exchange rates – Commodity prices Managing Risk Bear it Change it Hedge it Risk Management Spectrum From Smith (2006) Risk Profiles ΔV Risk Profile ΔP(oil) For an oil producer, rising oil prices [ΔP(oil) >0] increase revenues and increase firm value. Risk Profiles ΔV ΔP(oil) Core Business For an oil user, rising oil prices [ΔP(oil) > 0] increase costs and decrease firm value. Impact of Hedging on Core Business Risk ΔV Hedge ΔP(oil) Net Exposure Core Business The Effects of Risk Management Probability Distribution after risk management Inherent distribution Firm Value The World has Become A More Risky Place 0.07 Percent 0 -0.1 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 Swaps Futures Options Options on Futures 85 Break, Range, Participating Forwards Corporate Hedging and Insurance Firm value The cost of capital (r) depends on the systematic risk of the firm's cash flows. Insurable risks are generally nonsystematic. Since insurance purchases do not affect the firm's systematic risk, they do not lower the firm's cost of capital. Even if the beta of a hedging instrument is not zero, as long as it is fairly price, it will not change the discount rate in a way that would increase value. Corporate Hedging and Insurance Does this mean that hedging does not increase firm value? If risk management increases firm value, it must increase expected net cash flows. Hedging and the Modigliani/Miller Theorem If hedging affects the current firm value, then it must – change expected tax liabilities – change contracting costs – change future investment decisions. Hedging and Taxes Tax Liability E(T(Y)) T(E(Y)) Y1 E(Y) Y2 Income A progressive tax scheme provides the government with a call option on the taxable income of the corporation. Reducing the volatility of income reduces the value of this option. LOSS CARRYFORWARDS are restricted by some revenue-hungry states. Federal and most state laws let corporations carry forward their net operating losses and deduct them from taxable income in future years. But a countertrend may be beginning at the state level, says James P. Sweeney of Arthur Andersen & Co., CPAs. Pennsylvania not only raised corporate tax rates this year but also eliminated the use of loss carryforwards. California suspended for tax years started in 1991 and 1992 its partial deduction for carryforwards. Texas enacted a corporate levy that critics call a disguised income tax. A deduction for carryforwards isn’t allowed in the first year, 1992, but is supposed to be after then. In New York, Sweeney notes, many companies are required to pay the state’s alternative minimum tax, which doesn’t allow deductions for carryforwards. For that matter the calculation of the 20% federal minimum tax permits the deduction of only 90% of a carryforward. Multistate companies coming out of the recession will have to plan carefully for state taxes, Sweeney declares. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1991 Hedging and Taxes Tax Liability Y0 Y1 Y2 Income Tax loss carry backs and carry forwards can make your tax liability concave over some income levels. In this case, increasing volatility can reduce the expected tax liability. Hedging and Taxes Using data from COMPUSTAT, Graham/Smith (1998) find – Major source of convexity arises from statutory rates. – Carry backs and carry forwards reduce convexity at the kink - spread it over a wider array of taxable incomes. – ITCs and alternative minimum tax (AMT) provisions have little effect on convexity. – Firm tax schedules are convex (50%), linear (25%), concave (25%). Corporate Insurance Efficiency in project evaluation Efficiency in claims settlement – Claims only policies – Retroactive Insurance War Fears, Insurance Costs Curb Air Service to Mideast Special to The Wall Street Journal Flights to Israel and other Mideast points are being cut back, the result of war fears and soaring insurance costs. Pan Am Corp.’s Pan American World Airways said it was suspending all flights to Tel Aviv for a least a week following a rate increase by Lloyd’s of London. The carrier also said it was suspending flights to Saudi Arabia. Insurance rates for Tel Aviv flights increased 10-fold to $102,000 per flight and rates to Riyadh increased 20 times to $65,000 per flight, Pan Am said. Meanwhile, British Airways and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines said they were reducing flights to Israel. Those two airlines, as well as Swissair, also changed flight plans so crews could avoid flight plans so crews could avoid overnight stays in Israel. Pan Am previously operating two weekly flights to Riyadh and daily