IOE 539 - OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY ENGINEERING SYSTEMS SAFETY PROJECT ASSIGNMENT: System Safety Analysis of Pumping Fuel Final Report Submitted by: David “Ben” Komar, Plant Safety Professional Emily Yu, Plant Health Professional Adetunji Dahunsi, Equipment Engineer Francis Ogunseye, Process Engineer Date of Submission: December 12, 2013 Submitted to: Dr. Monroe Keyserling, Safety and Engineering Methods Instructor TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................iii I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 II. BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................... 3 III. RESULTS.................................................................................................................. 4 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 7 V. REFERENCES.........................................................................................................10 LIST OF APPENDICES ................................................................................................12 ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A job safety analysis (JSA) of the operation of a car fuel pump is detailed in the report to follow. The report outlines the most relevant hazards that an individual is exposed to while refueling a car and suggests possible interventions to prevent, or at the very least curtail injury to the operator. For this analysis, the operator of the fuel pump was assumed to be alone at the fueling station with no individuals in the car being refueled. To begin the analysis, several steps it takes to refuel a car are outlined and categorized. Subsequently, each step is analyzed for potential hazards that are described in detail using JSA forms. These hazards were then ranked in order of priority using an equation based on the likelihood and severity of the outcome of exposure to the hazard. Depending on priority, each hazard was then categorized into appropriate sections. Finally, recommendations were put forward to prevent exposure to the hazard, or at the very least curtail the severity of injury that the operator may sustain from hazard exposure. The results of our analysis yielded the following hazards and their respective categories: Low priority hazards: electric shock hazard, fire hazard (flash fire) Medium priority hazards: fire hazard (explosion), fire hazard (sustained combustion) High priority hazards; collision hazard (interior), collision hazard (exterior), trip hazard Each hazard had its own unique outcome associated with it; they include but are not limited to events like burns, bruising, lacerations, amputations, property damage and even death. The report also outlines the current safety measures in place for the process and proceeds to detail the effectiveness of each implementation in its current state. The report concludes with the team’s recommendations for managing exposure to these hazards which include the use of barrier systems around pump equipment to prevent collisions with the fuel source, gate systems to isolate each car while refueling, and the possibility of having a trained professional carry out the actual refueling process. The interventions are listed in order of decreasing preference; the final intervention listed is a rather costly proposition in the long term and would have a lot of pushback from various sources should it try to be implemented. iii I. INTRODUCTION Fuel dispensers are used by people worldwide to fuel vehicles and/ or with gasoline, diesel or other fuels. Fuel dispensers can also be used to fill portable containers that can be used to transport fuel to use for other purposes. The main components of the fuel dispenser used during vehicle fueling are the vehicle fuel hose, nozzle, keypad and the fuel meter. The main components of the fueling operator involved in vehicle fueling are the vehicle keys, vehicle fuel tank door, gas cap and button or switch used to open fuel tank door. Figure 1 shows a fueling dispenser used by Adetunji Dahunsi, our equipment engineer, to fuel his vehicle. Figure 1: Fuel dispenser used by Adetunji to fuel his car In the early 20th century, the first fuel dispenser was developed [1]. Although fuel dispensers have been used since the early 20th century, there are still possible hazards associated with vehicle fueling. These hazards can be classified into three main groups. 1. Fire/Explosion Potential: Safety concern that can affect many lives 2. Toxicological Health Effects: Exposures from inhalation of fumes, accidental ingestion, or skin contact can lead to diverse health issues 3. Environmental Contamination: Leaks or spillage from the fuel pump can negatively impact the environment, traveling via surface runoff The range of severity of these hazards is broad, from death to no negative impact. Thus, vehicle fueling will be an interesting procedure to observe and analyze. On November 12, 2103, our team was asked to perform a system safety analysis to “scrutinize a device or system in order to identify and evaluate situations that may cause 1 accidents” [2]. We decided to analyze the vehicle fueling procedure as this procedure is used by people worldwide. The purpose of this report is to detail the analysis we performed of vehicle fueling. The analysis of this report will be limited to the BP fuel station at 300N Main Street at the University of Michigan – Ann Arbor. The layout of this workstation can be seen in figure 2. Figure 2: Workstation layout of the BP feul station at 300N Main Street at the University of Michigan We utilized Job Safety Analysis (JSA) to do our system safety analysis. Job safety analysis involves first breaking down the job task into elemental steps, identifying possible hazards associated with each step and making recommendations based on the identified hazards [3]. We chose this system safety analysis method because it is a good method to evaluate a work task and identify possible hazards, especially those that include human error. There are already some administrative and engineering controls present at fueling stations as fueling stations have been around for many years. Some administrative controls include the operating instructions on the fueling dispenser and warnings on the dispenser associated with utilizing the fuel pump. Some engineering controls include the automatic stop valve to prevent overflow of vehicle tanks, robust and flexible hoses to prevent failure, hose breakaway system, and the flow limitation of fuel to 10 gallons per minute during 2 fueling [4]. Our analysis will try to develop engineering controls for other hazards that can occur during fueling. II. BACKGROUND The health and safety concerns associated with fuel pumps are due mainly to the fuel itself and can result in personal injuries, death, and millions of dollars of property damage. The largest safety hazard is the fire/explosion potential due to the fuel, the most common in the United States being gasoline. Gasoline is a highly flammable liquid, meaning it is capable of being easily ignited and burns quickly. Over 600 fire incidents related to fueling stations were reported between 2003 and 2006 in the United States [5]. Fires/explosions can lead to severe injuries such as burns, respiratory damage, with the potential of ending in death. There may also be millions of dollars of property damages. Gasoline is also associated with a wide range of toxicological health effects. According to the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), gasoline may be possibly carcinogenic to humans, meaning it may be capable of causing cancer in humans. Short-term exposure to gasoline due to inhalation of fumes can lead to nose and throat irritations and cause harm to the nervous system. Inhalation symptoms include headaches, nausea, dizziness, drowsiness, and confusion with severe exposure leading to potential unconsciousness. Skin exposure to gasoline can cause irritation while ingestion may cause mouth, throat and stomach irritation with the potential to cause organ damage and death. Chronic or long-term skin exposure can lead dermatitis, an inflammation of the skin. Other chronic effects are dependent on the chemical components of gasoline. Gasoline contains well-established toxic chemicals such as benzene; toluene, xylenes, etc. thus, varied health effects may result as well.[6] 3 Not only is gasoline hazardous to human health, but is also damaging to the environment. Environmental contamination from leaks or spillage of gasoline from a fuel pump can negatively impact a great number of organisms, due in part of its local and regional polluting effects. Gasoline spillage/leakage may potentially spread and cause nonlocalized effects from point of spillage, traveling via surface runoff and further affecting a larger area [7]. Environmental impacts of gasoline is specifically damaging for water, potentially adversely affecting the quality of drinking water, and further threatening public health and aquatic life [7]. III. RESULTS The hazards identified upon completion of the JSA include the following: fire hazards, collision hazards, electric shock hazards, and trip hazards. Our completed JSA is in Appendix A. Each hazard contributed to the possibility of at least one accident occurring with some hazards having multiple accidents as potential outcomes of hazard exposure. With hazards and their associated accidents identified, the team set out to outline the common or unique causes and possible outcomes that each accident posed in order to determine intervention priority. To determine priority, we utilized a quantitative scale to rank both the likelihood (probability scale) and impact (severity scale) of each accident. Short descriptions for scale values are listed below. See appendix B for more detailed description of these scale values which [8]. Probability Scale: 1: Very rare 2: Rare 3: Common 4: Frequent 5: Very Frequent 4 Severity Scale: 1: Negligible 2: Marginal 3: Serious 4: Critical 5: Catastrophic The development of the scale enabled us to rank the priority of an accident by multiplying the values of the terms in both the probability and severity scales. Certain accidents, such as those posed by trip hazards were allowed to have a range of values for which they scored in priority. For example, the outcome of trip hazard exposure can range from a slight bump to multiple and compound fractures that may result in grave injury or even death. Our priority scores resulted in a wide range of values that further allowed us to classify our accidents into low priority (less than 5 priority), medium priority (between 5 and 10 priority) and high priority (greater than 10 priority) hazards. These are summarized in the tables 1 – 3. Table 1: Low priority hazards for vehicle fueling 5 Table 2: