Mooting Training 1 - LSESU Bar Society

advertisement
Mooting Training 1
Harmish Mehta
Strategy
1) Introduction
1) Guide
2) LSESU Law Society Mooting Training
Seminar, 16th October, 12-1pm, Sheikh
Zayed Theatre
2) Training
3) Practice Moots
4) Competitions
Introduction
•
•
•
•
•
•
What is mooting?
Format
Questions
Mooting Guide
Laptops
Slides
(www.lsesubarsociety.co.uk/resources)
Introduction
• Mooting Training – Non-law students –
15th October 4pm-6pm – CLM.2.05
• Mooting Training – Non-UK students – 16th
October 3pm-5pm – CLM.1.02
• Practice Moot
Lucy v Drew
Drew and Lucy were long standing acquaintances who regularly had business
dealings with one another. On 1st November, Drew, from his home address in
Northampton, wrote to Lucy at her address in Bristol, offering to sell her his
customised Renault Clio motor car, (which she has long admired), for £7,000, the
offer to remain open until 5th November. On receiving the offer on 2nd November,
Lucy left Bristol on a business trip to Liverpool. On the 2nd November Drew sold the
car to Kelly and posted to Lucy a revocation of his offer. This was delivered to Lucy’s
Bristol address on 3rd November. On 4th November, Lucy posted an acceptance of
the offer from Liverpool, addressed to Drew at his business address, (which was the
address from which Drew usually conducted dealings with Lucy) in Coventry. It was
delivered there on 5th November but as Drew was absent from his office on that day,
it wasn’t read by him until 6th November. On 7th November Lucy returned home and
read the letter of revocation.
Lucy claimed that a contract had been formed between herself and Drew, in that she
had accepted the offer either on 4th November through the application of the postal
rule, or on the 5th November when the letter was delivered to Drew’s place of
business. Both events took place before the offer lapsed and before Drew’s letter of
revocation was communicated to her.
Lucy v Drew
Held by Nonsuch J.:
1. that the postal rule did not operate to form a contract on 4th November, since
the acceptance was posted to the wrong address. In such a case, the postal rule
becomes displaced and the acceptance does not take place until the letter of
acceptance is received and read, (i.e. on 6th November) by which time the
offer had lapsed. The court accepted the U.S.case of Eliason v. Henshaw 4
Wheat 225, as being a correct application of principle.
2. in any case, the offer had been revoked before Lucy’s letter of acceptance had
been posted. Although the rule is that an offer is not revoked until the
revocation is communicated to the offeree, in this case ‘communicated’ meant
that the offeree should be given a reasonable time to read the letter of
revocation, once it had been delivered to the place from which the offer had
been made and at which the offeree was reasonably supposed to be present.
This, at the latest, was at the close of business on 3rd November.
Lucy is appealing against both findings.
Positions
• Senior Appellant – against first finding
• Junior Appellant – against second finding
• Senior Respondent – for first finding
• Junior Respondent – for second finding
1) Our finding
1. that the postal rule did not operate to form a
contract on 4th November, since the acceptance
was posted to the wrong address. In such a
case, the postal rule becomes displaced and the
acceptance does not take place until the letter of
acceptance is received and read, (i.e. on 6th
November) by which time the offer had lapsed.
The court accepted the U.S.case of Eliason v.
Henshaw 4 Wheat 225, as being a correct
application of principle.
Senior Appellant
2) The key case
Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225
• An offer to sell barrels of flour stipulated
that the acceptance must be sent by the
wagon in which the offer was sent,
meaning it must be sent to Harper's Ferry,
where the wagon was headed. The offeree
instead sent acceptance to Georgetown.
Senior Appellant
2) The key case
Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225
• 'The place, therefore, to which the answer
was to be sent constituted an essential
part of the plaintiff's offer.'
• 'an acceptance communicated at a place
different from that pointed out by the
plaintiffs and forming a part of their
proposal imposed no obligation binding
upon them...'
Senior Appellant
3) Other submissions
• Lucy was not mistaken to post acceptance
to Drew’s business address in Coventry
• Adams v Lindsell [1818] 106 E.R. 250
• 'Then as to the delay in notifying the
acceptance, that arises entirely from the
mistake of the defendants, and it therefore
must be taken as against them, that the
plaintiffs' answer was received in course of
post.'
Senior Appellant
3) Other submissions
• Textbooks
• Academic articles
• Westlaw/Lexisnexis
Senior Appellant
4) Skeleton Argument
1. It was merely held in Eliason v Henshaw 4 Wheat 225
that if an offer stipulates to which address acceptance
must be communicated, it must be communicated in that
way; Drew, however, made no such stipulation, and so
the principle in Eliason v Henshaw may be distinguished
2. Furthermore, it was entirely reasonable for Lucy to have
posted her acceptance to Drew's business address in
Coventry, as she had regularly had business dealings
with him
3. In the alternative, if it is held that acceptance is not
operative until received and read, Drew's absence from
his office caused the delay in receiving and reading the
letter and this must be held against him, considering the
principle expounded in Adams v Lindsell 106 E.R. 250
Senior Appellant
5) Speech
•
•
•
•
Improvisation
Semi-improvisation
Scripted
Practice
Senior Appellant
3) Other submissions
• Lucy was mistaken to post acceptance to
Drew’s business address in Coventry, or
should have posted to both
• Argue against the postal rule
– Can lead to strange outcomes
– No strong justification
– Gardner (1992) 12 OJLS 170
Senior Respondent
Conclusion
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Other positions
Questions
Feedback
Practice Moots
contact@lsesubarsociety.co.uk
harmish.mehta@googlemail.com
07799726251
Download