service to Tel Aviv. Pan Am has applied to the Federal Aviation Administration for warrisk insurance. Under the FAA program, the government provides such insurance to carriers if they can’t get it from commercial insurance companies on reasonable terms. British Airways is reducing its Tel Aviv service to four weekly flights from six weekly flights, beginning Jan. 15, the deadline given to Iraq to relinquish Kuwait or face possible force. But an airline spokeswoman said the pull down isn’t related to the Gulf crisis and called it a “seasonal cutback.” She said full service will resume April 1. Citing security risks and slower traffic to the region, KLM said it is reducing service to Tel Aviv to three weekly flights from four. KLM canceled service to Amman, Jordan, on Wednesday. Israel’s national airline, El Al, was ordered to accommodated passengers or tourists affected by the cuts. THE WALL STREET JOURNALPRIDAY, JANUARY 4, 1991 Comparative Advantage in Risk Bearing Lessors Lessees Shareholders Suppliers Firm Customers Bondholders Board of Directors Managers Employees Hedging and the Firm's Employees To retain the same quality management team, increasing compensation risk requires increasing expected compensation levels. Thus, higher compensation risk imposes costs on the firm. These costs will be borne only if there are offsetting benefits. – tax benefits – incentive benefits Hedging and the Firm's Employees Tax Benefits (Miller/Scholes 1982) – If the marginal personal tax rate exceeds the marginal corporate tax rate, then there is a tax deferral benefit to bonus plans, stock option plans, and restricted stock plans. Hedging and the Firm's Employees Incentive Benefits – If the compensation risk is related to the managers' actions, then compensation risk improves incentives. – Thus, it is important to distinguish between controllable risk and uncontrollable risk. Du Pont's Incentive Pay Plan In 1989 Du Pont's fiber division instituted an incentive compensation plan for most of its 20,000 employees – Pay linked to overall profitability of division – Managers and lineworkers were part of the plan Du Pont's Incentive Pay Plan Two years later, the 'incentive' compensation plan was canceled – Recession reduced sales – Gulf War raised oil prices – 'Incentive' pay was very low. Risks unrelated to incentives dominated the variability of the compensation – Employees have no control over the state of the economy or world oil prices. Hedging and the Bondholder–Stockholder Conflict The agency costs of debt increase as leverage increases and as financial distress approaches Hedging can reduce the likelihood of financial distress, and consequently reduce the adverse incentives associated with debt financing Hedging and the Bondholder–Stockholder Conflict ΔV Hedge ΔP(oil) Net Core business Hedging and the Bondholder–Stockholder Conflict BP's Insurance Decision Benefits – Taxes – Contracting Costs – Investment Incentives Costs – Insurance premium Cost of Insurance Expected Indemnity + Loading Fees Payment Premium = PV Loading Fees = Expected Service Costs + Profit BP's Insurance Decision Loss Range $0 to $10 $10 to $500 $500 plus Total Number per Year 1845.0 Average Loss $ 1846.73 Loss Std. Dev. 0.03 m $ 52 m $ 12 m 40.0 m 70 m 98 m 1000.0 m 35 m 233 m 1.7 .03 Expected Ann. Loss $ 0.66 m $157 m BP's Insurance Decision Loss < $10 Million – Benefits Claims Administration Taxes – Riskshifting Costs Competitive Markets → Low Spreads "Common" Claims → Big Reputation Effects BP's Insurance Decision $10 Million < Loss < $500 Million – Benefits Claims Administration Taxes Riskshifting – Costs Lloyd's → High Spreads "Uncommon" Claims → Small Reputation effects BP's Insurance Decision $500 Million < Loss – – Benefits Investment Incentives Riskshifting Costs Market Virtually Non-Existent "Why Hedge?" and "What to Hedge?" "Why?" and "What?" are not independent questions in hedging decisions. Why Hedge? What is Hedged? Taxes Taxable income Contracting costs Reported income Investment incentives Market value "What to Hedge?" and "How to Hedge?" What is hedged? – Taxable income – Reported income – Market value How is it hedged? – Off-balance sheet hedging – On-balance sheet hedging Firm Characteristics Growth Options (Merck) Leverage Credence Goods (Eastern) Product Warranties (Yugo) Future Product Support (Yugo/Wang) Supplier Financing (Campeau) Closely Held Firm Size Regulation Firm Specific Assets Investment Tax Credits Marginal Corporate Tax Rate Marginal Personal Tax Rate Tax Progressivity Hedging Policy ? ? Higher Higher Higher Higher Higher ? Higher Higher Higher ----Higher