Medium priority hazards for vehicle fueling Table 3: High priority hazards for vehicle fueling The tables we generated for our results (tables 1-3) led the team to an interesting discovery. A majority of the high priority accidents were often caused by human error. In fact, petrol fueling stations have a lot of error proofing and “poka yoke” devices that make the process robust to accidents caused by failures of the actual equipment used. These include, but are not limited to: Automatic fuel pump turn off at full fuel tank Automatic detachment of fuel dispenser if attached to a moving car Plastic insulation of fuel pumps 6 Therefore, our recommendations were focused on creating ways to significantly reduce the effects of human variation in the fuel pumping process by creating methods that would increase the average level of process order associated with human interaction. IV. RECOMMENDATIONS Our safety analysis has lead us to make a few engineering recommendations. However, it must be noted that refueling stations in the United States are already equipped with robust engineering controls that provide significant protection from many of the identified hazards as detailed earlier in section III of this report. Some of these engineering controls consist of a hose breakaway mechanism, fuel shut-off valves, fuel sensing nozzles, anti-drip nozzles, foam and fire suppression systems, natural ventilation, spill kits, etc. The hazards that are difficult to prevent are those that result from human error. Therefore, our recommendations attempt to mitigate the risk and hazards from human error. A brief summary of our recommendations is in Table 4. Table 4: Robust engineering recommendations to mitigate risks from human error 7 Static electricity is a common fire hazard during the refueling process. There are many documentations and videos of flash fires that are ignited from static charges carried by the operator. In most cases it is due to the operator (i.e. vehicle driver) carrying a static charge from the drivers seat to the nozzle, and subsequently igniting the fuel vapors surrounding the fuel nozzle. In this case, the operators did not (unknowingly) ground themselves before approaching the fuel nozzle. One of the elementary tasks, exiting the vehicle and closing the door, is a key component of removing the static charge from the human body. When the person grasps the car door to close it, he or she essentially grounds themselves and removes and static charge. Therefore, we recommend installing a gas cap door interlock. This engineering control will prevent the gas cap door from opening unless all vehicle doors are closed. However, this engineering control is not full-proof. There are instances where this interlock will not be effective. First, for example, a service technician (fuel pump operator) will not have this protection because he or she does not operate the vehicle. Second, this interlock will only work upon initial opening of the gas cap door. When the operator, vehicle driver or passenger, attempts to go back to the nozzle when refueling is complete, the gas cap door is already open and the fuel vapors are exposed. There is no control that prevents the operator from handling the nozzle during this part of the process. Many stations have barriers on the pump station island (see figure 3), similar barriers to those in front of storefronts that prevent vehicles from crashing into the storefronts [9]. 8 Figure 3: Barriers typically present on pump station island In the case of refueling pumps, they prevent vehicles from crashing into the fuel pump. Many of the fuel station accidents result from vehicles damaging the fuel pump. However, most stations do not have barriers on all side of the pump. The first recommendation, and most feasible to implement, is a Protective Barrier around the pump. This is basically a more robust barrier system than what is depicted in figure 3. Figure 4 is a simple sketch that represents this recommendation. It should be noted that the barriers on the front and back sides of the pump are to be tall enough to protect against vehicle collisions, but short enough so as not to negatively affect the refueling process. Figure 4: SketchUp drawing of protective barrier Next, we made a recommendation based on observations that refueling stations are more often disorganized and unstructured with regards to traffic flow and interactions between vehicles. Therefore, we suggest a system that would add more structure to the process of entering and departing the fuel station. This recommendation is referred to as 9 the Gate System. A simple depiction of this recommendation is shown in figure 5. With this engineering control, a car will only be allowed to enter and depart the pumping zone when the gates allow the vehicle to do so. When the car at the pump has finished refueling and is ready to leave, the gate forward of the vehicle will lift, allowing the vehicle to depart. When this gate returns to the downward position after the vehicle has successfully departed, the rear gate will lift to allow any waiting vehicles to enter the refueling stall. The gate will close behind the vehicle once the vehicle has successfully parked in the proper position next to the fuel pump. Admittedly, there is an administrative control built into this engineering control with the yellow and black “caution” tape that covers the arms of the