Key Supreme Court Cases
In chronological order…
 Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Facts of the Case
The case began on March 2, 1801, when an obscure Federalist, William Marbury, was designated as a
justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury and several others were appointed to government
posts created by Congress in the last days of John Adams's presidency, but these last-minute appointments
were never fully finalized. The disgruntled appointees invoked an act of Congress and sued for their jobs in
the Supreme Court.
Question
Is Marbury entitled to his appointment? Is his lawsuit the correct way to get it? And, is the Supreme Court the
place for Marbury to get the relief he requests?
Conclusion
Yes; yes; and it depends. The justices held, through Marshall's forceful argument, that on the last issue the
Constitution was "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and that "an act of the legislature
repugnant to the constitution is void." In other words, when the Constitution--the nation's highest law-conflicts with an act of the legislature, that act is invalid. This case establishes the Supreme Court's power
of judicial review.
 McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)
Facts of the Case
In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed
legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the
bank, refused to pay the tax.
Question
The case presented two questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland
law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers?
Conclusion
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that
Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional
powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated
powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained the
power of taxation, "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme. . .they control the
constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them."
 Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)
Facts of the Case
A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state
jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require
foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case a steamboat owner
who did business between New York and New Jersey challenged the monopoly that New York had granted,
which forced him to obtain a special operating permit from the state to navigate on its waters.
Question
Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the
regulation of interstate commerce?
Conclusion
The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a
congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which
included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states"
in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this
important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for
purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the
Congress.
 Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857)
Facts of the Case
Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of
the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to
Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free
territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that
no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of
Article III of the Constitution.
Question
Was Dred Scott free or slave?
Conclusion
Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States
could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the
conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III
purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery
question once and for all.
 Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
Question
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both the
privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Henry
Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the
separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase, "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.)
Justice Brown conceded that the 14th amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races
before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling
of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute unlawful
discrimination.
 Lochner v. New York (1905)
Facts of the Case
The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a
day.
Question
Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute
interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to
employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground
for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.
 Schenck v. United States (1919)
Facts of the Case
This action was filed by the Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (PCN), on behalf of health care
providers, to enjoin Schenck and others from continuously staging blockades and other disruptive illegal
activities in front of abortion clinics. After its restraining order proved ineffective, a District Court issued a
preliminary injunction creating "fixed buffer zones" which prohibited demonstrations within fifteen feet of
entrances to abortion clinics, parking lots, or driveways. The court also created "floating buffer zones"
prohibiting demonstrators from coming within fifteen feet of people or vehicles seeking access to the clinics.
Following the Appellate Court's decision to uphold the District Court's ruling that the "buffer zones" were
constitutional, the Supreme Court granted Schenck certiorari.
Question
Did either or both types of "buffer zones" violate Schenck's First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
Conclusion
The Court held that while the "fixed buffer zones" were constitutional, the "floating buffer zones" were not. It
distinguished between the two types of "buffer zones." The Court supported the "fixed buffer zones" because
they protected the government's interest in public safety, by preventing protesters from engaging in unlawful
conduct (i.e. spitting on and shouting in clinic users' faces, blocking doorways), while still allowing them to be
heard from a short distance. "Floating buffer zones," by contrast, were struck down by the Court since they
imposed a greater burden on free speech than was required to protect the government's interest in public
safety and free traffic flow. The Court found that forcing demonstrators to remain at least 15 feet away from
the people they wished to communicate with would create an inordinate amount of dangerous confusion and
congestion.
 Gitlow v. New York (1925)
Facts of the Case
Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the
establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state
criminal anarchy law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial,
Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute
penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided
that anyone who advocated the doctrine of violent revolution violated the law.
Question
Does the New York law punishing the advocacy of overthrowing the government an unconstitutional violation
of the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of the liberty protected by
due process that no state shall deny (14th Amendment). On the merits, a state may forbid both speech
and publication if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though
such utterances create no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been
called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so
dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and
the defendant will be punished even if her speech created no danger at all.
 Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Question
Does the segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprive the minority children of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Despite the equalization of the schools by "objective" factors, intangible issues foster and maintain
inequality. Racial segregation in public education has a detrimental effect on minority children
because it is interpreted as a sign of inferiority. The long-held doctrine that separate facilities were
permissible provided they were equal was rejected. Separate but equal is inherently unequal in the context
of public education. The unanimous opinion sounded the death-knell for all forms of state-maintained racial
separation.
 Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
Facts of the Case
Dolree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her
home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.
Question
Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?)
Conclusion
The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court."
Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and
controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all
levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and
when to apply the exclusionary rule.
 Abington School District v. Schempp (1963)
Question
Did a Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom
religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Conclusion
The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were
essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice
Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it
did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.
 Gideon v. Wainright (1963)
Facts of the Case
Gideon was charged in a Florida state court with a felony for breaking and entering. He lacked funds and
was unable to hire a lawyer to prepare his defense. When he requested the court to appoint an attorney for
him, the court refused, stating that it was only obligated to appoint counsel to indigent defendants in capital
cases. Gideon defended himself in the trial; he was convicted by a jury and the court sentenced him to five
years in a state prison.
Question
Did the state court's failure to appoint counsel for Gideon violate his right to a fair trial and due process of
law as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion
In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Gideon had a right to be represented by a court-appointed
attorney and, in doing so, overruled its 1942 decision of Betts v. Brady. In this case the Court found that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel was a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, which should be
made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black
called it an "obvious truth" that a fair trial for a poor defendant could not be guaranteed without the
assistance of counsel. Those familiar with the American system of justice, commented Black, recognized
that "lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
 Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Facts of the Case
Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the
Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples
concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which
criminalized the provision of counseling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of
preventing conception.
Question
Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be
counseled in the use of contraceptives?
Conclusion
Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees
within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the
First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital
relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.
 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966)
Question
Did the Virginia poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that making voter affluence an electoral standard violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court found that wealth or fee-paying had no relation to voting qualifications.
The Court also noted that the Equal Protection Clause was not "shackled to the political theory of a particular
era" and that notions of what constituted equal treatment under the Clause were subject to change.
 Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Question
Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifying them of their right to counsel and their
protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of
defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of
an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to
suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present
during interrogations.
 Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
Facts of the Case
John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, 13 years old, and Christopher Echardt, 16 years old,
decided along with their parents to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to their Des Moines
schools during the Christmas holiday season. Upon learning of their intentions, and fearing that the
armbands would provoke disturbances, the principals of the Des Moines school district resolved that all
students wearing armbands be asked to remove them or face suspension. When the Tinker siblings and
Christopher wore their armbands to school, they were asked to remove them. When they refused, they were
suspended until after New Year's Day.
Question
Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate
the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections?
Conclusion
The wearing of armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First Amendment.
School environments imply limitations on free expression, but here the principals lacked justification for
imposing any such limits. The principals had failed to show that the forbidden conduct would substantially
interfere with appropriate school discipline.
 Roe v. Wade (1973)
Question
Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion?
Conclusion
The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total
autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the
second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling.
 United States v. Nixon (1974)
Facts of the Case
A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate
affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations
recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming
"executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve
confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together
with Nixon v. United States.
Question
Is the President's right to safeguard certain information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power,
entirely immune from judicial review?
Conclusion
No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified,
presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or
diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and
documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.
 Regents of the University of California at Davis v. Bakke (1978)
Facts of the Case
Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California
Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering
class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an
effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications
(college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years
Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme
Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.
Question
Did the University of California violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, by practicing an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of Bakke's
application for admission to its medical school?
Conclusion
No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota
system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed,
casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell
argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions
decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending
that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize
white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities
through affirmative action.
 Texas v. Johnson (1989)
Question
Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the
First Amendment?
Conclusion of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell
into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an
audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of
speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to
communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."