gates. Nevertheless, this recommendation should provide for more structure and more organized refueling evolutions from the time the customer enters and leave the refueling station. Figure 5: SketchUp drawing of gate system Finally, the last recommendation continues to prevent human error by introducing a well-trained service technician to operate the fuel pump and control the refueling process. This person, however, cannot prevent immediate or sudden hazards from nearby operations. This service technician will be someone who, just like a full-service refueling station, is aware of the hazards at a fuel station, and is knowledgeable in ways to prevent the identified hazards. This may be impractical as it would be costly for a fuel station to have these service technicians on staff year to year. 10 V. REFERENCES [1] "Fuel dispenser’s development history." . N.p., 9 Nobember 2012. Web. 11 Dec 2013. < http://www.fuel-dispenser.biz/article/fuel-dispenser-history.html >. [2] Keyserling, Monroe. "IOE 539 - Occupational Safety Engineering Systems Safety Project Assignment." . N.p., 24 Oct 2013. Web. 11 Dec 2013. [3] "Job Safety Analysis Process ." . N.p.. Web. 11 Dec 2013. < https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/job_safety_analysis_process.html > [4] " THE EPA 10 GALLON PER MINUTE FUEL DISPENSING LIMIT." . U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 4 Setember 1997. Web. 11 Dec 2013. <http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/ld-hwy/evap/spitback.txt>. [5] “Motor Fuel Dispensing Safety.” Willis. January 2010. Web. 4 Dec 2013. < https://ctools.umich.edu/access/content/group/d43ff3a5-a5de-479a-ad77b96099be9af7/Research/Motor_Fuel_Dispensing_Safety%20_2_.pdf> [6] “Gasoline.” Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety. 17 January 2013. Web. 4 Dec 2013. < http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/chemicals/chem_profiles/gasoline.html>. [7] “An Assessment of the Environmental Implications of Oil and Gas Production: A Regional Case Study.” Environmental Protection Agency. September 2008. Web. 4 Dec 2013. < http://www.epa.gov/sectors/pdf/oil-gas-report.pdf>. [8] Keyserling, Monroe. QUALITATIVE RANKINGS OF PROBABILITY AND SERIOUSNESS FOR JSA and FMEA. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Dec 2013. <https://ctools.umich.edu/access/content/group/7d6b05d0-b41d-4f7a-925c014855dd10db/Reading Assignments/Module 07 -- Systems Safety/Introduction to Systems Safety/probsev.pdf>. [9] "Calif. Rolling Out $100M for Hydrogen Vehicle Infrastructure." . N.p., 3 Dec 2013. Web. 11 Dec 2013. <http://www.greenfleetmagazine.com/hydrogen>. [10] “National Health Statistics Report - Anthropometric Reference Data for Children and Adults”: United States, 2003–2006. [11] ZheJiang LanFeng Machine Co.,Ltd. N.p.. Web. 11 Dec 2013. <http://www.chinalanfeng.com/en-fueldispenser/Starlight-Series-fuel-dispenserJDK50C222s.html>. [12] Service station safety. (2013, April 11). Retrieved from http://www.nfpa.org/safety-information/for-consumers/vehicles/service-stationsafety. 11 LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A: Job Safety Analysis form Appendix B: Qualitative Ranking of Probability and Seriousness for JSA 12 Appendix A: Job Safety Analysis form BASIC FACTS Job Identification: Vehicle refueling Work Objectives: Operate a fuel pump to put fuel into vehicle fuel tank Work Location(s): BP Fuel Service Station 300 N Main Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48104 Operator Identification: Name: Adetunji Dahunsi Height: 5’ 9” (69 in) Dominant hand: Right Relevant Experience: 5 years using fuel pump at fueling station Notes: Represents the 50th percentile male according to National Health Statistics Report (October 22, 2008). [10] Production Standards: N/A Shift/Shift Length: About 5 minutes per visit Job Rotation (if any) N/A JSA Date/Time: November 17, 2013, 2:30-3:00pm A-1 JSA Team Members: David “Ben” Komar, Plant Safety Professional Emily Yu, Plant Health Professional Adetunji Dahunsi, Equipment Engineer Francis Ogunseye, Process Engineer A-2 WORK STATION LAYOUT Fueling Station The plan layout for the BP fuel station at is in Figure A-1 below. Figure A-1: Plan view of fueling station with location of operator zone A-3 Fueling Dispenser The typical dimensions of a fuel dispenser unit used to fuel cars is in figure A-2 below [11]. Figure A-2: Fuel dispenser used to fuel cars (dimension in mm) A-4 EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS Item Hazard(s) Nozzle Malfunction of fuel proximity sensor (overfill) Fuel Hose Tripping hazard Vehicle Keys None Gas Cap Fire hazard (fuel residue) Key Pad Electrical shock from worn insulation Vehicle Fuel Tank Door Pinch with negligible seriousness Button/Switch to open Vehicle Fuel Tank Door None A-5 PARTS HANDLED Not applicable to our analysis. A-6 PROCESS CHEMICALS Item Hazard(s) Fuel (gasoline, diesel, kerosene, etc.) Flammable Explosive Skin/Eye Irritant Ingestion Hazard A-7 MAJOR TASKS AND WORK ELEMENTS 1. Pull vehicle into fuel station pumping stall with proper alignment 3. Use in-car button/switch to open vehicle fuel tank door 5. Make payment and select fuel type 2. Turn off engine after placing transmission into ‘park’ 4. Exit vehicle and close vehicle door 6. Remove vehicle fuel tank cap and stow A-8 7. Insert fueling nozzle into vehicle fuel tank opening 8. Squeeze nozzle trigger to begin fuel transfer, hold until fuel transfer is complete 9. Remove nozzle from vehicle fuel tank opening and place into pump station holder 10. Replace fuel tank cap and close fuel tank door 11. Enter vehicle, shut door and insert vehicle keys to start vehicle 12. Put vehicle transmission into ‘drive’ A-9 13. Drive away A-10 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E1: Pull vehicle into fuel station pumping stall with proper alignment Hazards from "normal" operations: N/A Hazards from human error: Failure to Drive Safely o Collision hazard with pump station or associated stall structure o Improper Alignment o Subsequent actions during fueling could lead to trip hazard/ spill hazard Spill Hazard o Gas hose left on ground or and car may potentially puncture hose possibly leading to fire Hazards from process/hardware failure: Collision Hazard o Brake failure leading to potential collision with pump station or other vehicles Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-11 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E2: Turn off engine after placing transmission into ‘park’ Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o High temperature vehicle components in contact with flammable fumes/liquids Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Fuel leak onto high temperature exhaust parts under car CIUB o Improper selection of transmission gear o Subsequent resulting hazards Hazards from process/hardware failure: Collision Hazard o Failure of gearbox Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-12 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E3: Use in-vehicle button/switch to open vehicle fuel tank door Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Fuel residue in cap area creates ignition source Hazards from human error: N/A Hazards from process/hardware failure: None Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-13 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E4: Exit vehicle and close vehicle door Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Static electricity Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Ignition from static electricity o Re-entering car can cause static charge build up and handling nozzle with static charge can cause fire CIUB o Door closes on operator Hazards from process/hardware failure: Trip Hazard o Unidentified object Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-14 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E5: Make payment and select fuel type Hazards from "normal" operations: None Hazards from human error: None Hazards from process/hardware failure: Shock Hazard o Rubber insulation on key pad and buttons are worn out. Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-15 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E6: Remove vehicle fuel tank cap and stow Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Fuel residue on gas cap potential ignition source Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Fuel residue on cap could ignite if operator adds a heat source Hazards from process/hardware failure: None Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-16 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E7: Insert fueling nozzle into vehicle fuel tank opening Hazards from "normal" operations: None Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Dropping nozzle could result in fuel spillage Hazards from process/hardware failure: Fire Hazard o Premature release of fuel Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-17 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E8: Squeeze nozzle trigger to begin fuel transfer, hold until fuel transfer is complete Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Improper fitting of nozzle to vehicle fuel tank Exposure Hazard o Increased exposure to fumes Pinch Hazard o Pinch point during squeezing of trigger Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Nozzle is incorrectly placed into vehicle fuel tank, possible fuel spillage Exposure Hazard o Contact with fuel if spilled, irritant Hazards from process/hardware failure: Fire Hazard o Sensor malfunctions leading to overflow and spillage o Loose fittings leading to leakage Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-18 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E9: Remove nozzle from vehicle fuel tank opening and place into pump station holder Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Presence of gasoline fumes o Gasoline dripping from nozzle Hazards from human error: Fire Hazard o Accidental pulling of trigger Accidental gasoline release to environment Leading to further exposure to fumes Higher potential of fire/explosion o Improper placement of nozzle back into handle, nozzle falls to ground, spills residual fuel o Failing to remove nozzle from vehicle fuel tank Tripping Hazard o Improper placement of nozzle back into handle, nozzle and hose fall to ground Hazards from process/hardware failure: Environmental Hazard o Trigger is stuck, fuel spillage o Malfunction of stopping sensors, fuel spillage o Loose fittings (leakage) Fire Hazard o Trigger is stuck, fuel spillage o Malfunction of stopping sensors, fuel spillage o Loose fittings (leakage) Exposure Hazard o Contact with fuel (fumes and/or liquid), irritant Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks A-19 o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-20 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E10: Replace fuel tank cap and close fuel tank door Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Presence of gasoline fumes Pinch Hazard o Possible pinch point while replacing cap Hazards from human error: Pinch Hazard o Possible pinch point while replacing cap and/or closing fuel door Hazards from process/hardware failure: Environmental Hazard o Trigger is stuck, fuel spillage o Malfunction of stopping sensors, fuel spillage o Loose fittings (leakage) Fire Hazard o Trigger is stuck, fuel spillage o Malfunction of stopping sensors, fuel spillage o Loose fittings (leakage) Exposure Hazard o Contact with fuel (fumes and/or liquid), irritant Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-21 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E11: Enter vehicle, shut door and insert vehicle keys to start vehicle Hazards from "normal" operations: Fire Hazard o Car ignition may pose fire threat Hazards from human error: Pinch Hazard o Close fingers in door Struck-by Hazard o Allowing self to be hit by the closing door Hazards from process/hardware failure: Fire Hazard o Malfunction of car ignition Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-22 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E12: Put car transmission into ‘drive’ Hazards from "normal" operations: N/A Hazards from human error: Collision Hazard o Accidental/unexpected vehicle motion leading to collision with another vehicle/person/structure Fire Hazard o Accidental/unexpected vehicle motion leading to collision with fuel pump Hazards from process/hardware failure: N/A Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-23 ELEMENTAL ANALYSIS Element Description: E13: Drive away Hazards from "normal" operations: Collision Hazard o Skidding hazard from slick service station surface Hazards from human error: Collision Hazard o Accidental/unexpected vehicle motion leading to collision with another vehicle/person/structure Fire Hazard o Accidental/unexpected vehicle motion leading to collision with a fuel pump Hazards from process/hardware failure: N/A Hazards from nearby operations: Fire Hazard o Spill of fuel from another person filling gas can lead to fire o Smoking nearby could lead to fire if gas leaks o Hardware failure Collision Hazard o Another vehicle collides with car if driver not attentive Trip Hazard o Pedestrians not paying attention while walking Nearby pump station/pump station components failing resulting in fire/health hazards A-24 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Fire Hazard Associated Tasks: Smoking nearby fuel station o Ignition source for fume/fuel leak Ignition of fuel residue in cap area can create ignition source Static fire Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Burn Injuries Death Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Marginal (burns) to critical (death) A-25 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Collision Hazard Associated Tasks: Pulling vehicle to fueling station - Other drivers in fueling station/ brake failure Putting vehicle into park - gear failure Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Environmental release Fire o Subsequent event after fuel spill if ignition source present Probability: Common Severity/Seriousness: Marginal (fuel spill) to critical (fire) A-26 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Trip Hazard Associated Tasks: Fueling car at station Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Head /neck / hand injury Probability: Frequent Severity/Seriousness: Marginal (head / neck / hand injury) A-27 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Spill Hazard Associated Tasks: Fueling of car o Collision of operator or other person with hose Topping off Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Inhalation causing irritation of nose or throat Skin contact can cause irritation Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Marginal (irritation and skin contact) A-28 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Improper alignment Associated Tasks: Pulling vehicle into fuel station Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Trip Hazard o Head /neck / hand injury Spill Hazard o Subsequent event may lead to spill if nozzle falls as a result of operator collision with hose Fire Hazard o Subsequent event may lead to fire if ignition source present o Burns o Death Probability: Common Severity/Seriousness: Marginal (burns, head / neck / hand injury) to critical (death) A-29 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Caught in under and between (CIUB) Associated Tasks: Closing car door Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Pinch Crush Amputation Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (Pinch) to critical (Amputation) A-30 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Explosion from human error from nearby operations (other consumers pumping gas) Associated Tasks: Performing any part of refueling process Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Burns Amputation Death Chain reactions resulting in further explosions Probability: The probability is very rare: (1/365)*(1/13) = 0.02107% chance of being at a fuel station when a fire occurs [12] Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (no injury) to Critical (death) A-31 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Ignition of fuel residue on gas cap Associated Tasks: Removing and replacing gas cap Stowing gas cap during fueling Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Small flash, could catch clothes or hair on fire (burns) Probability: Rare Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (cinched hair) to Serious (burns). A-32 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Fuel spillage Associated Tasks: Fueling o Overfilling: human error or hardware malfunction Moving nozzle from pump station to vehicle tank inlet (vice versa) Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Environmental contamination Human exposure to fuel (inhalation, skin contact, eye contact…irritation, dermatitis) Risk of fire/explosion if heat source (hot vehicle brakes, exhaust system, other hot car components, human error or smoking, static electricity) is present Probability: Very rare (assumed this is the probability of a spillage happening to operator, not by nearby operations) Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (no injury) to Critical (death) A-33 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Spark from car ignition may pose fire threat Associated Tasks: Starting the car’s engine just after refueling Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Fire Burns Asphyxiation Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Critical A-34 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Starting the car with the gear in the wrong position Associated Tasks: Starting the car Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Collisions with other vehicles, people or static equipment Whiplash Bodily injury: Sprain, strain, fractures, bruises, etc Probability: Frequent Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (bruise) to Catastrophic (amputation) A-35 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Putting car into reverse and accidentally backing into another vehicle Associated Tasks: Starting the car Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Collisions with other vehicles, people or static equipment Whiplash Bodily injury: Sprain, strain, fractures, bruises, etc. Probability: Common Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (bruise) to Catastrophic (amputation) A-36 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Skidding hazard from slick service station surface Associated Tasks: Driving car away from service station Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Collisions with other vehicles, people or static equipment Whiplash Bodily injury: Sprain, strain, fractures, bruises, etc Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (bruise) to Catastrophic (amputation) A-37 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Static electricity buildup on arid days Associated Tasks: Gas pumping process where the user moves their feet against the ground repeatedly Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Fire Burns Asphyxiation Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Critical A-38 HAZARD DESCRIPTION Hazard: Collision with fuel pump as a result of pulling in too close Associated Tasks: Driving car away from service station Likely accidents/injuries/disorders: Collisions with other vehicles, people or static equipment Whiplash Bodily injury: Sprain, strain, fractures, bruises, etc Probability: Very rare Severity/Seriousness: Negligible (bruise) to Catastrophic (amputation) A-39 PLAN FOR HAZARD CONTROL Installed safety components/mechanisms o Sprinklers/Fire Suppression System (Foam) o Fuel Shut-off Valves o Overhead roof (environmental protection) o Natural ventilation o Breakaway hose o Nozzle sensor o Anti-drip nozzles o Flow Rate control (10 gpm) Spill kits A-40 Appendix B: Qualitative Ranking of Probability and Seriousness for JSA This section details the probability and severity rankings we utilized in determining our priorities [8]. Probability Rankings A. Very Rare (1) 1. Accident - Less than one event for every ten years of operating experience. 2. Injury/Disease - Incidence rate (per 100 worker-years) less than 0.1 B. Rare (2) 1. Accident - One event every 1-10 years of operating experience. 2. Injury/Disease - Incidence rate (per 100 worker-years) between 0.1 and 1.0 C. Common (3) 1. Accident - One event each year of operating experience. 2. Injury/Disease - Incidence rate approximately 1.0 D. Frequent (4) 1. Accident - One event every 1-3 months of operating experience. 2. Injury/Disease - Incidence rate approximately 3.0-10.0. E. Very Frequent (5) 1. Accident - Multiple events every month. 2. Injury/Disease - Incidence rate approximately > 10.0 Seriousness Rankings A. Negligible (1) 1. Human: First aid treatment, same-day return to work. 2. Property Damage: Insignificant. B. Marginal (2) 1. Human: No lost days, however work restrictions may apply. 2. Property Damage: Minor damage repaired, loss of use less than one day. C. Serious (3) 1. Human: Compensable injury or illness, recovery to employable health within a few months, eventual return to original job. B-1 2. Property: Moderate repairs to a limited amount of equipment, down time less than one week. D. Critical (4) 1. Human: Permanent serious disability, disfigurement or death of a single worker. 2. Property: Facility or significant portion thereof down for multiple days. E. Catastrophic (5) 1. Human: Multiple cases of permanent disability, disease or death. 2. Property: Loss of physical facility or extended facility downtime. B-2